LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

DIGESTS

Block 2E 2022
Atty. Robert Nomar Leyretana
 1. CRUZ v. SECRETARY OF DENR
December 6, 2000 | G.R. No. 135385 | Per Curiam | Regalian Doctrine as
Enshrined in the Philippine COnstitution
Made by: Aine Alvero
Recit Ready: Isagani Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity
of RA 8371 or the Indigenous People’s Rights Act on the ground that the
law amounts to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands
of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article
XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural
resources. Cruz et al contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of “ancestral domains” and “ancestral lands” which might even
include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said
law violate the rights of private landowner.
The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and
reached a 7-7 vote. They deliberated again and the same result transpired.
Since there was no majority vote, Cruz’s petition was dismissed and the
IPRA law was sustained. The constitutionality of the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 was upheld.
Doctrine: Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands
of the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by
native title, which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective
of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and
possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371
(R.A. 8371), otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules).
● Respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the government agency
created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on
October 13, 1998 their Comment to the Petition, in which they
defend the constitutionality of the IPRA and pray that the petition
be dismissed for lack of merit.
● Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly
unconstitutional on the ground that it grants ownership over natural
resources to indigenous peoples and prays that the petition be
granted in part.
● Intervenors file their separate motions as below:
○ Group of intervenors composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one
of the authors of the IPRA et. al filed their Motion for
Leave to Intervene They join the NCIP in defending the
constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of
the petition.
○ CHR prays for the petition to be dismissed and asserts that
IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee
the rights of those who are at a serious disadvantage like
indigenous people.
○ Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon Foundation
for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon,
et al.), agree with NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is
consistent with the Constitution and pray that the petition
for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
● Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions
of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules on the ground that they
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State's ownership over
lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied
in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
 "(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of
ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;
"(2) Section 5, in relation to Section 3(a), which provides that
ancestral domains including inalienable public lands, bodies of
water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral
domains are private but community property of the indigenous
peoples;
"(3) Section 6 in relation to Section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines
the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands;
"(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over the ancestral domains;
"(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of
the indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands;
"(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the
indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development
or exploration of minerals and other natural resources within
the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and the right to
enter into agreements with non-indigenous peoples for the
development and utilization of natural resources therein for a
period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25
years; and
"(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the
responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be
necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or
reforestation."
● Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing
definition of "ancestral domains" and "ancestral lands" which might
even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and
3(b) violate the rights of private landowners
● After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court
voted - seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition while seven (7) other
members of the Court voted to grant the petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the provisions of IPRA violate the regalian doctrine? NO
RATIO:
1. NO. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral
domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains
remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs
over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them,
as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found,
the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same
time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
2. (Refer to Separate Opinions)
DISPOSITION:
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not
obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the
voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED
ASSENTING/DISSENTING OPINIONS:
PUNO, J (Assenting):
● Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property
of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of the land of
the public domain. The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of
ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The private
character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA
is further strengthened by the option given to individual ICCs/IPs
over their individually-owned ancestral lands.
● The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/lPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same. Ownership of ancestral
domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens
title but to a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The
 CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of
the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. The right of ownership
and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held
under the indigenous concept of ownership. This concept
maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private
but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of
the public domain. But its private character ends there. The
ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not
by one particular person. Ownership over the natural resources
in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs
are merely granted the right to "manage and conserve" them for
future generations, "benefit and share" the profits from their
allocation and utilization, and "negotiate the terms and conditions
for their exploration" for the purpose of "ensuring ecological and
environmental protection and conservation measures." Simply
stated, the ICCs/IPs' rights over the natural resources take the form
of management or stewardship .
● Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the regalian
doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/lPs in their ancestral domains
includes ownership, but this "ownership" is expressly defined and
limited in Section 7 (a) . The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim
ownership over "lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing
grounds.
KAPUNAN, J (Assenting):
● Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must
be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish Crown
or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter,
the Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the
origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title
to land must emanate from some source for it cannot issue forth from
nowhere. In its broad sense, the term "jura regalia" refers to royal
rights, or those rights which the King has by virtue of his
prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign
has over anything in which a subject has a right of property or
propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the
king as the sovereign.
● The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands
held in private ownership since time immemorial. In the landmark
case of Cariño vs. Insular Government the United States Supreme
Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine Supreme
Court, made the following pronouncement: . . . Every presumption
is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the
present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when,
as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by
individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed
to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land. . . . . The above ruling
institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to
land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession
under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an
exception to the theory of jura regalia. A proper reading of Cariño
would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to
lands which have always been considered as private, and not to lands
of the public domain, whether alienable or otherwise. A distinction
must be made between ownership of land under native title and
ownership by acquisitive prescription against the State. Ownership
by virtue a of native title presupposes that the land has been held by
its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an
owner since time immemorial. The land is not acquired from the
State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-interest, the United States
and the Philippine Government. There has been no transfer of title
from the State as the land has been regarded as private in character
as far back as memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land by
acquisitive prescription against the State involves a conversion of
the character of the property from alienable public land to private
land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private
person. Since native title assumes that the property covered by it is
private land and is deemed never to have been part of the public
domain, the Solicitor General's thesis that native title under Cariño
applies only to lands of the public domain is erroneous.
Consequently, the classification of lands of the public domain into
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks
under the Constitution is irrelevant to the application of the Cariño
doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State
ownership of lands of the public domain does not cover ancestral
lands and ancestral domains.
 2. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
NATURAL RESOURCES v. YAP
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
8 October 2008 | G.R. No. 167707 | R.T. Reyes | Regalian Doctrine
Doctrine: All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
Made by: Billie F. Blanco
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. It determines if lands of
public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. A positive act
Recit Ready: At stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
FACTS:
In Yap petition, then President, the late dictator, Ferdinand Marcos issued
● At the core of this case are two consolidated cases (herein, “Yap
Proclamation No. 1801, which declared Boracay Islands, among others as
petition” and “Sacay petition”) challenging the right of the present
tourist zones and marine reserves. Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
occupants Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied
Circular 3-82 was issued to implement the said Proclamation. Respondent-
lands.
claimants Mayor Jose Yap, Jr., et.al filed a petition for declaratory relief
● Yap petition
with the Regional Trial Court in Kalibo, Aklan. They contended that the
○ On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural
Proclamation and Circular precluded them from filing an application for
Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation
judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
Survey of Boracay Island. This identified several lots as
purposes.
occupied or claimed by named persons.
○ Then President, the late dictator, Ferdinand Marcos issued
During the pendency of the Yap petition, on May 22 2006, President Gloria
Proclamation No. 1801, which declared Boracay Islands,
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064, classifying Boracay
among others as tourist zones and marine reserves. Philippine
Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628 hectares of
Tourism Authority (PTA) Circular 3-82 was issued to
agricultural land. Respondent-claimants Orlando Sacay, et. al filed with
implement the said Proclamation.
the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification
○ Respondent-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, Jr., et.al filed a
of the said Proclamation. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on
petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court
their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay having been in
in Kalibo, Aklan. They contended that:
continued possession of their respective lots since time immemorial.
■ The Proclamation and Circular precluded them from filing
an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or
The issue of this case is whether or not the claimants have a right to secure
survey of land for titling purposes.
titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The Supreme Court ruled
■ They themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest,
that, claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, notorious
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over
possession and occupation of Boracay since 12 June, 1945
the occupied lands under the said law. In keeping with the presumption of
or since time immemorial.
State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must
■ The Proclamation and Circulation did not place
be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or
Boracay beyond the commerce of man and as a tourist
 zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. In fact,
under Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through
judicial confirmation of imperfect itles.
○ The Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), on the other hand,
argued that Boracay was an unclassified land of the public
domain. It formed part of the mass lands classified as
“public forests”, which was not available for disposition
under Sec. 3 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 705, or the
Revised Forestry Code. Since Boracay Islands had not been
classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they
had cannot ripen into ownership.
○ After submitting the case for the resolution upon submission of
memoranda, Yap, et.al were granted a favorable decision in the
RTC, which upheld their right to have their occupied lands
titled in their name. OSG moved for reconsideration, but was
denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the
RTC decision. Hence, the present petition.
● Sacay petition
○ During the pendency of the Yap petition, on May 22 2006,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064, classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved
forest land and 628 hectares of agricultural land.
○ Respondent-claimants Orlando Sacay, et. al filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of the said Proclamation They alleged that:
■ The Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested rights”
over portions of Boracay having been in continued
possession of their respective lots since time immemorial.
■ They invested billions in developing their lands and
building international renowned first class resorts.
■ There is no need for the proclamation reclassifying it to an
agricultural land because it is deemed agricultural under
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926.
○ OSG, on the contrary, argued that they do not have a vested
right as Boracay is an unclassified public forest land and as
such, portions are inalienable and cannot be subject of
judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
● Court ordered the consolidation of the two petition as they involved
the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the claimants have a right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay.- NO.
RATIO:
3. Except for lands already with existing titles, Boracay has never been
expressly and administratively classified before Proclamation No. 1064.
It was an unclassified land of public domain. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD 705.
4. Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public dominion
belongs to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
5. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State. It determines if lands
of public domain will be disposed of for private ownership.
6. The Court held that, a positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
7. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that
the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming such
presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
 ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
8. No such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report,
statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft
of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay
occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for
proof.
9. Ankron v. Government of the Philippines and de Aldecoa v. Insular
Government did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural.
○ These cases were decided under the provisions of Philippine Bill of
1902 and Act No. 926.
○ In these cases, the Supreme Court ruled that, “in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural
lands until the contrary is shown.” BUT, the Court clarified the
matter in the present case, stating that the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926 merely provided for the manner through which
land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain.
During this time, the President had no power to classify lands of
the public domain. Further, the assumption is absolute and in the
end, land classification is dependent on proof.
10. Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President
Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and disposable or
forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in
Proclamation No. 1801.
11. Claimants then are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights
over the occupied lands under the said law.
12. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
1. open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since
time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
2. the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
13. Claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying
on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No.
1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant
under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed
and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the
wording of the law itself. Where the land is not alienable and
disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer
ownership or possessory rights.
14. Neither may claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which
were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed to prove
the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court
of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
 3. REPUBLIC v. CA 1938, pursuant to said Decree, the Register of Deeds of Cagayan
AUG 6 2008 | G.R. No. 155450 | Carpio | Regalian Doctrine issued an Original Certificate of Title (OCT) in the name of
Made by: N. Caldozo spouses Carag. DcICEa
● The OCT was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly
stated in the Decree. Two transfer certificates of title were issued:
Recit Ready: The Court of First Instance of Cagayan issued a decree in
Transfer Certificate Title issued in the name of the Province of
favor of spouses Carag, covering a parcel of land in Tuguegarao, Cagayan.
Cagayan, consisting of 100,000 square meters and Transfer
The OCT was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in
Certificate of Title issued in the name of the private respondents
the Decree. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: Transfer
consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.
Certificate Title issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, and in the
● Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the
name of the private respondents. De dayag and others sent a letter-petition
Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and
requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of
Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition
the decree on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the
adjudicate a portion of the subject property 68 years after the issuance of
annulment of the decree on the ground that the trial court did not
the Decree, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for
have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property
annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titleson
which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of
the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a
issuance of the decree.
portion of the subject property. The SC held that the trial court had
● The investigating team of DENR claimed that "a portion of Lot
jurisdiction. Petitioner has not alleged and proven that the disputed portion
2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and disposable…”
had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public
● In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of
purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter.
the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of
Doctrine: Unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or
Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as
reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all
well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The
Crown lands were deemed alienable. This exclusion in Section 8 (Public
Director of Lands approved the recommendation.
Land Act) recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were
● On 10 June 1998,or 68 years after the issuance of the Decree,
per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise
petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for
reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law.
annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of
titles on the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction
FACTS: to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion
● On 2 June 1930, the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan (trial consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion). The
court) issued a decree in favor of spouses Antonio Carag and disputed portion was allegedly still classified as timber land at the
Victoria Turingan (spouses Carag), predecessors-in-interest of time of issuance of Decree No. 381928 and, therefore, was not
private respondents Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982 when the disputed
(private respondents), covering a parcel of land containing an area portion was classified as alienable and disposable.
of 7,047,673 square meters in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. On 19 July
 ● Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject
property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still
classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable,
when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner
admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject
property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and
disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only
the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had
the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.
IEAH
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the lands? YES.
RATIO:
● Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In
Aldecoa v. Insular Government,we ruled:
○ From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is
deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within
the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State
or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per
se alienableand, provided they are not destined to the use
of the public in general or reserved by the Government in
accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private
or juridical person . . . (Emphasis supplied)
● Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or
reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with
law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.
● In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had
been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public
purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or
thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the
complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was
part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The
certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information
Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the
disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.
● It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only
those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable.
Section 8 provides:
○ Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been o􏰉ficially delimited and
classi􏰉ed and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have
not been reserved for public or quasi- public uses, not
appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
become private property, nor those on which a private right
authorized and recognized by this Act or any other valid
law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest,
declare lands of the public domain open to disposition
before the same have had their boundaries established or
been surveyed, or may, for the same reasons, suspend their
concession or disposition by proclamation duly published
or by Act of the Legislature. (Emphasis supplied)
● Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well
as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are
not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for
purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that
during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless
falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for
some public purpose in accordance with law.
● Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification
requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate
these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the
disputed portion had not become private property prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the
disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be
claimed under any existing law at that time.
 ● As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the
issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had
jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the
disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral
land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and
that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and
a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the
original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not
appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as
agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago,
is now final and beyond review.
● Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural,
timber and mineral lands of the public domain belong to the State,
it recognized that these lands were "subject to any existing right,
grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution". When the
Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935
Constitution, spouses Carag had already an existing right to the
subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant to Decree No.
381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner Republic
of the Philippines' complaint for reversion, annulment of decree,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.
 4. Juan Ibañez de Aldecoa v. The Insular Government
circumstances.
March 12, 1909 | G.R. No. 3894 | J. Torres | Regalian Doctrine
Made by: E. Canceko
FACTS:
● In accordance with the new Land Registration Act, Juan Ibanez de
Recit Ready: Take note, the year was 1909. Juan Aldecoa applied for the
Aldecoa applied for the registration of his title to a parcel of land
registration of his land under the new Land Registration Act (Act No. 926).
(3,375 sq. meters) situated in the town of Surigao.
The Attorney-General objected to his application, and alleged that his land
● The Attorney-General objected to the registration applied for,
was the property of the US Government and is now controlled by the
alleging that the land in question was the property of the
Insular Government. Aldecoa prayed that Act No. 926 be applied to his
Government of the United States, and is now under the control of
land since it affords better facilities for securing titles. The Court of Land
the Insular Government.
Registration denied the petition, and cancelled the entry made of the
● Aldecoa alleged that at the time he requested the registration of the
property. Hence, this appeal.
land in question, Act No. 926 was not yet in force.
● As the latter affords better facilities for securing titles to property
The issue here is the fact that Act No. 926 governs “agricultural public
unprovided with them, he prayed that the same be applied to the
lands,” and it was argued that Aldecoa’s property was not an “agricultural
inscription of his land.
land” since he converted it into a building lot.
● Court of Land Registration denied the petition, and ordered the
cancellation of the entry made of the said property.
The court ruled that his property was still an agricultural land,
● The applicant excepted to this decision and moved for a new trial;
because “…even if they have ceased to be agricultural lands, they may later
his motion was overruled.
on again become transformed into farming land and, by the industry of the
owner, again be made to yield fruit.” And as long as the land is not mining
ISSUE:
or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the
W/N a parcel of land that is susceptible of being cultivated, and was
classification of agricultural land
converted into a building lot, is subject to the legal provisions in force
regarding Government public lands. YES
Doctrine: All public unappropriated lands, not mineral or forest lands, are
agricultural lands. All land classified as unappropriated or public land
RATIO:
belonging to the State, susceptible of alienation to private persons, and
● Brief history, just in case:
which is neither timber nor mining land, may be devoted to cultivation and
● The occupation or material possession together with the
converted into agricultural land at the will of the owner. Under this view,
improvement and cultivation for a certain number of years
any land or town lot, which may be converted into agricultural land and
was the method established by the Government to facilitate
planted with vegetation, if not being mining or forest land, and although
the acquisition thereof by private persons.
not actually used for agricultural purposes, is included within the legal
● Later, by the royal decrees of June 1880 and December
prescriptions governing agricultural lands, in consideration of its origin
1884, the system of composition with the State and that of
and of the fact that the same again became agricultural land under other
 sales by public auction were instituted as the means for ● Reserved by the Government in accordance with law
acquiring such lands. ● Considering their origin and primitive state and the general uses to
● After the change of sovereignty, the Commission enacted Land which they were accorded, they are called agricultural lands. The
Registration Act No. 926, relating to public lands: transformation they may have undergone is no obstacle to such
● “All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in classification as the possessors thereof may again convert them into
interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and rural estates.
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public ● If the land sought to be registered is neither mineral nor timber land,
lands xxx shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such and is susceptible of cultivation, the Act of Congress contains no
land under the provisions of this chapter.” provision whatever that would exclude it from being classified as
● In provincial towns, and in the suburbs of Manila, many houses are agricultural land.
to be seen that are erected on lots that form part of land used for ● Hence, the benefits of Act No. 926 must forthwith be applied for the
agricultural purposes. reason that it has been fully proven that the applicant was in
● If they have ceased to be such agricultural lands, they may later possession thereof for more than 13 years prior to the 26th of July.
on again become transformed into farming land and, by the
industry of the owner, again be made to yield fruit. DISPOSITION:
● Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, WHEREFORE, the view of the foregoing, it is our opinion that the judgment
and may be converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of appealed from should be reversed, and that it should be, as it is, hereby
vegetation. ordered, that, after holding in general default all such persons as may have
● For this reason, where land is not mining or forestal in its any interest in the said parcel of land, the registration of the same shall be
nature, it must necessarily be included within the granted in accordance with the Land Registration Act. No special ruling is
classification of agricultural land. made as to costs. So ordered.
● Besides, the Act of Congress contains only three
classifications, and makes no special provision with respect
to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be
agricultural land.
● In the case at bar, it is proper to apply thereto the laws in force
and classify it as agricultural land, inasmuch as it was
agricultural prior to its conversion into a building lot, and is
subject at any time to further rotation and cultivation.
Moreover, it does not appear that it was ever mining or forest land.
● All lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public
in character, and per se alienable and they may be acquired by any
private or juridical person. Except those:
● Comprised within the mineral and timber zone
● Not destined to the use of the public in general
5.
6.
 7. TRADERS ROYAL BANK v. COURT OF APPEALS
September 24, 1999 | G.R. No. 114299 | Kapunan | Purpose and
Meaning of Torrens System
Made by: Magi del Rosario
Recit Ready: Spouses Maximo and Patria Capay executed a mortgage in
favor of TRB pursuant to a loan they extended with the said bank. The
mortgaged properties included a parcel of land. When the loan became due,
the TRB instituted extra-judicial foreclosure. The Capays filed for
injunction in the CFI and for a notice of lis pendens over the property in
the Register of Deeds. The court issued a preliminary injunction that was
eventually lifted. The foreclosure sale went on and the property was bought
by TRB. A new TCT was entered into in the bank’s name excluding the
notice of lis pendens. Seven years later, the CFI rendered its decision
declaring the mortgage void for want of consideration. TRB appealed to
the CA. While the case was pending, TRB sold the land to Santiago whose
name a new TCT was issued also without any notice of lis pendens.
Santiago divided the land into 6 lots and sold them to Alcantara, et. al. who
thereafter sold the 6 lots whose titles bore no notice of lis pendens. The
Court ruled that TRB acted in bad faith for selling the property even when
with the notice of lis pendens attached to the TCT named in the Capays.
However, the Capays cannot recover the property anymore. The buyers in
good faith are protected by the Torrens Title. As recourse, the Court
ordered TRB to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the
time it was sold to Santiago.
FACTS:
● Spouses Maximo and Patria Capay executed a mortgage in favor of
TRB pursuant to a loan they extended with the said bank. The
mortgaged properties included a parcel of land.
● On January 8, 1961, the loan became due so TRB instituted extra-
judicial foreclosure proceedings upon the mortgaged property.
● On September 22, 1966, the Capays filed a filed a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction, alleging that the mortgage
was void since they did not receive the proceeds of the loan.
● On March 17, 1967, the Capays filed in the Register of Deeds of
Baguio City a notice of lis pendens over the property to prevent the
property’s sale by public auction. Said notice was entered in the Day
Book, as well as in the Capays' certificate of title.
● The trial court issued a preliminary injunction but was eventually
lifted thus allowing the foreclosure sale to proceed.
● Foreclosure proceedings were initiated and on October 17, 1968, the
property was sold to TRB which was the highest bidder at the
auction sale. A sheriff certificate of sale was issued in its name.
● On February 25, 1970, the property was consolidated in the name of
TRB, the sole bidder in the sale. A new TCT was entered in the
bank's name. However, the notice of lis pendens, was not carried
over in the certificate of title issued in the name TRB.
● The Capays filed with the CFI a supplemental complaint.
● On October 3, 1977, the CFI rendered its decision declaring the
mortgage void for want of consideration. The CFI ordered, among
other things, the cancellation of the TCT in the name of TRB and
the issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the Capay
spouses.
● TRB appealed to the CA. While the case was pending in the Court
of Appeals, TRB on March 17, 1982 sold the land to Emelita
Santiago in whose name a new certificate of title was issued, also,
without any notice of lis pendens.
● Santiago in turn divided the land into six (6) lots and sold these to
Marcial Alcantara, Armando Cruz and Artemio Sanchez, who
became co-owners thereof. Alcantara and his co-owners developed
the property and thereafter sold the six (6) lots to seperate buyers
who issued seperate titles, again, bearing no notice of lis pendens.
● The spouses then filed a complaint for recovery of possession
ownership.
ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses can recover the disputed property (NO)
RATIO:
● The Capays who, after sleeping on their rights for fifteen years to
assert ownership over the property that has undergone several
transfers made in good faith and for value and already subdivided
into several lots with improvements introduced thereon by their
owners, are barred by prescription.
● The Capays knew in 1968 of the extra-judicial foreclosure sale of
the property to TRB and the consolidation of title in the bank's name
following the lapse of the one-year period of redemption. But in the
next fifteen (15) years or so, they did not bother to find out the status
of their title or whether the liens noted on the original certificate of
title were still existing considering that the property had already
been foreclosed.
● TRB, however, admits holding on to the foreclosed property for
twelve (12) years after consolidating title in its name. The bank is,
therefore, estopped from involving banking laws and regulations to
justify its belated disposition of the property. It cannot be allowed
to hide behind the law which it itself violated.
● Central Bank regulations require that real properties of banks should
not he held for more than five (5) years.
● TRB cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lis pendens
because when the property was foreclosed by it, the notice of lis
pendens was annotated on the title. But when the TCT in the name
of the Capay spouses was cancelled after the foreclosure, the TCT
which was issued in place thereof in the name of TRB did not carry
over the notice of lis pendens.
● The Court does not find the Capays guilty of "inaction and
negligence" as against TRB. It may be recalled that upon the
commencement of foreclosure proceedings by TRB, the Capays
filed an action for prohibition on September 22, 1966 against the
TRB before the CFI to stop the foreclosure sale. Failing in that
attempt, the Capays filed a supplemental complaint for the recovery
of the property.
● Prescription or laches could not have worked against the Capays
because they had persistently pursued their suit against TRB to
recover their property.
● The TRB took advantage of the absence of the notice of lis pendens
at the back of their certificate of title and sold the property to an
unwary purchaser. The bank acted in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy and should be held liable for
damages.
● Considering however, that the mortgage in favor of TRB had been
declared null and void for want of consideration and, consequently,
the foreclosure proceedings did not have a valid effect, the Capays
would ordinarily be entitled to the recovery of their property.
Nevertheless, this remedy is not now available to the Capays
inasmuch as title to said property has passed into the hands of third
parties who acquired the same in good faith and for value.
● Such being the case, TRB is duty bound to pay the Capays the fair
market value of the property at the time it was sold to Emelita
Santiago, the transferee of TRB.
● Santiago, et. al. acquired their respective portions of the land with
clean title from their predecessors-in-interest. They had a right to
rely on what appeared on the face of the title of their respective
predecessors-in-interest, and were not bound to go beyond the same.
To hold otherwise would defeat one of the principal objects of the
Torrens system of land registration, that is, to facilitate transactions
involving lands.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24,
1994 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33920, as modified by its Resolution dated August
10, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED. In addition, Traders Royal Bank is ordered
to pay the Capays the fair market value of the property at the time it was sold
to Emelita Santiago.
DOCTRINE:
The main purpose of the Torrens system is to avoid possible conflicts of title
to real estate and to facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public
the right to rely upon the face of a Torrens certificate of title and to dispense
with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that should impel a reasonably
cautious man to make such further inquiry.

Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the certificate of

title thus issued, acquire rights over the property, the court cannot disregard
such rights and order the total cancellation of the certificate. The effect of
such an outright cancellation would be to impair public confidence in the
certificate of title, for everyone dealing with property registered under the
Torrens system would have to inquire in every instance as to whether the title
has been regularly or irregularly issued by the court. Every person dealing
with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of
title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the
certificate to determine the condition of the property.
 8. SPS. ALFONSO AND MARIA ANGELES CUSI v LILIA V.
the two spouses though, and held that they were NOT purchasers in good
DOMINGO | RAMON LIZA L. DE VERA v LILA V. DOMINGO
faith and for value. The CA affirmed the decision. The SC also affirmed
AND SPS. RADELIA AND ALFRED SY
the decision of the lower courts, holding that the petitioners were shown to
February 7, 2013 |BERSAMIN., J. | PURPOSE AND MEANING OF
have been deficient in their vigilance as buyers of the property, given that
TORRENS SYSTEM
they should have been extra careful since the TCT of Sy was a
T. DELA ROSA &
reconstituted one and was subject to several simultaneous transactions.

PETITIONER:
Case 1 (GR 195825): Sps. Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi
Case 2 (GR 195871): Ramon Liza L. De Vera
RESPONDENT:
Case 1: Lilia V. Domingo
Case 2: Lilia V. Domingo & Sps. Radela and Alfred Sy
RECIT-READY: Note: this is a consolidated petition. The land in dispute
here is a 658 sqm vacant, unfenced lot lacted in White Plains, QC. The lot
is covered by a TCT registered under the name of Lila Domingo. In July
1999, she found out that construction activities were happening on her lot,
without her consent. She later on found out that a certain Radelia Sy had
gone to the RTC to ask for an issuance of anew owner’s copy of Domingo’s
TCT, attaching on it a Deed of Absolute Sale that was allegedly executed
in Sy’s favor. Sy also attached an affidavit of loss (she claimed that her
bag that had the owner’s copy was snatched from her in SM North EDSA).
After obtaining a new TCT, she then subdivided the lot and sold each half
to Sps. Cusi and Sps. De Vera for P1,000,000 each. (Note: the value of the
property was not less than P14,000,000). Domingo was not aware of these
transactions and as such, her TCT remained in her undisturbed possession.
FACTS:
She found out that the construction activities were the De Veras doing - in
exercise of their dominical and possessory rights. Domingo thus filed an
action in the RTC seeking the annulment or cancellation of titles,
injunction and damages. The RTC ruled first that the sale between
Domingo and Sy were void but that the Sps Cusi and Sps De Vera were
purchasers in good faith and for value. They changed their ruling regarding
Another circumstance indicating that the Cusis and the De Veras were not
innocent purchasers for value was the gross undervaluation of the property
in the deeds of sale at the measly price of P1,000,000.00 for each half when
the true market value was then in the aggregate of at least P14,000,000.00
for the entire property. As such, the Court restored to Domingo her rights
of dominion over the property. Although as per the Torrens System, they
could have relied on the certificate of title so as to dispense with the need
of inquiring further, the circumstances showed that they had actual
knowledge of facts that should have compelled them to make further
inquiries.
DOCTRINE:
“A person dealing in registered land has the right to rely on the Torrens
certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry"
● The cases under review before the SC are two consolidated appeals
concerning a reissued owner’s copy of certificate of title and the
subsequent sales involving it.
● Lilia V. Domingo is the owner of a vacant unfenced lot in White
Plains, QC. It has an area of 658 sqm. The lot was covered by
 Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. N-165606 issued in the name
of respondent Lilia.
● In July 1999, she found out that construction activities were being
undertaken on her property without her consent.
● Lilia later found out that on July 18, 1997, Radelia Sy represented
herself as the owner of the property and then petitioned the RTC for
the issuance of a new owner’s copy of Domingo's TCT No. N-
165606, appending to her petition a deed of absolute sale dated July
14, 1997, allegedly executed in her favor.
○ She attached an affidavit of loss dated July 17, 1997 - she
claimed that her bag which contained the owner’s copy was
snatched from her while she was in SM North EDSA.
● The RTC granted Radelia’s petition on August 26, 1997.
○ The Registry of Deeds of Quezon City then issued a new
owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. N-165606, which was
later cancelled by virtue of the deed of absolute sale dated
July 14, 1997, and in its stead the Registry of Deeds of
Quezon City issued TCT No. 186142 in Sy's name.
● Radelia then subdivided the property into 2 and sold each half by
way of contract to sell to Sps. Edgardo and Ramona Liza De Vera
and to Sps. Alfonso and Maria Angeles Cusi.
● The consideration of the sale was P1,000,000.00 for each set of
buyers, or for a total of P2,000,000.00 for the entire property that
had an actual worth of not less than P14,000,000.00
○ As such, the TCT under Radelia’s name was cancelled by
virtue of the deeds of sale for the De Veras and the Cusis.
(to whom were respectively issued TCT No. 189568 and
TCT No. 189569)
● The transactions between Sy and the De Veras, and between Sy and
the Cusis were unknown to Domingo, whose TCT No. N-165606
remained in her undisturbed possession.
● As it turned out, the construction activities taking place on the
property were upon the initiative of the De Veras
● Lilia commenced an action against Radelia and Alfred Sy in the
RTC, seeking the annulment or cancellation of titles, injunction and
damages.
● The RTC initially ruled the sale between Lila and Radelia as VOID
but declared that the De Veras and Cusis as purchasers in good faith
and for value. They also found Radella liable to Lilia for the value
of the property, plus interest and damages.
● On the motion for reconsideration filed separately by Sy and
Domingo, the RTC rendered a new decision
○ the sale between Lila and Radelia was declared VOID and
OF NO EFFECT
○ They also held that the De Veras and Cusis were NOT
actually purchasers in good faith and for value.
○ Their TCTs were thus cancelled and declared null and void
ab initio. Lilia’s TCT was revalidated.
○ Radelia was found guilty of damages to Lilia
○ The court held that the decision was without prejudice to
whatever civil action for recovery and damages, the
defendants Sps. De Vera and Sps. Cusi may have against
defendant Spouses Radelia and Alfred Sy.
● The CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification of the damages
to be paid to the Domingos.
ISSUES:
● W/N the CA erred in finding that TCT No. 186142 registered in
Radelia Sy is a reconstituted title
● W/N the petitioners are buyers in good faith and for value - NO
● In GR No. 195871 the issue is W/N De Vera was an innocent
purchaser for value in good faith - NO
RATIO:
● The SC found that the petitions for review were bereft of merit
● Under the Torrens system of land registration, the State is
required to maintain a register of landholdings that guarantees
indefeasible title to those included in the register. The system
 has been instituted to combat the problems of uncertainty,
complexity and cost associated with old title systems that
depended upon proof of an unbroken chain of title back to a
good root of title.
● One of the guiding tenets underlying the Torrens system is the
curtain principle, in that one does not need to go behind the
certificate of title because it contains all the information about the
title of its holder. This principle dispenses with the need of proving
ownership by long complicated documents kept by the registered
owner
● The curtain principle, assures that all the necessary information
regarding ownership is on the certificate of title.
● The avowed objective of the Torrens system is to obviate possible
conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face
of the Torrens certificate and, as a rule, to dispense with the
necessity of inquiring further;
○ on the part of the registered owner, the system gives him
complete peace of mind that he would be secured in his
ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any
right over the covered land.
● The Philippines adopted the Torrens system through Act No. 496,
also known as the Land Registration Act. This took effect on
February 1, 1903.
● In this jurisdiction, therefore, "a person dealing in registered land
has the right to rely on the Torrens certificate of title and to
dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the
party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry"
● There is no question that the petitioners exerted some effort as
buyers to determine whether the property did rightfully belong to
Sy. For one, they did not find any encumbrance, like a notice of lis
pendens, being annotated on the TCT of Sy.
○ However, their observance of a certain degree of diligence
within the principles of the Torrens system was not only
their barometer under the law. They had to gauge the
validity of their acquisition also by making sure that they
were not only purchasers in good faith but also for value.
● The petitioners were shown to have been deficient in their vigilance
as buyers of the property. It was not enough for them to show that
the property was unfenced and vacant; otherwise, it would be too
easy for any registered owner to lose her property, including its
possession, through illegal occupation. It was not safe for them to
simply rely on the face of Sy's TCT No. 186142 in view of the fact
that they were aware that her TCT was derived from a duplicate
owner's copy reissued by virtue of the loss of the original duplicate
owner's copy. That circumstance should have already alerted them
to the need to inquire beyond the face of Sy's TCT No. 186142.
● There were other circumstances, like the almost simultaneous
transactions affecting the property within a short span of time. Given
that Radelia’s copy was a subsequent copy, this should have put on
notice of such fact that anyone dealing with such copies should be
warned to be extra-careful.
● As in the case of Garcia v Court of Appeals,
○ An impostor succeeded in tricking a court of law into
granting his petition for the issuance of a duplicate owner's
copy of the supposedly lost TCT. The impostor then had
the TCT cancelled by presenting a purported deed of sale
between him and the registered owners, both of whom had
already been dead for some time, and another TCT was
then issued in the impostor's own name. This issuance in
the impostor's own name was followed by the issuance of
yet another TCT in favor of a third party, supposedly the
buyer of the impostor. In turn, the impostor's transferee
(already the registered owner in his own name) mortgaged
the property to Spouses Miguel and Adela Lazaro, who
then caused the annotation of the mortgage on the TCT. All
the while, the original duplicate owner's copy of the TCT
remained in the hands of an heir of the deceased registered
owners with his co-heirs' knowledge and consent.
 ○ The Court in this case found that the Lazaros did not deal
on the property in good faith because: (a) "the title of the
property mortgaged to the Lazaros was a second owner's
duplicate TCT, which is, in effect a reconstituted title. This
circumstance should have alerted them to make the
necessary investigation, but they did not;" and (b) their
argument, that "because the TCT of the property on which
their mortgage lien was annotated did not contain the
annotation: "Reconstituted title," the treatment of the
reissued duplicate owner's copy of the TCT as akin to a
reconstituted title did not apply, had no merit.
● The Court also found that the Cusis and De Veras were aware of
several simultaneous transactions affecting the property.
○ The records also show that the forged deed of sale from
Domingo to Sy appeared to be executed on July 14, 1997;
that the affidavit of loss by which Sy would later on support
her petition for the issuance of the duplicate owner's copy
of Domingo's TCT No. 165606 was executed on July 17,
1997, the very same day in which Sy registered the
affidavit of loss in the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City;
that Sy led the petition for the issuance of the duplicate
owner's copy of Domingo's TCT No. 165606; that the RTC
granted her petition on August 26, 1997; and that on
October 31, 1997, a real estate mortgage was executed in
favor of one Emma Turingan, with the mortgage being
annotated on TCT No. 165606 on November 10, 1997.
● Another circumstance indicating that the Cusis and the De Veras
were not innocent purchasers for value was the gross undervaluation
of the property in the deeds of sale at the measly price of
P1,000,000.00 for each half when the true market value was then in
the aggregate of at least P14,000,000.00 for the entire property.
○ Even if the undervaluation was to accommodate the request
of Sy to enable her to minimize her liabilities for the capital
gains tax, their acquiescence to the fraud perpetrated
against the Government, no less, still rendered them as
parties to the wrongdoing. They were not any less guilty at
all.
● De Vera particularly insists that she and her late husband did not
have any hand in the undervaluation; and that Sy, having prepared
the deed of sale, should alone be held responsible for the
undervaluation that had inured only to her bene t as the seller.
However, such insistence was rendered of no consequence herein by
the fact that neither she nor her late husband had seen fit to rectify
the undervaluation. It is notable that the De Veras were contracting
parties who appeared to have transacted with full freedom from
undue influence from Sy or anyone else.
● Good faith is the honest intention to abstain from taking
unconscientious advantage of another. It means the "freedom from
knowledge and circumstances which ought to put a person on
inquiry.
● A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
such property and pays full and fair price for the same.
● The petitioners were not innocent purchasers in good faith and for
value. Their failure to investigate Sy's title despite the nearly
simultaneous transactions on the property that ought to have put
them on inquiry manifested their awareness of the flaw in Sy's title.
That they did not also appear to have paid the full price for their
share of the property evinced their not having paid true value
Resultantly, the Court affirms the lower courts, and restores to Domingo her
rights of dominion over the property.
WHEREFORE, the CourtAFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on July 16, 2010; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs
of suit.
SO ORDERED.
 9. Castillo v Escutin
March 13, 2009 | G.R. No. 171056 | Chico-Nazario| DISTINCTION B/W
"TITLE" AND "CERTIFICATE OF TITLE"
Made by: R. Dysico
Recit Ready: Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K.
Moratilla (Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her
search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner
discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and sister
Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of land consisting
of 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy. Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City,
Batangas, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449.
Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was able to
secure an Order[6] dated 4 March 1999 issued by Secretary Horacio R.
Morales, Jr. of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) approving the
application of Summit Point Golf & Country Club, Inc. for conversion of
several agricultural landholdings, including Lot 13713 owned by "Perla K.
Mortilla, et al." and covered by Tax Declaration No. 00449, to residential,
commercial, and recreational uses.
Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot 13713, and
the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on 14 May 2002.
Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled public auction sale,
petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the Summit Point Golf and
Country Club Subdivision owned by Summit Point Realty and
Development Corporation (Summit Realty). She immediately went to the
Makati City office of Summit Realty to meet with its Vice President,
Orense. However, she claimed that Orense did not show her any document
to prove... ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even threatened
her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too powerful
and influential for petitioner to tangle with.
The records of the Registry reveals that the source of the rights or interest
of the adverse claimant is by virtue of a Levy on Execution by the Regional
Trial Court Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 30, San Pablo City, in Civil
Case No. SP-4489 (1996), [Dinah] C. Castillo vs. Raquel Buenaventura.
The registered owner, Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation
nor its predecessor-in-interest are not the judgment debtor or a party in the
said case. Simply stated, there is no privity of contract between them. If
ever, her adverse claim is against Raquel Buenaventura, the judgment
debtor who holds no title over the property.
The LRA distinguished between two systems of land registration: one is
the Torrens system for registered lands under the Property Registration
Decree, and the other is the system of registration for unregistered land
under Act No. 3344 (now Section 113 of the Property Registration
Decree).
These systems are separate and distinct from each other. For documents
involving registered lands, the same should be recorded under the Property
Registration Decree. The registration, therefore, of an instrument under the
wrong system produces no legal effect.
Issue: W/N the CA was correct in cancelling the tax declaration of
petitioner on subject land in violation of sec 109 of PD 1529 (YES)
Ruling:
Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of possessing that
which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of ownership of property,
real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined briefly as that which
constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or which is the foundation
of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on the other hand, is a mere
evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself. Under the Torrens
system, a certificate of title may be an Original Certificate of Title, which
constitutes a true copy of the decree of registration; or a Transfer
Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the original registration. which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on
the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the
Petitioner's reliance on Section 109 of the Property Registration Decree is
land itself. Under the Torrens system, a certificate of title may be an
totally misplaced. It provides for the requirements for the issuance of a lost
Original Certificate of Title, which constitutes a true copy of the decree of
duplicate certificate of title. It cannot, in any way, be related to the
registration; or a Transfer Certificate of Title, issued subsequent to the
cancellation of petitioner's tax declaration.
original registration.
As between Catigbac's title, covered by a certificate of title, and petitioner's
title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is evidently far
superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate of title to the same
FACTS:
property, conclusive and indefeasible as to
Catigbac's ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac's certificate of title is binding ● Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
upon the whole world, including respondent public officers and even Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioner Dinah C. Castillo
petitioner herself. seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision, dated 18
October 2005, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533,
"[c]uriously, as to how and when petitioner's alleged predecessor-in-
as well as the Resolution, dated 11 January 2006 of the same court
interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed co-owners acquired
denying reconsideration of its afore-mentioned Decision. The
portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in TD No. 00449, petitioner
Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the Joint
had so far remained utterly silent." it must be remembered that Summit
Resolution dated 28 April 2004 and Joint Order dated 20 June
Realty had already acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its
2005 of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in OMB-
name over Lot 1-B, which constitutes conclusive and indefeasible evidence
L-A-03-0573-F and OMB-L-C-03-0728-F, dismissing petitioner
of its ownership of the said property
Dinah C. Castillo's complaint for grave misconduct and violation
Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions and to of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
convincingly explain that they had only acted in accordance therewith in Corrupt Practices Act, as amended, against respondent public
their dealings with petitioner and/or her documents. officers Antonio M. Escutin (Escutin), Aquilina A. Mistas (Mistas)
Respondents' actions were only consistent with the recognition of the title and Marietta L. Linatoc (Linatoc), together with private individuals
of Catigbac over Lot 1-B, transferred by sale to Summit Realty, registered Lauro S. Leviste II (Leviste) and Benedicto L. Orense (Orense).
under the Torrens system, and accordingly evidenced by certificates of ● Petitioner is a judgment creditor of a certain Raquel K. Moratilla
title. (Raquel), married to Roel Buenaventura. In the course of her
search for properties to satisfy the judgment in her favor, petitioner
discovered that Raquel, her mother Urbana Kalaw (Urbana), and
Doctrine: Title is generally defined as the lawful cause or ground of sister Perla K. Moratilla (Perla), co-owned Lot 13713, a parcel of
possessing that which is ours. It is that which is the foundation of land consisting of 15,000 square meters, situated at Brgy.
ownership of property, real or personal. Title, therefore, may be defined Bugtongnapulo, Lipa City, Batangas, and covered by Tax
briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession, or Declaration No. 00449.
● Petitioner set about verifying the ownership of Lot 13713. She was
also able to get from the Office of the City Assessor, Lipa City, a
Certification stating that Lot 13713, covered by Tax Declaration
No. 00554-A, was in the name of co-owners Raquel, Urbana, and
Perla. It was not covered by a certificate of title, whether judicial
or patent, or subject to the issuance of a Certificate of Land
Ownership Award or patent under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.
● Only thereafter did petitioner proceed to levy on execution Lot
13713, and the public auction sale of the same was scheduled on
14 May 2002. Sometime in May 2002, before the scheduled public
auction sale, petitioner learned that Lot 13713 was inside the
Summit Point Golf and Country Club Subdivision owned by
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation (Summit
Realty). She immediately went to the Makati City office of
Summit Realty to meet with its Vice President, Orense. However,
she claimed that Orense did not show her any document to prove
ownership of Lot 13713 by Summit Realty, and even threatened
her that the owners of Summit Realty, the Leviste family, was too
powerful and influential for petitioner to tangle with.
● The public auction sale pushed through on 14 May 2002, and
petitioner bought Raquel's 1/3 pro-indiviso share in Lot 13713.
● When petitioner attempted to pay real estate taxes for her 5,000-
square-meter share in Lot 13713, she was shocked to find out that,
without giving her notice, her Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was
cancelled. Lot 13713 was said to be encompassed in and
overlapping with the 105,648 square meter parcel of land known as
Lot 1-B, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
129642 and Tax Declaration No. 00949-A, both in the name of
Francisco Catigbac (Catigbac). The reverse side of TCT No.
129642 bore three entries, reflecting the supposed sale of Lot 1-B
to Summit Realty
● TCT No. 129642 in the name of Catigbac was cancelled and TCT
No. T-134609 in the name of Summit Realty was issued in its
place.
● The foregoing incidents prompted petitioner to file a Complaint
Affidavit before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
charging several public officers and private individuals as follows:
I respectfully charge that on or about the months of June 2002 and
July 2002 and onwards in Lipa City, Atty. Antonio M. [Escutin],
the Register of Deeds of Lipa City[;] Aquilina A. Mistas, the Local
Assessment Operations Officer III of the City Assessor's Office of
Lipa City[;] Marietta Linatoc, Records Clerk, Office of the City
Assessor of Lipa City, who are public officers and acting in
concert and conspiring with Lauro S. Leviste II and Benedicto L.
Orense, Executive Vice-President and Vice-President,
respectively[,] of Summit Point Realty and Development
Corporation while in the discharge of their administrative functions
did then and there unlawfully, through evident bad faith, gross
inexcusable negligence and with manifest partiality towards
Summit caused me injury in the sum of P20,000,000.00 by
cancelling my TD #00942-A in the Office of the City Assessor of
Lipa City and instead issuing in the name of Francisco Catigbac
TC #00949-A when aforesaid personalities well knew that TCT
No. 129642 was already cancelled and therefore not legally
entitled to a new tax declaration thereby manifestly favoring
Summit Point Realty and Development Corporation who now
appears to be the successor-in-interest of Francisco Catigbac, all to
my damage and prejudice.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA was correct in cancelling the tax declaration of petitioner on
subject land in violation of sec 109 of PD 1529 (YES)
RATIO:
● SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. - In
case of loss or theft of an owner's duplicate certificate of title, due
notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by someone in his
 behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land
lies as soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate
is lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced by a person applying for
the entry of a new certificate to him or for the registration of any
new instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or
destruction may be filed by the registered owner or other person in
interest and registered.
● Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest,
the court may, after notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a
new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a memorandum of the
fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall
in all respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original
duplicate, and shall thereafter be regarded as such for all purposes
of this decree.
● The cancellation of petitioner's Tax Declaration No. 00942-A was
not because of the issuance of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No.
181, but of the fact that Lot 1-B, which encompassed the 5,000
square meters petitioner lays claim to, was already covered by TCT
No. 181 (and subsequently by TCT No. 129642) in the name of
Catigbac. A certificate of title issued is an absolute and indefeasible
evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose
name appears therein. It is binding and conclusive upon the whole
world. All persons must take notice, and no one can plead ignorance
of the registration. Therefore, upon presentation of TCT No.
129642, the Office of the City Assessor must recognize the
ownership of Lot 1-B by Catigbac and issue in his name a tax
declaration for the said property. And since Lot 1-B is already
covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac, accordingly,
any other tax declaration for the same property or portion thereof in
the name of another person, not supported by any certificate of title,
such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City
Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from different
persons on one and the same property.
● As between Catigbac's title, covered by a certificate of title, and
petitioner's title, evidenced only by a tax declaration, the former is
evidently far superior and is, in the absence of any other certificate
of title to the same property, conclusive and indefeasible as to
Catigbac's ownership of Lot 1-B. Catigbac's certificate of title is
binding upon the whole world, including respondent public officers
and even petitioner herself. Time and again, the Court has ruled that
tax declarations and corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to
prove title to or ownership of a real property inasmuch as they are
not conclusive evidence of the same. Petitioner acquired her title to
the 5,000 square meter property from Raquel, her judgment debtor
who, it is important to note, likewise only had a tax declaration to
evidence her title. In addition, the Court of Appeals aptly observed
that, "[c]uriously, as to how and when petitioner's alleged
predecessor-in-interest, Raquel K. Moratilla and her supposed co-
owners acquired portions of Lot 1 described as Lot 13713 stated in
TD No. 00449, petitioner had so far remained utterly silent
● Petitioner's allegations of defects or irregularities in the sale of Lot
1-B to Summit Realty by Yagin, as Catigbac's attorney-in-fact, are
beyond the jurisdiction of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon to consider. It must be remembered that Summit Realty had
already acquired a certificate of title, TCT No. T-134609, in its name
over Lot 1-B, which constitutes conclusive and indefeasible
evidence of its ownership of the said property and, thus, cannot be
collaterally attacked in the administrative and preliminary
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman for
Luzon. Section 48 of the Property Registration Decree categorically
provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral
attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. For this same reason, the Court
has no jurisdiction to grant petitioner's prayer in the instant Petition
for the cancellation of TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit
Realty.
● Respondents were able to clearly describe their official functions
and to convincingly explain that they had only acted in accordance
therewith in their dealings with petitioner and/or her documents.
Respondents also enjoy in their favor the presumption of regularity
 in the performance of their official duty. The burden of proving
otherwise by substantial evidence falls on petitioner, who failed to
discharge the same.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated 18 October 2005 and Resolution dated 11
January 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 90533 are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioner Dinah C. Castillo.

ASSENTING/DISSENTING OPINIONS:
If any
 10. Manuela Grey Alba, et.al. v. Anacieto R. de la Cruz Bulacan. On Feb. 12, 1908, the court then entered a decree stating
Sept 16, 1910 | G.R. No. 5246 | Trent, J. | SEC. 2, PD 1529 - that the land described in the petition be registered in the names of
NATURE OF REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS AS AN ACTION IN the petitioners. However, on June 16, 1908, Anacieto de la Cruz
REM, COURTS JURISDICTION filed a motion in the Court of Land Registration asking for a revision
S. Espiritu of the case on the ground that he is the absolute owner of the two (2)
parcels of agricultural land which formed part of the parcel of land
registered under the four (4) petitioners. According to him, the
Recit Ready: The four (4) petitioners herein sought the registration of a
petitioners obtained the two (2) parcels of agricultural land
parcel of agricultural land in Bulacan. On Feb. 12, 1908, the court then
maliciously and fraudulently, thereby depriving him of said two
entered a decree stating that the land described in the petition be registered
parcels of land. Anacieto de la Cruz argued that he inherited these
in the names of the petitioners. However, on June 16, 1908, Anacieto de
two (2) parcels of land from his father to which his father received
la Cruz insisted that he is the absolute owner of the two (2) parcels of
ownership when the state granted them unto him. Thus, Anacieto de
agricultural land which formed part of the parcel of land registered under
la Cruz posits that the case should be reopened and modified to
the four (4) petitioners. Anacieto de la Cruz argued that he inherited these
reflect that he indeed is the absolute owner of the two (2) parcels of
two (2) parcels of land from his father to which his father received
agricultural land.
ownership when the state granted unto him. Thus, Anacieto de la Cruz
● Petitioners countered that Anacieto de la Cruz as their tenant and not
posits that the case should be reopened and modified to reflect that he
as as an occupant, thus they saw no need to include his name in the
indeed is the absolute owner of the two (2) parcels of agricultural land.
petition of registration. The Land Court upon this motion reopened
the case, and after hearing the additional evidence presented by both
Petitioners countered that Anacieto de la Cruz as their tenant and not as as
parties, rendered, on Nov. 23, 1908, its decision modifying the
an occupant, thus they saw no need to include his name in the petition of
former decree by excluding from the same the two parcels of land
registration. The Land Court ruled in favor of Anacieto de la Cruz, thus
claimed by Anacleto Ratilla de la Cruz.
modifying the decree and excluding the two (2) parcels of land. Aggrieved,
● The Land Court held that the failure on the part of the petitioners to
the petitioners appealed.
include the name of the appellee in their petition, as an occupant of
these two parcels of land, was a violation of section 21 of Act No.
The Court ruled that the petitioners acted without fraud when they did not
include Anacieto de la Cruz in their petition of registration since they did 496, and that this constituted fraud within the meaning of section 38
not have any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any right, or in any of said Land Registration Act. The trial court further held that the
way injure him. The Court further stated that since there was no fraud, the grant from the estate should prevail over the public document of
reopening of the case should not have happened. purchase of 1864. Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed hence the
present case.

ISSUE:
FACTS: Issue/s: W/N the modification by of the decree as to exclude said land will
● The four (4) petitioners, Manuela, Jose, Juan, and Francisco Grey prosper? No
Alba herein sought the registration of a parcel of agricultural land in RELEVANT: W/N the case at bar was in rem? YES
RATIO:
● The Court ruled that the petitioners acted without fraud when they
did not include Anacieto de la Cruz in their petition of registration
since they did not have any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee
of any right, or in any way injure him. The Court further stated that
since there was no fraud, the reopening of the case should not have
happened
● The said decree of February 12, 1908, should not have been opened
on account of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person
affected thereby, and could have been opened only on the ground
that the said decree had been obtained by fraud. That decree was not
obtained by fraud on the part of the applicants, inasmuch as they
honestly believed that the appellee was occupying these two small
parcels of land as their tenant
● Regarding the second issue, the main principle of registration is to
make registered titles indefeasible. Upon the presentation in court of
an application for the registration of the title to lands, the theory
under the Torrens system is that all occupants, adjoining owners,
adverse claimants, and other interested persons are notified of the
proceedings, and have a right to appear in opposition to such
application. In other words, the proceeding is against the world.
DOCTRINE:
"Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary
requirements of justice, a proceeding in rem dealing with a tangible res may
be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon claimants
within the State or notice by name to those outside of it, and not encounter
any provision of either constitution. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of
the court over the res. As we have said, such a proceeding would be
impossible, were this not so, for it hardly would do to make a distinction
between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those
who were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all." (Tyler
v. Judges, supra.)
"If the technical object of the suit is to establish a claim against some
particular person, with a judgment which generally, in theory at least, binds
his body, or to bar some individual claim or objection, so that only certain
persons are entitled to be heard in defense, the action is in personam, although
it may concern the right to or possession of a tangible thing. If, on the other
hand, the object is to bar indifferently all who might be minded to make an
objection of any sort against the right sought to be established, and if anyone
in the world has a right to be heard on the strength of alleging facts which, if
true, show an inconsistent interest, the proceeding is in rem." (Tyler v.
Judges, supra.)
DISPOSITION:
The judgment appealed from should be, and the same is hereby reversed and
judgment entered in favor of the petitioners in conformity with the decree of
the lower court of February 12, 1908, without special ruling as to costs. It is
so ordered
NOTES: Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that:
SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.-Judicial
proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines shall be
in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles underlying the
Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all applications
for original registration of title to lands, including improvements and interests
therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with
power to hear and determine a questions arising upon such applications or
petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land
Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits,
orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for land
registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days from
the filing or issuance there
 11. Tomas Averia, Jr. v. The Honorable Milagros V. Caguioa
registration of title, with power to hear and determine all questions arising
December 29, 1986 | G.R. No. 65129 | Cruz, J. | SEC. 2, PD 1529 -
upon such applications or petitions.
COMPARED WITH SEC. 51 AND 52 OF PD 1529
Since the respondent court proceeded to hear the case and arrived at its
K. LOPEZ DE LEON &
decision after considering only the evidence of the private respondent and
without regard to the evidence of the petitioner, the Court held that the
Recit Ready: The complaint stemmed on the decision rendered by the decision of the RTC is to be set aside and a new trial of Cadastral Case is
RTC of Lucena City (respondent) regarding the hearing of registration to be held whereby the petitioner, as well as other interested parties, shall
proceedings of a deed of sale. be given the opportunity to be heard.
Averia (petitioner) refused to participate in the said hearing, alleging that Doctrine: Specifically with reference to Section 112 of the Land
the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no competence to act Registration Act (now Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer
upon the said case under Section 112 of Act. 496, otherwise known as the fettered by its former limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief
Land Registration Act. Despite the absence of the petitioner during the only in cases where there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of
hearing, the respondent court still rendered a decision ex parte ordering the them raised any "adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended
registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence presented by Veronica law (PD No. 1529), the court is now authorized to hear and decide not
Padillo (private respondent) in the case. Thereafter, petitioner filed a only such non-controversial cases but even this contentious and
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against substantial issues, such as the question at bar, which were beyond its
the respondent court, based on the argument that the lower court had no competence before.
competence to act on the registration sought becase of the absence of
unanimity among the parties as required by Sec. 112 of Land Registration
FACTS:
Act.
● The complaint stemmed on the decision rendered by Judge Cagiuoa
Issue: W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction to order the registration
of the RTC of Lucena City (respondent) regarding the hearing of
of deed of sale which is opposed on the ground of an tencedent contract to
registration proceedings of a deed of sale.
sell.
● Averia (petitioner) refused to participate in the said hearing, alleging
Held: SC ruled that while this was a correct interpretation of the aforesaid
that the respondent court, acting as a cadastral court, had no
provision, the same is, however, not applicable to the instant case. The
competence to act upon the said case under Section 112 of Act. 496,
reason is that this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act.
been superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which became
● Despite the absence of the petitioner during the hearing, the
effective on June 11, 1979.
respondent court still rendered a decision ex parte ordering the
The provision under Sec. 2 of PD. 1529 has eliminated the distinction
registration prayed for on the basis of the evidence presented by
between the general jurisdiction vested in the RTC and the limited
Veronica Padillo (private respondent) in the case. Thereafter,
jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
cadastral court. The change has simplified registration proceedings by
preliminary injunction against the respondent court, based on the
conferring upon the RTCs the authority to act not only on applications for
argument that the lower court had no competence to act on the
original registration but also over all petitions filed after original
registration sought because of the absence of unanimity among the
 parties as required by Sec. 112 of Land Registration Act.
● Petitioner cites the case of Fojas v. Grey which posits that in a long
line of decisions dealing with proceedings under Section 112 of the
Land Registration Act, it has been held that summary relief under
Section 112 of Land Registration Act can only be granted if there is
unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim or serious
objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise, the case
becomes contentious and controversial which should be threshed out
in an ordinary action or in any case where the incident properly
belongs.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent court has jurisdiction to order the registration of deed of
sale which is opposed on the ground of an tencedent contract to sell. (NO)
RATIO:
● While this was a correct interpretation of the aforesaid provision, the
same is, however, not applicable to the instant case. The reason is that
this case arose in 1982, after the Land Registration Act had been
superseded by the Property Registration Decree, which became effective
on June 11, 1979.
● Sec. 2 of PD 1529 has eliminated the distinction between the general
jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral
court. Aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has simplified
registration proceedings by conferring upon the regional trial courts the
authority to act not only on applications for "original registration" but
also "over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power
to hear and determine all questions arising upon such applications or
petitions
● With reference to Section 112 of the Land Registration Act (now Section
108 of P.D. No. 1529), the court is no longer fettered by its former
limited jurisdiction which enabled it to grant relief only in cases where
there was "unanimity among the parties" or none of them raised any
"adverse claim or serious objection." Under the amended law, the court
is now authorized to hear and decide not only such non-controversial
cases but even this contentious and substantial issues, such as the
question at bar, which were beyond its competence before.
● It appears that the respondent court proceeded to hear the case below
notwithstanding the manifestation by the petitioner of his intention to
elevate to this Court the question of jurisdiction he had raised. The trial
court should have given him the opportunity to do so in the interest of
due process, pending a categorical ruling on the issue. As it happened, it
arrived at its decision after considering only the evidence of the private
respondent and without regard to the evidence of the petitioner.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated September 23,
1983, is set aside.
NOTES: Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529, it is clearly provided that:
SEC. 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.-
Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the Philippines
shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted principles
underlying the Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of title to lands, including improvements
and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after original registration of
title, with power to hear and determine a questions arising upon such
applications or petitions. The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the
Land Registration Commission with two certified copies of all pleadings,
exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in applications or petitions for
land registration, with the exception of stenographic notes, within five days
from the filing or issuance there
12.
 13. GARCIA v COURT OF APPEALS FACTS:
January 22, 1980 | Aquino, J. | Priority in Time ● August 9, 1918, a deed of sale for two parcels of land of the
M.NOEL Hacienda Maysilo, in Malabon, Rizal and covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 983, was executed in favor of Ismael
Lapus. This was pursuant to a case that involved a partition
PETITIONER: PACIFICO GARCIA
proceeding of the hacienda.
RESPONDENTS: COURT OF APPEALS, CAROLINA LAPUZ-
● The deed of sale was presented for registration in 1920 and was
GOZON, TECLA GUTIERREZ, ROSARIO FELIX, PAULINO D.
recorded in the registry of deeds. That deed of sale itself contains
BUENAVENTURA, RAYMUNDO DIONISIO, VIRGILIO AUSTRIA
entries showing that it was annotated on the back of OCT No.
and MARCEON VICENCIO
983.
Recit Ready:
● However, it seemed that the deed of sale was not annotated on
Land in Malabon Rizal was subject to partition proceedings, and as a
OCT No. 983 and that, consequently, that title was apparently not
result, two parcels of land were sold to Lapus. In 1920 the deed was
cancelled.
registered, and shows that the Original Certificate of Title (OCT No.
● TCT No. 4910 was issued to Lapus for the two parcels of land,
983) was annotated pursuant to the sale. While the annotations were on
and TCT No. 4911 was issued for the remaining five lots covered
record, they were never made on the actual OCT. When Lapus died, the
by OCT No. 983 (which embrace an area of more than two
land was inherited by his daughter, Lapus-Gozon, and the TCTs
hundred fifty-eight hectares registered in the names of more than
covering the land were registered to her. In 1962, the Riveras filed a case
twenty-six-co-owners). TCT Nos. 4910 and 4911 contain the
claiming that they were deprived of participation in the partitioning of
following entries: "Transfer from No. 983. Originally registered
the land, and should therefore be given the land in OCT No. 983 as it is
on the 29th day of January, in the year 1917 in Book No. A-9,
the only one available or without any annotation. Eventually, there were
page 215, of the said Province of Rizal, pursuant to decree entered
two sets of TCTs for the same land, one with Lapus and the other with
in Case No. 3850."
the Riveras, who gave the land to Garcia. The SC said that the TCT
● Lapus on different occasions mortgaged the two parcels of land
issued earlier to Lapus is valid as it was duly sold and registered to them
to secure his obligations. He died in 1951 and left the land to his
despite the OCT not being annotated to indicate such. The anomaly in
daughter, Carolina Lapuz-Gozon. She became the registered
that the OCT had no such annotations could not be attributed to Lapus.
owner of the two lots. She subdivided them into fifty-five lots and
sold some of the subdivision lots to the co-respondents. Lapus and
DOCTRINE:
his successors-in-interest have been in possession of the two
● General Rule: in the case of two certificates of title, purporting
parcels even before 1910 or for more than seventy years.
to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails, whether
● In 1962, the Riveras, alleged heirs of the late Maria de la
the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or only in
Concepcion Vidal filed a case alleging that they were deprived of
part, comprised in the earlier certificate”
their participation in the Hacienda Maysilo and that, since only
OCT No. 983 had no annotation, all the land covered by that title
should be adjudicated to them.
 ● OCT No. 983 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT 112235 was
issued to the Riveras. The Riveras assigned the parcels sold to
Lapus to Sergio Cruz and Pacifico Garcia (petitioner) and TCT
Nos. 112743 and 112742 were issued to Cruz and Garcia,
respectively.
● Therefore, two sets of TCTs for the same lots were issued to two
different people, namely Lapus-Gozon and Garcia.
● Lapus-Gozon later learned that the Riveras and their successors-
in-interest had acquired the land covered by OCT No. 983. Her
lawyer and a surveyor informed her that parcels E and G which
she inherited from her father, were identical to the ones which
were conveyed to Cruz and Garcia. She registered adverse claims
on the titles covering the lots. She filed an action to quiet title and
for damages.
● RTC declared valid the TCTs issued to Mrs. Gozon and her co-
plaintiffs. It voided the one issued to the Riveras and all titles and
transactions emanating from them.
● Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC ruling.
● Garcia contends that his title is valid and that the titles of Ismael
Lapus and his daughter, Mrs. Gozon, are void because the sale to
Lapus was not annotated on OCT No. 983 therefore it is
insufficient registration.
ISSUE/s:
● whether or not the1920 title issued to Lapus should prevail over
the 1963 title issued to the Riveras.(YES)
RATIO:
● SC: We hold that the two appeals have no merit. The title of Lapus
and the titles derived therefrom should be given effect. The title
of the Riveras and the titles springing from it are void.
● That title could not be nullified or defeated by the issuance forty-
three years later due to the failure of the register of deeds to cancel
the title preceding the title issued to Lapus. This must be so
considering that Lapus and his successors-in-interest remained in
possession of the disputed lots and the rival claimants never
possessed the same.
● SC: ”The general rule is that in the case of two certificates of title,
purporting to include the same land, the earlier in date prevails,
whether the land comprised in the latter certificate be wholly, or
only in part, comprised in the earlier certificate”
● "Where two certificates (of title) purport to include the same land,
the earlier in date prevails. . . . In successive registrations, where
more than once certificate is issued in respect particular estate or
interest in land, the person claiming under the prior certificate is
entitled to the estate or interest; and that person is deemed to hold
under the prior certificate who is the holder of, or whose claim is
derived directly or indirectly from the person who was the holder
of the earliest certificate issued in respect thereof.”
● prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time
is preferred in right) is followed in land registration matters.
● deed of sale in favor of Lapus and the titles issued to him and his
successors-in-interest, together with his mortgage in 1929 of the
disputed lots to the PNB itself, are all a matter of public record in
the registry of deeds.
● "When a conveyance has been properly recorded, such record is
constructive notice of its contents and all interests, legal and
equitable, included therein." "Under the rule of notice, it is
presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of
record affecting the title.
● Lapus cannot be blamed for the lack of any annotation in the
OCT, and he and his successors in interest are the rightful owners
of the lots in question.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
decision of the trial court, should stand, Costs against the appellants.
SO ORDERED.

 14. Sps. Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw, et. al. v. Ayala Land, Inc.
particular property described therein. Merely relying on the date of
July 26, 2017 | G.R. No. 173120 & 173141 | Mendoza | Priority in Time
registration of the original titles is insufficient because it is the surveys
Made by: Kia Opinion
therein that are being assailed.

Recit Ready: A survey plan for a parcel of land was submitted to the
FACTS:
General Land Registration Office for approval of the Director of Lands by
● The following survey plans of the same land were submitted to the
SPOUSES DIAZ in 1921. Subsequently, the same land was again
General Land Registration Office for approval of the Director of Lands:
submitted for subsequent surveys by various proponents, including
○ (1921) Petitioners Spouses Andres Diaz and Josefa Mia (Spouses
MAYUGA. In 1950 and 1958, an OCT was issued to Mayuga (OCT Nos.
Diaz) - Lot 1 - Sitio of Kay Monica, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las
242, 244, 1609). An OCT would be issued to Spouses Diaz only in 1970
Pinas, Rizal
(OCT No. 8510). Spouses Diaz would sell to SPOUSES YU. The Mayuga
○ (1925) Dominador Mayuga - Lot 3 - Sitio May Kokek, Barrio
lots would end up with Ayala Land Inc (ALI).
Almanza, Las Pinas, Rizal
○ (1930) Guico - Lot 2 - Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pinas, Rizal
The issue in this case is, as between the two titles, who has the superior
○ (1931) Yaptinchay - Lot 2 & Lot 3
right to the parcel of land. The court ruled that SPOUSES YU had a
Note: Despite being the same lot, the survey plans indicated different
superior right.
addresses.
● The following Original Certificate of Titles (OCT) were issued in favor
The court reiterated that between two conflicting titles, the general rule that
of:
the title registered earlier prevails IS NOT ABSOLUTE. A certificate of
○ (1950) Yaptinchay - Lot 2 & Lot 3 covered by OCT No. 242 and
title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property
244
described therein. Merely relying on the date of registration of the original
○ (1958) - Dominador Mayuga - Lot 3 covered by OCT No. 1609
titles is insufficient because it is the surveys therein that are being
● Some of these properties were sold to CPJ Corporation
assailed. The subsequent surveys contained numerous and serious
irregularities which cast doubt on the validity of OCT Nos. 242, 244,
DIAZ LOTS
1609 (See irregularities in ratio).
● Andres Diaz filed a petition for original registration for Lot 1. In 1970,
OCT No. 8510 was issued in the name of Spouses Diaz.
Doctrine:
○ They subdivided the 460,626 sqm property into 10 lots and
General Assumption: Between two conflicting titles, the title registered
conveyed to different third parties
first generally prevails.
● In 1976, Andres Diaz sold to Librado Cabautan the following parcels of
However: The rule that between two conflicting titles, the title registered
land:
earlier prevails IS NOT ABSOLUTE. It reinforced the doctrine that
○ Lot 1-I covered by TCT No. 287416
registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest
○ Lot 1-B covered by TCT No. 287411
title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
○ Lot 1-A and Lot 1-D covered by TCT No. 287412
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
● Spouses Yu Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw (Spouses Yu) acquired
ownership over 67,813 sqm representing the undivided half-portion
of Lot 1-A originating from OCT No. 8510 of Spouses Diaz. The
said property was co--owned by Spouses Diaz with Spouses Librado
and Susana Cabautan resulting from a civil case decided by the RTC of
Makati on March 29, 1986.
● (1994) Spouses Yu acquired ownership over Lot 1-B. TCT Nos. 39408
and 64549 were issued in their names.
DOMINADOR MAYUGA > CPJ LOTS
● (1980) CPJ Corporation transferred their interest in the subject
properties to third persons. (1988) Ayala Corporation obtained the
subject properties from Goldenrod, Inc. and PESALA.
● (1992) ALI acquired all the subject properties:
○ Lot 3 covered by TCT No. 41325
○ Lot 2, Lot 3, and Lot 6 covered by TCT No. 41261
● [DIAZ CASE] CPJ Corporation filed a Land Registration Case
against Spouses Diaz and other named respondents. It sought to
review OCT No. 8510 in the names of Spouses Diaz on the ground
that the interested persons were not notified of the application.
○ RTC rendered a decision against Spouses Diaz, opining
that the Spouses Diaz committed fraud when they filed
their application for original registration w/o informing
the interested parties in violation of Act No. 496. It also
held that Spouses Diaz knew that CPJ Corporation had an
appropriate interest over the subject property.
○ On appeal, CA held that Spouses Diaz had no obligation
to inform CPJ Corporation and its successors about their
registration because the original titles of the latter, from
which their transferred titles were derived, were based on
fraudulent surveys.
● [YU CASE] When the Spouses Yu visited their lots, they were
surprised to discover that ALI had already fenced the area and posted
guards and they were prevented from entering/occupying the same.
They also discovered that the transfer certificates of titles covering
parcels of land overlapping their claim were in the name of ALI. They
filed a complaint against ALI for declaration of nullity of ALI’s TCTs.
They also sought the recovery of possession of the property covered by
ALI's title which overlapped their land alleging that Spouses Diaz,
their predecessors, had open, uninterrupted and adverse possession
of the same from 1921 until it was transferred to Cabautan in 1976
and sold to them (Spouses Yu) in 1994.
○ [RTC] ruled in favor of Spouses Yu. ALI’s OCTs were marred
with numerous and blatant errors and that ALI did not offer any
satisfactory explanation regarding the glaring discrepancies (For
your reference, the survey/title started with Dominador Mayuga >
Goldenrod, Inc. / PESALA > CPJ Corporation > Ayala Land Inc)
○ [CA] ruled in favor of ALI. It held that Spouses Diaz committed
fraud. It opined that Spouses Diaz knew of CPJ Corporation’s
interest over the subject land but failed to form it of their
application. CA also ruled that Spouses Yu could no longer assert
that the titles of ALI were invalid because the one-year period to
contest the title had prescribed. CA ruled that OCTs Nos. 242,
244, and 1609 (ALI’s titles) were issued in 1950 and 1958 while
OCT No. 8510 (Spouses Yu’s title) was only issued in 1970
○ [CA MR] CA granted Spouses Yu and Spouses Diaz’ motion for
reconsideration. Citing Guico v. San Pedro (Guico was one of the
individuals who caused the survey of the lot. See first batch of
bullet points), the court noted that there were defects in the survey
of the lot. It also ruled that the doctrine that registration done
fraudulently is no registration at all prevails over the rules on
equity.
○ [CA MR 2] CA reversed again and ruled in favor of ALI
noting that in Guico v. San Pedro, the court did not
categorically declare that the land survey of Guico was invalid
and it even awarded some of the lots to the applicant.
○ Aggrieved, Spouses Yu elevates the matter to the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Is the complaint of Spouses Yu barred by prescription? NO.
2. Between the registered titles of Spouses Yu and ALI, which is more
superior? THE COURT RULED THAT SPOUSES YU’S TITLE
IS MORE SUPERIOR.
RATIO:
1. [PRESCRIPTION ISSUE] While Section 38 of Act No. 496 states
that the petition for review to question a decree of registration must
be filed within one (1) year after entry of the decree, such provision
is not the only remedy of an aggrieved party who was deprived of
land by fraudulent means.
2. The rule that between two conflicting titles, the title registered
earlier prevails IS NOT ABSOLUTE.
a. If it can be clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of
construction relating to written documents, that the
inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior
date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by
holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive.
b. It reinforced the doctrine that registering a piece of land
under the Torrens System does not create or vest title
because registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of
ownership or title over the particular property
described therein.
c. In Golloy v. Court of Appeals, there were two conflicting
titles with overlapping boundaries. The first title was
registered on March 1, 1918, while the second title was
registered on August 15, 1919. Despite having been
registered at a prior date, the Court did not allow the earlier
registered title of the respondents to prevail because of the
continuing possession of the petitioners therein and the
laches committed by the respondents. Hence, the holder of
an earlier registered title does not, in all instances,
absolutely triumph over a holder of a latter registered title.
d. In this case, the petitioners assail the numerous and serious
defects in the surveys of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and 1609,
which cast doubt on the inclusion of the subject lands in
ALI’s titles. Accordingly, the Court must delve into the
merits of their contentions to determine whether the subject
properties are truly and genuinely included in ALI’s title.
Merely relying on the date of registration of the original
titles is insufficient because it is the surveys therein that
are being assailed.
3. The subsequent land surveys conducted (after 1921) contained
numerous and serious irregularities which cast doubt on the
validity of OCT Nos. 242, 244, 1609 which were transferred to
ALI
a. The survey conducted in favor of Spouses Diaz was
conducted by a certain A.N. Feliciano. Curiously, the
subsequent surveys for a certain Dominador Mayuga, a
certain Guico, and for a certain Yaptinchay were also
conducted by A.N. Feliciano. It is dubious how the same
surveyor or agrimensor conducted the subsequent surveys.
He should obviously be aware that a previous survey was
already conducted. Furthermore, even if a single entity
(that is, Feliciano) conducted the survey, that lands were
described to be located in different places.
b. Other discrepancies include: Lack of signature of the
Director of Lands on some surveys, surveys referred to a
monument that only existed more than seven years after the
survey, many erasures as to total area of the property, there
was a difference in the intensity of the lower right portion
of one of the subsequent surveys which showed that it may
simply have been an attachment to the main document,
court ruled that irregularities existed in Guico v. San Pedro
4. It was established that Andres Diaz was the very first claimant
of the subject property and was the proponent of the first
survey. The said survey clearly contained the signature of the
surveyor and the Director of Lands, as can be seen on its face. It
did not contain any erasure or alterations thereon. Likewise, a
duly authenticated copy of the survey is readily available in the
Bureau of Lands.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The June 19, 2006 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. 61593 & 70622 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 8, 2005 Amended Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REINSTATED.
ASSENTING/DISSENTING OPINIONS:
NA
 15. Nemencio Evangelista, et. al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago
February 1976, required all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for
April 29, 2005 | G.R. No. 157447 | Ponente | PD892
registration of their lands under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known
Made by: N. Sabban
as the Land Registration Act, within six months from effectivity of the
decree. After the given period, Spanish titles could no longer be used as
Recit Ready: Evangelista, et. al are claiming that they occupy parcels of evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the
land in Hacienda Quibiga, Rizal by virtue of several Deeds of Assignment Torrens System.
from Ismael Favila. Favila claims to be the heir of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez who owns the said land by virtue of a Spanish Title by the
FACTS:
Queen of Spain.
● Evangelista, et. al are claiming that they occupied parcels of land in
“Hacienda Quibiga” Montalban, Rizal, by virtue of several Deeds
However, a certain Carmelino Manahan-Santiago was allegedly planning
of Assignment executed by a certain Ismael Favila y Rodriguez.
to evict the petitioners from the property. TCTs show that the land was
● Deeds of Assignment show that the property extends to Paranaque,
originally under the name of Santiago’s mother, and was later on
Las Pinas, Muntinlupa, Cavite, Batangas, Pasay, Taguig, Makati,
transferred to him by Deed of Donation.
Pasig, Mandaluyong, Quezon City, Caloocan, Bulacan, and Rizal.
● It was under the name of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez by the
Evangelista, et. al are now assailing the validity of said certificates of title.
Queen of Spain with a Spanish Title.
They are also claiming that they are the rightful owners of the property
● Ismael Favila, claiming to be an heir of Don Hermogenes
since they were in continuous possession of the land since time
Rodriguez, signed Deeds of Assignment in favor of petitioners in
immemorial.
exchange for the labor and work done on the said property.
● Carmelino Manahan Santiago was allegedly planning to evict
Issue: Whether Spanish titles can be used as evidence of land ownership
petitioners from the property.
in registration proceedings under the Torrens system? (NO)
○ TCTs show that the land was under the name of Santiago.
Said TCT originated from an Original Certificate of Title
Ruling: Pursuant to PD 892 1, Deed of Assignments which were based on
(OCT No. 670) under the name of Santiago’s mother
Spanish title have lost their evidentiary value. Further, petitioners did not
(Isabel Manahan)
comply with the said law -- to apply for registration of lands with the LRA
○ Title was transferred to Santiago by deed of donation.
within a specific period. Petitioners are therefore, not the lawful owners of
● Petitioners then filed an action for nullity of respondent's certificates
the land and their Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land
of title on the basis that it was fake and spurious.
ownership in any registration proceedings under the Torrens System.
● [Procedural]
○ RTC: Ruled in favor of Santiago
Doctrine: Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892, which took effect on 16
○ CA: Affirmed the order of the trial court

1 SPANISH TITLES AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION

Presidential Decree No. 892 "DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH
MORTGAGE SYSTEM OF REGISTRATION AND OF THE USE OF PROCEEDINGS."
ISSUE:
Whether Spanish titles can be used as evidence of land ownership in
registration proceedings under the Torrens system? (NO)
Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioners based their claim of title on their
possession of the land since time immemorial, and at the same time, on the
Spanish title granted to Don Hermogenes Rodriguez.
Respondent’s Contention: P.D. No. 892 prevents petitioners from invoking
the Spanish title as basis of their ownership of the property. PD892
effectively discontinued the system of registration under the Spanish
Mortgage Law.
RATIO:
1. Pursuant to PD 892, Deed of Assignments which were based on
Spanish title have lost their evidentiary value.
○ There is no showing that petitioners complied with the said
law -- to "apply for registration of their lands under Act No.
496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, within
six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree (February
16, 1976). Thereafter, Spanish titles cannot be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings
under the Torrens System."
○ Petitioners are therefore, not the lawful owners of the land
subject of this case, for they did not comply with PD 892.
2. Spanish titles are subject to prescription
○ A holder of a Spanish title may still lose his ownership to
an occupant who actually possesses the same for the
required prescriptive period.
○ Applicant for registration of a Spanish title under the
Torrens system must also submit proof that he is in actual
possession of the real property.
○ Under PD 892, all holders of Spanish titles should have
filed applications for registration of their title on or before
14 August 1976.
○ In a land registration proceeding, the applicant should
present to the court his Spanish title and proof of actual
possession of the real property. If filed and after said date,
applicant could no longer present his Spanish title to the
court to prove his ownership.
○ The fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the
property does not exclude them from the application of
P.D. No. 892, and their Spanish title remain inadmissible
as evidence of their ownership of the Subject Property,
whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to
remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, this Court DENIES the instant petition and AFFIRMS the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 29 July 2002, and the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77, dated 05 February
1999, dismissing petitioners' Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
-------
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 892 February 16, 1976
DISCONTINUANCE OF THE SPANISH MORTGAGE SYSTEM
OF REGISTRATION AND OF THE USE OF SPANISH TITLES
AS EVIDENCE IN LAND REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
WHEREAS, fraudulent sales, transfers, and other forms of conveyances of
large tracts of public and private lands to unsuspecting and unwary buyers
appear to have been perpetrated by unscrupulous persons claiming
ownership under Spanish titles or grants of dubious origin;
WHEREAS, these fraudulent transactions have often resulted in
conflicting claims and litigations between legitimate title holders, bona
fide occupants or applicants of public lands, on the one hand, and the
holders of, or persons claiming rights under, the said Spanish titles or
grants, on the other, thus creating confusion and instability in property Section 2. All laws, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and
ownership and threatening the peace and order conditions in the areas regulations inconsistent with the foregoing provisions are hereby repealed
affected; or accordingly modified;

WHEREAS, statistic in the Land Registration Commission show that Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
recording in the system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is
practically nil and that this system has become obsolete; Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of February, in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-six.
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under
the operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now
ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession;

WHEREAS, there is an imperative need to discontinue the system of

registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law and the use of Spanish titles
as evidence in registration proceedings under the Torrens system;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the

Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby decree and order;

Section 1. The system of registration under the Spanish Mortgage Law is

discontinued, and all lands recorded under said system which are not yet
covered by Torrens title shall be considered as unregistered lands.

All holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act,
within six (6) months from the effectivity of this decree. Thereafter,
Spanish titles cannot be used as evidence of land ownership in any
registration proceedings under the Torrens system.

Hereafter, all instruments affecting lands originally registered under the

Spanish Mortgage Law may be recorded under Section 194 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as amended by Act 3344;
 16. NOBLEJAS v. TEEHANKEE
April 29, 1968 | REYES, J.B.L., CJ. | Land Registration Authority
Administrator
B. SALAZAR & CHECKER
PETITIONER: Antonio H. Noblejas, as Commissioner of Land
Registration
RESPONDENT: Claudio Teehankee, as Secretary of Justice, and Rafael
Salas, as Executive Secretary
RECIT-READY: Antonio Noblejas is the duly appointed Commissioner
of Land Registration, a position created by RA 1151. Section 2 of said Act
states that Commissioner is declared entitiled to the same compensation,
emoluments, and privileges as those of a CFI Judge. One day, Secretary of
Justice Teehankee wrote petitioner a letter requesting him to explain in
writing why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for
approving subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas
covered by their original titles. Noblejas replied that, as he enjoys the
benefits of a CFI Judge, he could only be suspended and investigated in
the same manner as a judge of CFI, i.e. by the Supreme Court as per
Section 67 of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
Noblejas then received a communication signed by respondent Executive
Secretary stating that he is suspended pending investigation of a case of
gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest. Noblejas
went to this Court assailing lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion of
Secretary of Justice.
ISSUE: W/N the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
investigated by the Supreme Court – NO.
RULING: Section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation,
suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District
Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the President of the
Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the judgment of the
Supreme Court . . . ". It is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that the
Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member
of the Judiciary at all. In the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian
Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of
said bodies expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for
the same causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of
First Instance" or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank." It is thereby
shown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension or
removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to
other officers, provision to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal
language.
DOCTRINE: Land Registration Commissioner does not exercises
judicial functions; that the function of investigating charges against
public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the
Legislature may not charge the judiciary with nonjudicial functions or
duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial
duties, as it would be in violation of the principle of the separation of
powers.
● Petitioner is the duly appointed and qualified Commissioner of Land
Registration, a position created by RA No. 1151.
○ Section 2: Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a
Judge of the Court of First Instance."
○ The appropriation laws in the item setting forth the salary
of said officer, use the following expression: One Land
Registration Commissioner, with the rank and
privileges of district judge — P19,000.00.
● Respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter
requiring him to explain in writing why no disciplinary action
should be taken against petitioner for "approving or recommending
approval of subdivision, consolidation and consolidation-
 subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas
covered by the original titles."
● Noblejas answered that, as he enjoyed the rank, privileges,
emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the CFI, he could only
be suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the
CFI, and, therefore, the papers relative to his case should be
submitted to the Supreme Court, for action thereon conformably to
section 67 of the Judiciary Actand Revised Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court.
● Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on
"finding that a prima facie case exists against you for gross
negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner
was "hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation
of the above charges."
● Noblejas applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced
in his letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction
and abuse of discretion, and praying for restraining writs.
ISSUES: W/N the Commissioner of Land Registration may only be
investigated by the Supreme Court – NO.
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
Respondent: Admits the facts but deny that petitioner, as Land Registration
Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be
considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act
and Revised Rules of Court 140; that the function of investigating charges
against public officers is administrative or executive in nature; that the
Legislature may not charge the judiciary with nonjudicial functions or duties
except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it
would be in violation of the principle of the separation of powers.
RATIO:
● Section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing for investigation,
suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No
District Judge shall be separated or removed from office by the
President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall exist in the
judgment of the Supreme Court . . . ".It is nowhere claimed, much
less shown, that the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District
Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.
● Petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First
Instance" includes by implication the right to be investigated only
by the Supreme Court and to be suspended or removed upon its
recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being
possessed by a variety of executive officials upon whom the
Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the same privileges. To
adopt petitioner's theory would mean placing upon the Supreme
Court the duty of investigating and disciplining all these officials
whose functions are plainly executive, and the consequent
curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the
President's power to discipline and remove administrative officials
who are presidential appointees, and which the Constitution
expressly place under the President's supervision and control
(Constitution, Art. VII), sec. 10 [1]).
● In the case of the Judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations and
those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies
expressly provide that they are to be removed from office for the
same causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of
First Instance" or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank." It is
thereby shown that where the legislative design is to make the
suspension or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First
Instance applicable to other officers, provision to that effect is made
in plain and unequivocal language.
● If the Legislature had really intended to include in the general grant
of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the Court of First
Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to
be suspended or removed only upon recommendation of that Court,
 then such grant of privileges would be unconstitutional, since it
would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by
charging this court with the administrative functions of supervisory
control over executive officials, and simultaneously reducing pro
tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
● Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other
executive officials by claiming that under Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. Serious doubt may
well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consult by a
Register of Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with
administrative process. It will be noted that by specific provision of
the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner
"shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone,
and not upon other parties. This limitation in effect identifies the
resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of
any other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his
subordinates alone.
● But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the
Register of Deeds should constitute a judicial (or more properly
quasi-judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the
Land Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151,
sections 3 and 4, will show that the resolution of consultas are
but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive
functions and merely incidental to the latter.
● [StatCon] We are constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act
1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of the "same
privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not
include, and was not intended to include, the right to demand
investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the
said grant of privileges would be violative of the Constitution and
be null and void.

WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are

denied, and the petition is ordered dismissed. No costs.
 17. BARANDA v GUSTILO
September 26, 1988 | G.R. No. 81163 | Gutierrez, Jr., J | Office of the
Register of Deeds (General Functions)
Made by: H Sanchez
Recit Ready: The certificate of title of a parcel of land was transferred to
Hitalia & Baranda. So, the court issued a writ of possession over it but
Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor this
saying they have a TCT over that same land. The Court found that Perez,
et al’s TCT was fraudulently obtained, so it ordered their TCT to be
cancelled, and the TCT of Baranda & Hitalia to be cancelled too (so they
can be issued new ones). When Baranda & Hitalia’s new certificates were
issued, a notice of lis pendens was annotated on it, prompting Baranda &
Hitalia to ask the judge to order the Register of Deeds to remove the notice.
The judge so ordered this but Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso
filed a motion for reconsideration saying under P.D. 152, the cancellation
of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled
when the pending civil case has already been resolved.
But, the court ruled that the function of a Register of Deeds with reference
to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature. So, the Acting Register of Deeds did not have any
legal standing to file a motion for reconsideration of the respondent
Judge’s Order directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated
in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
Doctrine: The function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is ministerial
in nature.
FACTS:
● A petition for reconstitution of title was filed for parcel of land in
Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of Romana Hitalia
● Eventually, this land’s Original Certificate of Title was cancelled
and a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the names of
Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda.
● The Court issued a writ of possession over it but Gregorio Perez,
Maria P. Gotera and Susana Silao refused to honor it, saying they
have a TCT over the same land
● The Court, after considering the private respondents’ opposition
and finding Perez, et al’s TCT to be fraudulently acquired, ordered
that the writ of possession be carried out. A writ of demolition was
also issued.
● The RTC denied Perez, et al’s motion for reconsideration and
declared their TCT void. So, it ordered the Acting Register of
Deeds of Iloilo to register the Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as void.
● But, this order was set aside upon a motion for reconsideration and
manifestation filed by the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty.
Helen P. Sornito on the ground that there was a pending case
before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction
under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the
former which remained unresolved.
● Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia’s case for the full
implementation of the writ of possession was granted by the
Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division
● So, Judge Gustillo RTC ordered the Acting Register of Deeds to
register the Order of the SC
● In compliance, Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso annotated
the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title of Perez et al as
null & void, & issued new certificates of titles to the petitioners in
lieu of their TCT
● However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a
separate case (the Civil Case No.) still pending in the Court of
Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of
titles issued to the petitioners
 ● This prompted the petitioners to file another motion to have the
trial court direct the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice
of lis pendens in the new certificates of titles.
● Judge Gustilo did so but Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso
filed a motion for reconsideration saying under P.D. 152, the
cancellation of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or
deemed cancelled upon the registration of the certificate of the
Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending,
stating the manner of disposal thereof.
● According to Saclauso, since the Civil Case upon which the Notice
of Lis Pendens was based is still pending with the Intermediate
Court of Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not
the RTC can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pedens.
ISSUE:
W/N the Register of Deeds has the power to annotate and/or cancel the notice
of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title? - NO
RATIO:
● Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty of the
Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument presented
for registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requests for registration . . . If the instrument
is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and
inform the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or
reasons therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by
consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
● According to PD 1529: Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final
judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of
the Court after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the
rights of the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be
cancelled by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party
who caused the registration thereof
● Section 10 PD 1529 "It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for registration
dealing with real or personal property which complies with all the
requests for registration . . . If the instrument is not registrable, he
shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform the presentor of
such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and
advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with
Section 117 of this Decree."
● Section 117 PD 1529: Then the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in
pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to
him for registration or where any party in interest does not agree
with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any
such instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission
of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in
interest thru the Register of Deeds . . ."
● Here, the statute concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to
register instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves
no room for construction.
● According to Webster’s Dictionary, the word shall means "ought to,
must, . . . obligation - used to express a command or exhortation
● Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with reference to the
registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments and the like is
ministerial in nature.
● The Acting Register of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file
a motion for reconsideration of the respondent Judge’s Order
directing him to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the
certificates of titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land.
NOTES:
● Purpose of notice of lis pendens - serves as a warning to a
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular property
is in litigation. It’s for the party (Causing the land’s registration)
could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of
it.
 ● But, the private respondents are not entitled to this
● Ordinarily a notice of pendency (filed in a proper case), cannot be
cancelled while the action is pending and undetermined, the proper
court has the discretionary power to cancel it
● In this case, it can be seen that the cases reached all the way to the
Supreme Court illustrating how the private respondents tried to
block but unsuccessfully the already final decisions
● Judge Gustilo abused his discretion in sustaining the respondent
Acting Register of Deeds’ stand that the notice of lis pendens in the
certificates of title. Gustillo also abused his discretion when he
agreed with the Acting Register of Deeds in saying the annotations
cannot be cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No.
15871 with the Court of Appeals.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987
order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All
subsequent orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February 12,
1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
 18. BALBIN v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur
voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title
May 8, 1969 | G.R. No. L-20611 | Makalintal., J | Office of the Register of
Deeds (General Functions)
Doctrine: The matter of registration of an instrument disposing of a
Made by: H. Segovia Checker: Serrano
registered land under the Torrens system may be suspended to await the
outcome of a suit to determine the validity of the different conveyances
Recit Ready: Aurelio and Francisco Balbin presented to the register of executed by the person seeking the registration of the voluntary instrument.
deeds of Ilocus Sur a duplicate copy of OCT. No. 548 and a Deed of
Donation intervivos with the request that the same be annotated on the title.
FACTS:
Under the terms of the instrument to be annotated, C. Balbin, registered
● Aurelio and Francisco Balbin presented to the register of deeds of
owner of the land, appeared to have donated intervivos an undivided two-
Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner’s certificate of
thirds portion thereof to Aurelio and Francisco Balbin. The register of
title (OCT No. 548) and Deed of Donation inter-vivos with the
deeds denied the request for being “legally defective or otherwise not
request that the same be annotated on the title.
sufficient in law.” The title had been previously annotated with three
separate sales of undivided portions of land earlier executed in favor of
● Under the terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one
three different buyers. Because these three (3) other co-owner’s copies of
Cornelio Balbin, registered owner of the parcel of land described in
the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented by the Aurelio and
OCT No. 548 appears to have donated intervivos an undivided two-
Francisco, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested annotation.
thirds (⅔) portion thereof in favor of Aurelio and Francisco.
The Commissioner of Land registration held that the donor is now merely
a co-owner of the property having previously sold undivided portions on
● The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being
three different occasions to different buyers. In addition to the owner’s
“legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law.”
duplicate of the OCT, the three co-owner’s duplicates must likewise be
● It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of
surrendered.
encumbrances on certificate are three separate sales of undivided
portions of the land earlier executed by C. Balbin in favor of three
Issue in this case is w/n Aurelio and Francisco can compel the annotation
different buyers:
of the deed of donation upon the copy in their possession on the basis of
■ Entry No. 5658.
Sec. 55 of Act. 496
● Sale for the sum of P400.00
● Undivided portion of an area of 3,710 sq.
NO, Act. 496, Sec. 55 assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of
meters
the title in question, namely, that of the original owner himself, such that
● in favor of Florentino Gabayan
its production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes
● OCT No. 5488 is cancelled with respect
sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the
to said area of 3710 sq. meters and the
corresponding memorandum of registration. The law itself refers to every
name of the vendee is substituted to
copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which means
succeed all rights, participation in the
both must contain identical entries of the transactions, particularly
interest of the vendor.
 ● Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955
■ Entry No. 5659.
● Sale of portion for the sum of P100.00
● Undivided portion of an area of 16,713
sq. meters
● In favor of Roberto BRavo
● Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953
■ Entry No. 5660
● Sale of portion for the sum of P400.00
● Undivided portion of an area of 15,000
sq. meters
● In favor of Juana Gabayan
● Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952
● The final part of the annotations referring to the sales contain an
additional memorandum stating that “three co-owner’s duplicate
certificates of title have been issued by the register of deeds of
Ilocos Sur in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and
Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Cabeldo, Notary Public of
Caoyan, I. Sur.”
● Because these three (3) other co-owner’s copies of the certificate
of title No. 548 had not been presented by the Aurelio and
Francisco, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested
annotation.
● Ruling of the Commissioner of Land Registration: Upheld the
action of the Register of Deeds, holding that the donor is now
merely a co-owner of the property having previously sold
undivided portions on three different occasions to different buyers.
In addition to the owner’s duplicate of the OCT, the three co-
owner’s duplicates must likewise be surrendered.
● Without presenting those three (3) duplicates of the title, the
Balbins would want to compel the annotation of the deed of
donation upon the copy in their possession, citing Sec. 55 of Act.
496, which provides:
"the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title
whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for
registration shall be conclusive authority from the
registered owner to the register of deeds to make a
memorandum of registration in accordance with such
instrument."
● Petitioners: Under this provision, the presentation of the other
copies of the title is not required, first, because it speaks of
“registered owner” and not one whose claim to or interest in the
property is merely annotated on the title; and second, the
issuance of the duplicate copies in their favor was illegal or
unauthorized.
ISSUE:
W/N Aurelio and Francisco can compel the annotation of the deed of
donation upon the copy in their possession on the basis of Sec. 55 of Act. 496
- NO
RATIO:
● Act. 496, Sec. 55 assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the
title in question, namely, that of the original owner himself, such that its
production whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes
sufficient authority from him for the register of deeds to make the
corresponding memorandum of registration.
● In the case at bar, the three other copies of the title were in existence,
presumably issued under Sec. 43 of Act. 496.
● There being several copies of the same title in existence, it is easy to see
how their integrity may be adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an
outright conveyance, is annotated on one copy and not on the others.

● The law itself refers to every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate

of the original, which means both must contain identical entries of the
transactions, particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by
the title.

11. One other ground relied upon by the LRC in upholding the action taken
by the Register of Deeds is that since the property subject of the donation is
presumed conjugal, there should first be a liquidation of the partnership
before the surviving spouse may make such conveyance.

12. The deed of donation executed by the C. Balbin bears on its face an
infirmity which justified the denial of its registration. The fact that the two-
thirds(⅔) portion of said property was more than his one half (½) share.

DISPOSITION:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds
of Ilocos Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed.
No pronouncement as to costs.

ASSENTING/DISSENTING OPINIONS:
N/A
 19. LABURADA V. LRA
March 11, 1998 | G.R. No. 101387 | PANGANIBAN, J. | General
Functions
Made by: SERRANO
Recit Ready:Sps Laburada applied for the registration of lot 3-a located in
Mandaluyong which was approved by the trial court. Upon motion of the
sps , the trial court ordered LRA to issue the corresponding decree of
registration. However the LRA refused. Hence sps filed for mandamus.
Based on the record, some portions of the lot 3-a which is sought to be
registered is covered by certificates issued prior to the decree.
Issue: Whether or not the LRA could be compelled by mandamus to issue
a corresponding decree of registration (No)
Doctrine: The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial
function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled
through mandamus. (LRA is mandated to refer to the trial court any doubt
it may have in regard to the preparation and the issuance of a decree of
registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as administrative officials
but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of the court).
FACTS:
● Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the
registration of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On
January 8, 1991, the trial court, acting as a land registration court,
rendered its decision disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing
that the applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada,
have a registrable title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A,
Psd-1372, the Court declares, confirms and orders the registration
of their title thereto.
● After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of
petitioners, issued an order dated March 15, 1991 requiring the
LRA to issue the corresponding decree of registration. However,
the LRA refused. Hence, petitioners filed this action for
mandamus.
● LRA’s decision not to issue such decree of registration is because
the subjects lots were covered by already issued TCTs as explained
in the letter, dated November 27, 1997, of Feline M. Cortez, chief
of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree Division, which states:
With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed
herewith is a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to
Hon. Ramon S. Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of
the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-
7237 is really covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337
issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de Bunaflor [sic] which
was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6395, per
verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the
subdivision plan Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595
is incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the
corresponding decree of registration sought by the petitioners
pursuant to the decision dated January 9, 1991 and order dated
March 15, 1991, would result in the duplication of [the] title over
the same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and
purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity
of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio
Migriño, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid
duplication of title over the same parcel of land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the LRA could be compelled by mandamus to issue a
corresponding decree of registration (No)
RATIO:
● The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial
function of courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be
compelled through mandamus. (LRA is mandated to refer to the
trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the
issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act
not as administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their
act is the act of the court).
● Further, that the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in
the performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even
imperative. Considering the probable duplication of titles over the
same parcel of land, such issuance may contravene the policy and
the purpose, and thereby destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system
of registration.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is
REMANDED to the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration
Authority, on the other hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a
report determining with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property
described in TCT No. 6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt
of such report, the land registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with
deliberate and judicious speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may
issue the decree of registration, according to the facts and the law as herein
discussed.
 20. Fidela R. Angeles vs the Secretary of Justice, the Administrator,
Land Registration Authority, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City,
and Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., respondents.
March 9 2010 | G.R. No. 142549 | Leonardo-De Castro | Register of Deeds:
General Functions
Made by: J. Miranda
Recit Ready:
This case is about the Maysilo Estate whose OCT No. 994 was issued and
registered by the Registry of Deeds on May 3, 1917. Petitioners filed a case
for mandamus asking that the respondents comply with an RTC Court
Order dated January 8, 1998 ordering the RD to issue transfer certificates
of title in the names of all the co-owners, including petitioner, for twelve
(12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand
and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or
less; and ordered that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the
confirmation of the Court, and the proceeds be divided among the plaintiffs
in proportion to their respective interests in the property. The government
refused to comply with the court order because the results of their
investigation proved that the Title the court order was based on was no
longer existing. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondents
saying that their refusal to comply was justified given
Doctrine: That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative.
Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land,
such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby
destroy the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
FACTS:
● The property involved in this case is covered by Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One
Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two (1,342) hectares of the
Maysilo Estate.
● On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of
them claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion
Vidal, and alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional
share in the parcels of land located in Quezon City and in the
municipalities of Caloocan and Malabon, Province of Rizal,
commenced a special civil action (Civil Case No. C-424) for
partition and accounting of the property otherwise known as
Maysilo Estate covered by OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on
April 19, 1917.
● Some of said alleged heirs were previously able to procure
Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo
Estate. They also led the Court to believe that OCT No. 994 was
registered twice. Their claims on previous cases decided by this
Court which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994,
dated differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs
(in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier,
hence, was the superior title.
● The RTC held that the OCT No. 994 dated April 19, 1917, and not
May 3, 1917, was the valid title. The RTC thus ordered the RD to
issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners,
including petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an
aggregate area of One Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred
Sixty-Nine square meters (105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and
ordered that said parcels of land be sold, subject to the
confirmation of the Court, and the proceeds be divided among the
plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property.
● The RD refused to comply with the RTC order because the order
directing the issuance of transfer certificates of title as direct
transfer from OCT No. 994, suffers from certain deficiencies, to
wit: OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally by the issuance
 of various certificates of title in the names of different persons; and
that the plan and descriptions of the lands were not based on a
subdivision plan duly approved by the proper government agency
but merely sketch plans, in violation of Section 50 of PD 1529.
“Obviously, compliance with the Order will result to duplication of
certificates of title covering land previously registered in the names
of other persons.”
● Public respondents further claim that petitioner and her co-
plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the property subject of said
complaint for partition. Their allegation in the complaint that they
are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la
Concepcion Vidal, co-owner of the parcels of land described in
OCT No. 994, and are therefore entitled to the proportionate share,
ownership, and possession of the parcels of land described in
paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue statement made
with intent to deceive. This is because the findings embodied in the
Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ, which
are the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the
Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the
conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to
the issuance of new transfer certificates of title in their names.
ISSUE:
W/N the reluctance of the LRA to comply with a lower court order ordering
the issuance of new TCTs (when the LRA knows that the OCT the decision
is based on is no longer valid or existing) justifiable? YES
RATIO:
1. First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record,
that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3
May 1917, and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the
date of registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on
the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of
registration on 19 April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the
date of the title or the date when the title took effect.
2. Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated
[19] April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the
Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19]
April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an
inexistent OCT.
3. Third. Previous Court decisions cannot apply to the cases at
bar, especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19
April 1917, a title which is now acknowledged as inexistent. Neither could
the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated
19 April 1917 bind any other case operating under the factual setting the same
as or similar to that at bar.
4. That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is
understandable. Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the
performance of its duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative.
Considering the probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land,
such issuance may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy
the integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
5. It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the
performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a
right which is in substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists. It
is nonetheless likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters
involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment
or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either.
6. Petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No. C-
424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear several attempts of
different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be
attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a vast sum of money,
should she get a favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that
the partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and
her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive
findings quoted above that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit
earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist.

DISPOSITION:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

21.
 22. Eagle Realty Corporation Vs. Republic Of The Philippines,
integrity of the Torrens System and protect the Assurance Fund. Likewise,
Represented By The Administrator Of The Land Registration
it is not essential that the Republic of the Philippines has proprietary rights
Authority, National Treasurer Of The Philippines, Heirs Of Casiano De
over the property covered by the subject titles as it does not lay any claim
Leon, Maria Socorro De Leon, And Pilarita M. Reyes
over this property. As previously stated, the complaint merely seeks the
cancellation of erroneously issued titles in order to protect the Assurance
July 4 2008 | G.R. No. 151424 | Nachura | SEC. 6, IN RELATION TO SEC.
Fund from liability for damages that may be filed by the rightful owners
100 AND 95
Made by: N. Caldozo
FACTS:
● The spouses Casiano de Leon and Maria Socorro de Leon filed
Recit Ready:
with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal an application
CFI rendered a decision in favor of Casiano de Leon and his children for
for registration of Lots located at Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque,
a parcel of land in Rizal. It appears that another decision, similar to the
Rizal, with an area of 57,989 square meters.
De Leon Decision but adjudicating the property to a certain Martina G.
● Several parties opposed the application, including the Heirs of
Medina, was surreptitiously inserted in the records of the LRC. Then
Dionisio Tomas, and the Carabeo family.
Acting Land Registration Commissioner, issued Decree of Registration in
● The CFI rendered a decision in favor of Casiano de Leon and his
favor of Medina. Medine later exchanged the property to Reyes and
children, namely, Esmeralda, Rosario Rodriguez, Bernardita, and
Reyes issued it in favor the Eagle Realty Corporation. The De Leons sent
Cesario (Maria Socorro having died on September 21, 1974).
a letter-complaint to the LRC asking for an investigation on the matter.
Copies of this decision (De Leon Decision, for brevity) were sent
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Acting Land
through registered mail to the Land Registration Commission
Registration Commissioner, filed a complaint for "Annulment of
(LRC), Solicitor General, the counsel of the Heirs of Dionisio
Judgment and Cancellation of Decree and Titles" against Martina G.
Tomas and the Carabeo family.
Medina, Pilarita Reyes and petitioner Eagle Realty Corporation. Eagle
● It appears that another decision, similar to the De Leon Decision
Realty attacks the personality of the Republic of the Philippines,
but adjudicating the property to a certain Martina G. Medina,
represented by the Commissioner of Land Registration, to file the
alleged intervenor in LRC Case No. N-4140, was surreptitiously
Complaint. The SC held that indisputably, the government is charged
inserted in the records of the LRC. This decision (Medina
with the duty to preserve the integrity of the Torrens System and protect
Decision, for brevity) was similarly dated December 11, 1979 and
the Assurance Fund. The Republic instituted the complaint precisely to
purportedly signed by Judge Pedro C. Navarro. Likewise inserted
perform this duty. The Complaint seeks the cancellation of erroneously
in the records of the LRC was the Order for the Issuance of the
issued titles to protect the Assurance Fund from being made liable by the
Decree dated February 14, 1980, also bearing what purports to be
private respondents for damages in case they fail to recover the property.
the signature of Judge Pedro C. Navarro, with a Certi􏰉cation dated
The public officer specifically tasked to perform this duty is the Register
February 17, 1980 by Clerk of Court Nicanor G. Salaysay,
of Deeds (Commission on Land Registration having general supervision).
attesting that the decision has not been supplemented, amended or
otherwise modified.
Doctrine: The government is charged with the duty to preserve the
● Pursuant to these documents, Hon. Oscar R. Victoriano, then
Acting Land Registration Commissioner, issued Decree of
Registration No. N-188044. In accordance with this Decree, the
Register of Deeds of Pasay City issued OCT No. 129 on July 7,
1983 in the name of a Martina G. Medina.
● Medina later exchanged the property for a 3,000-hectare parcel of
land in Norzagaray, Bulacan owned by Pilarita Reyes through a
Deed of Exchange. The value of each property was approximately
P451,900.00. On November 2, 1983, OCT No. 129 was canceled
and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 74216 issued in the
name of Reyes. Thereafter, through a Deed of Sale dated February
22, 1984, Reyes sold the property to petitioner for P1,200,000.00.
On March 1, 1984, TCT No. 74216 was canceled, and TCT No.
78982 was issued in petitioner’s name.
● Meanwhile, Cesario de Leon discovered that OCT No. 129 was
issued to Martina G. Medina. The De Leons sent a letter-complaint
to the LRC asking for an investigation on the matter. This was
referred to Atty. Manuel Panis, Chief of the Inspection and
Investigation Division of the LRC. In a report dated July 20, 1984,
Atty. Panis concluded that the Medina Decision and the Order for
the Issuance of Decree were fake. He then recommended that the
appropriate action be filed for the nullification of OCT No. 129
and its derivative titles — TCT No. 74216 in the name of Pilarita
Reyes, and TCT No. 78982 in the name of petitioner Eagle Realty
Corporation.
● The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Acting Land
Registration Commissioner, filed a complaint for "Annulment of
Judgment and Cancellation of Decree and Titles" against Martina
G. Medina, Pilarita Reyes and petitioner Eagle Realty Corporation.
The Register of Deeds of Pasay City was impleaded as a nominal
party.
● In her Answer, Medina averred that she purchased the property
from Justino de Leon on March 5, 1973. Justino, in turn, acquired
this property from Casiano and Maria de Leon on October 29,
1971 through a Deed of Absolute Sale. She alleged that she
verifi􏰉ed the genuineness of this Deed of Absolute Sale from the
Manila CFI Notarial Section and from Casiano de Leon himself.
She immediately occupied the properties, appointed a caretaker
thereof, paid all the land taxes, and caused the transfer to her name
of LRC Survey Plan No. 13305 covering the property. She
claimed that, in 1979, she learned that this property was the subject
of a pending registration proceeding, commenced by Casiano and
Maria de Leon in 1966. She then filed, on September 28, 1979, a
petition for intervention in said case. This petition for intervention
was allegedly granted on October 4, 1979 by the CFI of Pasig.
● For its part, petitioner Eagle Realty Corporation alleged, inter alia,
as affirmative defenses, that (a) the Republic of the Philippines is
not the real party-in-interest since the subject property is private,
(b) the one-year prescriptive period within which to seek a review
of a decree of registration has already lapsed, and (c) it is a buyer
in good faith and for value. Petitioner also filed a cross-claim
against Pilarita Reyes to seek
● Eagle Realty attacks the personality of the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Commissioner of Land
Registration, to file the Complaint. It contends that the CA's
reliance on Section 100 of P.D. 1529 to justify the plaintiff's
personality to file the complaint for cancellation of erroneously or
unlawfully issued titles is misplaced as this provision only gives
the Register of Deeds the authority to file such action. It is Section
32 of the same law that should apply and this provision clearly
requires that the plaintiff must have a dominical right over the
property. Petitioner argues that since the subject parcel of land is
private property over which the government has no interest, the
Republic of the Philippines has no right to file the suit for
cancellation of titles. DEIHAa
ISSUE:
W/N the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Commissioner of
Land Registration, has the personality to file the Complaint? YES
RATIO:
● Indisputably, the government is charged with the duty to preserve
the integrity of the Torrens System and protect the Assurance Fund.
The Republic instituted the complaint precisely to perform this duty.
The Complaint seeks the cancellation of erroneously issued titles to
protect the Assurance Fund from being made liable by the private
respondents for damages in case they fail to recover the property.
The public officer specifically tasked to perform this duty is the
Register of Deeds who, under Section 100 of P.D. No. 1529, is
authorized to file an action to annul a certificate of title erroneously
or unlawfully issued, thus:
○ SEC. 100. Register of Deeds as party in interest. — When
it appears that the Assurance Fund may be liable for
damages that may be incurred due to the unlawful or
erroneous issuance of a certificate of title, the Register of
Deeds concerned shall be deemed a proper party in interest
who shall, upon the authority of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, file the necessary action in court to annul or
amend the title. \
The court may order the Register of Deeds to amend or
cancel a certificate of title or to do any other acts as may be
just and equitable. (Emphasis supplied).
● Under Section 6, P.D. 1529, the Commissioner of Land Registration
shall exercise supervision and control over all Registers of Deeds. It
is well understood that "supervision and control" includes the
authority to act directly whenever a speci􏰉fic function is entrusted
by law or regulation to a subordinate. As the public o􏰉cer having
supervision and control over Registers of Deeds, the Commissioner
of Land Registration therefore also has the authority to file the action
himself. ADCSEa
● The LRC is a mere agency of the government, unincorporated, and
with no separate juridical personality from that of the Republic of
the Philippines. Naming the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff
and merely acting as its representative was not even necessary since
the Commissioner of Land Registration himself, as the superior of
and exercising control over the Register of Deeds, had the authority
to file the complaint on his own. Under Section 1, Rule 3, an entity
specifically authorized by law to file the action may be a party in a
civil action.
● Likewise, it is not essential that the Republic of the Philippines has
proprietary rights over the property covered by the subject titles as
it does not lay any claim over this property. As previously stated,
the complaint merely seeks the cancellation of erroneously issued
titles in order to protect the Assurance Fund from liability for
damages that may be filed by the rightful owners under Section 95
of P.D. No. 1529.
● Petitioner likewise makes an issue out of the inclusion of the
Register of Deeds as a party-defendant. It contends that it would
cause an absurd situation because the plaintiff and defendant would
be represented by the same counsel. Such contention is not worthy
of consideration because the Register of Deeds was only impleaded
as a nominal party for purposes of enforcement, since he is the
public officer charged with the duty of registering land documents
and certificates of title.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of
Appeals' Decision dated January 22, 2001, and Resolution dated January 8,
2002, are AFFIRMED.