JOSE EMMANUEL P. GUILLERMO, Petitioner, v. CRISANTO P. USON,
Respondent, March 7 2016
Facts: Respondent Uson was an accounting supervisor in Royal Class Venture
Phils., Inc. (RCVPI) until Dec. 20, 2000 when he was allegedly dismissed by
petitioner Guillermo, the company’s president/general manager, for having
exposed the latter’s practice of dictating and undervaluing the shares of stocks of
the corporation. Thereafter he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the
corporation, RCVPI.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Uson, ordering respondent to
reinstate him to his former position and pay his backwages, 13th month pay as well
as moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. RCVPI did not file an
appeal but repeated issuances of Writs of Execution against the same remained
unsatisfied.
Uson filed another Motion for Alias Writ of Execution and to Hold Directors and
Officers of Respondent Liable for the Decision and quoted from the sheriff’s
return: a) that at RCVPI’s address (to which the writs are being served) there is a
new establishment named “ Joel and Sons Corporation” which was a family
corporation owned by the Guillermos, in which Jose Emmanuel Guillermo, the
President and General Manager of RCVPI, is one of the stockholders; b) that Jose
received the writ using the nickname “Joey” concealing his real identity and
pretended to be the brother of Jose; c) that RCVPI has already been dissolved.
Labor Arbiter granted the motion filed by respondent and held herein petitioner
Jose Emmanuel Guillermo, in his personal capacity jointly and severally liable with
the corporation stating that the officers of the corporation are jointly and severally
liable for the obligations of the corporation (“piercing the veil of corporate fiction”) to
the employees even if the said officers were not parties to the case.
Guillermo filed a Motion for Reconsideration/To Set Aside the Order of the labor
arbiter. His contentions were a) officers cannot be included as judgement obligor in
a labor case for the first time only after the decision of the Labor Arbiter had
become final and executory b) in piercing the veil of RCVPI, he was allegedly
discriminated against when he alone was belatedly impleaded despite the
existence of other officers of RCVPI; c)that the labor arbiter has no jurisdiction
because the case is one of an intra-corporate controversy, with the complainant
Uson also claiming to be a stockholder and director of the corporation.
Issues:
Whether an officer of a corporation may be included as judgement obligor in a
labor case for the first time only after the decision of the Labor Arbiter had become
final and executory?
Whether the twin doctrines of “piercing the veil of corporate fiction” and personal
liability of company officers in labor cases apply?
Ruling:The Petition is denied.
In earlier labor cases, the Court held that persons who were not originally
impleaded in the case were, even during execution, held to be solidarity liable with
the employer corporation for the latter's unpaid obligations to complainant-
employees. Personal liability attaches only when, as enumerated by the said
Section 31 of the Corporation Code, there is a willful and knowing assent to
patently unlawful acts of the corporation, there is gross negligence or bad faith in
directing the affairs of the corporation, or there is a conflict of interest resulting in
damages to the corporation. The conferment of liability on officers for a
corporation's obligations to labor is held to be an exception to the general doctrine
of separate personality of a corporation.
It also bears emphasis that in cases where personal liability attaches, not even all
officers are made accountable. Rather, only the "responsible officer," i.e., the
person directly responsible for and who "acted in bad faith" in committing the illegal
dismissal or any act violative of the Labor Code, is held solidarily liable, in cases
wherein the corporate veil is pierced
The veil of corporate fiction can be pierced, and responsible corporate directors
and officers or even a separate but related corporation, may be impleaded and
held answerable solidarily in a labor case, even after final judgment and on
execution, so long as it is established that such persons have deliberately used the
corporate vehicle to unjustly evade the judgment obligation, or have resorted to
fraud, bad faith or malice in doing so.
In the case at hand, respondent Uson’s sworn allegations stating that Guillermo
was the responsible officer in charge of running the company as well as the one
who maliciously and illegally dismissed Uson from employment was
uncontroverted. Furthermore, it was Guillermo himself, as President and General
Manager of the company, who received the summons to the case, and who also
subsequently and without justifiable cause refused to receive all notices and orders
of the Labor Arbiter that followed. He, likewise, was shown to have a role in
dissolving the original obligor company in an obvious "scheme to avoid liability".
Essentially, then, the facts form part of the records and stand as further proof of
Guillermo's bad faith and malicious intent to evade the judgment obligation.
It is settled in jurisprudence that not all conflicts between a stockholder and the
corporation are intra-corporate; an examination of the complaint must be made on
whether the complainant is involved in his capacity as a stockholder or director, or
as an employee.
In the case at bar, Uson's allegation was that he was maliciously and illegally
dismissed as an Accounting Supervisor by Guillermo, the Company President and
General Manager. It raised no intra-corporate relationship issues between him and
the corporation or Guillermo; neither did it raise any issue regarding the regulation
of the corporation.
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As correctly found by the appellate court, Uson's complaint and redress sought
were centered alone on his dismissal as an employee, and not upon any other
relationship he had with the company or with Guillermo. Thus, the matter is clearly
a labor dispute cognizable by the labor tribunals. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated June 8, 2011 and Resolution dated
October 7, 2011 in C.A. G.R. S.P. No. 115485 are AFFIRMED.
B. Persons Made Responsible For Others
1. In General
a. Quasi-delicts under Art. 2180, how interpreted
Felina Rodriguez-Luna vs The Honorable Intermediate Appellate Court
(1985)
Facts: The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a
vehicular collision.Those involved were the go-kart driven by the deceased, a
business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of 13
years who had no driver's license.
Trial court ruled On the amount of the award of P1,650,000.00. It was
based on two factors, namely: (a) that the deceased Roberto R. Luna could have
lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income was P55,000.00,
computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal
expenses.
According to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at age 33 the
life expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4 years. Dr. Vicente Campa testified that
based on Roberto Luna’s condition, he could reasonably expect to have a life
expectancy of 30 years.
Court of First Instance of Manila rendered sentencing the defendants Luis dela
Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of
P1,650,000.00 as unearned net earnings of Roberto Luna, compensatory
damages plus attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00.
The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals. The court
affirmed in toto that of the trial court. However, upon a motion for reconsideration
filed by the defendants-appellants, the Court of Appeals ordered the defendants to
pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the sum of Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P450,000.00) as unearned net earnings of Roberto R. Luna.
The Court of appeal takes notice that the wrongful death occurred as
early as January 18, 1970 and that until now the process of litigation is not yet
over. In the interest of justice, the private respondents are hereby ordered to pay to
the petitioners within thirty
(30) days from notice the following amounts adjudged against them:
P450,000.00 for unearned net earnings of the deceased.
Acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by the dela Rosas, the Court
of Appeals took into account the fact that the deceased Roberto R. Luna had been
engaged in car racing and manner of life should be one of the factors affecting the
value of mortality table in actions for damages. The court concluded that Luna
could not have lived beyond 43 years. The result was that the 30-year life
expectancy of Luna was reduced to 10 years only.
Court of Appeals ruled in respect of Luna's annual personal expenses, the
escalating price of automobile gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R. Luna's
social standing, it should increase that amount to P30,000.00.The Court of Appeals
then determined the amount of the award thus: P75,000.00 annual gross income
less P30,000.00 annual personal expenses leaves P45,000.00 multiplied by 10
years of life expectancy and the product is P450,000.00.
The petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred when by its resolution of
June 19, 1981, it reduced Luna's life expectancy from 30 to 10 Years and
increased his annual personal expenses from P20,000.00 to P30,000.00.
Their petition contains the following prayer: That after notice and hearing,
judgment be rendered, setting aside or modifying the RESOLUTION of respondent
Court of Appeal only insofar as it reduced the unearned net earnings to
P450,000.00, so as to affirm the trial court's finding as to the unearned net
earnings of the deceased in the amount of P1,650,000.00
The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to
explain they said that they had no cash money.
Matters still to be resolved shall be the following; whether the award for
unearned net earnings shall be increased to P1,650,000.00; and whether the
award for attorney's fees shall also be with interest at the legal rate.
Issue: WON the Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision. YES
Decision: Court of Appeals erred in modifying its original decision.
Supreme Court sustain the petitioners. Luna was engaged in go-kart racing which
cannot be categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung,
low powered vehicles, only slightly larger than foot-pedalled four wheeled
conveyances. It was error for the Court of Appeals to reduce the net annual
income of the deceased by increasing his annual personal expenses but without at
the same time increasing his annual gross income.
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 The petitioners now pray that the award of attorney's fees be with interest
at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint. There is merit in this
prayer. The attorney's fees were awarded in the concept of damages in a quasi-
delict case and under the circumstances interest as part thereof may be
adjudicated at the discretion of the court.
The courts are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case
because to do so will not serve the ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and
beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have any property
either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support
his family.
b. Indirect liability for intentional acts
Linday Paleyan, for her own and behalf of her Minor children vs Carlos
Bangkili and Victoria Bangkili (1971)
Facts: Plaintiffs are the widow and children of Balos Paleyan, who was killed by
defendant Carlos Bangkili. He was then accused of the crime of Homicide with less
serious physical injuries. At the time of the commission of the offense Carlos
Bangkili was a minor. Upon his plea of guilty, he was sentenced accordingly, but
the decision made no pronouncement as to the civil indemnity. The plaintiffs filed
the an action for damages against Carlos Bangkili and his mother, Victoria
Bangkili.
The Court orders the dismissal of the complaint against the defendant Victoria
Bangkili and renders judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant
Carlos Bangkili. In dismissing the complaint against Victoria Bangkili the court held
that under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code Victoria Bangkili could not be
held civilly liable for the criminal act of her minor son, who was already 19 years of
age at the time he committed the offense; and that Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code was not applicable for it covers only obligations arising from quasi-delicts
and not to those arising from crimes.
Issue: WON the latter, as the mother of Carlos who had him in her custody at the
time he committed the offense, should be adjudged liable with him for the amount
which he was sentenced to pay, considering that he was then a minor of 19 years.
Decision: VICTORIA BANGKILI IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH HER CO-
DEFENDANT.
The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180: "The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company." To hold that this
provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers obligations
which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence
intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage
caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with
criminal intent.
Where the allegations in the complaint show that herein appellee was
sued directly under the said provision, in that she "failed and neglected to exercise
the proper care and vigilance over her ward and minor child and as a consequence
of such failure and neglect, the said Carlos Bangkili committed the wrongful act
herein complained of.
The appellee here agrees that Article 2180 is applicable in this case, but submits
that its application should be relaxed, considering that her son, although living with
her, was already 19 years of age and hence mature enough to have a mind of his
own. This fact is not a legal defense, however, and does not exempt the
appellant from her responsibility as parent and natural guardian. Article 2180
does not provide for any exemption except proof that the defendant parent
"observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
There is no such proof in this case.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed with respect to
defendant-appellee Victoria Bangkili, and she is hereby adjudged liable solidarily
with her co-defendant for the amounts awarded in said judgment, with costs.
c. Nature of Solidarity
Feliz Lanuzo vs Sy Bon Ping and Salvador Mendoza (1980)
Facts: A Complaint for damages was instituted by Felix Lanuzo against Sy Bon
Ping, the owner and operator of a truck and his driver, Salvador Mendoza. It was
alleged that while Mendoza was driving the truck and because of his reckless
negligence, he rammed into the residential house and store of plaintiff. As a result,
the house and store were completely razed to the ground causing damage to
plaintiff in the total amount of P13,000.00. The defendants moved to dismiss on the
ground that a criminal case for Damage to Property through Reckless Imprudence,
was pending in the Municipal Court of Nabua, Camarines Sur, between the same
parties for the same cause. Plaintiff opposed the dismissal stressing that he had
made an express reservation in the criminal case to institute a civil action for
damages separate and distinct from the criminal suit.
The Court rendered a judgment in plaintiff's favor ordering the defendants
to pay jointly and severally the amount of P13,000.00 as damages.
They urged that the civil action was prematurely instituted in view of Rule
111, section 3, providing in part that "after the criminal action has been
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commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action." Additionally, they contended that even assuming
their liability, the lower Court nevertheless committed an error in holding them
jointly and severally liable.
Issues:
1) WON THE CIVIL ACTION WAS PREMATURELY INSTITUTED IN VIEW OF
RULE 111, SEC.3.
2) WON THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING SY BONG PING JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENT
ACT OF HIS EMPLOYEE
Decision:
1.) The terms of plaintiff's reservation of his right to institute a separate
civil action clearly and unmistakably make out a case for quasi-delict. This is also
evident from the recitals in plaintiff's Complaint averring the employer-employee
relationship between the appellants, alleging that damages to the house and store
were caused by the fact that Salvador Mendoza had driven the truck "recklessly,
with gross negligence and imprudence, without observance of traffic
rules and regulations and without regard to the safety of persons and property".
As it is apparent that plaintiff had predicated his present claim for
damages on quasi-delict, he is not barred from proceeding with this independent
civil suit. The institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting
the civil action based on quasi-delict. And the separate civil action for quasi-delict
may proceed independently and regardless of the result of the criminal case,
except that a plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
commission of the defendant.
2.) As to the subject of liability of the appellants herein, For his own
negligence in recklessly driving the truck owned and operated by his employer, the
driver, Salvador Mendoza, is primarily liable under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, the liability of his employer, Sy Bon Ping, is also primary and
direct under Article 2180 of the same Code, which explicitly provides:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.
For failure of the Sy Bon Ping to rebut the legal presumption of his
negligence in the selection and supervision of this employee, he is likewise
responsible for the damages caused by the negligent act of his employee (driver),
and his liability is primary and solidary. But although the employer is solidarity
liable with the employee for damages, the employer may demand reimbursement
from his employee for whatever amount the employer will have to pay the offended
party to satisfy the latter's claim.
Prima Malipol, in her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of her minor
children, Lydia Malijan, Josefina Malijan, Teodoro Malijan and Sebastian
Malijan vs Lily Lim Tan and Ernesto Labsan (1974)
Facts: In the evening of February 6, 1965, Pantaleon Malijan, who was walking on
a road in Barrio San Felix, Sto. Tomas, Batangas, was hit by a gasoline tanker and
was thrown to the ground. While he was sprawling on the ground Malijan was run
over by the tanker's right wheel that got detached from its axle. He died due to the
accident. The cause of death is "possible traumatic cerebral hemorrhage due to
vehicular accident."
The gasoline tanker was driven at the time of the accident by herein
appellant Ernesto Labsan which was being used in connection with the gasoline
business of the owner, the herein appellant Lily Lim Tan.
Representations and demands for payment of damage having been
ignored by appellants, appellees filed on May 18, 1966 a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Batangas praying that appellants be condemned to pay, jointly
and severally, the damages as specified in said complaint. The appellees are the
mother and the minor brothers and sisters of the deceased Pantaleon Malijan.
Appellants were duly served but they failed to file their answer within the
reglementary period. Upon appellees' motion, the trial court declared the
appellants in default and appellees were permitted to present their evidence in the
absence of the appellants.
CFI- Ernesto Labsan is liable to pay damages to the plaintiffs and should
Ernesto Labsan not be able to pay the damages, they shall be paid for by
defendant Lily Lim Tan, who by law, being the owner and operator of the gasoline
tanker that featured in the accident, is subsidiarily liable.
Appellants subsequently filed a verified motion to lift the order of default
and for a new trial which was denied by the trial court.
Issue: WON the liability of Lily Lim Tan in the case, who by law, being the owner
and operator of the gasoline tanker is subsidiary.
Decision: No. Lily Lim Tan’s liability is direct and primary.
We must point out a flaw in the decision of the lower court. It is stated in the
decision appealed from that the driver, Ernesto Labsan, was primarily liable for the
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payment of damages adjudged therein, and the appellant Lily Lim Tan, being the
owner and operator of the gasoline tanker that figured in the accident, is
subsidiarily liable, that is, liable only in case Ernesto Labsan was not able to pay.
This is not correct. The action in the instant case was brought not to demand civil
liability arising from a crime. The complaint makes no mention of a crime having
been committed, much less of the driver Ernesto Labsan having been convicted of
a crime. But there is an allegation in the complaint that Ernesto Labsan was the
authorized driver of the truck that figured in the accident, which truck was operated
by appellant Lily Lim Tan in connection with her gasoline business. The prayer in
the complaint, furthermore, sought to hold appellants jointly and solidarily liable for
damages. The instant action, therefore, was based, as the complaint shows, on
quasi delict. Under Article 218 of the Civil Code, which treats of quasi delicts, the
liability of the owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise for damages
caused by their employees is primary and direct, not subsidiary. 9 The employer,
however, can demand from his employee reimbursement of the amount which he
paid under his liability. The employer, appellant Lily Lim Tan, must be held
primarily and directly, not subsidiarily, liable for damages awarded in the decision
of the lower court. This is, of course, without prejudice to the right of appellant Lily
Lim Tan to demand from her co-appellant Ernesto Labsan reimbursement of the
damages that she would have to pay to appellees.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
dated July 1, 1966, as modified in accordance with the observations we made in
the preceding paragraph, and the order, dated October 10, 1966, denying
appellants' motion for the lifting of the order of default and for new trial, in Civil
Case No. 1732, are affirmed. Costs against defendants-appellees.
Gregorio Anuran, Maria Maligaya, Lapaz Laro, et al vs Pepito
Buno, Pedro Gahol, Luisa Alcantara, Guillermo Razon,
Anselmo Maligaya and Cerefina Aro (1966)
Facts:
Petitioners- Representatives of the dead and the injured
Respondents- Driver and owners of motor truck and driver and
owners of jeepney
At noon of January 12, 1958, a passenger jeepney was parked on the
road to Taal, Batangas. A motor truck speeding along, negligently bumped it from
behind, with such violence that three of its passengers died, even as two others
(passengers too) suffered injuries
that required their confinement at the Provincial Hospital for many days.
So, in February 1958 these suits were instituted by the representatives of
the dead and of the injured, to recover consequently damages against the driver
and the owners of the truck and also against the driver and the owners of the
jeepney.
Court of First Instance- rendered judgment absolving the driver of the
jeepney and its owners but it required the truck driver and the owners thereof to
make compensation.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals insisting that the driver
and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable for damages.
Court of Appeals- it affirmed the exoneration of the jeepney driver and of
its owners. It explained that although the driver of the ill-starred jeepney was not
free from fault, for he was guilty of an antecedent negligence in parking his vehicle
improperly with a portion thereof occupying the asphalted road and because it was
overloaded, it considered the truck driver guilty of greater negligence which was
the efficient cause of the collision; and applying the doctrine of the "last clear
chance", the said Court ordered the owners of the truck to pay, solidarily with its
driver, damages.
The plaintiffs brought the matter to this Supreme Court insisting that the
driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be made liable.
Issue: WON the driver and the owners of the jeepney should also be
made liable.
Decision: Yes.
Upon further and more extended consideration of the matter, we have
become convinced that error of law was committed in releasing the jeepney from
liability. It must be remembered that the obligation of the carrier to transport its
passengers safely is such that the New Civil Code requires "utmost diligence" from
the carriers (Art. 1755) who are "presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence"
(Art. 1756). In this instance, this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by
the Court of Appeals' finding that the driver of the jeepney in question was at fault
in parking the vehicle improperly. It must follow that the driver — and the owners
— of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers.
The principle about the "last clear chance" would call for application in a
suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise
where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of
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the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty
of negligence.
WHEREFORE, affirming the decision under review, we hereby modify it in
the sense prayed for by plaintiffs-petitioners. The three defendants ( Driver and
owners of the jeepney) are required to pay solidarily with the other defendants-
respondents the amounts fixed by the appealed decision. Costs of both appeals
against said three defendants. So ordered.
The last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts that is employed in
contributory negligence jurisdictions. Under this doctrine, a negligent plaintiff can
nonetheless recover if he is able to show that the defendant had the last
opportunity to avoid the accident. Where the plaintiff's previous negligence has
placed him or her in a position from which the person is powerless to extricate
himself or herselfby the exercise of any ordinary care, and the defendant detects
the danger while time remains to avoid it but fails to act, the courts have held that
the plaintiff can recover.There must be proof that the defendant discovered the
situation, had the time to take action that would have saved the plaintiff, but failed
to do what a reasonable person would have done. In the absence of any one of
these elements, the courts deny recovery on the part of the plaintiff.
John Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. vs Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc. (2005)
Facts: Petitioner John Kam Biak Y. Chan, Jr. (Chan), owner of a gasoline station
bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent Iglesia ni Kristo, Inc. (INC),
supposedly needed additional sewage and septic tanks for his gasoline station. To
this end Chan contracted the services of Dioscoro Yoro (Yoro) in which the latter
was to dig the parcel of land. Their Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) provided
among others, that any damage within or outside Chan’s property incurred during
the digging shall be borne by Yoro. Digging commenced, and after some time
Chan was informed that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land
belonging to INC. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug
directly under it to the damage and prejudice of the respondent.
A complaint was filed by INC with the RTC against Chan and his engineer
Oller, who filed an answer and third-party complaint against Yoro. The RTC ruled
that the diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage and septic
tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure, and that Chan
and Yoro are solidarily liable to INC and absolving Oller from any liability.
Chan and Yoro separately appealed to the CA, which disallowed the
latter’s appeal for failure to pay the docket and other fees. The CA denied Chan’s
appeal.
Issue: Whether Aruego is the real party in interest and may be sued as defendant
Decision:
Petition DENIED.
The Court finds no compelling reason to disturb this particular conclusion
reached by the Court of Appeals. The issue, therefore, must be ruled in the
negative.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. – Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are the following:
a) there must be an act or omission;
b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was
the excavation which caused damage to INC because it was done surreptitiously
within its premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The
excavation INC’s premises was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing
contractual relation between Chanand Yoro on the one hand, and INC on the
other.
For the damage caused to INC, Chan and Yoro are jointly liable as
they are joint tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons
who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
The heavy reliance of Chan in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited earlier
cannot steer him clear of any liability.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command,
instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or
abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done, if done
for their benefit.
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 Indubitably, Chan and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They
even had provisions in their MOA as to how they would divide the
treasure if any is found within or outside Chan’s property line. Thus, the
MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is the very noose that
insures that he be so declared as liable.
Besides, Chan cannot claim that he did not know that the excavation
traversed INC’s property. In fact, he had two (2) of his employees actually
observe the diggings, his security guard and his engineer Teofilo Oller.
2. In Particular
a. Parents
Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO
EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER
NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Congress assembled::
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the
Philippines, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless
otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and
property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil
life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the
duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for children and
wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second
and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills,
bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar
instruments containing references and provisions favorable to
minors will not retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its
publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989
Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child are shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution. (349a)
Art. 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article
shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not
apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the
particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by
the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (n)
Chapter 3. Effect of Parental Authority Upon the Persons of the Children
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the
respect to their unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by
right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with
their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and
understanding;
To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty,
integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in
civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational
materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association
with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them
7
 from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and
morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under
the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law
upon parents and guardians. (316a)
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority
shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the
acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their
company and under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (2180(2)a and (4)a )
(NCC)
Pedro Elcano and Patricia Elcano, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito
Elcano, deceased vs Reginald Hill, minor, and Marvin Hill, as father and
natural guardian of said minor (1977)
Facts: Appellee Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and
his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting
subsistence, was charged by appellants Pedro and Patricia Elcano for the killing by
Reginald of their son named Agapito Elcano. The CFI acquitted the Hills on the
ground that Marvin’s act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake." The CFI also dismissed the Elcano’s complaint for recovery of
damages against the Hills for the same charge. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code may be
applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married
Decision: Petition DENIED.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is
also the Court’s considered opinion that the conclusion of the Hills that Atty. Hill is
already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child
(Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or
encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian.
He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although
married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of
the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind
the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article
2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in order
to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that
such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do
any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-
767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see
to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings
of money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by
their minor married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in the Court’s considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as
it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty.
Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
Narciso Gutierrez vs. Bonifacio Gutierrez (1931)
8
Facts: A passenger truck and a private automobile collided while attempting to
pass each other on Talon Bridge in Las Piñas. The passenger truck was driven by
the chauffeur Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. On the other
hand, the private automobile was driven by Bonifacio Gutierrez (18 years old) and
owned by his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the collision,
the father was not in the car, but the mother, together with several other members
of the Gutierrez family was accommodated therein. The collision between the bus
and the automobile resulted in the injuries of Narciso Gutierrez, a passenger in
another autobus.
It was conceded that the young Bonifacio Gutierrez was incompetent
and that he was driving in an excessive rate. At the time of the collision, he lost
his control thus he contributed his negligence to the accident.
Issue: Whether Mr. Manuel Gutierrez, the father of Bonifacio, is liable for the
negligence of his son?
Decision: Yes. The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was granted a
license to operate motor vehicles made the father responsible for the acts of his
son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil
Code, the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be liable for the
damages caused by the minor.
At the same time, we believe that, as has been done in other cases, we
can take cognizance of the common law rule on the same subject. In the United
States, it is uniformly held that the head of a house, the owner of an automobile,
who maintains it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent
operation by one of his children, whom he designates or permits to run it, where
the car is occupied and being used at the time of the injury for the pleasure of
other members of the owner's family than the child driving it. The theory of the
law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry other members of the f
amily is within the scope of the owner's business, so that he is liable for the
negligence of the child because of the relationship of master and servant.
Sabina Exconde vs. Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno (1957)
Facts: Dante Capuno, a 15-year old member of the Boy Scout Organization and a
student of Balintawak Elementary School attended a parade in honor of Jose Rizal
in the City of San Pablo. Upon the instruction of the city school’s s upervisor, Dante
and with other students boarded a jeep to go to the parade. Dante took hold of the
wheel and drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far
when the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidoro
Caperiña, died as a consequence.
Dante was convicted of double homicide through reckless imprudence.
Sabina Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro Caperiña, reserved her right
to bring a separate civil action for damages against the accused. Sabina filed an
action for damages against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante.
Delfin Capuno’s defense primarily states that at the time of the accident,
the Dante was not under the control, supervision 'and custody of Delfin. On the
other hand, Sabina Exconde contends that Delfin Capuno is liable for the
damages with his son Dante because at the time the latter committed the
negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, he was a minor and was
then living with his father.
Issue: Whether Delfin Capuno can be held civilly liable with his son Dante, for
damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the negligent
act of minor Dante Capuno.
Decision: Yes. The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by the
minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary consequence of
the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the
"duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and
instructing them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them
the "right to correct and punish them in moderation". The only way by which they
can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
Here Dante Capuno was then a student of the Balintawak Elementary
School and as part of his extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade in
honor of Dr. José Rizal upon instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was
in connection with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions
and while driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that
neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be held
liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a student of an
institution of arts and trades as provided for by law.
Agapito Fuellas vs Elpidio Cadano (1961)
Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, were both 13 years old. They were
classmates at St. Mary’s High School. One afternoon, while Pepito was studying in
their classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and secretly placed
it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil, it was
Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of
Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito
and told them to go home.
When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by
Rico. Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended
his hand to Rico. However Rico held Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed
Pepito out of balance and pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side
with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While
Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out “My arm is broken.” Rico
then got up and went away. Pepito was helped by others to go home. That same
evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao General Hospital for treatment. Rico
9
was convicted for serious physical injuires. Elpidio Cadano, father of Pepito, filed
a civil case for damages against Agapito Fuellas, father of Rico.
Agapito Fuellas’ defense is based primarily on the fact that the act of the
minor must be one wherein “fault or negligence” is present; and that there being
no fault or negligence on the part of his son, but deliberate intent, the articles of
par. 2 of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same
Code are not applicable, for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission
of an act negatives the presence of fault or negligence in its.
Issue: Whether Agapito Fuellas is laible for the acts of his minor son, Rico?
Decision: Yes. The fact that the civil law liability under Article 2180 is not
respondeat superior but the relationship of pater familias which bases the liability
of the father ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his minor son and
that if an injury is caused by the fault or negligence of his minor son, the law
presumes that there was negligence on the part of his father.
To hold that Article 2180 does not apply to the instant case because it
only covers obligations which arise from quasi- delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act
where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily
liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent.
Ma. Teresa Cuadra, minor represented by her father Ulises Cuadra et al. vs.
Alfonso Monfort (1970)
Facts: Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates
in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. Their teacher
assigned them, together with three other classmates, to weed the grass in the
school premises. While thus engaged Monfort found a plastic headband. Jokingly
she said aloud that she had found an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the
Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter turned
around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain,
she rubbed the injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, the eye
became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents,
who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical
operation twice, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of
which the parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, Cuadra
completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter
against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was
ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as moral damages;
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.
Issue: Whether or not the parent of Monfort is liable for the act commited by the
latter, which caused damage to another child namely, Cuadra
Held: No.
The relevant provisions of the civil Code provides that:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by
provisions of this Chapter.
ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
When the act or omission is that of one person for whom another is
responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180, such as
that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above quoted. The basis
of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or
negligence, which is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or
omission. The presumption is merely prima facie and may be rebutted. This is
the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of
Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.".
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that
the defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due care,
or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority in failing
to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child
was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had
the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And
as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent
prank not unusual among children at play and which no parent, however careful,
10
would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it
reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character
which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could
be attributed to her parents.
Complaint dismissed.
Cresencio Libi and Amelia Libi vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court,
Felipe Gotiong and Shirley Gotiong (1992)
Facts: Respondent spouses Gotiong are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann
Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident which took place and from
which she died was an 18-year old first year commerce student of the University of
San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a
minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who
also died in the same event on the same date.
For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and
Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up
her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be sadistic and
irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept
pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her
refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her. In order to avoid
him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso.
On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single
gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver
licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the
scene of the crime inside the residence of private respondents.
Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances
surrounding the death of both minors, their parents, who are the contending
parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation of
circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical
facts.
Private respondents, submitted that Wendell caused her death by
shooting her with the aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself
to commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners, contended that an unknown
third party, whom Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his
work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU),
must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any
witness and thereby avoid identification.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed a case against
the parents of Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. After trial, the court rendered"
WHEREFORE, judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the
evidence.
On appeal, said judgment was set aside and another judgment was
rendered against spouses Libi.
Issue: Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by
respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.
Decision:Yes.
Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family, hence they should not be civilly liable for the crime committed
by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her
husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which he kept in a safety deposit box inside
a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to the safety
deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known
to Wendell. They have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She
admitted, however, that on that fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety
deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner
spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by
safely locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof
unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying around
or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.
The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent
and child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents
in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and
immaturity, so much so that it was only at the time of Wendell’s death that they
allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that Cresencio’s gun was
missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their
duty and responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children
who, for all they know, may be engaged in dangerous work such as being drug
informers, or even drug users..
Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
provides:
‘The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by their minor children who live in their
company.’
11
 The parents are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability
arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children under their legal
authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the
former acted with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such
damages. That primary liability is premised on the provisions of Article 101 of the
Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their children
9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without
discernment; and, with regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age
who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but under 21 years of age, such
primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code. 3
Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be
effected against the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother.
This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that the
same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon
the mother or, in case of her death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the
liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family friend of the
youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now,
without such alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those
who exercise parental authority over the minor offender. For civil liability arising
from quasi-delicts committed by minors, the same rules shall apply in accordance
with Articles 2180 and 2182 of the Civil Code, as so modified.
In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong
was caused by a felony or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent
court did not err in holding petitioners liable for damages arising therefrom.
Subject to the preceding modifications of the premises relied upon by it therefor
and on the bases of the legal imperatives herein explained, we conjoin in its
findings that said petitioners failed to duly exercise the requisite diligentissimi
patris familias to prevent such damages.
Petition is DENIED.
Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo and Aurelia Tamargo, vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, The Hon. Ariston L. Rubio, Victor Bundoc; and Clara Bundoc
(1992)
Facts: Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle causing injuries which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil
complaint for damages was filed with the by petitioner Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's
adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents
against respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he
was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages, a
criminal information for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was filed against
Adelberto. Adelberto, however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability
on the ground that he had acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt
the minor Adelberto. This petition for adoption was granted on after Adelberto
had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption, claimed that not
them, but rather the adopting parents, namely the spouses Rapisura, were
indispensable parties to the action since parental
authority had shifted to the adopting parents from the moment the successful
petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto was then
actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased nor
been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a petition for adoption.
The trial court dismissed petitioners' complaint, ruling that respondent
natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not indispensable parties to the action.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that
respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action for
damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc. Resolution
of this Petition hinges on the following issues:
Issue: Whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as parental authority is
concerned may be given retroactive effect so as to make the adopting parents
the indispensable parties in a damage case filed against their adopted child, for
acts committed by the latter, when actual custody was yet lodged with the
biological parents.
Held: No.
It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict
against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
reads:
12

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage.
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental authority
vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its
parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of
their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody
and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored upon parental authority
coupled with presumed parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties
accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of course, only
presumed and the presumption can be overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code by proof that the parents had exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air rifle
occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent Bundoc spouses,
the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would thus follow that the natural
parents who had then actual custody of the minor Adelberto, are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We do not consider that
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had
no actual or physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is
essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had
been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could
not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no
physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy
basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no
presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the
Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion
reached above.
Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally granted
unless and until the
adopting parents are given by the courts a supervised trial custody
period of at least six months to assess their adjustment and emotional
readiness for the legal union. During the period of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in the adopting parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in
the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the issuance of
a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting parents are given actual
custody of the child during such trial period. In the instant case, the trial custody
period either had not yet begun or bad already been completed at the time of the
air rifle shooting; in any case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his
natural parents, not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's
natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages brought by
petitioners.
Petition for Review is GRANTED.
Bartolome vs. SSS & Scanmar Maritime Services (2014)
FACTS: John Colcol died in a work-related accident while he was employed as an
electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. He was enrolled under the
government’s Employees’ Compensation Program (ECP).
Since John was childless and unmarried, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits with the SSS.
However, SSS denied the claim, stating that the petitioner is not considered as the
parent of John as he was legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol, the victim’s great
grandfather, therefore Bernardina cannot be considered as John’s beneficiary
because she is not the deceased’s legitimate parent. Cornelio Colcol, however,
already died on October 26, 1987, less than three years since the decree of John’s
adoption became final.
13

ISSUE: Do the biological parents of the covered qualify as the deceased’s
dependent parent and, thus, entitled to the death benefits?
HELD: YES. when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old,
petitioner’s parental authority over John was severed. However, lest it be
overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from Cornelio’s death, was that
when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after the adoption decree,
John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case
at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have
reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is
severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological
parents are not entirely eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome
instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of
the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be
governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the
adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary
rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which
provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or
descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall
be his legal heirs.
From the provisions, it is clear that the biological parents retain their rights of
succession tothe estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the
benefits arising from the death of an SSS covered employee do not form part of
the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on legal or intestate
succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and
those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the
same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental
authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive
parent.
Thus, the Court rules that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’s minority resulted in
the restoration of petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
People of the Philippines v. Noel Darilay (2004)
FACTS: On April 19, 1997 at about 9:00 am in Camarines Sur, Marilyn and Ailyn
Arganda were asked by their parents to buy tinapa (dried fish) from a store. After
buying the fried fish they walked back home. Momentarily they saw 15 year- old
Noel Darilay, the accused, emerge from a catmon tree. He stuck Ailyn twice with a
piece of wood and boxed her on the left side of her face. She fell unconscious. The
appellant then struck Marilyn twice on the back with a piece of wood. He then
carried Ailyn to a grassy area and left her there. When Ailyn regained her bearings,
she looked for Marilyn but the appellant and her sister were nowhere to be found.
Ailyn then rushed back home and told her mother what happened to her
and Marilyn. Their neighbour Allan Candelaria then rushed to the farm where
Pascal worked and informed him of what happened to his daughters. He hurried
home and looked for Marilyn to no avail. Earlier that day, Andres Arganda, the
victim’s uncle reported the incident to the police station. The three police officers
rushed to the scene. With the help of the tanods, they searched for Marilyn in the
place where the appellant attacked the girls. About 15 meters away, they found a
yellow and white colored dress, white panites and slipper bearing the name
Marilyn. The dress was torn. While the policemen were conducting their
investigation, the appellant arrived accompanied by PO3 Antonio Pacardo. The
appellant finally told them where Marilyn was and volunteered to accompany
them to the place. They proceeded to the place and found Marilyn’s body in a
grassy area near bushes and trees along the Palinao River. She was lying face
down, her legs spread apart and was naked. There was blood on her nose, her
mouth and her vagina. The policemen arrested the appellant and had him
detained in jail.
After the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting the appellant of
rape with homicide in Criminal case No. 97-201 and attempted murder in
Criminal Case No. RTC 97-202. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Noel Darilay should be held liable for the
damages sustained by the heirs of the victims.
HELD: Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, the appellant
was a minor under the parental authority of his parents, the Spouses Manuel and
Julieta Darilay are primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by the
heirs of the victims Marilyn and Ailyn Arganda.Consequently, the Spouses Manuel
and Julieta Darilay are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, in Criminal Case No.
RTC’97-201, to pay to the heirs of the victim Marilyn Arganda, the amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P28,000.00 as
14
exemplary -damages. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence in support of
actual damages; hence, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto. They are,
however, entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00. In Criminal
Case No. RTC’97-202, the Spouses Manuel and Julieta Darilay are hereby
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to Ailyn Arganda, the amount of P25,000.00
as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
b. Guardian
New Family Code
Art. 216. The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects.
Art. 218. The law governs family relations. No custom, practice or agreement
which is destructive of the family shall be recognized or given any effect.
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made, but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article
2035.
RULE 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
Sec. 1. Who may petition for appointment of guardian for resident. - Any
relative, friend, or other person on behalf of a resident minor or incompetent who
has no parent or lawful guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or
over, may petition the court having jurisdiction for the appointment of a general
guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such minor or incompetent. An
officer of the Federal Administration of the United States in the Philippines may
also file a petition in favor of a ward thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor of
an insane person who should be hospitalized, or in favor of an isolated leper.
Sec. 2. Contents of petition. - A petition for the appointment of a general
guardian must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the appointment necessary or
convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the relatives of the minor or
incompetent, and of the persons having him in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the petition or verification shall
render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
Sec. 3. Court to set time for hearing; Notice thereof. - When a petition for the
appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and place for
hearing the same, and shall cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons mentioned in the petition residing in the province, including the minor if
above 14 years of age or the incompetent himself, and may direct other general
or special notice thereof to be given.
Sec. 4. Opposition to petition. - Any interested person may, by filing a written
opposition, contest the petition on the ground of majority of the alleged minor,
competency of the alleged incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for
whom letters are prayed, and may pray that the petition be dismissed, or that
letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the
opposition.
Sec. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue. - At the hearing of the petition
the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown
that the required notice has been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the
evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations, and, if the
person in question is a minor, or incompetent it shall appoint a suitable guardian
of his person or estate, or both, with the powers and duties hereinafter
specified.chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 6. When and how guardian for nonresident appointed; Notice. - When a
person liable to be put under guardianship resides without the Philippines but has
estate therein, any relative or friend of such person, or any one interested in his
estate, in expectancy or otherwise, may petition a court having jurisdiction for the
appointment of a guardian for the estate, and if, after notice given to such person
and in such manner as the court deems proper, by publication or otherwise, and
hearing, the court is satisfied that such nonresident is a minor or incompetent
rendering a guardian necessary or convenient, it may appoint a guardian for such
estate.
Sec. 7. Parents as guardians. - When the property of the child under parental
authority is worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or the mother, without
the necessity of court appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When the
property of the child is worth more than two thousand pesos, the father or the
mother shall be considered guardian of the child's property, with the duties and
obligations of guardians under these rules, and shall file the petition required by
section 2 thereof. For good reasons the court may, however, appoint another
suitable person.chan robles virtual law library
Sec. 8. Service of judgment. - Final orders or judgments under this rule shall be
served upon the civil registrar of the municipality or city where the minor or
incompetent person resides or where his property or part thereof is situated.
RULE 96
GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF GUARDIANS
Sec. 1. To what guardianship shall extend. - A guardian appointed shall have
the care and custody of the person of his ward, and the management of his
15
estate, or the management of the estate only, as the case may be. The guardian
of the estate of a nonresident shall have the management of all the estate of the
ward within the Philippines, and no court other than that in which such guardian
was appointed shall have jurisdiction over the guardianship.
Sec. 2. Guardian to pay debts of ward. - Every guardian must pay the ward's
just debts out of his personal estate and the income of his real estate, if
sufficient; if not, then out of his real estate upon obtaining an order for the sale or
encumbrance thereof.
Sec. 3. Guardian to settle accounts, collect debts, and appear in actions for
ward. - A guardian must settle all accounts of his ward, and demand, sue for,
and receive all debts due him, or may, with the approval of the court, compound
for the same and give discharges to the debtor, on receiving a fair and just
dividend of the estate and effects; and he shall appear for and represent his ward
in all actions and special proceedings, unless another person be appointed for
that purpose.
Sec. 4. Estate to be managed frugally, and proceeds applied to
maintenance of ward. - A guardian must manage the estate of his ward frugally
and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereon, so far as may be
necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward and his
family, if there be any; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that
purpose, the guardian may sell or encumber the real estate, upon being
authorized by order so to do, and apply so much of the proceeds as may be
necessary to such maintenance.
Sec. 5. Guardian may be authorized to join in partition proceedings after
hearing. - The court may authorize the guardian to join in an assent to a partition
of real or personal estate held by the ward jointly or in common with others, but
such authority shall only be granted after hearing, upon such notice to relatives of
the ward as the court may direct, and a careful investigation as to the necessity
and propriety of the proposed action.
Sec. 6. Proceedings when person suspected of embezzling or concealing
property of ward. - Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person
having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor, heir, or
otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or
conveyed away any money, goods, or interest, or a written instrument, belonging
to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to appear for
examination touching such money, goods, interest, or instrument, and make such
orders as will secure the estate against such embezzlement, concealment or
conveyance.
Sec. 7. Inventories and accounts of guardians, and appraisement of
estates. - A guardian must render to the court an inventory of the estate of his
ward within three (3) months after his appointment, and annually after such
appointment an inventory and account, the rendition of any of which may be
compelled upon the application of an interested person. Such inventories and
accounts shall be sworn to by the guardian. All the estate of the ward described
in the first inventory shall be appraised. In the appraisement the court may
request the assistance of one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers. And
whenever any property of the ward not included in an inventory already rendered
is discovered, or succeeded to, or acquired by the ward, like proceedings shall
be had for securing an inventory and appraisement thereof within three (3)
months after such discovery, succession, or acquisition.
Sec. 8. When guardian's accounts presented for settlement. - Expenses and
compensation allowed. Upon the expiration of a year from the time of his
appointment, and as often thereafter as may be required, a guardian must
present his account to the court for settlement and allowance. In the settlement
of the account, the guardian, other than a parent, shall be allowed the amount of
his reasonable expenses incurred in the execution of his trust and also such
compensation for his services as the court deems just, not exceeding fifteen per
centum of the net income of the ward.
c. Owners and Managers of Establishments and Enterprises
Orlando D. Garcia, Jr., doing business under the name and style
Community Diagnostic Center and Bu Castro vs. Ranida D. Salvador and
Ramon Salvador
Facts: Ranida Salvador worked as a trainee in the accounting department of
Limay Bulk Handling Terminal. As a prerequisite for regular employment, she
underwent a medical exam at the Community Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia, a
medical technologist conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface Antigen) test and
issued the test result indicating that Ranida was “HBs Ag: Reactive.” The result
bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the rubber stamp
signature of Bu Castro as pathologist. When Ranida submitted the result to
company physician Dr. Sto.Domingo, the latter told her that she is suffering from
Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Based on medical report, the company terminated
Ranida’s employment for failing the physical exam. When she informed her father
Ramon, he suffered a heart attack and was confined at Bataan Doctors Hospital.
During her father’s confinement, she had another HBs Ag test at the same
hospital. The result indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed Sto. Domingo
but was told that the test by the CDC was more reliable because it used the Mirco-
Elisa Method. She went back to CDC for confirmatory testing and the Anti-HBs test
conducted on her had a Negative result. She also had another test at the hospital
using the Micro-Elisa Method and the result indicated that she was non-reactive.
She submitted both results to the Executive Officer of the company who requested
her to undergo another similar test before her re-employment would be considered.
The CDC conducted another test which indicated a Negative result. The Med-Tech
OIC of CDC issued a certification correcting the initial result and explaining that the
16
examining med tech Garcia interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or
negative. The company rehired Ranida. She then filed a complaint for damages
against Garcia and an unknown pathologist of CDC. She claimed that because of
the erroneous interpretation of the results of the examination, she lost her job and
suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma, sleepless nights, while Ramon was
hospitalized and lost business opportunities. In an amended complaint, she named
Castro as the pathologist. Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and
incompetence and reiterated the scientific explanation for the “false positive” result
of the first HBs Ag tests in a letter to the respondents. Castro claimed that as
pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case was referred to him; that
he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his rubber-stamp
signature. RTC dismissed the complaint because the respondent failed to present
sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. CA reversed the
RTC’s ruling and found Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an
erroneous HBs Ag result. The appellate court exonerated Castro for lack of
participation.
ISSUE: Whether Castro has been negligent in issuing the test result and thus
liable for damages
HELD: YES. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of
another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. For health
care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care
provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care
provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably
prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action
caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.
Thus, the elements of actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3)
injury, and 4) proximate causation. All the elements are present in the case at
bar. Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with
statutes, as well as rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and
promote the health of the people by preventing the operation of substandard,
improperly managed and inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by
improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory examinations. Their
business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards of
performance are expected from them. In fine, violation of a statutory duty is
negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his
omission or non- performance will render him liable to whoever may be injured
thereby. From provisions RA 4688, otherwise known as the The
ClinicalLaboratory Law, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be administered,
directed and supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Sec. of Health,
like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that
the medical technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or
licensed physician; and that the results of any examination may be released only
to the requesting physician or his authorized representative upon the direction of
the laboratory pathologist. These rules are intended for the protection of the
public by preventing performance of substandard clinical examinations by
laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised. The public demands
no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory
examinations through compliance with the quality standards set by laws and
regulations.
ST. MARTIN POLYCLINIC, INC. v. LWV CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: December 4,2017
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated July 11,
2014 and the Resolution3 dated February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 125451, which affirmed with modification the Decision4 dated
December 15, 2011 and the Order dated May 25, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 211 (RTC) in SCA Case No. MC11-879 (Civil Case
No. 21881), and thereby ordered herein petitioner St. Martin Polyclinic, Inc.
(petitioner) to pay respondent LWV Construction Corporation (respondent)
temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
FACTS: LWV Construction Corporation(LCC) is engaged in the business of
recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi Arabia. On the other hand,
petitioner is an accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative Council Approved
Medical Centers Association (GAMCA) and as such, authorized to conduct medical
examinations of prospective applicants for overseas employment.
On January 10, 2008, LCC referred prospective applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin
(Raguindin) to petitioner for a pre-deployment medical examination in accordance
with the instructions from GAMCA.After undergoing the required examinations,
petitioner cleared Raguindin and found him "fit for employment," as evidenced by a
Medical Report dated January 11, 2008 (Medical Report).
Based on the foregoing, LCC deployed Raguindin to Saudi Arabia, allegedly
incurring expenses in the amount of P84,373.41. Unfortunately, when Raguindin
underwent another medical examination with the General Care Dispensary of
Saudi Arabia (General Care Dispensary) on March 24, 2008, he purportedly tested
positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus. The Ministry of Health of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia (Ministry of Health) required a re-examination of Raguindin, which the
17
General Care Dispensary conducted on April 28, 2008. However, the results of the
re-examination remained the same. An undated HCV Confirmatory Test Report
likewise conducted by the Ministry of Health affirmed such finding, thereby leading
to Raguindin's repatriation to the Philippines.
Claiming that St. Martin was reckless in issuing its Medical Report stating that
Raguindin is "fit for employment" when a subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia
revealed that he was positive for HCV, LCC filed a Complaint for sum of money
and damages against petitioner before the MeTC of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.
LCC essentially averred that it relied on petitioner's declaration and incurred
expenses as a consequence. Thus, LCC prayed for the award of damages in the
amount of P84,373.41 representing the expenses it incurred in deploying
Raguindin abroad.
In its Answer, petitioner denied liability and claimed that: first, LCC was not a
proper party in interest for lack of privity of contract between them; second, the
MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case as it involves the interpretation and
implementation of a contract of employment; third, the action is premature as
Raguindin has yet to undergo a post-employment medical examination following
his repatriation; and fourth, the complaint failed to state a cause of action as the
Medical Report issued by St. Martin had already expired on April 11, 2008, or three
(3) months after its issuance on January 11, 2008.18
The MeTC Ruling (Dec 17, 2010)
the MeTC rendered judgment in favor of LCC and ordered St Martin to pay the
amount of P84,373.41 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, and the
costs of suit. The MeTC held that it had jurisdiction over the case, since LCC was
claiming actual damages incurred in the deployment of Raguindin in the amount of
P84,373.41. It further ruled that respondent was a real party in interest, as it would
not have incurred expenses had petitioner not issued the Medical Report certifying
that Raguindin was fit to work.
On the merits, the MeTC found that LCC was entitled to be informed accurately of
the precise condition of Raguindin before deploying the latter abroad and
consequently, had sustained damage as a result of the erroneous certification. In
this relation, it rejected St. Martin’s contention that Raguindin may have contracted
the disease after his medical examination in the Philippines up to the time of his
deployment, there being no evidence offered to corroborate the same.
Aggrieved, St. Martine appealed to the RTC, contending, among others, that
respondent failed to comply with the requirements on the authentication and proof
of documents under Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, considering that
LCC’s evidence, particularly the April 28, 2008 Certification issued by the General
Care Dispensary and the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of
Health, are foreign documents issued in Saudi Arabia.
The RTC Ruling (December 15, 2011)
RTC dismissed St. Martin’s appeal and affirmed the MeTC Decision in its entirety.
Additionally, the RTC pointed out that petitioner can no longer change the theory of
the case or raise new issues on appeal, referring to the latter's argument on the
authentication of respondent's documentary evidence.
Petitioner's motion for reconsiderationwas denied (May 25, 2012). Dissatisfied,
petitioner elevated the case to the CA.
The CA Ruling (July 11, 2014)
The CA affirmed the RTC Decision, with the modification deleting the award of
actual damages and instead, awarding temperate damages in the amount of
P50,000.00.
The CA held that St. Martin failed to perform its duty to accurately diagnose
Raguindin when it issued its Medical Report declaring the latter "fit for
employment", considering that he was subsequently found positive for HCV in
Saudi Arabia. Further, the CA opined that the Certification issued by the General
Care Dispensary is not a public document and in such regard, rejected petitioner's
argument that the same is inadmissible in evidence for not having been
authenticated. Moreover, it remarked that St. Martin’s own Medical Report does
not enjoy the presumption of regularity as St. Martin is merely an accredited clinic.
Finally, the CA ruled that St. Martin could not disclaim liability on the ground that
Raguindin tested positive for HCV in Saudi Arabia after the expiration of the
18
Medical Report on April 11, 2008, noting that the General Care Dispensary issued
its Certification on April 28, 2008, or a mere seventeen (17) days from the
expiration of petitioner's Medical Report. Hence, the CA concluded that "it is
contrary to human experience that a newly-deployed overseas worker, such as
Raguindin, would immediately contract a serious virus at the very beginning of a
deployment."
However, as the records are bereft of evidence to show that LCC actually incurred
the amount of P84,373.41 as expenses for Raguindin's deployment, the CA
deleted the award of actual damages and instead, awarded temperate damages in
the amount of P50,000.00.38
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration, which the CA denied
in a Resolution dated February 27, 2015; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON St. Martin Polyclinic was negligent in issuing the Medical Report
declaring Raguindin "fit for employment" and hence, should be held liable for
damages.
HELD: No. At the outset, it should be pointed out that a re-examination of factual
findings cannot be done acting on a petition for review on certiorari because the
Court is not a trier of facts but reviews only questions of law. Thus, in petitions for
review on certiorari, only questions of law may generally be put into issue. This
rule, however, admits of certain exceptions, such as "when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible"; or "when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based."42 Finding a
confluence of certain exceptions in this case, the general rule that only legal issues
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court would not apply, and the Court retains the authority to pass upon the
evidence presented and draw conclusions therefrom.43 An action for damages
due to the negligence of another may be instituted on the basis of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The elements of a quasi-delict are: (1) an act or omission; (2) the presence of fault
or negligencein the performance or non-performance of the act; (3) injury; (4) a
causal connection between the negligent act and the injury; and (5) no pre-existing
contractual relation.44
As a general rule, any act or omission coming under the purview of Article 2176
gives rise to a cause of action under quasi-delict. This, in turn, gives the basis for a
claim of damages.45 Notably, quasi-delict is one among several sources of
obligation. Article 1157 of the Civil Code states: Article 1157. Obligations arise
from: (1) Law;
(2) Contracts; (3) Quasi-contracts; (4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and (5)
Quasi-delicts.
However, as explained by Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Justice
Leonen) in his opinion in Alano v. Magud-Logmao46 (Alano), "Article 2176 is not
an all- encompassing enumeration of all actionable wrongs which can give rise to
the liability for damages. Under the Civil Code, acts done in violation of Articles 19,
20, and 21 will also give rise to damages."47 These provisions - which were cited
as bases by the MTC, RTC and CA in their respective rulings in this case - read as
follows:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
"[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
19
exercise of one's rights, but also in the performance of one's duties."48 Case law
states that "[w]hen a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with
the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong
is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while
Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and
for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would [then]
be proper."49 Between these two provisions as worded, it is Article 20 which
applies to both willful and negligent acts that are done contrary to law. On the other
hand, Article 21 applies only to willful acts done contra bonos mores.50
In the Alano case, Justice Leonen aptly elaborated on the distinctive applications
of Articles 19, 20 and 21, which are general provisions on human relations, vis-a-
vis Article 2176, which particularly governs quasi-delicts: Article 19 is the general
rule which governs the conduct of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of
an actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care required so that an
actionable tort may arise when it is alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.
Article 20 concerns violations of existing law as basis for an injury. It allows
recovery should the act have been willful or negligent. Willful may refer to the
intention to do the act and the desire to achieve the outcome which is considered
by the plaintiff in tort action as injurious. Negligence may refer to a situation where
the act was consciously done but without intending the result which the plaintiff
considers as injurious.
Article 21, on the other hand, concerns injuries that may be caused by acts which
are not necessarily proscribed by law. This article requires that the act be willful,
that is, that there was an intention to do the act and a desire to achieve the
outcome. In cases under Article 21, the legal issues revolve around whether such
outcome should be considered a legal injury on the part of the plaintiff or whether
the commission of the act was done in violation of the standards of care required in
Article 19.
Article 2176 covers situations where an injury happens through an act or omission
of the defendant. When it involves a positive act, the intention to commit the
outcome is irrelevant. The act itself must not be a breach of an existing law or a
pre-existing contractual obligation. What will be considered is whether there is
"fault or negligence attending the commission of the act which necessarily leads to
the outcome considered as injurious by the plaintiff. The required degree of
diligence will then be assessed in relation to the circumstances of each and every
case.
Thus, with respect to negligent acts or omissions, it should therefore be discerned
that Article 20 of the Civil Code concerns "violations of existing law as basis for an
injury", whereas Article 2176 applies when the negligent act causing damage to
another does not constitute "a breach of an existing law or a pre-existing
contractual obligation."
In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their respective rulings on the
provisions of Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. This is because LCC did not
proffer (nor have these courts mentioned) any law as basis for which damages
may be recovered due to petitioner's alleged negligent act. In its amended
complaint, LCC mainly avers that had St. Martin not issue a "fit for employment"
Medical Report to Raguindin, respondent would not have processed his
documents, deployed him to Saudi Arabia, and later on - in view of the subsequent
findings that Raguindin was positive for HCV and hence, unfit to work - suffered
actual damages in the amount of P84,373.41.Thus, as the claimed negligent act of
St. Martin was not premised on the breach of any law, and not to mention the
incontestable fact that no pre-existing contractual relation was averred to exist
between the parties, Article 2176 - instead of Articles 19, 20 and 21 - of the Civil
Code should govern.
III. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.53 Under
our Rules of Evidence, it is disputably presumed that a person takes ordinary care
of his concerns and that private transactions have been fair and regular.57 In
effect, negligence cannot be presumed, and thus, must be proven by him who
alleges it.58 In Huang v. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc.:59
[T]he negligence or fault should be clearly established as it is the basis of her
action. The burden of proof is upon [the plaintiff]. Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules
20
of Court provides that "burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law." It is then up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of
action or the defendant to establish his defense. Therefore, if the plaintiff alleged in
his complaint that he was damaged because of the negligent acts of the defendant,
he has the burden of proving such negligence. It is even presumed that a person
takes ordinary care of his concerns. The quantum of proof required is
preponderance of evidence.60 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The records of this case show that the pieces of evidence mainly relied upon by
LCC to establish St. Martin’s negligence are: (a) the Certification61 dated April 28,
2008; and (b) the HCV Confirmatory Test Report. However, these issuances only
indicate the results of the General Care Dispensary and Ministry of Health's own
medical examination of Raguindin finding him to be positive for HCV. Notably, the
examination conducted by the General Care Dispensary, which was later affirmed
by the Ministry of Health, was conducted only on March 24, 2008, or at least two
(2) months after petitioner issued its Medical Report on January 11, 2008. Hence,
even assuming that Raguindin's diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that he
later tested positive for the same does not convincingly prove that he was already
under the same medical state at the time petitioner issued the Medical Report on
January 11, 2008. In this regard, it was therefore incumbent upon LCC to show
that there was already negligence at the time the Medical Report was issued, may
it be through evidence that show that standard medical procedures were not
carefully observed or that there were already palpable signs that exhibited
Raguindin's unfitness for deployment at that time. This is hardly the case when
LCC only proffered evidence which demonstrate that months after petitioner's
Medical Report was issued, Raguindin, who had already been deployed to Saudi
Arabia, tested positive for HCV and as such, was no longer "fit for employment".
In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin became exposed to the
HCV only after his medical examination with petitioner on January 11, 2008. Based
on published reports from the World Health Organization, HCV or the hepatitis C
virus causes both acute and chronic infection. Acute HCV infection is usually
asymptomatic,63 and is only very rarely associated with life-threatening diseases.
The incubation period64 for HCV is two (2) weeks to six (6) months, and following
initial infection, approximately 80% of people do not exhibit any symptoms.65
Indisputably, Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi Arabia immediately after
petitioner's medical examination and hence, could have possibly contracted the
same only when he arrived thereat. In light of the foregoing, the CA therefore erred
in holding that "[h]ad petitioner more thoroughly and diligently examined Raguindin,
it would likely have discovered the existence of the HCV because it was contrary to
human experience that a newly- deployed overseas worker, such as Raguindin,
would immediately have contracted the disease at the beginning of his
deployment"66
While petitioner's Medical Report indicates an expiration of April 11, 2008, the
Court finds it fitting to clarify that the same could not be construed as a certified
guarantee coming from petitioner that Raguindin's medical status at the time the
report was issued on January 11, 2008 (i.e., that he was fit for employment) would
remain the same up until that date (i.e., April 11, 2008). As earlier intimated, the
intervening period could very well account for a number of variables that could
have led to a change in Raguindin's condition, such as his deployment to a
different environment in Saudi Arabia. If at all, the expiration date only means that
the Medical Report is valid - and as such, could be submitted - as a formal
requirement for overseas employment up until April 11, 2008; it does not, by any
means, create legal basis to hold the issuer accountable for any intervening
change of condition from the time of issuance up until expiration. Truly, petitioner
could not be reasonably expected to predict, much less assure, that Raguindin's
medical status of being fit for employment would remain unchanged. Thus, the fact
that the Medical Report's expiration date of April 11, 2008 was only seventeen (17)
days away from the issuance of the General Care Dispensary's April 28, 2008
Certification finding Raguindin positive for HCV should not - as it does not -
establish petitioner's negligence.
IV. At any rate, the fact that Raguindin tested positive for HCV could not have been
properly established since the courts a quo, in the first place, erred in admitting
and giving probative weight to the Certification of the General Care Dispensary,
which was written in an unofficial language. Section 33, Rule 132 ofthe Rules of
Court states that: Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. -
Documents written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence,
unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid interruption
of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation
21
prepared before trial.67 A cursory examination of the subject document would
reveal that while it contains English words, the majority of it is in an unofficial
language. Sans any translation in English or Filipino provided by respondent, the
same should not have been admitted in evidence; thus their contents could not be
given probative value, and deemed to constitute proof of the facts stated therein.
Moreover, the due execution and authenticity of the said certification were not
proven in accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court: Section 20.
Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(f) (a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(g)(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
(h)(c) Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to
be. Notably, the foregoing provision applies since the Certification does not fall
within the classes of public documents under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court68 - and hence, must be considered as private. It has been settled that an
unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative
value.69 In addition, case law states that "since a medical certificate involves an
opinion of one who must first be established as an expert witness, it cannot be
given weight or credit unless the doctor who issued it is presented in court to show
his qualifications. It is precluded because the party against whom it is presented is
deprived of the right and opportunity to cross- examine the person to whom the
statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as
a witness to provide the other party to the litigation the opportunity to question its
contents. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the
medical certificate renders its contents suspect and of no probative value,"70 as in
this case. Similarly, the HCV Confirmatory Test Report issued by the Ministry of
Health of Saudi Arabia should have also been excluded as evidence. Although the
same may be considered a public document, being an alleged written official act of
an official body of a foreign country,71 the same was not duly authenticated in
accordance with Section 24,72 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. While respondent
provided a translation73 thereof from the National Commission on Muslim
Filipinos, Bureau of External Relations, Office of the President, the same was not
accompanied by a certificate of the secretary of the embassy or legation, consul-
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or any officer in the foreign service
of the Philippines stationed in Saudi Arabia, where the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.74
To be sure, petitioner - contrary to respondent's contention75 - has not changed its
theory of the case by questioning the foregoing documents. As petitioner correctly
76
argued, it merely amplified its defense that it is not liable for negligence when it
further questioned the validity of the issuances of the General Care Dispensary
and Ministry of Health. In Limpangco Sons v. Yangco77, the Court explained that
"[t]here is a difference x x x between a change in the theory of the case and a
shifting of the incidence of the emphasis placed during the trial or in the briefs."
"Where x x x the theory of the case as set out in the pleadings remains the theory
throughout the progress of the cause, the change of emphasis from one phase of
the case as presented by one set of facts to another phase made prominent by
another set of facts x x x does not result in a change of theory x x x".78 In any
case, petitioner had already questioned the validity of these documents in its
Position Paper79 before the MeTC.80 Hence, there is no change of theory that
would preclude petitioner's arguments on this score.
All told, there being no negligence proven by respondent through credible and
admissible evidence, petitioner cannot be held liable for damages under Article
2176 of the Civil Code as above-discussed. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated July 11, 2014 and the Resolution
dated February 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125451 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE is entered, DISMISSING the
complaint of respondent LWV Construction Corporation for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis vs. Jerome Jovanne
Morales (2010)
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FACTS: Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died
in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in
Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store.
On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and
Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was
in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which
was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales
would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It
appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of
a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same.
Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun
to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag,
however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting
circumstance of “accident” under the RPC. By agreement of the parties, the
evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag was
reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the
defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for
the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory
damages, moral damages and attorney’s fees. Respondent appealed to the CA,
which reversed the trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil
liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Was Morales negligent?
HELD: Petition granted. The CA decision is set aside and the trial court’s Decision
reinstated. YES This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of
petitioners’ son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their
claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article
100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages
under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in
the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent
civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s
employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the
liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article
2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun
store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and
Ammunition Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of purchasing
and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety
requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will
be suspended or cancelled.
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his
possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in
character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in
possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the
ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business
dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of
care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable
about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in
his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has
the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should
be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not
needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the
store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and
may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case.
Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and
placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first
place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not
loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never
accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he
has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to
insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent.
Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to
Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original
composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence
required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of
someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in
this case.
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