Article 800

​ RUM
Junquera v. Borromeo, 19 SCRA 656 E

TESTATE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO. JOSE H. JUNQUERA vs.CRISPIN BORROMEO

G.R. No. L-18498 March 30, 1967

FACTS: ​Vito Borromeo, a widower, died on 1952 in Parañaque, Rizal, at the age of 88 years,
without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu. On the same year,
Jose Junquera filed with the CFI of Cebu a petition for the probate of a one page document as
the last will left by said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all
surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera as executor
thereof.

The document was dated 1946, drafted in Spanish, and allegedly signed and thumbmarked by
said deceased, in the presence of Dr. Cornelio Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna and Filiberto
Leonardo as attesting witnesses. Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the probate of the will
on the following grounds:

1. That the formalities required by law had not been complied with;
2. That the testator was mentally incapable of making a will at the time of its execution;
3. That the will was procured by undue and improper influence, on the part of the beneficiaries
and/or some other person;
4. That the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; and
5. That the testator acted by mistake or did not intend the instrument he signed to be his will at
the time he affixed his signature thereto.

The attesting witnesses obtained the testimonies of Rev. Fr. Julio Corres and Rev. Fr. Sergio
Alfafara, then confessors of Vito Borromeo, and Vicenta Mañacap, a mid-wife who lived in the
testator's house, to prove:

1. That at the time of the execution of the will, Vito was still strong and could move around freely
with the aid of a cane;
2. That he was still mentally alert and was a man of strong will;
3. That his right hand was unimpaired and he could write with it unaided;
4. That as a matter of fact, he still wrote personal letters to Tomas Borromeo, could eat by
himself and even played the piano.

On the other hand, the oppositors presented several witnesses who testified that the signatures
purporting to be those of Vito Borromeo were forgeries; that they were too good and too perfect
signatures and, therefore, quite impossible for the deceased — an ailing man already 82 years
old on May 17, 1945 — to write; and that he was found "positive for bacillus leprosy".
The trial court refused to believe the testimonies of the attesting witnesses and, as a result,
denied the petition for probate. The court found that the physical condition of the deceased at
the time of the execution of the questioned document was such that it was highly improbable, if
not impossible, for him to have affixed his signatures on certain documents in the spontaneous
and excellent manner they appear to have been written.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the evidence of record is sufficient to prove the due execution of the qill
in question.

RULING: ​NO. The condition and physical appearance of a questioned document constitute a
valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of surrounding circumstances, may help
in determining whether it is genuine or forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate
what they really know, saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half truths
to mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the other. This can not be said of the
condition and physical appearance of the questioned document itself. Both, albeit silently, will
reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting nothing, and exaggerating nothing. For this
reason, independently of the conflicting opinions expressed by the handwriting experts called to
the witness stand by the parties, we have carefully examined and considered the physical
appearance and condition of the original and two copies of the questioned will found in the
record — particularly the signatures attributed to the testator — and We have come to the
conclusion that the latter could not have been written by him.

Upon the face of the original and two copies of the contested will appear a total of six alleged
signatures of the testator. They are all well written along a practically straight line, without any
visible sign of tremor or lack of firmness in the hand that wrote them. In fact, in the respects just
adverted to, they appear better written than the unquestioned signatures, of attesting witnesses
Gandionco and Cabiluna, inspite of the fact that on the date of the alleged execution of the will
(May 17, 1945) the testator was considerably older and in a much poorer physical condition
than they.

According to the evidence, the testator was then a sick man, eighty-two years old, with the
entire left half of his body paralyzed since six years before, while the oldest attesting witness
(Cabiluna) was around sixty-five years of age and Leonardo and Gandionco were only forty-four
and forty-five years old respectively, and were all in good health. Despite the obviously very
poor physical condition of the testator, Leonardo claims that he signed the alleged will unaided,
writing his name thereon slowly but continuously or without interruption, and that, on the same
occasion, he signed his name several times not only on the original of the will and its copies but
also on the original and several copies of the alleged confirmatory sale Exhibit F-1 and on his
residence certificate. Considering all the attendant circumstances, we agree with the lower court
that Vito Borromeo could not have written the questioned signatures. In view of what has been
said heretofore, We find it unnecessary to examine and consider in detail the conflicting
testimony of the handwriting experts presented by the parties.
 ​ UENTES
Torres v. Lopez, 48 Phil 772 F

FACTS:

On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will and testament. Thereafter died leaving a
considerable estate. Subsequently, Manuel Torres, one of the executors named in the will asked that the
will of Rodriguez be allowed. Opposition was entered by Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased
on the grounds: (1) That the testator lacked mental capacity because at the time of senile dementia and
was under guardianship; (2) that undue influence had been exercised by the persons benefited in the
document in conjunction with others who acted in their behalf; and (3) that the signature of Tomas
Rodriguez to the document was obtained through fraud and deceit.

It was presented in this case, Rodriguez had reached the advanced age of 76 years. He was suffering
from anemia, hernia inguinal, chronic dypsia, and senility. Physically he was a wreck.

As to the mental state of Tomas Rodriguez on January 3, 1924, there were conflicting results. Doctors
Calderon Domingo, and Herrera certify that the intellectual faculties of the patient are "sound, except that
his memory is weak," and that in executing the will the testator had full understanding of the act he was
performing and full knowledge of the contents thereof. Doctors De Los Angeles, Tietze and Burke certify
that Tomas Rodriguez was of unsound mind and that they diagnosed his case as senile dementia of the
simple type approaching the deteriorated stage.

ISSUE:

Did Tomas Rodriguez was of sound mind when he executed the will?

HELD:

YES. Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction in which the
testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the persons who would
naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty. The mental capacity of the testator
is determined as of the date of the execution of his will. Of the specific tests of capacity, neither old age,
physical infirmities, feebleness of mind, weakness of the memory, the appointment of a guardian, nor
eccentricities are sufficient singly or jointly to show testamentary incapacity. Each case rests on its own
facts and must be decided by its own facts. There is one particular test relative to the capacity to make a
will which is of some practical utility. This rule concerns the nature and rationality of the will. Is the will
simple or complicated? Is it natural or unnatural? The mere exclusion of heirs will not, however, in itself
indicate that the will was the offspring of an unsound mind.

In the present case, the court opined that Tomas Rodriguez, comprehended the nature of the transaction
in which he was engaged. He had two conferences with his lawyer, Judge Mina, and knew what the will
was to contain. The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He signed the will and its two copies in the
proper places at the bottom and on the left margin. At that time the testator recollected the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon him While for some
months prior to the making of the will he had not manage his property he seem to have retained a distinct
recollection of what it consisted and of his income. Occasionally his memory failed him with reference to
the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he knew who they were, he seemed to entertain a prediliction
towards Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was nearest in which the instrument
distributed the property naming the objects of his bounty. His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed as
insistence on giving all of his property to the two persons whom he specified.

On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez may have been of advanced years, may have been physically
decrepit, may have been weak in intellect, may have suffered a loss of memory, may have had a guardian
and may have a been extremely eccentric, but he still possessed the spark of reason and of life, that
strength of mind to form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to enforce that intention,
which the law terms "testamentary capacity." Hence, the will of Tomas Rodriguez will be admitted to
probate.

Ramirez v. Ramirez, 39 SCRA 147 ​OLACO

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF MARIE GARNIER GARREAU. LIRIO
PFANNENSCHMIDT RAMIREZ,
vs.
JOSE MA. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-19910 May 31, 1971

FACTS: ​Maria Gamier Garreau, widow of Ramon Ramirez, was a native of Asnier Paris, France, but a
Filipino citizen residing in Madrid, Spain, where she died childless at the age of 84 on January 11, 1959.
The will in question was an "open" one, executed before a notary public in Madrid on May 24, 1958, and
instituting her niece Lirio (Lily) Pfannenschmidt now appellant, as sole and universal heir. Lirio is one of
the four children of Jose Ramirez, brother of the testatrix husband Ramon, the other three being Elsa,
Esperanza and Horacio. Ramon had a half-brother, Jorge P. Ramirez, whose son, Jose Maria Ramirez,
now appellee, opposed the petition for probate filed by Lirio. The Trial Court denied the probate of the will
on the ground of mental infirmity of the testatrix. It based its decision on the letters made by Lirio to her
uncle and the consultations and medical advices given by Dr. Romero de Arcos and Dr. Jose Germain,
the latter being a competent specialist. Both doctors saw and met with the testatrix.

ISSUE: ​Was the testarix, Maria, of sound mind at the time of making of the alleged will?

RULING: ​NO. Under the law, Art. 800. provides - ​The law presumes that every person is of sound mind,
in the absence of proof to the contrary.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on
the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his
will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the
testator made it during a lucid interval.---

In the instant case, The evidence presented, leads to the definite conclusion that Marie Gamier Garreau
was mentally incapacitated to make a will, that is, "to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of (her) bounty, and the character of the testamentary act" (Art. 799, Civil Code). As early
as 1955, when she was examined by the family physician, Dr. Romero de Arcos and by a qualified
psychiatrist, Dr. Jose Germain, she was already suffering from pre-senile dementia, a degenerative
mental, infirmity that was described by them as "a progressive and irreversible process." The
manifestations of this condition are amply illustrated in the letters written by appellant herself as well as in
the testimony of her uncle, Jose Eugenio Ramirez. In fact these two were convinced that the testatrix
should be placed under judicial guardianship, and actually took the initial steps towards that end.
Appellant's subsequent turn-about in her opinion of the testatrix' mental condition is of course
understandable, considering that in the will she is named as sole and universal heir. But precisely for this
reason not much reliance can be placed upon her testimony to the effect that the testatrix was possessed
of the necessary testamentary capacity. The issue here is essentially one of fact, and involves an
appraisal of the conflicting evidence presented by the parties. That issue was addressed in the first
instance to the trial Judge, and we cannot say that his conclusion as to the testamentary incapacity of the
testatrix is erroneous. It is based mainly on expert medical testimony to the effect that her mental infirmity
was observed by the family physician as far back as 1953 and confirmed in 1955 by a competent
psychiatrist, who described the process of the mental degeneration as progressive and irreversible; on
the written admissions and declarations of appellant herself, who would have no motive then to falsify the
facts; and on the testimony of the testatrix' brother-in-law, Jose Eugenio Ramirez.

Samson v. Corrales Tan, 44 Phil 573 ​RIVERA

FACTS:

A document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan is about to be
probated. The oppositor-appellant alleges, in substance, that the will is incomplete and fraudulent and
does not express the true intent of the testator; that the testator acted under duress and under undue
influence, and that at the time of the execution of the will he was not of sound and disposing mind.

Dr. Tee Han Kee, the attending physician, said that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had
been in a comatose condition for several days prior to his death. He died about eight or nine o'clock in the
evening of December 26, 1921, and the will is alleged to have been executed in the forenoon of the same
day. Counsel for the appellant, said that ​coma implies complete unconsciousness, and that the testator,
therefore, could not at that time have been in possession of his mental faculties and have executed a will.
here are, however, varying degrees of coma and in its lighter forms the patient may be aroused and have
lucid intervals. Such seems to have been the case here. Witnesses presented by the petitioner, five in
number, testify that the deceased was conscious, could hear and understand what was said to him and
was able to indicate his desires.

ISSUE:

Was the testator of sound mind when he executed his last will and testament?

RULING:

Yes. ​We do not think the opponent has succeeded in proving any of his allegations. There is no evidence
whatever showing that the testator acted under duress or undue influence and the only question of fact
which we need consider is whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind when the document in
question was executed.

That the deceased was in an exceedingly feeble condition at the time the will was executed is evident, but
if the witnesses presented in support of the petition told the truth there can be no doubt that he was of
sound mind and capable of making his will. And we see no reason to discredit any of these witnesses; the
discrepancies found between their respective versions of what took place at the execution of the
document are comparatively unimportant and so far from weakening their testimony rather lend strength
to it by indicating the absence of any conspiracy among them.
As against their testimony we have only the testimony of Maximina Ong and Dr. Tee Han Kee. The former
is not a disinterested witness. As to the testimony of the latter it is sufficient to say that mere professional
speculation cannot prevail over the positive statements of five apparently credible witnesses whose
testimony does not in itself seem unreasonable.

​ ILLARIN
Cuyugan v. Baron, 62 Phil 859 V

FACTS:

Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933, leaving an estate exceeding in value the sum of P80,000 which
she disposed of by will dated December 17, 1932. She died single without forced heirs. The will appointed
Vivencio Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor. The petition for probate recites that on the date of the
execution of said will on December 17, 1932, the said testatrix was about 80 years old, more or less, and
was found in disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and was in
every respect competent to dispose of her estate by will.

Guillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege, that at the
time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically incapacitated for the
execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged consent to the said will was obtained and
the attorney who prepared the document and the witnesses who affixed their signatures thereto.

ISSUE: ​Did the testator possess testamentary capacity at the time of the making of the will?

RULING: NO.

An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the formalities required
by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the burden of the evidence passed to the
proponent when the oppositors submit credible evidence tending to show that the supposed testator did
not possess testamentary capacity at the time or that the document was not the free and voluntary
expression of the alleged testator or that the will, for any other reason, is void in law.

She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which occurred forty-four days later. It
was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his possession alleging that she had instructed
him to keep it secret. There is, however, credible evidence in the record that before her death she had
denied to several persons that she made any will.

This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act of revocation in
the forty-four days during which she lingered in this life. The doctrine that where the testator has had an
opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon him but
makes no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the testimony of
undue influence, has no application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of testamentary
capacity.
 ​ AP
Gonzales vs. Gonzales (November 29, 1951) Y

Facts:
Manuela Ibarra Vda. de Gonzales (hereafter to be referred to as testatrix) died leaving five
children, namely, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr., Manuel Gonzales, Leopoldo Gonzales, Manolita Gonzales de
Carungcong, and Juan Gonzales.

Manuel Gonzales and Manolita G. de Carungcong each filed a different alleged will executed by
the testatrix on November 16, 1942 and May 5, 1945 respectively, devising each of them a greater portion
of the estate, without impairing the legitims of the other children.

Alejandro Gonzales, Jr. sought the disallowance of the wills executed on November 16, 1942,
and May 5, 1945, on the ground that, assuming their validity, they had been revoked by the testatrix in an
instrument executed by her on November 18, 1948, with the result that her estate should be distributed as
if she died intestate.

Appellee Manolita G. de Carungcong, like Manuel Gonzales (as appellee), contends that the
testatrix lacked the testamentary capacity when she allegedly executed the instrument of revocation, and
their contention was sustained by the trial court.

The applee contends that, for more than ten years prior to her death, the testatrix had suffered
from hypertension. She also had aphasia and was taken to the hospital upon advice of the family
physician, Dr. Jose C. Leveriza. In the letter introducing her to the hospital authorities Dr. Leveriza stated
that the testatrix was suffering from hypertension and cerebral thrombosis. Particularly on November 18,
1948, when the alleged instrument of revocation was executed by her, the testatrix was in a comatose
and unconscious state and could not talk or understand. (The testimony of Dr. Leveriza portraying the
physical condition of the testatrix up to November 18, 1948 was in Spanish Language)

Also, it is contended for the appellants that this will does not contain any attestation clause; that,
assuming the concluding paragraph to be the attestation clause, it is not valid because it is the act of the
testatrix and not of the witnesses, and because it does not state the number of sheets or pages of the will.

Issue/s:
(1) Whether the testatrix was not in her sound mind upon the execution of the revocation of the will; and
(2) Whether there was a valid attestation clause. (for recit purposes)

Decision:
No, the testatrix was not in her sound mind upon the execution of the revocation of the will as
testified by their family physician.

In support of the contention that the testimony of the attesting witnesses should be given more
credence than the opinion of an expert witness is notably distinguishable from the case at bar. The former
refer to situations in which the doctors were not in a position to certify definitely as to the testamentary
capacity of the testators at the time the wills therein involved were executed, because they had not
observed the testators on said dates or never saw them; whereas the case now before us involves a
family physician who attended the testatrix during her last illness and saw her on the day when the
alleged instrument of revocation was executed.
 In this case, where the family physician attended the testatrix during her last illness and saw her
on the day when the alleged document of revocation was executed, the testimony of the attesting
witnesses tending to imply that the testatrix was of sound mind at the time said document was executed,
cannot prevail over the contrary testimony of the attending physician.

Even under the theory of appellant Alejandro Gonzales, Jr., it is hard to rule that the testatrix had
sufficient testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of the alleged instrument of revocation. In the
first place, Constancio Padilla (brother of Jose Padilla) merely asked the testatrix, first, if she was
agreeable to the instrument of revocation prepared by Jose Padilla, and secondly, if she was agreeable to
the signing of said document by Constancio Padilla, to which two questions the testatrix allegedly
answered "Yes." It is not pretended that the testatrix said more about the matter or gave any further
instruction. The attesting witnesses were not introduced to the testatrix, and their presence was not even
mentioned to her. It is obviously doubtful whether the testatrix understood the meaning and extent of the
ceremony. Assuming that the testatrix answered in the affirmative the two questions of Constancio
Padilla, without more, we cannot fairly attribute to her a manifestation of her desire to proceed, right then
and there, with the signing of the questioned instrument. In other words, contrary to the recital of the
attestation clause, the testatrix cannot rightly be said to have published her last will to the attesting
witnesses.

FOR RECIT PURPOSES

WILLS; ATTESTATION CLAUSE MADE BY TESTATOR AND SIGNED BY WITNESSES,

SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLIES WITH LAW.

An attestation clause made by the testator himself more than by the instrumental witnesses, but
signed by the latter right under the signature of the testator, substantially complies with the requirements
of law.

STATEMENT OF SHEETS OR PAGES IN BODY OF WILL HELD SUFFICIENT WHEN CONSIDERED

IN CONNECTION WITH ATTESTATION CLAUSE.

The statement in the penultimate paragraph of the will as to the number of the sheets or pages
used is sufficient attestation which may be considered in conjunction with the last paragraph which was
herein held as the attestation clause. The law does not require the attestation to be contained in a single
clause.

Article 801

Ortega v. Valmonte, G.R. No. 157451, 2005 ​ALILLIAN

DOCTRINE: The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time
of its execution. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be unbroken
or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.

FACTS​: Placido Valmonte died on October 8, 1984. He executed a notarial last will and testament in
favor of his wife alone, named Josefina, who is thrice lower his age. The will was written in English and
consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. Notary
Public Floro Sarmiento testified that before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, he
explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and
understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his
witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the
formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. The attesting witnesses to the will corroborated the
testimony of the notary public.

Oppositors Leticia and Mary Jane Ortega declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because aside
from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit from him.
She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution of the notarial
will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.

They also contend that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life to almost
immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a]
Fil-American pensionado,"thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the
will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason, logic and common experience"for an old man with a
severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.

ISSUE​: Did Placido Valmonte possess testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the
subject will?

RULING​: YES. The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the
time of its execution.The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing
of credible evidence of fraud.Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of Leticia,
no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines:

"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of its
execution.

"Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession of all his
reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or
other cause.

"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the estate
to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the
contrary.

"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on
the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his
will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must prove that the
testator made it during a lucid interval."

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be considered
of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper objects of the
testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the present case,
Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
 ​ URGOS
Baltazar v. Laxa, G.R. No. 174489, 2012 B

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN, ROSIE M. MATEO, NENITA A.

PACHECO, VIRGILIO REGALA, JR., and RAFAEL TITCO,​ Petitioners, vs. ​LORENZO LAXA,​ Respondent.
G.R. No. 174489 April 11, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, ​J.:

FACTS: ​On September 13, 1981, Paciencia made a last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang Bilin o Testamento
Miss Paciencia Regala". Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and
Katherine Ross Laxa. The Will was executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin. The
witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco) and Faustino R.
Mercado (Faustino).

Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew, and Lorenzo treated Pacienca as a mother since it was she who raised and cared for
Lorenzo since his birth. On September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the USA and resided with Lorenzo and his family
until her death on January 4, 1996.

Petitioners opposed Lorenzo’s petition on the following grounds: that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will
belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, Antonio’s predecessor-in-interest, hence, Paciencia had no right to
bequeath them to Lorenzo that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its execution; that
she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had
been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his benefit;
that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; and that assuming the signature to be genuine, it was
obtained through fraud or trickery.

During probate proceedings, aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness
stand. Monico, son of Faustino, testified on his father’s condition who could no longer talk and express himself due
to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the court to support this allegation. Dra. Limpin testified
that her father, Judge Limpin could not be presented as a witness since he could no longer talk due to stroke. She
testified as to the age of her father at the time the latter notarized the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of
Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of photographs when the event took place.
Francisco could not testify as a witness as well since he died.

The RTC denied the petition for probate of will and disallowed the notarized will and concluded that at the time
Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have
testamentary capacity, as testified by Rosie that Panciencia was “magulyan” or forgetful. On appeal, the CA
reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. It ratiocinated that "the state of being
‘magulyan’ does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a
 ​
Will."​ Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able to overcome the presumption that
every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events were given to prove the allegation
that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will. Hence, this petition.

The petitioners asserted that the will should no longer be valid since all witnesses were not presented to the court
to testify as a witness of the will as provided under Sec. 11 of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: ​Whether all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court since all but
one witness, Francisco, are still living.

RULING: NO. ​The inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was satisfactorily
explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack, was already
bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said witness presented
the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge Limpin, suffered a
stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer talk and could not
even remember his daughter’s name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such conditions, her father could no
longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither interposed any
objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross examination. We thus hold that
for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the incapacity and failure of the said
subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this the probate of Paciencia’s Will may
be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpin’s testimony proving her sanity and the due execution of the Will, as well as
on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that "[a] testament may not be disallowed just because
the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it have to be necessarily allowed just
because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is decisive is that the court is convinced
by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses, although they must testify, that the will was or
was not duly executed in the manner required by law."

Article 804

Abada vs. Abaja (G.R. No. 147145, January 31, 2005) ​CUBELO

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALIPIO ABADA, BELINDA CAPONONG-NOBLE, petitioner,

vs. ALIPIO ABAJA and NOEL ABELLAR, respondents.

Facts

Abada died sometime in May 1940.4 His widow Paula Toray ("Toray") died sometime in
September 1943. Both died without legitimate children.

On 13 September 1968, Alipio C. Abaja ("Alipio") filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental (now RTC-Kabankalan) a petition for the probate of the last will and
testament ("will") of Abada. Abada allegedly named as his testamentary heirs his natural
children Eulogio Abaja ("Eulogio") and Rosario Cordova. Alipio is the son of Eulogio.

Nicanor Caponong ("Caponong") opposed the petition on the ground that Abada left no will
when he died in 1940. Caponong further alleged that the will, if Abada really executed it, should
be disallowed for the following reasons: (1) it was not executed and attested as required by law;
(2) it was not intended as the last will of the testator; and (3) it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries. Citing the same grounds
invoked by Caponong, the alleged intestate heirs of Abada, namely, Joel, Julian, Paz,
Evangeline, Geronimo, Humberto, Teodora and Elena Abada ("Joel Abada, et al."), and Levi,
Leandro, Antonio, Florian, Hernani and Carmela Tronco ("Levi Tronco, et al."), also opposed the
petition. The oppositors are the nephews, nieces and grandchildren of Abada and Toray.
On 13 September 1968, Alipio filed another petition before the RTC-Kabankalan, for the probate
of the last will and testament of Toray. Caponong, Joel Abada, et al., and Levi Tronco, et al.
opposed the petition on the same grounds.

Sometime in 1993, during the proceedings, Presiding Judge Rodolfo S. Layumas discovered
that in an Order dated 16 March 1992, former Presiding Judge Edgardo Catilo had already
submitted the case for decision. Thus, the RTC-Kabankalan rendered a Resolution dated 22
June 1994, as follows:

There having been sufficient notice to the heirs as required by law; that there is substantial
compliance with the formalities of a Will as the law directs and that the petitioner through his
testimony and the deposition of Felix Gallinero was able to establish the regularity of the
execution of the said Will and further, there being no evidence of bad faith and fraud, or
substitution of the said Will, the Last Will and Testament of Alipio Abada dated June 4, 1932 is
admitted and allowed probate.

The RTC-Kabankalan ruled on the only issue raised by the oppositors in their motions to
dismiss the petition for probate, that is, whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as
required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any
other matter forecloses all other issues.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the will must expressly state that it is written in a language or dialect known to the
testator;

2. Whether Caponong-Noble is precluded from raising the issue of whether the will of Abada is
written in a language known to Abada;

HELD:

Caponong-Noble asserts that the will of Abada does not indicate that it is written in a language
or dialect known to the testator. Further, she maintains that the will is not acknowledged before
a notary public. She cites in particular Articles 804 and 805 of the Old Civil Code, thus:

Art. 804. Every will must be in writing and executed in [a] language or dialect known to the
testator.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the
witnesses. xxx18
Caponong-Noble actually cited Articles 804 and 806 of the New Civil Code.19 Article 804 of the
Old Civil Code is about the rights and obligations of administrators of the property of an
absentee, while Article 806 of the Old Civil Code defines a legitime.

Caponong-Noble’s contention must still fail. There is no statutory requirement to state in the will
itself that the testator knew the language or dialect used in the will. This is a matter that a party
may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble further argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has
failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the contents of the will and the
Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used to gather
Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would
talk in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language.

Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not

imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the
language employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law
expects of it.

The last part of the attestation clause states "en testimonio de ello, cada uno de nosotros lo
firmamos en presencia de nosotros y del testador." In English, this means "in its witness, every
one of us also signed in our presence and of the testator." This clearly shows that the attesting
witnesses witnessed the signing of the will of the testator, and that each witness signed the will
in the presence of one another and of the testator.

​ RUM
Lopez vs. Liboro (81 Phil 429) E
TESTACY OF SIXTO LOPEZ vs. AGUSTIN IBORO
G.R. No. L-1787 AUGUST 27, 1948

FACTS: ​Don Sixto Lopez died on March 3, 1947 at the age of 83 leaving a will executed almost
six months before his death. The oppositor specified the grounds for which he relies his petition,
namely:

1. That the deceased never executed the alleged will;

2. That his signature appearing in said will was a forgery;
3. That at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental
capacity due to advanced age;
4. That, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and
one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured
by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and
the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez;
5. That the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
6. The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a separate
sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals; and
7. ​That the will was written in Spanish and that the same is silent as to the understanding
of the testator of the language.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not a statement that the testator knew the language in which the will was
written is necessary.

RULING: ​NO. There is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the
will itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof aliunde. This Court so impliedly ruled in
Gonzales vs. Laurel, 46 Phil., 781, in which the probate of a will written in Tagalog was ordered
although it did not say that the testator knew that idiom. In fact, there was not even extraneous
proof on the subject other than the fact that the testator resided in a Tagalog region, from which
the court said "a presumption arises that said Maria Tapia (testatrix) knew the Tagalog dialect.”

Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil 476) ​FUENTES

FACTS:

On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will
executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed. Said document, duly probated as Ana
Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly
signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by
three witnesses. With the said decision of the court, Anastacia Abanga et al. appealed alleging that the
records do not show that the testatrix knew the dialect in which the dialect was written.

ISSUE:

Is the will validly probated considering the language it was written?

HELD:

YES. The circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the
dialect of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the
contrary, to presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is written.

​ LACO
Acop vs. Piraso, 52 Phil 660 O
IN RE ESTATE OF PIRASO. SIXTO ACOP v. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL.
G. R. NO. L-28946 JANUARY 16, 1929.

FACTS: ​The CFI of Benguet denied the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso
based on the ground that the will sought to be probated was written in English which Piraso did not know.
Evidence shows that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although imperfectly, and could make
himself understood in that dialect, and the court is of the opinion that his will should have been written in
that dialect. Sixto Acop alleged that the lower court erred in not holding that the testator did not know the
Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will drawn up in said dialect.

ISSUE: ​Can the will of the decedent Piraso be probated?

RULING: ​NO. The decedent’s alleged will, being written in English, a language unknown to said
decedent, cannot be probated, because it is prohibited by the law, which clearly and positively requires
that the will be written in the language or dialect known by the testator. (Sec. 618, Act No. 190.)

"No will, except as provides in the preceding section" (as to wills executed by a Spaniard or a resident of
the Philippine Islands, before the present Code of Civil Procedure went into effect), "shall be valid to pass
any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect
known by the testator," etc. Nor can the presumption in favor of the will established by this court in
Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), to the effect that the testator is presumed to know the dialect of the
locality where he resides, unless there is proof to the contrary, even he invoked in support of the probate
of said document since in the instant case, not only is it not proven that English is the language of the City
of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but that the record contains
positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of
Ilocano hence, he did not know the English language in which the will was written. Even if such a
presumption could have been raised in this case it would have been wholly contradicted and destroyed. In
the instant case, the instrument in question allegedly written by Piraso was written in the English
language with which Piraso was unacquainted. Hence, the Court sustained the decision that the will
cannot be validly probated

​ IVERA
Reyes vs. Vidal (91 Phil. 127) R

FACTS:

This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last will and testament of Maria
Zuñiga Vda. de Pando​. Dolores Zuñiga Vda. de Vidal, sister of the deceased, filed an opposition based
on several grounds. And, after several days of trial, at which both parties presented their respective
evidence, the court rendered its decision disallowing the will on the ground that the signatures of the
deceased appearing therein are not genuine, that it was not proven that the deceased knew the Spanish
language in which it was written, and that even if the signatures are genuine, the same reveal that the
deceased was not of sound mind when she signed the will.

ISSUES:

a. Whether the signatures of the deceased appearing in the will are genuine

b. Whether there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was
written

RULING:

a. Yes. ​To prove that the will was signed by the testatrix in accordance with law, petitioner
presented as witnesses the three persons who attested to the execution of the will. These witnesses
testified in their own simple and natural way that the deceased signed the will seated on her bed but over
a small table placed near the bed in their presence, and after she had signed it in the places where her
signatures appear, they in turn signed it in the presence and in the presence of each other.
The witness of the oppositor (Jose G. Villanueva​) has reached the conclusion that the hand that wrote the
signatures of the deceased appearing in the will is not the same hand that wrote the genuine signatures
he had examined and which he used as basis of his analytical study, thereby concluding that said
signatures are not genuine. However, the Court gave more credence and weight to the testimony of
another expert witness (Jose C. Espinosa). The passing of time and the increase in age may have a
decisive influence in the writing characteristics of a person. It for this reasons that the authorities is of the
opinion that in order to bring about an accurate comparison and analysis, the standard of comparison
must be as close as possible in point of time to the suspected signature. Such was not followed in the
study made by Villanueva. But such was observed in the study made by Espinosa. He followed the
standard practice in handwriting analysis. It is for this reason that we hold that Espinosa's opinion
deserves more weight and consideration.

b. Yes. ​In the first place, we have the undisputed fact that the deceased was a ​mestiza española,​
was married to a Spaniard and made several trips to Spain. In the second place, we have the very letters
submitted as evidence by the oppositor written in Spanish by the deceased possessed the Spanish
language, oppositor cannot now be allowed to allege the contrary. These facts give rise to the
presumption that the testatrix knew the language in which the testament has been written, which
presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven. And finally, we have the very attestation clause
of the will which states that the testatrix knew and possessed the Spanish language. It is true that this
matter is not required to be stated in the attestation clause, but its inclusion can only mean that the
instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the deceased knew the language in which the will
was written. There is, therefore, no valid reason why the will should be avoided on this ground.

​ ILLARIN
Testate Estate of Javellana vs. Javellana (106 Phil 1973) V

FACTS:

By order of July 23, 1953, the CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate the documents in the Visayan dialect, as
the testament and codicil duly executed by the deceased Da. Apolinaria Ledesma Vda. de Javellana, on
March 30, 1950, and May 29, 1952, respectively, with Ramon Tabiana, Gloria Montinola de Tabiana and
Vicente Yap as witnesses. The contestant, Da. Matea Ledesma, sister and nearest surviving relative of
said deceased, appealed from the decision, insisting that the said exhibits were not executed in
conformity with law.

The contestant argues that the Court erred in refusing credence to her witnesses Maria Paderogao and
Vidal Allado, cook and driver, respectively, of the Apolinaria Ledesma. Both testified that on March 30,
1950, they saw and heard Vicente Yap (one of the witnesses to the will) inform Apolinaria that he had
brought the "testamento" and urge her to go to attorney Tabiana's office to sign it; that Da. Apolinaria
manifested that she could not go, because she was not feeling well; and that upon Yap's insistence that
the will had to be signed in the attorney's office and not elsewhere, the deceased took the paper and
signed it in the presence of Yap alone, and returned it with the statement that no one would question it
because the property involved was exclusively hers.

ISSUE: Will the signing of the will by the testator in the absence of the notary public affects the validity of
the will?

RULING: No. Our examination of the testimony on record discloses no grounds for reversing the trial
Court's rejection of the improbable story of the witnesses. It is squarely contradicted by the concordant
testimony of the instrumental witnesses, Vicente Yap, Atty. Ramon Tabiana, and his wife Gloria
Montinola, who asserted under oath that the testament was executed by testatrix and witnesses in the
presence of each other, at the house of the decedent on General Hughes St., Iloilo City, on March 30,
1950. And it is highly unlikely, and contrary to usage, that either Tabiana or Yap should have insisted that
Da. Apolinaria, an infirm lady then over 80 years old, should leave her own house in order to execute her
will, when all three witnesses could have easily repaired thither for the purpose.

Upon the other hand, the discrepancies in the testimony of the instrumental witnesses urged upon us by
the contestant-appellant, concerning the presence or absence of Aurelio Montinola at the signing of the
testament or of the codicil, and the identity of the person who inserted the date therein, are not material
and are largely imaginary, since the witness Mrs. Tabiana confessed inability to remember all the details
of the transaction. Neither are we impressed by the argument that the use of some Spanish terms in the
codicil and testament (like legado, partes iguales, plena propiedad​) is proof that its contents were not
understood by the testatrix, it appearing in evidence that those terms are of common use even in the
vernacular, and that the deceased was a woman of wide business interests.

The most important variation noted by the contestants concerns that signing of the certificate of
acknowledgment (in Spanish) appended to the Codicil in Visayan, Exhibit E. Unlike the testament, this
codicil was executed after the enactment of the new Civil Code, and, therefore, had to be acknowledged
before a notary public (Art. 806). Now, the instrumental witnesses (who happen to be the same ones who
attested the will of 1950) asserted that after the codicil had been signed by the testatrix and the witnesses
at the San Pablo Hospital, the same was signed and sealed by notary public Gimotea on the same
occasion. On the other hand, Gimotea affirmed that he did not do so, but brought the codicil to his office,
and signed and sealed it there. The variance does not necessarily imply conscious perversion of truth on
the part of the witnesses, but appears rather due to a well-established phenomenon, the tendency of the
mind, in recalling past events, to substitute the usual and habitual for what differs slightly from it.

At any rate, as observed by the Court below, whether or not the notary signed the certification of
acknowledgment in the presence of the testatrix and the witnesses, does not affect the validity of the
codicil. Unlike the Code of 1889 (Art. 699), the new Civil Code does not require that the signing of the
testator, witnesses and notary should be accomplished in one single act. A comparison of Articles 805
and 806 of the new Civil Code reveals that while testator and witnesses sign ​in the presence of each
other, ​all that is thereafter required is that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses" (Art. 806); i.e., that the latter should avow to the certifying officer the
authenticity of their signatures and the voluntariness of their actions in executing the testamentary
disposition.
 Suroza vs. Honrado (110 SCRA 32) ​YAP
Characters:
Marcelina Salvador Suroza – Alleged testatrix;
Mauro Suroza – Army corporal, decease husband of Marcelina;
Agapito – A boy reared by spouses Suroza;
Nenita – Legal wife of Agapito;
Arsenia de la Cruz – Girlfriend of Agapito; and
Marilyn – Child entrusted to Arsenia who was later delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought
her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter but was not legally adopted by
Agapito.

Facts:
The subject will in this case was allegedly one made by Marcelina Salvador Suroza. Marcelina
supposedly executed a notarial ​will which is in English was thumb marked by her.​ ​She was illiterate. In
that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn.

Marilyn Sy, who, when a few days old, was entrusted to Arsenia de la Cruz and who was later
delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as a supposed daughter of Agapito and as
her granddaughter. Marilyn used the surname Suroza. She stayed with Marcelina but was not legally
adopted by Agapito.

Nenita V. Suroza (the legal wife of Agapito) alleged that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void
because of the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix.

In a motion for the consolidation of all pending incidents, Nenita reiterated her contention that the
alleged will is void because Marcelina did not appear before the notary and because it is written in English
which is not known to her.

Judge Honrado in his order "denied" the various incidents "raised" by Nenita.

Issue:
Should disciplinary action be taken against respondent judge for having admitted to probate a
will, which on its face is ​void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate
testatrix?

Decision:
Yes, the respondent Judge should be held in disciplinary action.

Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be

inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the performance of his duties that diligence, prudence and
circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any public service (​In re Climaco, Adm. Case
No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107, 119).

In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and
was thumb marked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.

In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and
known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix
"and translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will was written in a language not
known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory provision of article 804
of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.
 Thus, a will written in English, which was not known to the Igorot testator, is void and was
disallowed.

Articles 805-806

​ LILIAN
Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil 476) A

DOCTRINE: For the presumption that the testatrix knew of the dialect in which the will is written, the
following circumstances must appear: 1) that the will must be in a language or dialect generally spoken in
the place of execution, and, 2) that the testator must be a native or resident of the said locality

FACTS​: On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's
will executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed. Said document, duly probated as
Ana Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix,
duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and
by three witnesses. With the said decision of the court, Anastacia Abanga et al. appealed alleging that the
records do not show that the testatrix knew the dialect in which the dialect was written.

ISSUE​:Is the will validly probated?

RULING​: YES, the will is validly probated.

The circumstance appearing in the will itself that same was executed in the city of Cebu and in the dialect
of this locality where the testatrix was a neighbor is enough, in the absence of any proof to the contrary, to
presume that she knew this dialect in which this will is written.

​ URGOS
Icasiano vs. Icasiano (11 SCRA 422) B

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE. CELSO ICASIANO, petitioner-appellee,
vs. ​NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO,​ oppositors-appellants.
G.R. No. L-18979. June 30, 1964
REYES, J.B.L., ​J.:

FACTS: ​On October 2, 1958, a petition to probate the will of Josefa Villacorte and for the appointment of petitioner
Celso Icasiano as executor was filed before the CFI. On October 31, 1958, Natividad Icasiano, a daughter of the
testatrix, filed her opposition; and on November 10, 1958, she petitioned to have herself appointed as a special
administrator, to which proponent objected. Hence, on November 18, 1958, the court issued an order appointing
the Philippine Trust Company as special administrator. On February 18, 1959, Enrique Icasiano, a son of the
testatrix, also opposed the probate of will.

On March 19, 1959, Celso filed a motion for the admission of an amended and supplemental petition, alleging that
the decedent left a will executed in duplicate with all the legal requirements, and that he was, on that date,
submitting the signed duplicate (Exhibit "A-1"), which he allegedly found only on or about May 26, 1959. Despite
opposition, the Court admitted the will and the duplicate to probate. Hence, this petition. The oppositors
contended that the will was not valid since it was not signed by the testatrix on all of its pages as required by the
Civil Code.

Celso presented as evidence: the late Josefa Villacorte executed a last will and testament in duplicate at the house
of her daughter Mrs. Felisa Icasiano; published before and attested by three instrumental witnesses, namely:
attorneys Justo P. Torres, Jr. and Jose V. Natividad, and Mr. Vinicio B. Diy; that the will was acknowledged by the
testatrix and by the said three instrumental witnesses on the same date before attorney Jose Oyengco Ong, Notary
Public; and that the will was actually prepared by attorney Fermin Samson, who was also present during the
execution and signing of the decedent's last will and testament, together with former Governor Emilio Rustia of
Bulacan, Judge Ramon Icasiano and a little girl.

The original of the will and its duplicate were subscribed at the end and on the left margin of each and every page
thereof by the testatrix herself and attested and subscribed by the three mentioned witnesses in the testatrix's
presence and in that of one another as witnesses (except for the missing signature of attorney Natividad on page
three (3) of the original). The will was executed on one single occasion in duplicate copies; and that both the
original and the duplicate copies were duly acknowledged before Notary Public Jose Oyengco of Manila on the
same date June 2, 1956.

Witness Natividad who testified on his failure to sign page three (3) of the original, admits that he may have lifted
two pages instead of one when he signed the same, but affirmed that page three (3) was signed in his presence.

ISSUE: 1. ​WON the failure of Natividad to sign page 3 of the original was fatal to the validity of the will.

2. Whether the duplicate was also entitled to be probated.

RULING: 1. NO, the inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.
Impossibility of substitution of this page is assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did
sign the defective page, but also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom
the testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses. The law should not be so strictly and literally
interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she
had no control, where the purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages
is sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record attests to the full
observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, as stated in ​Vda. de Gil. vs. Murciano​, 49 Off. Gaz. 1459, at 1479
(decision on reconsideration) "witnesses may sabotage the will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation
clause".

That the failure of witness Natividad to sign page three (3) was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own
testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. The
text of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment before the Notary Public likewise evidence that no one was
aware of the defect at the time.

This would not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory
requirements, where the purposes of the law are otherwise satisfied. Thus, despite the literal tenor of the law, this
Court has held that a testament, with the only page signed at its foot by testator and witnesses, but not in the left
margin, could nevertheless be probated (Abangan vs. Abangan, 41 Phil. 476); and that despite the requirement for
the correlative lettering of the pages of a will, the failure to make the first page either by letters or numbers is not
a fatal defect (Lopez vs. Liboro, 81 Phil. 429). These precedents exemplify the Court's policy to require satisfaction
of the legal requirements in order to guard against fraud and bid faith but without undue or unnecessary
curtailment of the testamentary privilege.

2. YES, ​The appellants also argue that since the original of the will is in existence and available, the duplicate (Exh.
A-1) is not entitled to probate. Since they opposed probate of original because it lacked one signature in its third
page, it is easily discerned that oppositors-appellants run here into a dilemma; if the original is defective and
invalid, then in law there is no other will but the duly signed carbon duplicate (Exh. A-1), and the same is
probatable. If the original is valid and can be probated, then the objection to the signed duplicate need not be
considered, being superfluous and irrelevant. At any rate, said duplicate, Exhibit A-1, serves to prove that the
omission of one signature in the third page of the original testament was inadvertent and not intentional.
That the carbon duplicate, Exhibit A-1, was produced and admitted without a new publication does not affect the
jurisdiction of the probate court, already conferred by the original publication of the petition for probate. The
amended petition did not substantially alter the one first filed, but merely supplemented it by disclosing the
existence of the duplicate, and no showing is made that new interests were involved (the contents of Exhibit A and
A-1 are admittedly identical); and appellants were duly notified of the proposed amendment. It is nowhere proved
or claimed that the amendment deprived the appellants of any substantial right, and we see no error in admitting
the amended petition.

Calde vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 93980 June 27, 1994) ​CUBELO

CLEMENTE CALDE, petitioner, vs THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRIMO AGAWIN and

DOMYAAN APED, respondents.

G.R. No. 93980 June 27, 1994

FACTS:

The records show that decedent left behind nine thousand pesos (P9,000.00) worth of property.
She also left a Last Will and Testament, dated October 30, 1972, and a Codicil thereto, dated
July 24, 1973. Both documents contained the thumbmarks of decedent. They were also signed
by three (3) attesting witnesses each, and acknowledged before Tomas A. Tolete, then the
Municipal Judge and Notary Public Ex-Officio of Bauko, Mt. Province.

Nicasio Calde, the executor named in the will, filed a Petition for its allowance before the RTC of
Bontoc, Mt. Province. He died during the pendency of the proceedings, and was duly
substituted by petitioner. Private respondents, relatives of decedent, opposed the Petitioner filed
by Calde, on the following grounds: that the will and codicil were written in Ilocano, a dialect that
decedent did not know; that decedent was mentally incapacitated to execute the two documents
because of her advanced age, illness and deafness; that decedent’s thumbmarks were
procured through fraud and undue influence; and that the codicil was not executed in
accordance with law.

On June 23, 1988, the trial court rendered judgment on the case, approving and allowing
decedent’s will and its codicil. The decision was appealed to and reversed by the respondent
Court of Appeals. It held:

Such admissions from instrumental witnesses are indeed significant since they point to no other
conclusion than that the documents were not signed by them in their presence but on different
occasions since the same ballpen used by them supposedly in succession could not have
produced a different color from blue to black and from black to blue. In fact, the attestation
clause followed the same pattern.
The absurd sequence was repeated when they signed the codicil, for which reason, We have no
other alternative but to disallow the Last Will and Codicil. Verily, if the witnesses and testatrix
used the same ballpen, then their signatures would have been in only one color, not in various
ones as shown in the documents. Moreover, the signatures, in different colors as they are,
appear to be of different broadness, some being finer than the others, indicating that, contrary to
what the testamentary witnesses declared on the witness stand, not only one ballpen was used,
and, therefore, showing that the documents were not signed by the testatrix and instrumental
witnesses in the presence of one another. . . "

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct of the conclusion that both decedent’s will and codicil
were not subscribed by the witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another,
contrary to the requirements of Article 805 of the Civil Code.

HELD: YES. A review of the facts and circumstances upon which respondent Court of Appeals
based its impugned finding, however, fails to convince us that the testamentary documents in
question were subscribed and attested by the instrumental witnesses during a single occasion.

As sharply noted by respondent appellate court, the signatures of some attesting witnesses in
decedent’s will and its codicil were written in blue ink, while the others were in black. This
discrepancy was not explained by petitioner. Nobody of his six (6) witnesses testified that two
pens were used by the signatories on the two documents. In fact, two (2) of petitioner’s
witnesses even testified that only one (1) ballpen was used in signing the two testamentary
documents.

In the case at bench, the autoptic proference contradicts the testimonial evidence produced by
petitioner. The will and its codicil, upon inspection by the respondent court, show in black and
white — or more accurately, in black and blue — that more than one pen was used by the
signatories thereto. Thus, it was not erroneous nor baseless for respondent court to disbelieve
petitioner’s claim that both testamentary documents in question were subscribed to in
accordance with the provisions of Art. 805 of the Civil Code.

Neither did respondent court err when it did not accord great weight to the testimony of Judge
Tomas A. Tolete. It is true that his testimony contains a narration of how the two testamentary
documents were subscribed and attested to, starting from decedent’s thumbmarking thereof, to
the alleged signing of the instrumental witnesses thereto in consecutive order. Nonetheless,
nowhere in Judge Tolete’s testimony is there any kind of explanation for the different-colored
signatures on the testaments.

​ RUM
Barut vs. Cagacungan (21 Phil 461) E
 PEDRO BARUT vs. FAUSTINO CABACUNGAN
G.R. No. L-6285 FEBRUARY 15, 1912

FACTS: ​Maria Salomon died on the 7th day of November, 1908, in the pueblo of Sinait, Ilocos
Sur, leaving a last will and testament bearing date March 2, 1907. Severo Agayan, Timotea
Inoselda, Catalino Ragasa, and A. M. Jimenez are alleged to have been witnesses to the
execution thereof. By the terms of said will Pedro Barut received the larger part of decedent's
property.

The original will appears on page 3 of the record and is in the Ilocano dialect. Its translation into
Spanish appears at page 11. After disposing of her property the testatrix revoked all former wills
by her made. She also stated in said will that being unable to read or write, the same had been
read to her by Ciriaco Concepcion and Timotea Inoselda and that she had instructed Severo
Agayan to sign her name to it as testatrix.

The probate court did not admit the will to probate on the sole ground that the handwriting of the
person who it is alleged signed the name of the testatrix to the will for and on her behalf looked
more like the handwriting of one of the other witnesses to the will than that of the person whose
handwriting it was alleged to be.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the will signed by a third person is valid.

RULING: ​YES. The court seems , by inference at least, to have had in mind that under the law
relating to the execution of a will it is necessary that the person who signs the name of the
testatrix must afterwards sign his own name; and that, in view of the fact that, in the case at bar,
the name signed below that of the testatrix as the person who signed her name, being, from its
appearance, not the same handwriting as that constituting the name of the testatrix, the will is
accordingly invalid, such fact indicating that the person who signed the name of the testatrix
failed to sign his own. We do not believe that this contention can be sustained. Section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate,
real or personal, nor charge or effect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the
testator, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his expenses direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of each xxxx

This is the important part of the section under the terms of which the court holds that the person
who signs the name of the testator for him must also sign his own name The remainder of the
section reads:
 The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it to be
signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence
of each other. But the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid
if it is proven that the will was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.

From these provisions it is entirely clear that, with respect to the validity of the will, it is
unimportant whether the person who writes the name of the testatrix signs his own or not. The
important thing is that it clearly appears that the name of the testatrix was signed at her express
direction in the presence of three witnesses and that they attested and subscribed it in her
presence and in the presence of each other. That is all the statute requires.

​ UENTES
In Re Will of Tan Duico (45 Phil 807) F

FACTS:

Mamerta Base instituted the probate of the will executed, according to her, by the Chinaman Tan Diuco.
The lower court denied the probate of the will since it was not signed by three instrumental witnesses.
Mamerta Base appealed the said decision.

The document in question, appears to have been signed by Simplicio Sala by order of the testator, whose
name is before the said signature, by reason of the latter's incapacity on account of his weakness and the
trembling of his hand, the testator also stating that he directed said Simplicio Sala to sign it in his name
and in the presence of three witnesses who also signed with him at the bottom of said document, and on
the left margin of each of its three pages correlatively numbered in letters by Sala in the name of the
testator Tan Diuco and by the witnesses therein mentioned, named Pablo Maturan, Ladislao Fenomeno,
and Enrique Peñaredondo. After the signature of the testator, Tan Diuco by Simplicio Sala.

ISSUE:

Did the will comply with requirements provided under Article 805 of the NCC?

HELD:

YES. Among the necessary requirements before a will can be probated, that it be attested and signed by
three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. An instrumental
witness is one who takes part in the execution of an instrument or writing.

In dealing with attestation, section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, does
not say that said witnesses must be different from those who signed the attestation clause. Besides, as
may be seen, the said three witnesses who signed the attestation clause, did so also on the left margin
and beside the signature of the testator or of Simplicio Sala who signed by order of the latter, and if
account is taken of the fact that these witnesses are "instrumental" witnesses, as above demonstrated,
and they have made reference to their own signatures, as well as that of the testator and of the person
who signed by the latter's order below the attestation clause, it is evident that in the instant case, it is
merely a matter of technicality devoid of any importance as to the probate of the will that said witnesses
are called instrumental witnesses, as if they were different from those who have to sign the attestation
clause.

Leano vs. Leano (30 Phil 612) ​OLACO

MARIANO LEANO v. ARCADIO LEAÑO
G.R. No. 9150. March 31, 1915

Facts: ​Cristina Valdes, deceased, placed a cross against her name attached by some other person to the
instrument offered for probate which purports to be her last will and testament, in the presence of the
three witnesses whose names are attached to the attesting clause, and that they attested and subscribed
the instrument in her presence and in the presence of each other. The trial judge declined to admit the
instrument to probate as the last will and testament of the decedent.

Issue: ​Did the act of the testatrix, placing a cross mark against her name exhibit animo testandi?

Ruling: YES. The placing of the cross opposite her name at the conclusion of the instrument was a
sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
prescribes that except where wills are signed by some other person than the testator in the manner and
form therein indicated, a valid will must be signed by the testator. The right of a testator to sign his will by
mark, executed animo testandi, has been uniformly sustained by the courts of last resort of the United
States in construing statutory provisions prescribing the mode of execution of wills in language identical
with, or substantially similar to that found in section 618 of our code, which was taken from section 2349
of the Code of Vermont.

​ IVERA
Garcia vs. Lacuesta (90 Phil 489) R

FACTS:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals disallowing the will of Antero Mercado. The will
is written in the Ilocano dialect and contains the following attestation clause:

We, the undersigned, by these presents to declare that the foregoing testament of Antero
Mercado was signed by himself and also by us below his name and of this attestation clause and
that of the left margin of the three pages thereof. Page three the continuation of this attestation
clause; this will is written in Ilocano dialect which is spoken and understood by the testator, and it
bears the corresponding number in letter which compose of three pages and all them were
signed in the presence of the testator and witnesses, and the witnesses in the presence of the
testator and all and each and every one of us witnesses.

In testimony, whereof, we sign this statement, this the third day of January, one thousand nine
hundred forty three, (1943) A.D.

(Sgd.) NUMERIANO EVANGELISTA (Sgd.) "ROSENDA CORTES

(Sgd.) BIBIANA ILLEGIBLE

The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of Antero Mercado,
followed below by "A reugo del testator" and the name of Florentino Javier. Antero Mercado is alleged to
have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of Appeals, reversing the judgement of the
Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, ruled that the attestation clause failed (1) to certify that the will was
signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Florentino Javier at the
express request of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses;
(2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the former's request said
testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of which the
will consists and at the end thereof; (3) to certify that the three witnesses signed the will in all the pages
thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other.

ISSUE:

Should the will be disallowed?

RULING:

Yes. ​The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty.
Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. The herein petitioner argues, however, that there is no need for such recital
because the cross written by the testator after his name is a sufficient signature and the signature of Atty.
Florentino Javier is a surplusage. Petitioner's theory is that the cross is as much a signature as a
thumbmark.

It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or
even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, we are not prepared to liken
the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark, and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not
have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.

What has been said makes it unnecessary for us to determine there is a sufficient recital in the attestation
clause as to the signing of the will by the testator in the presence of the witnesses, and by the latter in the
presence of the testator and of each other.

​ ILLARIN
Balonan vs. Abellana (109 Phil 359). V

FACTS:

The last Will and Testament is written in the Spanish language and consists of two (2) typewritten pages
double space. The first page is signed by Juan Bello and under his name appears typewritten ‘Por la
testadora Anacleta Abellana, residence Certificate A-1167629, Enero 20, 1951, Ciudad de Zamboanga’,
and on the second page appears the signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses Blas Sebastian,
Faustino Macaso and Rafael Ignacio, at the bottom of which appears the signature of T. de los Santos
and below his signature is his official designation as the notary public who notarized the said testament.
On the first page on the left margin of the said instrument also appear the signatures of the instrumental
witnesses. On the second page, which is the last page of the said last Will and Testament, also appears
the signature of the three (3) instrumental witnesses and on that second page on the left margin appears
the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the following phrase, ‘Por la
Testadora Anacleta Abellana’. The will is duly acknowledged before Notary Public, Attorney Timoteo de
los Santos.

ISSUE: ​Does the signature of Dr. Juan A. Abello above the typewritten statement "Por la Testadora
Anacleta Abellana” comply with the requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which a will shall
be executed?

RULING: NO. ​The present law, Article 805 of the Civil Code, in part provides as follows: "Every will, other
than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and
subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another."

The clause "must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name
written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction," is practically the same as the
provisions of Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) which reads as follows: "No will,
except as provided in the preceding section shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge
or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator’s name written by
some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or
more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. . . ."

Article 618 of the Old Civil Code as well as Article 805 of the New Civil Code require that the testator
himself sign the will, or if he cannot do so, the testator’s name must be written by some other person in
his presence and by his express direction.

Here, the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the will by said
Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express
requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by
some other person in his presence and by his express direction.

Abaya vs. Zalamero (10 Phil 357) ​YAP

Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads:

 No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or
personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by
the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator
and of each other. The attestation shall state the fact that the testator signed the will, or caused it
to be signed by some other person, at his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses,
and that they attested and subscribed it in his presence and in the presence of each other. But
the absence of such form of attestation shall not render the will invalid if it is proven that the will
was in fact signed and attested as in this section provided.

Facts:
Roman Abaya filed a petition for the allowance of the will executed by Juan Zalamero. Donata
Zalamero opposed the petition, alleging that the will had been executed under pressure and unlawful and
improper influence on the part of those who were to benefit thereby, and that it had not been executed
and signed in accordance with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The court refused to admit the will of said Juan Zalamero, as requested by Roman Abaya; Abaya
appealed from the decision and moved for a new trial which motion has not been finally acted upon by the
court; for this reason the petitioner, now before this court, still insists to admit the will of Juan.

Issue:
Whether the subject will was not executed and signed in accordance with the provisions of
section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure

Decision:
No, the subject will was executed and signed in accordance with the law.

It is shown by the evidence, and by the will itself, that for the reasons set forth by the testator and
at his own request, one of the witnesses to the will, Mariano Zaguirre, wrote with his own hand the name
and surname of Juan Zalamero, the testator, and his presence, and that the latter put a cross between
them and a note stating that what had been written before the name and surname of the said Juan
Zalamero, with the cross placed at the foot thereof, was his testament and contained his last will as stated
by him when he directed the execution thereof in the presence of the three witnesses who subscribed it in
his presence, and in the presence of each other and the same was subscribed by the three witnesses in
the manner provided by law.

The essential requisites prescribed by the above-mentioned section 618 of the law have been
complied with, namely, that three witnesses were present at the execution of the will of Juan Zalamero at
the date mentioned therein; that they heard his statement that the said instrument, written and drawn up
under his direction, contained his last will; that they saw and witnessed when, at the express request of
the testator, and under his direction, the witness, Mariano Zaguirre, wrote at the foot of the will the name
and surname of Juan Zalamero, and when the latter put the cross between his written name and
surname, each of the witnesses subscribing it at the time and in the presence of each other.

Therefore, the will executed by the late Juan Zalamero while in life, was executed in accordance
with the law, and that it should be duly admitted in order that it may produce all consequent legal effects.

Jaboneta vs. Gustilo (5 Phil 41) ​ALILIAN

DOCTRINE​: The true test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether
he might have seen him sign, considering his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the
subscription.

FACTS​: The last will and testament of Macario Jaboneta, deceased, was denied because the lower court
was of the opinion from the evidence adduced at the hearing that Julio Javellana, one of the witnesses,
did not attach his signature thereto in the presence of Isabelo Jena, another of the witnesses, as required
by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Before Jena left, he saw that last witness
Javellana, beginning to sign the latter’s signature was not yet completed when the former turned his back
and left the room.

ISSUE​: Should the will be admitted to probate?

RULING​: YES. The fact that Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana moving his hand and pen
in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses
which shows that Javellana did in fact there and then sign his name to the will, convinces us that the
signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of leaving, and that his back
was turned while a portion of the name of the witness was being written, is of no importance. He, with the
other witnesses and the testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing the testament, and were
together in the same room for that purpose, and at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the
document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Javellana that he
could see everything which took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and without any
physical obstruction to prevent his doing so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was in fact
signed before he finally left the room.

In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was held that it is sufficient if the witnesses are together
for the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will, and in a position to actually see the testator write, if
they choose to do so; and there are many cases which lay down the rule that the true test of vision is not
whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign, considering
his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the subscription.

​ URGOS
Nera vs. Rimando (G.R. No. L-5971, February 27, 1911) B

BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL ​vs.​NARCISA RIMANDO

G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911
CARSON, ​J.​:

FACTS: ​During the execution of the instrument propounded as a will, in a large room connecting with a smaller
room by a doorway where a curtain hangs across, one of the subscribed witness was outside while the other
subscribing witnesses were in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

The Trial Court ruled that under the doctrine laid down in the case of ​Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, the alleged fact that one
of the subscribing witnesses was in the outer room when the testator and the other describing witnesses signed
the instrument in the inner room, had it been proven, would not be sufficient in itself to invalidate the execution of
the will.

ISSUE: ​Whether the will was valid.

RULING: YES. ​The SC found that this subscribing witness was in the small room with the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses at the time when they attached their signatures to the instrument, and this finding, of
course, disposes of the appeal and necessitates the affirmance of the decree admitting the document to probate
as the last will and testament of the deceased.

The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually
saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so,
considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of
inscription of each signature.

It is noteworthy that the position of the parties with relation to each other ​at the moment of the subscription of
each signature,​ must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. The evidence in the case
relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he
was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that
took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and ​without any physical obstruction to prevent his
doing so​." And the decision merely laid down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the
subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon
proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of
them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by
merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine
further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat
the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of
a will.

Maravilla vs. Maravilla (37 SCRA 672) ​CUBELO

MARAVILLA VS. MARAVILLA

G.R. No. L-23225, FEB. 27, 1971

DOCTRINE:

In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent
attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the
instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to
participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the
attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney, being conversant with the
requisites of proper execution of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and
he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory

FACTS:

Appellant Herminio Maravilla, probate petitioner and husband of the decedent, died on 16 July
1966, after the case was submitted for decision. Upon motion for intervention filed by
Concepcion Maravilla Kohlhaas and Rose Mary Kohlhaas, this Supreme Court allowed their
intervention on 24 July 1967, upon showing that their interest as substitute heirs was vested
definitely upon the death of Herminio Maravilla, and that said movants for intervention merely
adopt the pleadings and briefs filed in behalf of the deceased Herminio Maravilla so that the
intervention will not delay the disposition of the case. Herminio Maravilla’s petition for probate
was opposed by the appellees Pedro, Asuncion and Regina, all surnamed "Maravilla," who are
allegedly the brother and sisters of the deceased Digna Maravilla, in an amended opposition
filed in the course of the trial in the court. The Oppositors alleged that the deceased the alleged
testatrix and the instrumental witnesses did not sign the alleged will, each and every page
thereof, in the presence of each other. That Digna affixed her signature on the will under undue
and improper pressure and she was not of sound mind. That the said will had already been
revoked by the deceased.

After trial, the court rendered judgment, holding as unsubstantiated the last three (3) grounds
above enumerated, but sustaining the first, that is, that the will was not executed in accordance
with Section 618 of Act 190, and, therefore, denied the probate of the will.The petitioner and one
Adelina Sajro, who was named a devisee under the questioned will, appealed the judgment.
The late Digna Maravilla died in Manapla, Negros Occidental, on 12 August 1958, leaving an
extensive estate. It is undisputed that, at the time of the probate proceedings, only one (1)
(Aquilino Mansueto) of the three (3) attesting witnesses to the will had survived, the two (2)
others (Timoteo Hernaez and Mariano Buenaflor) having died previously.The will submitted for
probate, Exhibit "A," which is typewritten in the Spanish language, purports to have been
executed in Manila on the 7th day of October, 1944; it consists of five (5) pages, including the
page on which the attestation clause was completed. The purported signatures of the testatrix
appear at the logical end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the other pages.

During the hearing, Col. Mansueto identified his own signature and those of Dr. Timoteo
Hernaez and of Digna Maravilla, and asserted that the latter did sign in the presence of all three
witnesses and Atty. Villanueva. The witness explained that he could not remember some details
because fourteen years had elapsed, and when he signed as a witness, he did not give it any
importance and because of the time he (Col. Mansueto) was very worried because of rumours
that the Japanese Kempeitai would arrest officers of the USAFFE who did not want to
collaborate.

Atty. Manuel Villanueva, as third witness for the proponent asserted that he had been the lawyer
of the Maravillas; that 5 or 6 days before 7 October 1944 he had been summoned through
Mariano Buenaflor to the house of the Maravillas and there met Digna who requested him to
draft a new will, revoking her old one, to include as additional beneficiaries Adelina Sajo,
Concepcion Maravilla, and the latter’s youngest daughter, Rose Mary Kohlhaas, who lived with
her (Digna) and whom she considered as her real children, having cared for them since
childhood.Digna gave Villanueva instructions concerning the will, and handed him her old will
and a handwritten list of the certificates of title of her properties, which list she asked and
obtained from her husband. Before leaving, Villanueva asked Digna to look for three witnesses.
Upon the evidence, the trial judge concluded that Mansueto did not actually see Digna Maravilla
sign the will in question, basing such conclusion upon the fact that while Mansueto positively
identified his own signature

ISSUE:

Should the court give credit to the testimony of Atty. Manuel Villanueva?
RULING: YES

That Mansueto, Hernaez and Buenaflor, together with the testatrix and the lawyer, sat next to
one another around one table when the will was signed is clearly established by the
uncontradicted testimony of both attorney Villanueva and Herminio Maravilla; and that detail
proves beyond doubt that each one of the parties concerned did sign in the presence of all the
others. It should be remembered, in this connection, that the test is not whether a witness did
see the signing of the will but whether he was in a position to see if he chose to do so. The trial
court rejected the evidence of both Herminio Maravilla and Manuel Villanueva, giving as a
reason that they were biased and interested in having the probate succeed. The reasoning is
not warranted for Herminio Maravilla certainly stood to gain more under the previous will of his
wife where he was made the sole beneficiary, As to attorney Villanueva, while he had been a
friend of Herminio from boyhood, he also had been the family lawyer, and his intervention in the
execution of the will of one of his clients became inevitable, for it is not to be expected that the
testatrix should call upon a stranger for the purpose. If Villanueva wished to perjure in favor of
Herminio, all he needed was to color his testimony against the due execution of the will (and not
in favor thereof, since, as previously observed, Digna’s first will was more advantageous to the
widower. It is hardly conceivable that any attorney of any standing would risk his professional
reputation by falsifying a will and then go before a court and give false testimony.

"‘In weighing the testimony of the attesting witnesses to a will, the statements of a competent
attorney, who has been charged with the responsibility of seeing to the proper execution of the
instrument, is entitled to greater weight than the testimony of a person casually called to
participate in the act, supposing of course that no motive is revealed that should induce the
attorney to prevaricate. The reason is that the mind of the attorney, being conversant with the
requisites of proper execution of the instrument, is more likely to become fixed on details, and
he is more likely than other persons to retain those incidents in his memory.’" The court is
satisfied that the preponderance of evidence is to the effect that the testament was duly
executed by a qualified testatrix and competent witnesses, in conformity with the statutory
requirements. The decree of the court denying probate of the 1944 will of Digna Maravilla is
reversed and the said testament is hereby ordered probated.

​ RUM
Gabriel vs. Mateo (51 Phil 216) E

TESTATE ESTATE OF FLORENCIA MATEO and PERFECTO GABRIEL vs. RITA MATEO
G.R. No. L-26545 DECEMBER 16, 1927

FACTS: Florencia Mateo dated February 6, 1923, composed of two used sheets to probate.
The will appears to be signed by the testatrix and three witnesses on the left margin of each of
the sheets, by the testatrix alone at the bottom, and by the three witnesses after the attestation
clause.

The testatrix died on August 13, 1925. Opposition to such probate was filed by Rita Mateo, the
testatrix's sister, and by other relatives.

The three attesting witnesses to this will, testifying in this case, declared that the signatures of
the testatrix were written in their presence and that they signed their names in the presence of
the testatrix and of each other.

The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name and did so with her right hand; but, as
the right side of her body later became paralyzed, she learned to sign with her left hand and for
many years thereafter, up to the time of her death, she used to sign with that hand.

The opposition relied on the following arguments:

1. The testatrix's signatures start on the line with Felicisimo Gabriel's signature, but tend to rise
and her surname reaches a level with Julio Gabriel's signature;
2. Different kinds of ink used by the testatrix in her signature and by the attesting witnesses. An
examination of these signatures reveal a somewhat deeper intensity of ink in the signature of
the testatrix than in those of the attesting witnesses; and
3. Unreasonableness of the testatrix in not leaving anything to the principal opponent, her sister
Rita Mateo, and to her nephews and nieces, to whom she had been so affectionate during life.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the signature on the will is genuine.

RULING: ​YES. It may be inferred with equal, if not greater, logic that the testatrix signed before
him, and when it came to the witness Gabriel's turn, he, finding the space below the testatrix
signature free, signed his name there. On the other hand, it may be noted that the testatrix's
other signature at the bottom of the will also shows a more or less marked tendency to rise,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no signature with which she might interfere if she
continued to write in a straight horizontal line. Furthermore, if, as the opposition alleges, the
testatrix's signature is not genuine and was placed there by another person, it is strange that the
latter should have done so in such a way as to write it above Gabriel's signature while following
the horizontal line, when this could have been avoided by simply putting it a little higher. And
this may be attributed to carelessness in the first case, but it cannot be so explained in the
second.

At all events, even admitting that there is a certain question as to whether the attesting
witnesses signed before or after the testatrix, or whether or not they signed with the same pen
and ink, these are details of such trivial importance, considering that this will was signed two
years before the date on which these witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to set
aside the will for this reason alone.
The attesting witnesses to this will, who testified also as witnesses at the trial of this case,
showed themselves to be intelligent and honest, one of them being a lawyer of twelve year's
practice, and there is no reason to reject their testimony, and to suppose that they were
untruthful in testifying, and that they falsified the will in question.

Moreover, there is nothing strange in the testatrix having left nothing to the opponents, or in her
having left all of her estate to the only heir instituted in her will, Tomas Mateo, who is also one of
her nieces. And not only is it not strange, but it seems reasonable, since, according to the
evidence of the testatrix when the former was but 3 years old, and from then on up to the time of
her death had never been separated from her.

​ UENTES
Gonzales vs. CA (90 SCRA 183) F

FACTS:

Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Isabel Gabriel and designating Lutgarda as
the principal beneficiary and executrix.

The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been
executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel
Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear
at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages.

At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia,
Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are
their respective places of residence​. Their signatures also appear on the left margin of all the other
pages. The WW is paged by typewritten words as follows: "Unang Dahon" and underneath "(Page One)",
"Ikalawang Dahon" and underneath "(Page Two)", etc., appearing at the top of each page.

The petition was opposed by Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales on the ground that the same was not executed
and attested as required by law. The Trial Court disallowed the probate of the will. The Court of Appeals
allowed the probate of the will. Hence this petition.

Gonzales now contends ​that the requirement in Article 806, Civil Code, that the witnesses must be
credible is an absolute requirement which must be complied with before an alleged last will and
testament may be admitted to probate and that to be a credible witness, there must be evidence on
record that the witness has a good standing in his community, or that he is honest and upright, or
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and unless the qualifications of the witness are first established,
his testimony may not be favorably considered.

Furthermore, she contends that the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness
may be competent under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required
by Article 805 of the same Code. It is further urged that the term "credible" as used in the Civil Code
should receive the same settled and well- known meaning it has under the Naturalization Law, the
latter being a kindred legislation with the Civil Code provisions on wigs with respect to the
qualifications of witnesses.

ISSUE:

Was the contention of Gonzales correct?

HELD:

NO. In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest
the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution.

In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely,
Matilde Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily
supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals.

Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses, much less has it
been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind, deaf or dumb, or cannot
read or write.

In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined
by the statute that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends on the
appreciation of his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness
is telling the truth.

In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order to be competent must be shown to have
the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821
and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory
that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or
that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be
such unless the contrary is established otherwise.

Nayve vs. Mojal, (47 Phil 152) ​OLACO

NAYVE VS. MOJAL
G.R. No. L-21755, DEC. 29, 1924

FACTS: ​This is a proceeding for the probate of the will of the deceased Antonio Moja Instituted by his
surviving spouse, Filomena Nayve. The probate is opposed by Leona Mojal and Luciana Aguilar, sister
and niece, respectively, of the deceased.

The assailed will in this case is composed of four sheets with the written matter on only side of each, that
is, four pages written on four sheets. The four sides or pages containing written matter are paged “Pag.
1,” “Pag. 2,” “Pag. 3,” “Pag. 4,” successively. Each of the first two sides or pages, which was issued, was
signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the margin, left side of the reader. On the third page
actually used, the signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the margin, left side of the reader, but
the signature of the testator is not on the margin, but about the middle of the page, at the end of the will
and before the attestation clause. On the fourth page,the signatures of the witnesses do not appear on
the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause, it being the signature of the testator that is on the
margin, left side of the reader.
The defects found against to the probate of the will are:(a)The fact of not having been signed by the
testator and the witnesses on each and every sheet on the left margin; (b) the fact of the sheets of the
document not being paged with letters; (c) the fact that the attestation clause does not state the number
of sheets or pages actually used of the will; and (d) the fact that the testator does not appear to have
signed all the sheets in the presence of the three witnesses, and the latter to have attested and signed all
the sheets in the presence of the testator and of each other.

ISSUE:​ Should the will be admitted to probate?

RULING: YES. Under the law: ​Art. 805. -- Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at
the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses
in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.---

Applying the provision in this case, As to the first defect pointed, as each and every page used of the will
bears the signatures of the testator and the witnesses, the fact that said signatures do not all appear on
the left margin of each page does not detract from the validity of the will.

As to the second defect, the court held in Unson vs. Abella that paging with Arabic numerals and not with
letters, as in the case before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as valid as paging with letters.

As to the third defect, the attestation clause must state the number of sheets or pages composing the will;
but, as in the present case, such fact, while it is not stated in the attestation clause, appears at the end of
the will proper, so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of the sheets of the will, then there
can be no doubt that it complies with the intention of the law that the number of sheets of which the will is
composed be shown by the document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of the will from being
unduly increased or decreased.

It must be noted that in the attestation clause above set out it is said that the testator signed the will “in
the presence of each of the witnesses” and the latter signed “in the presence of each other and of the
testator.” So that, as to whether the testator and the attesting witnesses saw each other sign the will, such
a requirement was clearly and sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this clause is whether the
testator and the witnesses signed all the sheets of the will.

The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing reciprocally the signing of the will is one which cannot be
proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is stated in the document. And this fact is expressly
stated in the attestation clause now before us. But the fact of the testator and the witnesses having signed
all the sheets of thewill may be proven by the mere examination of the document, although it does not say
anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect,
which is what the law tries to avoid, does not exist. The fact that the testator and the witnesses signed
each and every page of the will is proven by the mere examination of the signatures in the will, the
omission to expressly state such evident fact does not invalidate the will nor prevent its probate.
 In Re Estate of Saguinsin, (41 Phil 875) ​RIVERA

FACTS:

There was presented in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for allowance an instrument which
the petitioner calls the will of Remigia Saguinsin. It is a manuscript signed by the alleged testatrix and
three witnesses on October 3, 1918, the conclusion of which says:

"I, the testatrix, sign in the presence of the witnesses this will written by D. Lino Mendoza at my
request and under my direction." (Yo, la testadora, firmo en presencia de los testigos este
testamento que ha escrito D. Lino Mendoza a mi ruego y bajo mi direccion.)--Then follows a
signature and then these expressions: "The testatrix signed in our presence and each of us
signed in the presence of the others." (La testadora ha firmado en nuestra presencia y cada uno
de nosotros en presencia de los demas.) — "Witness who wrote this will at the request and under
the free and voluntary personal direction of the testatrix herself." (Testigo que escribio este
testamento a ruego y bajo la libre y voluntaria direccion personal de la misma testadora.) (Sgd.)
Lino

Mendoza — "Attesting witnesses." (Testigos del testamento.) Then come three signatures.

These three signature together with that of the alleged testatrix are written also on the left margin of the
first page or folio and on the third page or second folio, but not on the second page or reverse side of the
first page where, as is seen, the manuscript is continued, the second folio not containing anything but the
date and the and of the manuscript.

Under these, conditions the instrument was impugned by a sister of the alleged testatrix and after the
taking of the declaration of the authors of the signatures which appear three times and in different parts of
the manuscript, the court declared that the document attached to the record could not be allowed as a
will.

ISSUE:

Should the will be disallowed?

RULING:

Yes. ​In conformity with Act No. 2645, amendatory to section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the
concluding part of the will does not express what that law, under pain of nullity, requires. Section 618, as
amended, says: "The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used upon which the will is
written . . . ." None of these requirements appear in the attesting clause at the end of the document
presented. The second page, ​i.e., ​what is written on the reverse side of the first, engenders the doubt
whether what is written thereon was ordered written by the alleged testatrix or was subsequently added
by the same hand that drew the first page and the date that appears on the third. With this non-fulfillment
alone of Act No. 2645 it is impossible to allow the so-called will which violates said law.

Also, there is nothing which guarantees all the contents of page 2. The margin of this page is absolutely
blank. there is nothing which gives the assurance that the testatrix ordered the insertion of all the contents
of page 2. It may very well be that it was subsequently added thereby substituting the will of the testatrix,
a result for the prevention of which this manner of authenticity by affixing the signature on each page and
not merely on each folio was provided for by law. This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It
is not enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves; three
pages having been written, the authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed with the signature of
the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.

​ ILLARIN
Avera vs. Garcia (42 Phil 145) V

FACTS:

Eutiquia Avera filed a petition for the probate of the will of one Esteban Garcia. Marino Garcia and Juan
Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia contested
the probate. One of the attesting witnesses testified that the will was executed with all necessary external
formalities, and that the testator was at the time in full possession of disposing faculties. Upon the latter
point the witness was corroborated by the person who wrote the will at the request of the testator. Two of
the attesting witnesses were not introduced, nor was their absence accounted for by the proponent of the
will.

ISSUE: ​Is the will rendered invalid by the fact that the signature of the testator and of the three attesting
witnesses are written on the right margin of each page of the will instead of the left margin?

RULING: NO

The instrument now before us contains the necessary signatures on every page, and the only point of
deviation from the requirement of the statute is that these signatures appear in the right margin instead of
the left. By the mode of signing adopted every page and provision of the will is authenticated and guarded
from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it would have been protected by being signed in
the left margin; and the resources of casuistry could be exhausted without discovering the slightest
difference between the consequences of affixing the signatures in one margin or the other.

​ ill of Abangan (40 Phil.,

The controlling considerations on the point now before us were well stated ​In Re w
476,479), where the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Avanceña, in a case where the signatures were
placed at the bottom of the page and not in the margin, said:

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of will and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the
other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail
the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
In the case before us, where ingenuity could not suggest any possible prejudice to any person, as
attendant upon the actual deviation from the letter of the law, such deviation must be considered too trivial
to invalidate the instrument.

Unson vs. Abella (43 Phil 494) ​YAP

Facts:
Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella died and thereafter, Pedro Unsom, the executor appointed in the
will, filed in the court of First Instance an application for the probate of the will and the issuance of the
proper letters of administration in his favor.

To said application an opposition was presently filed by Antonio Abella, Ignacia Abella, Avicencia
Abella, and Santiago Vito, alleging that the supposed will of the deceased Zalamea was not executed in
conformity with the provinces of the law, inasmuch as it was not paged correlatively in letters, nor was
there any attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of
each other.

Trial having been held, the judge a quo overruled the opposition of the contestants, and ordered
the probate of the will. From the judgment of the court below, the contestants have appealed.

Issue:
(1) Whether allowing the probate was valid despite the fact that its paging is made in Arabic
numerals and not in letters;

For Recit Purposes:

(2) Whether the subject will was executed with all the solemnities required by the law; and

(3) Whether the court below erred in admitting the will to probate notwithstanding the omission of
the proponent to produce one of the attesting witnesses

Decision:

(1)
Yes, the probate of the will was valid.

In the case of ​Aldaba vs. Roque ​(p. 378, ​ante​), the validity of the will was assailed on the ground
that its folios were paged with the letters A, B, C, etc., instead of with the letters "one," two," "three," etc.

In the case of Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476), the testament was written on one page, and
the attestation clause on another. Neither one of these pages was numbered in any way, and it was held:
"In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed
at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, and the second contains only the attestation clause and
is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed
on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged."

The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed on the upper part of
the sheet, but if the paging should be placed in the lower part, would the testament be void for this sole
reason? We believe not. The law also provides that the testator and the witnesses must sign the left
margin of each of the sheets of the testament; but if they should sign on the right margin, would this fact
also annul the testament? Evidently not.

Therefore, ​adhering to the cases above with regard to the appreciation of the solemnities of a will​,
we hold that his object may be attained by writing one, two, three, etc., as well as by writing A, B, C, etc.
and ​the emission of paging does not necessarily render the testament invalid.

(2)
Examination of the evidence, and from the testimony of the attesting witnesses but have not
found anything that would justify the court in disturbing the finding of the court ​a quo​.

The foregoing is sufficient for us to conclude that the assignment of error with regard to whether
there was any attestation clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence
of each other made by the appellants is groundless.

(3)
The trial court found that the evidence introduced by the proponent, consisting of the testimony of
the two attesting witnesses and the other witness who was present at the execution, and had charge of
the preparation of the will and the inventory, was sufficient.

As announced in ​Cabang vs. Delfinado, supra,​ the general rule is that, where opposition is made
to the probate of a will, the attesting witnesses must be produced. But there are exceptions to this rule, for
instance, when a witness is dead, or cannot be served with the process of the court, or his reputation for
truth has been questioned or he appears hostile to the cause of the proponent.

In such cases, the will may be admitted to probate without the testimony of said witness, if, upon
the other proofs adduced in the case, the court is satisfied that the will has been duly executed.

Wherefore, we find that the non-production of the attesting witness, Pedro de Jesus, as
accounted for by the attorney for the proponent at the trial, does not render void the decree of the court ​a
quo​, allowing the probate.

Aldaba vs. Roque (43 Phil 378) ​ALILIAN

FACTS​: Maria Roque y Paraiso, the widow of Bruno Valenzuela, executed her last will and testament in
the Tagalog dialect with the help of Vicente Platon and in the presence of three witnesses who signed the
attestation clause and each of the four pages of the testament. Maria Roque died on December 3, 1919,
and when her will was filed in court for probate, it was contested by Ludovico Roque on the ground that it
had not been prepared nor executed in conformity with the requirements and solemnities prescribed by
law.

The errors assigned by Roque are two, to wit: "That each and every folio of the said testament is not
paged correlatively in letter," and "that the said will lacks the attestation clause required by law."

The will in question translated into English reads:

This document expresses my last and spontaneous will, and is my last will and testament, which was
drawn by the lawyer, Don Vicente Platon, at my direction, and everything contained in this testament has
been ordained and directed by me to said Vicente Platon in order that it might be embodied in this
testament, and after this testament has been drawn up, I directed him to read it so that I might hear all its
contents, and I have heard and understood all the contents of this document which is my last will,
wherefore, and not knowing how to write, I have requested Don Vicente Platon to write and sign my name
in my stead hereon; I declare that this testament is composed of four sheets, actually used, that the
sheets are paged with the letter A, B, C, and d, and above my name I have placed the thumb mark of my
right hand in the presence of the subscribing witnesses, and that all the witnesses have signed in my
presence and of each other here at Malolos, Bulacan, this 9th day of the month of July, 1918; and I also
declare that at my request Don Vicente Platon has written my name on the left margin of all pages of this
testament, in the presence of the witnesses, and all the witnesses have also signed all the pages of this
testament on the left margin in my presence and that of each other.

X (Her thumb mark)

MARIA ROQUE Y PARAISO,

Per VICENTE PLATON.

(Sgd.) REGINO E. MENDOZA,

Witness.

(Sgd.) IGNACIO ANIAG,

Witness.

(Sgd.) CEFERINO ALDABA.

Witness.

ISSUE​: WON the probate of the subject will shouldbe allowed

RULING​: YES.

Re Attestation: It appears that it is the testatrix who makes the declaration about the points contained in
the above described paragraph; however, as the witnesses, together with the testatrix, have signed the
said declaration, the words above quoted of the testament constitute a sufficient compliance with the
requirements of section 1 of Act No. 2645 which provides that:

The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name,
under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the
will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.

Re Page Numbering: In regard to the other assignment of error, to wit, that each of the folios of the said
testament is not paged correlatively in letters "one." "two," "three," etc., but only with the letters A, B, C,
etc., ​this method of indicating the paging of the testament is a compliance with the spirit of the
law, since either one of the two ways above-mentioned indicates the correlation of the pages and
serves to prevent the loss of any of them. It might be said that the object of the law in requiring that the
paging be made in letters is to make falsification more difficult, but it should be noted that since all the
pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of forging
the signatures in either case remains the same. In other words the more or less degree of facility to
imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not make for the easiness to forge the signature. And
as in the present case there exists the guaranty of the authenticity of the testament, consisting in the
signatures on the left marging of the testament and the paging thereof as declared in the attestation
clause, the holding of this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil, 476), might as well be repeated:
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and
fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and authenticity. Therefore
the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordial ends. But, on the
other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail
the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given assures such ends, any
other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecesary,
useless, and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation clause on another. Neither one of
these pages was numbered in any way; and it was held:

In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed
at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and
is signed also at the bottom by the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed
on their margings by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.

This means that, according to the particular case, the omission of paging does not necessarily render the
testament invalid.

The law provides that the numbering of the pages should be in letters placed on the upper part of the
sheet, but if the paging should be place din the lower part, would the testament be void for his sole
reason? We believe not. The law also provides that the testator and the witnesses must sign the left
margin of each of the sheets of the testament; but if they should sign on the right margin, would this fact
also annul the testament? Evidently not. This court has already held in Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez
(42 Phil., 145):lävvphì1·né+

It is true that the statute says that the testator and the instrumental witnesses shall sign their names on
the left margin of each and every page; and it is undeniable that the general doctrine is to the effect that
all statutory requirements as to the execution of wills must be fully complied with. The same doctrine is
also deducible from cases heretofore decided by this court:

Still some details at times creep into legislative enactments which are so trivial that it would be absurd to
suppose that the Legislature could have attached any decisive importance to them. The provision to the
effect that the signatures of the testator and witnesses shall be written on the left margin of each page —
rather than on the right margin — seems to be of this character. So far as concerns the authentication of
the will, and of every part thereof, it can make no possible different whether the names appear on the left
or on the right margin, provided they are on one or the other. In Caraig vs. Tatlonghari (R. G. No. 12558,
decided March 23, 1918, not reported), this court declared a will void which was totally lacking in the
signatures required to be written on its several pages; and in the case of Re estate of Saguinsin (41 Phil.,
875), a will was likewise declared void which contained the necessary signature on the margin of each left
(folio), but not on the margin of each page containing written matter.

In Re: Pilapil (72 Phil 546) ​BURGOS

Probate of the deceased Rev. P. Eleuterio Pilapil. ADRIANO MENDOZA, applicant and appealed, vs. ​CALIXTO
PILAPIL AND OTHERS,​ opponents and appellants.

FACTS: ​Father Eleuterio Pilapil died on December 6, 1935. His will was probated before the CFI. The two
documents, exhibits A and C, consist of three pages; and in the left margin of each of the first two; the signatures
that are seen at the end of the main body of said documents and their attesting clause appear; and that they are,
according to the evidence, signatures of the deceased P. Eleuterio Pilapil, and of the witnesses Wenceslao Pilapil,
Marcelo Pilapil and Eugenio K. Pilapil. L
ibCalixto, his brother, opposed the probate of will, and requested to be the administrator. The basis for opposition
was that exhibits A and C cannot be legalized because they were not prepared or signed in accordance with the
law, since the pages were not numbered with letters and the attestation clause does not state that they were
signed by the three instrumental witnesses, in the presence of the testator.

ISSUE: ​WON the will was valid.

RULING: YES. ​In this case, the objection was that the attestation clause does not state the number of pages
upon which the will was written, and yet the court held that the law has been substantially complied with
inasmuch as in the body of the will and on the same page wherein the attestation clause appears written it is
expressly stated that will contains three pages each of which was numbered in letters and in figures.

The attestation clause stated, “It consists of two articles; They contain sixteen provisions and it is written on three
pages” and in comparison with the actual document, it effectively contained two articles and sixteen provisions.

In the attestation clause, it was affirmed by the three instrumental witnesses who signed it, that

the pre-insertion Testament and Last Will,

has been signed, declared and sworn by

the Testator, Rev. P. Eleuterio Pilapil

in the presence of all of us;

already followed, it is also stated by the same witnesses that:

At the request of said testator,

each of us signed , here in Cebu, Cebu,

IF, today November 27, 1935.

The phrase "at the request of said testator", together with that of the fact that he signed and signed his will in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses, allows and justifies the inference that the testator was present when the
latter stamped their respective signatures there.

The purpose of the law when establishing the formalities required in a will, is undoubtedly to ensure and
guarantee its authenticity against bad faith and fraud, to prevent those who do not have the right to succeed the
testator from succeeding and benefiting from the legalization of the same. This purpose has been fulfilled in the
case that we are talking about because, in the same testament body and on the same page where the attestation
clause appears, that is the third, it is expressed that the testament consists of three pages and because each one of
the first two carry part the note in letters, and part note in figures, which are respectively the first and second
pages of it. These facts obviously exclude any fear, any suspicion, or any hint of doubt that some of the pages have
been replaced with another.

Fernandez vs. de Dios, (46 Phil 922) ​CUBELO

Fernandez v. de Dios

46 Phil 922
DOCTRINE:

Although the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause does not appear in the upper part
thereof, yet if that numbering is found in its text, the requirement prescribed by the law is substantially
complied with.

FACTS:

The question in this case is as to the validity of the document Exhibit A as a will, which was propounded
by Ramon J. Fernandez for probate, and contested by Fernando Vergel de Dios and Francisco, Ricardo
and VirgilioRustia, the court of First Instance of Manila having denied its probate. One of the issues raised
was that the will has 4 pages. However, the 4th page has no page number. Ramon takes this appeal,
assigning error to the action of the lower court in holding the attestation fatally defective and in not finding
Act No. 2645 void.

ISSUE:

1. Will the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause which does not appear in the upper
part make the will defective? NO

2. Should the attestation clause state, among other things,“that thetestator signed on the margin of each
sheet of the will in the presence of the witnesses and the latter in the presence of each other; and such a
fact cannot be proven by any other proof than the attestation clause itself”? NO

3. Are the signatures necessary in the attestation clause? NO

HELD:

1. NO. Although the numbering of the sheet containing the attestation clause does not appear in the
upper part thereof, yet if that numbering is found in its text, as when it is said therein that the will consists
of three sheets actually used, correlatively numbered, besides this one, that is to say, the sheet
containing the attestation clause, the requirementprescribed by the law is substantially complied with, for
if the will consists of three sheets besides the one containing the attestation clause, it is evident that the
latter is the fourth page, that is to say, that the document consists of four sheets.

2. NO. The fact appears in any manner intelligible from the attestation clause, the latter would be
sufficient and valid. Thus the attestation clause in question is sufficient in this respect which says: "* * *
and he (the testator) signed at the bottom of the aforesaid will in our presence, and at his request we also
signed our names as witnesses in his presence and that of each other, and finally, the testator, as well as
we, his witnesses, signed in the same manner on the left margin of each ,and every one of its sheets," for
the phrase, in the same manner, means that the testator signed in the presence of the witnesses, and the
latter in his presence and that of each other.

3. NO. The last paragraph of section 618 of the Code deals with the requirements for the attestation
clause. This last paragraph reads thus: The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used,
upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three
witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the
testator and of each other. As may be seen this last paragraph, it refers to the contents of the text of the
attestation, not the requirements or signatures thereof outside of its text. It does not require that the
attestation be signed by the testator or that the page or sheet containing it be numbered. From this
analysis of our law now in force it appears:

First. That the will must have an attestation clause as a complement, without which it cannot be probate
and with which only not aliunde(UyCoque vs. Navas L. Sioca , supra ) may the requirements to be stated
in its text be proven. The attestation clause must be prepared and signed, as in the instant case, on the
same occasion on which the will is prepared and signed, in such a way that the possibility of fraud, deceit
or suppression of the will or the attestation clause be reduced to a minimum; which possibility always
exists, as experience shows, in spite of the many precautions taken by the legislator to insure the true
and free expression of one's last will.

Second. That the will is distinct and different from the attestation, although both are necessary to the
validity of the will, similar, in our opinion, to a document which is not public so long as it is not
acknowledged before a notary, the document being a distinct and different thing from the
acknowledgment, each of which must comply with different requisites, among which is the signature of
the maker which is necessary in the document but not in the acknowledgment and both things being
necessary to the existence of the public document.

Third. That the will proper must meet the requirements enumerated in the second paragraph of section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Fourth. That the text of the attestation clause must express
compliance with the requirements prescribed for the will.In the case at bar the attestation clause in
question states that the requirements prescribed for the will were complied with, and this is enough for it,
as such attestation clause, to be held as meeting the requirements prescribed by the law for it. The fact
that in said clause the signature of the testator does not appear does not affect its validity, for, as above
stated, the law does not require that it be signed by the testator.

​ RUM
Lopez vs. Liboro (81 Phil 429) E

TESTACY OF SIXTO LOPEZ vs. AGUSTIN IBORO

G.R. No. L-1787 AUGUST 27, 1948

FACTS: ​Don Sixto Lopez died on March 3, 1947 at the age of 83 leaving a will executed almost
six months before his death. The oppositor specified the grounds for which he relies his petition,
namely:

1. That the deceased never executed the alleged will;

2. That his signature appearing in said will was a forgery;
3. That at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental
capacity due to advanced age;
4. That, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and
one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured
by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and
the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez;
5. That the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
6. ​The will in question comprises two pages, each of which is written on one side of a
separate sheet. The first sheet is not paged either in letters or in Arabic numerals​; and
7. That the will was written in Spanish and that the same is silent as to the understanding of the
testator of the language.

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the paging of the wills is a fatal defect.

RULING: ​NO. The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud,
and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. In
the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is
supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words
or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense
of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and
coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the
last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the
preceding page.

Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the
Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, — all of which,
in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's
property. Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation
clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by
any possibility be taken for other than page one.

​ UENTES
Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil 476) F

FACTS:

On September 19, 1917, the Court of First Instance of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will
executed July, 1916. From this decision the opponent's appealed. Said document, duly probated as Ana
Abangan's will, consists of two sheets, the first of which contains all of the disposition of the testatrix, duly
signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban (in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by
three witnesses. With the said decision of the court, Anastacia Abanga et al. appealed alleging that the
records do not show that the testatrix knew the dialect in which the dialect was written.

ISSUE:

Did the will comply with the solemnities under the law?
HELD:

YES. Synthesizing our opinion, we hold that in a will consisting of two sheets the first of which
contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by
the three witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the
testator and the witnesses, or be paged.

FOR purposes of discussion:

In requiring that each and every sheet of the will should also be signed on the left margin by the
testator and three witnesses in the presence of each other, Act No. 2645​ evidently has for its object to
avoid the substitution of any of said sheets, thereby changing the testator's dispositions. But when these
dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses,
their signatures on the left margin of said sheet would be completely purposeless. In requiring this
signature on the margin, the statute took into consideration, undoubtedly, the case of a will written on
several sheets and must have referred to the sheets which the testator and the witnesses do not have to
sign at the bottom. A different interpretation would assume that the statute requires that this sheet,
already signed at the bottom, be signed twice. We cannot attribute to the statute such an intention. As
these signatures must be written by the testator and the witnesses in the presence of each other, it
appears that, if the signatures at the bottom of the sheet guaranties its authenticity, another signature on
its left margin would be unneccessary; and if they do not guaranty, same signatures, affixed on another
part of same sheet, would add nothing. We cannot assume that the statute regards of such importance
the place where the testator and the witnesses must sign on the sheet that it would consider that their
signatures written on the bottom do not guaranty the authenticity of the sheet but, if repeated on the
margin, give sufficient security.

In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of the sheet, it is likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any
sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the dispositive parts of a will are written on one
sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single sheet, although
unnumbered, cannot be hidden.

What has been said is also applicable to the attestation clause. Wherefore, without considering
whether or not this clause is an essential part of the will, we hold that in the one accompanying the
will in question, the signatures of the testatrix and of the three witnesses on the margin and the
numbering of the pages of the sheet are formalities not required by the statute. Moreover, referring
specially to the signature of the testatrix, we can add that same is not necessary in the attestation
clause because this, as its name implies, appertains only to the witnesses and not to the testator
since the latter does not attest, but executes, the will.

The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith
and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity.
Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal
ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object of the
law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already
given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more
requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

Taboada vs. Rosal (G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982)​ O

​ LACO
TABOADA v. ROSAL
G.R. No. L-36033, November 5, 1982

FACTS: ​Dorotea Perez left a will. The will has two pages. On the first page, which contains the entire
testamentary dispositions, were the signatures of the three instrumental witnesses and that of Dorotea
Perez. The signatures of the three instrumental witnesses were on the left margin while Perez’ signature
was on the bottom. On the second page, which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgement,
were the signatures of the three attesting witnesses and that of Dorotea Perez. The attestation clause
failed to state the number of pages used in the will.

Taboada petitioned for the admission to probate of the said will. The Judge Pamatian denied the petition.
Taboada filed a motion for reconsideration but Pamatian was not able to act on it because he was
transferred to another jurisdiction. The case was transferred to Judge Rosal who also denied the motion
for reconsideration on the grounds that a) that the testator and the instrumental witnesses did not all sign
on the left margin of the page as prescribed by law; that the testator and the witnesses should have
placed their signature in the same place b) that the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages
used in writing the will this, according to Judge Rosal violated the requirement that the attestation clause
shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the will is written, which requirement has been held
to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of
the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed.

ISSUE: ​Should the will of the decedent be admitted to probate?

RULING: ​Yes. The will should be admitted. Generally, while perfection in the drafting of a will may be
desirable, unsubstantial departure from the usual forms should be ignored, especially where the
authenticity of the will is not assailed. The law is to be liberally construed, “the underlying and
fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in
expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of
fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is
in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will.”

In the instant case, the failure to include in the attestation clause of the number of pages used in writing
the will would have been a fatal defect. However, the matter should be approached liberally. There were
only two pages in the will left by Perez. The first page contains the entirety of the testamentary
dispositions and signed by the testatrix at the end or at the bottom while the instrumental witnesses
signed at the left margin. The other page which is marked as “Pagina dos” comprises the attestation
clause and the acknowledgment. Further, the acknowledgment itself states that “This Last Will and
Testament consists of two pages including this page. Finally the Court noted that there is substantial
compliance with the law. It would be absurd that the legislature intended to place so heavy an import on
the space or particular location where the signatures are to be found as long as this space or particular
location wherein the signatures are found is consistent with good faith.
 ​ IVERA
Payad vs. Tolentino (62 Phil 848) R

Facts:

This case is about the probate of the will of ​Leoncia Tolentino​. The oppositor bases her motion for
reconsideration on the grounds that the testatrix did not personally place her thumbmark on her alleged
will and that on the date the will in question was executed, the testatrix was no longer in a physical or
mental condition to make it.

The lower court denied the probate of the will on the ground that the attestation clause was not in
conformity with the requirements of the law in that it is not stated therein that the testatrix caused Attorney
Almario to write her name at her express direction.

Issue:

Should the will be disallowed?

Ruling:

No. ​The evidence shows that Leonicia Tolentino was assisted by Attorney Almario in the execution of the
will. The latter guided her in placing her thumbmark on each and every page of the said will and that the
latter merely wrote her name to indicate the place where she placed said thumbmark. The said acts are
not an indication that Attorney Almario sign for the testatrix. Hence, it is clear that it was not necessary
that the attestation clause in issue should state that the testatrix requested Attorney Almario to sign her
name inasmuch as the testatrix signed the will in accordance with the law.

Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil 30) ​VILLARIN

FACTS:

This is an appeal by the widow, Inocencia Gorecho, from an order of the CFI of Iloilo probating the last
will and testament of the deceased Hagoriles. The widow said that the alleged will was not prepared in
conformity with the law as it did not contain an attestation clause stating that the testator and the
witnesses signed all the pages of the will. She cited the case of Saño vs. Quintana. The defendant cited
the case of Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar.

ISSUE: ​WON an attestation clause which does not recite that the testator and the witnesses signed all
the pages of the will is defective.

RULING:
YES, based on Saño v. Quintana. The SC adopted and reaffirmed the decision in the case of Saño vs.
Quintana and modified Nayve vs. Mojal and Aguilar.

signing of the will, for such an act cannot be proved by the mere exhibition of the will, if it is not stated
therein. It was also held that the fact that the testator and the witnesses signed each and every page of
the will can be proved also by the mere examination of the signatures appearing on the document itself,
and the omission to state such evident fact does not invalidate the will.

In this case, the SC reaffirmed the decision in Saño v Quintana for the following reasons:

In the first place, the Mojal decision was concurred in by only four members of the court, less than a
majority, with two strong dissenting opinions; the Quintana decisions was concurred in by seven members
of the court, a clear majority, with one formal dissent. In the second place, the Mojal decision was
promulgated in December, 1924; the Quintana decision was thus subsequent in point of time. And in the
third place, the Quintana decision is believed more nearly to conform to the applicable provisions of the
law.

The right to dispose of property by will is governed entirely by statute. The law of the case is here found in
section 618 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, and in section 634 of the same
Code, as unamended. It is part provided in section 618, as amended, that "No will . . . shall be valid . . .
unless . . . ." It is further provided in the same section that "The attestation shall state the number of
sheets or pages used, upon which the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and
signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other." Codal section 634
provides that " The will shall be disallowed in either of the following cases: 1. If not executed and attested
as in this Act provided." The law not alone carefully makes use of the imperative, but cautiously goes
further and makes use of the negative, to enforce legislative intention. It is not within the province of the
courts to disregard the legislative purpose so emphatically and clearly expressed.

Caneda vs. CA (222 SCRA 781) ​YAP

Facts:
Mateo Caballero made a will and he himself filed a petition seeking the probate of his last will and
testament but the testator passed away before his petition could finally be heard by the probate court.

Thereafter, herein petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of the testator, instituted a
second petition for intestate proceedings and appeared as oppositors and objected to the allowance of
the testator's will.

The probate court rendered a decision declaring the will in question as the last will and testament
of the late Mateo Caballero.

Upon appeal, the petitioners asserted that the will in question is null and void for the reason that
its attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to
the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all
the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The attestation clause in question is recited in the English language and is likewise signed at the
end thereof by the three attesting witnesses thereto, as shown below:

We, the undersigned attesting Witnesses, whose Residences and postal addresses appear on
the Opposite of our respective names, we do hereby certify that the Testament was read by him
and the testator, MATEO CABALLERO; has published unto us the foregoing Will consisting of
 THREE PAGES, including the Acknowledgment, each page numbered correlatively in the letters
on the upper part of each page, as his Last Will and Testament and he has the same and every
page thereof, on the spaces provided for his signature and on the left hand margin, in the
presence of the said testator and in the presence of each and all of us.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence this petition.

Issue:
(1) Whether the attestation clause in the last will of Mateo Caballero was valid; and
(2) Whether the rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 is applicable in this case

Decision:
(1)
No, the attestation clause in the last will of Mater Caballero was invalid as it did not substantially
complies with Article 805 of the Civil Code.

An attestation clause refers to that part of an ordinary will whereby the attesting witnesses certify
that the instrument has been executed before them and to the manner of the execution the same.

Article 805 requires that:

Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof
by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters
placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation should state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and
the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in
the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witness, it shall be interpreted
to them.

In the case of an ordinary or attested will, its attestation clause need not be written in a language
or dialect known to the testator since it does not form part of the testamentary disposition. Furthermore,
the language used in the attestation clause likewise need not even be known to the attesting witnesses.
The last paragraph of Article 805 merely requires that, in such a case, the attestation clause shall be
interpreted to said witnesses.

The attestation clause fails to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses the testator
sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed the will and
every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other. The defect is not only in the form or
language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article 805 to be
specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will.

Therefore, the absence of that statement required by law is a fatal defect or imperfection which
must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will that is here sought to be admitted to probate.
(2)
No, Substantial Compliance as provided under Article 809 was not applicable

The rule on substantial compliance in Article 809 cannot be revoked or relied on by respondents
since it presupposes that the defects in the attestation clause can be cured or supplied by the text of the
will or a consideration of matters apparent therefrom which would provide the data not expressed in the
attestation clause or from which it may necessarily be gleaned or clearly inferred that the acts not stated
in the omitted textual requirements were actually complied within the execution of the will. In other words,
defects must be remedied by intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself.

In the case at bar, contrarily, proof of the acts required to have been performed by the attesting
witnesses can be supplied by only extrinsic evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents
of the will yields no basis whatsoever from with such facts may be plausibly deduced.

The rule, as it now stands, is that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be
supplied except by evidence ​aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and
ultimately, of the will itself.

​ LACO
Cagro vs. Cagro (92 Phil 1032)) O
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO V.PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL.
G.R. NO. L-5826, APRIL 29, 1953

FACTS: ​The will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Laoangan, Pambujan, Samar, on
February 14, 1949 is presented for probate proceedings. Pelagio Cagro opposed the petition claiming that
the will is fatally defective on the ground that the attestation clause was not signed by the (3) attesting
witnesses. The facts laid down shows that the signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear
at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the witnesses
on the left-hand margin.

ISSUE:​ Should the will be admitted for probate?

RULING : ​NO. The will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the
execution of the will. It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must necessarily
bear their signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses
since the omission of their signatures at the bottom negatives their participation.

In the instant case, the argument of Jesusa Cagro claiming that the signatures of the (3) witnesses on the
left-hand margin conform substantially to the law and may be deemed as their signatures to the
attestation clause. The Court stated that such is untenable, because said signatures are in compliance
with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation
clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy
to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of
the witnesses.

​ LILIAN
Azuela vs. CA (G.R. NO. 122880, April 12, 2006) A
DOCTRINE: A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is
written is fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is
fatally defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a
mere jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all
three defects is just aching for judicial rejection.

FACTS​: The case stems from a petition for probate filed on 10 April 1984 with the RTC of Manila. The
petition filed by petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo
(decedent), which was notarized on 10 June 1981. FELIX is the son of the cousin of the EUGENIA. The
three named witnesses to the will affixed their signatures on the left-hand margin of both pages of the will,
but not at the bottom of the attestation clause. The probate petition adverted to only 2 heirs, legatees and
devisees of the decedent, namely: FELIX, and one Irene Lynn Igsolo, who was alleged to have resided
abroad. FELIX prayed that the will be allowed, and that letters testamentary be issued to the designated
executor, Vart Prague.

It was opposed by Geralda Aida Castillo (Geralda Castillo), who represented herself as the
attorney-in-fact of "the 12 legitimate heirs" of the decedent. Geralda Castillo claimed that the will is a
forgery. It also asserted that contrary to the representations of FELIX, the decedent was actually survived
by 12 legitimate heirs, namely her grandchildren, who were then residing abroad. Per records, it was
subsequently alleged that decedent was the widow of Bonifacio Igsolo, who died in 1965, and the mother
of a legitimate child, Asuncion E. Igsolo, who predeceased her mother by three (3) months.

Geralda also argued that the will was not executed and attested to in accordance with law. She pointed
out that decedent’s signature did not appear on the second page of the will, and the will was not properly
acknowledged. These twin arguments are among the central matters to this petition.

ISSUE​: Is a will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages fatally defective?

HELD​: Yes. Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the
testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will,
shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left margin, and all the
pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his
express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed
the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to them.

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses. The
notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of the Clerk of
Court.

The failure of the attestation clause to state the number of pages on which the will was written remains a
fatal flaw, despite Article 809. The purpose of the law in requiring the clause to state the number of pages
on which the will is written is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its
pages and to prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. The failure to state the number of pages
equates with the absence of an averment on the part of the instrumental witnesses as to how many pages
consisted the will, the execution of which they had ostensibly just witnessed and subscribed to. In this
case, there could have been no substantial compliance with the requirements under Article 805 since
there is no statement in the attestation clause or anywhere in the will itself as to the number of pages
which comprise the will.

The Court could thus end here and affirm the Court of Appeals. However, an examination of the will itself
reveals a couple of even more critical defects that should necessarily lead to its rejection. For one, the
attestation clause was not signed by the instrumental witnesses. While the signatures of the instrumental
witnesses appear on the left-hand margin of the will, they do not appear at the bottom of the attestation
clause which after all consists of their averments before the notary public.

The attestation clause is "a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will" required by law
to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned
attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures
at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. Thus, the subject will cannot be considered to have
been validly attested to by the instrumental witnesses, as they failed to sign the attestation clause.

Yet, there is another fatal defect to the will on which the denial of this petition should also hinge. The
requirement under Article 806 that "every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the
testator and the witnesses" has also not been complied with. The importance of this requirement is
highlighted by the fact that it had been segregated from the other requirements under Article 805 and
entrusted into a separate provision, Article 806. The non-observance of Article 806 in this case is equally
as critical as the other cited flaws in compliance with Article 805, and should be treated as of equivalent
import.

In lieu of an acknowledgment, the notary public, Petronio Y. Bautista, wrote "Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko
ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila." By no manner of contemplation can
those words be construed as an acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has
executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It
involves an extra step undertaken whereby the signor actually declares to the notary that the executor of
a document has attested to the notary that the same is his/her own free act and deed.

It may not have been said before, but we can assert the rule, self-evident as it is under Article 806. A
notarial will that is not acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witnesses is fatally
defective, even if it is subscribed and sworn to before a notary public.

Matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Last Will and Testament of Enrique S. Lopez ​BURGOS

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ
RICHARD B. LOPEZ,​ Petitioner,

vs. ​DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L. TUAZON,​ Respondents.

G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012

PERLAS-BERNABE, ​J.:

FACTS: ​On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four
legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana),
Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he
executed a Last Will and Testament On August 10, 1996 and constituted Richard as his executor and administrator.
On September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate before the RTC with prayer for the issuance of
letters testamentary in his favor. Marybeth and Victoria opposed the petition contending that the purported last
will and testament was not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of Richard.

The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a
statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is written. It held that while
Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof,
the rule only applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no evidence aliunde or
extrinsic evidence required. While the acknowledgement portion stated that the will consists of 7 pages including
the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including
the acknowledgement portion. As such, it disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in
accordance with law.

Ona appeal to the CA, It held that the CA found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC. Hence, the
instant petition assailing the propriety of the CA's decision.

ISSUE: ​WON the will was valid.

RULING: NO. ​Under Art. 805, in relation to art. 809 of the Civil Code, the law is clear that the attestation must state
the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible
interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise
failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgement portion of the subject last will and testament that it
"consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be
deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which
discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliunde. On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of Article 809, to wit: x x x
The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself:
whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page;
whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can
reveal, and defects or even omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the
total number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other must
substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.
Hence, the CA properly sustained the disallowance of the will.

​ UBELO
Richard B. Lopez (G.R. NO. 189984, November 12, 2012) C

G.R. No. 189984 November 12, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND
TESTAMENT OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ, Petitioner, vs. DIANA JEANNE
LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and VICTORIA L. TUAZON, Respondents.

The Factual Antecedents

On June 21, 1999, Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their
four legitimate children, namely, petitioner Richard B. Lopez (Richard) and the respondents
Diana Jeanne Lopez (Diana), Marybeth de Leon (Marybeth) and Victoria L. Tuazon (Victoria) as
compulsory heirs. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament4 on August
10, 1996 and constituted Richard as his executor and administrator.

On September 27, 1999, Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and
Testament before the RTC of Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his
favor. Marybeth opposed the petition contending that the purported last will and testament was
not executed and attested as required by law, and that it was procured by undue and improper
pressure and influence on the part of Richard. The said opposition was also adopted by Victoria.

After submitting proofs of compliance with jurisdictional requirements, Richard presented the
attesting witnesses,and the notary public who notarized the will, Atty. Perfecto Nolasco (Atty.
Nolasco). The instrumental witnesses testified that after the late Enrique read and signed the
will on each and every page, they also read and signed the same in the latter's presence and of
one another. Manalo further testified that she was the one who prepared the drafts and
revisions from Enrique before the final copy of the will was made.

Likewise, Atty. Nolasco claimed that Enrique had been his client for more than 20 years. Prior to
August 10, 1996, the latter consulted him in the preparation of the subject will and furnished him
the list of his properties for distribution among his children. He prepared the will in accordance
with Enrique's instruction and that before the latter and the attesting witnesses signed it in the
presence of one another, he translated the will which was written in English to Filipino and
added that Enrique was in good health and of sound mind at that time.

Ruling of the RTC

In the Decision dated August 26, 2005, the RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to
comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of
the number of pages used upon which the will is written. It held that while Article 809 of the
same Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form laid down in Article 805 thereof,
the rule only applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in the will with no
evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion stated that
the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are
written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it
disallowed the will for not having been executed and attested in accordance with law.

Court of Appeals

the CA found no valid reason to deviate from the findings of the RTC that the failure to state the
number of pages of the will in the attestation clause was fatal. It noted that while Article 809 of
the Civil Code sanctions mere substantial compliance with the formal requirements set forth in
Article 805 thereof, there was a total omission of such fact in the attestation clause. Moreover,
while the acknowledgment of the will made mention of "7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written," the will had actually 8 pages including the
acknowledgment portion thus, necessitating the presentation of evidence aliunde to explain the
discrepancy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disallowance of the probate of will is proper on the ground on the
failure to comply the requirements on forms of Will under Article 805 and 809 of the Civil Code.
HELD:

YES. The provisions of the Civil Code on Forms of Wills, particularly, Articles 805 and 809 of the
Civil Code provide:

ART. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end thereof by the
testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by
his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the
presence of the testator and of one another.

The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of
the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last, on the left
margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of
each page.

The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, and the fact
that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write
his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental witnesses, and that
the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator
and of one another.

If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be interpreted to
them.

ART. 809. In the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein
shall not render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in
substantial compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one
or some of its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.

While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the
subject last will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the
ratification and acknowledgment are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will
actually consists of 8 pages including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be
explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the presentation of evidence
aliund.11 On this score is the comment of Justice J.B.L. Reyes regarding the application of
Article 809, to wit:

x x x The rule must be limited to disregarding those defects that can be supplied by an
examination of the will itself: whether all the pages are consecutively numbered; whether the
signatures appear in each and every page; whether the subscribing witnesses are three or the
will was notarized. All these are facts that the will itself can reveal, and defects or even
omissions concerning them in the attestation clause can be safely disregarded. But the total
number of pages, and whether all persons required to sign did so in the presence of each other
must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being the only check against perjury in the
probate proceedings.

Echavez vs. Dozen Construction and Development Corporation and the Register of Deeds of Cebu
City (G.R. No. 192916, October 11, 2010) ​ERUM

MANUEL ECHAVEZ vs. DOZEN CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

G.R. No. 192816 OCTOBER 11, 2010

FACTS: ​Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu, which
includes Lot 1956-A and Lot 1959 (subject lots). On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the
subject lots to petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
Manuel accepted the donation:

“[T]he DONOR, VICENTE S. ECHAVEZ, for and in consideration of the love and affection upon
and unto the DONEE, MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ, and of the uncertainty of life and inevitableness
of death that may strike a man at the most unexpected moment, and wishing to give DONEE
while able to do so, to take effect after death, the DONOR, do hereby give, transfer and convey
by way of donation the following personal and real properties”

In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen
Corporation. In October 1986, they executed two Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same
properties.

On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente’s nephew, filed a petition for the
settlement of Vicente’s intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve
Vicente’s donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente
executed in favor of Dozen Corporation.

The RTC dismissed Manuel’s petition to approve the donation and his action for annulment of
the contracts of sale. It found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of Dozen, after
Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the donation.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. It held that since the donation in favor of Manuel was
mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity of wills should have been observed.
The deed of donation did not contain an attestation clause and was therefore void.

Petitioner contends that the CA should have applied the rule on substantial compliance in the
construction of a will. He insists that the strict construction of a will shall not be applied in the
absence of bad faith or fraud. He argues that the CA ignored the Acknowledgment portion which
contains the “import and purpose” of the attestation clause required in the execution of wills.
The Acknowledgment reads:

“BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985 at Talisay, Cebu, personally
appeared VICENTE S. Echavez with Res. Cert. No. 16866094 issued on April 10, 1985 at [sic]
Talisay, Cebu known to me to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument of
Deed of Donation Mortis Causa before the Notary Public and in the presence of the foregoing
three (3) witnesses who signed this instrument before and in the presence of each other and of
the Notary Public and all of them acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary act and
deed.”

ISSUE: ​Whether or not the Donation Mortis Causa is valid.

RULING: ​NO. The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the
formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills, "otherwise, the donation is void and would
produce no effect." Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have been applied.

As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment
portion does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written. The exception
that although the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was
written, the number of pages was stated in one portion of the will cannot be made to apply in the
case at bar. This is not the factual situation in the present case.

Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are
not prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one
statement.

That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate
provisions of the Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law
contemplates two distinct acts that serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by
one executing a deed, declaring before a competent officer or court that the deed or act is his
own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses
themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument before them and to the manner of its
execution.

Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the
instrumental witnesses to the execution of a decedent’s will. An attestation must state all the
details the third paragraph of Article 805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the
witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement
of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.
 Tanchanco vs. Garcia Santos (G.R. No. 204793, June 8, 2020) ​FUENTES

The parties:

Consuelo – decedent died in April 4, 1997

2 daughters – Remedios & Natividad. Remedios died in 1985

Children of Remedios – Catalino and Ronaldo (the Tanchancos)

FACTS:

Consuelo died at age 91 leaving an estate. Catalino filed a petition before RTC to settle the intestate
estate of Consuelo. However, Natividad filed a motion to dismiss stating that there was a will and
she already filed a petition for probate of the will entitled ​Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya ni Consuelo
Santiago Garcia.​

The Tanchancos filed an Opposition stating that the will’s attestation clause did not state the number
of pages and the will was written in Tagalog and not English language usually used by Consuelo
often in her documents. They also alleged that the will was a sham and Consuelo could not have
gone to Makati to sign a will because of her illness.

Natividad countered it that there was substantial compliance with Article 805 of the NCC. That
although the attestation clause did not state the number of pages comprising the will, the same was
clearly indicated in acknowledgment portion. The Tanchancos now contends that the number of
pages should be found in the body of the will and not just in the attestation clause.

Natividad presented the witnesses to the attestation mostly were lawyers in the Quasha Law Office
where Consuelo allegedly signed the last will and testament. RTC ruled in favor of The Tanchacos.
However, the CA reversed it favoring testacy over intestacy.

ISSUE:

Was there substantial compliance with the solemnities provided under Article 805 of the NCC?

HELD:

YES. An examination of Consuelo’s will shows that it complied with the formalities required by law,
except that the attestation clause failed to indicate the total number of pages upon which the will was
written. Nevertheless, the acknowledgment portion of the will supplied the omission by stating that
the will has five pages, to wit: “​Ang HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima(5) na dahon, kasama
ang dahong kinaroroonan ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpatotoong ito.” U ​ ndoubtedly, such substantially
complied with the law. Mere reading and observation of the will, without resorting to other extrinsic
evidence, yields the conclusion that there are actually five pages even if the said information was not
provided in the attestation clause.

When the number of pages was provided in the acknowledgment portion instead of the attestation
clause, “the spirit behind the law was served though the letter was not. Although there should be
strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in order to insure the authenticity of the
will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose and
which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator’s will.”