Shiffrin, Intimate Relationship, and Conventionalism PDF

Philosophical Review
Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism

Author(s): Seana Valentine Shiffrin
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 117, No. 4 (OCTOBER 2008), pp. 481-524
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IntimateRelationships,
Promising,
and Conventionalism
Seana Valentine
Shiffrin
The old chestnut aboutpromisingposesa puzzleaboutthegeneration

ofmoralobligations. Somephilosophers worry whether itcouldbe pos-
declaration, obligationcan
siblethat,just throughan individual's an
come to exist.1Theyfindit incrediblethatthemereexpressionof an
in doingso in
willto alterhermoralstatuscan be effective
individual's
the
just way she intends.2
Otherobligationsarisefrom the need to pre-
or
vent,respondto, remedy eventsand statesofaffairs
that havemoral
For help and sound criticism, I am gratefultoJoshuaCohen,RuthChang,Helena

Debres,RonaldDworkin,David Goldman,MarkGreenberg, Moshe Halbertal,Niko
Kolodny,HerbertMorris,Thomas Nagel, Collin O'Neil, David Owens,Abe Roth,
Tim Scanlon,ErinTaylor, JulieTannenbaum,LarryTemkin, JayWallace,an anony-
mous reviewer, and especially,Barbara Herman and Liam Murphy.I have also
profitedfromconversations withaudiencemembersat the GeneralAspectsof Law
Seminarat Boalt Hall, the PoliticalTheoryWorkshopat BrownUniversity, Cornell
theKennedyCenterforEthicsand theProfessions,
University, Ohio StateUniversity,
the 2006 OSU/Maribor/Rijeka Conferencein Dubrovnik, California
StateUniversity,
Northridge, RutgersUniversity, the StanfordUniversity PoliticalTheoryColloquium,
theUniversity ofVermont, theUniversityofWashington, and theNYUColloquiumon
Law and Philosophy.
1. This worryis articulated by,amongothers,Baier (1994, 111); Hume (1978,
455,524); Anscombe(1981b,97, 100); Prichard(2002a,257); Markovits (2004, 1417,
1442-43);Murphy(n.d.); Den Hartogh(1998,352).
2. This latterclause distinguishes insults,in which
cases like thatof gratuitous
theissuerwishesto assertsuperiority overanotherbutmay,throughtheexpression of
herwillto assertsuperiority,createtheunintendeddutyto apologizeor makeother
amends.
Review,Vol. 117, No. 4, 2008
Philosophical
DOI: 10.1215/00318108-2008-014
© 2008 by Cornell University
481

SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN
significanceindependent oftheboundagent'swilltobe so bound,such

as harm,suffering, thedeceptionofanother, or theweakening or abuse
ofa valuablesocialpractice. Promises seemlikepeculiarentities because
itis onlythrough theexpression ofthewillthatthedutyis created.
Grappling withthisconcern,whatI willcallthegenerative problem,
has givenfruitto important disputesaboutwhether themoralforceof
promisesderivesfromor dependson a usefulsocialconvention thatis,
at theoutset,morally discretionary.3I have never felt the magnetism of
theproblemnortheattraction of theconventionalist solution,despite
theirdistinguished careers.4As I willargue,a fullerappreciation ofthe
moralrole and need forpromisesin centralhumanrelations justifies
nonchalancetowardtheproblemand resistance toanyinteresting form
oftheconventionalist solution.
I willuse 'convention' or 'socialconvention' broadlyand inter-
changeably to refer to a socialpractice or custom.5 I taketheconven-
tionalistposition to involve two components: the
first, conventionalist
endorsestheviewthatthemoralforceofpromises is notmorally funda-
mentaland does not,in fact,derivedirectly fromtheexpression ofan
individual'swillto be bound.Rather,theirmoralforcedependsupon
anothermoralobligationconcerning theproperuse of a convention,
suchas thedutynot to free-ride on or underminea mutually benefi-
cial socialpracticeor custom,or thedutynotto harmsomeonewhois
3. For positivediscussionsof whetheror how the moral forceof a promise

dependson convention, see Fried1981,12-17;Hume 1978,516-25;Rawls1999;1971,
344-50; Kolodnyand Wallace2003; Murphyn.d. Kolodnyand Wallace'sconcernis
notso muchwhether a communicative actcouldaffect whatis morally permissible but
whethersuchactscould createan obligationtoa particular party.Criticisms of,and
alternatives to, conventionalism can be foundin Raz 1982,916, 927; Scanlon 1999,
295-327;Thomson1990.
4. It isn'tmerelythatthesolutionis unattractive. I do notfindit fullyilluminat-
ing.Forinstance, whyis actingagainstthisconvention thatredoundsto mutualbenefit
morallywrong,whereasmeremisuseofthelanguage(a sociallybeneficial convention)
is typically
thought to be a mistake,perhapsa signofintellectual vice,butnotmorally
wrong?Thosewhobelievemisuseof thelanguagecan be of moralconcernmuststill
explainwhythesignificance ofsuchfailures to abidebyusefulconventions, evenwhen
potentially - as withjournalists'sloppylanguage
influential - pale in comparison with
the moralsignificance of promissory breaches,even whenthesemaynot have any
widespreadinfluenceon themaintenance and healthof the convention. Contempo-
rary conventionalistswho out
single promising as strangeseemmostvulnerable to this
concern.Humeand Anscombe(1981a,10-21) stressed similarities
betweenpromising
and language,butdid notaddressthisissuein particular.
5. I willnotrestrict myselfto themoreconfinedmeaningof a socialpracticeor
customthatsolvesa coordination problem.See, forexample,Lewis1969,78-79.
482

Promising, and Conventionalism
vulnerablebecausehe or she has reliedon one's invocation

ofconven-
and practices.6
tionalunderstandings Second,the takes
conventionalist
thepositionthatthemoralobligationthat¿5at thefoundation ¿5acti-
vatedonlybythehappenstance thata socialconvention of promising
has developed,the majorand minordetailsofwhichare also socially
contingentand subjectto change.7
6. The firsttwojustifications, each of whichconcernthe properuse of a social

practice,appearin Kolodnyand Wallace2003,121,and in Murphyn.d. Rawls(1971,
346-50) appeals to the principleof fairnessto explainthe requirement of fidelity.
On the thirdjustification, the moralpowerof the convention is moreindirect.The
essentialwrongis in doingharm,ratherthanin undermining or free-riding offthe
conventionas such; it is morelike the dutyto driveon the rightside of the road
in jurisdictions in whichthatis whatothersdo. The thirdjustification shareswith
the otherconventionalist arguments thatthe activityto be done, or refrained from,
need not have important moralsignificance as such but maymatteronlybecause a
convention of similarpracticeshas developed.
7. An alternative, weakerconventionalist positionis available.It maintainsthat
althoughit maybe possibleforthe obligationto existin some otherwayabsenta
social convention, a systematicsocial conventioncould generatedutiesthatentirely
replacedwhatevernonconventional dutieswerein place absentthe convention.In
some domains,social conventions(and otherintentional humaninstitutions) have
the capacityto substitute forand substantially alterthe structure of nonconvention-
alistduties.Manywho hold conventionalist viewsof real property arrangements hold
someviewof thiskind:absenta socialconvention, some "natural"dutiesof property
mayarisebetweenindividuals, perhapsgroundedin appropriative efforts based on
need or labor;but,thesedutiesneed nothinderor operateas substantive constraints
on thedevelopment of a system of sociallyengineeredproperty rights.It is perfectly
just to establishsocialinstitutions thatallocateand distribute property basedon more
rigorousstandardsof distributive justice,resulting in quite differentproperty rights
and duties.
Similarpositionsare oftenheldconcerning therightofself-help withina state
of natureand itssusceptibility to replacement bysocialinstitutions of tortand crim-
inal law.I am open to bothaccounts,but I do not thinkpromising adheresto this
structure.Neitherthemaincontentof promissory dutiesnor theirmoralsignificance
is eligiblefornear-complete replacement or eradicationby social conventions. The
argumentI givein the textabout the essentialand fundamental importance of the
powerto promiseforelementalinterpersonal relationsprovidesthebasisforthisview.
Whythedutiesassociatedwithproperty relationsand self-protection are,bycontrast,
moresusceptibleto transformation bysocial conventions thanthoseassociatedwith
promising is a subjectwhosefullpursuitis bettersuitedforanotheroccasion.Here,
I merelynote thatthe motivations forconventionalism about real property and the
propermeansof defensedo not stemfromanysourcelike the generative problem
thatdrivesconventionalism about promise;rather,theystemfromconcernsabout
our equal standingwithrespectto materialresourcesand theneed forclearrulesto
enablerespectful formsofjoint sociallife.I discusstherelationship betweenpromise
and contract, a socialconvention operatingwithinclose territorial waters,in Shiffrin
2007.
483

Bothconventionalists and nonconventionalists agreethatmany

featuresofpromising haveconventional components thatarenotintrin-
-
sicallymorallysignificantincludingwhichwords,gestures, or condi-
tionsofsilencecreatecommitments. They even agree thatsome morally
significantaspectsofourpromissory relationships mayvaryaccordingto
custom.Whatisatissueiswhether thebasicmoralrelationofpromissory
commitment and itsassociateddutiesderivefromdutiesactivatedby
socialconventions and themoralprinciples thatgovernouruseofthem.
Many othersopposeconventionalism, yetsomeprominent mod-
ernnonconventionalist accountsimplicitly makeunnecessary and prob-
lematicconcessionsto the conventionalist's core instinctsabout the
mystery of promisesand the necessity of derivingthe moralforceof
promisesfromsomething outsidetheagent'sexpression ofherwillto
be bound. I have in mindthe near ubiquitousendorsement of the
that
requirement bindingpromises involve the promisee's beliefthat the
will
promisor perform; the related view that through promise,the
the
promiseeand promisor sharean end;8and finally, thetendency to take
promises between strangers,rather than intimates, as the prototypical
promises aroundwhichtobuilda satisfactory accountofpromising.9
Afterdiscussing whywe shouldrejectthesefeatures, I willpur-
sue a relationalaccountofpromising thatdoes notmaketheseconces-
sionsand findsitsmotivation in theirrejection.10 Manysuspectthatthe
of
bindingness promises does not dependupon social conventions but
also thatit cannotderivesolelyfromconsiderations aboutthewillor
integrityofthepromisor, consideredalone,or thedisappointed expec-
tationsor disappointed relianceofthepromisee.Something aboutthe
8. JudithJarvisThomson's(1990) accountdoes not sufferfromthisflaw.The

textat 297-98is somewhat ambiguousaboutthesortof recipient uptakeshe believes
is required.It seemsthesortofrecipient distrustthatmakesitthecase thatan offeror
failsto giveherwordis distrust in theofferer's sincerity, abouttheofferor's
notdistrust
carrythrough. Thomson does seem to endorse a requirement the
that promiseeaccept
thepromise, whereasI believeall thatis warranted is a requirementthatthepromisee
notrejectthepromise.See textaccompanying note20 and ibid.,294-312.
9. Dori Kimeland Daniel Markovits, however, takepromisesbetweenintimates
seriously.See Kimel 2003, 57-89; Markovits 2004, 1438-46. Kimel (2003, 30-31)
regardspromises betweenstrangers and mereacquaintances, however,as fairly
anoma-
lous and as so transformative as to renderstrangers no longerquitestrangers. I worry
thathisaccountthereby fallssubjectto theinverseimplausibility. Markovits's account
has manystrengths butimplausibly relieson appeal to thenotionofsharedendsand
to thepromisee's beliefin performance. suchreliancein sectionsLi and I.ii.
I criticize
10. JosephRaz hasgesturedat a morerelational viewbutnotelaborateditsdetails.
See Raz 1977;1981,103,125; 1982,928; 1986,173-75.
484

and Conventionalism
Promising,
relationship betweenthepromiseeand promisor makesa promisebind-

ing.But what it is about therelationship between themthatunderwrites
thebindingness ofpromises has seemedelusive.
I hope to put thematterin closerreach.The mainclaimI will
advanceis that:thepowerto makebindingpromises, as wellas toforge
a varietyofotherrelatedforms ofcommitment, is an integral partofthe
abilityto engagein specialrelationships in a morally good way,under
conditions ofequal respect.Thisclaim,iftrue,posesa problemforthe
conventionalist.11 The argument proceedsbyexamining whatwouldbe
missing fromintimate relationships ifwe lacked the powertopromise.I
arguethatthepowertopromiseis an essentialtooltoforestall and neu-
tralizemorally problematic inequalities between people and that moral
agents must the to
possess power engage morally in respectful relations
withothers.
I emphasizethepowerto promisebecause,as I willargue,our
abilityto engagein otherformsof commitment (such as the ability
to inducemorally weighty reliance throughcommunication) depends
on thesamepowerthatis in questionwithrespectto promises;ifthe
issueis whetherwe can generateobligationsbywillingand commu-
nicatingtheirexistence,theseobligationsstandor falltogether. Fur-
ther,othersortsofcommitments, the
especially ability to induce morally
weighty reliance,gain muchof theirforceand determinacy in a con-
textthatincludesthe opportunity to makeformal,explicit,and strin-
gentpromises.So, byarguing moral agentsmusthave the "powerto
promise," I meanto encompassthefullrangeofpowersto makecom-
mitments; thissetincludeswhatI regardas thefoundational anchorof
theset,thepowerto makea full-fledged promise, as wellas lesser com-
mitments ofdifferent strengths and contents.
Finally,I concludebyreturning to conventionalism and address-
ing the objection thatthe essay'sargument shows only that we havea
duty to create a convention ofpromising, not that the convention is,so
to speak,morally superfluous.Although I resistthe thrust of this objec-
tion,I alsoarguethatitspremiserepresents a significantconcessionthat
greatly reducesthedistancebetweenconventionalism and nonconven-
tionalism. Once itisgrantedthatthereisa dutytocreatetheconvention
forthe sortsof interpersonal reasonsI adduce,thenthe stingof the
11. AlthoughCharlesFried(1981,13) connectspromising to individual

autonomy,
positionthatis not especiallyconcernedwithindividual
he adoptsa conventionalist
relationships.
485

conventionalist
challengeis ameliorated
and the conventionalist
posi-
tionlosesitsmoraldistinctiveness.
I. Desiderata
Beforeembarking on themainargument, I willdefendsomedesider-
ata fora plausibleviewofpromising. The desiderataare notmeantto
captureall thefoundational aspectsof promising. Rather,theyreflect
somedissatisfactionswithsomeothernonconventionalist accountsthat,
in part,motivatemyapproach.12
The desiderataare as follows:First,an accountof a binding
promiseshouldnotdependuponwhatI willcall thepromisee'sbelief
inperformance, thatis,herbeliefor trustthatthepromisor willactually
do whatis promised. Second,a bindingpromiseneednotforgeor rein-
forcea relationshipofsharedends.Third,a satisfactory
accountshould
nottakepromisesbetweenintimates as unusual,strange,or as outlier
cases.Letme saymoreabouteach desideratum in turn,beginning with
therejectionoftherequirement thatthepromiseebelieveperformance
willoccur.
Li. Promisee'sBeliefin Performance
An important cornerof the promisingliteratureexploreswhether

the wrongof breachof promiseshouldbe analyzedin termsof the
promisee'sdisappointedexpectations alone or in termsof the detri-
mentalreliancetakenby the promiseebased on her expectations.13
Bothexpectation-based and reliance-basedviewspresupposethatthe
promisee must form the expectationthat the promisorwillperform
whatever is promisedforthepromiseto bind (or perhapsforitto have
been formedat all). Theydisagreeas towhether action
on thisexpecta-
tionis also necessary
forthepromisetobind.
To supportthe expectation-based view,Scanlonoffersthe case
of theguiltysecret.Haroldextracts a promisefroma friend,call her
Hedda,tokeepmumtoHarold'snewcolleaguesaboutan embarrassing
12. Withminorexceptions,thesedissatisfactions do not pertainto JudithJarvis

Thomson'snonconventionalist account,however.Mypositionis largely
complementary
to hers,althoughour argumentative differ.
pathssubstantially
13. Representatives
of theexpectation-basedviewincludeFried(1981) and Scan-
lon (1999); representatives
of the reliance-based
viewincludeP. Atiyah(1983), Mac-
Cormick(1972),and,in law,Fullerand Perdue(1936).
486

incidentfromHarold's past, althoughthe promisecannot affect

Harold'scourseofaction.Scanlon(1999,302-3) contendsthepromise
is binding, althoughthereis no actualor potentialreliancebyHarold.I
agreethecase is convincing and showsexpectation-based viewsto have
thebetterofthedispute.
Buttheexamplecouldbe takenfurther in a directionthatcalls
intoquestionbothaccounts'sharedsupposition thatthepromiseemust
believethepromisor willperform.SupposeagainthatHaroldextracts a
transparently sincere promise from Hedda notto reveal the embarrass-
ingincident.But,in thiscase,Haroldis inflatedwithself-importance.
Overestimating thesalaciousvalueofhissecret,he suffers highanxiety.
He believesit nearlyinevitable thatHedda willbe unableto resistthe
temptation to gossip.Supposefurther thatHarold is vocallyneurotic
and tellsHedda ofhisfears.The promisestillbinds,althoughbetrayal
willonlyconfirm thelowexpectations Haroldhasbroadcastto Hedda.
As thisextendedcase shows,thepromiseeneed notbelievethe
promisorwillperformnor need the promisorbelievethe promisee
believesthis.Othercases supportthisposition,includingScanlon's
"Profligate Pal" (althoughScanlon[1999,321] intendsittoconfirm just
theopposite).Pal borrows moneyfromLenderand sincerely promises
to payit back.Lenderhas been burnedby Pal beforeand does not
believePal willrepayhimthoughhe takesPal'spromiseto be sincere.
I submitthatPal owesthemoneysimply becausehe haspromised
repayment. On the expectation-basedview,however, Pal is notboundin
lightofthepromisebecauseLenderhas developedno expectations of
repayment. Scanlonconcedesthatitis counterintuitive to thinkPal has
no dutyto repaybutcontendsthatPal is boundforotherreasons,such
as thoseofgratitude.
I findthisexplanationunconvincing. Noticethatan appeal to
gratitude failsto explainwhy Hedda is bound in theextendedcase of
theGuiltySecret.Perhapsit maybe arguedthatdutiesof kindnessfit
thatbill.In lightofHarold'sdistress, thekindfriend wouldabstainfrom
-
gossiping promiseorno. ButsupposeHedda knowsthatnothing unto-
wardwillhappenifothersknowHarold'ssecret,butHarold'sanxiety
willbe calmed.Perhapsthekindthingto do is to relieveHaroldofhis
secret.IfHedda promised to keepthesecret,shewouldbe bound,even
whentelling(and notpromising to beginwith)wouldbe what'skind.
Whether kindness couldactas thefill-in
valuein Harold'scaseor
not,thisstrategy offossickingfora fill-in
valuehas otherhazards.The
strategy attempts to defusethesensethatthe promisesin thesecases
487

are bindingas suchbyreexplaining the sense thatthereis a dutyin

thesecasesthroughappeal to anothervaluesuchas gratitude or kind-
ness.But thiserrortheorymayprovetoo much.It mightundermine
themoregeneralviewScanlonaimstodefend - namelythatpromissory
dutiesdo arisewhenexpectations develop responseto a promise.If
in
the existenceof a further moralobligationcan dispelthe impression
thatthereis a promissory dutyin casesliketheProfligate Pal,whywon't
it do thesameformanyof thepromissory dutiesScanlondoes recog-
nize?Formanyseriouspromises, thereis oftena strongmoralreasonto
maketheminthefirst place.One's obligations ofkindness, or
gratitude,
beneficence willtypically be engagedas well.Iftheappeal to gratitude
in theProfligate Pal case is effective,
theunderlying threatens
strategy
tobe overinclusive.
I am notsuretheexplanation worksevenin thatcase.Weare to
thinkthisis nota loan securedbya promiseto repay,buta gift;yetit
typicallyviolatesnormsofgratitude toreturn thevery giftthatwasgiven.
Thereare otherreasonsfordoubt.Let'ssharpentheProfligate
Pal case.Aspresented, itisambiguous whether Lenderregardstheprof-
feredpromiseas a farcebut reactsgracefully to let Pal saveface,or
whether Lender,knowing is
repayment unlikely, stilltakesthepromise
to be sincere.Supposethelatter.LendertakesPal's promiseto be sin-
cere,evenifhopelessly LenderwouldlikePal to keep the
unrealistic.
promise, for the reason that Pal promised,and takesPal to be bound
to repay,evenifLenderwouldnot care to wagerthatPal willdo so.
Lenderclarifies: "I amnota charitable giver.I wantyoutoshapeup and
repay me because we are making a deal. Otherwise, considerthemoney
thebountyofyourimmoralcharacter."14 Is Lender'spositionthatPal
is morally boundreallyundermined byhisrealistic assessment ofPal's
moralfortitude? I takeit thatPal is morallybound to repayLender,
despitethefactthat - as Pal knows- Lenderhasformedno expectation
thatPal willrepay.GivenLender'sclarification, itis highlyquestionable
thatgratitude is theproper, muchlessthesole,motivation forPal'sduty
to repay.
14. I am notsuregratitude can be directly Butat leastcertainformsof

forbidden.
of
expression gratitude can be made inappropriatewhere the givermakesclearthat
thatexpressionwouldnotbe a fitting response.The givercouldmakestandardforms
of gratitudeinappropriatewherethe giverdenied thata giftwas beingmade at all;
thegivercouldalso makeparticular expressionsofgratitude
inappropriatewherethe
disclaimedan interest
giverdeliberately in them.
488

and Conventionalism
Promising,
Moreover, I doubtthe forceof a promisecould depend upon

thepromisor's reputation. Whyshoulda publichistory ofpriorbreach
makea contemporary breachmorallyinsignificant?15 Such a position
poses obstaclesto a significantform of moral rehabilitation. Someone
witha priorrecordofinfidelity is unlikely to convincecolleaguesthat
shewillactas promised. Butifshecannotmakea bindingpromise, how
can she showthatshe is nowcapableoffidelity?16 It is unclearhowshe
couldbuildor drawupontrustin thefuture, at leastifsheis amongcol-
leagueswhoknowofherhistory. Norcan shepractice fidelity to develop
thevirtue.17To exclude a personpermanently from the realm ofthose
whocan makebindingpromisesseemsundulyharsh,an extremeform
of moralpunitiveness. Of course,a conceptionof moralobligationis
notimpugnedsimply becauseitmight,on occasion,haveharshconse-
quences.But,ifthe abilityto makebindingpromisesis an important
aspectofparticipation in morally healthyrelationships, as I willgo on
toargue,thiswouldgiveus groundsto questionan accountofpromises
thatrendersbindingpromises inaccessible toautonomous agentswhose
imperfect,butnotmonstrous, pastsare known.
The promiseebeliefrequirement has also been a sourceofvul-
to
nerability conventionalistattack. It renders Scanlon'saccountopento
chargesofcircularity,similarto those mounted byHumeandAnscombe
againstpriornonconventionalist accounts.18 Scanlon'sargument forthe
of
bindingness promises derivesfrom a principledirecting partiesnot
15. Evenworse,whyshoulda falseperceptionof a history of priorbreachexert

thatmoralimpact?
16. See also Kimel2003,17, 19-20.
17. She couldpracticeon theunwitting or thegullible.But,thedefenseofa moral
theory should not relyon the prevalence thesefigures.
of She couldalso actupon her
declaredintentions, but thisis not thesameas keepinga promise;her actionscould
notbe describedas performing hermoraldutybykeepinga promise.Actingon one's
declaredintentions may sometimes drawupon thesamecharacter virtuesand involve
or havingresistedthesametemptations
resisting to defectas are involvedin keepinga
promise,butit is notalwaysso. So too withothersortsof trustworthy behavior.There
are someI expectto be steadfast whenonlytheirownsenseofhonorto themselves is
whena commitment
at stakebut not necessarily to anotheris, and viceversa.In the
imperfect person,also knownas thestandardmoralagent,moralreliability does not
alwaysrunacrosstheboard.
18. See, forexample,Kolodnyand Wallace2003;Pratt2003.Pratt(2003,115) takes
theproblemas an argument forrejecting,as I do, therequirement thatthepromisee
developan expectationof performance, althoughhe endorsesrequirements thatI
reject,namely,thatthe promiseewantsassuranceof performance and the promisor
knowsthis.Anothermore generaland sympathetic explorationof the circularity
489

to intentionallyelicitothers'expectations and offerassurancesonlyto

let themdown.NikoKolodnyand R.JayWallacechallengeScanlon's
presupposition that,absenta socialconvention, a personcould gener-
ateexpectations ofperformance inrecipients merely bycommunicating
an intention to cpon thegroundsthatthisverycommunication creates
a moralreasonforthe promisorto (p.Kolodnyand Wallacecontend
thatScanlon'sprinciplecreatesa bindingobligationonlysubsequent
to the recipient's belief.But,the acquisitionconditionsof the recip-
ient'sbeliefand contentof the offeror's communication alreadypre-
supposethe existenceof a bindingobligation.Hence theyclaimthat
Scanlon'saccountsuffers fromcircularity. Thisformsthebasisoftheir
case forconventionalism as a meansbywhichone could generatea
promisee'sexpectation thattheactionwillbe performed becauseit is
thepromisor's duty. Theirargument supports thecasefor conventional-
ismonlyifweacceptwhatweshouldreject,namely, thepremisethatthe
promisee must believe (or at leastfeel assured)performance willoccur
in orderforthereto be a bindingpromise.Abandoningthe require-
mentof promiseebeliefwould,therefore, defangone motivation for
conventionalism.
Giventhesedifficulties and theirsourcein thepromiseebelief
requirement, whyis therequirement presupposedbymostprominent
accountsof promising? Strangely, not explicitly
it is addressedby its
adherents. It maystemfromthesensethatvalidpromisesare,in some
sense,perceived bythepromiseeas sincere.But,a requirement ofbelief
in performance shouldbe distinguished fromsomesortofrequirement
thatthepromiseetakethepromiseto be sincerely proffered,forexam-
ple, that
itnot be a joke.19Once belief in is
performancedistinguished
problemthatlikewisedependson the assumption thata promisemustgeneratean

expectation ofperformance is pursuedin Den Hartogh1998,354-56.
19. Framinga plausiblesincerity conditionis a delicatematterbecauseeventrans-
parentlyingpromisesmaybind.The lyingpromiseis bindingbecause thepromisor
aimsin earnesttocommunicate a commitment. It therefore fromcasesin which
differs
bothpartiesknowor shouldknowthe proffer is meantinjest and maydiffer from
cases in whichthe promiseeknowsthe proffer is based on fundamentally mistaken
facts.Whatmatters is whetherthepromiseeeitherbelievesthepromisorintendedto
communicate an intentionto perform or intentionally engagedin an objectiveman-
ifestationof an intentionto communicate an intentionto perform.The promisor
shouldact such thatshe provideswarrant fora justifiedbeliefin the promiseethat
thepromisor intendssincerely to conveya commitment to be understoodas such,or
thatthe promisoracts in a waythatstandardly, giventhe context,and the parties'
mutualknowledge ofone another, wouldreasonably be takento communicate sucha
490

fromthepromise'ssincerity, it is difficult
to locatestrongmotivations
forrequiringthe former, and thereare good reasonsto abandonit.
Although itis oftenpresentin promissory situations,thatfactdoes not
renderita necessary conditionofa bindingpromise.
I also suspectthattheattachment to thisrequirement is related
to theoften-posited,but also questionable, of
requirement acceptance of
a promisebythepromisee.20 Promiseeshavea clearinterest in being
able to avoidthe sometimes charged relation of moral debtor to the
But
promisor. protecting this interest entails only that the potential
promiseehavea right(and a low-cost opportunity) torejectthepromise
or towaiveperformance.21
To be sure,somepromises are offered onlyto inducerelianceor
to evokeparticular The
expectations. promisor maybe willingto offer
them,and thepromisedactionsmaymakesense,onlyin situations in
whichthe promiseewillactuallydevelopthe relevantexpectations or
reactin certainwaysupon receipt.Otherwise, thepromisor wouldbet-
terexpend her effortsand commitments elsewhere. In such cases,the
promissory offermayimplicitly containa requirement ofacceptanceor
commitment. Perhapsit is also reasonableto requirethatthepromiseereceivesand

understands thiscommunication. WhatI question,however, is whetherthepromisee
mustalso havefaiththepromisor willlaterperform.
20. See forexample,Thomson1990,296-98.Thomsonarguesthatpromisesare
formedwhenthepromisor invitesreliancebythepromiseeand thepromisee"receives
and acceptstheinvitation (thereis uptake)."Kolodnyand Wallace(2003) arguethat
thisrequirement cannotbe metwithina nonconventionalist accounton thegrounds
thateitheruptakerequiresbeliefand is subjectto thecircularity problem,or uptake
requiresactionbythepromisee, whichtheycontestas a precondition forforming bind-
ingpromises. The concerns Thomson articulates,
however, would be fully bythe
met
moremodestrequirement thatthe promiseemustunderstand whatis beingoffered
and does not rejecttheoffer. In at leastthosecaseswherethepromisorand promisee
do notknowone anotherand itis unclearwhythepromisor's offerwouldbe directed
at the promisee - Thomson'scase of a newspaperad promising she'll go to bed by
midnight nightly- rejectionof the offermaynot even have to be communicated to
theoffe ror.See also Watson2004.Watson(2004,70) assertsthat"promising presup-
poses the promiseewantsor needs assurance.If it becomesmutualknowledgethat
thispresupposition is false,then,whatever elseyouare doing,youare notpromising,"
but thefootnotesupporting thisclaimhingeson an examplein whichthepromisee
attempts to reject
thepromise.
21. See alsoRaz 1977,214.Whataboutcampaignpromises? Whilemanyare cynical
abouttheirsincerity, and moredoubtthelikelihoodoftheirfulfillment, theirstatusas
is
promises rarely challenged. Yet they do not seemaccepted by theiraudience. Could
the mereabilityto voteon the candidatereallybe thoughtof as the opportunity to
rejectwhatis offered?
491

ofbelief,dependingon thesituation. "IfyouwillbelieveI willperform

(p (or,ifyouwillacceptmypromise)shouldI makea promiseto you
to cp,thenI thereby makea promiseto <p."The recognition thatsome
promises have thisconditional
form need notbleed,however, intoinsist-
ing that all bindingpromisestakethisshape.22
Thus I reject the requirementof belief in performance.
An accountof promissory bindingnessshould not depend on the
promisee'sdependenceon, or the beliefin, the promisor'sperfor-
mance.Hence I also rejectbothexpectation and relianceaccounts.23
BecauseI cannotlocatea compelling motivationfortherequirement,
I am inclinedto speculatethatthe promiseebeliefrequirement rep-
resentsan implicit, unintentionalvestigeof one impetusbehindcon-
ventionalism24 - namely,thesensethatdutiesarisein responseto some
22. Whatof CharlesFried'sstrangecase in whichcompletestrangers send me a

notepromising to haveonlytwochildren? See Fried1981,41-43.The promise,ifitis
one at all,does notseembinding.Mightn't thissupporteitheran acceptancerequire-
ment,a requirement thatthe thingpromisedor the promiseitselfat leastappear,
reasonably, to thepromisoras something desirableto the promisee,or a disjunctive
combination of thetworequirements? For thereasonsmentionedin thetext,I think
thecostofeitheralternative is high.The case couldbe handledotherwise, bypositing
thatwherethereis no connectionbetweenthe promiseeand thepromisedthingor
thepromisor, so thatitwouldbe perverseto thinkthepromiseor thepromisedthing
could be of interest to thepromisee,thesepromisesbe interpreted as havinga con-
ditionalformsuchas "Ifyouacceptmypromiseto youto (p,thenI thereby promise
to cp." In such cases,an implicitacceptancerequirement understoodas a condition
withinthepromisemakesmoresensebecauseit establishes a connectionbetweenthe
promiseeand thepromiseor promisedthing.Evenso, absentfurther motivating con-
text(e.g.,theletteris addressedto a memberof some groupadvocating population
control) , I wonderwhetherevenacceptancecouldmakethispromisebinding.
23. I also rejectsuch accountsof threats.A sincerethreatcan be wrongeven if
therecipient is confident thatthethreatener willnotcarryit out or willnotbe effec-
tivebecause,forexample,thethreatened partyhas a foolproof security system.There
maybe a distinctquestionof whethera threatmustbe credible,however, to count
as a threator forit to be wrong.That is to say,one mighttake the positionthat
to be a wrongful threat,the threatened actionmustbe the sortof thingthatcould
possibly be accomplished. One mightrejectan expectation conditionon threats while
nonetheless endorsinga credibility requirement. If someonewereto warnme thatif
I failedto delivermoney,I wouldbe harmedbythe transmission of psychicdaggers,
we mightdoubtthatthiswastrulya wrongful threat;nonetheless, we could stillhold
thatitwasa wrongful threatforthatsamepersonto threaten to inflictharmthrough
standardphysical means,forexample,a knife,evenifI, thetarget, tooktheviewthat
the threatener was,at bottom,a softieand wouldneverfollowthrough.The same
distinction betweencredibility and beliefin performance couldbe drawnwithrespect
to promises.
24. I do notequatethebeliefin a performance requirement withconventionalism.
I merelysuspecttheyhavesimilarmotivational sources.Scanlonendorsestheformer
492

and Conventionalism
Promising,
- in thiscase,a changein themental

externaleventor stateof affairs
statesof thepromiseethatare occasionedbythepromisebutdistinct
fromitscommunication.25
LU. SharedEnds
Perhapsthepromiseebeliefrequirement tracesbackto an old notion

thatpromisesinvolvea meetingof the mindsbetweenautonomous
agents,a waythatindependent partiesmayjoin together. Thatmotiva-
tionmaylie behindanotherfeatureof some accounts,includingone
recentlyadvancedbyDanielMarkovits (2004,1419,1429,1434),namely,
theidea thatpromising involvesthecreationandpursuit ofsharedends.
If themindsdo notmeetoverthebeliefin promisorperformance or
the
through positive acceptance ofthe promise, perhapsthey meet over
theend to whichthepromisor pledgesor thatthepromisepromotes.
Thatsharedend becomesan important component oftherelationship,
and so thepromise, fromrespectfortherelationship, shouldbe kept.
Whatexactlyit meansto saya promiserepresents or createsa
sharedend is unclear.26 it
First, may mean that both partiestakethe
-
contentofthepromiseto be one oftheirends thatwhatis promised
is valuableto each of them,shouldbe done, and thatthe promise
establishes
or distinctively representsthissharedvaluing.This,as I will
argue, need not be true.Or, second,it maymean bothpartiestake
thepromise itselfas one of theirends- something valuablethatshould
be performed. Thisalso need notbe true.Or,third,it mayjust mean
thatbothofthemin somewayregardthepromiseas something on the
conditionbutrejectsconventionalism. Furthermore, couldwellposit

a conventionalist
thatthe reigningconventionis to keep one's wordwhetheror not the recipient
believestheword-giver willkeep it.
25. Thisthemelurksin Anscombe'swriting. See Anscombe1981b,98-99.
to parseexactlywhathappensin Markovits's
26. It is difficult description(2004,
1431-32,includingn. 27). He saysthe promisoradopts the ends "associatedwith
the promisedperformance." He thendeclaresthattheseends are availableto the
promisee - thatis,itis conceivablethepromiseecouldadoptthem - and thattheyare
adoptedbythepromisee.The footnotemakesroomforthe possibility
ordinarily that
thepromiseemayhope thepromiseis broken,but the textthengoes on to saythat
"theendsofthepromisortherefore coincidewiththoseof thepromisee."I am notsure
howthe"therefore" corresponds to theclaimofwhatordinarily and to the
transpires
baitedrecognition oftheexceptionin thefootnote. whatseems
As thetextprogresses,
to be sharedisjust therecognition thatthepromisortransfers powerto thepromisee
overwhether thepromisor willperform theact.I am notcertainthistransfer
ofpower
and mutualacknowledgment ofit is properlyunderstoodas an end,sharedor no.
493

agendaof thatwhichshouldbe done. Something alongthethirdline

seemscorrect, butI am notsurethatmutualrecognition thatan action
is to be done constitutes an end; in anycase,understood in thisway,it
is notclearthatsayingpromising involves sharedendsilluminates any-
thingaboutpromisesthatis notalreadycapturedbythefactthatthe
partiesunderstand thatpromises havemoralweight.
On thefirst twopossiblecharacterizations, theclaimthatpromis-
ing involves shared ends often holds. But ifthe idea thatpromisesneces-
sarily involve shared ends is taken to an
posit illuminating requirement
or a necessary featureofall bindingpromises, it is falseforimportant
and interesting reasons.
the
First, promisor and promiseemayalreadyhavea sharedend,
to
prior anypromisebetweenthem;thepromiseneed notadd an addi-
tionalendtotheirportfolio. Theymaybothbe committed tothemselves
or to othersto pursuingthesamegoal and evenforthesamereasons.
Promises maycreatesharedendsin thosecasesinwhicha commitment
fromanotheris a conditionofone or bothparties'adoptingtheend,
buttheyoftenoccurbetweenpartieswhoalreadyshareends.Consider
thefollowing example:youand I plan to reviewthedepartment's job
applications tomorrow. Weconcurthatwe shouldgetan earlystartand
that9 a.m.wouldbe a civilized, sensibletimeto begin.In a conversa-
tionconfirming our plan,yousay"I'll see youat 9 a.m.,"and I reply
'Yes. . . Do youpromise tobe on time?" Yourespond,'Yes,I'll be on time."
We have not createdor generatedanynewsharedend throughthis
exchange,at leastnotin anyinteresting way;ourendsremainthesame.
Byasking forthe promise, I communicate perhapsa concernaboutyour
past tardiness and a desire for to
you acknowledge thespecialsignifi-
cance of resisting yourtendency to interpret starting timesin a loose
way.You undertake a specialobligationto be on timeand therefore to
pay close attention to the temptations and habits that have previously
led youastray. The promisealtersourmoralsituation, butdoes notadd
a newend.We alreadyhad theend ofmeetingfora sharedpurposeat
a specific, agreeabletime.Further, I mayregarditas regrettable, rather
thanvaluable,thata promiseneed be soughtor reliedupon.
Second,a personmaypromiseto performan actionthatthe
promiseedoesnotespecially valueorregardas an ingredient ofanyend.
Supposein theProfligate Pal case thattheabsurdly wealthy lenderhas
no particular interest in receiving themoneybackas such.The lender
wouldhavepreferred to havemade an explicitgift.But,sincethePal
askedfora loan and promisedto repay,thelendertakesthePal to be
494

bound- eventhoughthereis no distinct end thelendervaluestowhich

repayment contributes. Or take
Joseph Raz's case.A nephewpromises
an uncle to forswear drinking. The uncle does not have anyparticu-
lar concernsabout the nephew'sdrinking and is not of a mindthat
socialdrinking is to be avoided.Nonetheless, ifthenephewmakesthis
promise to theuncle, and theuncledoes not rejectit,thenephewmay
be boundeventhoughtheuncledoes notvaluewhatthenephewhas
promised.27
In somecasesneitherpartywantsthepromiseor thepromised
thing.Twoparties, perhapsaristocratstowardthecloseoftheirera,may
feelboundbytheirrolesto makeand receivea promise,althoughnei-
therpartyvaluesthepromiseor whatis promised.Still,theymayrea-
sonablyfeelboundbythepromises.Somearrangedmarriages mayhave
thesefeatures.28
Casesin whichthepromisee does notshare,muchlessvalue,the
end facilitatedby motivating promisemayseem peculiar.It is
or the
morecommonplace forthepromiseetovaluethepromise, butforrea-
sonsnotsharedbythepromisor. Forinstance,although Amyquiteconfi-
dentlyrevilesthe voice ofCharo, Bernard asks Amy to listento Charo's
27. Raz (1977, 213-14) describesan even more complex case in which the
promiseeis both uninterested in the objectof the promiseand actively wishesthe
promisor to breach because breachwillreveal a true character flawto another party
underthemisapprehension aboutthepromisor's virtue.In a further,
yetnotimplau-
sible,twist,it turnsout thepromisoris wiseto thepromisee'sscheme;he knowsthe
promisee does notdesirethepromisedobjectbutmakesthepromiseanyway, hoping
to keep thepromiseand thereby frustratethepromisee.
28. As discussedin thelastsection,someproffered commitments maybe rejected
byrecipients. Perhapssome proffered commitments are sufficiently and so
repellant,
obviously so, thattheyshouldbe presumedto be implicitly rejectedunlesstheputative
promiseeaccepts.These factscan be accommodated withoutgoingso faras to char-
acterizea promiseas a sharedend. Alternatively, thecommitment maybe a threat,in
whichcase in contrast withpromises,it does not proffer the recipientthe powerto
neutralize orwaivethecommitment. Thesetwooptionsrepresent otherwaysto accom-
modatetheconsiderations Thomsongivesto supportherclaimthatwhilegivingone's
worddoes notrequirethattherecipient careaboutwhatone has asserted,thespecial
case of givinga promisedoes. See Thomson1990,300-301.Thereis a lingering dif-
ficultyaboutthreats, however;theinability of therecipientto neutralizeor waivethe
commitment conditionof threats.
is not a sufficient Whatshouldwe sayof a parent
whocommitsto setup a trustfora child,whichthechildnowwants,iftheparentis
clearthatthecommitment willhold irrespective ofthechild'slatereffort to waivethe
obligation? The parentclearlyhas not threatened. Has the parentpromised?Can a
promisebe nonwaivable byitsnow-willingrecipient? I'm unsure.Perhapsitrepresents
anothersortof commitment suchas a vowof honoror somesuch.
495

newalbum,hopingthe newalbumwillchangeAmy'smind.Bernard
beginsto detailthe album'svirtues. Amywishesto avoidthe tedious
point and counterpoint about Charo 's talentsand defects and theritual
airing ofthe that
charges Amy is close-minded. Instead,Amypromises to
listen.Butwhatsharedend is therehere?It isn'ttoavoida discussion -
thereis nothing Bernardwouldlikemorethanto detailCharo's merits.
And,itcertainly is notAmy'send thatAmywillchangehermind.Amy
promises to listen to Charo,but thatdoes not makelistening one of
Amy'sends,at leastnotin anyinteresting sense.Whiletheydon'tshare
an end becauseofor throughthepromise,thepromiseallowsAmyto
committopursuean end thatis notactually heldorvaluedbyher.This
is an important feature ofthepowertopromise.29 To be able tocommit
toa courseofaction,without valuingitas thepromiseedoes,can facili-
tatehealthy dynamics withinrelationships, as I shallelaborate.Butfirst
a finalrelateddesideratum mustbe addressed, pertaining tothesortsof
relationships and the sortsof promisors promisees shouldbe
and that
accommodated byan accountofpromising.
/.in. Promises
between
Intimates
Manyaccountsof promisingtake promisesbetweenstrangers to be

an accountof promis-
the standardcases aroundwhichto construct
ing.30 mutualconcernor the
Twopartiesapproachone anotherwithout
basisfortrust, betweenthemwouldbe to theirmutual
butcooperation
The promiseis somehow
advantagewereit securefromexploitation.
meantto formthebasisfortrust.31Fromthisvantagepoint,promises
29. One mightresistand saythatthereis a sharedend,something liketheend of

sharinga relationship boundbythetrustcreatedbya promiseor theend of sharing
a relationship markedbyfidelity, and thattheseends are presenteven in the cases
describedabove.But thiscannotbe whatis meantby the idea thatpromising nec-
essarilycreatessharedends,especiallyifthisfeatureis to tellus anything interesting
about promisesand theirbindingforce.True,a promisecreatesa relationship that
involves For it to be
a promise.If thatis all thatis meant,though,itseemsa triviality.
a significant sharedend or formof relationship, we wouldneed a distinctaccountof
whythatkindofrelationship mattered and whyfidelity Butthatis what
to itmattered.
we are afterin thefirst place.Thisnotionofa sharedend and theidea thatpromises
createthemdo nothingto further thatproject.
30. See, forexample,Baier1994,112,118.Baierclaimsthemainusersofpromises
are strangers, althoughshe treatspromiseand contract ratherinterchangeably.
31. Although, ratherpredictably, and especiallyifone requirespromiseebeliefin
performance, thiscreatesdifficulty.For how are strangers withouta basisfortrust
supposed to come to trustone another justbydeclaring some to makethat
intentions
496

and Conventionalism
Promising,
betweenintimates seem anomalousbecause,typically, intimates both

trustand care aboutone another;so, it mayseemunclearwhatprob-
lempromisesbetweenthemare meantto surmount. On suchmodels,
promisesbetweenintimates seem aberrational at bestand difficultto
fathom atworst.
But accountsthat place promisesbetweenintimatesat the
to squarewithour experience
are difficult - withthepreva-
periphery
lence of promisingwithinthe family, for instance.32 Promisesare
learnedfairly and a
young33 play significant role in the parent-child
Ifyouspendtimearoundyoungchildren,
relationship. younoticehow
assiduously manychildrenseek (and remember)promisesand how
prominently theyloomin children's moralconsciousness. Childrenmay
exaggerate their but a of
significance, theory promising seems defective
totheextentthatitcannotmakesomesense ofthis behavior or regards
thesepromisesas abnormalor illusory. Whereas,a theory ofpromising
thatcould motivatepracticesof promising amongthosewho already
careforand trust one another wouldnot onlysquarewithour experi-
ence,butmightilluminate ourunderstanding ofthefunction promises
serve.
An accountof promising shouldtreatpromiseswithinfriendly
and intimaterelationships central,thoughnot exclusive,cases.
as
Indeed,I willarguethatan accountof morallydecentrelationships
the case? See, forexample,Hume 1978,3.2.5; Kolodnyand Wallace2003, 141-43.

Scanlon'sdiscussionbeginswithstrangerand neighborcases to whichhe returns
(Scanlon 1999,296-97 and 305), althoughtheyare not his onlyexamples.(Recall
Harold and the prioracquaintance.)His starting pointsmayrepresentan effort to
avoidimplicit relianceon specialunderstandings betweenfriendsand intimates.Liam
Murphy motivates thearms-length assumption on thegroundsthatpromisesmakeup
foran absenceof trustbut thatintimates who alreadyenjoytrustand care forone
another'sinterests haveless need forpromises.See Murphyn.d. BothKimel(2003)
and Markovits (2004) also rejectthisassumption. See note9.
32. See also Raz'sperhapsstronger complaint(Raz 1982,931): Promisesbetween
strangersare theexception,and anyattempt to understandthepracticeofpromising
byfocusingon theseunusualpromisesis onlytoo likelyto breeddistortions."
33. A shortoverview of the literatureon children'scognitionof promisescan be
foundin Lyon2000,1058-63.Some contendthatchildrendo notachievea complete
understanding of promising untiltheyare nine or eveneleven.Lyonarguesthatthis
evidenceis surprising in lightoftheparentalexperienceofyoungerchildren'sappeal
to others'pastpromises.He further arguessomeof theexperimental evidenceis mis-
leading and may reflectcomplications in experimentaldesign.His own experimental
researchprovidessomeevidencethatnonabusedchildrenhad a good understanding
of the distinction between"I will"and "I promise"by age six and thatmistreated
childrenlaggedbehindbyone to twoyears.
497

mustincludethepowerto promise.I do notclaimthatspecial,volun-

couldnotdevelopwithout
taryrelationships formal)promises.
(explicit,
But,beingable to promiseplaysa role in forestalling some morally
undesirable dynamics within and
specialrelationships in an
reinforcing
important of
aspect equality within them. This claim underscoresa dif-
ferencein emphasisbetweenmyaccountand othernonconventionalist
accounts,one broachedin theearlierdiscussion on sharedends.Many
focuson promises as waystoinduceotherstoactinwaystheywouldnot
otherwise.Whathas been relatively neglectedis thewaypromisesmay
contribute to the characterof,and emotionsassociatedwith,actions
thatwouldbe undertaken anyway.
II. IntimateRelationshipsand theNeed forPromising

Havingarticulated somedesiderata foran accountofpromising, I pro-
pose nowto drawattention to thesignificance ofpromising in personal
relationships, and thereby toshed new lighton the controversy overcon-
ventionalism. One wayto oppose conventionalism is to attackitscen-
tralmotivation, namely, thepuzzleaboutwillingobligations intoexis-
tence.I willexpresssomedoubtsaboutthispuzzle,butI willnotattack
itdirectly,in partbecausethenatureofthemystery remainsopaque to
me.A secondstrategy woulddemonstrate that
directly promising could
arisewithoutrecourseto a convention. This has been Scanlon'sstrat-
egywithwhichI havesympathy. As he developsit,however, Scanlon's
approach, as I have justargued,appeals to values
extraneous to thebind-
of -
ingness promises specifically, to the of
wrong disappointing culti-
vatedexpectations. One couldtryagainwithout relying on thosevalues,
butif,as I suspect, thepowertopromiseand theassociatedmoralduties
are fairlyfundamental, thenitwillbe hardto demonstrate thisdirectly
in a waythatis illuminating.
Mystrategy is indirect.It offers a reductioof thedistinctive ele-
mentsofconventionalism and a transcendental argument forconclud-
ing we have the to
power promise. The conventionalist storyhas itthat
promises are not among the fundamental moral elements, so to speak.
Rather, they are conventional constructs. The wrong promisebreak-
of
ingand thepowertomakepromises arederivative oftheseconventions,
coupled with distinct moral principles againstharming, free-riding, or
undermining a beneficial social practice. On thistheory, promises are
inventions thatwecouldhavefailedtoinventandstillgottenbymorally,
althoughperhapslesswelland lessefficiently. Butis itreallyplausibleto
498

imaginea morally acceptableworld - or evensimply morallyacceptable,

complex,and closerelationships - without thepowerto promise?34
Positively, I assumethatwe are capable of minimally morally
decentinterpersonal relationships and that autonomy rightsencom-
the
pass right to form some such This
relationships. assumption presup-
poseswhatI taketo be a relatively uncontroversial conceptionofmin-
imallymorally decentinterpersonal relationships;theassumption may
resteitheron an invocation ofa rathermodestversionofought-implies-
can or perhapsanothersourceofmoraloptimism. I furtherassumethis
capacityitselfis notthedirectproductof contingent conventions, but
is a noncontingent capacity,albeitone thatlikemanynoncontingent
- moraland otherwise
capacities - maybe enhancedby,and sometimes
dependon, a conducive atmosphere.35 Althoughspecialrelationships
are clearlyinfluenced and oftengivensupportbyconventions, theyare
not usuallythoughtto depend on contingent social conventions for
theirexistence orfortheirminimal moralhealthamongwilling, compli-
antmoralagents.(I willreturn tothisassumption.) I willthenarguethat
ourcapacity toconductourrelationships in a minimally morally decent
waydepends on our the to
having power promise (as wellas related,
derivativepowersofcommitment). Therefore, givenournoncontingent
capacityand its dependence on the to
power promise, wemusthavethe
powerto promise.To pursuethisstrategy, I identify somefeaturesof
promises that make them or their possibilitymorallyindispensable to
specialrelationships.
34. Hume (1978) describesotherconventions, suchas theconvention ofproperty,

as "necessaryforthe establishment of humansociety"(TreatiseIILii) and seemsto
takea likeviewof promising: "Tison thestrictobservance. . . [ofthelawof perfor-
manceofpromises, alongsiderespectforproperty] . . . thatthepeace and securityof
humansocietyentirely depend;noris thereanypossibility of establishing
a good cor-
respondenceamongmen,wheretheseare neglected"(TreatiseIll.vi).Whathe seems
to have in mind,however, is whatis necessaryforcivilsociety.His examplesinvolve
relationshipsbetweenstrangers, neighbors,partners formutualadvantage, and those
engagedin businesstransactions; he is not advancingclaimsaboutwhatis necessary
formorally decentinterpersonal relationships.
35. Thatis, thecapacitycould existwithouttheinvention or maintenance of con-
tingentconventions. In some contingent social circumstances, includingour own,it
mightbe thatwe could not eat or breatheor drinkunlesscertaincontingent con-
ventions,inventions, and institutions
werein place; ifthiswereso, we also could not
exerciseour noncontingent moralcapacitiesand abilities.Butthissortof relianceon
conventions is itselfcontingent and notdirectin therelevant sense.
499

ILL Consent
I previewthe argumentabout promising by firstrunninga parallel,
but simpler,argumentabout a relatedcommunicative activitywith
similarfeatures,namelyconsent.Manyworriedabout the generative
problem focus on promising
exclusively as thoughpromising uniquely
involvedthegeneration ofmorally significant relations merelythrough
the expressionof thewillto do so. But,promising is not singularin
thisrespect,as theexampleofconsentshows.36 The idea thatan agent
can intentionallyforman obligationthroughtheexerciseand expres-
sionofherwillalone (and notbyfirst transforming thestateofaffairs
aroundher) comespartand parcelwithanyplausibleconceptionofan
autonomous agent.
Whenan agentgivesconsentto another - to a doctorto per-
forman examination ortoa worker toentertheagent'sapartment - she
transforms,in thewayintended, themoralsituation betweentheparties
simplythrough the transmissionofher willto do so. Priortoconferring
the
consent, agent'sright to controlherbody, and her property,forbade
or
touching entering as forms ofassault
and trespass. Simply byexpress-
ing herwill,the consenting agentmorallytransforms the situationas
intended,thereby generating a permission foranother.A newobliga-
tionarisestoo.The agentbecomesobligednotto raisecomplaints that
she otherwise couldmakeaboutentryintoherpersonalspaceand has
a dutyto inform therecipientifshewishesto revokethepermission.37
Thus,consentalsoreconfigures themorallandscapeofpermissions and
36. Thereare otherpertinent examplesas well,suchas commands. Still,somemay

thinkthatcommandsgaintheirforcefroman authority relationthatin turndepends
on some sortof commitment and perforce,the powerto makecommitments. That
topic is too broadto takeup here.
37. Here,I differ fromRaz (1981,120-22).He arguesconsentdiffers frompromise
in thatconsentneed not imposean obligationon the consenterbut mayaffecthis
normative situationmerelybywaivinga right.Raz alsoarguesfortwootherdistinctions
betweenconsentand promising. First,he contendsthatconsent,unlikepromising,
maybe givenwithoutthe purposeto do so, as whenone entersa parkto walkbut
whereone is on noticethatentryrendersone subjectto itsrules.Second,promising,
unlikeconsent,mayconfera "rightof recipience"on another,"e.g. a rightto be
paid a certainsum of money," whereasconsentmayonlyconfera "rightof action
. . . e.g. a righttojoin the expedition."
These distinctionsdo not bear directly on
myargument, butI havereservationsaboutthemnonetheless. Withinsomecontexts
of understanding, one maymakea promisethroughsilenceevenifthatis not one's
purpose;one is just lazy.Also,one may,by consent,conveya rightof recipience,
thoughperhapsonlyindirectly. Supposea defaultmechanism is programmed tosupply
a monthly paymentto me, but mustfirstgo throughyourcheckpoint. Byfailingto
500

and Conventionalism
Promising,
obligationsthrough themeretransmission oftheintention todo so and

without first the
altering independently describablestate of affairs.
To be sure,consentand promising can differ.
First,consent need
not involvecommitment intothefuture.It oftenexertspowerin the
present may givenand laterwithdrawn.
or be By contrast, promises
are pro tantoirrevocable bind
and,typically, the agentintothefuture.
Those formsof consentthatbindintothefuturemayseemmorelike
hybrids- disguisedpromisesnot to laterrevoke,or to obeylater.Sec-
ond,consent'sprimary moralimpactis tocreatea permission foranother
to actin an otherwise unauthorizedway. The obligations generatedare
itssubsidiary consequences.Whereas,a promise's primary moralimpact
is to generatean obligationon thepromisorand powersand permis-
sionsforthepromisee(namely,to come to expector relyon whatis
promised, withgroundsforcomplaint ifdisappointed, and thepowerto
relievethepromisor ofobligation).
But,thesetwodifferences do notbearon thefeatureunderlying
theputativepuzzleaboutpromising's invocation of a putativelymyste-
riousmoralpower.Theybothaltermoralstatuswithouta changein
circumstances thatis independentof the parties'wills.Whythenhas
consentseemedso unexceptional, sufficientlyinvisibleso as to render
sensibletheidea thatpromisesare uniquein thisrespect?38 Perhapsit
is becausethismoralpowerflowsso naturally froma plausibleunder-
of a
standing meaningful of
right autonomy.
One couldimaginea conceptionofautonomy without consentin
whichan agentexercisedcompletesovereignty overher bodyand other
personalspaces,suchas thehome,buthadno ability toshareortransfer
exerciseyourveto,youconsentto myreceiving themoney,thoughyoudo notconfer

a rightofaction.
38. AnnetteBaier (1985, 183-86), however,discussesconsentand promising
together, tracingthe (somewhatinconsistent) connectionHume drewbetweenthe
activities(Hume 1978, 498, 520, 525). In Hume's discussion,as in Baier's,how-
ever,consentis understoodnarrowly, as authorizingthe transfer of real property,
whereproperty and the rightsconnectedto it are understoodas stemming froma
convention-based practice.Othersortsof consent,includingthe sortsnecessaryfor
humanphysical interaction,go unnoticed.WhileI finditplausiblethatsystems ofreal
property,and the rightsassociatedwiththem, are I
conventional, do not thinkthat
basic rightsof moralcontroloverone's bodycould be fullyconventional. Prichard
also notesthesimilaritybetweenpromising and givingand exchanging. See Prichard
2002a,257 and also Prichard2002b,266-67.Givingand exchanging, likepromising,
involvethe sortof consentthatinvolves, or at leastborderson, a promise - because
they involvea commitment to allowanotheruse of a and
thingpermanently thereby
giveone's irrevocable, consent.
future-regarding
501

thesepowersto others.Thatis, theagentcould not grantconsentto

othersto exercisethesepowersin lieu of or alongsideherself.Such a
structureis imaginablebut so impoverished as to be utterly implausi-
ble. AsJosephRaz (1986,chap. 14) has argued,thedevelopment and
ofourcentralautonomouscapacitiesrequiresa diverseand
realization
richsetofmeaningful options.Rightsofautonomous controlthatwere
inalienabletothisdegreewouldrender(morally) impossible realforms
ofmeaningful humanrelationships and thefulldefinition and recogni-
tionoftheself(notto mentionmakingmedicaland dentalcarecum-
bersome, dangerous, andawfully painful).To forgemeaningful relation-
ships,embodied human beings must have the to
ability interact within
thesamephysical space,to sharetheuse of property,and to touch one
another.Theymusttherefore be able to empowerparticular people.A
plausibleaccountof autonomy wouldhave to rejectthe isolationthe
constricted modelofself-sovereigntywouldenforceas inconsistent with
affordingopportunities to lead a decent lifeand realizeone's central
capacities.It wouldhaveto includethe powerof consentto shareat
leastsomeofthepowersassociatedwithself-sovereignty.
U.U. Promising
I willnowproceedto construct a similarargumentabout the power

to promise.Justas a pictureof individual autonomy withoutconsent
a conceptionof a moralworldwithoutthe powerto
is implausible,
promise seems unsustainable.The implicitconventionalist assumption
thatpromisesare a contingent construct we havedone
that,morally,
and could do withoutis absurd.The autonomy of moralagentsmust
be capableofbeingexercisedwithinand throughrespectful relations
withothers.For thisto occur,therightofautonomy mustcontainthe
powerto makebindingpromises.The backboneof the argumentis:
An autonomousliferequiresthe opportunity to engagein meaning-
ful,moralrelationswithothers.Meaningful, moralrelationsdependon
the
agentshaving ability to makebindingpromises.
So, whatwouldour personalrelationships lackwerewe without
to
thepower promise? Partiescould not bind themselves throughthe
communication of theirintentionto do so. At most,theycould say
to one another"I intendto cp"but thiswouldalwaysridealongside
"butI am not morallybound to you to (pjust
an implicitdisclaimer:
becauseyouknowofmyintention through mydeclaration;norwouldI
be boundifyouactedinrelianceuponmydeclaration." In sucha world,
502

partiescouldoftencoordinate: theycoulddeclaretheirwantsand their

intentions and thenhopeforthebest.IfI wantedtoattenda concertbut
onlytheone youwereattending, I could inquireaboutwhichconcert
you intended to attend, tell youmydesireand intention, showup, and
hope that you had not changedyour mind. You would be in thesame
situation too. Shouldeitherofus changeour mindsin theinterim, we
mightfailto coordinate; at leastone ofus maybe disappointed.
Some partof our social lifeis like this.We declareour plans
to otherpartieswho maybe interested, makingmutualadjustments
basedon whatwe learnthrough suchcommunications, and we delight
whenthingsworkoutand mindschange.But,really, thispartofsocial
lifeis ratheruncommon.Reiteratedinteractions of thiskinddo not
develop into or sustain strongrelationships. Could an intimate relation-
shipthrive on healthy terms(or develop)ifthiswereall we coulddo?
Let's considera case- twopeople who are or who aim to be
friends, whotakeeachothertohaveequal moralstanding, andwhocare
about one another. Howwillthey fare without the to
power promise? A
fewadditionalassumptions willisolatetheworkofpromisesand disen-
tangle them from the work done byothertacitmoralunderstandings
insideinterpersonal relations.Bothpartiesare forthcoming. Theytell
the truthabouttheirdesires,beliefs,and intentions, and each knows
theotherto tellthetruth.Let'salso supposethepartiesare transpar-
ent,pedantically so if necessary, and articulatein theirspeechabout
theirattitudes and perceivedmoralrelations towardone another. Aswe
-
workthroughthecase,thepartiescannot evenimplicitly or without
awareness - use theresources, eveninmorecasualorlessstringent ways,
providedbythe powerto promise.So, the partiesknowtheyare not
morally boundto protectotherparties'relianceinterests thatdevelop
merelybecauseof whata partysaysaboutwhathe or she intendsto
do. I willlaterdefendthisassumption at greaterlength.Putbriefly, the
motivation behindthisassumption is thattheconsiderations thatmoti-
vatetheconventionalist accountwouldalsocallintoquestionthemoral
forceof relianceinterests absenta convention thatallowedpeople to
relyreasonably on others' declarations.
On theseassumptions, we would need promises.Then, I will
return to theassumption aboutrelianceand explorewhether themoral
obligationto protectothers'relianceinterests is logicallyprioror sub-
ordinateto thenotionofpromissory-type powers.Evenifrelaxingthe
assumption aboutrelianceweakenedthepowerof thethoughtexperi-
mentI pursue,iftheidea thatrelianceexertsa moralforcein someway
503

dependsuponhavingpromissory-type powers,thegeneralargument for

thefoundational necessity a
of promissory powerwouldstillbe vindi-
cated.
Backto theexample:A strongly wishesto cp,butonlyifB (psas
well.ForA, (p-ing is important or worthwhile onlyifitis a jointactivity
withB. Assumethatwe are discussing somematterofimportance, not
the
merely philosopher's of a
staple picking personup from the airport
or meetingsomeoneforlunch.Promisesaboutrelatively insubstantial
matters are common,butitis peculiarto fixateon themand to ignore
theweighty subjectsinvolved in manypromises. <pis an activity thatwill
makea difference tothecharacter ofA'sandB's lives,forexample,mov-
ingto a particular city.A statesherintention B
to cpas a joint activity.
stateshiscurrent intention to(pwithA,butitisclearthatB haslessofan
interestincpthanA. B findssomeofthealternatives to(p-ing,alternatives
open only to B, quite attractiveand closecompetitors. B's current
From
vantagepoint, it is not perfectly clear whether ç or itsalternatives are
preferable, thoughcpseemspreferable now.Closertothetimeofaction,
moreinformation willbe availablethatwillrevealwhichoptionis more
worthy. On ourassumptions, bothA and B areawarethatB's declaration
ofintention does notmorally bindhimto(p.
In thissituation, A and B areunequallysituated withrespectto(p.
Thismayaffect theirrelationship. WhatisA todo?Bothareequallyenti-
tledto reconsider, yetA'sinterest in (p-ingwithB is muchstronger than
in
B's interest (p-ing withA,givenB's alternatives. A is more vulnerable.
IfA preparesto cp,herriskthatherinvestment willgo unredeemedfor
reasonsbeyondhercontrolis higherthanB's corresponding risk.This
greatervulnerability may, in some cases,lead to of
feelings powerless-
nessor frustration thatcan further maketherelationmorefraught. Or,
A might,out of self-protection, failto investor preemptively alterher
intention, to avoidrisking disappointment and to eliminatethesource
and exposureofhervulnerability. A's withdrawal maycutagainstboth
B's and A's interests, partlybecause such behaviors can sourrelation-
shipsand partly becausewhatmaybe bestforthembothis to (p.39
39. I focushereon thenegativeunderpinnings of theperhapsmorefamiliar pos-

itivepointthatpromisesmaycreatetheconditionsnecessary forpartiesto engagein
thattheyotherwise
joint activity wouldnotperform absentthesecurity providedbya
promise.These negativeunderpinningsare, I believe,priorto the positivepotential
promisesprovide.
504

and Conventionalism
Promising,
Or,A mightreactin the oppositewayto tryto makeit more

likelythat B willnot reconsider. Withoutthe abilityof B to give,and
ofA to elicit,a commitment, A facesis that,givenwhat
the difficulty
A wants,A mustjust hope forB to wantwhatA wantsand to use the
resourcesat herdisposalto bringthisabout.WhatcouldA do in light
ofherposition? She couldsweetenthepotbyannouncing intentionsto
do otherthings B wantsshouldB cp,tomakecpclearly superior. Ex hypoth-
esi,A's intentionsare notbinding.Nonetheless, ifA implements them,
theymayreplace the of
inequity vulnerability with a more substantive
inequity - a transfer
ofgoodsor services fromA toB. Suchtransfers can
makesensewithinthesubstanceofa good relationship whendoingcp
alreadyobjectively redounds to A'sgreater benefit or is objectivelymore
to
costly B, but thatis not the situationI describe. Here, the transfer
of goodsis notpropercompensation to B based on a substantive and
unfairinequality betweenthem,buta concreterealization of theirdis-
proportionate vulnerability.A's situationmakesherbothvulnerableto
exploitation byB and at riskthat she willbe temptedherselfto initiate
exploitative arrangements.40
Again,thisis nota healthy dynamic forequal participants toplay
out, at leastnot with to
respect important matters, especially when sus-
tainedovertime.B mayrebuff theseoffers, or attempt to excludethem
fromhis deliberations. But it is unclearhowhe can quell themfrom
A fromtheget-goif(pis notclearlybestto B and B is morally freeto
40. I assumeexploitation can occurwhenA transfers goods to B to induceB to

perform an activityevenwhen,takingintoaccountthe costof the transfer fromA,
the activityB is inducedto perform willmakeA betteroffin materialrespectsthan
A otherwise wouldbe. SupposeA and B bothenjoyan equal levelof resources, cal-
ibratedin the properwayto takeaccountof anydisabilities or relevantdifferences
in theirabilitiesto makeuse of resources.Activity Q wouldbenefitA and B equally
relativeto theirstartingbaseline,butalternative R and S are availableto B,
activities
thoughnot throughanymeriton B's part,and wouldbenefitB no morethanQ;
no such alternatives are availableto A. Otherthingsbeingequal, wereA to trans-
fer80 percentof the benefitQ suppliesto A to induceB to electQ overR and S,
and wereB to accept,thisarrangement wouldbe, primafacieexploitative (at least
betweenfriends) - eventhoughA desiresQ morethanB, and eventhoughA's trans-
ferstillmakesQ worthwhile to A. The substantive,objectiveinequalitybetweenA
and B, achievedjust throughB's superiorbargaining position,is exploitative.
See also
mydiscussionofobjectionable exploitativearrangements thatneverthelessbenefitthe
exploitedin some wayin Shiffrin 2000, 205, 233-34.A fullaccountof exploitation
requirescriteriato determine whatsortsof transfers countas exploitative,especially
whenthepartyreceiving thetransfer has greateropportunitycosts,butthattaskcan-
notbe pursuedhere.
505

changehismind.ThisgivesA an incentive totrytoinfluence B's deliber-

ationsbymaking(pmoreattractive. Or itmayencourage A to makenot
lessattractive.
cp-ing -
A could announceor act on intentionsto make
otheractivities of B's thatA typically facilitatesmorecostlyshouldB
change hismind. This a
produces different, but no healthier,dynamic.
Finally,A mightredoubleherefforts to persuadeB ofthesupe-
of(poverotheroptions.She maycontinueto provideB withrea-
riority
sons,arguewithB, and evenciteherownpotentialdisappointment if
B does not(pas a reasonforB to do it.Suchactivities are notintrinsi-
callydestructive in relationships. Quitethecontrary. Butin somesitu-
ations,prolongedovertimeor wherethereis a senseofurgency, they
can becomedangerous.WhatifB does notcare to discussthematter
further?B maydeclarea lackofinterest in continuedconversation, but
thisdeclaration may make
itself the relation more strained.If B is really
unconvinced of thesuperiority of cp,B cannotmisleadA, and so can-
notstaunchtheconversation without risking tensionofanothersort.Or
supposeitis notso muchthatB has tiredofdiscussion butthateither
A or B finditdegrading orjustawkward and unseemly forA to haveto
dwellopenlyupon herpotentialdisappointment and hervulnerability.
Whatcan B do if B nevertheless wishes to give a reasonto feelshe
A
need notgo tolengthsto persuadehimofthesuperiority of(pi
If B wereable to promiseto A to <p,B could end or preempt
theconversation and thecontinuing deliberation. Promisesare,inter-
conversation-stoppers.
estingly, So muchso thatifA weretopersist with
reasonsin thefaceofB's sincerepromise,itwouldrepresent a certain
or
insensitivity thickness, even rudeness; it is like being poorwinner.
a
Even ifB weretransparently unconvinced of <p'ssuperiority, it would
notmatterbecausea promisewouldrepresent a waiverof B's rightto
decidethematter basedupontheperceivedmerits ofcpalone.B would
havetransferred thatpowertoA.41The capacityofa promiseto end a
conversation is notvaluablemerelybecauseitforestalls tediousdiscus-
sionsthatmaykindleconflict openor wounds. It represents thepower
promises givefriends to navigate aroundthefactthattheyare notiden-
motivated
tically and not
may always sharethesameagenda.The ability
topromiseprovides a crucialtooltopermitmutualengagement among
the fluidity
41. Althoughpromisesact as conversation-stoppers, of the linguistic
meansbywhicha promiseis made generatesthepossibility issuinga
of inadvertently
promise.Thisriskmaypromptgreaterdiscussionand precisionin thearticulation
of
to makeclearwhattheyare supposedto signify.
intentions
506

and Conventionalism
Promising,
equals,whoare nevertheless distinct and diverse,withouteitherparty

the to
feeling pressure homogenize.
Butis theability topromisereallynecessary? Couldn'tBjuststate
an intention to q>becauseitis whatA wantsor declarean intention not
to reconsider on thegroundsthatreconsideration wouldbe bad forthe
relationship? IfB caresforA andwantsA'sgood,shouldn'tB declarean
intention to cpnotmerelyon <p'smeritsbutforA's sake?Wouldn'tthis
be sufficient toforestall A'spreemptive activities?Communicated inten-
tionsofthiskindcan do somework,buttheyare notalwayssufficient.
As stipulated, themeredeclarationofan intention to (pdoes notbind
thedeclarernorauthorize therecipient toholdthedeclarerresponsible
for(por anylostinvestment costs.Morally, B is freeto changehismind.
So longas thatis true,theunderlying currents thatarisefromcontin-
gencyremain.Further, forthedeclaration againstreconsideration tobe
B
fullyconvincing, may have to voice the hazards to the relationship of
reconsideration. In somecircumstances, thisrecitalitselfis partof the
destructive dynamic B is attempting to circumvent.
Could B publiclyvow,to himself, on his honor,not to change
hismind,thereby B
giving greater reason to staysteadfast, reasonthat
wouldbe evidenttoA?Thismoveseemsunavailableto theconvention-
alist,atleastnotone motivated in thetraditional ways.HowcouldB lack
thepowerto bindhimself toA through a declaration ofintention to do
so buthavethepowerto bindhimself to himself through a declaration
ofintention to do so?
Further, whatis importantly missingfromsolutionsthatinvolve
increasingly more complexnestingsof intentions, declarations, and
vowsis anyinvolvement ofA. Becauseno statement of intention byB
createsan obligation toA,A remainsa bystander toB's decisionand B's
futureaction.Butthatis thecruxoftheproblemtheyfacein thefirst
place- thefalloutfroma localizedimbalanceofpower.
Bycontrast, a promisebyB involves A directlybycreating a moral
obligation to A and the power in A to insiston or to releaseB from
performance. Thereby, an
thepowertopromiseprovides opportunity to
precludethedevelopment oftheotherdestructive potentials withinthe
situation. to B's
Promising cpconveys willingness to forswear themoral
right to alter course. B's participation longerdependenton how
is no
B perceivesthemeritsoftheactivity at thetimeofaction.The promise
acknowledges A's investment in the situationin a waythatincludesA
ratherthanmakingA a bystander to whatunfolds(as intention-based
solutionsdo). The promiseto A does notjust increasethelikelihood
507

ofB's performance (ifitdoes so at all) butactively affirms A's statusas

a freeperson,capableand worthy ofexercising sound judgmentabout
whatis to be done. B's relinquishment andtransfer of thatpowerto A
worksto neutralize aspects of thesituation's hazards and to restorean
equal standing between A and B in thislocal domain.42
Of course,the issuanceof a promisedoes not guaranteeper-
formance. A promiseemaybecomevulnerable to thepromisor in new
ways on the occasionof a the
promise: promiseemayworry whether the
will the
promisor perform; promiseemayrely on the promise,making
himor hermorevulnerable thanbefore;and thepromisor maydirectly
or
exploit inadvertently the
disappoint promisee's expectations through
breach.
I agree thatthe prospectand realityof brokenpromisesmay
introducefurther or newinequalitiesintoa relationship. So maythe
extraction ofpromises a
by stronger party that do not serve theweaker
promisor's But
interest. these factsdo not undermine mypoint.I do not
meanto suggestthatpromises magicallyrepelall vulnerabilities, repair
and lockdownthefuture.
all inequalities, Rather, formoralagentsact-
ing in moralcharacter, promisesprovidea unique and indispensable
tooltomanage assuagevulnerabilities.
and Thisclaimiscompatible with
thefactthatthismoraltoolmaybe misusedbythosewhodo notact
morally welland thattheprospectand reality ofmisusemaycreatenew,
distinct problems and tensions. The complications posed byimmoral
actionare not unique to promising. Other moral devices and duties
maybe perverted or misused.For instance,thevirtueof beneficence
may misapplied.It maygiverisebothto overweening
be interference
and unhealthy formsofdependence.The lessneedymayportray mat-
tersso as to manipulatemorallymotivated help and service from the
moreneedy.The possibility ofmisusedoes not,however, impeachthe
essential importance of duties and virtuesof beneficence to establishing
and maintaining morally goodrelations. So toothepossibility ofmisuse,
on
breach,and overreliance promises does not serve to undermine the
42. CompareBarbaraHerman's(2002) reconstruction ofKant'sargument forthe

necessityof marriage - to repairand regulatetheinequalities
- a legalcontract inher-
ent in sexualrelations.Kantconsidersthe narrower matterof the inequalitiesand
thatarisefromsexualdesireand beingitsobject.He is bothperhapsunduly
indignities
aboutthenecessity
pessimistic forlegalrelationsto resolvethemand overlyoptimistic
aboutthepotentialof legal relationsto do so. Our accounts,however,sharea sense
thatagreements mayredistributeor managepowerin waysthatregulateitshazards.
508

and Conventionalism
Promising,
claimthattheabilityto promiseis essentialto morallygood relations

betweenpeople.
It willnothaveescapedattention thattheexamplerehearsedin
thissectioninvolvesone partyproviding the otherassurance.Earlier,
however, I arguedthattheneedforassurance, achieving assurance, and
producing promisor beliefin performance are not necessary conditions
on orfeatures ofpromising. Examplesinvolving assurancecan highlight
thesignificance or function ofpromising without relying on assurance
as a necessary feature.Noticethat,evenintheexample,workisdoneeven
ifA is notsuccessfully assured.B no longerhas a moralpermission to
changehismindand thereby hasa newreasonto(p.Further, B's failure
tocpwillalterhismoralstatuswithrespecttoA and,justifiably, A'sviewof
B's moralcharacter. Otherexamplesunderscore thatassurancemaynot
be necessary forthefunction ofpromising to be served.The Profligate
Pal mayproffer a promiseto repay,evenifhe is notdeceivedaboutthe
recipient's beliefsabouthisfidelity. Nonetheless, thepromiseservesas
a concretemanifestation oftheborrower's willingness to surrender the
righttokeepthemoneyand hiseffort to reestablishhimself as a person
of
capable being trusted.Likewise, a friend may offera promise,even
wherethereis no signofinsecurity or needforassurance, toshowgood
faithand to offer for
a foundation security and manifest the willingness
to handlelocalizedpowerwell,byempowering theothercooperating
party. Still,althoughassuranceneed notbe theaimor effect ofpromis-
itis
ing, certainly a common aim and effectof promising - even a central
use ofpromising.
The suggestion thatthe powerto promiseprovidesan impor-
tantwayto managevulnerability maybe reinforced byreturning to the
case of children.Theirneed forpromisesarisesindependently of the
qualityofparenting and is directedat eventhemostloving,nurturing,
devotedparents.It is implausibleto attribute children'sstrongdesire
forpromises to
predominantlyparental failures toattendto theirneeds
or evento theirinsecurity aboutwhether they lovedand important.
are
The parent-child relationship, though,does carryan important, emo-
tionally charged,powerimbalance.Whathappensto childrenis largely
determined bytheirparents;childrenhavelittleofficial power.In seek-
ing promises,they seek some measure of acknowledged controlover
theirexperience.To promisea childis, in a limited domain,to share
powerwithhimor her.Providing a promiseon anyparticular occasion
be
may morally discretionary, but once given, the stateof vulnerability
509

and subordination ofthechildwithrespectto thatissueis,at someoffi-

ciallevel,suspended.43
To allowchildrento be promiseesis partofpreparing themfor
operating as an equal,exercising autonomy oftheir own,havingpower
of varioussorts.Of course,promiseesmustwaitto see whetherthe
promisor willactin character as a moralagentor violatethetrust.But
thataspect- trueofmanycasesin whichone is theobjectofa duty - is
notwhatis distinctive aboutthestatusand powersassociatedwiththe
promissory duty and the relationship.Beinga promiseeis not a fully
passivestate;thepromiseeofficially wieldspowercededbythepromisor.
Childrenalso seekthestatusofpromisor. Thistoo makessense.
To assumethemantleof promisorrepresents an effortto assertone-
selfas a responsibleagent,an adult-in-coming, a person who does not
merely haveneedsandvulnerabilities, butwhoalsois needed,hassome
localforms ofpower, and iswilling toacknowledge hisorherpowerand
to committo use and shareitinwaysresponsive to theneedsofothers.
II Àii. Reliance
Beforecirclingback to conventionalism, let's revisitthe assumption

behindtheessay'smainexample.Thatassumption wasthatiftherewere
no powerto promise,therewouldbe no relianceduties.Sinceredecla-
rationsofintention aboutone's futureactivitythattriggered listeners'
actionswouldnotnecessarily generatean obligationto act to avoidthe
lossesofthelistener ifone lateractedotherwise. I do notendorsethis
assumption as an ultimate moral principle. suspectsomeversionof
I
a relianceprinciplewiththisstructureis correct,thoughitsdetailsare
43. I havebeenfocusing on thequitespecific and oftenquotidianpromises parents

giveto childrenthroughtypically utterances
explicitlinguistic such as "I promiseto
takeyou to see the Metson Saturday." Anotherlayerunderliesthesepromises.The
trivialpromisemayoftenserveas a symbolicreinforcement or reaffirmation of the
commitment of real magnitudeunderlying theparent-child relationship,namelythat
theparentwillcareforthechildindefinitely, in waysthatevolveovertime.Thiscom-
mitment is,I believe,communicated earlyon - - throughbothlinguis-
usuallyat birth
ticand nonlinguistic means.Itsforcedoes notdependon thechild'sfullcognitionof
it.In fact,thecommitment persistsevenin lightofthechild'slaterexpressions ofdis-
dain and nonchalancetowardit throughtantrums, fitsofanger,rebellion,rejection-
thegeneralepisodesof theadolescentyears.These phenomenafurther reinforcemy
earlierclaimthatacceptanceand promiseebeliefin performance cannotbe requisites
ofa bindingpromise.
510

and Conventionalism
Promising,
topindownand dependheavily
difficult The pointofthe
on context.44
assumption wasratherto avoidimplicit use ofthepowerto promisein
a differentguise,namely, the
through recognition ofdutiesofreliance
triggeredintentionallyby communication. Put another way,I question
whether whatever moralprinciplethatcapturesthesensethatwe have
somedutiestowardthosewhoactinrelianceon ourstatedsincereinten-
tionscouldbothbe sufficientto do thenecessary workpromises do and
be logically
prior to thepowersassumed the of
by principle promising.
Evenwerea relianceprinciplelogicallypriorto or independent
ofthepowersassumedbya promising itwouldbe insufficient
principle,
to do theworkforwhichwe (sometimes)need promises. As I willfur-
therdiscussin a moment,withoutthe powerto promise,it wouldbe
unclearwhenandwhydeclarations ofintentiongeneraterelianceduties
on the issuerjust becausethe listeneractedon them.This instability
44. AlthoughScanlon (1999,301) is correctto assertthatthereare somerequire-

mentsto attendto the losses othersmaysufferbecause of expectationsone has
inducedin them,theprincipleshe endorses,suchas principleL, seemoverlybroad.
PrincipleL wouldrequirethatone alwaystakestepsto preventanother'ssignificant
lossjust because thatloss is occasionedby a disappointedexpectationabout one's
actionif one intentionally led a personto developthatexpectation, albeitwithout
committing to act in a particular way.This doesn'tseem correct.Much dependson
therelationship betweenthepartiesand thecontext,as CharlesFried'sexampleof a
potentialbuyeroflandillustrates (Fried1981,9). A potentialbuyeraskstheneighbor
oftheplotunderconsideration whether theneighborintendsto developherlandfor
commercial purposesbecausethepotentialbuyerdoes notwantto livenextdoor to a
commercial property. Hopingthepotentialbuyerwillpurchase,theneighborsincerely
reportsthatshe has no plansto developand cannotimaginewanting to;consequently,
thequestionerrealizeshispotentialand purchasestheland.Fiveyearslater,a change
in financialcircumstances promptstheneighborto reconsider; she entertainsan offer
to developher property commercially. It doesn'tseem truethattheneighboris obli-
gatednot to accepttheoffereventhoughthebuyeronlyboughtbecausethe neigh-
bor intentionally led the buyerto expectthatshe wouldnot develop.Althoughthe
buyermaysuffer significantlossessuchas losingtheenjoyment valueof his property,
opportunity lossesto buya different property,and loweredproperty value,and the
buyer'svulnerability to thislosscan tracebackto hisrelianceon theneighbor's stated
intention,I don'tsee whythisbindsthe neighborto preventthebuyer'sloss.Maybe
thisreactionis influencedbythefactthatthe buyercould haveaskedthe neighbor
fora promiseor,morerealistically, could havepaid theneighborfora guaranteethe
neighborwouldnotbuild.Giventhathe mighthavedone so and did not,thismight
explainmysense thatthe neighboroweslittlemorethanthe courtesy of informing
thebuyeroftheneighbor's changeofheart.Ifthepowerto promisewereunavailable,
wouldmysenseof thecase alter?I don'tthinkso forthereasonsgivenin thetext.
511

wouldgenerateproblemsof the sortI have alreadydiscussed.45 Fur-

ther,itseemsimplausible thatanyformofrelianceactionbya listener,
evenifbased on a reasonablesupposition thatthedeclaredintention
wassincereand likelyto be realized,could generatea dutyto protect
therelianceinterest and yetbe compatible withhealthyrelationships.
A stand-alone relianceprinciplewouldencourageunhealthy formsof
overinvestment inwhatpeoplesayandmightmotivate investment justto
makethespeaker bound. This might in turn discouragefull, forthcom-
ing communication, againdisserving thepartiesand therelationship.
And,in anycase,a relianceprinciple wouldfailto protecttheinterests
within relationshipsbetween parties whichone party
in isvulnerable but
unableto actin sucha wayas to createa relianceinterest. Recall here
Scanlon'scase ofHarold'sguilty secret.
But the main difficulty is in supposingtherecould be robust
reliancedutiesevenifwelackthesortofpowerimplicated in thepower
topromise.In a worldwithout thepowertopromise, whywouldanother
person's actionbased upon one's sincere declaration ofintention pro-
videa dutytoimplement one'sintention? Why wouldn't the listeneract
at hisor herown risk?There are two issueshere: whether
first, the lis-
tener'sreliancecouldbe reasonableand,second,whyone'sdeclarations
wouldcreatea dutytoprotect another'sreasonablerelianceuponthem.
The guessesobservers makeaboutourfuture behaviormaytypically be
accuratebutdo notgenerally generateduties to do as predicted. Why
wouldthevoicingoftheintention makethatdifference? The communi-
cationmight, afterall,be offered merelyto provideprobabilistic infor-
mation.
To recognizea robustreliance-based duty(one thatwouldhave
contentdistinct fromanygeneraldutyof benevolenceto avoidharm
and wouldin somewayconstrain whatwouldotherwise be permissible
self-chosenpursuits), one must start to think that one's communication
attempts to influencetheconductofanotherin a waythatgeneratesa
dutyto thatpersonbecause itis one's intention to makeoneselfbound
by one's communication. This is not the same as thefull-fledged notion
ofpromising, to be sure.But,it alreadypartakesof thesameessential
idea thatis supposedto be controversial in thefirst place,namely, that
45. Some indeterminacyand instability as theynow

surroundsrelianceinterests
standevenwithina contextthatincludesthepowerto promise.These difficulties
are
byaskingfora firmpromiseand by
to somedegreebytheabilityto clarify
controlled
whatis communicatedbythefailureto giveor to askfora promise.
512

and Conventionalism
Promising,
ofgenerating an obligation through intentional efforts todo so through

communication. Whatever itsscope,thedutytoprotectothers'reliance
interestsbased on one's declarations ofintention seemsto relyon the
samepowerthatunderliesthepowerto createpromissory duties - not
theotherwayaround.Whyelsecouldthedutiesassociatedwithreliance
be deactivated throughthe speaker'sefforts to wardoffthe hearer's
reliance,thatis,throughstatements of thekind"I intendto eliminate
thegarden'sbreedinggroundformosquitoesbutdon'tcounton it"?If
thereis no powerto generatea dutythrough declarative fiat,itis ques-
tionable that what would otherwise create a duty can be avoided bydec-
laration.Noticealso thatitseemsimplausible thatwe mustprotectthe
relianceactivity oflisteners in thosecaseswherethelistener reasonably
misunderstands whatwesay,butthrough no faultofourown.Whatobli-
gationswehavetoprotecttherelianceactivities ofothershingesimpor-
tantlyon what we actually say- on what we intend to makeourselves
for
responsible through our intent to do so via communication. The
relianceprincipleseemsto be a variationof the promising principle,
invoking similargenerative powers.
Ifourmoraland metaphysical worldwereone inwhichwecould
not,merely our
through expressed intention todo so,generatea dutyto
othersto act ain certain way, how could it be thatour communication
of our intention to act in a certainwaycould nonetheless generatea
duty to others to actas we said we intended because they believed what
we said and tookactionon it?This seemsa veryfinehairto be able
- especially
to split forthosewho,exhypothesi, haveonlylimitedpowers.
To be sure,the relianceprincipleis typically thoughtto generateless
onerousdutiesthanfull-fledged promises therelianceprincipleis
do;
thought to make one owe either performance orcompensation ormerely
a timely warning thatone has changedone's mindto thosewhomight
relyon one's declaration. Butitshouldbe irrelevant howlightor stren-
uous thedutiesare iftheproblemis one ofbeingunableto generate
dutiesthroughthe expressionof a willto do so. If it is impossibleto
do so, thenit shouldn'tbe possibleto createa dutyto <pbyintention-
allydeclaringthatone will(pin thehopesofeliciting or providing the
foundation foranother'sreliance.
The problemseems to be this:eitherthe relianceprinciple
invokesa powerto createdutiesthroughcommunicating one's willto
anotheror thedutiespositedbytherelianceprinciplearisebecauseof
theeffects ofsuchcommunication, nottheintentions to createmoral
relationsgeneratedby such communication. If it is the former, then
513

itwouldseemthattheprincipleshouldstandor fallwiththepromis-
ing principlebut could not precede it. If it is the latter,then the
accounthas to providesomewayto explainhowtheeffects ofcommu-
nicationare generatedand how theygrounda duty.We wouldneed
an accountof whyrelianceoccursand whetherit can be reasonable
withina contextin whichthe speakercannotsuccessfully intendto
becomeboundthrough thecommunication ofherintention. So, either
therelianceaccountpresupposes- and therefore cannotground - the
essentialpowerbehindthepowerto promise,or,therelianceaccount
remainsimportantly and mysterious.
underspecified
//.iv. FormalPromises, and OtherCommitments

Promises,
Implicit
Atthispoint,we can relaxtheimplicit, overlysimplisticbinaryassump-
tionof themainexample,namelythateithera mereintention to act
in a certainwayis voicedor an explicit, full-fledged promiseis given.
Once we acknowledge theexistenceof the powerto promise,we are
situatedtoacknowledge thefullspectrum ofmoralrelations sparkedby
intentions to createthem,at leastone ofwhichincludessomeversion
ofa relianceprinciple.Theyrunthegamutfromstatements of inten-
tionthatare meantto generatesomelegitimate expectations but not
a rightto performance, to declarations meantto createsomebasisfor,
and securitybehind,reasonablereliance,to strong, full-fledgedpromis-
sorydeclarations. Intermediary relationsofcreatedcommitment often
transpireimplicitly,doing some of the work I ascribed to firmcommit-
mentas suchbutin a myriad ofsubtle,flexibleways,employing moral
gradations based on the knowledgeand comfort levelof intimates.46
Variationsmayoccur,notonlywithrespectto whatlanguageis used,if
any,butalso in themoralconsequencesoffailureto keepthecommit-
ment,whatconditions shouldexcusethecommitment, and underwhat
conditions thepromiseeshouldreleasethepromisor. Mostofus use the
languageofpromises andpromising as suchinfrequently withfriends for
good reason;too much and
precision formality between friends tends to
grate.Yet,friends do not abstain from promissory commitment; rather,
theytendto relyon thesemoreimplicit and intermediary relationsthat
46. Thisdegreeofplasticity mayalso cutagainsttheconventionalist

and flexibility
at leaston thoseunderstandings
thesis, ofconventionsinwhichtheyare understood to
resemblegames- withrulesthatare welldefinedand fairlyrigid,evenifin principle
changeable.See, bywayofcomparison, Cavell1979,294-99.
514

areavailableto thosewhoknoweach otherwell.ThatiswhyI remarked

earlierthatit is quiteuncommonto haveone's sociallifedependon
bald declarations of intentions withoutcommitment; betweenfriends,
statements like"I'mgoingto thatconcert;I hope to see youthere,"typ-
icallycarrywiththemsomeflavorofobligationto showup, thoughper-
hapslessthana full-fledged promise.The samefluidity does nothold
ifthesameutterance is directedat a stranger on a train.Often,special
troublemustbe takento clarify thatall thatone conveysto a friendis
a mereintention; one mustappendan additional"butI can'tcommit."
Although explicitpromises betweenfriends maybe uncommon, implicit
commitments (that involveexerciseof the power to promise)are
prevalent.
Betweenfriends and othercloseassociates, theformallanguage
of promisetendsto be used to negotiatepotentialfaultlinesand to
emphasizethespecialseriousness ofa particular commitment, as in the
case of the colleagueswho alreadyhad committed to meetat 9 a.m.
bydeclaration; theexplicitlanguageof promisesignaledtherecogni-
tionoftheimportance of,and commitment to,makingan extraeffort
to resista persistent weakness.Betweenstrangers wholacktheseforms
ofmutualunderstanding, whoare attempting to connectand to man-
age theirvulnerability, explicitpromisesare morecommon.Thismay
explainwhypromisesbetweenstrangers haveseemedmoresalientto
commentators.
I havebeenemphasizing theroleofpromises incounteracting or
forestalling thedevelopment of certainnegativedynamics withinrela-
tionships. There is a complementary positivepower that full-fledged
promises and these other forms of created commitment maybring -
namely, to enable a first-person on
perspective jointactivity. Suppose we
just havetheabilityto stateour intentions. You say"I intendto <pwith
you,"and I say"I plan to <pwithyou,"butitis clear,byhypothesis, that
thisoccursagainstthebackdropoftheability and moralpermission to
change one's mind. In this case,when I say "we to
plan <p"(or when I
thinkit), myattitude orperspective toward (p-ingisnotthesameas when
I declaretomyself "I planto(p."In thelattercase,I can takea fully first-
personal attitude to my intention and statement. I mayrecognize I that
am morally freeto altermystance,butI also havegroundsfora special
formofconfidenceand resoluteness in mystatement. WhatI do is up
to me and undermycontrol.It is notmerelythatI can makefurther
plansbasedupon thisintention witha highdegreeofconfidence. I am
notin a positionofforecaster. The relationis as intimate as itcan be. By
575

contrast, whenwe havejust announcedour coincidingintentions, the

'we' statementsI makemusthavetheflavorofprediction and forecast.
Givenyourability andyourmoralpermission tochangeyourmind,I can
reasononlyas towhatwe are likely - perhapsevenvirtually certain- to
do. It wouldbe presumptuous of me to thinkotherwise, forwhatyou
willdo is notup to me. I merelyhavereliableinformation. Butifthis
werethelimittoourrelations, something wouldbe terribly missing.But
becausethepowerbehindmakingpromises, as wellas the palerand
moreimplicit formsofcommitment oftendeployed,involves thetrans-
ferofa party's powerto changeone's mindto anotherparty, and so, a
consolidationofthepowerto determine whatthetwopartieswilldo, it
enablesa fullyfirst-personal
perspectiveonjointactivity.47
Althoughmy focushas been on the waypromiseshelp to man-
age the dynamics withinexistingrelationships, manyof thesesame
points illuminatehow promises facilitate
thecreation ofrelationshipsas
wellas lessrobustinteractionsbetweenstrangers. The positiverolethat
promisesand theirpaler,oftenimplicit, cousinscan playin enabling
thepluralfirst-person perspectivemakesthisquiteexplicitand direct.
And,of course,promisesand theirpalerrelatives, as wellas themere
opportunity to ask forand make them, can ameliorate concernsabout
exposingoneselfto a variety of thelocal hazardswithinrelationships
and renderthemsafer.Thereby, promisescan playa rolein boththe
creationofa relationshipand itsmoralsubstance.48
I havebeen arguingthatwe musthavethepowerto makebind-
ingpromisesto permitrelationships ofsomecomplexity withtheright
moraldynamics to developand flourish. In a fulleraccount,greater
47. I suspectthatthepowerinvolved in promising enablesthefirst-person perspec-

butI do notendorsetheviewthatall we-intentions
tiveonjointactivity, are basedon
an exchangeoffull-fledged promises.The criticisms
ofthatvieware ratherconvincing
(Gilbert1993,627-49;Roth2004). Rather, thesortsofintermediary and oftenimplicit
commitments thatrangeon thespectrum betweenpromising and merestatements of
intention seeminvolved.In somecases,all thatmaybe involved is theimplicit
granting
of permission,perhapsreciprocally,fortheotherpartyto speakforoneself.Because
thispermission oftenrangesintothefutureand thereare at leastminimalcommit-
mentsnot to changeone's mindat whimand to providereasonsifone does (Roth
2004), thepowersinvolvedseemto lie betweenthemorespareformsof consentand
thebroader,morecommittal formsoffull-fledgedpromissory commitments.
48. Fordifferentparties,theshapeand formality suchcommitments takemayvary
considerably.This pointis wellillustratedbyPatriciaWilliams's accountof her per-
ceivedneed forformalcontractual promisesto rentan apartment and hercolleague's
perceivedneed to avoidformality and to use moreinformal commitments to achieve
thesameend (Williams1991,146-47).
516

detailwouldbe providedabouthowthepower to promisecan oftensuf-

fice,evenwhenundeployed, whypromises need not alwaysbe made,
and theroleofpromising amongstrangers.But in thelimitedspace I
havehere,I wantto returnto howthisargumentbearson thebinding-
nessofpromises and theargumentsaboutconventionalism.
II. v. Bindingness
In a sense,theargument forthebindingness ofpromises fallsoutquite
The conception
naturally. oftheability topromiseforwhichI havebeen
arguing is one on which a promisor theability
has to transfer a rightto
makea decisionand to acton certainreasonsto anotherparty.49 I have
beenarguingthattheymusthavethisability iftheyaretohavetheability
to conductrelationships of adequatemoralcharacter. It thusparallels
theargument aboutconsentI madeat theoutset - thatconsentinvolves
theability to transmita moralpermission to actin certainwaysand that
thispoweris essentialtotheability toconductmeaningful relationships;
ifautonomousmoralagencyis possible,thispowermustbe possible.
If thisargument succeeds,thentheargument forbindingness isn'tso
difficult. to the
Bypromising (p, promisor transfershis or her righttoact
otherwise tothepromisee. To not(p,then,is toactina waythepromisor
has no rightto do, and to (pis to actin a waythepromiseehas a right
thatshe (thepromisor)do.
This accountof promissory bindingness mayseem fast.I have
arguedthatwemusthavethispower,butI havenotgivena directargu-
mentabouthowthispoweris possible;thatlacunamayfeelespecially
troubling to thosewho are alreadyskepticalof the modelof promis-
ing on which somethinglike a rightto do otherwiseor a rightto
decidewhetherto actbasedon certainreasonsis transferred fromthe
promisor to the promisee. I do not harbor such doubts, but the con-
clusionthatpromisesare morally binding absent special circumstances
maybe arrivedat througha redescription of the argument's themes
thatmakesthe basisforbindingness morevivid.Apartfromwhether
or nota promiseprovidesassurance, or whether itspawnsexpectations
or reliancebythepromisee, a promiserepresents a solicitationoftrust
49. See also Owens2006 fora largelycomplementary, butdistinct,

defenseof the
viewthatpromising involvesa transfer
ofauthority.The significance
of thetransfer
of
therightto acta certainwayto thepromiseeis also stressed
byGilbert(2004,83-109)
and Hart(1955,183-84).
517

addressedto thepromiseefromthepromisor. The promisor forswears

certainopportunities thatmayor may not be to the promisor's advan-
tageand represents herself as willingtoact,withrespecttothoseoppor-
tunities,as specified unlessthepromiseereleasesthepromisor.
Whywouldthisforswearance be morallybinding?One could
appeal to a moregeneralprincipleof thefollowing sort:otherthings
beingequal, itis wrong to solicit
another's trustand then to actin a way
thatis inconsistent withthatinvitation.50 If one invitestrustin a par-
ticularway - forexample,byoffering a giftor bydeclaringthatone is
thesortofpersoninwhomanothercouldsafely confide - itiswrongto
retract theoffer(unlessitwasclearthata timely acceptancewasneces-
sary) or to act in ways that undermine itsvalue. The wrongness does
not essentially lie in the giftor in the offer'sintrinsic significance to
therecipient, butbecausesuchactionsbelietheinvitation oftrust. The
offerneed nothavealreadybeen acceptedor valuedbytherecipient
forretraction or undermining behaviorto be offensive. So, too,gratu-
itousliesarewrongwhether or notthehearercaresaboutthecontent,
or relieson, or evenbelieveswhatis represented; suchlies are wrong
evenifthelie is retracted beforethe hearercomesto believeor rely
upon theliar'smisrepresentation. Whenone solicitstrustthroughthe
forswearance ofopportunities and a representation thatone willabide
by another's discretionary judgment on the matter, but nonetheless acts
on the forsworn opportunity, one has acted inconsistently with one's
solicitationoftrust.
Myargumentmaybe understoodas an argumentabout why
nonepistemic trust(thatis,trust concerning whether peoplewilldowhat
theysincerely saytheywill, as contrasted with the trust involved in gaug-
ing the sincerity and accuracyof theirclaims about their intentions,
beliefs,and theworld)isessential tomoralrelationships, andso whyact-
ingin waysthatare inconsistent withsolicitations ofnonepistemic trust
is wrong.The situations I havedescribed,in whichthereis a need to
solicittrustand tocultivate trust,underscore themoralstakes.Promises
ofteninvolvethe solicitation of trustin situations in whichthereis a
local imbalanceof poweror vulnerability, or the potentialforthisto
50. CompareThomson1990,298,whichalso emphasizestheresponsibilities atten-

of trustthatare recognizedas suchbytherecipient.
dantto sincereinvitations Com-
pare also Kimel2003,14-29,57-64; Fried1981,16. Kimel'saccount,though,hinges
on promiseebeliefin performance thetrustthatgrowsfromit.Fried's
and respecting
languageis ambiguousas to whetherthe invitation itselfactivatesthe dutyor action
on theinvitation,
thatis,theactualdevelopment of trust.
518

develop,althoughit is notnecessary in anyparticular case thatthisbe

so. The promisedoes notonlyinvolvethesolicitation of trustbutthe
solicitationoftrustthrough a representation thatcertainopportunities
to exploittheimbalanceor vulnerability, to leavesomeonevulnerable,
or to allowthehazardsofvulnerability to unfoldwillbe forsworn. This
mayreasonably be taken as a furtherrepresentation thatthe conditions
oftherelationship matter totheoffering party,thattheparty represents
thatat leastsomeaspectoftherelationship willbe conductedon terms
sensitive to,and respectful of,the potentialforvulnerability and in a
way that reinforcesthe recognition of the equal needs and statusofthe
participants in the relationship.To solicittrustthata certainformof
power will be managed in a waythatwilltryto controlthe
respectful
hazardsofvulnerability and to thenact in a wayinconsistent withsuch
a solicitationseemsdoublyviolenttowardthevaluesoftrust.51
III. Conventionalism
Revisited
One mayobjectthatevenif thisaccountexplainswhywe musthave
thepowerto promiseand why,generally, breachofpromiseis morally
wrong, it does not conventionalism.
disrupt The argumentdoes not
establishthatthe rightor abilityto makepromisesis an integralpart
ofindividual autonomy butrather, thepowerto makepromisesis the
sortofthingthatenhancesourlivesand makestheoptionsavailableto
us as autonomousagentsricherand moreattractive. Thisis compatible
withtheviewthatin suitablecircumstances, we havean obligationto
initiateand followa conventionthatmakesthispoweravailableso as to
51. Scanlonalso advertsto relatedprinciplesof due care and againstmanipula-

tionto providethe backdropforthe principleof fidelity he putsforward. Although
something about thewrongness of manipulation, attempted manipulation of others,
and thefailureto takedue care to avoidmanipulation seemsfoundational, Scanlon's
formulations of theseprinciplesare overlynarrow.His principlebanningunjustified
manipulation focusesonlyon casesin whichone personcourtsanother'sexpectations
in orderto induce action,wherethatactionmaybringsignificant lossto the agent
(Scanlon1999,298). The principleof due care also focuseson the riskof significant
loss(ibid.,300). As I havealreadyargued,therequirements ofbelief,riskof loss,and
relianceare unnecessary in thisdomain.The wrongness of manipulation seemsmore
likelyto be located in whatmanipulation represents about the manipulator's viewof
howanothermaybe treated.Thisviewand thewillingness to act upon sucha motive
underwrite thewrongness of the behavior.Theyrendersensiblethe emotionalreac-
tionto manipulation and thefeelingsof betrayalthatoccasiondiscoveries of manip-
ulation,even whenno significant loss was at stake (somethingScanlon's principles
cannotexplain).
519

providea fullsetofoptionsforautonomous agents.So understood, this

maybe an argument forestablishing a certainsortof convention and
notnecessarily an argument againstconventionalism.
I willnottryto establishdefinitively thatthepowerto conduct
meaningful, equitablerelationships is inherent in thecapacitiesof an
autonomous moralagent.Cursorily, theability tolivefreely on an equal
basiswithothersseemscentralenoughto the foundations of moral-
ityand the significanceof individual autonomy as to render it plausi-
ble thatthepoweris inherent in thebasicrights and capacitiesofself-
governing individuals. Thisdependson theidea thatthefundamental
powers contained within autonomy includethosenecessary to comply
withmorality's minimaldemands;it thereby relieson a fairlyminimal
versionof ought-implies-can (thoughit could derivefroma stronger
notionofautonomy, one moreintimately connectedto moralidentity) .
Foragentssuchas ourselves, whoseembodiment and development must
necessarilyinvolvedependent, interdependent, and mutually enriching
relationshipswithothers,itseemsimplausible to positthattherightof
autonomy mustbe understood in sucha starkindividualist waythatit
wouldnotincludethepowersnecessary to becomefullagentsand to
helpothersbecomefullagentswhocan recognizeand be recognized by
othersin morally respectful and empowered ways.
Butwhatof thesimplefactthatpromisesdependon language,
whichis conventional?52 Forthatmatter, don'tminimally complexand
richrelationships betweenpersonsdepend on languageand thereby
dependon conventions?
Promises dependon theability to communicate, but,as Scanlon
has argued,theymaynotnecessarily depend on theparties'sharinga
commonlanguage.A commitment of some brute sortmaybe commu-
albeitwithout
nicatedextralinguistically, thenuancesaccessiblethrough
a commonlanguage(Scanlon1999,296-97).Further, whatmatters for
theissueat handiswherethecontingency enters.Whilethedetailsand
contents ofanyparticular languagemaybe conventional, theimpetus,
to,and need forcommunication
ability are notconventional forratio-
nal,moralagents,atleastthosewhoareseparateindividuals withlimited
epistemic capacities.Or so I submit.
In thatvein,we shoulddistinguish thosecasesin whichconven-
tionsand otherinventions helpus to overcomepersistent weaknesses,
even in invaluableways,but do not supplyany essentialassistance.
For instance,labor-saving devicesand birthcontrolmethodsmay
52. See Anscombe1981b,99; Lewis1969.

520

and Conventionalism
Promising,
facilitatetheachievement ofgenderequalitybydampeningtheeffects
of, and controlling tendencies toward, domination. Butthedutiesasso-
ciatedwithgenderequalitydo not dependessentially on theseinven-
tions.In contexts inwhichinequitiesoftendevelop - suchas thecareof
children - thedemandforan equal divisionoflaborand burdencould
be articulated and suppliedevenabsentsuchinventions. The invention
of labor-saving devicesis notnecessary to addresstheinequity; rather,
theyhelp us evade the difficulties posedbypersistent failurestodo one's
equal share and to create the expectations and socializationprocesses
thatwouldrenderthismorecommonplace.
Bycontrast, thetensionsand hazardswithin intimatefriendships
I havebeen describing do not emanatefromarbitrary and unreason-
able forms ofpowerthatarisebecauseofdifferential physicalpowersor
morally arbitrary socialvaluations ofcharacteristics. Rather, theyrepre-
sentpersistent tensions arisingbetweenrationalagentswhoareseparate
and distinct - whohavewillsand interests of theirown- and whocan
and need to formspecialrelationships. Our distinctness makesenrich-
ing,meaningful friendship possiblebutalso createshazardsassociated
withvulnerability; thisconnection is not,ofcourse,accidental.Notonly
are thehazardsinherentin thepossibility of friendship, but thesalve
offered bypromising differs from the roleplayedbylabor-saving devices
withrespectto genderequality.A promiseis not a moreconvenient
wayto do whatcouldbe done withcomplicated formsofexchangesof
intentions. Noris ita wayto circumnavigate aroundthemorally unfor-
tunatefactofdifference orheterogeneity. Difference and heterogeneity
are notunfortunate states.It is nota moralfailurethatwe do notand
cannotanticipate ourfriends' everyneedandwishand thencoordinate
perfectly to act together completeand emotionally
with safeharmony.
Promisesprovidea methodto managehazardsand tensionsbetween
distinct,different people;theopportunity theysupplydoes notmerely
substitute foror makeeasiermoralbehaviorthatcouldor shouldhave
been achievedjustthrough moralawareness, firmresolve, or truecare.
Suppose,however, itis insistedthatthemostmyargument shows
is thatit is quiteimportant thatwe havethepowerto promiseto have
morally respectful relations withothers.Thisis consistent withitsbeing
the case thatpromising is not morallyelementaland that,rather, we
havea dutyto createa convention thatcreatesthepowerto promise.
I suspectthisviewreflects an inadequateappreciation ofhowfun-
damentalthepowertopromiseand itsrelataare,butI amdisinclined to
press these points further. Once we have arrived at thisjuncture,though
521

mypositiondiffers fromthe conventionalist responseI havejust out-

lined,littleofsignificanceremains atstakebetweenconventionalists and
nonconventionalists aboutpromising. If it is concededthatthereis a
dutyto establish a convention ofpromising to facilitate
morally healthy
relationships, then much ofwhat seems distinctively problematic about
conventionalist accountshas evaporated. On sucha view,theexistence
oftheconvention wouldno longerbe optionaland itsinternal structure
wouldbe significantly constrained inlightofthemoralpurposetowhich
itwasbeingput.
Furthermore, thisversionof conventionalism also embodiesa
substantially differentunderstanding of the nature of the promissory
obligation than thatoffered bystandard conventionalism. If thereis a
dutyto createtheconvention thatarises from therequirements associ-
atedwithsoundmoralrelationswithothers,thenthedutyto comply
withtheconvention cannotbe completely describedin termsofduties
nottoundermine orfree-rideon a usefulconvention. The relevant duty
wouldhavedeeperroots,moreinterpersonal attheirsource.The under-
lyingdutygivingriseto theimpetusto createand maintaintheconven-
tionwouldbe a dutyowedto thosewithwhomone has or wouldhave
directinterpersonal To breacha promise,then,wouldnot
relations.53
merelybe to act in a waycontrary to thoseobligations associatedwith
usefulconventions, but,indoingso,toactina waythatwasdisrespectful
ofthemoralclaimsofindividuals withwhomone hasdirectrelations.54
53. Describedin thisway,the moralphenomenonof promising would thenbe

analogous to a versionof nonpositivismabout law. Nonpositivistsconcede thatlegal
systems standardlyinvolveconventionsand thatthe unpackingof mostlegal duties
willinvolvesomereference to conventionalist
explanations.Butnonpositivists typically
denythatconventionalist explanationssufficeto accountfullyforthe existenceand
contentof theseduties.On one strandof nonpositivism to whichI am sympathetic,
we individualswhosharesocialrelationshavea dutyto createlegal systems in order
to maintainproperrelationsto one another,to establishthe social conditionsthat
embodyand facilitatejustice,and,perhaps,to establisha commonvoiceand identity.
These dutiesto one anotherprovidethe moralimpetusto createlegal institutions,
moralconstraints on and moralinputsto theirformand content, and theunderlying
moralbasisfor (and limitson) the dutiesto complywithlegal requirements. This
structurelooksquitesimilarto therevisedconventionalism aboutpromising I imagine
in the text,exceptthatthe underlying dutiesin the promising case concerndirect
interpersonal whereas
relations, theunderlyingdutiesin the case oflaware dutieswe
as a groupowe to one anotheras groupmembers.
54. Wallaceand Kolodnyhavearguedthatconventionalist accountsare compati-
ble with,and a prerequisiteto,accountsthatstressa moredirectly interpersonal
duty
betweenthepromisor and promisee.See Kolodnyand Wallace2003,119-20,150-54.
522

On thisrendering,theconventionalist
viewshedsitsassociation
withcontingency, comprehensiveplasticity, a purelyconvention-
and
basedaccountoftheobligationto keeppromises.Instead,itbecomesa
viewabouta setofpractices
weareobligedtoone anothertocreateand
maintain. Once conventionalism
has transformed
itselfthiscompletely,
itlosesitsmoraldistinctiveness.
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Philosophical Review

Promising, Intimate Relationships, and Conventionalism

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.46 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:45:34 PM

The old chestnut aboutpromisingposesa puzzleaboutthegeneration

For help and sound criticism, I am gratefultoJoshuaCohen,RuthChang,Helena

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.46 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:45:34 PM

significanceindependent oftheboundagent'swilltobe so bound,such

3. For positivediscussionsof whetheror how the moral forceof a promise

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.46 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:45:34 PM

vulnerablebecausehe or she has reliedon one's invocation

6. The firsttwojustifications, each of whichconcernthe properuse of a social

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.46 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:45:34 PM

Bothconventionalists and nonconventionalists agreethatmany

8. JudithJarvisThomson's(1990) accountdoes not sufferfromthisflaw.The

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.46 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:45:34 PM

relationship betweenthepromiseeand promisor makesa promisebind-

11. AlthoughCharlesFried(1981,13) connectspromising to individual

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Li. Promisee'sBeliefin Performance

An important cornerof the promisingliteratureexploreswhether

12. Withminorexceptions,thesedissatisfactions do not pertainto JudithJarvis

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.46 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:45:34 PM

incidentfromHarold's past, althoughthe promisecannot affect

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.46 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:45:34 PM

are bindingas suchbyreexplaining the sense thatthereis a dutyin

14. I am notsuregratitude can be directly Butat leastcertainformsof

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.46 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:45:34 PM

Moreover, I doubtthe forceof a promisecould depend upon

15. Evenworse,whyshoulda falseperceptionof a history of priorbreachexert

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to intentionallyelicitothers'expectations and offerassurancesonlyto

problemthatlikewisedependson the assumption thata promisemustgeneratean

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commitment. Perhapsit is also reasonableto requirethatthepromiseereceivesand

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ofbelief,dependingon thesituation. "IfyouwillbelieveI willperform

22. Whatof CharlesFried'sstrangecase in whichcompletestrangers send me a

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- in thiscase,a changein themental

Perhapsthepromiseebeliefrequirement tracesbackto an old notion

conditionbutrejectsconventionalism. Furthermore, couldwellposit

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agendaof thatwhichshouldbe done. Something alongthethirdline

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bound- eventhoughthereis no distinct end thelendervaluestowhich

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Manyaccountsof promisingtake promisesbetweenstrangers to be

29. One mightresistand saythatthereis a sharedend,something liketheend of

This content downloaded from 185.2.32.46 on Tue, 24 Jun 2014 22:45:34 PM

betweenintimates seem anomalousbecause,typically, intimates both

the case? See, forexample,Hume 1978,3.2.5; Kolodnyand Wallace2003, 141-43.

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mustincludethepowerto promise.I do notclaimthatspecial,volun-

II. IntimateRelationshipsand theNeed forPromising

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imaginea morally acceptableworld - or evensimply morallyacceptable,

34. Hume (1978) describesotherconventions, suchas theconvention ofproperty,

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36. Thereare otherpertinent examplesas well,suchas commands. Still,somemay

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obligationsthrough themeretransmission oftheintention todo so and

exerciseyourveto,youconsentto myreceiving themoney,thoughyoudo notconfer

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