Lee Hong Hok v. David, G.R. No.

L-30389, December 27, 1972

The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes clear that there is no legal justification
for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by
respondent officials. As noted in the decision under review, he "acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous
sales application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent was made by the Director of
Lands

A. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, can
bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued pursuant to a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian. This was not done by
said officers but by private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the land involved
are void since they are not the registered owners thereof.

Maninang v. Consolacion
As was there categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was made by the government is undisputed. Whether the grant
was in conformity with the law or not is a question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government
and set aside, the defendant can not question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the grantee and the
government."

B. As far as the Philippines was concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, 12 a
case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from
the Crown...." 13 That was a manifestation of the concept of jura regalia, 14 which was adopted by the present Constitution,
ownership however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. 

 in Montano v. Insular Government" 18 that "as to the unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole
power of legislation is vested in Congress, ..."
 Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being
correctly categorized as public land is undeniable.
"There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever acquired by the applicants or their ancestors
either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the
acquisition of public lands, the property must be held to be public domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that no public land can
be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government."

C. Under Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be raised
within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes
indefeasible ..."

The latest case in point is Cabacug v. Lao, "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land acquired under a free patent is
more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of
a Torrens Title, but in addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase within a
period of five years." 

Collado v. CA, 390 SCRA 343

 Collado filed with the land registration court an application for registration of a parcel of landPetitioners alleged
that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their possession has been open, public, notorious and
in the concept of owners. The Republic of the Philippines filed oppositions to petitioners’ application

the main thrust of petitioners’ claim over the Lot is that "all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights." They point out that EO 33
contains a saving clause that the reservations are "subject to existing private rights, if any there be." They claim
that the presumption of law then prevailing under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land
possessed and claimed by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and disposable.
Petitioners’ arguments find no basis in law.

The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview

Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.11 The Spaniards first introduced the doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas, specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias12 which laid the
foundation that "all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public
domain."13 Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all "lands, territories and possessions" in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.14
the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the
government; and that the government’s title to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties
between Spain and the United States. The term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still
remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands."

Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere
possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.

B)
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII23 of the 1935 Constitution, on "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources" barred
the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could
alienate. The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV24 on the "National Economy and the
Patrimony of the Nation". The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII25 on "National
Economy and Patrimony".

Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except agricultural lands of the public
domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources
enumerated in the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.

Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource

The term "natural resource" includes "not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and submerged lands,
but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the health, welfare, and benefit of a
community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and proper enjoyment of property devoted to park
and recreational purposes."

Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:

"Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water
may be declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a protected area. Rules and Regulations may
be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such activities by the owners or occupants
thereof within the protected area which may damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or
ground water or interfere with the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of
such waters."

Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously argue, private
rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the same as a watershed
reservation?
The answer is in the negative.

An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that he meets the requirements
of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for
is part of the public domain and that he has an interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his
name arising from an imperfect title. 

Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant
must prove the following:
"(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed
in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued."31

Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the Lot is predicated
mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because of the failure to complete
the required period of possession, whether under the original Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the
issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942 and PD 1073.

The Court ruled:

"We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied
from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title from the state. The facts show
that petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the subject land prior to its reservation under Proclamation
No. 573. He filed his application for free patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the
issuance of Proclamation No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot
River Forest Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest
reserve for the public good.
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, "private rights," in Proclamation No. 573, should not be
interpreted as requiring a title.
In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a settler claiming the protection of "private rights" to exclude
his land from a military or forest reservation must show "x x x by clear and convincing evidence that the
property in question was acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of public lands."

In fine, one claiming "private rights" must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as amended,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural
requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and possession of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent.
The rationale for the 30-year period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State,
and that the occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title
or continuous, open and notorious possession."

NESTOR PAGKATIPUNAN and ROSALINA MAÑAGAS

PAGKATIPUNAN, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

G. R. No. 129682. March 21, 2002

spouses Getulio Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia Esquires, filed an application for judicial confirmation and
registration of their title to their Lots

the Court of First Instance promulgated a decision confirming petitioners’ title to the property. Almost
eighteen (18) years later the Republic of the Philippines filed an action to declare the proceedings null and
void, and to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-12665 and titles derived therefrom as null and void,
to direct the register of deeds to annul said certificates of title, and to confirm the subject land as part of
the public domain.
The Republic claimed that the subject land was classified as timberland. Moreover,
petitioners’ title thereto can not be confirmed for lack of showing of possession and occupation of the land.

The petition lacks merit.

Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private

person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title.

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and
the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with
the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing
to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. To overcome such
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable.

In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the land has been
reclassified as disposable or alienable. Before any land may be declassified from
the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or
other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government

There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in the dictionary and "forest or
timber land" as a classification of land of the public domain in the Constitution. One
is descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a
classification for legal purposes. The "forest land" started out as a "forest" or vast
tracts of wooded land with dense growths of trees and underbrush. However, the
cutting down of trees and the disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically
convert the land of the public domain from forest or timber land to alienable
agricultural land. 31

The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal
nature or status, and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like. 32 A person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a
portion of that land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title.
The Government must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse
possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title.
It is a basic precept that prescription does not run against the State.

Carino v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)

FACTS: 
 Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed for writ of error because the CFI and SC
dismissed his petition for application

 For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his ancestors had held the land as
recognized owners by the Igorots. (grandfather maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts and used
parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)

 1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail

 1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but process only
established possessory title

 Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of
1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation

ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.

HELD: YES. Petition Granted.  
 Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public land.

 Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."  For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is enough.
For uncultivated, 30.

 Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was
made. 

 Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

 There must be a presumption against the government when a private individual claims property as his or her own. It
went so far as to say that the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof. 

Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of
the Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new
titles, one who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration
under Act No. 496 of 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.

While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute,

practically it is a question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new
sovereign to decide how far it will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to
the former sovereign and how far it will recognize actual facts.

The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands
occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32
Stat. 691, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the
inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for
failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the
Philippine Commission or by Spanish law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many
years, and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to
comply with provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.

Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the
Philippine Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying
land in the Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is
entitled to the continued possession thereof.

[G.R. No. L-2832. November 24, 1906. ]

Barlin v. Ramirez