LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

DIGESTS
CASES 39-85

Block 2E 2022
Atty. Robert Nomar Leyretana
39. HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES PEDRO S. PALANCA, ET. AL.
v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
August 30, 2006 | J. Azcuna | Land of Public Domain: When Alienable
and Disposable
BARLONGAY & CHECKER
PETITIONER: ​Heirs Of The Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca And
Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca Namely: Imelda R. Palanca, Mamerta
R. Palanca, Ofelia P. Miguel, Estefania P. Pe, Candelaria P. Punzalan,
Nicolas R. Palanca, Constantino R. Palanca, Edmundo Palanca, Leocadia
R. Palanca And Oliverio R. Palanca, Represented By Their
Attorney-In-Fact, Ofelia P. Miguel
RESPONDENT: Republic Of The Philippines, (Represented By The
Lands Management Bureau), Regional Trial Court Of Palawan (Office
Of The Executive Judge) And The Register Of Deeds Of Palawan
RECIT-READY: T​he heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, (petitioners herein),
filed an application to bring the pieces of land they allegedly owned
under the operation of the Land Registration Act. They acquired said
realties by inheritance from the late Pedro S. Palanca, who had occupied
and possessed said land openly and continuously in the concept of an
owner 39 years before the filing of said application, and planted on said
lands coconut trees, declared the same for taxation purposes and paid the
taxes.Petitioners likewise presented six witnesses in support of their
application. Alfonso Lucero as one of the witnesses testified that he is a
Forester in the Bureau of Forestry before and he is convinced that the
lands in question have already been released before the war for
agricultural purposes in favor of Pedro S. Palanca through which a
certification was issued by his office.
After trial, the CFI of Palawan issued a decision declaring petitioners as
the owners in fee simple of the two parcels of land in question. After
almost 23 years, respondent Republic of the Philippines filed with the CA
a petition for annulment of judgment, cancellation of the decree of
registration and title, and reversion.
Respondent presented a Land Classification Map showing that the
subject properties were unclassified lands as of that date as well as a
certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office stating that "the islands of Talampulan and Capar
Island located in the municipality of Busuanga, Palawan are within the
unclassified public forest."
ISSUE:
● W/N the lands in question are alienable lands. ​No.
RULING: ​CFI as land registration court has no jurisdiction to decree the
registration of the questioned lands since they are not alienable lands,
otherwise, the tile is null and void.
The possession of public (forest) land on the part of the claimant,
however long, cannot convert the same into private property. Possession
in such an event, even if spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen
into ownership. It bears stressing that unless and until the land classified
as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it
may form part of the disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title does not apply.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically
state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they were
unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified
land until released and rendered open to disposition. When the property is
still unclassified, whatever possession applicants may have had, and
however long, still cannot ripen into private ownership. This is because,
pursuant to Constitutional precepts, all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership
in such lands and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
Thus, the Court has emphasized the need to show in registration
proceedings that the government, through a positive act, has declassified
inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.
DOCTRINE:​The possession of public (forest) land on the part of the
claimant, however long, cannot convert the same into private property.
Possession in such an event, even if spanning decades or centuries, could
never ripen into ownership. It bears stressing that unless and until the

land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that
effect so that it may form part of the disposable lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title does not apply.
FACTS:
● On July 19, 1973, the heirs of Pedro S. Palanca, (petitioners
herein), filed an application to bring 2 pieces of land (in Palawan)
they allegedly owned under the operation of the Land Registration
Act.
● They acquired said realties by inheritance from the late Pedro S.
Palanca, who had occupied and possessed said land openly and
continuously in the concept of an owner since 1934, or 39 years
before the filing of said application, and planted on said lands
about 1,200 coconut trees on each land, declared the same for
taxation purposes and paid the taxes.
● During the initial hearing of the case, verbal oppositions to the
application were made by the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan
● The Provincial Fiscal stated that the lands subject of the
application had no clearance from the Bureau of Forestry and that
portions thereof may still be part of the timberland block and/or
public forest under the administration of the Bureau of Forestry
and had not been certified as being alienable and disposable by the
Bureau of Lands.
● After the lapse of three years from the date of the initial hearing,
however, no valid and formal opposition was filed by any of the
oppositors in the form and manner required by law. Neither did
the Provincial Fiscal present witnesses from the relevant
government bureaus and agencies to support his contention that the
subject lands had not yet been cleared for public disposition.
● On the other hand, petitioners submitted the plan and technical
description of the land, a survey certificate approved by the Bureau
of Lands and also tax declarations showing that they have
consistently paid the realty taxes accruing on the property.
Petitioners likewise presented six witnesses in support of their
application, namely Constantino Palanca, Ofelia Palanca-Miguel,
Lopez Libarra, Alejandro Cabajar, Alfonso Lucero and Augustin
Timbancaya.
● Both Constantino Palanca and Ofelia Palanca-Miguel testified that:
(1) they were heirs of one Pedro S. Palanca; (2) they, together with
their other siblings, were applicants for the registration of two
parcels of land located in Barrio Panlaitan, Busuanga, Palawan; (3)
their father, Pedro S. Palanca, acquired ownership over the subject
properties by continuous, public and notorious possession; (4) their
father built a house on each parcel of land and planted coconut
trees; (5) since their father’s death, they have continued their
possession over the lands in the concept of owners and adverse to
all claimants; and (6) the properties have been declared for taxation
purposes and the corresponding taxes religiously paid for over
forty (40) years.
● Alfonso Lucero testified that he is a Forester in the Bureau of
Forest Development, formerly the Bureau of Forestry. His duty
was to supervise the team that conducted the limitation,
segregation and deviation of agricultural lands within the area
where the lands in question are situated. As such, he issued
certifications after due classification by his office, of alienable and
disposable land. He identified Exhibits "JJ" and "KK" to be
certifications to the effect that Talampulan in Panlaitan Island and
Talampetan, a portion of Capari Island, both in Busuanga
(formerly Coron), Palawan, are fully cultivated and mainly planted
to coconuts before World War II by herein applicants, the heirs of
Pedro S. Palanca. He is fully convinced that the lands in question
have already been released before the war for agricultural purposes
in favor of Pedro S. Palanca. On the basis of the Bureau of
Forestry investigation, a certification was then issued as to its
availability for the purpose for which the application was made.
● Augustin O. Timbancaya testified that he is a licensed geodetic
engineer, formerly called a land surveyor. His services were
engaged by applicant Ofelia P. Miguel, the representative of the
other applicants, to conduct and prepare a land plan for two parcels
of land subject of the application. He believes that both parcels of
land have been released for agricultural purposes because if it were
otherwise, the survey plans he executed would not have been
approved by the Director of Lands.
● After trial, the CFI of Palawan issued a decision on December 15,
1977 declaring petitioners as the owners in fee simple of the two
parcels of land in question.
 ● On December 6, 2000, or after almost 23 years, respondent
Republic of the Philippines filed with the CA a petition for
annulment of judgment, cancellation of the decree of registration
and title, and reversion. Respondent sought to annul the December
15, 1977 decision of the CFI, arguing that the decision was null
and void because the two lands in question were unclassified
public forest land and, as such, were not capable of private
appropriation.
● In support of this proposition, respondent presented a Land
Classification Map showing that the subject properties were
unclassified lands as of that date as well as a certification dated
November 24, 2000 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office stating that "the islands of Talampulan
and Capar Island located in the municipality of Busuanga, Palawan
are within the unclassified public forest."
● Respondent likewise drew attention to Executive Proclamation No.
219 issued on July 2, 1967 which classified the Province of
Palawan as a National Game Refuge and Bird Sanctuary and the
small islands off Palawan as national reserves closed to
exploitation and settlement under the administration of the Parks
and Wildlife Office, subject only to existing private rights.
● Respondent also maintained that a culture of collusion existed
between and among the petitioners, the Provincial Fiscal and the
ranking officer of the District Forestry Office, Alfonso Lucero,
such that the State was deprived of the opportunity to fairly present
its case to the court.
● CA favoured the respondent.
ISSUES:
● W/N the lands in question are alienable lands. No.
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● Petitioner: Opine that it is not necessary for them to prove that the
government had expressly given a grant of the subject properties to
Pedro S. Palanca, separate of the legislative grant given to them
purportedly under Public Land Act. Petitioners also insist that a
particular land need not be formally released by an act of the
Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership,
citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands. They likewise argue that the
CA erred in relying upon Executive Proclamation No. 219 and
upon Land Classification Map No. 839, Project 2-A to nullify
petitioners’ mother title. According to petitioners, the reversal of
the CFI’s decision violated the principle of res judicata as well as
the rule on incontrovertibility of land titles under Act No. 496.
● Respondent: CFI has no jurisdiction to declare petitioners as the
owners of the questioned lands since the said lands are not
alienable lands.
RATIO:
● Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act upon which petitioners
anchor their claim states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
● The above provision clearly requires the concurrence of two
things: (1) that the land sought to be registered is public
agricultural land, and (2) that the applicant seeking registration
must have possessed and occupied the same for at least thirty years
prior to the filing of the application.
● The possession of public forests on the part of the claimant,
however long, cannot convert the same into private property.
Possession in such an event, even if spanning decades or centuries,
 could never ripen into ownership. It bears stressing that unless and
until the land classified as forest is released in an official
proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title donot apply.
● The Land Classification Map indicated that the Talampulan and
Capari Islands on which the properties were located were
unclassified public lands as of December 9, 1929. It was by virtue
of Executive Proclamation No. 219 issued on July 2, 1967 that
these islands were subsequently classified as national reserves.
Based on these, it becomes evident that the subject properties have
never been released for public disposition. Obviously, from the
time that petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest were
occupying the properties in 1934 until the time that an application
for registration was filed in 1973, these properties remained as
inalienable public lands.
● While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that
they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land
remains unclassified land until released and rendered open to
disposition.
● Petitioners’ reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron
v. Government is also misplaced. These cases were decided under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under
which there was no legal provision vesting in the Chief Executive
or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the
public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the
courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases.
● But as petitioners themselves admit, registration of the properties is
sought under Commonwealth Act No. 141. The classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department of the government. Clearly, the courts no
longer have the authority to determine the classification of lands of
the public domain.
● The court also pointed out that petitioners’ contention that the State
has the burden to prove that the land which it avers to be of public
domain is really of such nature applies only in instances where the
applicant has been in possession of the property since time
immemorial. When referring to this type of possession, it means
possession of which no person living has seen the beginning and
the existence of which such person has learned from the latter’s
elders. Immemorial possession justifies the presumption that the
land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been
private property even before the Spanish conquest. The possession
of petitioners in this case does not fall under the above-named
exception as their possession, by their own admission, only
commenced sometime in 1934.
● Where there is a showing that lots sought to be registered are part
of the public domain, the applicant for land registration under
Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 must secure a
certification from the government that the lands claimed to have
been possessed by the applicant as owner for more than 30 years
are alienable and disposable. Petitioners’ failure to do so in this
case, when taken with the evidence adduced by respondent
showing that the lands in question indeed remain part of the public
domain and form part of the national reserves, confirms that the
CFI never acquired jurisdiction to order the registration of such
lands in favor of petitioners, and certainly justifies their reversion
to the State.
WHEREFORE,the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs.
 40. BUENAVENTURA v. REPUBLIC
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
March 2, 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J. | Land of Public Domain: When
least 30 years Petitioners’ right to have their title to the subject property
Alienable and Disposable
registered cannot be defeated simply because the possession of
R. BARRALES & CHECKER
petitioners commenced on a date later than 12 June 1945

PETITIONER: ​Angelita and Preciosa Buenaventura DOCTRINE: ​SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may
RESPONDENT: ​Republic of the Philippines file in the proper Court of First Instance [now RTC] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
RECIT-READY: ​Angelita and Preciosa are the applicants for authorized representatives:
registration of title over the subject property. They are the heirs of (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
spouses Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
from whom they acquired the subject property. The facts reveal that the occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
subject property was acquired by the spouses Buenaventura even ​before a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
World War II​. However, it was only on ​3 January 1948 that the (2) Those who have ​acquired ownership of private lands by
corresponding Deed of Sale was executed in favor of the spouses prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Buenaventura.
FACTS:
ISSUE: ​W/N the Petitioners have the right to have their title to the
subject property registered - ​YES
● Petitioners Angelita and Preciosa are the applicants for registration
of title over the subject property.
RULING: ​Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who
● They are the heirs of spouses Amado Buenaventura and Irene
may apply for registration of land. There are three requisites for the filing
Flores (spouses Buenaventura) from whom they acquired the
of an application for registration of title under the first category, to wit:
subject property.
1. that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the
● The facts reveal that the subject property was acquired by the
public domain;
spouses Buenaventura from the Heirs of Lazaro de Leon, namely:
2. that the applicants by themselves or through their
Aurelio de Leon and his sister Rodencia Sta. Agueda even ​before
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
World War II​. (important)
and notorious possession and occupation; and
● However, it was only on ​3 January 1948 that the corresponding
3. that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
Deed of Sale was executed in favor of the spouses Buenaventura.
12 June 1945 or earlier.
● In 1978, the spouses Buenaventura transferred, by way of Deed of
The second classification relates to the ​acquisition of private lands by
Sale, the subject property, together with the adjacent property, to
prescription. ​This Court found out that petitioners offered in evidence a
their children, among whom are herein petitioners.
certification from the DENR, dated 29 October 2001, to prove that the
● Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title
subject property was alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
before the RTC of Parañaque City of the subject property, located
It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and disposable land
in San Dionisio, Parañaque City.
may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
● Petitioners alleged that "they and their predecessors-in-interest
exclusive possession of at least 30 years. It is well-settled that properties
acquired title to the said parcel of land thru inheritance, transfer,
classified as alienable and disposable land may be converted into private
 and possession as owners of the same since time immemorial
and/or within the period provided for by law.”
● In order to establish the fact that petitioners and their predecessors
have acquired vested right over the subject property by their open,
continuous, and exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership for over 50 years completely unmolested by any
adverse claim.
● Meaning, their possession of the subject property was in the
manner and for the period required by law; likewise, to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the subject property.
● They also presented and identified several documents offered in
evidence, which tend to establish further the following: (1)
petitioners’ fee simple title over the subject property;(2) the nature
of the possession and occupation of the property;(3) its
classification as part of the alienable and disposable zone of the
government​; and(4) the improvements introduced thereon and the
taxes paid on the subject property.
ISSUES: ​W/N the Petitioners have the right to have their title to the subject
property registered - ​YES
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any): ​According to the Republic,
petitioners failed to prove continuous, open, exclusive and notorious
possession by their predecessors-in-interest and by themselves; hence, the
trial court erred in granting petitioners’ application for registration of the
subject property.
RATIO:
● Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree speaks of who may
apply for registration of land. The said provision of law refers to an
original registration through ordinary registration proceedings.
● SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance [now RTC] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since ​June 12, 1945, or earlier. ​(2) Those
who have acquired ownership of private lands by ​prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
● From the provisions of the Property Registration Decree, there are
three requisites for the filing of an application for registration of
title under the first category, to wit:
1. that the property in question is alienable and disposable land
of the public domain;
2. that the applicants by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and
3. that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
● The second classification relates to the ​acquisition of private
lands by prescription.
● This Court found out that petitioners offered in evidence a
certification from the DENR, dated 29 October 2001, to prove that
the subject property was alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. It is well-settled that properties classified as
alienable and disposable land
● The only reason posited by the appellate court (and SC) in denying
to grant the application for registration of title of the petitioners
was the fact that petitioners’ ​evidence was not sufficient to prove
that their possession of the subject property was since ​12 June
1945 or earlier.
● It is well-settled that properties classified as alienable and
disposable land may be converted into private property by reason
of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least 30 years.
● Such property now falls within the contemplation of "private
lands" under Section 14(2), over which title by prescription can be
acquired.
● Hence, because of Section 14(2) of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
those who are in possession of alienable and disposable land, and
whose possession has been characterized as open, continuous and
exclusive for 30 years or more, may have the right to register their
title to such land despite the fact that their possession of the land
commenced only after 12 June 1945.
● IN ALL, petitioners were able to prove sufficiently that they have
been in possession of the subject property for more than 30 years,
 which possession is characterized as open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious, in the concept of an owner.
● By this, the subject alienable and disposable public land had been
effectively converted into private property over which petitioners
have acquired ownership through prescription to which they are
entitled to have title through registration proceedings.
● Petitioners’ right to have their title to the subject property
registered cannot be defeated simply because the possession of
petitioners commenced on a date later than 12 June 1945, for the
law and supplementing jurisprudence amply, justly and rightfully
provides the necessary remedy to what would otherwise result in
an unjust and unwarranted situation.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby

GRANTED.
 41. LIMCOMA VS. REPUBLIC
10 July 2007 | J. Nachura |
‘When is a land of public domain alienable and disposable?’ and the
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles.
Calilung & Checker
PETITIONER:​LIMCOMA MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE
RESPONDENT: ​REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
RECIT-READY:
Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative filed with the RTC an application
for registration and confirmation of title over a 646 sq meter parcel of
land in Barangay Namuco, Rosario, Batangas. Limcoma alleged that it is
the owner in fee simple of the subject lot and the improvements thereon,
and that it has been in the open, exclusive, peaceful, and continuous
possession thereof for more than 30 years, reckoned from the time of
possession of its predecessors-in-interest. There were no private
oppositors, hence Limcoma presented the testimonies of Olivia P.
Gomez, Arsenia P. Alcantara, and Lorenzo P. Limbo. (If you want more
details on the testimonies check the facts.) RTC granted. CA reversed
and set aside on the basis that: (Limcoma) ‘failed to (1) demonstrate the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since June 12,
1945 or earlier, required by the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act; and (2) overcome the presumption that the subject lot is
public and alienable land.’ Hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the subject lot is public and alienable land, and Limcoma has
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession thereof
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, under a bona fide claim of ownership;
2. Corollarily, whether or not the subject lot acquired a private character
in 1968, thus within the operation of the laws on prescription.
RULING:
1. The records reveal that the petitioner presented several
documents to prove that the subject lot is alienable public land.
In fact, the petitioner introduced in evidence a ​Certification 31
from the DENR-CENRO​, dated September 30, 2002 which
reads:
“This is to certify that the parcel of land identified as Lot 972-A,
Csd-04-015172-D, situated at Barangay Namuco, Rosario, Batangas
containing an area of SIX HUNDRED FORTY-SIX METERS and
shown at the reverse side thereof has been verified to be within the
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE ZONE under Project No. 27-A, land
Classification Map No. 718 certified on 26 March 1928.”
The DENR-CENRO Report, likewise, contains the foregoing notation.
Further, the subject lot has been classified as commercial for tax
purposes. These documents all point to the undeniable fact that the
subject lot is public alienable land and, thereby, overcome the
presumption that such forms part of the public dominion.
In the recent case of Buenaventura v. Republic we ruled that said
Certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character of the
subject property as public and alienable land. We similarly ruled in
Republic v. Court of Appeal and intoned therein that the certification
enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of contradictory
evidence.
Both the DENR-CENRO Certification and Report constitute a positive
government act, an administrative action, validly classifying the land in
question. As adverted to by the petitioner, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral, or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government. Clearly, the petitioner has overcome the burden of proving
the alienability of the subject lot.
2. The testimonies of petitioner's witnesses consistently declared that the
Spouses Andres and Trinidad occupied and possessed the subject lot in
the concept of owner since 1938. Worth noting is the testimony of
Lorenzo Limbo who had resided in and frequented the area since he was
a child and is thus familiar with the Spouses Andres' and Trinidad's
ownership of Lot 972. He gave direct and categorical testimony
consisting of specific acts of ownership to substantiate the petitioner's

claim that the Spouses Andres and Trinidad possessed and occupied the
subject lot. Lorenzo Limbo certainly knew from whereof he spoke as his
father was the compadre of the Spouses Andres and Trinidad, he
eventually married Trinidad's sister, and he had been a long time
neighbor of the Alcantaras.
Moreover, petitioner proffered in evidence the TDs showing payment of
realty taxes by the Spouses Andres and Trinidad from 1938 which was
subsequently continued by Venustiano and Arsenia. Although as a rule,
tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are proof
that the holder has a claim of title over the property and serve as
sufficient basis for inferring possession. These tax declarations bolster
the petitioner's claim that its predecessors-in-interest possessed and
occupied the lot in question since 1938.
DOCTRINE:
In the recent case of Buenaventura v. Republic we ruled that
(DENR-CENRO Certification) is sufficient to establish the true nature or
character of the subject property as public and alienable land. We
similarly ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeal and intoned therein that
the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence.
Both the DENR-CENRO Certification and Report constitute a positive
government act, an administrative action, validly classifying the land in
question. As adverted to by the petitioner, the classification or
reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral, or
forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government. Clearly, the petitioner has overcome the burden of proving
the alienability of the subject lot.
FACTS:
(Merely additional info on the land and testimonies. Not really necessary;
just in case.)
Olivia P. Gomez​, petitioner's Assistant General Manager, testified that she
knows the subject lot which has been occupied and used by the petitioner
from the date of purchase as its sales and warehouse office in Rosario,
Batangas. The subject lot was bought by petitioner from the Spouses
Venustiano and Arsenia Alcantara on September 4, 1991. As a cooperative,
the petitioner is empowered by its Articles of Cooperation to hold real
property. However, it is exempted from the payment of real estate taxes.
The subject lot is not within a military reservation or forest zone but falls
under a commercial classification. There are no tenants on the subject lot
and it is located along the provincial road. Upon continuation of Olivia's
testimony, she identified the evidence to establish the historical ownership
of the subject lot traced back from the petitioner's predecessors-in interest.
Unfortunately, Tax Declaration (TD) No. 0884 12 could not be found in the
files of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Rosario, Batangas despite
diligent efforts to locate said document. However, TD Nos. 00584 13 and
0452 both specifically refer to TD No. 0884 which provides the link to
reflect the transfer of ownership from the Spouses Andres and Trinidad
Alcantara to Venustiano. The character of petitioner's and its
predecessors-in-interest's possession of the subject lot was peaceful, open,
continuous, exclusive, and in the concept of owners. Olivia further testified
on the subject lot's classification as certified by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Community and Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO). The CENRO Report dated
September 23, 2002 stated, among others, that (1) Lot 972-A is not within
a reservation or forest zone; (2) there is no previously issued patent, decree,
or title; (3) there is no public land application filed for the same by the
applicant (petitioner) or any other person; (4) the land applied for is
commercial in nature and is used as warehouse of feeds for animals; and (5)
the land does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbank
protection, creek, or right of way. Olivia further reiterated that the subject
lot is classified as commercial and within the alienable and disposable zone.
In turn, ​Arsenia Alcantara identified Lot 972 and declared that it was
previously owned by her parents-in-law, the Spouses Andres and Trinidad,
who had occupied and possessed said lot, in the concept of owner, since
1938. In 1982, Lot 972 was donated by the couple to their son, Venustiano.
She came to know of her in-laws' ownership of Lot 972 a year after she and
Venustiano were married in 1953. In this regard, Arsenia testified that the
Spouses Andres and Trinidad planted and harvested several coconut trees, continuous, and exclusive, that they planted citrus on the said lot, and that
other crops, and vegetables thereon. She and Venustiano, likewise, stored the perimeter area was surrounded by madre de cacao, bamboos, and some
thereat some of their equipment and things used in their bakery. When wire. The subject lot is not tenanted, is located outside a military reservation
Venustiano became the owner thereof, they put up a perimeter fence on Lot or forest zone, and is without adverse claimants. Likewise, Lorenzo verified
972 and continued to use the property as a storage site for materials utilized Arsenia's testimony on the Spouses Andres and Trinidad's donation of the
in their bakery. Thereafter, Lot 972 was segregated into Lots 972-A and subject lot to Venustiano in 1982. Initially, Lorenzo only knew from his
972-B. Lot 972-A was the subject of the petitioner's application for wife that Lot 972 was donated to Venustiano by the latter's parents.
registration before the RTC while Lot 972-B was donated by Venustiano to Subsequently, however, he was able to confirm that the ownership of the
their daughter, Trinidad Alcantara. Finally, Arsenia identified and ratified subject lot had been transferred to Venustiano because it was of public
the Deed of Sale evidencing petitioner's acquisition of the subject lot. On knowledge and they became his neighbors in the same place.
cross-examination, Arsenia confirmed that there were no adverse claimants
over the subject lot, and her in-laws' possession thereof was peaceful, WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The
adversarial, continuous, and open, which they (Venustiano and her) January 31, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
eventually continued in like manner. REVERSED, and the April 10, 2003 Order of the Regional Trial Court
granting the petitioner's application for registration of the subject lot,
Lorenzo Limbo corroborated Arsenia's testimony on the Spouses Andres is hereby REINSTATED. No costs.
and Trinidad's possession and ownership of the subject lot since 1938.
Lorenzo testified that he was born and raised in Poblacion, Rosario, SO ORDERED.
Batangas, the same place where the subject lot is located. He was a resident
thereof for 59 years. In addition, Lorenzo declared that he knows the subject
lot which was originally part of Lot 972, and ownership thereof by the
Spouses Andres and Trinidad, because Lorenzo's family used to own a
parcel of land near the property. In fact, the Spouses Andres and Trinidad
were compadres of Lorenzo's father. Lorenzo was already a teenager in
1938 when the Spouses Andres and Trinidad possessed and tilled Lot 972
encompassing the subject lot. As a boy, Lorenzo frequented the property
near Lot 972, and, from 1938, he observed the Spouses Andres and Trinidad
working on and utilizing the land as storage site for their business. ASHaDT
Lorenzo's familiarity with Lot 972 and its previous owners was solidified by
his marriage to Trinidad's sister, which makes Lorenzo, Venustiano's uncle
by affinity. Indeed, Lorenzo asseverated that the Spouses Andres and
Trinidad were the recognized and acknowledged owners of Lot 972, and
they remained owners thereof when he got married on January 18, 1951. He
recalled that the Spouses Andres and Trinidad's possession was open,
 42. REPUBLIC v. T.A.N. PROPERTIES
26 June 2008 | J. Carpio | Sec. 3, Art. XII of the Constitution and the
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles
M. del Rosario & T. dela Rosa
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: ​T.A.N. Properties
RECIT-READY: ​T.A.N. Properties filed from an Application for
Original Registration of title covering a 56.4007 hectares of a lot in a
subdivision plan which is a portion of a consolidated Sto. Tomas
Cadastre in Batangas. The only oppositor was the Republic of the
Philippines represented by the Director of Lands.
ISSUE:​ (Note: The issues most relevant to the syllabus topic are in bold.)
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable (NO)
2. Whether T.A.N. or its predecessors-in-interest had open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the land in the concept of an owner since June 1945 or earlier
(NO)
3. Whether T.A.N. Properties, a private corporation, cannot apply
for registration of the land of the public domain (NO)
4. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the
land under the Public Land Act (NO)
RULING: ​The land is not alienable and disposable.
The rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State. It is upon the respondent to overturn such
presumption. In this case, T.A.N submitted two certifications issued by
the DENR. The first one is the 3 June 1997 Certification by CENRO
certified that the disputed lot falls within ​the alienable and disposable
zone. The second certification in the form of a memorandum to the trial
court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director, Forest
Management Services of the DENR (FMS-DENR), stated "that the
subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land, Project No. 30
of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
The two certificates are INSUFFICIENT. The CENRO certificate
presented is beyond the authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable
and disposable based on DENR Administrative Order No. 20, series of
1988, the CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas
below 50 hectares. Moreover, the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Offices (PENRO) is the one issuing certificates of land
classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares.
Likewise, the FMS-DENR Memorandum is insufficient for having no
probative value for lack of authority of the Regional Technical Director
to issue the same under DAO Nos. 20 and 38.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR,
certifications do not prove that the lot falls within the alienable and
disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government
certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated
therein. In the present case, only Torres, respondent's Operations
Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The
government officials who issued the certifications were not presented
before the trial court to testify on their contents.
DOCTRINE: ​It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that
a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration
must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification
and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable,
and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO.
In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must
be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
FACTS:
● T.A.N. Properties filed from an Application for Original
Registration of title covering a 56.4007 hectares of a lot in a
subdivision plan which is a portion of a consolidated Sto. Tomas
Cadastre.
● After publishing the Notice of Initial Hearing, the trial court, on 11
November 1999 called the case for initial hearing. The only
oppositor was the Republic of the Philippines represented by the
Director of Lands.
● T.A.N. Properties presented three witnesses: Anthony Dimayuga
Torres (Torres), its Operations Manager and its authorized
representative in the case; Primitivo Evangelista (Evangelista), a
72-year old resident of San Bartolome, Sto. Tomas, Batangas since
birth; and Regalado Marquez, Records Officer II of the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), Quezon City.
● T.A.N.’s witnesses testified for the transfer of the lands:
1942 – 1960 Kabesang Puroy had peaceful, adverse, open,
and continuous possession in the concept of
an owner.
1960 Upon Kabesang Puroy’s death, he was
succeeded by his son Antonio.
1960 Antonio executed a Deed of Donation in
favour of one of his children, Fortunato.
Later, however, Antonio gave Fortunato
another piece of land.
1961 Antonio executed a Partial Revocation of
Donation, and the land was adjudicated to one
of Antonio’s children, Porting.
1997 Porting sold the land to T.A.N. Properties.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the land is alienable and disposable (NO)
2. Whether T.A.N. Properties, a private corporation, cannot apply for
registration of the land of the public domain (NO)
3. Whether respondent is qualified to apply for registration of the
land under the Public Land Act (NO)
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS: ​See ratio.
RATIO:
1. ​T.A.N. Properties failed to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
● The rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private
dominion presumably belong to the State. It is upon the respondent
to overturn such presumption.· ​In this case, T.A.N submitted
two certifications issued by the DENR.
1. ​The first one is the 3 June 1997 Certification by the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(CENRO)​, Batangas City certified that the disputed lot falls within
the alienable and disposable zone.
2. ​The second certification in the form of a memorandum to the
trial court, which was issued by the Regional Technical Director,
Forest Management Services of the DENR ​(FMS-DENR)​, stated
"that the subject area falls within an alienable and disposable land,
Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
● ​The two certificates are INSUFFICIENT.
1. The ​CENRO certificate presented by T.A.N. covered the
entire lot with an area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO
No. 38, series of 1990, is ​beyond the authority of the CENRO to
certify as alienable and disposable.
BASIS: Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the CENRO issues
certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares.
The Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices
(PENRO) issues certificate of land classification status for lands
covering over 50 hectares.
2. The ​FMS-DENR Memorandum has ​no probative value
for lack of authority of the Regional Technical Director to issue the
same.
BASIS: under DAO Nos. 20 and 38 to issue certificates of land
classification. Under DAO No. 20, the Regional Technical Director,
FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor products (OM)
permits except rattan;
2. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
3. Approves renewal of special use permits covering over five
hectares for public infrastructure projects; andcralawlibrary
4. Issues renewal of certificates of registration for logs, poles, piles,
and lumber dealers.
Under DAO No. 38, the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR:
1. Issues original and renewal of ordinary minor [products] (OM)
permits except rattan;
2. Issues renewal of certificate of registration for logs, poles, and
piles and lumber dealers;
3. Approves renewal of resaw/mini-sawmill permits;
4. Issues public gratuitous permits for 20 to 50 cubic meters within
calamity declared areas for public infrastructure projects;
andcralawlibrary
5. Approves original and renewal of special use permits covering
over five hectares for public infrastructure projects.
· ​It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a
true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts
must be established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the
certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials
who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial
court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have
accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated
therein. Even if the · ​certifications are presumed duly issued and
admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing
that the land is alienable and disposable.
2. There was No Open, Continuous, Exclusive, and Notorious
Possession and Occupation in the Concept of an Owner
Ruling was discussed in Case #26 (same case).
3. ​T.A.N. Properties, a private corporation, cannot apply for
registration of the land of the public domain.
Ruling was discussed in Case #26 (same case).
4. T.A.N. is NOT qualified to apply for registration of the land under
the Public Land Act

Ruling was discussed in Case #26 (same case).

WHEREFORE, ​we SET ASIDE ​the 21 August 2002 Decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66658 and the 16 December 1999
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6 in
Land Registration Case No. T-635. We ​DENY ​the application for
registration filed by T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
 43. REPUBLIC v. CA
were deemed alienable. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the
August 6, 2008 | G.R. No. 155450 | Carpio | Land of Public Domain:
disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved
When Alienable and Disposable
for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish
LUCES | MIRANDA
regime or thereafter. When the trial court issued the decision for the
issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the Philippines represented by the Regional determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion,
Executive Director, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court
Regional Office No. 2 determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved
RESPONDENT: ​Court of Appeals, Heirs of Antonio Carag and Victoria that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The
Turingan, The Register of Deeds of Cagayan, and the Court of First government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial
Instance of Cagayan court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court
declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had
RECIT-READY: ​The CFI of Cagayan issued a Decree in favor of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in
Spouses Carag covering a parcel of land situated in Cagayan. A 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review.
letter-petition was filed with the DENR by a certain Bienvenida Taguiam
requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment DOCTRINE:
of the decree on the ground that the trial court (CFI Cagayan) did not During the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless
have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property still falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some
allegedly classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of the public purpose in accordance with law.
Decree. ​68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928​, the Republic
of the Philippines filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint to annul
FACTS:
and declare the nullity of titles on the same ground of lack of jurisdiction
● The CFI of Cagayan issued Decree No. 381928 in favor of spouses
of the CFI Cagayan. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still
Antonio Carag and Victoria Turingan, covering a parcel of land
classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable, when
situated in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. Pursuant to said Decree, the
Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or
Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title
in 1938, only the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial
No. 11585 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag.
courts, had the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public
● Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others filed with the
domain.
Regional Office No. 2 of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Tuguegarao, Cagayan, a letter-petition
ISSUE:
requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the
● W/N the CFI of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of
annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court
timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and
did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject
Victoria Turingan - ​YES
property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the
time of the issuance of Decree No. 381928.
RULING:
● In a Memorandum, the Legal Division of the Land Management
Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. Thus,
Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for
unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the
the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles,
State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands
 be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved
the recommendation.
● 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928​, petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment,
cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles on the ground that
in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of
the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square
meters (disputed portion). The disputed portion was allegedly still
classified as timber land at the time of issuance of Decree No.
381928 and, therefore, was not alienable and disposable until 22
February 1982 when the disputed portion was classified as
alienable and disposable.
● Petitioner contends that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate to spouses Carag the disputed portion of the subject
property. Petitioner claims that the disputed portion was still
classified as timber land, and thus not alienable and disposable,
when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930. In effect, petitioner
admits that the adjacent 4,407,673 square meters of the subject
property, outside of the disputed portion, were alienable and
disposable in 1930. Petitioner argues that in 1930 or in 1938, only
the Executive Branch of the Government, not the trial courts, had
the power to declassify or reclassify lands of the public domain.
ISSUE:
● W/N the CFI of Cagayan had jurisdiction to adjudicate a tract of
timberland in favor of respondent spouses Antonio Carag and
Victoria Turingan - ​YES
RULING:
● Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable.
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or
reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with
law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.
● In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had
been declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some
public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime
or thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached to the
complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was
part of the forest zone or reserved for some public purpose. The
certification of the National Mapping and Resources Information
Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the
disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.
● The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930
was Act No. 2874, which provides:
SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from
time to time classify the lands of the public domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable
(b) Timber and
(c) Mineral lands
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from
one class to another, for the purposes of their government and
disposition.
● Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared
the disputed portion of the subject property timber or mineral land
pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
● It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only
those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable.
Section 8 provides:
SECTION 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and
classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not
been reserved for public or quasi- public uses, not appropriated by
the Government, nor in any manner become private property, nor
those on which a private right authorized and recognized by this
Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been
reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
Governor-General may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands
of the public domain open to disposition before the same have had
their boundaries established or been surveyed, or may, for the same
reasons, suspend their concession or disposition by proclamation
duly published or by Act of the Legislature.
● However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private
lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made
 under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in
Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8
recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per
se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or
otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with
law.
● Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification
requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate
these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the
disputed portion had not become private property prior to the
enactment of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the
disputed portion was not land on which a private right may be
claimed under any existing law at that time.
● When the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree
No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine
whether the subject property, including the disputed portion,
applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court
determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag
proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of
title. The government, which was a party in the original
proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the
decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural.
Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final
and beyond review.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We DISMISS petitioner

Republic of the Philippines' complaint for reversion, annulment of
decree, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titles for lack of merit.
44. SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCES v. YAP
8 October 2008 | G.R. No. 167707 | R.T. Reyes | Regalian Doctrine
Made by: Billie F. Blanco (“Ruling” added by J. Miranda)
PETITIONER: ​Secretary of DENR
RESPONDENT: ​Mayor Jose Yap
Recit Ready: ​At stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the
present occupants of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied
lands.
In ​Yap p​ etition, then President, the late dictator, Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1801, which declared Boracay Islands, among others as
tourist zones and marine reserves. Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA)
Circular 3-82 was issued to implement the said Proclamation.
Respondent-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, Jr., et.al filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court in Kalibo, Aklan. They
contended that the Proclamation and Circular precluded them from filing
an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of
land for titling purposes.
During the pendency of the Yap petition, on May 22 2006, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064, classifying
Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628 hectares
of agricultural land. Respondent-claimants Orlando Sacay, et. al filed
with the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of the said Proclamation. They alleged that the Proclamation
infringed on their “prior vested rights” over portions of Boracay having
been in continued possession of their respective lots since time
immemorial.
The issue of this case is whether or not the claimants have a right to
secure titles over their occupied portions in Boracay. The Supreme Court
ruled that, claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over
the occupied lands under the said law. In keeping with the presumption
of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there
must be a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not the claimants have a right to secure titles over
their occupied portions in Boracay - ​NO
RULING:
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and
again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation, 80 declassifying inalienable public land
into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. In fact, Section 8
of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands
which have been "officially delimited and classified."
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership
of the lands of the public domain is on the person applying for
registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land
subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. There
must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application
for registration is alienable the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an
executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau
of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant
may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed
to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative
action, report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The
records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
 o ​On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such
Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National Reservation
well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the
Survey of Boracay Island. This identified several lots as
submission that lands occupied by private claimants were already open to
occupied or claimed by named persons.
disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification
cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
o ​Then President, the late dictator, Ferdinand Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 1801, ​which declared Boracay Islands,
While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial confirmation of
among others as tourist zones and marine reserves. Philippine
imperfect title under Section 48 (b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does
Tourism Authority (PTA) Circular 3-82 was issued to
not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and
implement the said Proclamation.
other areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this
mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied alienable
o ​Respondent-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, Jr., et.al filed a
lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess. For
petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court in
one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders
Kalibo, Aklan. They contended that:
of improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their
possession. For another, they may look into other modes of applying for
§ ​The Proclamation and Circular precluded them from
original registration of title, such as by homestead 131 or sales patent,
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect
132 subject to the conditions imposed by law.
title or survey of land for titling purposes.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants
§ ​They themselves, or through their
to acquire title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain
predecessors-in-interest, have been in ​open, continuous,
requirements under the present land laws. There is one such bill 133 now
exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of
pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar
Boracay since 12 June, 1945 or since time immemorial.
bill will become a law is for Congress to decide..
Doctrine: All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
§ ​The Proclamation and Circulation did not place
ownership are ​presumed t​ o belong to the State. It determines if lands of
Boracay ​beyond the commerce of man and as a tourist
public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. A positive act
zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. In fact,
declaring land as alienable and disposable is required.
under Sec. 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through
FACTS: judicial confirmation of imperfect itles.

● At the core of this case are two consolidated cases (herein, “Yap
petition” and “Sacay petition”) challenging ​the right of the present
occupants Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied
lands.
● Yap petition
o ​The Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), on the other
hand, argued that Boracay was an ​unclassified land o​ f the
public domain. It formed part of the mass lands classified as
“public forests”, which was not available for disposition under
Sec. 3 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 705, or the Revised
Forestry Code. Since Boracay Islands had not been classified
 as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had
cannot ripen into ownership.
o ​After submitting the case for the resolution upon
submission of memoranda, Yap, et.al were granted a favorable
decision in the RTC, which upheld their right to have their
occupied lands titled in their name. OSG moved for
reconsideration, but was denied. On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, CA affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, the present
petition.
● Sacay petition
o ​During the pendency of the Yap petition, on May 22 2006,
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No.
1064, ​classifying Boracay Island into 400 hectares of reserved
forest land and 628 hectares of agricultural land.
o ​Respondent-claimants Orlando Sacay, et. al filed with the
Supreme Court a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of the said Proclamation They alleged that:
§ ​The Proclamation infringed on their “prior vested
rights” over portions of Boracay having been in continued
possession of their respective lots since time immemorial.
§ ​They invested billions in developing their lands and
building international renowned first class resorts.
§ ​There is no need for the proclamation reclassifying it to
an agricultural land because it is ​deemed ​agricultural
under Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926.
o ​OSG, on the contrary, argued that they do not have a vested
right as Boracay is an unclassified public forest land and as
such, portions are inalienable and cannot be subject of judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.
● Court ordered the consolidation of the two petition as they
involved the same issues on the land classification of Boracay
Island.
RATIO:
1. ​Except for lands already with existing titles, Boracay has ​never
been expressly and administratively classified before Proclamation No.
1​064. It was an unclassified land of public domain. Such unclassified
lands are considered public forest under PD 705.
2. ​Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public dominion
belongs to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted
right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.
3. All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are ​presumed t​ o belong to the State. It determines if lands of
public domain will be disposed of for private ownership.
4. The Court held that, a positive act declaring land as alienable and
disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State
ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be
a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or
an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
5. The applicant may also secure a certification from the government
that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable. The burden of proof in overcoming
such presumption is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable.
6. No such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records
are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of
Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.
7. Ankron v. Government of the Philippines and ​de Aldecoa v. Insular
Government d​ id not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of
it, agricultural.
o These cases were decided under the provisions of
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926.
o In these cases, the Supreme Court ruled that, “in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands ​until the contrary is shown​.” ​BUT, the Court
clarified the matter in the present case, stating that the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided for the manner
through which land registration courts would classify lands of the
public domain. During this time, the President had no power to
classify lands of the public domain. Further, the assumption is
absolute and in the end, land classification is dependent on proof.
8. Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed
to classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If
President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific
limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This
was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
9. Claimants then are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141. ​Neither do they have vested rights
over the occupied lands under the said law.
10. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
1. open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership
since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and
2. the classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain.
11. ​Claimants’ bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying
on the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801,
must fail because of the absence of the second element of alienable and
disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present
Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is
already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law
itself. ​Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the
land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
12. ​Neither may claimants apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands
which were classified as agricultural lands. ​Private claimants failed to
prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the
Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
 45. HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN v. REPUBLIC
April 29, 2009 | J. Tinga | Land of Public Domain: When Alienable and
Disposable
F. QUIJANO & J. SALAMAT
PETITIONER: ​Heirs of Mario Malabanan
RESPONDENT: ​Republic of the Philippines
RECIT-READY: ​Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property
from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering
the property in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite,
claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse
possession and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby
entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title. The RTC rendered
judgment granting Malabanan’s application for land registration. The CA
promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. The CA declared that under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of
possession prior to the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property
was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain? -
NO
FACTS:
RULING: ​The petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in
possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the
requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation
that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that
the land has remained ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be
ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree
DOCTRINE: ​Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words
"lands of the public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e.,
mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or
private ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What
the law does not include, it excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase
"alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to
only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article
XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations
under the Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,​ ​to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken
place since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
● On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had
purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, filed an application
for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property
formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and
occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling
him to the judicial confirmation of his title.
 ● To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, Malabanan presented during trial a certification
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR)
● The RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanan’s application for
land registration.
● The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment
to the CA, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain
● The CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application for registration of Malabanan. The CA
declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree, any period of possession prior to the classification of the
land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting
that the CENRO-DENR certification stated that the property had
been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15, 1982,
Velazco’s possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked
for purposes of computing Malabanan’s period of possession.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was
an alienable and disposable land of the public domain? - ​NO
RATIO:
● Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories,
to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of the State, or those classified as
lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil Code,
without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the
public lands as provided by the Constitution, but with the
limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently,
lands classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are
not susceptible of alienation or disposition unless they are
reclassified as agricultural. A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification, ​and the exclusive
prerogative to classify public lands under existing laws is vested in
the Executive Department, not in the courts.
● Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the
public domain" or "alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise classified, i.e.,
mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of
patrimonial or private ownership, are outside the coverage of the
Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it excludes. The
use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further
limits the coverage of Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands
of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2 of the
1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the
Public Land Act, the applicant must satisfy the following
requirements in order for his application to come under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,​ ​to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession and
occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place
since June 12, 1945, or earlier; and
5. The property subject of the application must be an
agricultural land of the public domain.
● An examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates
that Congress prescribed no requirement that the land subject of
the registration should have been classified as agricultural since
June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicant’s imperfect or
incomplete title is derived only from possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the character of the
property subject of the application as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain determines its eligibility for
land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
● Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and
exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to
private property by the mere lapse or completion of the period. In
 fact, by virtue of this doctrine, corporations may now acquire lands
of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of
satisfying the requisite period of possession prescribed by the
Public Land Act.
● The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to
determine the point at which prescription may run against the
State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by
reason of the applicant’s possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
Where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the
Government are complied with through actual physical, open,
continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, the possessor is deemed to
have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a
certificate of title be issued in order that such a grant be sanctioned
by the courts.
● The petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish
that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession
of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite
character and period of possession - possession and occupation that
is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945,
or earlier - the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to
private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as
alienable and disposable. Prescription never began to run against
the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise,
the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress
enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the
land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

WHEREFORE, ​the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for

Reconsideration and the respondent's Partial Motion for
Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
 46. REPUBLIC v. LEE TSAI
June 22, 2009 | CARPIO, J.| Land of Public Domain: When Alienable
and Disposable
SALAMAT, J. & SORIANO, P.
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: ​Ruby Lee Tsai
RECIT-READY: ​Ruby Lee Tsai filed an application for confirmation
and registration of her property under PD No. 1529. She claimed that she
bought the property back in 1993 from Carungcong and that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the property for more than 30
years. For proof she submitted among others Tax Declarations (earliest of
which was dated 1948 under the name of Carungcong). The Republic
opposed saying that Lee Tsai failed to present sufficient evidence that she
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945. Republic also
countered that tax declarations and tax receipts do not constitute
sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition. The RTC ruled in favor of
Lee Tsai. The CA affirmed the RTC, and added that Lee Tsai need not
prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of
the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier because Section 48(b)
of CA 141 was already superseded by Republic Act No. 1942 (RA 1942),
which provides for a simple 30 year prescriptive period of occupation by
an applicant for judicial conrmation of title.
ISSUE:
● Whether the trial court can grant the application for registration
despite the lack of proof of Lee Tsai’s open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property since
12 June 1945 or earlier - NO (Lee Tsai did not satisfy requisites
under PD 1529)
FACTS:
RULING: ​The Court of Appeals have an erroneous interpretation of
Section 48(b) of CA 141. As the law now stands, a mere showing of
possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not sufcient.
Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must
now be shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the
applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on
12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section
14(1) of PD 1529. There are three requisites for the ling of an
application for registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD 1529: (1)
that the property in question is ​alienable and disposable land of the
public domain;​ (2) that the applicant by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest ​have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation​; and (3) that such possession is
under a ​bona de claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier .
We agree with the Republic that respondent’s evidence was not enough
to prove that her possession of the subject property started since 12 June
1945 or ​earlier because Lee Tsai’s earliest evidence can be traced
back to a tax declaration issued in the name of her
predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1948.
We note that Lee Tsai also failed to prove that the subject property has
been declared alienable and disposable by the President or the Secretary
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
DOCTRINE: ​[T]he applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classication and released the
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that ​the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verication through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of
the original classication approved by the DENR Secretary and
certied as a true copy by the legal custodian of the ofcial records.
These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable
and disposable.
● On 3 December 1996, Lee Tsai led an application for the
conrmation and registration of the subject property under
Presidential Decree No. 1529. She alleged that she is the owner of
 the subject property and the improvements thereon. She stated that
on 31 May 1993, she purchased the subject property from Manolita
Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong (Carungcong), through Wendy
Mitsuko Sato, Carungcong’s daughter and attorney in fact. She
also declared that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years
● Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositors to the
application. The Republic opposed Lee Tsai’s application on the
following grounds:
○ (1) that Lee Tsai and her predecessors-in-interest failed to
present sufcient evidence to show that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (CA 141), as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 1073
○ (2) that the tax declarations and tax receipt payments
attached to the application do not constitute competent
and sufcient evidence of a bona de acquisition of the
land applied for or of Lee Tsai’s open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject property in the concept of an owner since 12 June
1945 or earlier; and
○ (3) that the subject property forms part of the public
domain and is not subject to private appropriation
● Lee Tsai presented the following documents to support her
application: Deed of Absolute Sale (Yr 1993); Tax Declarations
(Yrs (under the name of Carungcong) 1948, 1965, 1960, 1974,
1980, 1992); Tax declaration (Yr 1994 under the name of Lee
Tsai); Official Receipts of real property taxes under the name of
Carungcong (Yr 1991-1993); Official Receipts of Real Property
Taxes under the name of Lee Tsai Yrs 1994-1995)
● On 21 September 1998, the trial court granted Lee Tsai’s
application for registration. The Republic appealed to the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in granting the
application for registration despite Lee Tsai’s failure to prove
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the Republic,
it is not sufcient that respondent proved possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years. The Court of Appeals afrmed the
trial court’s decision. According to the Court of Appeals, Lee Tsai
need not prove that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier
because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was already superseded by
Republic Act No. 1942 (RA 1942), which provides for a simple 30
year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
conrmation of title.
ISSUES:
● Whether the trial court can grant the application for registration
despite the lack of proof of Lee Tsai’s open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the subject property since 12 June
1945 or earlier - NO
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● Petitioner: Lee Tsai only proved possession since 1948, which is in
violation of Section 48(b) of CA 141, as amended by PD 1073
● Respondent: insists that it is sufcient that she proved that she and
her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property under a bona de claim of ownership for more than 30
years
RATIO:
● The Court notes that in Lee Tsai’s original application before the
trial court, she claimed that she was entitled to the conrmation
 and registration of her title to the subject property under PD 1529.
However, Lee Tsai did not specify under what paragraph of
Section 14 of PD 1529 she was ling the application. But going
over Lee Tsai’s application and the evidence she presented before
the trial court, it appears that Lee Tsai led her application under
Section 14(1) of PD 1529:
○ “SEC. 14. Who may apply: (1) Those who by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona de claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier
● Thus, there are three requisites for the ling of an application for
registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD 1529:
○ (1) that the property in question is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain;
○ (2) that the applicant by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation; and
○ (3) that such possession is under a bona de claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier
● A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of CA 141, as
amended by PD 1073. According to the Court of Appeals,
respondent need not prove possession of the subject property since
12 June 1945 or earlier because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was
amended by RA 1942, which provided for a simple 30-year
prescriptive period. The Court of Appeals appears to have an
erroneous interpretation of Section 48(b) of CA 141.
● Through the years, Section 48(b) of the CA 141 has been amended
several times. 21 The Court of Appeals failed to consider the
amendment introduced by PD 1073. In Republic v. Doldol, 22 the
Court provided a summary of these amendments:
○ “The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No.141 provided for
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No.
1942, which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive
period of occupation by an applicant for judicial
conrmation of imperfect title. The same, however, has
already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073
● As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and
occupation for 30 years or more is not sufcient. Therefore, since
the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be
shown that possession and occupation of the piece of land by the
applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
started on 12 June 1945 or earlier. This provision is in total
conformity with Section 14(1) of PD 1529
● Lee Tsai failed to comply with the period of possession and
occupation of the subject property, as required by both PD 1529
and CA 141. We agree with the Republic that respondent’s
evidence was not enough to prove that her possession of the
subject property started since 12 June 1945 or ​earlier because Lee
Tsai’s earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration
issued in the name of her predecessors-in-interest only in the
year 1948. In view of the lack of sufcient showing that
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest possessed the subject
property under a bona de claim of ownership since 12 June 1945
or earlier, respondent’s application for conrmation and
registration of the subject property under PD 1529 and CA 141
should be denied
● Finally, we note that respondent also failed to prove that the
subject property has been declared alienable and disposable by the
President or the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc:
○ “[T]he applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classication and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that ​the land subject of the application
for registration falls within the approved area per
 verication through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land
registration must present a copy of the original
classication approved by the DENR Secretary and
certied as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
ofcial records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 30

January 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
70006 and the 21 September 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in LRC Case No. TG-788. We DENY
respondent Ruby Lee Tsai’s application for conrmation and
registration of Lot No. 7062 described in plan Ap-04-010084, Cad355,
Tagaytay Cadastre. SO ORDERED
 47. DIAZ v. REPUBLIC FACTS:
2 Feb. 2010 | J.Corona | Land of public domain ● Diaz’s late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for
P. SORIANO & COMPANY registration of a vast tract of land She alleged that she possessed
the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the
agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously,
PETITIONER: ​Florencia Diaz
publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.
RESPONDENT: ​Republic of the Philippines
● The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG opposed
the application because the land in question was within the Fort
RECIT-READY: ​Garcia filed an application to register a parcel of land
Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of
which she had alleged owned for 27 years.. The Republic opposed this on
Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237) 3 in 1955. Thus, it was
the ground that the land was within a military reservation. In another
inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
case, ​Director of Lands v. Reyes,​ the court ruled that someone else’s land
● Significantly, this Court already ruled in ​Director of Lands v.
which was likewise within the reservation was inalienable. Nonetheless,
Reyes that the property subject of Garcia's application was
the court granted the application. Republic appealed in CA arguing that
inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover,
the land has been proclaimed to be inalienable. Garcia died, daughter
the existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216 (allegedly
Diaz substituted her. CA reversed its decision. Diaz appealed on the
registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5,
ground that she has “private rights” over the property.
1895), on which therein respondent Parañaque Investment and
Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not
ISSUE: ​[None explicitly stated]
proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor
● W/N Diaz has private rights to the property. -NO
was declared null and void.
● W/N the Compromise Agreement between Diaz and OSG is
● Reyes n​ otwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia's favor.
valid. -NO
● The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the
CA. In its decision penned by Justice Vicente V.
RULING: ​In this case, Diaz was not able to produce such evidence.
Mendoza(Mendoza decision), the appellate court reversed and set
Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her
aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was
predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the
applicable to Diaz’'s case as it involved the same property. The CA
subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as
observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in
alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in
question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcia's right
reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement under
to the property was largely dependent on the existence and validity
the Public Land Act.
of the possessory information title the probative value of which
had already been passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and
DOCTRINE: ​Forest lands are not registrable under the Public Land Act.
inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the
However, forest lands may be registered when they have been
CA concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.
reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical
● During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away
manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head who
and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner
has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable
Florencia G. Diaz.
or disposable, timber and mineral lands) coupled with possession by the
● the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement on
claimant as well as that of her predecessors-in- interest.
the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and
finalize the same. The parties ultimately entered into a compromise
 agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or
less 4,689 hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part,
Diaz withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside
the military reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the
amicable settlement in the CA. CA approved the compromise
agreement. CA directed the Land Registration Administration to
issue the corresponding decree of registration in petitioner's favor
● OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution. The
OSG informed CA that the tract of land subject of the amicable
settlement was still within the military reservation.
● CA issued an amended resolution (amended resolution) annulling
the compromise agreement entered into between the parties
● Diaz .moved for reconsideration. Diaz filed a petition for review
on certiorari. Diaz insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of
judgment and motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and to refer the case to theSupreme Court en banc.
Diaz wrote identical letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno himself.
ISSUES: [​None explicitly stated​]
● W/N Diaz has private rights to the property. ​-NO
● W/N the Compromise Agreement between Diaz and OSG is valid​.
-NO
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● Petitioner:
● Respondent:
RATIO:
Diaz does not have “private rights” to the property
● Forest lands are not registrable under the Public Land Act. It
is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and
its inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the
Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of
registration, nullifies the title.
● However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when
they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a
clear and categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the
proper department head who has the authority to classify the
lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber
and mineral lands) coupled with possession by the claimant as
well as that of her predecessors-in- interest.
● Unfortunately for Diaz, she was not able to produce such
evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her
predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into
ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the
conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance
with the thirty-year possession requirement under the Public
Land Act.
● The rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply
unless and until the land classified as forest land is released
through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then
will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.
● Coming now to Diaz's contention that her "private rights" to the
property, meaning her and her predecessors' possession thereof
prior to the establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the
same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already recognized the
same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was
established.
To reiterate:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is
inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that
the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter
of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded that
approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest.
● Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could
never ripen to ownership.
● But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land
before it was established as a military reservation, there was
nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation
 by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner
years. is NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration.
● Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which The motion is DENIED considering that a third motion for
Diaz also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea utterly lacks
in Reyes, 39 thus rendering its probative value suspect, further merit. Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a
militates against granting her application for registration. FINE of Five Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within
ten days from receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that
Compromise agreement is null and void. any repetition hereof shall be dealt with more severely.
● There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
○ Consent of the contracting parties;
○ Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
○ Cause of the obligation which is established.
● In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel
for the Republic, it was never given the specific or special
authority to enter into a compromise agreement with petitioner.
This is in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the
Rules of Court which requires "special authority" for attorneys to
bind their clients.
● Diaz was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the
Republic, through the appropriate government agencies, i.e., the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land
Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the Office
of the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the
agreement with her.
● Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject
matter of a contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable.
Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides: all things which are not
outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the
object of a contract.
● Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation
contrary to law and against public policy. The agreement provided
that, in consideration of Diaz's withdrawal of her application for
registration of title from that portion of the property located within
the military reservation, Republic was withdrawing its claim on
that part of the land situated outside said reservation. The Republic
could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject matter
of the agreement was outside the commerce of man.
 48. REPUBLIC v. HANOVER WHEREFORE, start here.
April 29, 2009 | J. Tinga | Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or
Incomplete Titles; When is a land of public domain alienable and
Disposable
A. ALVERO & V. BARLONGAY

[For AINE]: Case link - ​LTD - Republic v. Hanover Worldwide

Trading Corp GR 172102

PETITIONER: ​Republic of the Philippines

RESPONDENT: ​Hanover Worldwide Trading Corporation

RECIT-READY: ​Start here.

ISSUE:
● W/N? ​YES/NO
● W/N? Y​ ES/NO

RULING: ​Start here.

DOCTRINE: ​Start here.

FACTS:
● Fact #1
● Fact #2

ISSUES:
● Issue #1
● Issue #2

RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):

● Petitioner:
● Respondent:

RATIO:
● Ratio #1
● Ratio #2
 49. REPUBLIC v. VEGA
January 17,, 2011 | J. Sereno | Land Of Public Domain: When
Alienable And Disposable
BARLONGAY & BARRALES
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: ​Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega,
Lubin R. Vega, Heirs Of Gloria R. Vega, Namely: Fracisco L. Yap, Ma.
Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap And Francisco V. Yap, Jr.
RECIT-READY: ​Respondents sought to register a parcel of land,
claiming that they inherited the same from their deceased mother.
Respondent-intervenors Buhay claimed a portion of the lot in question
and offered in evidence a Subdivision Plan which indicated the portion of
the subject land, which they claimed was sold to their
predecessors-in-interest. On their part, Vegas presented as witness an
officer from CENRO who testified that the land in question is indeed
alienable.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
claim and argued that Vegas failed to prove that the subject land was
alienable and disposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales did not
contain the date when the land was declared as such. The RTC ruled in
favor of the respondents and ordered titles to be issued in favor of Vega
and Buhay. The Republic appealed the case to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the findings of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
● W/N based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have
sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and
disposable. ​Yes ​(But this case falls under the exception, not the
general rule)
RULING: ​The rule for registration of government land is that there must
be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable government land. The fact of occupation and that the land is
alienable government land must be proven. Here, the Republic does not
question the fact of occupation, but that of the alienability of the land.
They also contended that the testimony of the CENRO officer is
insufficient. It has been held in Jurisprudence that a ​CENRO certificate is
inadequate proof that the land is alienable​. ​There must also be a
certification from the Secretary of DENR that a lot was alienable and
disposable​ as ruled in Republic v. Tan.
However, in light of a recent ruling in Republic v. Serrano, the CENRO
certification is held to be substantial compliance to the needed proof. In
the present case, the Court, has nonetheless recognized and affirmed
applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing
evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the
DENR on the ground of ​substantial compliance.
Respondents here substantially complied.
● First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of
the CENRO who testified that the subject land is alienable and
disposable.
● Second, the Subdivision Plan formally offered as evidence by
respondents-intervenors Buhays, ​expressly indicates that the
land is alienable and disposable.
● Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas’ application
for original registration, the LRA never raised the issue that the
land subject of registration was not alienable and disposable.
It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance
applies pro hac vice (this time only).
DOCTRINE: ​To establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all
applications for original registration under the Property Registration
Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a
certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR
Secretary.

As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based
solely on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application,
pro hac vice, on the ground of ​substantial compliance. ​This exception
shall only apply to applications for registration currently pending before
the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future
applications.
FACTS:
● On 26 May 1995, respondents filed an application for the
registration of title.
● The application covered a parcel of land in Los Baños, Laguna,
with a total area of 6,902 square meters
● Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land
from their mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn
inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mother’s
siblings (two brothers and a sister) died intestate, all without
leaving any offspring.
● On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to
respondents Vegas’ application for registration on the ground, inter
alia, that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the
public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation.
● During the trial court hearing on the application for registration,
respondents Vegas presented several exhibits in compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove
respondents Vegas’ ownership, occupation and possession of the
land subject of the registration.
● Significant was the testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special
Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baños, Laguna, under the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). He
attested to having conducted an inspection of the subject land and
identified the corresponding Report dated 13 January 1997, which
he had submitted to the Regional Executive Director, Region IV.
The report stated that the area subject of the investigation was
entirely within the alienable and disposable zone, and that there
was no public land application filed for the same land by the
applicant or by any other person.
● During the trial, respondents-intervenors Romea, Francisco,
Orlando etc. all surnamed buhay (respondents-intervenors
Buhays) entered their appearance and moved to intervene in
respondents Vegas’ application for registration.
Respondents-intervenors Buhays claimed a portion of the subject
land , purportedly sold by respondents Vegas’ mother. ​They
likewise formally offered in evidence Subdivision Plan
Csd-04-024336-D, which indicated the portion of the subject land,
which they claimed was sold to their predecessors-in-interest.
● The trial court granted respondents Vegas’ application and directed
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding
decree of registration in the name of respondents Vegas and
respondents-intervenors Buhays’ predecessors, in proportion to
their claims over the subject land.
● Petitioner Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court,
arguing that respondents Vegas failed to prove that the subject land
was alienable and disposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales
did not contain the date when the land was declared as such.
● The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the earlier Decision of the
trial court. Aggrieved by the ruling, petitioner filed the instant Rule
45 Petition with this Court.
ISSUES:
● W/N based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have
sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and
disposable. ​Yes ​(This case falls under the exception, not the
general rule)
RATIO:
● Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, provides for the instances when a person may
file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of land.
Applicants for registration of title must prove the following: (1)
that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open,
 continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945
or earlier.
● Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas’ open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land
in the present Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first
requisite: specifically, whether it has sufficiently been
demonstrated that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
● To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of
a positive act of the government, such as any of the following: a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; other
administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator; or a legislative act or statute. ​The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the lands applied
for are alienable and disposable.
● Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable
and disposable was sufficient to establish the true nature and
character of the property and enjoyed the presumption of regularity
in the absence of contradictory evidence.
● However, in ​Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Supreme
Court overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original
application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and
ruled that a CENRO certification is not enough to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable.
● As it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an
application for original registration of title over a parcel of land
must be accompanied by a copy of the ​original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary ​and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish that
the land indeed is alienable and disposable.
● To comply with the first requisite for an application for original
registration of title under the Property Registration Decree,
respondents Vegas should have submitted a CENRO certification
and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR
Secretary that the land is alienable and disposable, together with
their application.
● If the stringent rule imposed in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
is to be followed, the absence of these twin certifications justifies a
denial of an application for registration. ​Significantly, however, the
Court’s pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc. was
issued after the decisions of the trial court and the appellate court ​in
this case.
● Recently, however, in Republic v. Serrano, ​the Court affirmed the
findings of the trial and appellate courts that the parcel of land
subject of registration was alienable and disposable. The Court
held that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification,
which is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence,
constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement.
● The ​DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity
absent any evidence to the contrary. ​It bears noting that no
opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration
Authority or the DENR to contest respondents' applications on the
ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There
being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the
benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor
of respondents.
● Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is
alienable and disposable are a certification from the CENRO or
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
and a certified true copy of the DENR’s original classification of
the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and
affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and
convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from
the LRA or the DENR on the ground of ​substantial compliance.
● Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence
of a certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy of the
original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has been
substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the
subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the
evidence on record.
● First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the
CENRO who testified that the subject land is alienable and
disposable, and who identified his written report on his inspection
of the subject land.
● Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as
evidence by respondents-intervenors Buhays, ​expressly indicates
 that the land is alienable and disposable. Mr. Samson G. de Leon’s CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of
(the officer-in-charge of the Office of the Assistant Regional the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.
Executive Director for Operations of the DENR) ​annotation ● As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion
pertaining to the identification of the land as alienable and and based solely on the evidence presented on record - may
disposable coincides with the investigation report of Mr. Gonzales. approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of ​substantial
● Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas’ application compliance showing that there has been a positive act of
for original registration, the LRA never raised the issue that the government to show the nature and character of the land and an
land subject of registration was not alienable and disposable. ​In absence of effective opposition from the government. This
addition, not only did the government fail to cross-examine Mr. exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently
Gonzales, it likewise chose not to present any countervailing pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be
evidence to support its opposition. In contrast to the other cases inapplicable to all future applications.
brought before this Court, ​no opposition was raised by any
interested government body, aside from the pro forma opposition WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
filed by the OSG. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 30 April 2007 and the trial
● Petitioner Republic also assails the failure of Mr. Gonzales to court’s Decision dated 18 November 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.
testify as to when the land was declared as alienable and
disposable. However, these matters could have been dealt with
extensively during cross-examination, which petitioner Republic
waived because of its repeated absences and failure to present
counter evidence. In any event, the Report, as well as the
Subdivision Plan, readily reveals that the subject land was certified
as alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and was
even classified as residential and commercial in nature.
● Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents
Vegas, coupled with the absence of any countervailing evidence by
petitioner Republic, substantially establishes that the land applied
for is alienable and disposable and is the subject of original
registration proceedings under the Property Registration Decree.
● It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial
compliance applies pro hac vice (this time only). It does not in any
way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,
and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that
the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case
when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals
were rendered prior to these rulings. To establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land,
the general rule remains: all applications for original registration
under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a
 50. VICENTE YU CHANG AND SOLEDAD YU CHANG v.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE
February 23, 2011 | Villarama, Jr., J. | Topic
CHECKER & MAKER
PETITIONER: ​Vicente Yu Chang and Soledad Yu Chang
RESPONDENT: ​Republic of the Philippines
RECIT-READY: ​On February 21, 1997, petitioner Soledad Yu Chang,
and Vicente Yu Chang, filed a petition for registration of title over the
aforementioned lots under the Property Registration Decree. They
declared that they are the co-owners of the subject lots; that they and
their predecessors-in-interest "have been in actual, physical, material,
exclusive, open, occupation and possession of the above described
parcels of land for more than 100 years" The Republic, filed an
Opposition to the application, alleging that: (1) neither the applicants nor
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession of the land since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto;
(2) the muniments of title, tax declarations and tax receipts do not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of
the land; and (3) that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the
public domain and are not subject to private appropriation.
ISSUE: ​W/N the subject properties could no longer be considered and
classified as forest land - ​NO
RULING: ​The Court Ruled that petitioners' application for registration
of title may be granted, they must first establish the following: (1) that
FACTS:
the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide
claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier. In the instant case,
petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the effect that the lots subject
of their application are alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. Instead, petitioners contend that the subject properties could no
longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are building
structures, residential houses and even government buildings existing and
standing on the area. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted with crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out-of-the-way places. ​The classification of land is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified
as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that
it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title does not apply.
Petitioners' possession of the subject forest land prior to the date when it
was classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should
be excluded from the computation of the period of possession. (The
subject lots were declared alienable and disposable only on October 30,
1986.)
DOCTRINE: ​A forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified
as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted with crops
by ​kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be
on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. The classification of land is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive
of what the land actually looks like. ​Unless and until the land classified
as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so
that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
● On March 22, 1949, petitioners' father, L. Yu Chang and the
Municipality of Pili, Camarines Sur, through its then Mayor, Justo
Casuncad, executed an Agreement to Exchange Real Property
● Wherein the former assigned and transferred to the Municipality of
Pili his 400-square-meter residential lot in Barrio San Roque, Pili,
Camarines Sur, in exchange for a 400-square-meter piece of land
located in San Juan, Pili.
● Thereafter, L. Yu Chang and his family took possession of the
property thus obtained and erected a residential house and a
gasoline station thereon. (it was still a forest land during this time)
 ● When L. Yu Chang died on September 30, 1976, his wife, Donata
Sta. Ana and his seven children inherited the property and
succeeded in the possession of the property.
● On March 1, 1978, a Deed of Transfer and Renunciation of their
rights over the property was executed by L. Yu Chang's five
children, Rafaela, Catalina, Flaviana, Esperanza, and Antonio, in
favor of herein petitioners.
● On February 21, 1997, petitioner Soledad Yu Chang, for herself
and in representation of her brother and co-petitioner, Vicente Yu
Chang, filed a petition for registration of title over the
aforementioned lots under the Property Registration Decree.
● In their petition, they declared that they are the co-owners of the
subject lots; that they and their predecessors-in-interest "have been
in actual, physical, material, exclusive, open, occupation and
possession of the above described parcels of land for more than
100 years"; and that allegedly, they have continuously, peacefully,
and adversely possessed the property in the concept of owners.
● Hence, they are entitled to confirmation of ownership and issuance
and registration of title in their names.
● The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed an Opposition to the application, alleging, inter alia, that: (1)
neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniments of title, tax
declarations and tax receipts do not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and (3)
that the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public
domain and are not subject to private appropriation.
ISSUES:
● W/N the subject properties could no longer be considered and
classified as forest land since there are building structures,
residential houses and even government buildings existing and
standing on the area. - ​NO
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● Petitioner: Petitioners insist that the subject properties could no
longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are
buildings, residential houses and even government structures
existing and standing on the land. In their Memorandum,
petitioners point out that the original owner and possessor of the
subject land was the Municipal Government of Pili which was
established in 1930. The land was originally part of the
municipal ground adjacent to the Municipal Building located
at the right side of the Naga-Legaspi National Highway​. From
1949, when L. Yu Chang acquired the property through barter and
up to the filing of petitioners' application in 1997, petitioners and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual physical and
material possession of the land in the concept of an owner,
notorious and known to the public and adverse to the whole world.
● Respondent: The Republic, through the OSG, for its part,
maintains that petitioners failed to prove their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject lots for the
period of time required by law. ​The OSG also submits that the
subject lands were declared as alienable and disposable only on
October 30, 1986.
RATIO:
● Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073,
under which petitioners' application was filed, provides:
● SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Regional Trial Court of
the province or city where the land is located for confirmation of
their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Property Registration Decree, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in the open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
● Under this provision, in order that petitioners' application for ● The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
registration of title may be granted, they must first establish the confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after
following: (1) that the subject land forms part of alienable and forest land has been declared and alienable.
disposable lands of the public domain and (2) that they have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
● In the instant case, petitioners did not adduce any evidence to the
effect that the lots subject of their application are alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
● Instead, petitioners contend that the subject properties could no
longer be considered and classified as forest land since there are
building structures, residential houses and even government
buildings existing and standing on the area. This, however, is
hardly the proof required under the law.
● As clarified by this Court in ​Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director
of Forestry, a forested area classified as forest land of the public
domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or
settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
● Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered
with grass or planted with crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in
out-of-the-way places.
● The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks
like.
● Unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an
official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
● Petitioners' possession of the subject forest land prior to the date
when it was classified as alienable and disposable is
inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of
the period of possession. (The subject lots were declared alienable
and disposable only on October 30, 1986.)
● To reiterate, it is well settled that possession of forest land, prior to
its classification as alienable and disposable land, is ineffective
since such possession may not be considered as possession in the
concept of owner.
 51. TAN v. REPUBLIC
DOCTRINE: Possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable
April 16, 2012 ​| J. Reyes | Land of Public Domain: When Alienable and
public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code will not convert
Disposable
it to patrimonial or private property. There must be an express declaration
B. BLANCO & N. CALDOZO
that the property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of national wealth. In the absence thereof, the property
PETITIONER: ​Jean Tan, Roseller Anacinto, Carlo Lolo Espineda, and remains to be alienable and disposable and may not be acquired by
Daisy Aliado Manaois, represented in this act by their Attorney-in-Fact prescription under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Ma. Wilhelmina E. Tobias
RESPONDENT: ​Republic of the Philippines Moreover, tax declarations per se do not qualify as competent evidence
of actual possession for purposes of prescription. More so, if the payment
RECIT-READY: Petitioners Jean Tan, et.al filed with the Regional of the taxes due on the property is episodic, irregular and random.
Trial Court (RTC) of Naic, Cavite, an application for land registration Adverse, continuous, open, public possession in the concept of an owner
covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9972 in Indang, Cavite. Tan, is a conclusion of law and the burden to prove it by clear, positive and
et.al ​alleged that they acquired the subject property from Gregonio convincing evidence is on the applicant. A claim of ownership will not
Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 25, 1996. proper on the basis of tax declarations if unaccompanied by proof of
Moreover, they and their predecessors-in-interest contended that they actual possession.
have been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject
property in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.
FACTS:
● Petitioners Jean Tan, et.al ​filed with the Regional Trial Court
ISSUE:
(RTC) of Naic, Cavite, an application for land registration
● Whether or not Tan et.al have proven themselves qualified to
covering a parcel of land ​identified as Lot 9972 ​in Indang
the benefits under the relevant laws on the confirmation of
Cadastre, situated in Barangay Bancod, Indang, Cavite and
imperfect or incomplete titles. - ​NO.
with an area of 6,920 square meters.
● Tan, et.al ​alleged that they acquired the subject property from
RULING: ​The Court finds the evidence presented by Tan, et.al to be
Gregonio Gatdula pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale dated
wanting. They failed to demonstrate that they and their
April 25, 1996. Moreover, they and their predecessors-in-interest
predecessors-in-interest possessed the property in the requisite manner in
contended that they have been in open, continuous and exclusive
that possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful,
possession of the subject property in the concept of an owner
uninterrupted and adverse. In this case, the taxes were paid only on 11
for more than 30 years.
occasions within the 40-year period from 1961 to 2001. Moreover, the
● RTC granted Tan et.al’s petition.
application was filed after only 1 year from the time the subject property
● On appeal by the Republic of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals
may be considered patrimonial. DARCO Conversion Order No.
held that the petitioners failed to prove that they and their
040210005-(340)-99 was issued by the DAR only on July 13, 2000,
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject
which means that the counting of the 30-year prescriptive period for
property for the requisite period of 30 years.
purposes of acquiring ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can
● Tan, et.al moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the
only start from such date. Before the property was declared patrimonial
CA. Hence, the present petition.
by virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be acquired by prescription.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not Tan et.al have proven themselves qualified to the
benefits under the relevant laws on the confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles? ​- NO.
RELEVANT ARGUMENT:
● Tan, et.al contend that the following sufficed to demonstrate that
they acquired title over the subject property ​by prescription​:
1. Testimony of their attorney-in-fact, Ma. Wilhelmina
Tobias​, stating that:
○ Tan et.al have been in actual, notorious, and open
possession of the property since the time they
purchased it;
○ They regularly paid their taxes;
○ Their predecessors-in-interest, Victorio Garcia,
Felipe Gatdula, and Gregonio Gatdula have been in
possession of property for more than 30 years and
likewise religiously paid taxes;
○ The subject property is agricultural, alienable, and
disposable.
2. Testimony of Margarito Pena, the caretaker of the
property;
○ He witnessed the execution of the deed of sale that
Tan et.al entered into with Gregonio Gatdula; and
○ Tan, et.al and their predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the property for more than 30 years.
3. Testimony of Ferdinand Encarnacion, a clerk in the
Docket Division of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA);
4. Tax Declarations;
5. Resolution No. 69, Series of 1998, of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Indang, Cavite, ​which approved the
reclassification of several lots, including the subject
property, from agricultural to residential/commercial;
6. DARCO Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99,
Series of 2000, issued by the Department of Agrarian
Reform ​on July 13, 2000, which converted several
parcels of land, including the subject property, from
agricultural to residential/commercial; and
7. Certification issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) –
CALABARZON ​dated October 29, 2002, stating that
“the subject area falls within the Alienable and
Disposable Land Project No. 13-A of Indang, Cavite per
LC Map 3091 certified on June 21, 1983.”
RATIO:
● Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the “Public
Land Act” governs ​the classification and disposition of lands
forming part of the public domain.
○ Section 11 thereof provides that ​one of the modes of
disposing public lands suitable for agricultural
purposes is by “confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles.”
○ Section 48 thereof ​enumerates those who are considered
to have acquired an imperfect or incomplete title over an
alienable and disposable public land.
● Presidential Decree No. 1529​, otherwise known as the “Property
Registration Decree”, is a codification of all the laws relative to
the registration of property​.
○ Section 14 thereof ​specifies those who are qualified to
register their incomplete title over an alienable and
disposable public land under the Torrens system,
particularly:
Section 14. ​Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned
river beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
 (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner the burden to prove it by clear, positive and convincing
provided for by law [emphasis supplied].
evidence is on the applicant. A claim of ownership will not
proper on the basis of tax declarations if unaccompanied by
● Possession and occupation of an alienable and disposable proof of actual possession.
public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code will ● Finally, the application was filed after only 1 year from the time
not convert it to patrimonial or private property. ​There must be the subject property may be considered patrimonial. ​DARCO
an ​express declaration that the property is no longer intended for Conversion Order No. 040210005-(340)-99 was issued by the
public service or the development of national wealth. In the DAR only on July 13, 2000, which means that the counting of the
absence thereof, the property remains to be alienable and thirty 30-year prescriptive period for purposes of acquiring
disposable and may not be acquired by prescription under Section ownership of a public land under Section 14(2) can only start from
14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. such date. ​Before the property was declared patrimonial by
● Tan’s application is obviously anchored on Section 14(2) of P.D. virtue of such conversion order, it cannot be acquired by
No. 1529 as they do not claim to have possessed, by themselves or prescription.
their predecessors-in-interest, the subject property since June 12,
1945 or earlier; thus, they posit that ​through prescription that WHEREFORE, ​premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED
they had acquired an imperfect title over the subject property for lack of merit. The July 6, 2009 Decision and August 12, 2010
is the foundation upon which they rest their application. Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
● However, the Court finds the evidence presented by the Tan,
et.al to be wanting. They failed to demonstrate that they and their
predecessors-in-interest possessed the property in the requisite
manner:
It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down by
law, namely, that ​the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public,
peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. ​Possession is open when it is patent,
visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when
uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when
the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an
appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people
in the neighborhood. ​The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must
prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription.

● The Court ruled that, tax declarations ​per se do not qualify as

competent evidence of actual possession for purposes of
prescription. ​More so, if the payment of the taxes due on the
property is episodic, irregular and random such as in this case.
In this case, the taxes were paid only on 11 occasions within the
40-year period from 1961 to 2001.
● It was emphasized that adverse, continuous, open, public
possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law and
 52. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BANTIGUE POINT
DEVELOPMENT COPORATION
Mar 14 2012 | J. Sereno | 52. Forms and contents of petition for original
application of title: Where to file. / 59. Publication, Opposition, Order
of General default, Hearing, Judgement, and decree of registration:
Notice of initial hearing
N. CALDOZO & CHECKER
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: ​Bantigue Point Development Corporation
RECIT-READY: ​On 17 July 1997, Bantigue Point Development
Corporation filed with the RTC of Rosario, Batangas an application for
original registration of title over a parcel of land. On 18 July 1997, the
RTC issued an Order setting the case for initial hearing on 22 October
1997. On 7 August 1997, it issued a second Order setting the initial
hearing on 4 November 1997. On 8 January 1998, Republic filed its
Opposition to the application for registration while the records were still
with the RTC. In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, Republidc
argued ​first​, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
application, because the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing
beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property Registration
Decree. ​Second​, petitioner contended that since the selling price of the
property based on the Deed of Sale annexed to respondent's application
for original registration was P160,000,the MTC did not have jurisdiction
over the case. Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as
amended,the MTC's delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land
registration cases is limited to lands, the value of which should not
exceed P100,000.
ISSUE:
● W/N The municipal trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
application for original registration of land title? YES
○ (a) the period for setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing; and
○ (b) the value of the land to be registered.
RULING:
(A) The RTC's failure to issue the Order setting the date and hour of the
initial hearing within five days from the filing of the application for
registration, as provided in the Property Registration Decree, did not
affect the court's jurisdiction. Observance of the five- day period was
merely directory, and failure to issue the Order within that period did not
deprive the RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance
with the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the
subject matter dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot
be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.
(B) The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with
reference to the corresponding ​Tax Declarations submitted by
respondent Corporation together with its application for registration.
From the records, we finds that the assessed value of the property is
P4,330, P1,920 and P8,670, or a total assessed value of P14,920 for the
entire property. ​Based on these Tax Declarations, it is evident that the
total value of the land in question does not exceed P100,000. ​Clearly,
the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, as amended.
DOCTRINE:
(A) Observance of the five- day period was merely directory, and failure
to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the RTC of its
jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with the five-day
period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the subject matter
dependent upon the trial court.
(B) The MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration
cases in two instances: ​first​, where there is no controversy or opposition;
or, ​second​, over contested lots, the value of which does not exceed
P100,000.
Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of
the property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways:
first, by the affidavit of the claimant; ​second, by agreement of the
respective claimants, if there are more than one; ​or​, ​third​, ​from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property.
FACTS:
● On 17 July 1997, Bantigue Point Development Corporation filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Rosario, Batangas an
application for original registration of title over a parcel of land
with an assessed value of P4,330, P1,920 and P8,670, or a total
assessed value of P14,920 for the entire property, more particularly
described as Lot 8060 of Cad 453-D, San Juan Cadastre, with an
area of more or less 10,732 square meters, located at Barangay
Barualte, San Juan, Batangas.
● On 18 July 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for
initial hearing on 22 October 1997. On 7 August 1997, it issued a
second Order setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997.
● Petitioner Republic filed its Opposition to the application for
registration on 8 January 1998 while the records were still with the
RTC.
● On 31 March 1998, the RTC Clerk of Court transmitted motu
proprio the records of the case to the MTC of San Juan, because
the assessed value of the property was allegedly less than
P100,000.
● Thereafter, the MTC entered an Order of General Default and
commenced with the reception of evidence.Among the documents
presented by respondent in support of its application are Tax
Declarations,a Deed of Absolute Sale in its favor,and a
Certification from the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Batangas City that the lot in
question is within the alienable and disposable zone.Thereafter, it
awarded the land to respondent Corporation.
ISSUES:
● W/N the Republic is estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction
in this case? NO
● W/N the municipal trial court acquired jurisdiction over the
application for original registration of land title? YES
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner: First, the lower court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
application, because the RTC set the date and hour of the initial hearing
beyond the 90-day period provided under the Property Registration Decree.
Second, petitioner contended that since the selling price of the property
based on the Deed of Sale annexed to respondent's application for original
registration was P160,000,the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.
Under Section 34 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended,the
MTC's delegated jurisdiction to try cadastral and land registration cases is
limited to lands, the value of which should not exceed P100,000.
RATIO:
(not super relevant) Republic is not estopped from raising the issue of
jurisdiction in this case
● In this case, petitioner Republic has not displayed such
unreasonable failure or neglect that would lead us to conclude that
it has abandoned or declined to assert its right to question the lower
court's jurisdiction.
The municipal trial court acquired jurisdiction over the application for
original registration of land title
● In assailing the jurisdiction of the lower courts, petitioner Republic
raised two points of contention: ​(a) the period for setting the date
and hour of the initial hearing and ​(b) the value of the land to be
registered.
● A. The period for setting the date and hour of the initial hearing
● The Property Registration Decree provides:
○ Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall,
within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the
date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.
● In this case, the application for original registration was filed on 17
July 1997. On 18 July 1997, or a day after the filing of the
application, the RTC immediately issued an Order setting the case
for initial hearing on 22 October 1997, which was 96 days from the
Order. While the date set by the RTC was beyond the 90-day
period provided for in Section 23, this fact did not affect the
jurisdiction of the trial court. In Republic v. Manna Properties,
Inc., petitioner Republic therein contended that there was failure
to comply with the jurisdictional requirements for original
registration, because there were 125 days between the Order
setting the date of the initial hearing and the initial hearing itself.
We ruled that the lapse of time between the issuance of the Order
 setting the date of initial hearing and the date of the initial hearing
itself was not fatal to the application. ​Thus, we held:
○ . . . [A] party to an action has no control over the Administrator or the
Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle unduly
with the business of such official in the performance of his duties. A
party cannot intervene in matters within the exclusive power of the trial
court. No fault is attributable to such party if the trial court errs on
matters within its sole power. It is unfair to punish an applicant for an
act or omission over which the applicant has neither responsibility nor
control, especially if the applicant has complied with all the
requirements of the law.
● Indeed, it would be the height of injustice to penalize respondent
Corporation by dismissing its application for registration on
account of events beyond its control.
● Moreover, since the RTC issued a second Order on 7 August 1997
setting the initial hearing on 4 November 1997,within the 90-day
period provided by law, petitioner Republic argued that the
jurisdictional defect was still not cured, as the second Order was
issued more than five days from the filing of the application, again
contrary to the prescribed period under the Property Registration
Decree.
● Petitioner is incorrect. T​he RTC's failure to issue the Order setting
the date and hour of the initial hearing within five days from the
filing of the application for registration, as provided in the Property
Registration Decree, did not affect the court's jurisdiction.
Observance of the five- day period was merely directory, and
failure to issue the Order within that period did not deprive the
RTC of its jurisdiction over the case. To rule that compliance with
the five-day period is mandatory would make jurisdiction over the
subject matter dependent upon the trial court. Jurisdiction over the
subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. It
cannot be contingent upon the action or inaction of the court.
● This does not mean that courts may disregard the statutory periods
with impunity. We cannot assume that the law deliberately meant
the provision "to become meaningless and to be treated as a dead
letter." However, the records of this case do not show such blatant
disregard for the law. In fact, the RTC immediately set the case for
initial hearing a day after the filing of the application for
registration, except that it had to issue a second Order because the
initial hearing had been set beyond the 90-day period provided by
law.
● B. the value of the land to be registered.
● The delegated jurisdiction of the MTC over cadastral and land
registration cases is indeed set forth in the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, which provides:
○ Sec. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration
Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court to
hear and determine ​cadastral or land registration cases covering lots
where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots where the
value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00)​, such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of the
claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are more
than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real property.
Their decision in these cases shall be appealable in the same manner as
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (As amended by R.A. No. 7691)
(Emphasis supplied.) ​CAaEDH
● Thus, the MTC has delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and
land registration cases in two instances: first, where there is no
controversy or opposition; ​or, second, over contested lots, the
value of which does not exceed P100,000.
● The case at bar does not fall under the first instance, because
petitioner opposed respondent Corporation's application for
registration on 8 January 1998.
● However, the MTC had jurisdiction under ​the second instance,
because the value of the lot in this case does not exceed P100,000.
● Contrary to petitioner's contention, the value of the land should not
be determined with reference to its selling price. ​Rather, Section 34
of the Judiciary Reorganization Act provides that the value of the
property sought to be registered may be ascertained in three ways:
first, by the affidavit of the claimant; second, by agreement of the
respective claimants, if there are more than one; or, third, from the
corresponding tax declaration of the real property.
● In this case, the value of the property cannot be determined using
the first method, because the records are bereft of any affidavit
executed by respondent as to the value of the property. Likewise,
valuation cannot be done through the second method, because this
method finds application only where there are multiple claimants
who agree on and make a joint submission as to the value of the
property. Here, only respondent Bantigue Point Development
 Corporation claims the property.
● The value of the property must therefore be ascertained with
reference to the corresponding ​Tax Declarations submitted by
respondent Corporation together with its application for
registration. From the records, we finds that the assessed value of
the property is P4,330, P1,920 and P8,670, or a total assessed value
of P14,920 for the entire property. ​Based on these Tax
Declarations, it is evident that the total value of the land in
question does not exceed P100,000.
● Clearly, the MTC may exercise its delegated jurisdiction under
the Judiciary Reorganization Act, as amended.
A certification from the CENRO is not sufficient proof that the
property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
● Even as we affirm the propriety of the MTC's exercise of its
delegated jurisdiction, we find that the lower court erred in
granting respondent Corporation's application for original
registration in the absence of sufficient proof that the property in
question was alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
● Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration
must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification;
and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.
● Here, respondent Corporation only presented a CENRO
certification in support of its application. Clearly, this falls short of
the requirements for original registration.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is

DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to the Municipal Trial Court
of San Juan, Batangas, for reception of evidence to prove that the
property sought to be registered is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
 53. FORTUNA VS. REPUBLIC
5 March 2014 | J. Brion |
‘When is a land of public domain alienable and disposable?’ and the
Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Titles.
Calilung & Checker
PETITIONER:​SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA
FORTUNA
RESPONDENT: ​REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
RECIT-READY: ​Spouses Fortuna filed an application with the RTC for
registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as (Lot) Lot No.
4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. They stated that
the Lot was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death
was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through
an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all
her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the
lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same
lot to the spouses Fortuna. Hence they claim that they, through
themselves and their predecessors in-interest, have been in quiet,
peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of the Lot for more than
50 years, and submitted as evidence the lot's survey plan, technical
description, and certificate of assessment. RTC granted.
Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the
spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the
government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable
agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortuna's evidence —
Tax Declaration No. 8366 — showed that possession over the lot dates
back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period
provided under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or
the Property Registration Decree (PRD). CA reversed and set aside,
hence the present petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the nature of Lot No. 4457 is alienable and disposable public land.
RULING:
The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and disposable public land has
not been sufficiently established.
The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned
by the State. Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands,
forest or timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks, only agricultural
lands may be alienated. Public land that has not been classified as
alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
Thus, it is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land
derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and
disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the grant and
disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48 (b),
will find application only from the time that a public land has been
classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and disposable. Under
Section 6 of the PLA, the classification and reclassification of public
lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The President,
through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or
reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public domain. The
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is
likewise empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare
such land as alienable and disposable. Accordingly, jurisprudence has
required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a
public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land
subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute.
In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was
established by the​ notation in the survey plan​, which states:
“This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project
No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any
civil or military reservation.”
It also relied on the ​Certification from the DENR-CENRO that "there is,
per record, neither any public land application led nor title previously
issued for the subject parcel[.]

However, we nd that neither of the above documents is evidence of a
positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain Mere notations
appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties'
alienable and disposable character.
These notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of
the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and
disposable area per verification through survey by the proper government
office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared
by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. In Republic v.
Heirs of Juan Fabio the Court ruled that [t]he applicant for land
registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain a alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application fo registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO
or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the
DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.
The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that
the President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the
public land as alienable and disposable. The oces that prepared these
documents are not the ocia repositories or legal custodian of the
issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public
land as alienable and disposable. For failure to present incontrovertible
evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the
Executive Department, the spouses Fortuna's claim of title through a
public land grant under the PLA should be denied.
DOCTRINE: ​Public land that has not been classified as alienable
agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is
essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through
a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of
the land. The PLA provisions on the grant and disposition of alienable
public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48 (b), will find application
only from the time that a public land has been classified as agricultural
and declared as alienable and disposable. (Note: Take note of the notation
in the survey plan and the DENR-CENRO Certification. Why they are
insufficient in this case.)
Ruling: ​(On another relevant issue, however not the main issue)
In judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the latest, as of May 9, 1947. Although the
above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the alienable and
disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient ground to deny the
petition and terminate the case, we deem it proper to continue to address the
other important legal issues raised in the petition. As mentioned, the PLA is
the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable agricultural lands.
Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain may be
disposed of, among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title. This mode of acquisition of title is governed by Section 48
(b) of the PLA, the original version of which states:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
Government, ​since July twenty sixth, eighteen hundred and
 ninety-four​, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphasis
supplied]
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a
30-year period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48 (b) of the
PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942, read:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, ​for at
least thirty years​, immediately preceding the ruling of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. [emphasis supplied]
On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of
possession by requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD
No. 1073 reads:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c),
Chapter
VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that
these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain which have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant
himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, ​since June 12, 1945​. [emphasis
supplied]
Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years — from
1945 up to its enactment in 1977 — is required. This effectively impairs the
vested rights of applicants who had complied with the 30-year possession
required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but whose possession
commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 was established by
the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled in Abejaron
v. Nabasa 30 that "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their
predecessors-in interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on
January 25, 1977 , in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since
January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial confirmation of their imperfect or
incomplete title under Sec. 48 (b) of the [PLA]." January 24, 1947 was
considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years counted
backward from January 25, 1977 — the effectivity date of PD No. 1073.
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was
enacted ; based on the certification from the National Printing O ce, 31 PD
No. 1073 was published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the O cial Gazette , months
later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977. This uncontroverted fact
materially affects the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation
of incomplete title under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take
effect upon its promulgation," the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v.
Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. 32 that the publication of laws is an indispensable
requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature." 33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD
No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only
upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. ​This, therefore, moves the cut-off
date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title under Section 48 (b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words,
applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30
years, or at least since May 8, 1947​.
WHEREFORE,the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16,
2005 and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMED insofar as these dismissed the
spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration of
title on the basis of the grounds discussed above. Costs against the
spouses Fortuna.
SO ORDERED.
 54. REPUBLIC v. HEIRS OF SIN
March 26, 2014 | J. Leonardo-De Castro | Land of
Public Domain: When Alienable and Disposable
E. CANCEKO & S. CERILLA
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the Philippines (represented by Aklan
National College Fisheries and Dr. Elenita Andrade)
RESPONDENT: ​Heirs of Maxima Lachica Sin
RECIT-READY: ​Maxima Sin bought a parcel of land in 1932. She
planted coconut trees, banana plants, and nipa palms on such land until
the day she died. Her heirs then inherited the land. In 1988, a portion of
the land was occupied by ANCF and was converted into a fishpond.
Because of this, the heirs instituted a complaint against ANCF for
recovery of possession​.
The Republic, through ANCF, countered that (1) the land was the subject
of Proclamation No. 2074 allocating such land as ​civil reservation f​ or
educational purposes, and that (2) the land had also been declared a
timberland i​ n 1960 and therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
The MCTC, RTC, and CA ruled in favor of the heirs of Sin. It was held
that the Republic failed to show that the land was ​timberland ​before
1960​. ​Therefore, it was susceptible of private ownership ​until 1960.
Since such land had been privately possessed for more than 30 years
before it was declared a ​timberland, ​Maxima’s possession had ripened
​ herefore, the Proclamation cannot be
into an ownership (imperfect title). T
applied on the disputed land.
SC reversed and held that the land was never susceptible of
​ ence, neither
ownership even before it was declared a ​timberland. H
Maxima nor her heirs acquired private rights over the land.
Aside from open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, the
other requisite for an ​imperfect title is ​the classification of the land as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. ​It is clear that the
disputed land became a ​timberland in 1960. The issue was whether or not
it was susceptible of private ownership ​before 1960. The lower courts
ruled that the land was alienable and disposable before 1960, since the
Republic failed to prove otherwise. However, SC held that ​the
presumption is that ​unclassified lands are inalienable public lands.
To overcome this presumption, there must be a positive act (like an
official proclamation) ​declaring land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable. ​The burden of proof should fall on the one alleging that
it is alienable and disposable, not the other way around.
DOCTRINE: ​All lands of the public domain belong to the State and
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. ​(Regalian Doctrine)
FACTS:
● Maxima Sin acquired a parcel of land by virtue of a Deed of Sale
in 1932, and then developed the same by planting coconut trees,
banana plants, mango trees and nipa palms and usufructing the
produce of said land until her death in 1945.
● The heirs of Sin asserted that they were previously in possession of
the disputed land (in the concept of an owner) before a portion of
the land was occupied by ANCF and converted into a fishpond for
educational purposes in 1988.
● To prove possession, the heirs presented several ​tax declarations,​
the earliest of which was in the year 1945.
● The ANCF Superintendent countered that the parcel of land being
claimed by respondents was the subject of ​Proclamation No. 2074
of then President Ferdinand E. Marcos allocating land within the
area, which included said portion of private respondents' alleged
property, as ​civil reservation​ for educational purposes of ANCF.
● The ANCF Superintendent furthermore averred that the parcel of
land was declared a ​timberland in 1960 and therefore not
susceptible of private ownership.
● The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals unanimously held
that the heirs of Sin retain private rights to the disputed property.
 ● The private right referred to is an alleged ​imperfect title, which the
heirs supposedly acquired by possession of the property, through
their predecessors-in-interest, for 30 years ​before it was declared as
a ​timberland​.
● The Court of Appeals held:
○ “It should be noted that Maxima Sin purchased the
subject property from its previous owners in 1932 (28
years before it was declared a ​timberland in 1960).
Tacking, therefore, the possession of the previous owners
and that of Maxima Sin over the disputed property, it does
not tax one’s imagination to conclude that the subject
property had been privately possessed for more than 30
years before it was declared a timberland. This being the
case, the said possession has ripened into an ownership
against​ the State, albeit an imperfect one.”
ISSUES: ​W/N the disputed property was alienable and disposable - ​NO
RATIO:
● At the outset, it must be noted that the heirs have not filed an
application for ​judicial confirmation of imperfect title under the
Public Land Act or the Property Registration Decree.
● There are two requisites for ​judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title​ under CA No. 141, namely:
○ (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of
ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945;
○ (2) ​the classification of the land as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
● With respect to the second requisite, the lower courts held that the
disputed property was ​alienable and disposable before 1960, citing
the Republic’s failure to show competent evidence that the subject
land was declared a ​timberland before its formal classification as
such on said year.
● However, under the​ ​Regalian Doctrine:
○ All lands of the public domain belong to the State and
lands not appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
● Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of man and
not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive
prescription. ​Occupation thereof in the concept of owner no
matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be registered
as a title.
● To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable. There must be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable.
● The failure of the Republic to show competent evidence that the
subject land was declared a ​timberland before its formal
classification does ​not lead to the presumption that said land was
alienable and disposable. ​On the contrary, the presumption is
that unclassified lands are inalienable public lands.
● It is therefore the ​respondent heirs ​which have the burden to
identify a ​positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into disposable
land for agricultural or other purposes.
● Since respondents failed to do so, the alleged possession by
them and by their predecessors-in-interest is inconsequential
and could never ripen into ownership.
WHEREFORE, ​premises considered, the Petition for Review is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, which upheld the
Decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the First Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, segregating from the ANCF reservation the portion of land being
claimed by respondents is ​REVERSED​ and ​SET ASIDE.
55.
56.
 57. DUMO v. REPUBLIC
Whether or not the Subject Property is alienable and disposable (NO)
In Re: Application for Land Registration
Whther or not the Subject Property is a private land (NO)
6 June 2018 | G.R. No. 218269 | Carpio | Land of Public Domain: When
Alienable and Disposable
RULING:
M. del Rosario | T. dela Rosa
● The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are
found in ​Section 14​ o​f Presidential Decree No. 1529​ (PD No.
PETITIONER: ​Suprema T. Dumo 1529), which provides:
RESPONDENT: ​Republic of the Philippines
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons
RECIT-READY: ​In 1943, Espinas purchased from Calica a parcel of may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
land located in Bauang, La Union classified as unirrigated riceland. In application for registration of title to land, whether
1963, Espinas executed an affidavit stating his claim of ownership over personally or through their duly authorized
the property. He had also been paying realty taxes on the property. In representatives:
1987, the heirs of Trinidad executed a Deed of Partition with Absolute
Sale over another parcel of land on the North of the Subject Property. (1) Those who by themselves or through their
The heirs of Espinas filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, predecessors-in-interest have been in ​open, continuous,
Possession, and Damages upon finding that the Deed of Partition with exclusive and notorious possession and occupation​ of
Absolute Sale executed by the heirs of Trinidad included the Subject alienable and disposable lands of the public domain​ under a
Property. Dumo (an heir of Trinidad) filed an application for registration bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
of two parcels of land. She alleged that the lots belonged to her mother
and that she and her siblings inherited them upon their mother’s death. (2) Those who have acquired ownership of ​private
lands​ by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
The RTC found that the Subject Property was owned by the heirs of
Espinas and ordered the dismissal of Dumo’s land and registration (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private
application. CA affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the application for lands or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion
land registration. The CA also found that the Subject Property did not under the existing laws.
belong to the heirs of Espinas as it still belonged to the public domain.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
Dumo seeks to reverse the CA decision by alleging her compliance with other manner provided for by law.
Sec. 14(1) and (2) of PD 1529 that she and her predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under ● Dumo failed to submit any of the documents required to
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. She also alleged that prove that the land she seeks to register is alienable and
her ownership is based on prescription. disposable land of the public domain.
● The CA found that Dumo and her predecessors-in-interest
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumo shall be allowed to apply for land
have been in possession of the land only from 1948, which is
registration (NO)
the earliest date of the tax declaration presented. ​Thus, by

admission, it is clear that she failed to prove her and her
predecessors-in-interest’s possession and occupation of the land
for the duration required by law -- from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
● Dumo cannot argue that she may be allowed to register due to
prescription. Dumo not only failed to prove that the land sought
to be registered is alienable and disposable, but also utterly
failed to submit any evidence to establish that such land has
been converted into patrimonial property by an express
declaration by the State.
DOCTRINE:
As it is only the President or the DENR Secretary who may classify as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, an applicant for land
registration must prove that the land sought to be registered has been
declared by the President or DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
FACTS:
● October 19, 1943 - Espinas purchased from Calica through a Deed
of Absolute Sale a parcel of land located in Paringao, Bauang, La
Union classified as unirrigated Riceland with an area of 1,065
square meters.
● 1963 - Espinas executed an affidavit stating his claim of ownership
over the Subject Property. Espinas had also been paying realty
taxes on the Subject Property.
● February 6, 1987 - the heirs of Trinidad executed a Deed of
Partition with Absolute Sale over another parcel of land on the
North of the Subject Property.
● Finding that the Deed of Partition with Absolute Sale executed by
the heirs of Trinidad included the Subject Property, the heirs of
Espinas filed a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession
and Damages to protect their interests.
● Additionally, Dumo filed an application for registration of two
parcels of land. Dumo alleged that the lots belonged to her mother
and that she and her siblings inherited them upon their mother's
death. She further alleged that through a Deed of Partition with
Absolute Sale dated 6 February 1987, she acquired the subject lots
from her siblings.
● Dumo traces her title from her mother, Trinidad, who purchased
the lots from Florencio Mabalay in August 1951. Mabalay was
Dumo's maternal grandfather. Mabalay, on the other hand,
purchased the properties from Carlos Calica.
● The heirs of Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land
registration on the ground that the properties sought to be
registered by Dumo are involved in the ​accion reivindicatoria ( is
an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land
and seeks recovery of its full possession) ​case. Thus, the RTC
consolidated the land registration case with the Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages.
● The RTC found that the Subject Property was owned by the heirs
of Espinas. The RTC ordered the dismissal of Dumo's land
registration application on the ground of lack of registrable title,
and ordered Dumo to restore ownership and possession of the lots
to the heirs of Espinas.
● The CA affirming the RTC's decision dismissing the application
for land registration of Dumo, and finding that she failed to
demonstrate that she and her predecessors-in¬ interest possessed
the property in the manner required by law to merit the grant of her
application for land registration.
● The CA, however, modified the decision of the RTC insofar as it
found that the Subject Property belonged to the heirs of Espinas.
The CA found that since the property still belonged to the public
domain, and the heirs of Espinas were not able to establish their
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
12 June 1945 or earlier, it was erroneous for the RTC to declare the
heirs of Espinas as the owners of the Subject Property.
● Dumo argues that the Certification from the Regional Surveys
Division and not opposed by the Republic, should be considered
substantial compliance with the requirement that the applicant
must submit the certified true copy of the original classification of
the land as approved by the DENR Secretary.
● Dumo also argues that it does not matter that her possession dates
only back to 1948 because this Court has allegedly stated that even
 if the possession or occupation started after 12 June 1945, this does
not bar the grant of an application for registration of land.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not Dumo should be allowed to proceed with the
application for land registration
○ By proving that she or her predecessors-in-interet were in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a ​bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier (NO); or
○ By proving that she has acquired ownership of private
lands by prescription under the provision of existing laws
(NO)
RULING:
● The requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect title are
found in ​Section 14 o​f Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD No.
1529), which provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands
or abandoned river beds by right of accession or accretion under
the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any
other manner provided for by law.
● Dumo failed to submit any of the documents required to prove
that the land she seeks to register is alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.
● The first requirement is to prove that the land sought to be
registered is ​alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
This is because under the Regalian Doctrine, as embodied in the
1987 Philippine Constitution, lands which do not clearly appear to
be within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Thus, in an application for land registration, the applicant has the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the State owns the land
applied for, and proving that the land has already been classified as
alienable and disposable. To overcome the presumption that the
land belongs to the State, the applicant must prove by ​clear and
incontrovertible evidence at the time of application that the land
has been classified as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.
● DISCUSSION ON THE CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN:
○ Section 3 of Article XII classifies lands of the public
domain into
■ Agricultural
■ forest or timber
■ mineral lands, and
■ national parks.
Of these four classifications, only agricultural lands may
be alienated and disposed of by the State.
○ How are the lands of public domain classified into
agricultural lands, as well as their further classification
into alienable and disposable lands of the public domain?
Answer: LEGISLATIVE PREROGATIVE! ​This
prerogative has long been exercised through the
 enactment of ​Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA No. 141)
or the ​Public Land Act of 1936.
○ Section 1827 of the Administrative Code of 1917
merely authorizes the Department Head to classify as
agricultural lands those forrest lands which are better
adapted and more valuable for agricultural purposes.
NOTE: Sec. 1827 does not authorize the Department
Head to classify agricultural lands ​as alienable and
disposable lands. ​This power is expressly delegated by
the same Code solely to the ​Governor-General.
○ At present, the existing Administrative Code is ​EO 292 ​or
the ​Administrative Code of 1987. ​The Admin Code of
1987 did not reenact Sec. 1827 of the Admin Code of
1917. However, in the absence of incompatibility as to the
two statutes, Sec. 1827 has NOT been repealed.
○ There is nothing in Section 1827 that authorizes the
Department Head to classify agricultural lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Thus,
public lands classified as agricultural and used by the
Bureau of Plant Industry of the Department of Agriculture
for plant research or plant propagation are not necessarily
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
despite being classified as agricultural lands.
○ For such agricultural lands to be alienable and
disposable, there must be an ​express proclamation by
the President ​declaring such agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable.
○ Furthermore, agricultural land may still be reserved for
public or quasi-public purposes which would prohibit
the alienation or disposition of such land. CA 141
provides:
Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared
open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified and,
when practicable, surveyed, and which have not
been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor
appropriated by the Government, nor in any
manner become private property, nor those on
which a private right authorized and recognized
by this Act or any other valid law may be
claimed, or which, having been reserved or
appropriated, have ceased to be so. ​However,
the President may, for reasons of public
interest, declare lands of the public domain
open to disposition before the same have had
their boundaries established or been
surveyed, or may, for the same reason,
suspend their concession or disposition until
they are again declared open to concession or
disposition by proclamation duly published or
by Act of the National Assembly.
○ Section 13 ​of the ​Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines of 1975, ​however, delegates discretionary
power to the DENR Secretary to classify as alienable and
disposable forest lands of the public domain no longer
needed for forest reserves. He shall declare those
classified and determined not to be needed for forest
purposes as alienable and disposable lands, the
administrative jurisdiction and management of which
shall be transferred to the Bureau of Lands: Provided,
That mangrove and other swamps not needed for shore
protection and suitable for fishpond purposes shall be
released to, and be placed under the administrative
jurisdiction and management of the Bureau of Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources. Those still to be classified under
the present system shall continue to remain as part of the
public forest.
○ Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
states: "x x x. Alienable lands of the public domain shall
be limited to agricultural lands. x x x." Thus, the
unclassified lands of the public domain, not needed for
 forest reserve purposes, must first be declared agricultural
lands of the public domain before the DENR Secretary
can declare them alienable and disposable. Under the
foregoing Section 13 of PD No. 705, the DENR Secretary
has no discretionary power to classify unclassified lands
of the public domain, not needed for forest reserve
purposes, into agricultural lands. However, the DENR
Secretary can invoke his power under Section 1827 of the
Revised Administrative Code of 1917 to classify forest
lands into agricultural lands. Once so declared as
agricultural lands of the public domain, the DENR
Secretary can then invoke his delegated power under
Section 13 of PD No. 705 to declare such agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.
○ As it is only the President or the DENR Secretary who
may classify as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, an applicant for land registration must
prove that the land sought to be registered has been
declared by the President or DENR Secretary as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain.
○ The applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant for land registration must present a copy of
the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the official records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
○ Submitting a mere certification by the CENRO or
PENRO with references to the original classification
made by the President or the DENR Secretary is sorely
inadequate since it has no probative value as a public
document to prove the alienable and disposable character
of the public land. The certification should always be
accompanied by the original or certified true copy of the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
or the President.
● The CA found that Dumo and her predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the land only from 1948, which is
the earliest date of the tax declaration presented.
● Thus, by admission, it is clear that she failed to prove her and her
predecessors-in-interest’s possession and occupation of the land
for the duration required by law -- from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
● Dumo cannot argue that she may be allowed to register due to
prescription. Dumo not only failed to prove that the land
sought to be registered is alienable and disposable, but also
utterly failed to submit any evidence to establish that such land
has been converted into patrimonial property by an express
declaration by the State.
● Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529 puts into operation the entire regime
of prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137.55 Article 1113 provides that "[p]roperty
of the State or any of its subdivisions ​not patrimonial in character
shall not be the object of prescription​." Thus, it is clear that the
land must be patrimonial before it may be susceptible of
acquisitive prescription. Indeed, Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529
provides that one may acquire ownership of private lands by
prescription.
● Mere classification of agricultural land as alienable and disposable
does not make such land patrimonial property of the State – an
express declaration by the State that such land is no longer
intended for public use, public service or the development of
national wealth is imperative.
● Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are those that
are to be disposed of to private individuals by sale or application,
because their disposition to private individuals is for the
development of the national wealth. However, until the lands are
alienated or disposed of to private individuals, they remain
"alienable lands of the public domain," as expressly classified by
the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
● Lands of the public domain become patrimonial property ​only
when they are no longer intended for public use or public
service or the development of national wealth​. Articles 421 and
422 of the Civil Code expressly provide:
○ Article 421. All other property of the State, which is not
of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property
○ Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form
part of the patrimonial property of the State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is ​DENIED​. The assailed decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
 58. REPUBLIC v. VEGA
January 17,, 2011 | J. Sereno | Land Of Public Domain: When
Alienable And Disposable
BARLONGAY & BARRALES
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: ​Carlos R. Vega, Marcos R. Vega, Rogelio R. Vega,
Lubin R. Vega, Heirs Of Gloria R. Vega, Namely: Fracisco L. Yap, Ma.
Winona Y. Rodriguez, Ma. Wendelyn V. Yap And Francisco V. Yap, Jr.
RECIT-READY: ​Respondents sought to register a parcel of land,
claiming that they inherited the same from their deceased mother.
Respondent-intervenors Buhay claimed a portion of the lot in question
and offered in evidence a Subdivision Plan which indicated the portion of
the subject land, which they claimed was sold to their
predecessors-in-interest. On their part, Vegas presented as witness an
officer from CENRO who testified that the land in question is indeed
alienable.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the
claim and argued that Vegas failed to prove that the subject land was
alienable and disposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales did not
contain the date when the land was declared as such. The RTC ruled in
favor of the respondents and ordered titles to be issued in favor of Vega
and Buhay. The Republic appealed the case to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the findings of the lower court. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
● W/N based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have
sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and
disposable. ​Yes ​(But this case falls under the exception, not the
general rule)
RULING: ​The rule for registration of government land is that there must
be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable government land. The fact of occupation and that the land is
alienable government land must be proven. Here, the Republic does not
question the fact of occupation, but that of the alienability of the land.
They also contended that the testimony of the CENRO officer is
insufficient. It has been held in Jurisprudence that a ​CENRO certificate is
inadequate proof that the land is alienable​. ​There must also be a
certification from the Secretary of DENR that a lot was alienable and
disposable​ as ruled in Republic v. Tan.
However, in light of a recent ruling in Republic v. Serrano, the CENRO
certification is held to be substantial compliance to the needed proof. In
the present case, the Court, has nonetheless recognized and affirmed
applications for land registration on other substantial and convincing
evidence duly presented without any opposition from the LRA or the
DENR on the ground of ​substantial compliance.
Respondents here substantially complied.
● First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of
the CENRO who testified that the subject land is alienable and
disposable.
● Second, the Subdivision Plan formally offered as evidence by
respondents-intervenors Buhays, ​expressly indicates that the
land is alienable and disposable.
● Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas’ application
for original registration, the LRA never raised the issue that the
land subject of registration was not alienable and disposable.
It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial compliance
applies pro hac vice (this time only).
DOCTRINE: ​To establish that the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable public land, the general rule remains: all
applications for original registration under the Property Registration
Decree must include both (1) a CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a
certified true copy of the original classification made by the DENR
Secretary.

As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion and based
solely on the evidence presented on record - may approve the application,
pro hac vice, on the ground of ​substantial compliance. ​This exception
shall only apply to applications for registration currently pending before
the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be inapplicable to all future
applications.
FACTS:
● On 26 May 1995, respondents filed an application for the
registration of title.
● The application covered a parcel of land in Los Baños, Laguna,
with a total area of 6,902 square meters
● Respondents Vegas alleged that they inherited the subject land
from their mother, Maria Revilleza Vda. de Vega, who in turn
inherited it from her father, Lorenzo Revilleza. Their mother’s
siblings (two brothers and a sister) died intestate, all without
leaving any offspring.
● On 21 June 1995, petitioner Republic filed an opposition to
respondents Vegas’ application for registration on the ground, inter
alia, that the subject land or portions thereof were lands of the
public domain and, as such, not subject to private appropriation.
● During the trial court hearing on the application for registration,
respondents Vegas presented several exhibits in compliance with
the jurisdictional requirements, as well as witnesses to prove
respondents Vegas’ ownership, occupation and possession of the
land subject of the registration.
● Significant was the testimony of Mr. Rodolfo Gonzales, a Special
Investigator of the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baños, Laguna, under the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). He
attested to having conducted an inspection of the subject land and
identified the corresponding Report dated 13 January 1997, which
he had submitted to the Regional Executive Director, Region IV.
The report stated that the area subject of the investigation was
entirely within the alienable and disposable zone, and that there
was no public land application filed for the same land by the
applicant or by any other person.
● During the trial, respondents-intervenors Romea, Francisco,
Orlando etc. all surnamed buhay (respondents-intervenors
Buhays) entered their appearance and moved to intervene in
respondents Vegas’ application for registration.
Respondents-intervenors Buhays claimed a portion of the subject
land , purportedly sold by respondents Vegas’ mother. ​They
likewise formally offered in evidence Subdivision Plan
Csd-04-024336-D, which indicated the portion of the subject land,
which they claimed was sold to their predecessors-in-interest.
● The trial court granted respondents Vegas’ application and directed
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding
decree of registration in the name of respondents Vegas and
respondents-intervenors Buhays’ predecessors, in proportion to
their claims over the subject land.
● Petitioner Republic appealed the Decision of the trial court,
arguing that respondents Vegas failed to prove that the subject land
was alienable and disposable, since the testimony of Mr. Gonzales
did not contain the date when the land was declared as such.
● The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the earlier Decision of the
trial court. Aggrieved by the ruling, petitioner filed the instant Rule
45 Petition with this Court.
ISSUES:
● W/N based on the evidence on record, respondents Vegas have
sufficiently established that the subject land is alienable and
disposable. ​Yes ​(This case falls under the exception, not the
general rule)
RATIO:
● Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, provides for the instances when a person may
file for an application for registration of title over a parcel of land.
Applicants for registration of title must prove the following: (1)
 that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; and (2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945
or earlier.
● Raising no issue with respect to respondents Vegas’ open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land
in the present Petition, the Court will limit its focus on the first
requisite: specifically, whether it has sufficiently been
demonstrated that the subject land is alienable and disposable.
● To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must conclusively establish the existence of
a positive act of the government, such as any of the following: a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; other
administrative actions; investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator; or a legislative act or statute. ​The applicant may also
secure a certification from the government that the lands applied
for are alienable and disposable.
● Previously, a certification from the DENR that a lot was alienable
and disposable was sufficient to establish the true nature and
character of the property and enjoyed the presumption of regularity
in the absence of contradictory evidence.
● However, in ​Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., the Supreme
Court overturned the grant by the lower courts of an original
application for registration over a parcel of land in Batangas and
ruled that a CENRO certification is not enough to certify that a
land is alienable and disposable.
● As it now stands, aside from a CENRO certification, an
application for original registration of title over a parcel of land
must be accompanied by a copy of the ​original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary ​and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records in order to establish that
the land indeed is alienable and disposable.
● To comply with the first requisite for an application for original
registration of title under the Property Registration Decree,
respondents Vegas should have submitted a CENRO certification
and a certified true copy of the original classification by the DENR
Secretary that the land is alienable and disposable, together with
their application.
● If the stringent rule imposed in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.
is to be followed, the absence of these twin certifications justifies a
denial of an application for registration. ​Significantly, however, the
Court’s pronouncement in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., was
issued after the decision of the trial court and the appellate court ​in
this case.
● Recently, however, in Republic v. Serrano, ​the Court affirmed the
findings of the trial and appellate courts that the parcel of land
subject of registration was alienable and disposable. The Court
held that a DENR Regional Technical Director’s certification,
which is annotated on the subdivision plan submitted in evidence,
constitutes substantial compliance with the legal requirement.
● The ​DENR certification enjoys the presumption of regularity
absent any evidence to the contrary. ​It bears noting that no
opposition was filed or registered by the Land Registration
Authority or the DENR to contest respondents' applications on the
ground that their respective shares of the lot are inalienable. There
being no substantive rights which stand to be prejudiced, the
benefit of the Certification may thus be equitably extended in favor
of respondents.
● Indeed, the best proofs in registration proceedings that a land is
alienable and disposable are a certification from the CENRO or
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)
and a certified true copy of the DENR’s original classification of
the land. The Court, however, has nonetheless recognized and
affirmed applications for land registration on other substantial and
convincing evidence duly presented without any opposition from
the LRA or the DENR on the ground of ​substantial compliance.
● Applying these precedents, the Court finds that despite the absence
of a certification by the CENRO and a certified true copy of the
original classification by the DENR Secretary, there has been
substantial compliance with the requirement to show that the
subject land is indeed alienable and disposable based on the
evidence on record.
● First, respondents Vegas were able to present Mr. Gonzales of the
CENRO who testified that the subject land is alienable and
disposable, and who identified his written report on his inspection
of the subject land.
● Second, Subdivision Plan Csd-04-02433-6, formally offered as the general rule remains: all applications for original registration
evidence by respondents-intervenors Buhays, ​expressly indicates under the Property Registration Decree must include both (1) a
that the land is alienable and disposable. Mr. Samson G. de Leon’s CENRO or PENRO certification and (2) a certified true copy of
(the officer-in-charge of the Office of the Assistant Regional the original classification made by the DENR Secretary.
Executive Director for Operations of the DENR) ​annotation ● As an exception, however, the courts - in their sound discretion
pertaining to the identification of the land as alienable and and based solely on the evidence presented on record - may
disposable coincides with the investigation report of Mr. Gonzales. approve the application, pro hac vice, on the ground of ​substantial
● Finally, upon being informed of respondents Vegas’ application compliance showing that there has been a positive act of
for original registration, the LRA never raised the issue that the government to show the nature and character of the land and an
land subject of registration was not alienable and disposable. ​In absence of effective opposition from the government. This
addition, not only did the government fail to cross-examine Mr. exception shall only apply to applications for registration currently
Gonzales, it likewise chose not to present any countervailing pending before the trial court prior to this Decision and shall be
evidence to support its opposition. In contrast to the other cases inapplicable to all future applications.
brought before this Court, ​no opposition was raised by any
interested government body, aside from the pro forma opposition WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.
filed by the OSG. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 30 April 2007 and the trial
● Petitioner Republic also assails the failure of Mr. Gonzales to court’s Decision dated 18 November 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.
testify as to when the land was declared as alienable and
disposable. However, these matters could have been dealt with
extensively during cross-examination, which petitioner Republic
waived because of its repeated absences and failure to present
counter evidence. In any event, the Report, as well as the
Subdivision Plan, readily reveals that the subject land was certified
as alienable and disposable as early as 31 December 1925 and was
even classified as residential and commercial in nature.
● Thus, the Court finds that the evidence presented by respondents
Vegas, coupled with the absence of any countervailing evidence by
petitioner Republic, substantially establishes that the land applied
for is alienable and disposable and is the subject of original
registration proceedings under the Property Registration Decree.
● It must be emphasized that the present ruling on substantial
compliance applies pro hac vice (this time only). It does not in any
way detract from our rulings in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,
and similar cases which impose a strict requirement to prove that
the public land is alienable and disposable, especially in this case
when the Decisions of the lower court and the Court of Appeals
were rendered prior to these rulings. To establish that the land
subject of the application is alienable and disposable public land,
59.
60.
61.
62.
 63. OPPEN v COMPAS
Oct 21, 2015 | Mendoza | Where to file
R. Dysico &
PETITIONER: ​Ernesto Oppen Inc.
RESPONDENT: ​Alberto Compas
RECIT-READY: ​The case involves two (2) parcels of land in Las Piñas
City.
On August 10, 1987, pursuant to the writ of execution issued by the
MeTC, EOI annotated its lien on TCT No. S-100162. A certificate of sale
was issued in its favor on October 19, 1987, and entered on TCT No.
S-100612 on August 24, 1989. The said property was later sold in a
public auction where EOI was the highest bidder and the Final Deed of
Sale, dated September 28, 1990, was issued after the lapse of the
redemption period. Subsequently, EOI filed for the cancellation of
PMMSl's title and the issuance of a new one under EOI's name. Pursuant
to a writ of execution, dated December 9, 2003, TCT No. 95712 in the
name of EOI, was issued cancelling on March 18, 2004 TCT No.
S-100612.
Meanwhile, on September 2, 2002, an alias writ of execution11 was
issued by MeTC- Branch 7 in connection with the case between PMMSI
and MBI. On November 8, 2002, the properties covered by TCT Nos.
S-100612 and S-100613 were sold in a public auction in which
respondent Alberto Compas (Compas) was the winning bidder and had
the sale annotated on both titles on November 11, 2002. The Final Deed
of Sale12 was issued to Compas after PMMSI failed to redeem the said
properties during the redemption period which expired on November 11,
2003.
ISSUE:
● Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the amended petition
of EOI. (YES)
RULING: ​It is basic in law that the jurisdiction of courts is conferred by
law.​[24] The jurisdiction of regional trial courts in land registration cases is
conferred by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529. It expressly provides:
Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts​.
Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted
principles underlying the Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and over ​all petitions filed after
original registration of title​, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through
its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with
two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed
or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the
exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or
issuance thereof.
From a perusal of the above-quoted provision, it is apparent that courts of
first instance, now the RTC, have exclusive jurisdiction over registration
proceedings, including petitions filed after the original registration of
title.
DOCTRINE: ​Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529. It expressly provides:
Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of courts.
Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout the
Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally accepted
principles underlying the Torrens system.
Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
applications for original registration of title to lands, including
improvements and interests therein, and over all petitions filed after
original registration of title, with power to hear and determine all
questions arising upon such applications or petitions. The court through

its clerk of court shall furnish the Land Registration Commission with
two certified copies of all pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed
or issued in applications or petitions for land registration, with the
exception of stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or
issuance thereof.
FACTS:
PMMSI and MBI. On November 8, 2002, the properties covered
by TCT Nos. S-100612 and S-100613 were sold in a public auction
in which respondent Alberto Compas (Compas) was the winning
bidder and had the sale annotated on both titles on November 11,
2002. The Final Deed of Sale was issued to Compas after PMMSI
failed to redeem the said properties during the redemption period
which expired on November 11, 2003.

● The case involves two (2) parcels of land, each with an area of 11,
452 square meters, located in Las Piñas City, covered by Transfer ISSUES:
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. S-100612 and TCT No. S-100613, ● Whether the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the amended petition of
and previously registered in the name of Philippine Merchant EOI. (YES)
Marine School Inc. (P MMSI).
● On May 21, 1984, the said properties were levied upon pursuant to RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
the decision rendered, and the writ of execution issued,by the ● Petitioner:
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila which approved the ● Respondent:
compromise agreement between Manufacturers Building, Inc.
(MBI) and PMMSI. Thereafter, the Notice of Levy in favor of RATIO:
MBI was annotated at the back of TCT Nos. S-100612 and
● It is basic in law that the jurisdiction of courts is conferred by law.
S100613 on August 22, 1986.
The jurisdiction of regional trial courts in land registration cases is
● On August 10, 1987, pursuant to the writ of execution issued by
conferred by Section 2 of P.D. No. 1529. It expressly provides:
the MeTC, EOI annotated its lien on TCT No. S-100162. A
● Section 2. Nature of registration proceedings; jurisdiction of
certificate of sale was issued in its favor on October 19, 1987, and
courts​. Judicial proceedings for the registration of lands throughout
entered on TCT No. S-100612 on August 24, 1989. The said
the Philippines shall be in rem and shall be based on the generally
property was later sold in a public auction where EOI was the
accepted principles underlying the Torrens system.
highest bidder and the Final Deed of Sale, dated September 28,
● Courts of First Instance shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all
1990, was issued after the lapse of the redemption period.
applications for original registration of title to lands, including
Subsequently, EOI filed for the cancellation of PMMSl's title and
improvements and interests therein, and over ​all petitions filed
the issuance of a new one under EOI's name. Pursuant to a writ of
after original registration of title​, with power to hear and
execution, dated December 9, 2003, TCT No. 95712 in the name
determine all questions arising upon such applications or petitions.
of EOI, was issued cancelling on March 18, 2004 TCT No.
The court through its clerk of court shall furnish the Land
S-100612.
Registration Commission with two certified copies of all
● Meanwhile, on September 2, 2002, an alias writ of execution was
pleadings, exhibits, orders, and decisions filed or issued in
issued by MeTC- Branch 7 in connection with the case between
 applications or petitions for land registration, with the exception of
stenographic notes, within five days from the filing or issuance
thereof.
● From a perusal of the above-quoted provision, it is apparent that
courts of first instance, now the RTC, have exclusive jurisdiction
over registration proceedings, including petitions filed after the
original registration of title.
● On the other hand, Section 108 states that:
Sec. 108. ​Amendment and alterations of certificates.​ - No erasure,
alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book
after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon
and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by
order of the proper Court of First Instance.
● All petitions or motions filed under this Section as well as any
other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be
filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or
registration was entered.
● The CA was correct in stating that EOI's reliance on Section 108 of
P.D. No. 1529 was misplaced. The appellate court aptly cited
Philippine Veteran's Bank v. Valenzuela​where the Court held that
the prevailing rule was that proceedings under Section 108 were
summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of
mistakes which were only ​clerical but certainly not controversial
issues. Relief under the said legal provision can only be granted if
there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse
claim or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.Thus,
the petition was properly filed with the RTC-Las Piñas where it
was docketed as LRC Case No. LP-05-0089, and not before the
court which heard the original registration proceeding under LRC
No. N-1238, as the petition involved adversarial issues.
● EOI cannot insist that the action should have been filed with the
RTC where the original registration was filed and issued
considering that the case involved controversial issues. The parties
obviously lacked unanimity as EOI even filed a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a cause of action, claiming that its Torrens Title
was indefeasible and could not be collaterally attacked.
● Even granting that Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 was applicable,
EOI's second motion to dismiss should still be denied. The second
paragraph of Section 108 provides that all petitions or motions, as
well as under any other provision of P.D. No. 1529 after original
registration, shall be filed in the original case in which the decree
or registration was made.
● A closer scrutiny of Section 2 and Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529
will show that the former pertains to the grant of jurisdiction to
regional trial courts while the latter refers to the venue where the
action is to be instituted. EOI's second motion to dismiss was
supposed to be on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It, however,
alleges that the petition should not have been filed with the RTC of
Las Piñas under LRC Case No. LP-05-0089, but with the RTC
where the original title was filed and issued under LRC No.
N-1238. Based on the allegations thereof, it appeared that the
second motion was invoking the ground of improper venue.
● Granting it to be so, the second motion to dismiss was rightfully
denied as EOI waived the ground of improper venue after it had
filed its first motion to dismiss pursuant to the Omnibus Motion
Rule. Section 8 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court provides
that a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment or proceeding
shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so
included shall be deemed waived.
● In ​Spouses de Guzman v. Spouses Ochoa,​ a second motion to
dismiss on the ground of defective verification was denied
pursuant to the Omnibus Motion Rule. The Court held:
● Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus
motion as a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding.
A motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a
pleading, that is the complaint. For this reason, a motion to
 dismiss, like any other omnibus motion, must raise and include all
objections available at the time of the filing of the motion because
under Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed
waived." As inferred from the provision, only the following
defenses Under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its
application: [a] lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b]
there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause (​litispendentia​); [c] the action is barred by prior
judgment (​res judicata)​ ; and the action is barred by the statute of
limitations or prescription.
● In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective
verification and certification of forum shopping only when they
filed their second motion to dismiss, despite the fact that this
ground was existent and available at the time of the filing of their
first motion to dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to explain
this fatal omission, the ground of defective verification and
certification of forum shopping was deemed waived and could no
longer be questioned by the petitioners in their second motion to
dismiss.
● Similar to the above-cited case, EOI erroneously filed a second
motion to dismiss raising improper venue as basis—one which is
susceptible of being waived—after the first motion to dismiss was
denied. EOI only insisted that the proper venue was the RTC
where the original case in which the decree or registration was
entered and not with the RTC Las Piñas after its first motion to
dismiss alleging the failure to state a cause of action was filed and
denied. Consequently, the ground of improper venue was deemed
waived and could no longer be questioned by EOI because the
issue on venue was not raised in its prior motion to dismiss.

WHEREFORE​, the petition is ​DENIED​.

 63. Sps. Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw, et. al. v. Ayala Land, Inc.
vest title because registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A
July 26, 2017 | G.R. No. 173120 & 173141 | Mendoza | Priority in Time
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
Made by: Kia Opinion
particular property described therein. Merely relying on the date of
registration of the original titles is insufficient because it is the surveys
Recit Ready​: ​A survey plan for a parcel of land was submitted to the therein that are being assailed.
General Land Registration Office for approval of the Director of Lands
by ​SPOUSES DIAZ ​in 1921​. Subsequently, the same land was again
FACTS:
submitted for subsequent surveys by various proponents, including
● The following survey plans ​of the same land ​were submitted to the
MAYUGA. ​In 1950 and 1958, an OCT was issued to Mayuga (OCT
General Land Registration Office for approval of the Director of Lands:
Nos. 242, 244, 1609). An OCT would be issued to Spouses Diaz only in
○ (1921) Petitioners Spouses Andres Diaz and Josefa Mia (Spouses
1970 (OCT No. 8510). Spouses Diaz would sell to ​SPOUSES YU​. The
Diaz) - Lot 1 - Sitio of Kay Monica, Barrio Pugad Lawin, Las
Mayuga lots would end up with Ayala Land Inc (​ALI​).
Pinas, Rizal
○ (1925) Dominador Mayuga - ​Lot 3 - Sitio May Kokek, Barrio
Issue:
Almanza, Las Pinas, Rizal
As between the two titles, who has the superior right to the parcel of land.
○ (1930) Guico - ​Lot 2 ​- Barrio Tindig na Mangga, Las Pinas, Rizal
The court ruled that SPOUSES YU had a superior right.
○ (1931) Yaptinchay - ​Lot 2 & Lot 3
Note: Despite being the same lot, the survey plans indicated different
Ratio:
addresses.
The court reiterated that between two conflicting titles, the general rule
● The following Original Certificate of Titles (OCT) were issued in favor
that the title registered earlier prevails IS NOT ABSOLUTE. A
of:
certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the
○ (1950) Yaptinchay - ​Lot 2 & Lot 3 covered by OCT No. 242 and
particular property described therein. Merely relying on the date of
244
registration of the original titles is insufficient because ​it is the surveys
○ (1958) - Dominador Mayuga - ​Lot 3​ ​covered by OCT No. 1609
therein that are being assailed. The subsequent surveys contained
● Some of these properties were sold to ​CPJ Corporation
numerous and serious irregularities which cast doubt on the validity
of OCT Nos. 242, 244, 1609 ​(See irregularities in ratio)​.
DIAZ LOTS
● Andres Diaz filed a petition for original registration for Lot 1. In 1970,
Doctrine:
OCT No. 8510​ was issued in the name of Spouses Diaz.
General Assumption: ​Between two conflicting titles, the title registered
○ They subdivided the 460,626 sqm property into 10 lots and
first generally prevails.
conveyed to different third parties
However: ​The rule that between two conflicting titles, the title registered
● In 1976, Andres Diaz sold to Librado Cabautan the following parcels of
earlier prevails IS NOT ABSOLUTE. It reinforced the doctrine that
land:
registering a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or
○ Lot 1-I covered by TCT No. 287416
 ○ Lot 1-B covered by TCT No. 287411
○ Lot 1-A and Lot 1-D covered by TCT No. 287412
● Spouses Yu Hwa Ping and Mary Gaw (Spouses Yu) acquired
ownership over 67,813 sqm representing the undivided half-portion
of Lot 1-A originating from OCT No. 8510 of Spouses Diaz. The
said property was co​-owned by Spouses Diaz with Spouses Librado
and Susana Cabautan resulting from a civil case decided by the RTC of
Makati on March 29, 1986.
● (1994) Spouses Yu acquired ownership over Lot 1-B. TCT Nos. 39408
and 64549 were issued in their names.
DOMINADOR MAYUGA > CPJ LOTS
● (1980) CPJ Corporation transferred their interest in the subject
properties to third persons. (1988) Ayala Corporation obtained the
subject properties from Goldenrod, Inc. and PESALA.
● (1992) ALI acquired all the subject properties:
○ Lot 3 covered by TCT No. 41325
○ Lot 2, Lot 3, and Lot 6 covered by TCT No. 41261
● [DIAZ CASE] CPJ Corporation filed a Land Registration Case
against Spouses Diaz and other named respondents. It sought to
review OCT No. 8510 in the names of Spouses Diaz on the ground
that the interested persons were not notified of the application.
○ RTC rendered a decision against Spouses Diaz, opining
that the Spouses Diaz committed fraud when they filed
their application for original registration w/o informing
the interested parties in violation of Act No. 496. It also
held that Spouses Diaz knew that CPJ Corporation had an
appropriate interest over the subject property.
○ On appeal, CA held that Spouses Diaz had no obligation
to inform CPJ Corporation and its successors about their
registration because the original titles of the latter, from
which their transferred titles were derived, were based on
fraudulent surveys.
● [YU CASE] ​When the Spouses Yu visited their lots, they were
surprised to discover that ALI had already fenced the area and posted
guards and they were prevented from entering/occupying the same.
They also discovered that the transfer certificates of titles covering
parcels of land overlapping their claim were in the name of ALI. They
filed a complaint against ALI for declaration of nullity of ALI’s TCTs.
They also sought the recovery of possession of the property covered by
ALI's title which overlapped their land ​alleging that Spouses Diaz,
their predecessors, had open, uninterrupted and adverse possession
of the same from 1921 until it was transferred to Cabautan in 1976
and sold to them (Spouses Yu) in 1994.
○ [RTC] ruled in favor of Spouses Yu. ALI’s OCTs were marred
with numerous and blatant errors and that ALI did not offer any
satisfactory explanation regarding the glaring discrepancies (For
your reference, the survey/title started with Dominador Mayuga >
Goldenrod, Inc. / PESALA > CPJ Corporation > Ayala Land Inc)
○ [CA] ruled in favor of ALI. It held that Spouses Diaz committed
fraud. It opined that Spouses Diaz knew of CPJ Corporation’s
interest over the subject land but failed to form it of their
application. CA also ruled that Spouses Yu could no longer assert
that the titles of ALI were invalid because the one-year period to
contest the title had prescribed. ​CA ruled that OCTs Nos. 242,
244, and 1609 (ALI’s titles) were issued in 1950 and 1958 while
OCT No. 8510 (Spouses Yu’s title) was only issued in 1970
○ [CA MR] ​CA granted Spouses Yu and Spouses Diaz’ motion for
reconsideration. Citing ​Guico v. San Pedro (​ Guico was one of the
individuals who caused the survey of the lot. See first batch of
bullet points), the court noted that there were defects in the survey
of the lot. It also ruled that the ​doctrine that registration done
fraudulently is no registration at all prevails over the rules on
equity.
○ [CA MR 2] CA reversed again and ruled in favor of ALI
noting that in ​Guico v. San Pedro​, the court did not
 categorically declare that the land survey of Guico was invalid
and it even awarded some of the lots to the applicant.
○ Aggrieved, Spouses Yu elevates the matter to the SC.
ISSUE:
1. Is the complaint of Spouses Yu barred by prescription? ​NO.
2. Between the registered titles of Spouses Yu and ALI, which is
more superior? ​THE ​COURT RULED THAT SPOUSES YU’S
TITLE IS MORE SUPERIOR.
RATIO:
1. [PRESCRIPTION ISSUE] While Section 38 of Act No. 496 states
that the petition for review to question a decree of registration must
be filed within one (1) year after entry of the decree, such
provision is not the only remedy of an aggrieved party who was
deprived of land by fraudulent means.
2. The rule that between two conflicting titles, the title registered
earlier prevails IS NOT ABSOLUTE.
a. If it can be clearly ascertained by the ordinary rules of
construction relating to written documents, that the
inclusion of the land in the certificate of title of prior
date is a mistake, the mistake may be rectified by
holding the latter of the two certificates of title to be
conclusive.
b. It reinforced the doctrine that registering a piece of land
under the Torrens System does not create or vest title
because registration is not a mode of acquiring
ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence
of ownership or title over the particular property
described therein.
c. In ​Golloy v. Court of Appeals,​ there were two conflicting
titles with overlapping boundaries. The first title was
registered on March 1, 1918, while the second title was
registered on August 15, 1919. Despite having been
registered at a prior date, the Court did not allow the
earlier registered title of the respondents to prevail
because of the continuing possession of the petitioners
therein and the laches committed by the respondents.
Hence, the holder of an earlier registered title does not, in
all instances, absolutely triumph over a holder of a latter
registered title.
d. In this case, the petitioners assail the numerous and
serious defects in the surveys of OCT Nos. 242, 244 and
1609, which cast doubt on the inclusion of the subject
lands in ALI’s titles. Accordingly, the Court must delve
into the merits of their contentions to determine whether
the subject properties are truly and genuinely included in
ALI’s title. ​Merely relying on the date of registration of
the original titles is insufficient because it is the
surveys therein that are being assailed.
3. The subsequent land surveys conducted (after 1921) contained
numerous and serious irregularities which cast doubt on the
validity of OCT Nos. 242, 244, 1609 which were transferred to
ALI
a. The survey conducted in favor of Spouses Diaz was
conducted by a certain A.N. Feliciano. Curiously, the
subsequent surveys for a certain Dominador Mayuga, a
certain Guico, and for a certain Yaptinchay were also
conducted by A.N. Feliciano. It is dubious how the same
surveyor or agrimensor conducted the subsequent
surveys. He should obviously be aware that a previous
survey was already conducted. Furthermore, even if a
single entity (that is, Feliciano) conducted the survey, that
lands were described to be located ​in different places​.
b. Other discrepancies include: Lack of signature of the
Director of Lands on some surveys, surveys referred to a
monument that only existed more than seven years after
the survey, many erasures as to total area of the property,
 there was a difference in the intensity of the lower right
portion of one of the subsequent surveys which showed
that it may simply have been an attachment to the main
document, court ruled that irregularities existed in ​Guico
v. San Pedro
4. It was established that Andres Diaz was the very first claimant
of the subject property and was the proponent of the first
survey. The said survey clearly contained the signature of the
surveyor and the Director of Lands, as can be seen on its face.
It did not contain any erasure or alterations thereon. Likewise,
a duly authenticated copy of the survey is readily available in
the Bureau of Lands.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are ​GRANTED​. The June 19, 2006 Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA​G.R. CV Nos. 61593 & 70622 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The February 8, 2005 Amended Decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby REINSTATED.

ASSENTING/DISSENTING OPINIONS:
NA
64.
 65. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROSARIO
March 28, 2001 | Pardo, ​J.​ | PD 1529; Section 17: Survey of the Land
K. LOPEZ DE LEON & CHECKER
PETITIONER: ​University of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: ​Segundina Rosario
RECIT-READY: S​ept 7, 1971, Datu Ditingke Ramos filed at CFI an
application for registration of title covering a parcel of land situated in
Quezon City, with an area of 100,000 sqm and covered by Plan (LRC)
SWO-15055. UP filed an intervention claiming that the land covered by
the application is within its property described in TCT No. 9462. U.P.
filed with the trial court an opposition and motion to dismiss Datu
Ditingke Ramos' application. The CFI denied motion to dismiss since it
did not encroach the land and on June 8, 1973 it granted the Application
for Registration of Ramos. CFI ordered the finality of decision and
ordered the LRC to comply with Sec. 21 of Act 2347. LRC issued Decree
No. N- 150604 in favor of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de Ramos, and
pursuant to which the RD of Quezon issued an OCT No. 17 in her name.
Due to some technical errors, RD of Quezon cancelled the OCT and
issued TCT 223619 in the name of Ramos. February 23, 1988, Ramos
issued a Deed of Sale infavor of Segundina Rosario covering said parcel
in TCT. A fire razed the City hall (housing the RD) and destroyed the
TCT 223619. It resulted to the reconstitution and issuance of TCT
RT-78195 (223619).
UP filed for the cancellation of said TCT. Segundina caused the
registration of Deed of Absolute sale to the RD and it cancelled the
previousTCT and issued a new TCT in favor of Segundina. U.P. filed an
amended petition alleging that it is "the true, absolute and registered
owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
9462" of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City and that the "unlawful
acts of ownership being exercised by (Segundina) and (Bugnay
Construction and Development Corporation) as well as the existence of
their spurious certificates of title, create a cloud of doubt on the title of
(U.P.). UP also prayed that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 121042 or
the reconstituted titles or derivatives thereof be declared null and void ab
initio for being spurious and fraudulently issued (third cause of action)
Segundina filed an omnibus motion to dismiss UP’s third cause of action
and cancel the notice of ​litis pendens annotated in the TCT. But RTC
denied the motion. MR was filed but it was again denied.
ISSUE​: W/N the OCT No. 17 was void ab initio on the ground that CFI
has no jurisdiction since the requisite signature approval of the Director
of Lands over the survey plan was nowhere to be found​ (YES)
RULING: No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands. The submission of
the plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. Unless a plan
and its technical description are duly approved by the Director of Lands,
the same are of no value. Thus, the allegation that the signature approval
for the survey plan was nowhere to be found is an important
jurisdictional fact that must be ventilated before the trial court. Thus, as
OCT No. 17 is void and Segundina traces her rights to OCT No. 17, her
claim would have no basis as a spring cannot rise higher than its source.
Further, the judgment in LRC Q-329 was subject to the qualification that
"If the parcel of land is found to be inside decreed properties, this plan is
automatically cancelled. Whether the land covered by OCT No. 17 is
inside decreed property is an issue of fact that can be best determined by
the trial court after an examination of the evidence. We find meritorious
the trial court's rationale for denying Segundina's motion to dismiss. We
quote: "To establish their respective rights over the disputed property,
both plaintiff and respondents submitted documentary exhibits, the
genuineness and authenticity of which can only be proved in a full blown
trial. "There is no pretense that the foregoing conflicting claims entail
determination of facts. It, thus, become imperative that both parties be
given their day in Court to avoid the danger of committing a grave
injustice if they were denied an opportunity to introduce evidence in their
behalf. "It is within this context that the Court considers it appropriate
under the present stage of the action to DENY the instant motion.
Pending final ruling on the merits of the case, Segundina's motion to
cancel the notice of lis pendens must be denied. Case is remanded to the
trial court for trial on the merits.
DOCTRINE: ​The submission of the plan is a statutory requirement of
mandatory character. Unless a plan and its technical description are duly

approved by the Director of Lands, the sam are of no value.
P. D. No. 1529 requires the Director of Lands to sign and approve the
survey plan for the land applied for, otherwise, the title is void.
"Sec. 17. ​What and where to file - The application for land
registration shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province
or city where the land is situated. The applicant ​shall file together with
the application all original muniments of titles or copies thereof and ​a
survey plan approved by the Bureau of Lands​.
"The clerk of court ​shall not accept any application ​unless it is shown
that the applicant has furnished the Director of Lands with a copy of the
application and all the annexes (emphasis ours).
FACTS:
● On Sept 7, 1971, Datu Ditingke Ramos filed with the CFI of
Quezon City an application for registration of title covering a
parcel of land situated in QC, with an area of 100,000 square
meters and covered by Plan (LRC) SWO-15055
● Petitioner University of the Philippines (UP) filed with the trial
court a "motion for intervention" in the case, claiming that the land
covered by the application (by Datu Ditingke Ramos) is within its
property.
● U.P. filed with the trial court an opposition and motion to dismiss
Datu Ditingke Ramos' application for registration.
● On June 6, 1973, the trial court issued an order which reads as
follows:
○ SWO-15055 does not encroach on the property of
the UP and that it is not inside any decreed -
property, the motion to dismiss the application is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
● On May 8, 1974, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued
Decree No. N-150604 in favor of Rosario Alcovendas Vda. de
Ramos, pursuant to which the Register of Deeds of QC issued
OCT No. 17 in her name.
● On Nov 21, 1976, the Register of Deeds of QC cancelled OCT No.
17 and issued TCT No. 223619 also in the name of Vda. de Ramos
due to errors in the technical description
● On Feb 23, 1988, Vda. de Ramos executed a "deed of absolute
sale" in favor of Segundina Rosario (Segundina) covering the land
embraced in TCT No. 223619.
● On June 11, 1988, fire razed the QC Hall Building which housed
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.
○ Transfer Certificate of Title No. 223619 was one of the
titles destroyed by the fire.
● Segundina requested the Register to reconstitute TCT No. 223619
resulting in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
RT-78195 (223619).
● On March 11, 1993, U.P. filed with the RTC of QC a petition for
the cancellation of TCT No. (N-126671) 367316 naming
Segundina, Bugnay Construction and Development Corporation
and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, among others, as
respondents.
● Nov 10, 1994, Segundina registered the deed of absolute sale.so
she was issued in her name TCT No. 121042 name, resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. RT-78195 (223619).
● On Nov 19, 1996, U.P. filed an amended petition alleging that it is
"the true, absolute and registered owner of a parcel of land covered
by TCT No. 9462" of the Register of Deeds of QC and that the
"unlawful acts of ownership being exercised by Segundina and
Bugnay Construction as well as the existence of their spurious
certificates of title, create a cloud of doubt on the title of (U.P.)."
● U.P. prayed that TCT No. 121042 or the reconstituted titles be
declared null and void ​ab initio for being spurious and fraudulently
issued.
● On Dec 30, 1997, Segundina filed with the trial court an MR and
motion to cancel the notice of ​lis pendens​, which was later on
denied.
● On May 26, 1998, Segundina filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari assailing the orders of the trial court denying her motion
to dismiss.
● On Sept 18, 1998, the CA ruled in favor of Segundina, reasoned
that the third cause of action is barred by ​res judicata and that the
 trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
Segundina's "motion to dismiss.”
● On Oct 26, 1998, U.P. filed with the CA, a motion for
reconsideration of the afore-quoted decision, which was later
denied.
ISSUE:
● W/N the OCT No. 17 was void ab initio on the ground that CFI has
no jurisdiction since the requisite signature approval of the
Director of Lands over the survey plan was nowhere to be found
(YES)
trial court's rationale for denying Segundina's motion to dismiss.
● Thus, it became imperative that both parties be given their day in
Court to avoid the danger of committing a grave injustice if they
were denied an opportunity to introduce evidence in their behalf.
● "It is within this context that the Court considers it appropriate
under the present stage of the action to DENY the instant motion.
Pending final ruling on the merits of the case, Segundina's motion
to cancel the notice of lis pendens must be denied. Case is
remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits.

RULING:

● The trial court declared U.P. as having no interest in the land

covered by TCT No. 121042. However, UP's contention that OCT
No. 17 is void for lack of the requisite "signature approval of the
Director of Lands over the survey plan"is worth looking into.
● P. D. No. 1529 requires the Director of Lands to sign and
approve the survey plan for the land applied for, otherwise, the
title is ​void.​
● No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration proceedings
until approved by the Director of Lands. The submission of the
plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character.
● Unless a plan and its technical description are duly approved by
the Director of Lands, the same are of no value.
● Thus, the allegation that the signature approval for the survey plan
was nowhere to be found is an important jurisdictional fact that
must be ventilated before the trial court.
● Thus, as OCT No. 17 is void and Segundina traces her rights to
OCT No. 17, her claim would have no basis as a spring cannot rise
higher than its source.
● Further, the judgment in LRC Q-329 was subject to the
qualification that "If the parcel of land is found to be inside
decreed properties, this plan is automatically cancelled.
● Whether the land covered by OCT No. 17 is inside decreed
property is an issue of fact that can be best determined by the trial
court after an examination of the evidence. We find meritorious the
 66. DEL ROSARIO v. REPUBLIC
June 6, 2002 | J. Mendoza | Section 17, PD 1529 - Survey of the Land
LUCES & MIRANDA
PETITIONER: ​Angel Del Rosario
RESPONDENT: ​Republic of the Philippines
RECIT-READY: ​Angel Del Rosario filed an application for registration
of a parcel of land in Brgy. Pinagsanhan, Maragondon, Cavite. In his
application, he stated that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in
the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of the land in question, which was alienable and disposable land, under a
bona de claim of ownership since the 1920s or even earlier; and that
such land was being occupied and cultivated by him and his family.
Petitioner Del Rosario annexed to his application SEVERAL documents
(see facts). On the same day that he filed his application, petitioner also
submitted to the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Jameswell Resus, the
original tracing cloth plan for the Lot. The clerk of court transmitted to
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) the duplicate copy of petitioner’s
application, the original tracing cloth plan, and all other documents
submitted by petitioner. The trial court rendered its decision granting the
application of petitioner. The Republic of the Philippines (respondent)
appealed to the CA, putting in issue the failure of petitioner to submit in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891 and to establish
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and
notorious possession of the land applied for registration for the period
required by law. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the denial of his application because of his failure
to submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of Lot No. 1891 was
FACTS:
unjustified. He claims that he should not be faulted for such failure since
he turned over the same to the trial court on the day he led his
application, but it was submitted to the LRA by the branch clerk of court
and could not be produced during the trial.
ISSUE:
● W/N the denial of petitioner’s application for original
registration was unjustified - ​NO
RULING: ​Del Rosario’s claim has no merit. Petitioner is duty bound to
retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and to present it in evidence
in the trial court. Neither does the advance survey plan, which was
attached to petitioner's application and marked in evidence, su ffice to
comply with the requirement of the law. In this case, what was marked
in evidence, the advance survey plan and the technical description, lacked
the necessary certification from the Bureau of Lands.
The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of original
registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The reason for this rule
is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does not
overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a
previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The
failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application
for registration.
DOCTRINE: ​The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth
plan, ​duly approved by the Bureau of Lands​, in cases for application of
original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The reason for
this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to ensure that it does
not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof already covered by a
previous land registration, and to forestall the possibility that it will be
overlapped by a subsequent registration of any adjoining land. The
failure to comply with this requirement is fatal to petitioner's application
for registration.
● Angel Del Rosario filed an application for registration of a parcel
of land in Brgy. Pinagsanhan, Maragondon, Cavite.
● In his application, petitioner stated that he is a Filipino, married to
Agustina Catalasan, and a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite;
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
the land in question, which was alienable and disposable land,
under a bona de claim of ownership since the 1920s or even
earlier; and that such land was being occupied and cultivated by
 him and his family. Petitioner further alleged that there was no
mortgage or encumbrance on the land; that the same was not
bound by any public or private road or by any river or creek; and
that there was no person having any interest therein, legal or
equitable, or having possession thereof other than himself.
● Petitioner indicated the owners/ claimants/ occupants of the
adjoining properties, and annexed to his application the following
documents: (a) an advance survey plan of the land applied for with
technical descriptions; (b) Technical Description of Lot No. 1891;
(c) Certi cation in lieu of Geodetic Engineer's certification issued
for registration purposes, attesting to the genuineness of the survey
plan; (d) Certification that the subject land is alienable and
disposable; (e) Certification that the property is not covered by any
public land application or patent; (f) Tax Declaration covering the
parcel of land; and (g) Official Receipt showing petitioner's
payment of the realty taxes on the said lot up to 1997.
● On the same day he fi led his application, petitioner also
submitted to the Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Jameswell M.
Resus, the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891. On
October 15, 1997, the clerk of court transmitted to the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) the duplicate copy of petitioner's
application for registration of title of Lot No. 1891, the original
tracing cloth plan, and the other documents submitted by
petitioner in support of his application.
● In his testimony, petitioner reiterated the allegations in his
application and identified the annexed documents. He claimed he
and his family planted in the subject lot mango and bamboo trees
and raised animals on it. Petitioner testified that he inherited the
land from his grandfather, who caused the survey of the said lot to
be made in his name as the original claimant. He said that he
possessed the subject property from 1984, the time the cadastral
survey was made thereon, but also claimed that the rst survey on
the land was made in 1930. Petitioner also stated that his
predecessors-in-interest started cultivating the property in 1940,
planting kakawati trees along its boundaries. He claimed that he
and his family alone were the ones who gathered the fruits and
forest products of the land and that no one had ever disturbed his
possession over the lot or questioned his ownership of the same.
● The trial court rendered its decision granting the application of
petitioner.
● The Republic of the Philippines (respondent) appealed to the Court
of Appeals, putting in issue the failure of petitioner to submit in
evidence the original tracing cloth plan for Lot No. 1891 and to
establish that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, and notorious possession of the land applied for
registration for the period required by law.
● The Court of Appeals rendered its decision reversing the decision
of the trial court on the ground that petitioner indeed failed to
submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of the land
applied for registration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
● W/N the denial of petitioner’s application for original registration
was unjustified - ​NO
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● Petitioner: Petitioner argues that the denial of his application
because of his failure to submit in evidence the original tracing
cloth plan of Lot No. 1891 was unjustified. He claims that he
should not be faulted for such failure since he turned over the same
to the trial court on the day he led his application, but it was
submitted to the LRA by the branch clerk of court and could not be
produced during the trial.
RATIO:
● The submission in evidence of the original tracing cloth plan, duly
approved by the Bureau of Lands, in cases for application of
original registration of land is a mandatory requirement. The
reason for this rule is to establish the true identity of the land to
ensure that it does not overlap a parcel of land or a portion thereof
already covered by a previous land registration, and to forestall the
possibility that it will be overlapped by a subsequent registration of
any adjoining land. The failure to comply with this requirement is
fatal to petitioner's application for registration.
● Petitioner contends, however, that he had submitted the original
tracing cloth plan to the branch clerk of court, but the latter
submitted the same to the LRA. This claim has no merit. Petitioner
 is duty bound to retrieve the tracing cloth plan from the LRA and
to present it in evidence in the trial court.
● Neither does the advance survey plan, which was attached to
petitioner's application and marked in evidence, suffice to comply
with the requirement of the law. Although in one case it was ruled
that a mere blueprint copy of the cloth plan, together with the lot's
technical description, was su cient to identify the land applied for
registration, both the blueprint copy and the technical description
were certified as to their correctness by the Director of Lands. In
this case, what was marked in evidence, the advance survey plan
and the technical description, lacked the necessary certification
from the Bureau of Lands.
● Moreover, petitioner failed to establish that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had met the legal requirements as to the
nature and length of possession leading to a registrable title over
the land. Petitioner claims that he and his family cultivated the
subject land, without the help of tenants, in order to plant bamboo
and mango trees thereon. His witness also testified that the land
was for a time planted with coconut trees and palay. However,
from the testimonies of petitioner and his witness, it appears that
petitioner is a businessman who, while born in Maragondon,
Cavite, has actually been a resident of Poblacion, Ternate, Cavite
from childhood until the present. Moreover, it appears that the land
was only planted with bamboo trees, which do not require much
tending to. There is also doubt as to how many mango trees, if any,
existed on the land or to the volume of fruits harvested from these
trees, since there was no testimony to that effect and the tax
declaration offered in evidence stated that the improvements found
on the land were only bamboo trees.
● Raymundo Telia testified he remembered that there existed on the
land some coconut trees, but these were no longer there at the time
of his testimony. He also testified that the land was planted with
palay, but not by petitioner or his predecessors or his family but by
kaingeros, including himself, who only asked permission from
petitioner to use the land. Assuming that petitioner had planted the
bamboo and mango trees thereon, this fact would hardly su ce to
prove possession as it would constitute "a mere casual cultivation"
of that large tract of land. A mere casual cultivation of portions of
the land by the claimant does not constitute possession under claim
of ownership. For him, possession is not exclusive and notorious
so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the state. The
possession of public land, however long the period thereof may
have, extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor
because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does
not operate against the state, unless the occupant can prove
possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership
for the required number of years.
● Although petitioner claims that he possessed Lot No. 1891 by
himself and through his predecessors-in-interest since the 1930s,
his tax declaration and tax payment receipt belie the same. The
taxes due on the land subject of the application covered only a
period of 10 years beginning 1988 and was paid only on
September 9, 1997, or a little more than a month prior to the filing
of the application. There is no other tax declaration or receipt for
tax payments by petitioner's predecessors-in-interest. Moreover,
tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership but are merely indicia of a claim of ownership.
● Hence, in view of the lack of suffcient evidence of the 30-year
open, notorious, and conclusive possession in the concept of an
owner, as required by C.A. No. 141, §48 (b), as amended,
petitioner's application for original registration of Lot No. 1891
cannot be granted.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals denying the
application of petitioner Angel del Rosario for original registration of
Lot No. 1891, Cadastral 457-D, Maragondon, Cavite, Ap-04-0011601, is
AFFIRMED.
 67.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SARMIENTO
March 13, 2007 | J. Carpio-Morales | Sec. 17. Survey of the Land
J. Miranda &
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: ​Restituto Sarmiento, represented by his
Attorney-In-Fact, Magdaleno Sarmiento
RECIT-READY: ​Respondent Restituto Sarmiento through his
brother-attorney-in-fact Magdaleno Sarmiento filed on November 29,
2000 with the MeTC of Taguig, Metro Manila an application for
registration of a parcel of land with a total land area of 2,664 square
meters and located at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro Manila. He
claimed to have acquired the lot through donation under a Kasulatan ng
Pagkakaloob dated July 16, 1988 executed by his father, Placido
Sarmiento, who in turn inherited it from his mother Florentina
Sarmiento. Respondent added that he and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and public
possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years.
Respondent’s proof is a blue print copy (photocopy) of the conversion
and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center. The Solicitor
General opposed the application stating that the possession claim was not
true, that the tax declarations and tax payment receipts do not appear to
be genuine, that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a
Spanish title or grant can no longer be availed of by respondent as he
failed to file an appropriate application for registration within six months
from February 16, 1976, as required under P.D. No. 892, and that the lot
is part of the public domain not subject to private appropriation. The
MeTCt ruled for Sarmiento and ordered the decree of registration to be
issued. The Republic appealed to the CA, but the CA affirmed the lower
court’s decision, hence the appeal to the SC.
ISSUE:
● Whether or not the blue print copy of the conversion and
FACTS:
subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the
notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is
inside the alienable and disposable area, certified by the Bureau
of Forestry." is a sufficient proof that the land in question has
been declared alienable? ​NO
RULING: ​This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. . . ."
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's
notation indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable
land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. By relying solely on
the said surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that
the land in question has been declared alienable..
DOCTRINE: ​It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by
private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to
public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law. Verily, a mere surveyor has
no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
For the original registration of title, the applicant must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of
owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible
evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land
sought to be registered remains inalienable.
● Respondent Restituto Sarmiento through his
brother-attorney-in-fact Magdaleno Sarmiento filed on November
29, 2000 with the MeTC of Taguig, Metro Manila an application
for registration of a parcel of land, delineated as Lot 535-D under
 Approved Survey Plan Swo-13-000465 with a total land area of
2,664 square meters and located at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro
Manila (the lot).
● Respondent claimed to have acquired the lot through donation
under a Kasulatan ng Pagkakaloob dated July 16, 1988 executed
by his father, Placido Sarmiento, which lot formed part of Lot 535
that was allegedly inherited by Placido from Florentina Sarmiento.
● Respondent further claimed that he and his predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and public
possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30
years.
● To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of
the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center
which bears the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that
"this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No.
27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the
Bureau of Forestry."
● On January 17, 2001, the Solicitor General, through the Prosecutor
of Taguig who was deputized to assist in the case, filed, as counsel
for the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), an Opposition to
respondent’s application for registration. However the MeTC
ordered the issuance of a decree of registration for the said land in
favor of the respondent.
● By Decision of May 20, 2005, the appellate court held that as the
lot was sufficiently identified by the blue print copy of the plan and
the technical description, the presentation of the original tracing
cloth ceased to become indispensable for the grant of the
application. The appellate court thus affirmed the decision of the
MeTC. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration having been denied
by Resolution 28 of August 19, 2005, petitioner appealed to the
SC.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not the blue print copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the
notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer that "this survey is
inside the alienable and disposable area, certified by the Bureau of
Forestry." is a sufficient proof that the land in question has been
declared alienable? ​NO
RATIO:
● It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government, and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to
public land should show that his title was acquired from the State
or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
● To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, petitioners relied on the
printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable
and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No.
2623, certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,"
appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).This
proof is not sufficient. For the original registration of title, the
applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or
alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the
inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the
concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership
and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent
such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
● In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineer's
notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey was inside
alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a
positive government act validly changing the classification of the
land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to
reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyor's assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that
the land in question has been declared alienable.
● Even assuming that respondent has proven that the lot is alienable,
his application would still be denied for failure to comply with the
period of possession requirement.
● To this Court, Tax Declaration No. 9631-Exhibit "N-4" does not
constitute competent proof of Placido’s title over Lot 535. For one,
respondent failed to prove that Placido is an heir of Florentina. For
another, respondent failed to prove the metes and bounds of the
"palayero" allegedly owned by Florentina and that the lot actually
forms part thereof.
 ● But even assuming arguendo that, as found by the MeTC, Placido
was an heir and inherited Lot 535 from Florentina, respondent still
failed to provide proof, nay allege, that Florentina possessed Lot
535 since June 12, 1945 or earlier under a bona fide claim of
ownership

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 20, 2005 and August 19,
2005, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application
for registration filed by respondent, Restituto Sarmiento, over Lot
535-D, with a total area of Two Thousand Six Hundred Sixty Four
(2,664) square meters situated at Barangay Wawa, Taguig, Metro
Manila is DENIED
 WHEREFORE, start here.

68. BENIN v. TUASON

Date | J. Zaldivar | Topic: Sec. 19 Amendments of Boundaries or Area
CHECKER & MAKER

PETITIONER: ​Victor Benin

RESPONDENT: ​Mariano Severo Tuason

RECIT-READY: ​Start here.

ISSUE:
● W/N? ​YES/NO
● W/N? Y​ ES/NO

RULING: ​Start here.

DOCTRINE: ​Start here.

FACTS:
● Fact #1
● Fact #2

ISSUES:
● Issue #1
● Issue #2

RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):

● Petitioner:
● Respondent:

RATIO:
● Ratio #1
● Ratio #2
 69. REPUBLIC v. SANTOS III.
November 12, 2012 |Bersamin, J. | Sec. 19 Amendments of Boundaries
or Area
NOEL & CHECKER
PETITIONER: Republic of The Philippines
RESPONDENT: Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III, Arcadio C. Santos Jr.
RECIT-READY: ​Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.,
are the owners of the land subject of this application which was
previously a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it
dried up. They are alleging ​that the property had been formed through
accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public,
continuous and adverse possession for more than 30 years. ​The City
of Parañaque is opposing it arguing that their property was not formed
through accretion, but was the result of a part of the Parañaque river
drying up. The RTC and CA granted Santos ownership
ISSUE:
● Whether or not the land in question can be acquired through
accretion. (NO)
RULING: ​By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit
made through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the owner
of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. ​The drying up
of the river is not accretion. ​Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to
the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner,
unless a law vests the ownership in some other person. ​Also, since it is
property of the State it cannot be acquired through prescription unless the
same had been declared alienable and disposable.
DOCTRINE: ​Start here.
FACTS:
● Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the
owners of the land subject of this application which was previously
a part of the Parañaque River which became an orchard after it
dried up.
● Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten
years, respondent Arcadio Ivan Santos III applied on March 7,
1997 for the registration of Lot which was bounded in the
Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos,
Jr. in the Southeast by the Parañaque River, in the Southwest by an
abandoned road, and in the Northwest by another lot also owned
by Arcadio Ivan.
● Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to
include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s
co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had
been formed through accretion and had been in their joint
open, notorious, public, continuous and adverse possession for
more than 30 years.
● The City of Parañaque opposed the application for land
registration, stating that it needed the property for its flood control
program, and that the property was within the legal easement of 20
meters from the river bank. Also, assuming that the property was
not covered by the legal easement, title to the property could not be
registered in favor of Santos for the reason that the property was an
orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.
● The RTC granted the application for land registration declaring
Arcadio III and Arcadio Jr., both as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE
OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the
Barangay of San Dionisio, City of Parañaque City.
● The CA affirmed. Both lower courts used Art. 457 of the Civil
Code as their basis in awarding the land to Santos. Civil Code
Article 457- To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of
 rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters."
ISSUE/S:
● Whether or not the land in question can be acquired through
accretion. (NO)
RATIO:
● ​By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made
through the effects of the current of the water- belongs to the
owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms.
The drying up of the river is not accretion. ​Hence, the dried-up
river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion,
not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in
some other person.
● Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the
banks of rivers. ​The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion,
must be:
● Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State. No public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is
indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the
State.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
of the Court of Appeals promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the
application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. and Arcadio Ivan
S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square
meters, more or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Parañaque
City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot 4998-B as exclusively
belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the
Parañaque River.

(a) gradual and imperceptible;

(b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and

(c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.

● Respondents Santos should establish the concurrence of the

elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for
land registration, and they failed to do so.

● Even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents

possessed Lot 4998-B for more than thirty years in the character
they claimed, ​they did not thereby acquire the land by
prescription or by other means without any competent proof
that the land was already declared as alienable and disposable
by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still
belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.
70. DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC. v.
BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
July 24, 2013 | J. Reyes | Amendments of Boundaries or Area
OPINION &
PETITIONER: ​Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc.,
represented by its Incumbent President, Greg Seriego
RESPONDENT: ​Bases Conversion Development Authority
RECIT-READY: ​The present petition by Dream Village concerns a
dispute over a lot in present-day Fort Bonifacio against BCDA. Dream
Village claims to represent more than 2,000 families who have been
occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig City
since 1985 “in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and
notoriously.” It argues that according to Proclamation No. 172, such area
was made alienable and disposable. On the other hand, BCDA asserts
that its title to the subject property is pursuant to R.A. No. 7227. It is the
holder of patrimonial government property.
ISSUE:
● W/N the portion of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan SWO-13-000298,
situated in the barrio of Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
which is presently being occupied by Dream Village is within
FACTS:
the coverage of Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 and outside the
claim of BCDA? ​NO. The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio
by virtue of RA 7227.
● W/N area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of
acquisition by prescription? ​NO. Not while it is intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
RULING: ​The court ruled that the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio, a
matter which has long been decided with finality in ​Samahan ng Masang
Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. BCDA​. It is unequivocal that the Philippine
Government, and now the BCDA, has title and ownership over Fort
Bonifacio.
Dream Village sits on the abandoned C-5 Road, which lies outside the
area declared in Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as alienable and
disposable.
It was noted that while some portions of Fort Bonifacio have been
declared “alienable and disposable”, the said lands did not thereby
become patrimonial, since the BCDA law (RA 7227) makes the express
reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the
conversion of the former American bases in Clark and Subic.
The property sought to be registered must not only be classified as
alienable and disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State
that it is no longer intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth, or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.
Absent such an express declaration by the State, the land remains to
be property of public dominion.
DOCTRINE: ​While property of the State or any of its subdivisions
patrimonial in character may be the object of prescription, ​those
“intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth” are considered property of public dominion and
therefore not susceptible to acquisition by prescription.
● Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream
Village) claims to represent more than 2,000 families who have
been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan,
Taguig City since 1985 “in the concept of owners continuously,
exclusively and notoriously.”
● The lot can be traced back to Dolores Casal y Ochoa, owner of
Hacienda de Maricaban ​(covers parts of present-day Makati,
Pasig, Taguig, Pasay, Paranaque). Maricaban was purchased by the
US government, who transferred 30 hectares to the Manila
Railroad Company. The US formally ceded Fort William Mckinley
to the Republic of the Philippines.
● President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423
withdrawing from sale or settlement the tracts of land within Fort
William Mckinley, now renamed ​Fort Bonifacio​, and reserving
them for military purposes.
● President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476
declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and
disposable in the manner provided under Republic Act (R.A.) Nos.
274 and 730, in relation to the Public Land Act, thus allowing the
sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan,
Signal Village, and Western Bicutan.
● President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172
amending Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of
the survey Swo-13-000298 the areas in Western Bicutan open
for disposition.
● In 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed creating the Bases Conversion
and Development Authority (BCDA) to oversee and accelerate the
conversion of Clark and Subic military reservations and their
extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station,
O’Donnell Transmitter Station, San Miguel Naval
Communications Station and Capas Relay Station) to productive
civilian uses.
○ Section 8 provides that the capital of the BCDA will be
provided from sales proceeds or transfers of lots in nine
(9) military camps in Metro Manila, including 723 has. of
Fort Bonifacio. The law, thus, expressly authorized the
President of the Philippines “to sell the above lands, in
whole or in part, which are hereby declared alienable and
disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and
regulations governing sales of government properties,”
specifically to raise capital for the BCDA. Titles to the
camps were transferred to the BCDA for this purpose
○ Excepted from disposition by the BCDA are: a)
approximately 148.80 has. reserved for the National
Capital Region (NCR) Security Brigade, Philippine Army
officers’ housing area, and Philippine National Police jails
and support services (presently known as Camp Bagong
Diwa); b) approximately 99.91 has. in Villamor Air Base
for the Presidential Airlift Wing, one squadron of
helicopters for the NCR and respective security units; c)
twenty one (21) areas segregated by various presidential
proclamations; and d) a proposed 30.15 has. as relocation
site for families to be affected by the construction of
Circumferential Road 5 and Radial Road 4, provided that
the boundaries and technical description of these exempt
areas shall be determined by an actual ground survey.
● Conflict arose when Dream Village and its members were
subjected to summary demolition by BCDA, resulting in unrest
and tensions among the residents ​over the subject 78,466-sq m
property, which they claimed is within Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298
and thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172.
● A relocation/verification survey was conducted over the subject
lot. The Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) received the report and resolved that the lot lies outside
of BCDA, and thus directed the LMB of the DENR to process the
applications of Dream Village’s members for sales patent, noting
that in view of the length of time that they “have been openly,
continuously and notoriously occupying the subject property in the
concept of an owner, x x x they are qualified to apply for sales
patent on their respective occupied lots pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274
and 730 in relation to the provisions of the Public Land Act.”
● CA ruled that COSLAP has no jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
● W/N the portion of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan SWO-13-000298,
situated in the barrio of Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila,
which is presently being occupied by Dream Village is within the
coverage of Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 and outside the claim
of BCDA? ​NO. The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio.
● W/N area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of acquisition
by prescription? ​NO. Not while it is intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● Petitioner:
○ They claim the portion of of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan
SWO-13-000298, situated in the barrio of Western
Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
○ They claim that they have been occupying the area for
thirty (30) years “in the concept of owners continuously,
exclusively and notoriously for several years,” and have
built their houses of sturdy materials thereon and
introduced paved roads, drainage and recreational and
 religious facilities. The lot is not among those transferred
to the BCDA under R.A. No. 7227.
● Respondent:
○ Its title to the subject property is pursuant to R.A. No.
7227. ​It is the holder of patrimonial government
property.
RATIO:
● That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long been decided
with finality. In ​Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v.
BCDA​, it was categorically ruled as follows:
○ First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine
Government, and now the BCDA, has title and
ownership over Fort Bonifacio. The case of Acting
Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig
and Makati is final and conclusive on the ownership of
the then ​Hacienda de Maricaban e​ state by the Republic
of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue on the ownership of
the subject lands in Fort Bonifacio is laid to rest.
○ The facts in ​Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati are
essentially not much different from the controversy
below. There, 20,000 families were long-time residents
occupying 98 has. of Fort Bonifacio in Makati City, who
vainly sought to avert their eviction and the demolition of
their houses by the BCDA upon a claim that the land was
owned by the USA. The SC ruled that their TCT has been
cancelled in the name of the Republic and transferred to
BCDA. ​The Court ruled that the BCDA’s aforesaid
titles over Fort Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and
beyond question pursuant to an explicit authority
under R.A. No. 7227.
● Dream Village sits on the abandoned C-5 Road, which lies outside
the area declared in Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as alienable
and disposable.
○ Dream Village is not situated in Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298
but actually occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of
Swo-00-0001302, part of the abandoned right-of-way of
C-5 Road.
○ The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to
cross Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned by deviating it
northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng
mga Bayani ​does not signify abandonment by the
government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots
would then become alienable and disposable
● In ​Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,​ it was pointed out that
from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the subject military
lands in Metro Manila became alienable and disposable. ​However,
it was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby become
patrimonial, since the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA) law makes the express reservation that they
are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the
former American bases in Clark and Subic.
○ The Court noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to
either “public service” or “the development of national
wealth” under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that
the lands remain the property of the public dominion,
albeit their status is now alienable and disposable​. The
Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a
private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law
that they become private property and cease to be
property of the public dominion: For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified
as alienable or disposable, it remains the property of the
public dominion when it is “intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.”
● While property of the State or any of its subdivisions patrimonial
in character may be the object of prescription, ​those “intended for
some public service or for the development of the national
wealth” are considered property of public dominion and
therefore not susceptible to acquisition by prescription. ​(Article
420, par. 2 of the Civil Code)
○ The property sought to be registered must not only be
classified as alienable and disposable, it must also be
expressly declared by the State that it is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the
national wealth, or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. ​Absent such an express declaration by
 the State, the land remains to be property of public
dominion.
● Dream Village has been unable to dispute BCDA’s claim that Lots
10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are the abandoned
right-of-way of C-5 Road, which is within the vast titled territory
of Fort Bonifacio. ​We have already established that these lots
have not been declared alienable and disposable under
Proclamation Nos. 2476 or 172. Moreover, it is a settled rule
that lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

 71. GENEROSA MENDOZA v. CA
July 14, 1978 | J. Santos | Sec. 22 Dealings with Land Pending
Registration
F. QUIJANO & N. SABBAN
PETITIONER: ​Generosa Mendoza, substituted by his wife and
administratrix Diega De Leon Vda. De Mendoza
RESPONDENT: ​Hon. Court of Appeals, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores
Mendoza
RECIT-READY: ​Generoso Mendoza, filed for an application for the
registration of two parcels of land. It was proven that he and his wife,
Diega de Leon, were the owners of the parcels of land subject of the
application but the same were sold by them, during the pendency of the
case, to the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, subject to
the vendors' usufructuary rights. After the decision had become final,
Generoso Mendoza, filed a motion for the issuance of the decree. Decree
No. 114454 was issued confirming the title to the land of vendees Daniel
Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, and ordering the registration of the
same in their names. Generoso Mendoza filed an urgent petition for
reconsideration praying that the decision and the decree issued pursuant
thereto be set aside and that Original Certificate of Title No. 03787 be
cancelled, on the ground that the vendees, the registered owners, had
failed to pay the purchase price of the lands.
ISSUE:
● W/N the registration court could legally order the registration of
the land in the names of the vendees-respondents, who were
neither the applicants nor the oppositors in the registration case
below - ​YES
RULING: ​Petitioner overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act
which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a
registration proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person to
whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed during the
interval of time between the filing of the application for registration and
the issuance of the decree of title.
DOCTRINE: T​he law expressly allows the land subject matter of an
application for registration to be "dealt with", i.e., to be disposed of or
encumbered during the interval of time between the filing of the
application and the issuance of the decree of title, and to have the
instruments embodying such disposition or encumbrance presented to the
registration court by the “interested party" for the court to either "order
such land registered subject to the encumbrance created by said
instruments, ​or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the
buyer or of the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said
instruments.​
FACTS:
● Generoso Mendoza, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan an application for the registration of two parcels of land,
with a residential house thereon, situated in the Poblacion of Sta.
Maria Bulacan.
● From the evidence presented by Generoso Mendoza, it was proven
that he and his wife, Diega de Leon, were the owners of the parcels
of land subject of the application but the same were sold by them,
during the pendency of the case, to the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz
and Dolores Mendoza, subject to the vendors' usufructuary rights.
The instrument embodying such sale was presented as Exhibit 1.
On the basis of such evidence, the registration court rendered a
decision on July 21, 1965, ordering the registration of the two
parcels of land in the names of the vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and
Dolores Mendoza, subject to the usufructuary rights of the
vendors, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon.
● After the decision had become final, Generoso Mendoza, filed a
motion for the issuance of the decree. On May 16, 1967, Decree
No. 114454 was issued confirming the title to the land of vendees
Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, and ordering the
registration of the same in their names, subject to the usufructuary
rights of the vendors. Consequently, Original Certificate of Title
 No. 0-3787 was issued to spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores
Mendoza.
● Generoso Mendoza filed an urgent petition for reconsideration
praying that the decision dated July 21, 1965 and the decree issued
pursuant thereto dated May 16, 1967 be set aside and that Original
Certificate of Title No. 03787 be cancelled, on the ground that the
vendees, the registered owners, had failed to pay the purchase price
of the lands.
ISSUES:
● W/N the registration court could legally order the registration of
the land in the names of the vendees-respondents, who were
neither the applicants nor the oppositors in the registration case
below - ​YES
RATIO:
● Petitioner overlooks Section 29 of the Land Registration Act which
expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a
registration proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person to
whom the land has been conveyed by an instrument executed
during the interval of time between the filing of the application for
registration and the issuance of the decree of title
● It is clear from the provision that the law expressly allows the land
subject matter of an application for registration to be "dealt with",
i.e., to be disposed of or encumbered during the interval of time
between the filing of the application and the issuance of the decree
of title, and to have the instruments embodying such disposition or
encumbrance presented to the registration court by the ,interested
party" for the court to either "order such land registered subject to
the encumbrance created by said instruments, ​or order the decree
of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of the person to
whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments.​ The
law does not require that the application for registration be
amended by substituting the "buyer" or the person to whom the
property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it
require that the "buyer" or the "person to whom the property has
been conveyed" be a party to the case. He may thus be a total
stranger to the land registration proceedings. The only
requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented to
the court by the interested party together with a motion that the
same be considered in relation with the application; and (2) that
prior notice be given to the parties to the case.
● T​he instrument embodying the sale of the subject property by the
petitioner to the private respondents was duly presented to the
registration court for consideration. That the purpose was to have
the land registered in the names of private respondents subject to
the usufructuary rights of petitioner and his wife is explicit in the
following facts and circumstances. Firstly, it was the petitioner
himself, the applicant in the registration proceedings, who
presented the deed of sale (Exh. I) to the court and testified before
the same that he did sell the land to the private respondents. This
was done by him despite the fact that he could easily have the land
registered in his name — as an order of general default had been
issued and the hearing on the application for registration had been
conducted EX-PARTE. Secondly, as if to fully convince the court
of the fact of sale, petitioner presented his wife, Diega de Leon,
and private respondent, Daniel GolE Cruz, to confirm the said sale
of the land and the stipulated usufructuary rights. Finally, the
petitioner even filed the motion for the issuance of the decree of
confirmation of title after having received the decision of the court
ordering the registration of the title to the land in the names of
vendees-respondents, subject to the stipulated usufructuary rights
— thereby signifying his full assent to the same.
WHEREFORE ​the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 17,
1973 is hereby affirmed with costs against petitioner.
 72. Director of Lands v. CA and Abistado
July 28, 1997 | J. Panganiban | Notice of Initial Hearing
N. SABBAN & J. SALAMAT
PETITIONER: ​Director of Lands
RESPONDENT: ​Court of Appeals and Teodoro Abistado, substituted
by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold, and Mary Ann Abistado
RECIT-READY:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for registration of title over a parcel of
land. During the pendency of the petition, Abistado died, hence, he is
now represented by his heirs. The RTC dismissed the petition and ruled
that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 of PD
1529, ​requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines​. In this case, notice
was only published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: ​Whether newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in
an original land registration case mandatory? ​(YES)
FACTS:
RULING:
Land registration is a proceeding ​in rem,​ which is validated
essentially through publication​. The ​process must strictly be
complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose
rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an
application which they had no knowledge of.
Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published
therein may not reach the interested parties on time. In sum, the
all-encompassing ​in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.
There was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Thus, the application for land registration
filed by the Abistados must be dismissed without prejudice to
reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been
duly complied with.
DOCTRINE:
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,
the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of the initial
hearing to be published ​once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines​.
Notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in
the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known. It shall
also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and
time.
● In December 1986, Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
registration of his title over 648 sqm of land under PD 1529.
During the pendency of the petition, Abistado died. Hence, his
heirs were substituted as applicants.
● The land registration court dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
● RTC: Dismissed the petition. Ruled that applicants failed to
comply with the provisions of Section 23 of PD 1529, ​requiring the
Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines​. Notice was only published
in the Official Gazette.
● CA: Set aside the decision of RTC and ordered the registration of
the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
Petitioner’s Contention​: Under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial
hearing shall be published ​both in the Official Gazette ​and in a newspaper
of general circulation.
Respondent’s Contention: Failure to comply with the requirement of
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural
defect; publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient.
ISSUE: ​Whether newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in
an original land registration case mandatory? ​(YES)
RULING:
● Newspaper Publication Mandatory
○ The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing reads as follows:
■ Sec. 23. ​Notice of initial hearing, publication,
etc. -- The court shall, within five days from
filing of the application, issue an order setting
the date and hour of the initial hearing which
shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later
than ninety days from the date of the order.
■ The public shall be given notice of initial hearing
of the application for land registration by means
of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
● Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a
notice of the initial hearing to be published ​once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines​.
● Notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far
as known. It shall also require all persons concerned to appear in
court at a certain date and time.
● Publication in the Official Gazette is enough merely to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question
boils down to ​whether, absent any publication in a newspaper
of general circulation, the land registration court can validly
confirm and register the title of private respondents​.
● In ​Republic vs. Marasigan, ​the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of
the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3)
posting, all of which must be complied with.
● Land registration is a proceeding ​in rem;​ such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against ​all persons,
including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property.
● An ​in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication​. The ​process must strictly be complied with.
Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be
adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application
which they had no knowledge of.
● Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers
and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at
all. In sum, the all-encompassing ​in rem nature of land registration
cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole
world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
● There was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by the Abistados must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is ​GRANTED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution are ​REVERSED ​and ​SET ASIDE​. The application of
private respondent for land registration is ​DISMISSED w ​ ithout
prejudice. No costs.
73. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v MANNA PROPERTIES,
INC. (​SUPRA BUT EDITED​)
January 31, 2005 | CARPIO, J | PD 1529 Notice of Initial Hearing
H SANCHEZ
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the PH
RESPONDENT: ​Manna Properties Inc, Represented by its President
Jose Tanyao
RECIT-READY: ​Manna wants to register titles over 2 parcels of land.
But, the OSG, representing the Republic, said the applicant is a private
corporation disqualified under the new Philippine Constitution to hold
alienable lands of public domain. They’re also saying Manna failed to
comply with PD 1529’s initial hearing rule for original registrations since
the initial hearing date of the application kept being delayed (From feb
16, 1995 to july 18 1995)
ISSUE:
● W/N Manna Properties Failed to Comply with the Jurisdictional
Requirements for Original Registration due to non-compliance
with PD 1529’s notice of initial hearing rule? - NO
RULING: ​The delays in the initial hearing was not the fault of Manna.
Sec 23 of PD 1529 is complied with since the records show, the notice of
hearing was published both in the Official Gazette and a newspaper of
general circulation well ahead of the date of hearing. This complies with
the legal requirement of serving the entire world with sufficient notice of
the registration proceedings.
DOCTRINE: ​A party to an action has no control over the Administrator
or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has no right to meddle
unduly with the business of such official in the performance of his duties.
IF the 90-day notice is not followed without fault of the applicant, it can’t
be taken against him.
FACTS:
● Manna Properties filed an Application for the registration of title of
two (2) parcels of land
● Initial hearing was set on February 16, 1995
● But, the full names and complete postal addresses of all adjoining
lot owners were not stated for notification purposes so they were
required to be submitted first and the initial hearing was reset to
April 13, 1995.
● The Land Registration Authority requested for the resetting of the
initial hearing since April 13, 1995 fell on Holy Thursday, a
non-working day. So, it was reset to April 20, 1995
● the court a quo received a letter dated March 6, 1995 from the
LRA with the information that the notice can no longer be
published in the Official Gazette for lack of material time since the
National Printing Office required submission of the printing
materials 75 days before the date of the hearing. It was again
requested that the initial hearing be moved to a date. So it was
moved to March 15, 1995
● Per Certificate of Publication issued by the LRA and the National
Printing Office, the Notice of Initial Hearing was published in the
June 12, 1995 issue of the Official Gazette officially released on
June 19, 1995. The same notice was published in the July 12, 1995
issue of the The Ilocos Herald.
● But the trial court set the hearing date itself on 18 July 1995.
ISSUES:
● W/N Manna Properties Failed to Comply with the Jurisdictional
Requirements for Original Registration due to non-compliance
with PD 1529’s notice of initial hearing rule? - NO
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
Petitioner is contending:
 ○ That PD 1529 sets a 90-day maximum period between the
court order setting the initial hearing date and the hearing
itself.
○ Petitioner points out that in this case, the trial court issued
the order setting the date of the initial hearing on 15
March 1995, but the trial court set the hearing date
itself on 18 July 1995​. Considering that there are 125
days in between the two dates, petitioner argues that the
trial court exceeded the 90-day period set by PD 1529.
Thus, petitioner concludes "the applicant [Manna
Properties] failed to comply with the jurisdictional
requirements for original registration."
RATIO:
● PD 1529 Sec. 23. ​Notice of initial hearing, publication etc. - The
court shall, within five days from filing of the application, issue an
order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not
be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the
date of the order.
● The duty and the power to set the hearing date lies with the land
registration court.
● After an applicant has filed his application, the law requires the
issuance of a court order setting the initial hearing date. The notice
of initial hearing is a court document.
● The notice of initial hearing is signed by the judge and copy of the
notice is mailed by the clerk of court to the LRA. This involves a
process to which the party applicant absolutely has no
participation.
● Manna Properties was not at fault why the hearing date was set
beyond the 90-day maximum period.
● The Docket Division of the LRA repeatedly requested the trial
court to reset the initial hearing date because of printing problems
with the National Printing Office, which could affect the timely
publication of the notice of hearing in the Official Gazette. Indeed,
nothing in the records indicates that Manna Properties failed to
perform the acts required of it by law.
● We have held that "a party to an action has no control over the
Administrator or the Clerk of Court acting as a land court; he has
no right to meddle unduly with the business of such official in the
performance of his duties."
● It is unfair to punish an applicant for an act or omission over which
the applicant has neither responsibility nor control, especially if the
applicant has complied with all the requirements of the law.
● Sec 23 of PD 1529 is complied with since the records show, the
notice of hearing was published both in the Official Gazette and a
newspaper of general circulation well ahead of the date of hearing.
● This complies with the legal requirement of serving the entire
world with sufficient notice of the registration proceedings.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the instant petition. We REVERSE the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2000 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 52562. The Application for Registration filed by Manna
Properties, Inc. over Lots No. 9515 and 1006 of Cad. 539-D, with a total
area of One Thousand Four Hundred Eighty (1,480) square meters
situated in Barangay Pagdaraoan, San Fernando, La Union, is
DENIED.
74.
75.
 76. Director of Lands v. CA and Abistado
July 28, 1997 | J. Panganiban | SEC. 23 - Notice of Initial Hearing
N. SABBAN & J. SALAMAT
PETITIONER: ​Director of Lands
RESPONDENT: ​Court of Appeals and Teodoro Abistado, substituted
by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold, and Mary Ann Abistado
RECIT-READY:
Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for registration of title over a parcel of
land. During the pendency of the petition, Abistado died, hence, he is
now represented by his heirs. The RTC dismissed the petition and ruled
that applicants failed to comply with the provisions of Section 23 of PD
1529, ​requiring the Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines​. In this case, notice
was only published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: ​Whether newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in
an original land registration case mandatory? ​(YES)
FACTS:
RULING:
Land registration is a proceeding ​in rem,​ which is validated
essentially through publication​. The ​process must strictly be
complied with. Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose
rights may be adversely affected would be barred from contesting an
application which they had no knowledge of.
Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is
oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published
therein may not reach the interested parties on time. In sum, the
all-encompassing ​in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.
There was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Thus, the application for land registration
filed by the Abistados must be dismissed without prejudice to
reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been
duly complied with.
DOCTRINE:
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,
the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of the initial
hearing to be published ​once in the Official Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines​.
Notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in
the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known. It shall
also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and
time.
● In December 1986, Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for
registration of his title over 648 sqm of land under PD 1529.
During the pendency of the petition, Abistado died. Hence, his
heirs were substituted as applicants.
● The land registration court dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction. However, it found that the applicants through their
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive
and peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.
● RTC: Dismissed the petition. Ruled that applicants failed to
comply with the provisions of Section 23 of PD 1529, ​requiring the
Applicants to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines​. Notice was only published
in the Official Gazette.
● CA: Set aside the decision of RTC and ordered the registration of
the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.
Petitioner’s Contention​: Under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial
hearing shall be published ​both in the Official Gazette ​and in a newspaper
of general circulation.
Respondent’s Contention: Failure to comply with the requirement of
publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere procedural
defect; publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient.
ISSUE: ​Whether newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in
an original land registration case mandatory? ​(YES)
RULING:
● Newspaper Publication Mandatory
○ The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree
No. 1529 requiring publication of the notice of initial
hearing reads as follows:
■ Sec. 23. ​Notice of initial hearing, publication,
etc. -- The court shall, within five days from
filing of the application, issue an order setting
the date and hour of the initial hearing which
shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later
than ninety days from the date of the order.
■ The public shall be given notice of initial hearing
of the application for land registration by means
of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
● Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial
hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a
notice of the initial hearing to be published ​once in the Official
Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines​.
● Notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an
interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far
as known. It shall also require all persons concerned to appear in
court at a certain date and time.
● Publication in the Official Gazette is enough merely to confer
jurisdiction upon the land registration court. However, the question
boils down to ​whether, absent any publication in a newspaper
of general circulation, the land registration court can validly
confirm and register the title of private respondents​.
● In ​Republic vs. Marasigan, ​the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. held that Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of
the initial hearing by means of (1) publication, (2) mailing and (3)
posting, all of which must be complied with.
● Land registration is a proceeding ​in rem;​ such proceeding
requires constructive seizure of the land as against ​all persons,
including the state, who have rights to or interests in the
property.
● An ​in rem proceeding is validated essentially through
publication​. The ​process must strictly be complied with.
Otherwise, persons who may be interested or whose rights may be
adversely affected would be barred from contesting an application
which they had no knowledge of.
● Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers
and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at
all. In sum, the all-encompassing ​in rem nature of land registration
cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole
world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the
requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
● There was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law. Thus, the application for land
registration filed by the Abistados must be dismissed without
prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with.
WHEREFORE, the petition is ​GRANTED and the assailed Decision
and Resolution are ​REVERSED ​and ​SET ASIDE​. The application of
private respondent for land registration is ​DISMISSED w ​ ithout
prejudice. No costs.
 1. PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. IMPERIAL
March 31, 1926 | Street, J. | Notice of Hearing
SALAMAT, J.
PETITIONER: ​Philippine Manufacturing Company
RESPONDENT: ​Honoroable Judge Carlos Imperial
RECIT-READY: ​Philippine Manufacturing Company holds Torrens
Certificates to lots Nos. 31, 32, & 35. Bec of a mistake in the Cadastral
Plan, there were some lands not really adjudicated to PH Manufacturing
that was included in Lot No. 35. The lands mistakenly included is a strip
of land - about 3 hectares - that was formed through accretion from the
west side of the sea. Meanwhile, Cabangis heirs filed a petition for
cadastral proceeding where they asserted ownership over the strip of
land. They asserted that the strip was not included in the cadastral plan
and requested that it be included in the plan that way it would be
adjudicated to them. The Bureau of Lands amended the plan and added
the questioned land and indicated it as Lot 40. This survey was made
without previous notice to PH Manufacturing and without publishing the
survey in the Official Gazette. Pursuant to the amended Cadastral Plan,
Respondent judge adjudicated Lot No. 40 to the Cabangis Heirs.
ISSUE:
● Whether the trial court’s decision was valid - NO
RULING: ​Respondent judge had no jurisdiction whatever over lot No.
40 in the cadastral case now pending before him and the adjudication of
said lot to the Cabangis heirs by the decision of July 16, 1925, is a mere
nullity. No publication has ever been made except the initial publication,
and this did not include lot No. 40. Publication of course is one of the
essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in land registration and
cadastral cases, and the attempt that was here made to incorporate lot No.
40 into the cadastral was futile. Before a cadastral survey can be
amended so as to include land in which no publication has been made,
new publication is necessary,—a step essential to the protection of
persons interested in the property which is intended to be included
DOCTRINE: ​An order of court in a cadastral case amending the ofcial
plan so as to make it include land not previously included therein is a
nullity unless new publication is made as a preliminary to such step.
Publication is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court in
land registration and cadastral cases, and additional territory cannot be
included by amendment of the plan without new publication
FACTS:
● The Director of Lands, on behalf of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, instituted a cadastral proceeding in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for the purpose of procuring an
adjudication of the titles to certain lands in the Tondo District of
Manila. Among the prop-erties covered by the preliminary survey
in this cadastral "were the lots bearing the numbers 7, 8, 9, 31, 32,
35, and 36, all located on a small peninsula in the Tondo District
between Estero Vitas and the Manila Bay.
● The Philippine Manufacturing Company, by virtue of a registration
effected many years ago, holds Torrens certicates of title to lots
Nos. 31, 32, and 35. By what appears to have been a mistake in the
cadastral plan lot No. 35 was made to include some land not really
adjudicated to said company in the former registration proceeding.
The peninsula referred to appears to be gaining land on its west
side from the sea, and this process, even since the date of the
survey upon which the cadastral plan was based, has resulted in the
making of a new strip on the west side of said peninsula containing
an area of about three hectares. This strip is immediately
contiguous to lots Nos. 7, 8, 9, 36, and 35, as the latter was
originally laid down in the cadastral plan. As the Philippine
Manufacturing Company claims the whole of lot No. 35 it results
that the new strip is contiguous to land claimed by said company in
the cadastral proceeding
● Publication was duly made as required by law with respect to all
land included in the plan, but of course the new strip was not
included therein as it has been made since the survey. The court
 entered a partial decision declaring that lots Nos. 31, 32, and 35
had already been decreed in case No. 8425 and that these lots
appeared in the cadastral plan in the name of the Philippine
Manufacturing Company.
● The attorneys for the Cabangis respondents, who will hereafter be
referred to as the Cabangis heirs, led a petition in the cadastral
proceeding in which they asserted ownership to the strip of newly
made land lying on the shore of the Manila Bay contiguous to and
west of some of the lots already specied. They informed the court
that said land had not been included in the cadastral plan and
requested that the cadastral plan be amended to the end that it
might be adjudicated to them
● The Bureau of Lands amended its plan and added to it the
questioned lot, indicated as lot No. 40. The actual survey of this lot
had been made at the instance of the Cabangis heirs, and without
any previous notice of the survey to the Philippine Manufacturing
Company. No notice of the aforementioned survey or of the
inclusion of lot No. 40 in the cadastral plan was published in the
Ofcial Gazette. Subsequent to the amendment of the cadastral
plan in the manner above stated the respondent judge, on July 16,
1925, adjudicated and decreed lot No. 40 to the Cabangis heirs
● More than 30 days later, the atty for Philippine Manufacturing
Company for the rst time learned of the adjudication of this lot to
the Cabangis heirs. As the time for an appeal had passed and the
court had lost jurisdiction to change the decree, the present petition
was led for relief in this court
● The claim of the Philippine Manufacturing Company to lot No. 40
appears to be based, rst, upon an assertion of private ownership in
itself by accretion or reclamation; and, secondly, upon rights
acquired by it under a lease granted by the Government. In behalf
of the Government it is insisted that the land in question is
foreshore land
●
ISSUES:
● Whether the trial court’s decision was valid - NO
RATIO:
● Respondent judge had no jurisdiction whatever over lot No. 40 in
the cadastral case now pending before him and the adjudication of
said lot to the Cabangis heirs by the decision of July 16, 1925, is a
mere nullity. No publication has ever been made except the initial
publication, and this did not include lot No. 40. Publication of
course is one of the essential bases of the jurisdiction of the court
in land registration and cadastral cases, and the attempt that was
here made to incorporate lot No. 40 into the cadastral was futile.
Before a cadastral survey can be amended so as to include land in
which no publication has been made, new publication is
necessary,—a step essential to the protection of persons interested
in the property which is intended to be included. Even if the order
amending the cadastral plan had not been wholly void, the facts
above revealed would justify the granting of a new trial by this
court under section 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However,
bec of lack of publication, the order of July 16, 1925 is void, and a
new trial is not necessary
● The petition is therefore granted, the order of July 16, 1925, is set
aside, and the registration of lot No, 40 in the name of the
Cabangis heirs is abrogated. The owner's duplicate certicate,
attached as Exhibit 6 (c) to this pro ceeding, shall be surrendered to
the register of deeds of Manila for ling and the word "cancelled"
stamped upon it as well as upon the original certicate in the ofce
of the register. The nal decree by virtue of which the certicate of
title was issued shall be marked "revoked," both in the General
Land Registration Ofce and in the ofce of the register of deeds.
The costs of this proceeding will be paid by the Cabangis heirs
 78. AMELITA DOLFO v. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE
PROVINCE OF CAVITE, ET. AL.
September 25, 2000 | J. Mendoza | Section 26 - Order of
General Default
B. SALAZAR &
PETITIONER: ​AMELITA DOLFO
RESPONDENT: ​THE REGISTER OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE
OF CAVITE, TRECE MARTIRES CITY, THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, CESAR E.
CASAL, RUSTICO A. CASAL, ERNESTO A. CASAL, RODOLFO A.
CASAL, ALFREDO A. CASAL, JR., EMMANUEL A. B. CASAL,
RAFAEL S. CASAL, JR., C. JOSEFINA S. CASAL, CELEDONIA S.
CASAL, WILHELMINA S. CASAL, MELANIO MEDINA,
ADELAIDA MEDINA, AURORA MEDINA, C.P.G. AGRICOM
CORPORATION and HEIRS OF DAMIAN ERMITANIO and
CELEDONIA MARTINEZ
RECIT-READY: ​Amelita Dolfo and Yangtze Properties Inc. filed a
motion to intervene in 3 LRC cases pending before the RTC Branch 19
of Bacoor, Cavite. One case is for Reconstitution of Original Certificate
of Title and the other two are for Registration of Title. Dolfo alleged that
she is the registered owner of the real property that is the subject of said
FACTS:
LRC cases as shown by a TCT issued in her name by the Register of
Deeds of Trece Martires City. Yangtze​(kaya siya involved)h​ ad earlier
entered into a Contract to Sell with Dolfo over said propery.
Trial court denied their motion to intervene because there has already
been an order of general default entered by the court against those who
failed to oppose the application. Court also gave greater weight to the
report of the LRA that petitioner's certificate of title was issued without
any legal basis and the report of the NBI that the signature of Antonia
Cabuco, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite signatory on the
certificate, was a forgery.
ISSUE: [Syllabus issue] ​W/N the CA erred in holding that the proper
remedy in a land registration case is an opposition to the application of
the applicants, and not a motion to intervene in the proceedings – NO.
RULING: T​he provisions of §§ 14 and 25 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) show that the applicant and the oppositor are the
only parties in cases of original applications for land registration, unlike
in ordinary civil actions where parties may include the plaintiff, the
defendant, third party complainants, cross-claimants, and intervenors. ​A
motion to intervene in a land registration case cannot be allowed. A party
wishing to be heard should ask for the lifting of the order of general
default, and then if lifted, file an opposition to the application for
registration. ​This is so because proceedings in land registration are ​in
rema​ nd ​not in personam​, the sole object being the registration applied
for, not the determination of any right connected with the registration.
DOCTRINE: A motion to intervene in a land registration case
cannot be allowed. A party wishing to be heard should ask for the
lifting of the order of general default, and then if lifted, file an
opposition to the application for registration. This is so because
proceedings in land registration are ​in rema​ nd ​not in personam​, the
sole object being the registration applied for, not the determination
of any right connected with the registration.
● On March 5, 1996, petitioner Dolfo and Yangtze Properties, Inc.
(Yangtze) filed a motion for leave to file and/or admit
complaint-in-intervention in 3 LRC Cases pending before the
RTC, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite.
○ The first case is for ​reconstitution of Original
Certificate of Title​No. 362 purportedly covering the
subject real property, while the last two were cases for
registration of title​.
● Petitioner alleged that she is the registered owner of the real
property subject of the said LRC Cases as shown by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-320601 issued in her name by the
Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City.
● Yangtze, petitioner's co-movant, had earlier entered into a Contract
to Sell with Dolfo over the said property.
● Trial Court denied the motion saying
 ○ it is a procedural error to file a complaint for intervention
in cases involving original application for land
registration, the proceedings therein being ​in rem
○ ​There has already been an order of general default
entered by the court against those who failed to oppose
the application.
● Dolfo and Yangtze filed a motion for reconsideration. The trial
court denied the same. Court gave greater weight to the report of
the Land Registration Authority (LRA) that petitioner's certificate
of title was issued without any legal basis and the report of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that the signature of
Antonia Cabuco, the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cavite
signatory on the certificate, was a forgery.
● Atty. Artemio Caña, in his capacity as Acting Register of Deeds of
the Province of Cavite, filed a complaint for the annulment of
petitioner's certificate of title before the RTC, Branch 89, Bacoor,
Cavite. The matter remains pending in that court.
● RTC, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite rendered a joint decision
recognizing and confirming the rights of private respondents over
the litigated property and ordered the issuance of a Decree of
Registration in their favor.
● Dolfo filed before the CA a petition to annul and set aside the
above orders of the RTC. CA denied the petition.
ISSUES/ RATIO:
W/N the CA erred in holding that the proper remedy in a land
registration case is an opposition to the application of the applicants,
and not a motion to intervene in the proceedings – NO.
● The provisions of §§ 14 and 25 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property
Registration Decree) show that the applicant and the oppositor are
the only parties in cases of original applications for land
registration, unlike in ordinary civil actions where parties may
include the plaintiff, the defendant, third party complainants,
cross-claimants, and intervenors.
● A motion to intervene in a land registration case cannot be
allowed. A party wishing to be heard should ask for the lifting of
the order of general default, and then if lifted, file an opposition to
the application for registration. This is so because proceedings in
land registration are ​in rem​and ​not in personam,​ the sole object
being the registration applied for, not the determination of any
right connected with the registration.
W/N the CA erred in not upholding Dolfo’s title – NO.
● The rule that a title issued under the Torrens System is presumed
valid and, hence, is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land
does not apply where the certificate itself is faulty as to its
purported origin.
● Petitioner anchors her arguments on the premise that her title to the
subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption that her
certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is
overcome by the evidence presented, consisting of the LRA report
that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis and the NBI
report that the signature of Antonia Cabuco was a forgery.
● Although petitioner submitted documents purporting to show the
genuineness of Antonia Cabuco's signature, she has not refuted the
findings contained in the LRA report that her certificate of title has
no legal basis.
o ​there is no document on file in the registry vault to
support the issuance of TCT No. T-320601 in favor
of Amelita Dolfo.
● Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate
of title. It bears emphasis that the Torrens system does not create
or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and
vested.
W/N petitioner is allowed to intervene – NO.
● To allow petitioner to intervene in the LRC cases would not avoid
multiplicity of suits in view of the case for annulment and
cancellation of TCT No. T- 320601 now pending before the RTC
Branch 89, Bacoor, Cavite.
● It is premature for petitioner to intervene in the LRC cases because
her certificate of title, supposedly her best proof of ownership over
the property described therein, is questionable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision and the
resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
 79. REPUBLIC v ESTONILO FACTS:
November 25, 2005 | J. Panganiban | Sec. 26 - Order Of General ● This case originated from an application for registration of a parcel
Default of land in Cagayan de Oro, filed by Nazaria Bombeo
H. Sanchez ● Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously owned
and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it was
sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the Philippines
attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an
RESPONDENT: ​Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo & Andrea Actub Tiu Po
Absolute Sale of Realty
(in Substitution Of Nazaria Bombeo)
● After due notice and publication of said application, the Provincial
Fiscal of Misamis Oriental (in behalf of of the Chief of Staff of the
RECIT-READY: ​Bombeo wanted to register her land but the Republic
AFP & Director of Bureau of Lands) opposed to this alleging the
opposed, saying the land is not registrable as it’s been segregated for use
land is not registrable pursuant to PD 265
of the Philippine Army by virtue or PD 265. The lower court & CA ruled
● PD 265 declared the lease-sale of the land to the Phil. Army
that PD 265 wasn’t self-executing since a judicial order is needed for it to
● During the initial hearing set on February 12, 1955, an Order of
take effect.
General Default was issued by the lower court.
● The trial court confirmed title over the land to Nazaria Bombeo
ISSUE:
(substituted by her heirs Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea
● W/N PD 265 needs judicial order for it to be executed because it
Actub Tiu Po) and ordered its registration under the names of the
is non self executing? NO
latter.
● W/N Estonillo has the required period of possession under the
● Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of Armed Forces of
Public Land Act? - NO
the Philippines, thru OSG, appealed
● CA ruled that PD 265 failed to segregate effectively Lot 4318 as
RULING: ​The Public Land Act does not require a judicial order to
part of the military reservation. It also said the proclamation was
create a military reservation Under Sec 83, 86, 87, 53 of the law, only a
'not self-executory and self-adjudicating considering that there is a
positive act of the President is needed to segregate a piece of land for a
need to determine private rights of claimants over lands sought to
public purpose. While Section 53 grants authority to the director of lands
be reserved.
to file a petition against claimants of the reserved land, the filing of that
petition is not mandatory. The director of lands is required to file a
ISSUES:
petition only 'whenever in the opinion of the President public interest
● W/N PD 265 needs judicial order for it to be executed because it is
requires it. And since PD 265 is self-executing, the respondents could not
non self executing? NO
have validly possessed it after its issuance. Also, the evidence they
● W/N Estonillo has the required period of possession under the
presented were insufficient to prove possession anyway.
Public Land Act? - NO

RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):

DOCTRINE: ​To segregate portions of the public domain as reservations
● Respondent: Estonillo alleges that their predecessors-in-interest
for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or any of its branches, like
were already in adverse, open, peaceful and continuous possession
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, all that is needed is a presidential
of the property for over 30 years prior to 1938. Thus, they
proclamation to that effect. A court judgment is not necessary to make
conclude that their imperfect title had already attached long before
the proclamation effective or valid.
 the issuance of the Proclamation segregating the land as a military
reservation.
RATIO:
W/N PD 265 needs judicial order for it to be executed because it is non
self executing? NO
● The Public Land Act requires applicants for confirmation of
imperfect titles to prove
○ (1) that the land is alienable public land; and
○ (2) that their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property has taken place
either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed
by law.
● If these are complied with, the possessor of the land -- by operation
of law -- acquires a right to a government grant, without
necessitating the issuance of a certificate of title.
● The Public Land Act does not require a judicial order to create a
military reservation
● Under Sec 83, 86, 87, 53 of the law, only a positive act of the
President is needed to segregate a piece of land for a public
purpose.
● While Section 53 grants authority to the director of lands --
through the solicitor general -- to file a petition against claimants
of the reserved land, the filing of that petition is not mandatory.
The director of lands is required to file a petition only 'whenever in
the opinion of the President public interest requires it.
● Consequently, respondents could not have validly occupied it in
1954, because it was considered inalienable since its reservation in
1938.
declarations were issued under the names of respondents'
predecessors-in-interest, the earliest one presented was issued only
in 1954.
● Evidence on record merely established the transfer of the property
from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo. The evidence did not
show the nature and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto
and Rosendo Bacas.
● Applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles must
present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claims; they
cannot simply offer general statements that are mere conclusions
of law rather than factual evidence of possession.
● Also, a person is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered
under the Torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose
his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must show,
even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED , and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The
segregation of Lot 4318 as part of a military reservation is declared
VALID. No pronouncement as to costs.

W/N Estonillo has the required period of possession under the Public
Land Act? - NO
● Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belongs to the State as part of the public
domain.
● In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect
title, the trial and the appellate courts gave much weight to the tax
declarations presented by the former. However, while the tax
 80. HEIRS OF ROXAS v. CA
March 21, 1997 | G.R. No. 118436 | Romero | Notice of Initial Hearing
SEGOVIA | SERRANO
PETITIONER: ​Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas and Trinidad de Leon Vda.
De Roxas (in substitution of original petitioner)
RESPONDENT: ​Court of Appeals and Maguesun Management &
Development Corporation
RECIT-READY: ​Maguesun Corporation filed an application for
registration of two parcels of unregistered land located in Tagaytay City.
In support of its application for registration, Maguesun Corporation
presented a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Zenaida Melliza as
vendor. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from the original
petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas two and a half months
earlier, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale. Notices of the initial hearing
were sent by the Land Registration Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil
and Leon Luna as indicated on Maguesun Corporation's application for
registration. Since Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an
adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of the proceedings.
Publication was made in the O fficial Gazette and the Record
Newsweekly. After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court
proceeded to hear the land registration case. Eventually, the RTC granted
Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. It was only when
the caretaker of the property was being asked to vacate the land that
petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas learned of its sale and the
registration of the lots in Maguesun Corporation's name. Hence,
FACTS:
petitioner filed a petition for review before the RTC to set aside the
decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun Corporation
committed actual fraud. The CA ruled in favor of Maguesun Corporation
that there was no fruad; and that publication of the initial hearing in the
O fficial Gazette is su fficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
ISSUE:
● W/N the CA erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not
commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the
registration decree - ​YES
RULING:
Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the O fficial
Gazette and in the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a newspaper of
general circulation. Pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, publication in the O fficial Gazette is su fficient to confer
jurisdiction.
While publication of the notice in the O fficial Gazette is su fficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement. Couched in
mandatory terms, it is a component of procedural due process and aimed
at giving "as wide publicity as possible" so that all persons having an
adverse-interest in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be
noti fied thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the
fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of general circulation
is material and relevant in assessing the applicant's right or title to the
land.
DOCTRINE:
While publication of the notice in the O fficial Gazette is su fficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a newspaper of general
circulation remains an indispensable procedural requirement. Although
jurisdiction of the court is not affected, the fact that publication was not
made in a newspaper of general circulation is material and relevant in
assessing the applicant's right or title to the land.
● Maguesun Management and Development Corporation (Maguesun
Corporation) filed an application for registration of two parcels of
unregistered land located in Brgy. Sungay, Tagaytay City.
● In support of its application for registration, Maguesun
Corporation presented a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Zenaida Melliza as vendor and indicating the purchase price to be
P170,000.00. Zenaida Melliza in turn, bought the property from
the original petitioner herein, Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas for
P200,000.00 two and a half months earlier, as evidenced by a Deed
of Sale.
● Notices of the initial hearing were sent by the Land Registration
Authority to Hilario Luna, Jose Gil and Leon Luna on the basis of
Maguesun Corporation's application for registration. Since
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas was not named as an adjoining
owner, occupant or adverse claimant, she was not sent a notice of
the proceedings.
● Publication was made in the O fficial Gazette and the Record
Newsweekly.
● After an Order of general default was issued, the trial court
proceeded to hear the land registration case. Eventually, on
February 13, 1991 the Regional Trial Court granted Maguesun
Corporation's application for registration.
● It was only when the caretaker of the property was being asked to
vacate the land that petitioner Trinidad de Leon Vda. de Roxas
learned of its sale and the registration of the lots in Maguesun
Corporation's name.
● Hence, petitioner filed a petition for review before the RTC to set
aside the decree of registration on the ground that Maguesun
Corporation committed actual fraud. She alleged that the lots were
among the properties she inherited from her husband, former
President Manuel A. Roxas, who died on April 15, 1946 and that
her family had been in open, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
possession of the subject property in the concept of owner for more
than thirty years before they applied for its registration under the
Torrens System of land titling. Petitioner further denied that she
sold the lots to Zenaida Melliza whom she had never met before
and that her signature was forged in both the Deed of Sale and the
A davit of Self-Adjudication. In support of her claims, she also
listed a number of irregularities in the documents to prove actual
fraud. In addition, and perhaps more signi cantly, she claimed that
Maguesun Corporation intentionally omitted her name as an
adverse claimant, occupant or adjoining owner in the application
for registration submitted to the Land Registration Authority such
that the latter could not send her a Notice of Initial Hearing. As
result, an order of general default was issued and Maguesun
Corporation's application for registration was granted.
● She charged Maguesun Corporation with knowledge or authorship
of the fraud owing to the fact that Maguesun Corporation's
president, Manolita Guevarra Suntay after whom the corporation
was named, was her niece. Manolita Suntay is the daughter of
Lourdes Guevarra Suntay, a deceased cousin of petitioner Vda. de
Roxas who used to help with the latter's business affairs. Manolita
Suntay used to take care of the registration and insurance of the
latter's cars.
● The Court of Appeals held that petitioner failed to demonstrate that
there was actual or extrinsic fraud, not merely constructive or
intrinsic fraud, a prerequisite for purposes of annulling a judgment
or reviewing a decree of registration.
● The Court of Appeals also ruled that publication of the initial
hearing in the O fficial Gazette is su fficient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court.
ISSUE:
● W/N the CA erred in ruling that Maguesun Corporation did not
commit actual fraud warranting the setting aside of the registration
decree - ​YES
RULING:
[On Fraud - not really relevant to our topic but to explain lang how the
Court set aside the CA decision]
● The Court here finds that respondent Maguesun Corporation
committed actual fraud in obtaining the decree of registration
sought to be reviewed by petitioner.
● Petitioner Vda. de Roxas contended that Maguesun Corporation
intentionally omitted their name, or that of the Roxas family, as
having a claim to or as an occupant of the subject property.
○ In the corporation’s application for registration filed with
the trial court, it seems that the name of Roxas was
intentionally omitted with correction fluid, and typed
over, with a different typewriter, with the words “
Provincial Road all at Tagaytay City”.
● The truth is that the Roxas family had been in possession of the
property uninterruptedly through their caretaker, Jose Ramirez.
● Respondent corporation's intentional concealment and
representation of petitioner's interest in the subject lots as
possessor, occupant and claimant constitutes actual fraud justifying
the reopening and review of the decree of registration.
[On Notice of Initial Hearing - RELEVANT!] corresponding decree of registration and certificate of title pursuant to
Section 39 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
● Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing was made in the
O fficial Gazette and in the Record Newsweekly, admittedly not a
newspaper of general circulation. The Court of Appeals held that
pursuant to Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
publication in the O fficial Gazette is su fficient to confer
jurisdiction. Said provision of law expressly states that "the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial
hearing to be published once in the O fficial Gazette and once in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Provided,
however, that the publication in the O fficial Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. . . ."
● While publication of the notice in the O fficial Gazette is
su fficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court, publication in a
newspaper of general circulation remains an indispensable
procedural requirement. Couched in mandatory terms, it is a
component of procedural due process and aimed at giving "as wide
publicity as possible" so that all persons having an adverse-interest
in the land subject of the registration proceedings may be
noti fied thereof. Although jurisdiction of the court is not
affected, the fact that publication was not made in a newspaper of
general circulation is material and relevant in assessing the
applicant's right or title to the land.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV No. 38328 ("Trinidad de Leon
Vda. de Roxas v. Maguesun Management & Development Corporation,
et al.") promulgated on December 8, 1994 is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. Accordingly, registration of title over the subject parcels
of land, described in Plan AS-04-000108, Lot Nos. 7231 and 7239, with
an area of 3,461 and 10,674 square meters, respectively, as shown and
supported by the corresponding technical descriptions now forming
part of the Records of LRC No. TG-373, is awarded to herein petitioner
Trinidad de Leon vda. de Roxas and her heirs, herein substituted as
petitioners. Upon nality of this Decision, the Land Registration
Authority is hereby directed to ISSUE with reasonable dispatch the
81. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v JEREMIAS AND DAVID
HERBIETO
26 May 2005 | G.R. No. 156117 | Chico- Nazario, J | When is a land of
public domain alienable and disposable
Made by: SERRANO
Recit Ready​:
On September 23, 1998, Herbieto brothers,, Jeremias and David, filed
with the MTC a single application for registration of 2 parcels of land
located in Cabangahan Consolacion Cebu (Subject Lots). They claim to
be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots which was purchased from
the parents. (Sps. Gregorio Herbieto nd Isabel Owatan) on June 25, 1976.
The MTC scheduled a hearing on ​September 3, 1999 MTC ​set an ​initial
hearing at 8:30 am. All owners of land adjoining the Subject Lots were
sent copies of Notice of Initial Hearing. On ​July 27, 1999​, ​copies were
placed on a conspicuous plac​e on the Subject Lots as well as the
bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion Cebu where the
lots were located. ​August 2, 1999 Notice was published in the Official
Gazette. ​December 19, 1999 Notice was published in ​The Freeman
Banat News. S ​ ept. 3, 1999, ​The MTC issued an Order of Special Default
with only the petitioner Republic opposing the application for the
registration of the Subject Lots.
The MTC and CA granted the application. They both held the land
sought to be registered has been classified within the alienable and
disposable zone since June 25, 1963. In accordance to Section 12(4) of
PD 1529, which allows individuals to own land in any manner provided
by law.
However, the Republic appealed and averred that the CA erred in
granting the petition.
ISSUE:
W/N the mandatory requirement of publication was complied with
sufficiently, making the MTC judgment valid ​(NO)
RULING:
The MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration
and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots
No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02
February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 Final and
executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of
registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been
issued by the MTC without jurisdiction. The late publication of the
Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is
tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result.
Indubitably, such late publication of the Notice, way after the date of the
initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read
the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat News and had a
claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already
too late for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial
hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration, and to present
his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice
itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC
on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be
barred from contesting respondents' application for registration and even
the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the
MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.​The
all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the
objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.

Doctrine: The all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases,
the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and
the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.
FACTS:
● This petition seeks to reverse the judgment granting the application
for land registration of the respondents.
● Herbieto brothers (Jeremias and David as respondents) filed a
single application for registration of two parcels of land (Lots No.
8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu
(Subject Lots).
● The brothers claim to be in fee simple of the Subject Lots which
they purchased from their parents, Sps. Herbieto and Isabel
Owatan on June 25, 1976.
● On 11 December 1998, petitioner Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) filed an opposition to the application of the Subjects
Lots because of the ff argument.
● September 3, 1999 MTC ​set an ​initial hearing at 8:30 am. all
owners of land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of
Notice of Initial Hearing
● July 27, 1999​. ​Copies were also placed on a conspicuous plac​e
on the Subject Lots as well as the bulletin board of the municipal
building of Consolacion Cebu where the lots were located.
● August 2, 1999​ Notice was duly published in the Official Gazette.
● December 19, 1999 Notice was published in ​The Freeman Banat
News
● Sept. 3, 1999, ​The MTC issued an Order of Special Default with
only the petitioner Republic opposing the application for the
registration of the Subject Lots.
● MTC on December 21, 1999 ​promulgated its judgement ordering
the registration and confirmation of the title of Jeremias over Lot
No. 8422 and Dacid over Lot No. 8423. The order also directed the
Administrator of the RA to issue a decree of registration for the
Subject Lots.
○ Feb. 2, 2000 ​declared its judgement.
● CA​: Affirmed the MTC judgment saying that the land sought to be
registered as within the alienable and disposable zone. CA also
acknowledge that the parents of the appellees have acquired
subject parcels of land since 1950 and cultivated it with jackfruits,
bamboos, coconuts, and other trees In sort, it is undisputed that the
appellees are predecessors-in-interest.
ISSUE:
(1) W/N the mandatory requirement of publication was complied with
sufficiently, making the MTC judgment valid ​(NO)
RATIO:
The MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No.
8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February
2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 Final and executory,
and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the
Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC
without jurisdiction. The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in
the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all,
having the same ultimate result. Indubitably, such late publication of the
Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless
and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The
Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of
due process for it was already too late for him to appear before the MTC on
the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for
registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim.
Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to
appear before the MTC on the date of initial hearing, he would be in default
and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application for
registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant its Order, dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID.
thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 Respondents' application for registration is DISMISSED.
September 1999.​The all encompassing in rem nature of land registration SO ORDERED.
cases, theconsequences of default orders issued against the whole world and
the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible
demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication,
mailing and posting.

PLEASE NOTE:
Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be
given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by
means of:
(1)publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following

manner:
1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to
be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the
publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to
have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far
as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require
all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show
cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted.

DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22
November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of
Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and
 82. VERGEL V. CA
September 28, 2001​ | ​PARDO, ​J​.​ | General default
Serrano | Soriano
PETITIONER: ​Digna Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz Manacop,
Felicisima Flores, Generoso Salvacruz, Blandino Salvacruz, Milagros
Salvacruz And The Heirs Of Corazon Santiago
RESPONDENT: ​Court Of Appeals And Dorotea Tamisin Gonzale​s
RECIT-READY: ​Vergel et al., filed with the RTC of Calamba Laguna
an application for registration of land. Republic of the Philippines filed
an opposition to the said application. RTC issued a general default with
regards to the said land. Gonzales filed a motion to set aside the order of
general default claiming that she is the owner of said land. RTC denied
motion for lack of merit. Gonzales filed with the CA a petition for
certiorari and CA subsequently reversed the RTC decision. Hence this
appeal by the Vergel et al.
ISSUE: ​The issue presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
setting aside the trial court’s order of general default in the land
registration case involved without making a specific finding of fraud,
negligence, accident or excusable mistake ​(YES)
RULING: ​We grant the petition. The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set
aside the trial court’s order of general default without factual basis save
for its own gut feeling, ​ipse dixit​. Gonzales’ failure to file timely
opposition to the application for land registration in itself may not be
considered excusable negligence. Hence, we find that the appellate court
erred in setting aside the order of general default in the Land Registration
Case No. 88-94-C, without making a specific finding of fraud, accident
or excusable neglect that prevented respondent from timely opposing the
application.
DOCTRINE: ​It is erroneous to set aside the order of general default
without making a specific finding of fraud, accident or excusable neglect.
FACTS:
● On May 26, 1994, Digna Vergel, Eduardo Salvacruz, Beatriz
Mañacop, Felicisima Flores, Generoso and Blandino Salvacruz,
Milagros Evangelista and the heirs of Corazon Santiago, namely:
Leocadio, Jr. and Concepcion Santiago filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna an application for registration of a
parcel of land (for titling purposes).
● On July 20, 1994, the Republic of the Philippines represented by
the Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application for
registration.
● On December 15, 1994, the trial court issued "an order of general
default against the whole world with the exception of Republic of
the Philippines
● On October 3, 1995, respondent Dorotea Tamisin Gonzales filed
with the trial court an "Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Order of
General Default" alleging, in her affidavit that she is claiming the
land in question subject of this petition as an owner which motion
was opposed by the Vergel et al herein.
● On October 18, 1995, the trial court issued the first assailed order,
the dispositive portion of which is quoted, as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, the motion to set aside the Order of default as
well as the motion to suspend the proceedings filed by the movant
through counsel is hereby denied for lack of merit.’
● On November 21, 1995, Gonzales filed with the trial court a
"motion for reconsideration" of the order denying the motion to set
aside the order of general default, which motion Vergel et al
opposed.
● On November 28, 1995, the trial court issued its second questioned
order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
‘WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for
reconsideration, dated November 16, 1995, is hereby denied for
lack of merit.’
● On December 13, 1995, Gonzales filed with the Court of Appeal sa
petition for certiorari alleging that the trial court judge "acted
 capriciously and without or in excess of his jurisdiction and
gravely abused the exercise of his discretion" in issuing the two
aforementioned orders."
● On April 02, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision
annulling the trial court’s orders dated October 18, 1995 and
November 28, 1995, and consequently, setting aside the trial
court’s order of general default dated December 15, 1994, in Land
Registration Case No. 88-94-C with respect to Gonzales.
● Hence, this appeal
ISSUES:
● The issue presented is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
setting aside the trial court’s order of general default in the land
registration case involved without making a specific finding of
fraud, negligence, accident or excusable mistake (YES)
● We are not a trier of facts. Consequently, we have to remand the
case to the Court of Appeals for it to make findings of fact
constituting fraud, accident or excusable neglect sufficient for the
court to lift the order of general default in the land registration case
involved.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 39239.
Let the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings with instructions to determine whether there exists facts
warranting the lifting of the order of general default in LRC Case No.
88-94-C of the trial court.

RATIO:

● We grant the petition. The Court of Appeals arbitrarily set aside

the trial court’s order of general default without factual basis save
for its own gut feeling, ​ipse dixit​. Gonzales’ failure to file timely
opposition to the application for land registration because she
missed reading the publication of the notice in the Official Gazette
or in the newspaper "Malaya" issue of August 8, 1994, in itself
may not be considered excusable negligence.
● In Gonzales’ motion to set aside order of general default, she
alleged that petitioners were aware of her claim of ownership over
the subject property, but did not give her personal notice of the
filing of the application. She learned about the application by
accident. In the petition for certiorari she filed with the Court of
Appeals, Gonzales alleged that Vergel et al filed the application in
bad faith, surreptitiously and without notice to her. The Court of
Appeals did not make a finding on this.
● Hence, we find that the appellate court erred in setting aside the
order of general default in the Land Registration Case No.
88-94-C, without making a specific finding of fraud, accident or
excusable neglect that prevented respondent from timely opposing
the application.
 83. SPS MANUEL DEL CAMPO v. CA
1 Feb. 2001| J. Quisumbing | Order of General Default
P. SORIANO & A. ALVERO
PETITIONER: ​Spouses Manuel and Salvacion del Campo
RESPONDENT: ​Court of Appeals and Heirs of Jose Regalado, Sr
appearing, order a default to be recorded and require the applicant
to present evidence.
Where an appearance has been entered and an answer filed, a
default order shall be entered against persons who did not appear
and answer.

RECIT-READY: ​Salome and 7 others co-owned a lot. The lot was The facts in italics are the only passages directly related to the provision.
divided in aliquot shares. Salome sold her part to Soleda with a Deed of Case did not discuss default. Best guess is Regalado’s widow and one
Absolute Sale passing the property to Soledad. Soledad mortgaged the child were issued order of special default. Said order is when an
property to Regalado Sr as evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage. Soledad appearance has been entered and answer filed, default order shall be
died. Soledad's heirs later paid the mortgage and Regalado Sr. executed a entered upon against persons who didn't appear and answer.]
Discharge of Mortgage. The Soledad heirs then sold their lot to Spouses
del Campo.
FACTS:
Regalado caused the reconstituted of the original certificate of title which
● Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and
included the lot previously mortgaged. Sps del Campo now assail the title
Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the original co-owners of Lot
on the ground that they own part of the lot, after Soledad heirs sold it to
162 Original Certificate of Title No. 18047
them. Summons were served to Regalado’s widow and 2 of his children.
● The lot was divided in aliquot shares among the eight (8)
Only 1 child, Antonio answered.
co-owners as follows:
○ Salome Bornales 4/16
ISSUE: ​W/N the heirs of Regalado are estopped from denying the right
○ Consorcia Bornales 4/16
and title of Sps. del Campo. -YES
○ Alfredo Bornales 2/16
○ Maria Bornales 2/16
RULING: ​The deed of mortgage between Regalado Sr. and Soledad as
○ Jose Bornales 1/16
well as the discharge of mortgage between Regalado Se. and Soledad’s
○ Quirico Bornales 1/16
heirs state that Soledad was the owner of the property. Having conformed
○ Rosalia Bornales 1/16
to the documents, Regalado Sr. cannot deny Soledad’s ownership nor can
○ Julita Bornales 1/16
Regalado’s heirs. They are estopped from denying the right and title of
● Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 Soledad Daynolo.
Sps. del Campo, to whom Soledad’s heirs sold the property to.
The portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad was described in the Deed
of Absolute Sale as having:
DOCTRINE: ​If an individual has executed a Deed of Mortgage over a
land recognizing another as the absolute owner thereof, the individual
63-1/2 meters from point "9" to "10", 35 meters from
and his heirs are estopped from asserting ownership over the same land.
point "10" to point "11", 30 meters from point "11" to a
certain point parallel to a line drawn from points "9" to
[The case is listed under Section 26 which states:
"10"; and then from this "Certain Point" to point "9" and
If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court
as shown in the accompanying sketch, and made an
shall, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the contrary
 integral part of this deed, ​to SOLEDAD DAYNOLO,
her heirs and assigns.
● Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the
land built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and her
husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of
Lot 162 as security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr.
evidenced by a Deed of Mortgage.
● [Later] three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically,
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said
lot to Jose Regalado, Sr.
● Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died,
paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot
162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. ​The latter, in turn, executed a Deed
of Discharge of Mortgage 3 in favor of Soledad's heirs​. The
heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to the
Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.
● Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original Certificate
of Title No. 18047. The reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541 initially
reflected the shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162. However,
title was transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the
entire property into smaller lots, each covered by a respective title
in his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an
area of 11,732 square meters.
● Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for
"repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of the
now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Sps del Campo claimed that they
owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6
which was erroneously included in TCT No. 14566 in the name of
Regalado.
● Summons were served on Regalado's widow, Josefina Buenvenida,
and two of her children, Rosemarie and Antonio. Josefina and
Rosemarie were declared in default because only Antonio filed an
answer to the complaint.
● Spouses presented the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between
Soledad Daynolo and Salome Bornales as well as the Deed of
Mortgage and Deed of Discharge signed by Jose Regalado, Sr.
● Despite the filing of an answer, Antonio failed to present any
evidence to refute the claim of petitioners. Thus, after considering
Antonio to have waived his opportunity to present evidence, the
trial court deemed the case submitted for decision.
● The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.
● Spouses appealed.
ISSUES: ​W/N the heirs of Regalado are estopped from denying the right
and title of Sps. del Campo. -YES
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
●
RATIO:
● Heirs of Regalado are estopped from asserting that they own the
subject land in view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of
Mortgage executed between Regalado and Spouses'
predecessor-in-interest.
● Heirs are barred from making this assertion under the equitable
principle of estoppel by deed, whereby a party to a deed and his
privies are precluded from asserting as against the other and his
privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying
the truth of any material fact asserted in it.
● A perusal of the documents evidencing the mortgage would readily
reveal that Soledad, as mortgagor, had declared herself absolute
owner of the piece of land now being litigated. This declaration of
fact was accepted by Regalado as mortgagee and accordingly, his
heirs cannot now be permitted to deny it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30438 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The parties are directed to cause a SURVEY for exact
determination of their respective portions in Lot 162-C-6. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 14566 is declared CANCELLED and the
Register of Deeds of Capiz is ordered to ISSUE a new title in
accordance with said survey, upon finality of this decision.
 84. LOPEZ v. ENRIQUEZ
before entry of final judgment. The land registration court granted the
21 Jan 2005 | J. Carpio | Order of General Default
application for registration of title on 31 May 1966 and issued a
R. REALUBIN & MAKER
certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners led their motion on 16
July 1997. Thus, even if petitioners led a motion to lift the order of
PETITIONER: ​Heirs of Eugenio Lopez Sr general default, the order of default could not be set aside because the
RESPONDENT: ​Hon. Alfredo R. Enriquez, in his capacity as motion was filed out of time.
Administrator of the Land Registration Authority and the Register of
Deeds of Marikina City DOCTRINE: ​In cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such
RECIT-READY: ​Alfonso Sandoval ("Sandoval") and Roman Ozaeta, fraud, without prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for
Jr. ("Ozaeta") led an application for registration of title. Their value of a certificate of title. This is called an Action for Reconveyance.
applications were approved and two OCTs were issued. The heirs of
Lopez Sr filed a motion to declare the deeds and OCTs void contending
FACTS:
the land was sold to their predecessor. They filed an application to
● Alfonso Sandoval ("Sandoval") and Roman Ozaeta, Jr. ("Ozaeta")
annotate a notice of lis pendens at the back of the OCTs which the LRA
led an application for registration of title. On 31 May 1966, the
denied. Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the LRA
land registration court granted the application. The decision
ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to le a notice of
became final and executory, and the land registration court issued a
lis pendens relative to the pending case. Since a land registration case is a
certificate of finality dated 8 March 1991. LRA issued on 20
proceeding in rem, an order of general default binds the whole world as a
October 1977 Decree Nos. N-217643 and N-217644 in the names
party in the case. Petitioners are mere movants whose personality the
of Sandoval and his wife Rosa Ruiz, and Ozaeta and his wife Ma.
court has not admitted. Based on Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled
Salome Lao.
that petitioners should have filed a motion to lift the order of general
● On 16 July 1997, petitioners Eugenio Lopez, Jr., Manolo Lopez,
default.
Oscar Lopez, and Presentacion L. Psinakis, heirs of Eugenio
Lopez, Sr., filed a motion stating that Sandoval and Ozaeta sold the
ISSUE:
lots subject of the application to the late Eugenio Lopez, Sr. on 23
Whether or not the notice of lis pendens can be annotated to the OCTs
September 1970.
granting that an Order for General Default is obtained? - ​NO (the
● The Register of Deeds of Marikina City issued the corresponding
remedy should be to file an Action for Reconveyance)
OCT Nos. O-1603 and O-1604 in favor of Sandoval and Ozaeta
and their spouses only on 18 August 1998.
RULING:
● Petitioners led another motion on 25 November 1998 to declare
In cases of registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his
void the Decrees and OCTs. Petitioners pointed out that the OCTs
legal and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without
show that incumbent Administrator Alfredo R. Enriquez signed the
prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value of a
Decrees on 20 October 1997, before he assumed office on 8 July
certificate of title. This is called an Action for Reconveyance.
1998 and even before Hon. Briccio C. Ygaña issued the Order of 3
July 1998.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the LRA and the appellate court's
● Enriquez explained that the inconsistency in the dates: the issuance
observation that petitioners need to file a motion to lift the order of
was on 1993 but the release and signing was on 1998.
general default. A motion to lift the order of general default should be led
 ● On 25 November 1998, petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds
of Marikina City an application to annotate the notice of lis
pendens at the back of the OCTs which the LRA denied.
● The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of LRA.
ISSUES:
● Whether or not the notice of lis pendens can be annotated to the
OCTs granting that an Order for General Default is obtained? - ​NO
(the remedy should be to file an Action for Reconveyance)
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
● LRA: Relying on Section 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the
LRA ruled that only a party to a case has the legal personality to
file a notice of lis pendens relative to the pending case. Since a
land registration case is a proceeding in rem, an order of general
default binds the whole world as a party in the case. Petitioners are
mere movants whose personality the court has not admitted. Based
on Section 26 of PD 1529, the LRA ruled that petitioners should
have led a motion to lift the order of general default.
RATIO:
● As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens
should contain a statement of the institution of an action or
proceeding, the court where the same is pending, and the date of its
institution. A notice of lis pendens should also contain a reference
to the number of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate
description of the land affected and its registered owner.
● The Register of Deeds denied registration of the notice of lis
pendens because "the application was bereft of the original petition
or complaint upon which this office will base its action." Both the
LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of
lis pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original
parties.
● Petitioners committed a fatal procedural error when they led a
motion in LRC on 16 July 1997. The remedy of petitioners is an
action for reconveyance against Sandoval, Ozaeta and their
spouses. Reconveyance is based on Section 55 of Act No. 496, as
amended by Act No. 3322, which states that ". . . in all cases of
registration procured by fraud the owner may pursue all his legal
and equitable remedies against the parties to such fraud, without
prejudice, however, to the rights of any innocent holder for value
of a certificate of title . . . ."
● An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a
person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the
Torrens system in another's name. Reconveyance is always
available as long as the property has not passed to an innocent third
person for value. A notice of lis pendens may thus be annotated on
the certificate of title immediately upon the institution of the action
in court. The notice of lis pendens will avoid transfer to an
innocent third person for value and preserve the claim of the real
owner.
● [Issue on the motion for general default] The Supreme Court
disagreed with the LRA and the appellate court's observation that
petitioners need to file a motion to lift the order of general default.
A motion to lift the order of general default should be led before
entry of final judgment. The land registration court granted the
application for registration of title on 31 May 1966 and issued a
certificate of finality on 8 March 1991. Petitioners led their motion
on 16 July 1997. Thus, even if petitioners led a motion to lift the
order of general default, the order of default could not be set aside
because the motion was filed out of time. Also, petitioners are not
mere interested parties in this case. By ling their motion to have
the decrees and the corresponding certificates of title declared
void, they took the role of oppositors to the application for land
registration.
WHEREFORE, ​we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55993 dated 29 November 2000.
 85. SSS v. CHAVEZ FACTS:
13 October 2004 | J. Quisumbing | Topic
R. REALUBIN & MAKER ● Juanito and Agustina Obedencio filed a case praying that the
Social Security System (SSS) be ordered to cancel the mortgage on
the properties of the spouses and to release the documents covering
PETITIONER: ​Social Security System
the said properties.
RESPONDENT: ​Hon. Nazar U. Chaves, RTC, BR. 18, Misamis
● SSS filed an Answer with Counterclaim alleging that the private
Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City and Sps. Juanito & Augustina Obedencio
respondents had an unpaid obligation in the amount of P48,188.72
as of September 1, 1994.
RECIT-READY: ​Juanito and Agustina Obedencio filed a case praying
● After the issues were joined, a pre-trial conference was scheduled
that the Social Security System (SSS) be ordered to cancel the mortgage
on February 16, 1995. Atty. Rodrigo B. Filoteo, acting assistant
on the properties of the spouses and to release the documents covering
branch manager of the SSS in Cagayan de Oro City entered his
the said properties. SSS filed an Answer with Counterclaim alleging that
appearance as counsel for the petitioner. The hearing was cancelled
the private respondents had an unpaid obligation in the amount of
because the respondent judge was indisposed. The hearing of the
P48,188.72. Atty. Rodrigo B. Filoteo is the counsel for SSS. The hearing
case was reset on April 18, 1995. This time, Atty. Filoteo failed to
originally scheduled on Feb 16, 1995 was moved to April 18, 1995. He
attend because of an o cial mission to Zamboanga City from April
failed to attend the hearing. On motion of Atty. Alberto Bacal, counsel of
7 to May 8, 1995 involving SSS cases.
the respondent spouses, respondent judge issued an Order dated April 18,
● On motion of Atty. Alberto Bacal, counsel of the respondent
1995 declaring petitioner in default and allowed private respondents to
spouses, respondent judge issued an Order dated April 18, 1995
present their evidence ex parte. SSS moved for reconsideration.
declaring petitioner in default and allowed private respondents to
present their evidence ex parte.
ISSUE:
● SSS filed for a motion for reconsideration to lift the order of
Whether or not the default order of the lower court should be lifted, so
default. It was denied. On appeal, the CA also denied the petition.
that substantial justice would prevail over technical rules? -​ NO
To be relieved of the effects of the order of default, Sec. 3, Rule 18
of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant must le a motion
RULING: ​The counsel of SSS failed to comply not only with one rule.
under oath to set aside the order of default; that he must show that
Other than failing to appear during pre-trial, petitioner does not deny that
his failure to appear at the pre- trial was due to fraud, accident,
its Motion for Reconsideration to lift the order of default lacked
mistake or excusable neglect and accompany the motion with
verification, notice of hearing and affidavit of merit. If not accompanied
affidavit of merit.
by affidavits of merit, the trial court has no authority to consider the
same. A motion to lift an order of default is fatally flawed and the trial
ISSUES:
court has no authority to consider the same where it was not under oath
● Whether or not the default order of the lower court should be
and unaccompanied by an a davit of merit. In effect, the petitioner failed
lifted, so that substantial justice would prevail over technical rules?
to set aside the order of default and must suffer the consequences thereof.
-​ NO
DOCTRINE: ​The declaration of default for non-appearance at a pre-trial
RELEVANT ARGUMENTS (if any):
conference is sanctioned by Rule 20, Sec. 2 of the Rules of ​Court, thus: A
● SSS: Although the respondent judge has the discretion to declare a
party who fails to appear at a pretrial conference may be non-suited or
defendant in default for failure to appear during pre-trial
considered as in default.
conference, the strict, rigid and arbitrary application thereof denied
 the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present its meritorious
defense, refute the evidence of the private respondents, present his
own, and exercise his right to due process. The rules should be
liberally construed in order to protect the substantive rights of the
parties.
● Sps. Obedencio: They claim that they had fully paid their
obligation with the SSS. They allege that they already paid
P63,000, an amount that exceeded their supposed accountability of
P56,427.

RATIO:

● Sadly, the records reveal that petitioner failed to comply not only
with one rule. Other than failing to appear during pre-trial,
petitioner does not deny that its Motion for Reconsideration to lift
the order of default lacked verification, notice of hearing and
affidavit of merit. If not accompanied by affidavits of merit, the
trial court has no authority to consider the same. A motion to lift an
order of default is fatally flawed and the trial court has no authority
to consider the same where it was not under oath and
unaccompanied by an a davit of merit. In effect, the petitioner
failed to set aside the order of default and must suffer the
consequences thereof.

WHEREFORE, ​the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision

dated February 29, 2000, and the Resolution dated December 12, 2001 of
the Court of Appeals, are AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 18,
for further proceedings.
 1. REPUBLIC v. TSAI
prove that her possession of the subject property started since 12 June
June 22, 2009 | Carpio J. | Land of Public Domain When Alienable and
1945 or earlier because Tsai's earliest evidence can be traced back to a
Disposable
tax declaration issued in the name of her predecessors-in-interest only in
SALAMAT, J. & SORIANO, P.
the year 1948. Finally, ​we note that Tsai also failed to prove that the
subject property has been declared alienable and disposable by the
PETITIONER: ​Republic of the PH President or the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
RESPONDENT: ​Ruby Lee Tsai Natural Resources

RECIT-READY:
Ruby Tsai filed an application for confirmation and registration of her DOCTRINE:
property under PD No. 1529. She alleged that she bought the property The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary
from the Carungcongs in 1993, and she and her predecessors in interest had approved the land classication and released the land of the public
has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the
occupation of the property for more than 30 years. The Republic opposed application for registration falls within the approved area per verication
this alleging that Tsai and her predecessors failed to present sufficient through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for
evidence to show that have been in open, continuous, exclusive, land registration must present a copy of the original classication
notorious possession of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or approved by the DENR Secretary and certied as a true copy by the legal
earlier as required by CA No. 141. The RTC found that the pieces of custodian of the ofcial records. These facts must be established to prove
evidence presented by Tsai was sufficient (Deed of Sale, Tax that the land is alienable and disposable
Declarations etc) and ordered for the registration of the property under
Tsai’s name. The Republic appealed, but the CA affirmed ruling that Tsai
FACTS:
does not have to prove possession since June 1945 because CA 141 has
● On 3 December 1996, Tsai led an application for conrmation
been amended by RA 1942, which provided for a simple 30 year
and registration of the subject property under PD No. 1529. She
prescriptive period.
alleged that she is the owner of the subject property and the
improvements thereon. Tsai stated that on 31 May 1993, she
ISSUE:
purchased the subject property from the Carungcongs
Whether the lower courts erred in granting Tsai’s application for
(Carungcong), through Wendy Mitsuko Sato, Carungcong’s
registration of the said property - YES
daughter and attorney in fact. She also declared that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
RULING:
and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
The Court of Appeals failed to consider the amendment introduced by
for more than 30 years
PD 1073. As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession and
● Except for the Republic, there were no other oppositors to the
occupation for 30 years or more is not sufcient. Therefore, since the
application. The Republic opposed on the following grounds: (1)
effectivity of PD 1073 on 25 January 1977, it must now be shown that
that Tsai and her predecessors-in interest failed to present
possession and occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by
sufcient evidence to show that they have been in open,
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
or earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of PD
the subject property since 12 June 1945 or earlier as required by
1529. We agree with the Republic that Tsai's evidence was not enough to
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by
 Presidential Decree No. 1073 (2) that the tax declarations and tax
receipt payments attached to the application do not constitute
competent and sufcient evidence of a bona de acquisition of the
land applied for or of Tsai's open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject property in the
concept of an owner since 12 June 1945 or earlier; and (3) that the
subject property forms part of the public domain and is not subject
to private appropriation
● During the trial, Tsai gave the following pieces of evidence: Deed
of Absolute Sale between Tsai and Carungcong (Yr 1993); Tax
Declarations (Years 1948, 1960, 1980, 1985); Official receipts for
real property tax (Yrs 1991-1993). The trial court granted Tsai's
application for registration. The court ruled that Tsai was able to
prove her actual possession of the land for more than 30 years and
that the subject property was residential and not within any forest
zone or the public domain. The Republic appealed to the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in granting the
application for registration despite respondent’s failure to prove
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the Republic,
it is not sufcient that respondent proved possession of the subject
property for more than 30 years. CA affirmed RTC
ISSUES:
● Whether the trial court can grant the application for registration
despite the lack of proof of Tsai's open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the subject property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier - NO
RATIO:
● According to the Republic, Tsai only proved possession since
1948, which is in violation of Section 48(b) of CA 141, as
amended by PD 1073. On the other hand, Tsai insists that it is
sufcient that she proved that she and her predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject property under a bona de claim of
ownership for more than 30 years
● The Court notes that in Tsai's original application before the trial
court, she claimed that she was entitled to the conrmation and
registration of her title to the subject property under PD 1529.
However, Tsai did not specify under what paragraph of Section 14
of PD 1529 she was ling the application. But going over Tsai's
application and the evidence she presented before the trial court, it
appears that Tsai led her application under Section 14(1) of PD
1529
● “SEC. 14. Who may apply..
(1) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona de ​claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier
● Thus, there are three requisites for the ling of an application for
registration of title under Section 14(1) of PD 1529:
(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain;
(2) that the applicant by himself or through his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation; and
(3) that such possession is under a bona de claim of ownership
since 12 June 1945 or earlier
● A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of CA 141, as
amended by PD 1073. According to the Court of Appeals, Tsai
need not prove possession of the subject property since 12 June
1945 or earlier because Section 48(b) of CA 141 was amended by
RA 1942, which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period.
The Court of Appeals appears to have an erroneous interpretation
of Section 48(b) of CA 141
● Through the years, Section 48(b) of the CA 141 has been amended
several times. The Court of Appeals failed to consider the
amendment introduced by PD 1073. As the law now stands, a mere
showing of possession and occupation for 30 years or more is not
sufcient. Therefore, since the effectivity of PD 1073 on 25
January 1977, it must now be shown that possession and
occupation of the piece of land by the applicant, by himself or
through his predecessors-in-interest, started on 12 June 1945 or
earlier. This provision is in total conformity with Section 14(1) of
PD 1529
 ● Tsai failed to comply with the period of possession and occupation
of the subject property, as required by both PD 1529 and CA 141.
We agree with the Republic that Tsai's evidence was not enough to
prove that her possession of the subject property started since 12
June 1945 or earlier because Tsai's earliest evidence can be traced
back to a tax declaration issued in the name of her
predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1948. In view of the lack
of sufcient showing that Tsai and her predecessors-in-interest
possessed the subject property under a bona de claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, Tsai's application for
conrmation and registration of the subject property under PD
1529 and CA 141 should be denied
● Finally, ​we note that Tsai also failed to prove that the subject
property has been declared alienable and disposable by the
President or the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources​. In ​Republic v Tan Properties the court
said:
● “[T]he applicant for land registration must prove that the
DENR Secretary had approved the land classication and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, and that the land subject of the application for
registration falls within the approved area per verication
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition,
the applicant for land registration must present a copy of
the original classication approved by the DENR
Secretary and certied as a true copy by the legal
custodian of the ofcial records. These facts must be
established to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 30

January 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
70006 and the 21 September 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in LRC Case No. TG-788. We DENY
respondent Ruby Lee Tsai’s application for conrmation and
registration of Lot No. 7062 described in plan Ap-04-010084, Cad355,
Tagaytay Cadastre.