Int Ontology Metaphysics (2008) 9:119–127

DOI 10.1007/s12133-008-0026-y
O R I G I N A L PA P E R

Towards an Ontology of Scientific Models

S. Ducheyne

Published online: 26 March 2008

# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008

Abstract Scientific models occupy centre stage in scientific practice. Correspond-

ingly, in recent literature in the philosophy of science, scientific models have been a
focus of research. However, little attention has been paid so far to the ontology of
scientific models. In this essay, I attempt to clarify the issues involved in formulating
an informatively rich ontology of scientific models. Although no full-blown theory—
containing all ontological issues involved—is provided, I make several distinctions
and point to several characteristic properties exhibited by scientific models that are
relevant for individuating scientific models.

Keywords Ontology of scientific models . Idealisation . Abstraction

1 Introduction

That scientific models represent aspects of the natural world is a communis opinio in
the recent debate on models in science (e.g. Bailer-Jones 2003; Giere 1988, 2004;
Morgan and Morrison 1999; Teller 2001). Despite the ever-increasing bulk of
material written on scientific models, no detailed analysis of the ontology of
scientific models is at hand. Authors have so far focussed on the question how does
a scientific model represent (Contessa 2007; Frigg 2006; Giere 2004; Suárez 2003,

The author is Postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Research Foundation (Flanders).

S. Ducheyne (*)
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium
e-mail: Steffen.Ducheyne@UGent.be
URL: http://logica.ugent.be/steffen

S. Ducheyne
Centre for History of Science, Ghent University, Blandijnberg 2, B-9000 Ghent, Belgium
120 S. Ducheyne

2004), instead of on the question what kind of entities are scientific models. In this
essay, I attempt to sketch what such ontology should preferably include.
One caveat should be made, though: if we accept that models are functional
entities (cf. infra), it should come as no surprise that when we deal with scientific
models ontologically, we cannot remain silent on how such models function as
carriers of scientific knowledge.

2 Scientific Models and the Broader Context

Scientific models are essentially a subset of mental representations. Like all mental
representations, scientific models are produced by human minds. A full-blown theory
of scientific representation should therefore clarify: (1) what mental representations
are, (2) how they are produced by the mind and, furthermore, (3) what the ontology of
the human mind looks like. The first two questions will mainly occupy scholars
working in cognitive science and psychology. The third question is clearly a task for
metaphysicians. I shall not pretend to answer these fundamental questions. Rather, I
shall differentiate scientific models from mental representations in general. Thus, in
the remainder of this essay, I shall assume that scientific models are mental repre-
sentations—without qualifying ontologically what mental representations are like.
Let me, more importantly for my present purposes, clarify why I consider
scientific models as (a subset of) mental representations. Let us refer to some recent
work done on mental representation in cognitive science. Allan Paivio (1986) has
characterised mental representations as analogous to physical representations (e.g. a
written text). Like physical representations, mental representations can be picture-
like (such as mental maps and diagrams) and language-like (e.g. mathematical or
logical formulae) (Paivio 1986, p. 16). Now, these properties are compatible with the
properties of scientific models: on one side of the spectrum, we have pictorial
representations of physical systems (e.g. 2-D models of the earth); on the other side,
we have language-like mental representations (e.g. equations in physics). Further-
more, mental representations can be described as having different levels of
concreteness or abstractness just as scientific models. In line with this distinction,
Paivio argues for a dual coding theory which posits that “there are two classes of
phenomena handled by separate subsystems, one specialised for the representation
and processing of information concerning non-verbal objects and events, the other
specialised for dealing with language” (ibid., p. 53). These subsystems are both
structurally (i.e. they differ in the nature of representational units) and functionally
different (i.e. they can act separately of simultaneously). Scientific models frequently
involve a combination of both pictorial- and language-like features. The dual coding
theory developed by Paivia allows such interaction between pictorial and verbal
features (cf. ibid., p. 54).
Philip Johnson-Laird’s (1983, especially chapters 7 and 15) theory of mental
representation aims to highlight how humans interact with the external world by
means of mental models (or, as he calls them, “working models”). According to
Johnson-Laird, such models are not the exact replica of the external world: they are
only similar with respect to the external world in order to guarantee successful
interaction. Scientific models also qualify as functional mental representations: they
Towards an ontology of scientific models 121

are designed by their users to represent aspects of the natural world in order to
realise certain cognitive or practical goals. Johnson-Laird claims that mental models
should have the same structure as the phenomenon being depicted. He distinguishes
between three kinds of mental representations: propositional representations, i.e.
verbal representations; mental models, i.e. structural analogues of the world; and
mental images, i.e. perceptual correlates of the phenomenon being depicted.
These accounts in cognitive science are obviously still in development and further
empirical research is required. Nevertheless, scientific models exhibit properties that
are close to mental representations as described in recent work in cognitive science. I
shall, in the remainder of this essay, impose further restrictions so that we can, in a
clear-cut fashion, differentiate between mental representations in general and
scientific models specifically. In view of what we said above, it seems reasonable
to accept the following statement:
(1) Scientific models are (functional) mental representations designed by users to
represent aspects of the natural world in order to realise certain cognitive or
practical goals.

3 The Variety of Scientific Models

“Scientific model” refers to a broad range of instances. We can think of a statistical

model in thermodynamics, a mathematical model of inertial motion, a 2-D model of
a skeleton and scale models. It is quite a challenge to accommodate these different
phenomena under a single ontological theory. An ontology of scientific models
should be broad enough to cover all these instances and at the same time sufficiently
rich to render their ontology intelligible. It is not desirable to have an ontology that is
too general because we should be able to delineate scientific models from non-
scientific models and from other forms of mental representation. As I will defend in
what follows, it should also be ruled out that scientific models are treated as mere
“fictional entities”. Claiming that scientific models are mere fictions seems to come
close to asserting that science is a fiction, a claim that has very strong implications. I
argue that scientific models are not fictitious without needing to commit myself to
some form of scientific realism.

4 Scientific Models and Physical Realisability

As is clear from the case of scale models, some scientific models are physically
realisable. Being not physically realisable is not an adequate criterion for
individuating scientific models. The majority of scientific models, I suspect, are
not physically realisable. Just think of a Newtonian gravitational model of two
billiard balls. The Newtonian model introduces point masses and circumstances
where no other forces of whatever kind are active. Such ideal conditions are
obviously not physically realisable.
Whether a scientific model is physically realisable depends on the sort of
properties it abstracts from and idealises (see infra). Let me first clarify why a scale
122 S. Ducheyne

model of a bridge, for instance, can be considered as abstract and idealised

representations of the real world bridge. When using a scale model, we abstract from
the actual size of the bridge and use a replica that has lengths in the same proportions
as the lengths of the real bridge. (In most cases, we also abstract from the colouration
of the bridge and even from the actual material.) Now, constructing a 3-D object
which has certain proportions is perfectly physically realisable. By contrast,
constructing a system with point masses in systems where no other forces are active
is physically impossible.
Thus, scientific models are mental representations that, depending on the
properties of a physical system they abstract from and idealise, might be physically
realisable, but not necessarily so. Thus far we have arrived at:
(2) Scientific models are mental representations that, depending on the properties
they abstract from and idealise, are possibly physically realisable but not
necessarily so.

5 A Criterion for Individuating Scientific Models

I will now spell out my account of scientific models (followed by several

clarifications). It is important to note that in contrast to Johnson-Laird my proposal
does not require that scientific models should be entities that are isomorphic to their
targets (note that isomorphism, similarity qua structure, is a subset of similarity). I
require scientific models to be similar to their targets.1 Because of the context
sensitivity involved in scientific representation, no general account of relevant
similarity is required. As Paul Teller correctly points out:
No general account is needed precisely because it is the specifics of any case at
hand which provide the basis for saying what counts as relevant similarity. In
other words, the very facts which make this demand impossible to meet also
show that the demand was misguided to begin with (Teller 2001, p. 401).
It is also worth noting that scientific models are not ab initio similar to their
targets, rather when exploring a potential scientific model we hypothesise that this
model might be similar to its target. Whether a scientific model and the physical
system it intends to represent are indeed similar will depend on whether the results
entailed by this model are compatible with the empirical data at hand. If these results
are empirically sound, we can rightfully conclude that a model is indeed similar to
certain aspects of the natural world.

1
This claim is not accepted by all philosophers working on scientific representation. In my currently
unpublished manuscript “In Defence of Pragmatic Similarity in Scientific Representation”, I show that the
criticisms on similarity are unfounded if a pragmatic version of similarity is upheld (Ducheyne,
unpublished manuscript).
Towards an ontology of scientific models 123

I propose the following criterion for further individuating scientific models from
mental representations:
(3) A mental representation (MR) is a scientific model of its corresponding
physical system, i.e. a target T with respect to a set of relevant aspects and
certain cognitive goals for a person p, if and only if:

(1) Person p initially hypothesises that there is a shared set of relevant aspects,
Γ(A), which contains at least one member, pertaining to both MR and T.2
(2) In virtue of Γ(A), this mental representation allows surrogative inferences to
be drawn about T (i.e. MR→I).
(3) These inferences, in turn, lead to a result or a conclusion (I→R), which can
be tested empirically.
(4) R is such that:
(4.1) In view of the empirical adequacy of R, a person p accepts that MR and T
indeed share a set of relevant aspects and
(4.2) R, provided by MR, meets the cognitive and/or practical goals (Gs) of p,
which, in turn, affect the level of stringency of empirical adequacy p
requires in a specified situation.
Using scientific models is, therefore, always a pragmatic activity: scientific
models are used in view of certain goals their users want to realise. We shall now
explain these characterisations.
(1) Provisional hypothesis of shared aspects. Very often, observational data
concerning the target “suggest” to a person p that there is a set of shared
aspects pertaining to a target and a model representation under consideration.
For instance, interference patterns suggest that light under some circumstances
behaves in a wave-like manner. In light of these, an agent hypothesises that
inferences to be drawn from a respective model in view of Γ(A) will yield
empirically interesting consequences. At this stage, a user does not assert that
there is similarity, but rather seeks to establish whether a model, exhibiting
Γ(A), counts as a proper scientific model; in other words, he/she investigates
whether the suggested shared aspects provide an empirically confirmed model,
i.e. a scientific model, of the phenomenon under consideration. At this stage,
one is not asserting that a model is similar to its target, but investigating
whether it will stand the empirical test. If it does, one could rightfully claim that
the similarity is genuine.
(2) Surrogative inferences drawn form MR given Γ(A). The inferential power of
models stems from their selectivity, which supposes abstraction and ideal-
isation. This set contains at least one element. By focusing on a certain Γ(A),
models exhibit their inferential power (see 3).
(3) Empirical consequences entailed by a provisional mental model. Scientific
models do not represent a system in its entirety, but they are selective: they
represent some aspects of a system (cf. Bailer-Jones 2003). Models facilitate

2
It is important to note that at this stage a model does not count as a scientific model of its target. Whether
a model counts as a scientific model is the thing we want to establish.
124 S. Ducheyne

inferential steps by cutting loose from the complexities of the real world.
Focusing on certain characteristics entails that: (1) not all the properties of a
system are included (=abstraction) and/or (2) that sometimes we explicitly
distort some of the characteristics of the system (=idealisation). Consider a
simple gravitationalmodel between two bodies. In this model, the formula
F ¼ ðg
ml
m2 Þ r2 is only valid in vacuo for perfect point masses if we
neglect from all other possible forces. These ceteris absentibus conditions allow
for a neat mathematical solution. It is easier to sum the inverse-square forces of
the individual points of a point mass than those of an irregular solid. Obviously,
in the real world situation, the bodies will not be point masses, there will be air
resistance and there will probably be other forces active. The model is assumed
to share its “gravitational properties” with the real world situation. Inferences
are generated more easily by abstraction and idealisation.
(4.1) Testing of the relevant aspects. The result derived from the model is trans-
ferred back to observation (O). If the result does not correspond with ob-
servation (given certain cognitive goals), we may choose to no longer accept
these shared aspects. This means that the model is not a scientific model. In
view of an empirical test of a model, person p accepts or rejects its repre-
sentational force. One remark should be made here: though I refer to empiri-
cal adequacy, my proposal is independent of the realism–instrumentalism
debate because it represents both realists and instrumentalists models. I
merely assert that a model should be at least empirically adequate (leaving
open the option to interpret this adequacy in realist terms). Scientific models
are mental representations with a striking feature: they allow one to correct or
reject the content of a mental representation.
(4.2) Agreement with cognitive and/or practical goals. Our cognitive and/or
practical goals (G) will determine the level of detail we require. If our goals
are very stringent, then we will require a very high level of detail. If our goals
aim only at giving a rough sketch, we will be satisfied with a lower level of
detail. This agrees with saying that scientific models are intrinsically
functional: they represent aspects of the world in order to realise a cognitive
or practical goal. If we only want a rough sketch of a pendulum’s
gravitational force (e.g. for educational means) we will use a very simple
model. What we do here is make the assumption that the ideal pendulum and
the real pendulum have similar dynamical properties. That there can be no
full identity is evident, since this model does not take into account air
resistance or the mass of the wire for instance. In one of the most simple
pendulum models, we assume that the cord of length l is massless and that
there is no air resistance. The period (T) of such a pendulum can be found by
the equation:
T ¼ 2
p
ð1=gÞ1=2 ¼ 2
p=w ðw is the angular frequency w ¼ g=1Þ:

If we have determined the l and T, we can also determine the acceleration of

gravitation. This is done by the following equation:


g ¼ 4
p2
1 T 2 :
Towards an ontology of scientific models 125

By means of this model, we are able to infer the value of g. The determination of
g is obviously facilitated by the fact that we only focus on certain characteristics (we
only have to know two things: l and T). For educational purposes, this simple
pendulum model will be a convenient one. Suppose now that our cognitive goals are
very stringent (e.g. we want to produce a really detailed picture of the pendulum as a
physical system). One way to start would be to incorporate the mass distributions.
The period would now be determined as follows:

T ¼ 2
p
ðI=m
g
hÞ1=2

where I is the inertia around the axis of rotation, m is the total mass and h is the
distance from the axis and the centre of the mass. Accordingly, the acceleration of
gravitation equals:


g ¼ 4
p2
I T2
m
h :

The set of shared aspects is now extended. This system is not only similar with
respect to its basic dynamical properties, but also with respect to its mass
distribution. Suppose the model is still not detailed enough in order to satisfy our
cognitive goals. Another factor we might include is air resistance. And so on.
Whether a model represents is dependent of our cognitive goals. The simple
pendulum would not be a good representation given very stringent ambitions. It is an
appropriate model for educational means, though. There is no end to this process:
one cannot include all correction factors in one model. Models are always what
Contessa calls “partially faithful representations” (Contessa 2007, p. 54).
Visually, this can be represented as follows—the requirements of scientific
models are numbered correspondingly in the scheme:

Observation (O) Goals (G)

(4.1) (4.2)

(1)
Initial hypothesis (3)

Mental Model (M)

Target Γ(A)
(2) Inferences
(T)
Result

where (1) reflects that the presumed representational performance of a model is not
ab initio established. (2) and (3) refer to the capacity of surrogative reasoning
exhibited by models. (4.1) warrants a feedback loop to test the shared aspects with
respect to the phenomena. (4.2) points to the pragmatic character of representation.
This helps us to delineate the difference between mental models in general and
scientific models specifically—it also helps to explain cases of misrepresentation.
126 S. Ducheyne

6 Why Scientific Models are not Merely Fictional Entities

One might claim that scientific models are fictional entities. As we have seen, a
gravitational model posits point masses and zero interaction with other forces. I
agree that these conditions are not physically possible. However, claiming that
scientific models are mere fictions is unwarranted. Scientific models deliberately
abstract from and idealise features of the physical world. By being abstract and
idealised, models offer insight in certain aspects or properties pertaining to the real
world. In a scientific model, several explicitly listed aspects or properties of the
physical world are picked out in a cognitive context where the relations between
these aspects or properties are explored or manipulated (without having to deal with
the full complexity of the real world). We can finitely enumerate these aspects or
properties. Just think about the variant simple pendulum models we have discussed.
The model in which T ¼ 2
p
ðI=m
g
hÞ1=2 is exactly valid includes the
following properties: period, inertia, gravitational acceleration and height. One
aspect which is not included in this model is obviously air resistance. However, by
experimental setups we can check whether air resistance will significantly invalidate
the results derived from this model. Comparing pendulums in vacuo and on earth
shows that the deviations resulting from air resistance are indeed very minute.
Moreover, by exhibiting their abstract and idealised properties, scientific models
allow surrogative reasoning that leads to empirically testable results. If these results
are empirically adequate and agree to the level of stringency we require, we are
justified in claiming that we have a scientific model of the phenomenon at hand.
This suffices to show that scientific models are not merely arbitrary. Although
scientific models abstract and idealise properties of the natural world, we can
empirically determine that the aspects or properties not covered by our model are
irrelevant. Scientific models are constructed by human minds, but they are tested in
the external world.

7 In Conclusion

Summarising, we can now individuate scientific models as follows:

1. Scientific models are functional “objects” designed by users to represent certain
aspects of the natural world.
2. Scientific models are a subset of mental representations.
3. Depending on the properties they abstract from and idealise, some scientific
models are possibly physically realisable (but not necessarily so).
4. Mental representations are scientific models if all of the following requirements
hold:
– A MR is such that it is similar to certain aspects of the natural world. In other
words, there is a shared set of relevant aspects, Γ(A), which contains at least one
member, pertaining to MR and T.
– In virtue of Γ(A), which involves abstracted and idealised features of the natural
world, a MR allows surrogative reasoning and yields conclusions that do not
follow immediately from “brute facts”.
Towards an ontology of scientific models 127

– These conclusions are empirically testable.

– Moreover, these conclusions are empirically adequate and meet our cognitive of
practical goals (which, in turn, determine the level of stringency of the empirical
adequacy p requires in a specified situation).

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