Africa's Many Divides and Africa's Future - Charles Quist-Adade

Africa’s Many Divides
and Africa’s Future

Africa’s Many Divides
and Africa’s Future:
Pursuing Nkrumah’s Vision

of Pan-Africanism
in an Era of Globalization
Edited by
Charles Quist-Adade and Vincent Dodoo

Africa’s Many Divides and Africa’s Future:
Pursuing Nkrumah’s Vision of Pan-Africanism in an Era of Globalization
Edited by Charles Quist-Adade and Vincent Dodoo
This book first published 2015
Cambridge Scholars Publishing
Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Copyright © 2015 by Charles Quist-Adade, Vincent Dodoo and

contributors
All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without
the prior permission of the copyright owner.
ISBN (10): 1-4438-7662-3

ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-7662-9
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgements .................................................................................. viii
Preface ........................................................................................................ ix
Welcome Addresses at the Opening Ceremony .......................................... 1
Keynote Address ......................................................................................... 5

Literature as a Tool for National Liberation and Post-colonial
Reconstruction, Anti-Palanquinity and the Pan-Africanist Imperative
Professor Atukwei Okai
Chapter One ............................................................................................... 14

Perspectives on African Independence: Perennial Challenges to African
Independence and the Nagging Essentials of African Liberation
Dr Zizwe Poe
Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 34

Global African Unity in the Era of Globalization: An Assessment
of the Place of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)
Dr Asogwa Felix Chinwe and Akachuku Anny Agu
Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 51

Colonialism, Ethnicity and Nigeria’s Integration: An Analysis of Impact
Relationship
Professor O. S. A. Obikeze
Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 63

Ethnic Integration and Continental Unity
Dr Vincent Dodoo and Amisah Zenabu Bakuri
Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 85

Perspectives on African Decolonization and Development:
The Case of Kenya
Omosa Mogambi and Kennedy Onkware
vi Table of Contents
Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 99

Nkrumah and His “Chicks”: An Examination of Women
and Organisational Strategies of the CPP
Dr Wilhelmina Donkoh
Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 122

Africa Unite: A Slogan of Intellectual and Cultural Significance
in the Works of Kwame Nkrumah and Bob Marley
Dr B. Steiner Iferkwe
Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 140

The Intellectual and Political Legacies of Kwame Nkrumah
Ama Biney
Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 155

Pan-Africanism, Feminism and Socio-Sexual Power
Dr Annecka Leolyn Marshall
Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 169

Africa and the Gender Debate: Basis of Division and Future Union
Henry Kam Kah
Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 190

Sino-Pessimism versus Sino-Optimism: Which Way for Chinese
Africana?
Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi
Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 217

Racialization of Asia, Africa and the Americas, and the Construction
of the Ideal Iranian Citizen: Local and Global Representations
of Colonialism, Geography, Culture and Religious Diversity
in Iranian School Textbooks
Amir Mirfakhraie
Chapter Thirteen ...................................................................................... 254

The United States Peace Corps as a Facet of US-Ghana Relations
E. Ofori Bekoe
Africa’s Many Divides and Africa’s Future vii
Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 268

South-South Cooperation: A New Post-Cold War Divide or a True
Post-North-South Divide?
Dr Catherine Schittecatte
Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 296

Pan-African-Education: A Case Study of the Kwame Nkrumah
Ideological Institute, Print Media and the Young Pioneer Movement
Dr Mjiba Frehiwot
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The edition of this volume has been made possible thanks to the
generous funding provided by Social Science and Humanities Research
Council of Canada (SSHRC), the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science
and Technology (KNUST, the Department of History and Political Studies
(KNUST), Kwantlen Polytechnic University, the Faculty of Arts of
Kwantlen Polytechnic University, and the Department of Sociology (KPU).
Our sincere thanks go to the keynote speakers, the session chairs and the
participants for their support and assistance. We wish to thank Dr. Hakim
Adi, Dr. Kofi Anyidoho, Dr. Molefi K. Asante, Dr. Akwasi Assensoh, Dr.
Afua Cooper, Dr. Gillian Creese, and Dr. Atukewei Oka, Professor
Agyeman Badu Akosa, Professor Kofi Anyidoho, Dr Wilhelmina Donkoh,
the Very Reverend Dr Nathan Samwini, Dr Buckner Dogbe, Professor
George W. Brobby, Dr Frederica Dadson, Dr Mjiba Frehiwot, Dr Adisa
Alkebulan and Mr. Solomon Panford, who was the emcee for the
conference.
We also thank all the presenters, including those whose papers have
not been included in this volume, for their wonderful contributions.
We are grateful to the staff at Kwantlen Polytechnic University: Dr
Alan Davies (President and Vice-Chancellor), Dr Diane Purvey (Dean of
Arts), Dr Farhad Dastur (Former Associate Dean, Faculty of Arts, Leslee
Birch and Catherine Parlee (both of the Office of Research and Scholarship),
and Melody Mercardo, Departmental Assistant at the Sociology Department
(KPU).
Our hearty thanks also go to our student volunteers, Avesta
Rezazadah, Nasim Mosallaei, Carol Moutal, Isaac Baidoo, Sheila Wong,
Kaelan Wong, Lenny Piprah, Kimbereley Gunn, Maayaa Quist-Adade,
Stephanie Kustra, Justin McGregor, Deidre Olson, and Gurpreet Bagha for
their dedication and hard work.
Finally, we wish to thank Dr George Bob-Milliar for reading through
the document and making suggestions for improving it.
Dr Charles Quist-Adade, Department of Sociology, KPU

Dr Vincent Dodoo, Department of History and Political Studies, KNUST
PREFACE
DR. CHARLES QUIST-ADADE

CONFERENCE CO-ORGANIZER AND CONTRIBUTING EDITOR
From September 21–23, 2012, Kwantlen Polytechnic University (KPU)

and the Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology (KNUST)
hosted the 2nd Biennial Kwame Nkrumah International Conference
(KNIC2) at the KNUST campus in Kumasi, Ghana. The conference was a
sequel to the very successful SSHRC-funded first Kwame Nkrumah
International Conference, held at Kwantlen Polytechnic University in
Summer 2010, which attracted more than 200 participants globally. The
theme for the inaugural conference, which marked the Centenary Birthday
Anniversary of “Africa’s Man of the Millennium,” was “From Neo-
Colonization to Neo-Liberal Globalization: The Political and Intellectual
Legacies of Kwame Nkrumah.”
The theme for KNIC2 was “Africa’s Many Divides and Africa’s
Future,” and it targeted international and Canadian scholars. The
presenters included academics as well as members of non-governmental
organizations and civic society organizations (NGOs and CSOs).
KNIC2 was organized by the Sociology Department of KPU and the
Political Science Department of KNUST. KNIC2 attracted worldwide
interest and brought a global focus to the economic, cultural, social and
political issues that African countries and Africans face in the twenty-first
century.
As its theme, “Africa’s Many Divides and Africa’s Future,” indicates,
KNIC2’s primary objective was to provide an avenue for the creation and
sharing of knowledge on ways to bridge Africa’s many divides and to
break Africa’s cycle of underdevelopment.
“If in the past the Sahara divided us, now it unites us,” Kwame
Nkrumah declared some fifty years ago. Keenly aware of Africa’s many
artificial divides, Nkrumah was determined to lead a revolution that would
bridge them. One way to achieve this goal, Nkrumah proposed, was a
continental pan-African government, which would provide the African
people with the opportunity to pool and marshal their enormous real and
potential economic, human and natural resources for the optimal
x Preface
development of their continent. A continental union government, Nkrumah

was convinced, would ensure that Africa ended the divisions created by
the trilogy of the enslavement, colonization and neo-colonization of
Africans. Nkrumah was concerned by other divisions as well, specifically
those created by time/history, nature and above all Africans themselves,
such as ethnic/racial and religious discrimination, classism, sexism and
ageism as well as atavistic and backward traditional practices, including
“tribalism” and patriarchy.
Nkrumah had long predicted that unless Africans formed a political
and economic union to address the continent’s acute problems, the raging
“revolutions” in the north of the continent, religious and ethnic strife and
civil wars in other parts of Africa were inevitable. He warned that unless
urgent steps were taken to bridge Africa’s divides, Africans would be
warring among themselves as their detractors hid behind the scenes,
pulling “vicious wires” to cut “each other’s throats.” For him, these
upheavals are all masked economic “wars.” In other words, these wars and
unrests are struggles over scarce economic resources and scrambles to
control political power. Religion and “tribalism” are mere fronts for deep-
seated grievances over economic deprivation.
Topics discussed included: The Northern Africa-Southern Africa
divide; the linguistic divide; the class divide; the ethnic divide; the
ideological-political divide; the gender and sexuality divides; the
heterosexuality/homosexuality divide; the ability/disability divide, the
generational divide; the religious divides; the rural/urban divide; the afro-
pessimism/afro-optimism divide; the continental Africa-diaspora/Africa
divide; the intellectual/non-intellectual divide; the elitism/non-elitism
divide; the Global South/Global North divide; the Cold War ideological
(Soviet-East/American-West) divide; the post-Cold War divide(s); the
slave-raiders/sellers and the enslaved divide; and the rhetoric (theory)/action
(practice) divide.
Scholars of all stripes agree that peace, security, democracy, good
governance, human rights and sound economic management are pre-
conditions for ending the economic marginalization of Africa. But this is
where the agreement ends. Scholarship on post-colonial Africa is riveted
by several interconnected discursive debates on the historical, current and
future trajectories of the continent. The debates reflect two general
politico-ideological positions: (1) the discourse of Afro-pessimism versus
the discourse of Afro-optimism; and (2) the discourse of looking inward
(internalist) versus the discourse of looking outward (externalist) (Bourenane
1992). Briefly, Afro-pessimists insist that African underdevelopment is self-
induced through inept, autocratic and kleptocratic leadership, and that
Africa’s Many Divides and Africa’s Future xi
Western aid does more harm than good to the continent (Ayittey 1992;
1998; Kaplan 1994). Afro-optimists, on the other hand, argue that Africa’s
current parlous state is attributable to centuries of slavery, colonialism and
neo-colonialism (TSCN) (Quist-Adade 2001), and that the West has a
moral obligation to right the wrongs of the past (of slavery and
colonialism) and to end its continuing neo-colonial policies in Africa if the
continent is to have any hope to develop. The “Afro-pessimism/Afro-
optimism divide” also reflects diametrically opposed positions on pan-
Africanism. Afro-pessimists dismiss pan-Africanism as a chimera, a
utopian pipe dream, while Afro-optimists, like Kwame Nkrumah, see in
pan-Africanism the antidote to African underdevelopment (Mbeki 1999).
Between the Afro-pessimists and Afro-optimists are the Afro-realists, who
temper pessimism with healthy doses of optimism (Gordon & Wolpe
1998). While they take into account the weight of Africa’s sordid colonial
history and the 500-year vestiges of the TSCN, as well as the current
lopsided global economic system, they also account for African agency—
the creative energies of Africans to overcome at least some of their
problems.
Nkrumah’s Continuing Relevance

Nkrumah was ahead of his time, a political prophet, as many of his
pessimistic cautions about the fate of the African continent have proven to
be true (Davidson 1973). Four decades since his death, the ideas and issues
for which Nkrumah lived and fought and about which he wrote continue to
reverberate across the continent. In his controversial book Neo-Colonialism:
The Last Stage of Imperialism, Nkrumah denounced the rampaging nature
of multi-national companies operating on the continent, as well as Africa’s
dependency on aid, its debt and its increasing poverty in the absence of
greater economic and political integration (Biney 2008). As Mazrui (2004)
points out, Nkrumah’s book, like Lenin’s more famous Imperialism: The
Last Stage of Capitalism, identified the negative side of globalization.
Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism was published when
Kwame Nkrumah was the President of Ghana, the first country in sub-
Saharan Africa to achieve independence from colonial rule. He had come
to the sad conclusion that his country had moved from colonial state to
neo-colonial country after the euphoria and optimism of the heady years of
independence. Like the rest of the countries in the tri-continents of Africa,
Asia and Latin America, now known as the Global South, Ghana was a
neo-colonial state instead of the full-blooded independent country that the
independence leaders had envisioned. No doubt, the heady years of
xii Preface
independence were imbued with bold ideas and projects to break away
entirely from the colonial yoke. But as Nkrumah would explain in his
book and post-coup writings, this was not to be. In fact, one would say that
Nkrumah and his fellow independence leaders became managers of a neo-
colonial project in the scheme of the grand neo-imperialism of things
(Quist-Adade 2012, 144).
Among the innumerable ways of neo-colonialist exploitation (read—
neo-liberal globalization), Nkrumah delineates and emphasizes the
following: (1) the conclusion of commerce and navigation treaties; (2)
agreements for economic co-operation; (3) the right to meddle in internal
finances, including currency and foreign exchange, (4) lowering trade
barriers in favour of the donor country’s goods and capital; (5) protecting
the interests of private investments; (6) the determination of how the funds
are to be used; (7) forcing the recipient to set up counterpart funds; (8)
supplying raw materials to the donor; and (9) using the majority of such
funds to buy goods from the donor nation (Quist-Adade 2012, 146).
Nkrumah’s analysis of neo-colonialism is classic. It is not only
relevant for understanding the dynamics and logics of the current
processes of our post-Cold War world; it offers a clear trajectory and a
lens for viewing and understanding neo-colonialism in the twenty-first
century. Neo-liberal globalization is a continuation of twentieth-century
neo-colonialism. Neo-liberal globalization is simply old wine in a new
bottle. Thus, the conference offered a unique opportunity to contextualize
Nkrumah’s pan-Africanist agenda within the neo-liberal global project and
against the backdrop of the current global economic and political ferment.
For Nkrumah, African unity was the first requisite for defeating neo-
colonialism. He considered African unity a precondition for the survival of
Africa and Africans. In the present era of neo-liberal globalization and
unbridled capitalist expansion, Nkrumah’s socio-political and economic
thought continues to have relevance to a new generation of scholars and
African people around the world (Biney 2008).
Who Was Nkrumah?

One hundred years ago, in the small village of Nkroful in the Western
region of Ghana, a child was born. The event passed, as in the case of
many children, as an ordinary event. Like many African families, the
parents of this child did not even take note of the date on which he was
born. Later, in his autobiography, Nkrumah stated that it was with some
difficulty that he could pinpoint his birth date: September 21, 1909. As fate
would have it, Kwame Nkrumah, the man his admirers called “Osagyefo,”
Africa’s Many Divides and Africa’s Future xiii
(the Redeemer) left our shore to join the ancestors when he succumbed to
cancer on a cold, Romanian hospital bed in 1972.
Born into a humble smith’s family, Nkrumah was to become one of the
most illustrious makers of modern Africa, and perhaps the most ardent,
consistent advocate of the unity of the black race after Marcus Garvey.
Nkrumah was a visionary and fearless leader of the African people whose
desire to see the continent united knew no bounds. He led Ghana to
independence on March 6, 1957 after more than a century of British
colonial rule, the first independent state in sub-Saharan Africa. He
declared, on Ghana’s Independence Day, that Ghana’s independence was
meaningless unless it was linked with the liberation of the entire African
continent.
Nkrumah's words of wisdom reveal the extent of his commitment to
unflagging zeal and unquenchable optimism in the African cause and
world peace. It is no wonder many say he lived ahead of his times.
Nkrumah’s axioms should serve as constant reminders and signposts to
Africans and all well-meaning people as we chart our way through the
current millennium.
His single-minded desire to make Africa the proud home of all people
of African descent dispersed around the world brought him to work
together with leaders and architects of the Pan-Africanist movement,
including W.E.B. Du Bois of the United States, George Padmore of
Trinidad, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia,
Sekou Toure of Guinea, Modibo Keita of Mali, and Patrice Lumumba of
the Democratic Republic of Congo.
Nkrumah was one of the organizers of the historic fifth Pan-Africanist
Congress in Manchester more than half a century ago; a congress that
proved decisive in the struggle against foreign rule in Africa and racial
oppression in the West, and that demonstrated a remarkable unity between
continental Africans and Africans in the Diaspora. He not only brought
Pan-Africanism to its natural home when he returned to the Gold Coast
after his sojourn in America and England to lead the independence
movement, he also established and sustained a link between the continent
and the Diaspora until the end of his regime.
Without doubt, Nkrumah ranks among the greatest political figures of
the twentieth century. An indefatigable champion of world peace, advocate
and spokesman of the Non-Aligned Movement, it was only ironic that his
government was overthrown in a violent CIA-masterminded coup while he
was on his way to Hanoi to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the war in
Vietnam.
xiv Preface
His courageous and tactical (Gandhian passive non-resistance, or what

he termed "positive action") leadership led to the wresting of political
independence of his country from Britain, the first in sub-Saharan Africa.
Ghana’s independence not only became a powder keg that ignited a
continental revolution against European imperialism, Nkrumah consciously
made his newly liberated country the powerhouse of the African revolution.
Nkrumah’s revolutionary and pan-Africanist ideas swept across the
entire continent—from Casablanca to Cape Town. Consistent with his
independence day declaration that the independence of Ghana was
meaningless unless it was linked with the total liberation of the entire
African continent, Nkrumah trained African liberation fighters, financed
their movements and encouraged them to dislodge colonial rule from their
territories.
It was no wonder that in less than a decade after Ghana’s independence
in 1957, more than 90% of African countries had attained their own
independence.
All of Nkrumah’s adult life was devoted to one and one passion
alone—the liberation and unity of the African people. He lived, dreamed
and died for this ideal. This passion and quest for a continental union
government prompted his enemies to brand him a dreamer, a
megalomaniac, and an African Don Quixote. But judging from the parlous
state of the continent’s desperate, dispirited and non-viable fifty-five
countries today, Nkrumah’s call for the formation of a United States of
Africa government was a wise one, even if it was brazen at the time.
Nkrumah argued forcefully that only a federal state of Africa based on a
common market, a common currency, a unified army (an African High
Command) and a common foreign policy could not only provide the
launching pad for a massive reconstruction and modernization of the
continent, but also optimize Africa’s efforts to find its rightful place in the
international arena and effectively checkmate internal conflicts, as well as
fending off superpower interference and predatory and imperialistic wars.
But Nkrumah’s tragedy was probably that he came to power at an
inauspicious time, in the “heat” of the Cold War, a period when the bi-
polar East-West ideological confrontation made leaders like Nkrumah
sacrificial lambs on the altar of superpower chauvinism. Cold War politics
broached no homegrown nationalists and patriots; it did not forgive leaders
who refused to worship the gods of Soviet Communism or American
capitalism. Would Nkrumah’s ideas have been much more welcome in this
post-Cold War, uni-polar, globalizing world? It is difficult to say.
A continental union government as advocated by Nkrumah may not
have been a magic bullet or a panacea for all of the continent's seemingly
Africa’s Many Divides and Africa’s Future xv
intractable problems, but one can say without fear of contradiction that the
situation in the continent would have been better than it is today. Such a
union would have made it possible for the marshalling and pooling of the
continent’s rich resources for the collective benefit of the citizens of
Africa. Advantages of economies of scale, the avoidance of duplicity,
presenting a united voice in world affairs and a collective bargain in
international trade (instead of Africans competing among themselves for
the lowest commodity prices at the international bargaining table) are but a
few of the fruits that could be reaped in a continental union government.
The examples on both sides of the Atlantic—the European Union and
the North American Free Trade Agreement—which have united countries
of disparate cultures, languages, political and even ideological orientations,
coupled with the surging globalization of the world economy, point to the
breadth of Nkrumah’s vision. But Nkrumah was no paragon of political
virtues; he had his flaws. His one-party state “democracy” stifled different
and divergent views from the other side of the political divide.
His installation as “Life President” of his party, the Convention
People’s Party, made Nkrumah a dictator in the eyes of many. He also did
nothing to discourage party cronies from turning him into a demigod.
While he did not subject his opponents to the callous, brutal repressions
and bloody massacres symptomatic of African dictators such as Idi Amin
of Uganda and Jean-Bédel Bokassa of the Central African Republic,
Nkrumah did use the Preventative Detention Act (PDA), enacted by the
British Colonial Administration, to throw his political opponents into jail
without trial. His enforcement of the PDA to crack down on his opponents,
who were bent on unseating him through terrorist bombings and numerous
assassination attempts, was criticized as dictatorial and draconian.
This volume brings together scholars from across this country and
internationally to share their research and ideas about Dr Kwame
Nkrumah. It is hoped that it provides an excellent opportunity for scholars
and students from different disciplines to connect with peers, share ideas
and cultivate knowledge.
We are convinced that this volume offers a unique opportunity to
contextualize Nkrumah’s pan-Africanist agenda within the neo-liberal
global project and against the backdrop of the current global economic and
political ferment. We also hope that it will generate new ideas, revise and
fortify old ones, and cross-fertilize theories on international/transnational
development, post-colonial Africa and global/international issues.
Comprising papers delivered at the first and second KNICs dedicated
to “Africa’s Man of the Millennium” in a period of intense academic
debate about the merits and demerits of globalization and the place and
xvi Preface
role of the tri-continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America, this volume
provides Canadian scholars with a unique and timely opportunity to
seriously engage and scrutinize Nkrumah’s intellectual and political legacy
in the areas of international political economy and governance.
Included in this volume are the following topics: “Perspectives on
African Independence—Perennial Challenges to African Independence
and the Nagging Essentials of African Liberation” by Dr Zizwe Poe,
chapter one, “Global African Unity in the Era of Globalization—An
Assessment of the Place of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD)” by Dr Asogwa Felix Chinwe and Akachuku Anny Agu,
chapter two, “Colonialism, Ethnicity and Nigeria’s Integration—An
Analysis of Impact Relationship” by Professor O. S. A. Obikeze, chapter
three, “Ethnic Integration and Continental Unity” by Dr Vincent Dodoo
and Amisah Zenabu Bakuri, chapter four, “Perspectives on African
Decolonization and Development—The Case of Kenya” by Omosa
Mogambi and Kennedy Onkware, chapter five, “Nkrumah and His
“Chicks”—An Examination of Women and Organisational Strategies of
the CPP” by Dr Wilhelmina Donkoh, chapter six, “Africa Unite—A
Slogan of Intellectual and Cultural Significance in the Works of Kwame
Nkrumah and Bob Marley” by Dr B. Steiner Iferkwe, chapter seven, “The
Intellectual and Political Legacies of Kwame Nkrumah” by Ama Biney,
chapter eight, “Pan-Africanism, Feminism and Socio-Sexual Power” by Dr
Annecka Leolyn Marshall, chapter nine, “Africa and the Gender Debate—
Basis of Division and Future Union” by Henry Kam Kah, chapter ten,
“Sino-Pessimism versus Sino-Optimism—Which way for Chinese
Africana?” by Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, chapter eleven, “Racialization of
Asia, Africa and the Americas, and the Construction of the Ideal Iranian
Citizen—Local and Global Representations of Colonialism, Geography,
Culture and Religious Diversity in Iranian School Textbooks” by Amir
Mirfakhraie, chapter twelve, the United States Peace Corps as a Facet of
US-Ghana Relations by E. Ofori Bekoe, chapter thirteen, “South-South
Cooperation—A New Post-Cold War Divide or a True Post-North-South
Divide?” by Dr Catherine Schittecatte, chapter fourteen, “Pan-African-
Education—A Case Study of The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute,
Print Media and The Young Pioneer Movement” Dr Mjiba Frehiwot,
chapter fifteen
Africa’s Many Divides and Africa’s Future xvii
References
Adesida, Olugbenga & Oteh, Arunma. 2001. African Voices, African
Visions. Stockholm: The Nordic African Institute.
Biney, Ama. 2008. “The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect.”
Journal of Pan-African Studies 2 (3): 129–159.
Bourenane, N. 1992. “Prospects for Africa for an Alternative Approach to
the Dominant Afro-Pessimism.” In Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o (ed.), 30
Years of Independence in Africa: The Lost Decades. Nairobi: Academy
Science Publishers.
Gordon, David F. & Howard Wolpe. 1998. “The Other Africa: An End to
Afro-Pessimism.” World Policy Journal 15 (1): 49–59.
Kaplan, Robert. G. 1994. “The Coming Anarchy.” Atlantic Monthly 2 (2):
44–76.
Mbeki, Thabo. 1999. “On African Renaissance.” African Philosophy 12
(1): 5–10.
—. 1999. “I Am an African.” In Africa—The Time has Come: Selected
Speeches, 215–223. Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers and Mafube
Publishing.
Moyo, Dambisa. 2009. Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How
There is Another Way for Africa. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Nkrumah, Kwame. 1963. Africa Must Unite. London: Heinemann
Publishers.
—. 1967. Axioms of Kwame Nkrumah. London: Panaf.
Onwudiwe, Ebere & Ibelema, Minabere. 2003. Afro-Optimism: Perspectives
on Africa’s Advances. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
Quist-Adade, Charles. 2001. In the Shadows of the Kremlin and the White
House: Africa’s Media Image From Communism to Post-Communism.
Lanham: University Press of America.
—. 2012. Social Justice Issues in Local and Global Contexts. Ste Sault
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WELCOME ADDRESSES AT THE OPENING
CEREMONY OF THE SECOND KWAME
NKRUMAH INTERNATIONAL (KNIC2)
CONFERENCE AND A STATEMENT
ON THE MAN KWAME NKRUMAH
From Professor William Otoo Ellis,

Vice-Chancellor, KNUST
It is with great pleasure that I welcome all participants to the KNUST
campus. Kwame Nkrumah, the first President of our country, the great
pan-Africanist and the person for whom our university is named, had a
vision and a mission not limited to Africa alone but which extended to the
rest of the world. He wanted a free and peaceful world where Africans are
featured as equal partners, not as subordinate players. He had confidence
in the ability of the African and the University of Science & Technology
(UST), now Kwame Nkrumah University of Science & Technology
(KNUST), which was established with this objective in mind, to train
engineers, architects and other professionals for the continent. The person
he selected to supervise this project was an accomplished African, R. P.
Baffour. He was a good example of what the African could do if they are
given the opportunity and the resources.
The problems of Africa and especially its status in the world, Kwame
Nkrumah insisted, can never be resolved if Africans remain divided. The
great debate on uniting Africans has been going on for half a century and
one theme of this conference is seeking to provide new suggestions to help
eliminate disunity among them. Looking at the program, there are about
eighty papers to be presented within the two days of the conference. These
new ideas should contribute to the solution of the African problem. It has
been observed rightly that, if in the past the Sahara divided us, now it
should unite us.
With these few words, I wish you all fruitful deliberations and an
enjoyable conference. Once more, welcome to the KNUST campus and
enjoy our green environment.
2 Welcome Addresses at the Opening Ceremony
From Dr Alan R. Davis,

President and Vice-Chancellor of KPU
It is my pleasure to add my welcome to those attending the 2nd Biennial
Kwame Nkrumah International Conference: Africa’s Many Divides and
Africa’s Future. You have come from all corners of the world to focus
your discussions on the issues and opportunities facing this wonderful,
diverse and extraordinary continent.
The program shows enormous depth and breadth, and I congratulate Dr
Charles Quist-Adade and Dr Vincent Dodoo on their success in organizing
such a rich event, and, on behalf of Kwantlen Polytechnic University, I
thank them and all of you for your contributions to the conference.
As the new President of Kwantlen Polytechnic University, I am
especially proud to see this wonderful, new and important institution be so
involved in this major global initiative, and to see the partnership it has
developed with the host, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and
Technology. I am also proud as a Canadian to see the support of our
government through the Social Science and Humanities Research Council.
Likewise, the support of the Oxford University Press is important and
heartening.
Most recently in my career, in the field of open and distance learning, I
have had the privilege of meeting with many colleagues from across
Africa, including those at the Africa Virtual University, the University of
South Africa, and similar open institutions across the continent. I am
humbled by their optimism and commitment. I look forward to expanding
my understanding of all aspects of Africa’s future in the years ahead
through events and partnerships such as this.
I wish you all the very best in your endeavours.
From Professor Sam Afrane, Provost of the College of Art

and Social Sciences, KNUST
There is no doubt that the social, economic and political landscape of
Africa is characterized by visible and disturbing “divides” which cloak the
wheel of progress of the continent. These “divides” result in many forms
of countless “dualisms.” The common ones include formal and informal,
poor and rich, urban and rich, educated and uneducated, etc. This is not to
mention the serious societal divides driven by parochial partisan politics
and ideological posturing in many African countries.
Africa’s Many Divides and Africa’s Future 3
Unfortunately, the policy objectives of many governments in Africa

have, rather than built bridges between these crippling dichotomies,
widened these gaps.
Many political and economic analysts/commenters blame this situation
on our colonial past. They argue that the colonial masters created
disjointed social and economic systems that failed to develop “holistic”
economies and consequently gave birth to divided societies. Obviously,
there may be other causes we need to identify and critically interrogate.
Fortunately, this conference comes at the right time to help us
understand this phenomenon in Africa. It is expected that the presenters
will not only explore the causes, dynamics, effects and ramifications of
this problem, but will also go further to offer prescriptions that will unify
and consolidate the African society for accelerated development.
I want to take this opportunity to welcome all participants of the
conference, especially our friends from outside our borders. We hope the
conference will provide an appropriate platform for stimulating intellectual
exchanges and mutual learning. Besides the core business of the
conference, please find some time to fraternize and also enjoy a bit of our
beautiful campus and country.
Once again I welcome you to the KNUST campus and Ghana.
From Dr Diane Purvey, Dean of Arts, KPU

Two years ago, Kwantlen Polytechnic University was pleased to hold
the inaugural Biennial Kwame Nkrumah International Conference in
Metro Vancouver, in the shared traditional territories of the Kwantlen,
Kwatzie, Semiahmoo and Tsawwassen First Nations. It is highly
gratifying to see that the promise of the first meeting has been realized
with a second. It is often challenging enough to organize a series of
conferences in one city, on one continent; to do so half a world away is a
major accomplishment, for which the organizers must be applauded.
It has been fifty-five years since Ghana achieved independence. In
those years, the size and extent of the African diaspora have continued to
grow. Currently, slightly more than one Canadian in one hundred
identifies in the census as “African.” The share of Canadians with African
ancestry—recent or remote—is much, much greater. A desktop globe
suggests that we are far apart, though in fact we are not.
The Faculty of Arts at Kwantlen Polytechnic University is happy to
continue supporting this conference. The program is a robust and
ambitious one, reflecting the excellence of scholarship on topics as diverse
as Rastafari and the gendered implications of mobile phone technology,
4 Welcome Addresses at the Opening Ceremony
from Pan-Africanism to Brazilian footballers. There is much on the table

here at this international gathering and Kwantlen is proud to play its part.
With best wishes for an invigorating and fruitful conference.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
LITERATURE AS A TOOL FOR NATIONAL
LIBERATION AND POST-COLONIAL
RECONSTRUCTION, ANTI-PALANQUINITY
AND THE PAN-AFRICANIST IMPERATIVE
PROFESSOR ATUKWEI OKAI

DEPARTMENT OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS
UNIVERSITY OF EDUCATION, WINNEBA, GHANA
SECRETARY-GENERAL, PAN-AFRICAN WRITERS’ ASSOCIATION
(PAWA)
History will single you out, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, for this
gesture and venture of yours, in organizing this Nkrumah International
Conference. It is a laudable and memorable gesture and venture. Consider
this conference as a critical building block in the body of worldwide
efforts to achieve the United States of Africa. Doubtless, it is a veritable
Molotov cocktail hurled against those elements that would try to construct
belief systems against our drive for unification of our continent.
In this keynote address, I wish to address the questions of whether and
how literature can be a tool for national liberation and post-colonial
reconstruction, and why it should be an important tool for modern Africa.
It is because literature carries and conveys information in a powerfully
persuasive and permanent way—across consciousness, into psyches,
across borders and boundaries, and across ages; its nature and construct
has invested it with the aura and awe of authority. Throughout history
there have been several cases of the deployment of the power of books to
affect and turn minds, to orient or reorient, and thereby control them.
Our platform is that, if the books had been used to colonize our minds,
then we must use the book to decolonize our minds. Take for example the
statement by Pastor Mensa Otabil that shows how a wicked and vicious
interpretation of the Bible has been used to destroy the self-confidence of a
whole race, even to the point of building the pillars of Apartheid on the
6 Keynote Address
teachings of the Dutch Reform Church. Otabil has even read a book by a
“Bible-believing” Canadian minister, which taught that the black man is
what the Bible calls the “beast of the field” (Otabil, 10). By omitting or
treating lightly those areas that mention a Black presence in scripture,
European and Euro-American biblical scholars have, for long, obscured
the role of Blacks in the Bible, thus giving a deceptively racial bias to this
subject. Otabil, in his book Beyond The Rivers of Ethiopia, tracks the
biblical narrative in a new way as he lifts up such blatant omissions as
Keturah’s six children, fathered by Abraham, who were, “given gifts and
sent to the East.” According to Otabil, these black children of Abraham
and Keturah were the ones who were disinherited. Another example cites
Moses who sat at the feet of the priest of Midian and married Zipporah.
Racism, an old problem, surfaced as a result of Moses’s marriage to an
Ethiopian. As noted by Leonard Lovett, with Otabil’s invaluable insistence
on a sense of history, he explodes long-held myths about Africa and
exhorts us to unite (Lovett, in Otabil, xiii). Explaining how the world’s
power structures perpetuate themselves through a meticulous and
systematic network designed to keep their subjects in total ignorance,
Otabil points out the often quoted revealing statement that U.S. Senator
Henry Berry made to the Virginia House of delegates, concerning the state
of the Negro slaves:
We have as far as possible, closed every avenue by which light may enter
the slave’s mind. If we could extinguish the capacity to see the light, our
work would be complete. They would then be on the level with the beast of
the field and we should be safe (Otabil, 3).
As a result of persistent misinformation and misinterpretation, the

tragedy we have to contend with is that many blacks have bought into this
propaganda of the inferiority of the black race and have resigned
themselves to the unfortunate notion that God designed them to be non-
achievers. One needs only to look further back to the Great Flood. After
the flood, the leaders of the world were Cushites, whose skin colour was
black, and Ethiopia and Cush are synonymous. Obviously, Blacks are not
a biblically cursed race.
It takes a long process to make one dependent, and it will take a longer
fighting process to make one independent. Mental slavery is more difficult
to shrug off than physical slavery (we need a spirit of anti-palanquinity!).
In our national liberation struggles, literature played a clear and key role.
“The African intellectual who fought for independence engaged himself in
agonizing cerebral calisthenics in order to carve an enduring path for his
nations’ development, and he values education and reading over

everything else,” (Achebe, 32).
The early nationalist intellectuals included, for example, Africa’s great
poet Leopold Sedar Senghor, who was also Senegal’s President;
Agostinho Neto, another great poet who stirred up his Angolan fighters for
independence by reading poems he had composed; Jomo Kenyatta of
Kenya; Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda; Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana; Nigeria’s
Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo and Aminu Kano; South Africa’s
Mandela and Kenya’s Oginga Odinga. They all wrote masterpieces on
governance or fiction. As recorded by Joseph Ushie and Denja Abdullahi,
there was, at this time, hardly any gulf between the crown and the gown,
and this marriage between the two benefitted the town. This time, too,
“education, as the indispensable bedrock for development, was accorded
the highest priority by this group of visionary leaders, a tradition that has
continued anywhere else in the world except in sub-Saharan Africa’s
murderdoms where visionless military and neomilitary lootocrats (looters)
have kidnapped whole nations and turned them into death-prone prisons
without walls, such as Nigeria,” (Achebe, 32). Using Nigeria as a case
study, Ushie and Abdullahi note that:
In no other sector is this strange betrayal more visible than in the nation’s
education sector, which baked these literary giants for the world, but which
the neo-colonialist leaders treat with disdain after having yanked off their
own children and relatives from the virused system and emptied them into
schools in other lands where sanity in governance has prevailed (Achebe,
33).
They observe that, of course, in the absence of any vision or ideology,

the political scene is no better than a fathering of drunken pirates and
outlaws among whom the decent dwell at their own peril” (Achebe, 23).
The dispiriting consequence is that, Nigeria, for example, which was the
hope of Africa in the 1960s, galloping fast to level up with the likes of
Britain and the United States, has been “burnt into cold nauseating ash” as
the only country in the world where the unbelievable situation of a local
government councillor earning four times the salary of a professor is
considered normal, and where the senator’s monthly salary is the
professor’s annual salary, and it is seen as normal. All these are
testimonies that Chinua Achebe’s vision is recreating the pre-colonial
African society in Things Fall Apart “which ought to be factored into a
truly postcolonial cultural reconstruction of Africa, has been afflicted with
a still birth by these neo-colonialist rulers,” (Achebe, 33).
8 Keynote Address
It is a cause for concern that the early team spirit of collaboration that
was evident among Nigeria’s cultural producers and the political-
intellectual class, which was in the interest of the nation’s independence,
has now vanished to the point that the country’s writers such as Chinua
Achebe, Wole Soyinka, Niyi Osundare, Tanure Ojaide, and others have
been made to drift away and have remained ill at ease with home.
Governance and literature

For literature to succeed in doing what it is carved out to do with its
particular contribution in the scheme of things, there is the need for the
creation of an enabling environment that will facilitate both the coming
into being, as well as the strategic positioning of the various factors that
can produce the sustainable synergy of productive possibilities. In this
regard, NgǊgƭ Wa Thiong’O believes that in order to create a progressive
movement in the African novel and literature, it will take “a progressive
state which would overhaul the current neo-colonial linguistic policies and
tackle the national question in a democratic manner.” Above all, the most
important element, NgǊgƭ submits, is a willing and widening readership
(NgǊgƭ, 85). NgǊgƭ spells out the power that literature has in the moulding
of the mind of man in his book Writers in Politics, where he sums up the
kinds of literature available to African children in the classrooms and
libraries for their school and university education. He classifies them in
three broad categories.
The first category was the great humanist and democratic tradition of
European literature: Aeschylus, Balzac, Brecht, Dickens, Dostoevsky,
Gorky, Shakespeare, Sophocles, and Tolstoy just to mention a few. But as
NgǊgƭ points out, their literature, even at its most humane and universal,
necessarily reflected the European experience of history. The world of its
setting and the world it evoked would be more familiar to a child brought
up in the same landscape than to one brought up outside it. The second
category was the literature of liberal Europeans who often had Africa as
the subject of their imaginative explorations. The third category was the
downright racist literature of writers like Rider Haggard, Elspeth Hatley,
Nicholas Monsarrat, and Robert Ruarls, whose work depicted mainly two
types of Africans: the good and the bad. NgǊgƭ further explains that:
The good African was the one who co-operated with the European
colonizer; particularly the African who helped the European colonizer in
the occupation and subjugation of his own people and country. Such a
character was portrayed as possessing qualities of strength, intelligence and
beauty. But it was the strength, intelligence and the beauty of a sell-out.
The bad African character was the one who offered resistance to the
foreign conquest and occupation of his country. Such a character was
portrayed as being ugly, weak, cowardly and scheming. (NgǊgƭ, 92).
NgǊgƭ further points out that the reader’s sympathies are guided in
such a way as to make him identify with Africans collaborating with
colonialism and to make him distance himself from those offering political
and military resistance to colonialism (NgǊgƭ, 92). NgǊgƭ therefore
concludes that African children who encountered literature in colonial
schools and universities were experiencing the world as defined and
reflected in the European experiences of history. The African children’s
entire way of looking at the world, even the world of the immediate
environment, was Eurocentric. Europe was the centre of the universe, and
the earth, NgǊgƭ reminds us, moved around the European intellectual
scholarly axis.
Reinforcing the images children encountered in literature by their study
of geography and history fit well with the cultural imperatives of British
imperialism. Thus the economic control of the African people was effected
through politics and culture, and the universities and colleges set up in the
colonies after the war were meant to produce a native elite which would
later help prop up the Empire (NgǊgƭ, 93).
It is clear that African children studying literature in our schools and
universities are subjected to a literature that defines the world in a certain
way. Literature indeed has an enormous impact and therefore must be
carefully selected, given due attention, and handled carefully. It should
always be borne in mind that literature is a powerful instrument in
evolving the cultural ethos of a people and imperialism, particularly during
colonialism, provides the best example of how literature as an element of
culture was used in the domination of Africa (NgǊgƭ, 99).
For instance, prior to independence, education in Kenya was an
instrument of colonial policy designed to educate the people of Kenya into
acceptance of their role as the colonised (NgǊgƭ, 96). The language and
literature syllabuses, inadequate and irrelevant to the needs of the country,
were so organized that a Kenyan child knew himself through London and
New York (NgǊgƭ, 97).
The quest for self-recognition: the anti-palanquinity

mindset
The quest for self-recognition: the anti-palanquinity mindset: In
reflecting on what immediately underlines the politics of languages in
African literature, NgǊgƭ Wa Thiong’O observes that it is the search for a
10 Keynote Address
liberation in which to see ourselves clearly in relationship to ourselves and

to otherselves in the universe, and calls this “a quest for relevance..” I
would rather suggest we term it “the quest for self-recognition.” Such a
mission has the aim of rediscovering and accepting ourselves, and
thereupon feeling empowered and enlightened enough to develop an anti-
palanquinity mindset and consciousness in order to transform our
condition.
A basic quality of the anti-palanquinity consciousness is to question
and subvert a negative or unjust status quo. In the context of the history of
the African People, an anti-palanquinity consciousness and mindset
involves a psychological reorientation of self, a reordering of our belief
systems from an inferiority complex and replacing it with new belief
systems of self-knowledge, self-discovery, self-confidence, and self-
reliance—and the reinforcement within our people’s psyche of an inner
posture of anti-palanquinity.
Anti-palanquinity denotes a readiness to question sacred cows. A
palanquin is a covered litter, carried by four people. The African
bourgeoisie would miss the revolution’s productive characteristics, which
marked the rise of its Western counterpart from the ashes of feudal
Europe. It is under feudalism that you agree to carry another person, a
higher, mighty person, or personage, in a palanquin!
An anti-palanquinity consciousness will not accept the present neo-
colonial order (Onoge, 34). An anti-palanquinity consciousness will not
entertain any feeling of inferiority complex nor accept any act of
superiority complex on anybody’s part.
The Pan-Africanist Imperative

Given our pan-Africanist conviction, agenda, and struggle, it is
imperative for us to build our countries in a particular direction. Ths will
only be possible if we pay proper attention to the place of literature in the
scheme of things through the promotion of production, appreciation and
consumption of our indigenous literary offerings. We need to promote our
indigenous book industry because in the general competitive marketplace
of ideas, there is a struggle for the influencing and controlling of the minds
of people against their own interests.
A major pan-Africanist imperative in reaching this goal is the
challenge of guiding, encouraging and inspiring the youth to empower
themselves with knowledge and enlightenment. The youth must struggle
“to know the time of day.” As a people who believe we have a stake in the
real destiny of Africa, we may ask ourselves, for instance, how many of
Nkrumah’s books have we read in order to ground our understandings

fully, not only in the arguments for the creation of a United States of
Africa, but also in the knowledge of the incredible good we stand to gain
as a people, and therefore as individuals?
What, now, is the task confronting modern African youth? It is that
they have to empower themselves by reading widely and by self-education
in order to achieve enlightenment. It has rarely been noted and propagated
for the benefit of the youth that Nkrumah’s brilliance as a leader,
revolutionary organizer and writer was predicated on his self-education
and not by the orthodox methods of acquiring knowledge. He read widely,
beyond and around his basic textbooks. He realized that he needed to
know as much as he could in order to first understand the real forces that
had created the given circumstances of his people; secondly, he needed to
dig deep into the heritage of human history in order to so enlighten himself
that he could then fashion the requisite, but then non-existent theories and
strategies that would empower him to liberate his people. The youth have
to learn how to organize, because it is indisputable that organization
decides everything. This has been proven over the centuries by societies
and organizations, and we have the examples of Ghandi and Gamal Abdul
Nasser, among others.
The case for the youth reading broadly is premised on the fact that the
modern African world was not born at the inception of the African
struggle, and they therefore need to read avidly so as to catch up with their
heritage in order to “know the time of the day” and understand the times in
which we live. In his essay of 2006, “The Unfortunate Children of
Fortunate Parents: Reflections on African Literature in the Wake of 1986
and the Age of Neoliberal Globalization,” Biodun Jeyifo wrote that the
previous two decades had witnessed an “arrested decolonization and the
devaluation of the legacies of the national liberation movement,” and that
the relationship between African writers and their audiences have
undergone tremendous changes (2006, 28). These resulted “in a
phenomenon of worldwide dimensions, a seismic, tectonic migration of
persons, projects and ideas and movements around the globe—to the
overwhelming detriment of the developing world.” He said, as did Wole
Soyinka, that many of the most:
Authoritative scholars and critics of African literature have departed from
African universities and colleges and now reside and teach in North
American and European institutions (we are talking here of the Ireles, the
Jeyifos, the Obiechinas, the Okpewhos, the Emenyinous, the Osundares,
the Gikand as and many, many others) (ibid., 29).
12 Keynote Address
The universities on the continent themselves, he continues, are buffeted

by unprecedented crises of underfunding, demoralization of faculty, staff
and students, as well as the rise of a pervasive culture of obscurantism and
fetishistic pseudo-intellectualism and the attendant subversion of reason
and critical thought Gbemi, 29). Amidst all these reversals, other concerns
are raised by critics. Chinweizu, for example, states that direct rule might
have ended, but what about indirect rule? “What of African political elites
managing their independent nations for Europe’s economic benefits? Or
intellectual elites managing Africa’s minds for the benefits of Western
Cultural Imperialism?” (Chinweizu & Madubuike 1980, 232).
The Pan-Africanist imperative recognizes that enslavement wiped our
minds of our heritage, and that colonialism filled the vacuum with its own
ideas. It is therefore a sharp and sensitive response to the Pan-Africanist
imperative when Pastor Mensa Otabil declares that: “as a black man, I
have observed that a war is being waged on all fronts to portray our people
in a very negative light …” (1992, 6). Luckily for us, Otabil, as witnessed
by the inspiring revelations in Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia, reveals that
he believes in a faith which is able to speak to Africa’s social needs, and is
convinced that the inherent strength of the great African people is yet to be
fully released.
The Pan-Africanist imperative demands that as many of our people as
possible be brought as fast as possible into connection with an
understanding and appreciation of our common heritage and destiny. This
raises the question of the provision of libraries and their stocking with the
necessary kinds of books. We also need to translate works by African
writers into other African languages, so that the African citizen can have
access to his continental literary heritage.
In conclusion, let us take note that those who in 1884 sat down to
parcel out among themselves pencilled chunks of the territories of the
African people are no longer after Africans—they are after Africa!
Thousands of acres of land—land with resources—are being acquired by
outsiders in Ethiopia, Tanzania and Nigeria.
Africa is the richest continent on earth, yet we need outside support for
our budgets. In light of the pan-Africanist imperative, the understanding
must be clear that our individual African states, as they are now, are as
viable and fragile as a broomstick. The security of our future lies in the
strength of a broom, which is unbreakable. The insurrection of pan-
Africanist ideas needs to be everywhere.
Indeed, the independence of African states is meaningless to the
African people unless it is translated into a United States of Africa; a
proper image of the African self, inculcated through an understanding of
African literature and language, has a pivotal role in the building of a Pan-
African concept and a redemptive realm.
References
Achibe, Chinua. 1958. Things Fall Apart. New York: Anchor Books
Chinweizu, Jemie Onwuchekea & Ihechukwu Madubuike. 1980. Towards
the Decolonisation of African Literature, Enugu: Nigeria Fourth
Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.
Gbemi, Alao, Abimbola, ( 2010). The Goshen Principle: A Shelter in the
Time of Storm: New York. Author House
Jeyifo, Biodun. 2006. “The Unfortunate Children of Fortunate Parents:
Reflections on African Literature in the Wake of 1986 and the Age of
Neoliberal Globalisation.” In After The Nobel Prize: Reflections on
African Literature, Governance and Development, Gbemisola Adeoti
& Mabel Evwierhoma (eds). Lagos, Nigeria: Association of Nigerian
Authors.
Onogoe, Omafume. F. 1985. “The Crisis of Consciousness in Modern
African Literature.” In Marxism and African Literature, George M.
Gugelberger (ed.). Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc.
Otabil, Mensa. 1992. Beyond the Rivers of Ethiopia. Accra, Ghana: Altar
International.
Ushie, Joseph A. & Denja Abdullahi. 2009. “Introduction: Chinua
Achebe: The Making of a Legend.” In Themes Fall Apart But the
Centre Holds, Joseph A. Ushie & Denja Abdullahi (eds). Lagos,
Association of Nigeria Authors.
Wa Thiong’O NgǊgƭ. 1986. Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of
Language in African Literature. London: James Currey, Heinemann
Kenya, Heinemann.
CHAPTER ONE
PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE:

PERSONAL CHALLENGES TO AFRICAN
INDEPENDENCE AND NAGGING ESSENTIALS
OF AFRICAN LIBERATION
DR D. ZIZWE POE
HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT AT, LINCOLN
UNIVERSITY, PENNSYLVANIA
Abstract
Nkrumah’s strategic thought described African territory as being
divided into three dynamic zones: liberated, contested, and enemy-held.
According to his vision each territory was characterized by the battle to
optimize the positive forces against the negative forces with the end goal
of improving the living conditions of the African masses. This analysis
needs updating with an exigent focus on contemporary liberated zones as
springboards of Pan-African activity. This particular task of ideation falls
on the African intelligentsia and in this light I offer this paper and
presentation.
I will contextualize historically Nkrumah’s assessments asserted in his
texts, Class Struggle in Africa and Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare.
From that contextualization I will offer an update and recommend
categories that can assist in identifying the direction of liberated zones
toward optimization on one hand and deterioration on the other. My
presentation will illustrate the dynamic character of collective African
agency toward Pan-African unity since the passing of Kwame Nkrumah
into the ancestral realm. I will integrate aspects of the rise and demise of
Libya as a Pan-African liberated zone in my presentation.
Perspectives on African Independence 15
Introduction
The African independence movement of the second half of the
twentieth century achieved only a part of its goal to disconnect the
imperial tether to African natural and human resources. The African
Liberation Movement was first led by the Pan-African Nationalists of the
African Unity Movement, but was eventually sidelined by neo-colonialist
manoeuvres. The African Union has the potential to revitalize the African
Unity Movement and continue its work to consolidate African
Independence by building the United States of Africa.
A little more than fifty years ago, a man, who the British Broadcasting
Corporation’s (BBC) African listenership would later vote as “the African
of the Millennium,” declared to a rousing crowd of delegates from
independent territories, dependent territories, and observers that: “This
decade is the decade of African Independence. “FORWARD THEN TO
INDEPENDENCE, TO INDEPENDENCE NOW, TOMORROW, THE
UNITED STATES OF AFRICA” (Meyer, 51). The year of the declaration
was 1958 and the location was Accra, Ghana. The person making the
declaration was none other than Kwame Nkrumah as he was wrapping up
his opening address to the First All-African People’s Conference.
Nkrumah continued throughout that conference to urge the delegates to
return to their respective territories, unite broadly and prosecute speedy
liberations. Such liberations, urged Nkrumah, should be followed by the
consolidating force of African union. During that decade, from 1958
through 1968, more than two thirds of the African states declared their
independence.
Independence may seem like a cut-and-dry concept unto itself, yet it is
a relative concept describing the relationship of one entity with another. In
academic environments, independence is a term that is most often used to
describe the relationship between a particular nation state and European
imperialism. Such a Eurocentric focus misses the essential character of
African independence, which is the Pan-African interdependence of the
African parts. Nkrumah stressed this point at the First All-African
People’s Conference:
Our enemies are many and they stand ready to pounce upon and exploit
our every weakness. They tell us that this particular person or that
particular country has greater or more favourable potentialities than the
other. They do not tell us that we should unite, that we are all as good as
we are able to make ourselves once we are free. Remember always that
you have four stages to make (GP/A1670/5,500/6/61-62, 5).
(1) the attainment of freedom and independence;
16 Chapter One
(2) the consolidation of that freedom and independence;

(3) the creation of unity and community between the free African
states;
(4) the economic and social reconstruction of Africa.
Those comments came at a time when African independence was being

shaped and reshaped through the political contests of debate and war. For
Nkrumah and other Pan-African nationalists, African independence was a
component part of Africa’s destiny; it depended on the political and
economic unification of Africa. African independence clearly insinuated
the choice of Pan-African interdependence or continued dependence on
foreign imperialism.
The debate between the Pan-African nationalist view on African
independence and the Eurocentric view offers a valuable method for
interpreting the modern political and economic reality in Africa today.
There is, of course, a temptation to recount the brilliant and gallant
struggles of political parties and armed liberation movements as they
engaged the evil forces of the empire, but such an effort is akin to
describing a marriage by presenting a photo album of the wedding. The
album only displays the extent of euphoric hope and celebration and, at
best, records the vows. If the marriage has soured because of some
abandonment of vows, the album appears as a sad reminder of a dream
deferred. This metaphor is painfully apt in illuminating African
independence. It is hoped, therefore, that this discussion will have a
remedial effect similar to the marriage counsellor that reminds the once
optimistic couple of the progeny they had hoped to engender through their
union. Like that metaphorical counsellor, it may be necessary to resurrect
the vows that were to secure the union, in this case the productive liberty
of African independence.
In 1994, Nelson Mandela was elected president of South Africa. For
the political novice, this signal event marked the end of the European
imperial era in Africa. More informed observers claimed that the era of
neo-colonialism had already entrenched itself in the African continent and
that Mandela’s election victory was a mere smokescreen. Many a heated
debate has taken place over the results of the independence movement in
Africa during the second half of the twentieth century.
The experiences of African People since 1958 have proven that
African independence requires the functional interdependence of the
African masses within the African continent in cahoots with their
dispersed relations abroad. By functional interdependence, or unity, the
author means the wilful organization of Africa’s resources, both natural
and human, by Africans and for the African masses, with the interest of
humanity according to an African worldview. All else, in these first few

decades of the twenty-first century, is neo-colonialism. All is not doom
and gloom, but the sad reality today is that contemporary claims of
widespread African liberty are ruses of neo-colonial propaganda. A closer
inspection of the facts and their subtext reveals the illusions being used to
hypnotize a generation into a friendly form of fascism.
Some review of the lingua franca used to discuss African
independence is useful and reveals relations of the actors in the ongoing
global conflict between imperial centres and colonial appendages.
Significant terms include: sovereignty, nation-state, sham-independence,
neo-colonialism, and Pan-African nationalism. Calibrating these terms
allows one to render the available mountains of data useful for assessing
the present state of African liberty, and perhaps construct a voice to
predict its future. The concept of “sovereign nation-state,” for example,
needs contextualizing in this era of growing global interdependence. At
first glance the concept evokes images of a monarchical government from
a nostalgic period. The intended use of the concept, however, is a polemic
reference to foreign rule. To avoid confusion the reader should accept
“foreign” to mean “non-African” for the remainder of this writing.
References to “sovereign nation-states” in discussions about African
independence are references to liberation from colonial rule and could
imply a broad array of government paradigms.
The dimensions of African sovereignty are multifaceted but those most
frequently mentioned are the political and economic ones. The pundits
who rendered descriptions of world affairs during the second half of the
twentieth century are responsible for this orientation. The era they
described was marked by continuous wars of imperial competition and
international conflicts compounded by melodramatic class struggles
between annexed populations and imperial metropolises. In short, it was a
time of wars and rumours of wars. In retrospect, empires built under the
leadership of capitalist classes have war as a permanent character of their
modi operandi. War, therefore, did not distinguish this historical epoch but
the nexus of conflict did. The conflagrations appeared to reach such a
crescendo that populations under colonial control were finally able to
assert their own collective agency for liberation in contrast to the
collective agents established by imperial centres.
States emerged as the preeminent faces of collective agents;
subsequently, political discourse employed the language of state relations.
Implicit in those state relationships were class antagonisms reflecting the
competition for real and imagined wealth. For this work, the term “class”
is used in the same way Nkrumah used it. He said: “a class is nothing more
18 Chapter One
than the sum total of individuals bound together by certain interests which,
as a class, they try to preserve and protect” (Nkrumah 1968, 17). The
claim by some political-economists that “states” are machines ultimately
working to protect the interests of the ruling classes that validate them is
also accepted in this work. Discussions about “African independence”
necessarily involve the relationships between states, but state relations do
not sufficiently describe the relations between African nations and global
capital.
Concretization of the terms “sham-independence,” “neocolonialism”
and “Pan-Africanism” enables an understanding of the conditions and
exigencies of post-liberation realities. The first two concepts were
thoroughly described by Nkrumah. He described a territory experiencing
“sham-independence” as one that continued to be exploited economically
by alien interests “intrinsic to the world capitalist sector” (Nkrumah 1968,
8). Nkrumah used the synonym “client state,” an early twentieth-century
term for states subordinate to more powerful states, when referring to these
pseudo-independent territories. Sham-independence was the artifact
generated by the process of neo-colonialism. It was the “empire striking
back” with a lick that negated the final ingredient required for any
meaningful movement of African independence, “Pan-Africanism” or,
more accurately, Pan-African nationalism. Without this Pan-African
realignment of African policies, independence quickly mutated into a
sham reality, and similar patterns of colonial interdependence emerged in
more insidious ways than in the earlier model. Pan-African nationalism
offered an identity and structure to nurture African independence. It was a
nationalism that sought to prioritize African agency at an optimal level of
the African continent, reflecting the productive potential of contemporary
world-powerful mega-states. Such nationalism, however, had to/should
have been rooted deeply in the ideology of liberation movements in order
to flower in the post-liberation era.
The social engineers of the imperial order recognized this ideology as a
lethal threat to capitalist interests and induced independence in territories
prematurely so as to abort the Pan-African nationalist movement. Neo-
colonialist architects casted, coached and encouraged micro-nationalists to
play leading parts in remakes of earlier failed acts of governance. These B-
actors, buffered by major financing, outnumbered and outmanoeuvred the
Pan-African nationalists, thus supplanting the era of African unity with the
era of neo-colonialism. The United States of Africa was slowed by the
creation of the “procrastinated states” of Africa led by gradualists.
The imperial act of colonizing Africa employed a matrix of ideological
and cultural manipulation through state relations. African independence
has been a dialectical product of state-created nations often referred to as

“nation-states.” Historically, states have been conceived of as national
developments to resolve class relations. African nations, however,
experienced deliberate disintegration at the hands of colonial agencies.
National states that did not cooperate with the intrusive imperial order
were dismantled and replaced with cooperative ones. States, therefore,
became the products of their sponsoring classes often contained in foreign-
designed national boundaries. In the post-colonial era the boundaries were
predominantly products of neo-colonial “balkanization.”
Balkanization is a process of consciously dividing nations into micro-
nations to weaken them and render them controllable by the sponsoring
forces of fission. This process earned its name from its early twentieth-
century manifestation and has been used repeatedly by controlling nations
to subdue those beyond their borders. The European colonial powers used
this manoeuvre as they feigned the granting of independence to their
African colonies. Africa was coordinated by fewer than ten
administrations at the beginning of the twentieth century but was divided
into more than fifty by the beginning of the twenty-first century. This was
all done during a century in which an increased productive capacity
required larger centrally organized populations with the streamlined
utilization of strategic resources. African mineral resources enriched
Europe and Asia but the profits escaped the coffers of the African masses
while redundant bureaucracies exhausted African reserves. Some of the
bureaucracies that emerged in the balkanized states found it opportune and
preferable to join European-controlled associations and communities.
Once associated with the previous colonial overlords, the balkanized states
and their ruling classes are recolonized. Balkanization has proven to be an
effective tactic of neo-colonialism.
In the neo-colonial era, imperial plunder yields higher profits and
inflicts relatively greater suffering than the primitive colonial era.
Essential elements of neo-colonialism are: (1) wealth siphoning through
the profit drain of finance-capital intensive operations; (2) interlocking
military relationships; and (3) mass psychological manipulation through
value orientation. Structurally, the neo-colonial era is marked by
unprecedented cooperation among formerly competitive colonial states
and increasing monopolization and consolidation of capitalist operations.
Simultaneously, neo-colonial propaganda is generated to intensify
balkanization in the neo-colonial appendages. Such a situation, if left to
fester, may lead to an inevitable conflict reminiscent of the great world
wars of the twentieth century. Without an authentic African independence,
a horrifying image is constructed of an imperial incubus draining the
20 Chapter One
lifeblood of its African hosts, then fretting for its own insatiable existence
and feeding on itself as the hosts run out of blood to supply it.
The struggle for African independence was first and foremost a contest
of classes within and between nations. Classes in African colonies,
normally in tension, temporarily united to oppose foreign nationals during
the highpoints of independence efforts. Internal class conflict was
submerged in an effort to subdue “a common enemy.” This has
occasionally been explained as a betrayal, albeit a temporary one, of class
allegiance between merchant classes within the colonies and capitalist
classes indigenous to the metropoles. Was the decade of African
Independence an overall class betrayal or, as hindsight suggests, a
modification of relations between these private profit oriented classes as
partnership re-negotiations? Time would constantly change the
relationship between the partners in particular, and between Europe and
Africa in general. Every European country that participated in the so-
called “carve-up” of Africa at the end of the nineteenth century had to
readjust its relationship with their previous wards by the end of the
twentieth century.
The pre-colonial condition of African influences

and responses to colonial agents
The competition for social leadership was present in Africa before the
arrival of Europeans. The dialectical relationship between culture and time
requires abandoning the earlier notion that African culture was static. The
fact that new “traditions” were created within African culture reveals that
there was a vital dynamism between old, and sometimes useless, traditions
and cultural innovations. Seemingly successful innovations became the
new traditions. Given this obvious process of cultural evolution, our
understanding of “traditional Africa” must allow for dynamism. The
prevalent view that social change in African culture was always
undesirable is overly simplistic and inaccurate.
The classification of pre-colonial experience as uniformly communal
may be at the root of this error. Before the existence of European
imperialism and Islamic influence, Africa had experienced internal
organizations controlling expansive geographical areas and populations.
Contrary to the dogmatic edicts of unilinear models of development,
Africa experienced centralized societies co-existing with relatively
decentralized societies, sometimes sharing symbiotic relationships.
Ancient Nile Valley civilizations, Sahara-Sahel and Mediterranean
civilizations, Western Central African civilizations, and the Eastern
Central Southern corridor civilizations show that Africa’s cultural

diversity included the social and political-economic areas. This diversity
adds conceptual depth to the term “traditional Africa.”
If we accept the declaration made by a number of historical and
anthropological scholars that traditional Africa was predominantly
communacratic, then communalism itself must be viewed as a political-
economic social order containing a general set of values that enables it to
operate under a diverse array of organizational types. When dialectically
considering the dynamic nature of social change, one could correctly
assert that the seed of counter-communalism was omnipresent in
traditional Africa, generating competition between professions for the
management of nations. This could be seen as class struggle. The
competitive seed usually yielded a minimal impact until it was
strengthened to a nodal point of transformation by counter-communal
forces from outside of Africa, acerbating similar forces within Africa. This
is precisely what happened when African merchant groups developed an
ongoing relationship with European merchants.
The relationship between merchant classes in Africa and Europe went
through three stages over the second half of the last millennium. At the
outset the initial relationship was one of trade between partners. This era
helped to elevate the capitalist class into a ruling class in Europe and
likewise to strengthen the political control of merchant groups in African
governance. Traditional monarchies were usurped in both locations,
setting the stage for a new world order. The organization of societies for
profit generated European imperialism on a worldwide level and realigned
collective agency in African geographical regions.
The merchant relationship eventually mutated into the infamous
Atlantic slave trade. This new relationship brought unparalleled wealth to
European metropolises and utter chaos to African populations. After three
centuries of this relationship the European capitalist class sought to reduce
the partner position of collaborating African states and minimize their
sovereignty. Thus, the last relationship to be established removed or
reduced the power of agency of African merchants and their governments.
Where governments and merchants remained strong, a system known as
indirect rule was established, leaving the local leadership in place but
subservient to external business interests. The alternative to indirect rule
was direct rule, in which governance was placed in the hands of European
settlers and/or European-appointed civil servants.
The inevitable entropy of capitalist economies, combined with the
plenum of class tensions, generated protracted crises and social upheavals
in capitalist societies. The wars between competing capitalist empires
22 Chapter One
(1914–1945) destroyed a great deal of capital around the world. The

second round of this war (World War II), which took place between 1939
and 1945, hit harder inside Europe than the previous round (World War I).
The malaise that followed the devastation reflected the weakened state of
the European countries. The finance capitalists of the United States of
America used the opportunity to entrap Europe in a crippling debt that
would strengthen the United States’ foothold in the economic dealings of
European enterprises. At the conclusion of the capitalist competitive wars,
France and England were in debt to the United States finance capital and
Germany was subdued by United States military power.
The chaos of the war and the shift in imperial leadership temporarily
relaxed the grip of colonial control, allowing the Pan-African Nationalists
to entrench themselves in the African body politic. Some of these
nationalists were keen to assert the declaration of the Atlantic Charter.
Ascendancy of the Pan-African Nationalists

Nkrumah began planting the seeds of African unity among future
African heads of state before he left Europe, organizing with African
intelligentsia who were studying or working in England and France in the
years between 1945 and 1947, promoting the agenda of Pan-African
liberation.
Following the general strategy laid out at the 1945 Pan-African
Conference in Manchester, England, Nkrumah accepted an invitation from
the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) to return to what was then
called the colony of the Gold Coast and organize the masses in support of
the UGCC’s gradual independence efforts. Nkrumah utilized this
invitation to speed up the demand for independence and eventually split
with the UGCC to form the Convention People’s Party (CPP). From then
on he used that party as the primary vehicle to launch Pan-African
nationalism from Ghana. As the masses of women, workers, ex-soldiers,
students and youth elevated Nkrumah to the higher ranks of government
leadership in the Gold Coast colony, he prepared the groundwork to
summon his cadre that were committed to the strategy of Pan-African
nationalism. After being elected to head government business, Nkrumah
travelled to England and the United States. In both directions of his
journey he met with his Pan-African cadre in England. While in the USA
to receive an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from Lincoln University in
Pennsylvania, Nkrumah expanded his trip to include Chicago and New
York City, where he invited supporters of African liberty and unity to
support these efforts from Ghana upon its independence.
The Pan-African nationalists organized a two-pronged approach toward

consolidating the independence of Africa. On the one hand, alliances
would be formed between newly liberated states as the core of the United
States of Africa, and liberation movements would be encouraged to link
unity intrinsically into their efforts for territorial liberty. For this latter
group, Nkrumah encouraged not only unity within an African Union but
also functional unity among the factions of freedom fighters within their
territories. On the other hand, states that were already independent were to
be drawn into conferences that would draft pacts and encourage their
voluntary allegiance to the formation of an African Union. Upon Ghana’s
declaration of independence a series of important meetings were
organized:
The first Conference of Independent African States was held in Accra,
Ghana, April 15–22, 1958. This conference was attended by representatives
from Ghana, Guinea, Egypt, Libya, Liberia, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia.
Six of these eight states were independent before Ghana but did not
possess the Pan-African consciousness to launch this type of meeting.
Liberia, for its part, would come out explicitly for a go-slow approach
toward unity in the near future. South Africa was invited but refused to
attend because of its racist leadership and its disdain for the other
independent African states. Eventually most of Africa would consider
South Africa to be a pseudo-independent state because of its racist, settler-
led government and draconian treatment of the autochthonous population.
The conference was able to forge agreements on the need for a unified
foreign policy characteristic of an African personality and a unified
African policy to handle disputes peacefully. The collective support for
Algeria’s war of liberation was commonly agreed upon.
This conference was followed by a series of similar conferences with
the aim of generating unified action among freedom fighters, union
organizers, journalists and women throughout the African continent. These
segments were seen as key agents of African liberation and the Pan-
African nationalists wanted to ensure that the groundwork of their unified
action was laid.
An additional factor that assisted the initial effectiveness of the Pan-
African nationalists in the African Liberation Movement was the rear-
guard confusion taking place in the colonial metropoles. Class struggle
was threatening the internal stability of the capitalist societies and
reducing the united efforts of their societies to execute the maintenance of
empire. The mounting devastation from wars around the globe reduced the
confidence of the European masses in their home countries. Additionally,
the wars to keep the Asian colonial territories subdued were not going
24 Chapter One
well. For many of the youth and the intelligentsia in the metropoles,
alternatives to the conservative capitalist order began to be investigated.
The disenchanted were on the verge of forming a “fifth column” within the
European countries. In the United States of America, college students,
high school students and non-white groups, especially African
descendants, were offering a similar level of disturbance. Some attention
had to be focused internally to consolidate the imperial centres. This
provided breathing space for Pan-African nationalists within the African
Liberation Movement.
The existence of the USSR and Socialist China provided alternative
models for economic interdependence in the global reality. The productive
capacities of the populations in these societies impressed those who
observed them in the colonies. Both nations showed that Socialist
organization allowed for the rapid transformation of underdogs in the
global arena to world powers. This vision was liberating and revealed the
viability of non-capitalist methods of organizing economic life. Such a
vision unravelled another thread of colonial dependence.
To a rising generation of intelligentsia, the inherent competition of
capitalist economies began to be viewed as an economic model too
precarious and haphazard to provide for the needs of the African masses.
African liberation movements began to advocate their preference for
Socialism over capitalism. Their preferences were also influenced by the
assistance that liberation movements began to receive from the Socialist
Bloc.
Revolutionary activity throughout the globe directly affected African
politics and trade. The Bandung Conference of 1954 gave a serious
impetus to the African liberation movements and early independent
African states. The liberation movements throughout Asia spread a
contagious encouragement to other non-European peoples fighting to
dislodge themselves from imperialist control.
Pan-African nationalists asserted Socialist organization as a foregone
conclusion for African independence. Such an outlook was seen to be in
line with the communal and humanist past of African tradition. A debate
in the liberation movement surfaced, contrasting African Socialism with
scientific Socialism. Divisive or not, the former colonial powers were
disturbed by any consideration of Socialism of all stripes.
The shrewdness of the imperialist powers deserves acknowledgement.
After recognizing the revolutionary fervour of the African Unity
movement and its orientation of the African Liberation Movement, the
imperialist powers developed a strategy to survive the declaration of
African Independence. The strategy was to join the liberation movement
by “granting independence” to prevent the seizing of independence. That

strategy slowed the momentum of the African Unity Movement and
bogged it down in a quagmire of gradualism, allowing the colonial
operations to regroup, retool and resurface in more subtle and obscure
ways.
Colonial forces also observed the proposals within the liberation
movement to obliterate colonial borders. Pan-African notions of nationhood
provided opposing notions of sovereignty to irredentist and colonial
notions of nationhood. The colonial forces could not sit idly by and allow
the Pan-African nationalists to continue in the leadership of the African
Liberation Movement so they joined, provoked and arrested the
movement. In 1960, France pushed the reluctant leaders of its colonies out,
kicking and screaming.
England, after careful observation and regrouping, encouraged the
remainder of its colonies without settlers to change their relationship with
the metropoles. All that was required was the acceptance of old colonial
borders and in some cases increased atomization, as was the case with
Nigeria’s regional solution. In the matter of a few years, the African
Liberation Movement was dominated by members who challenged the
Pan-African Nationalists and thereby challenged the African Unity
Movement.
Assessing African Independence

One of the shrewdest implements of neo-colonialism was the
employment of structural adjustment programs (SAPs). These programs
were policy appendages which often accompanied aid packages from
financial institutions controlled by former colonial powers in cahoots with
the United States of America. Initially, SAPs required three conditions of
grant or loan recipients: (1) reduction of social services provided by
governments; (2) removal of tariffs and customs charged on foreign
products; and (3) devaluation of the recipient’s currency. Items (2) and (3)
were said to encourage trade and investment, while (1) was said to be part
of prudent government spending. In reality, the three conditions reduced
the ability of independent states to improve the lives of their populations
while simultaneously improving the trading positions of non-African
business interests. The SAPs were not strings attached to foreign financial
aid—they were chains.
26 Chapter One
The African Liberation Movement and the African Unity

Movement
The conflict between the African Liberation Movement (ALM) and the
African Unity Movement (AUM) illuminated the arrest of the African
revolution. Former colonial powers benefited from the stall but they were
not the sole drag on complete liberation. There were some African
politicians who rued the day that direct European tutelage would cease and
who openly complained that such a departure was premature. Those
politicians were predominantly but not solely aligned with the Paris
connection. For these Africans, even speedy liberation was problematic.
However behind the times they appear to have been, they did share one
prognosis with Nkrumah—that relatively small, non-viable states
declaring independence in the latter part of the twentieth century could not
fare well without a secure umbrella of an overarching protector. For the
conservative minority that protector was preferably France, England, the
United States of America or some combination thereof. For Nkrumah and
his like-minded associates, that protector had to be an African Union that
was allied with the global forces of anti-imperialists. The third perspective,
the one that became dominant by the end of the decade of African
liberation, advocated speedy liberation from colonialism and gradual
unification.
Clearly, the idea of Pan-Africanism and its corollary, Pan-African
nationalism, was not unanimous among the leadership of African freedom
fighters and politicians during the decade of African liberation. The idea
had also not been automatic for Nkrumah. Nkrumah’s clarity on the
necessary connection of the two movements along with the essential
requirement of the non-capitalist development for African society was
connected to his global experiences and relationships. Nkrumah had once
considered a federation of African regions. He would later reconsider that
arrangement, correctly predicting that it would bring about an unnecessary
ossification of regional loyalties, slowing continental African unity.
During the earlier phases of the African liberation decade, Nkrumah
and other Pan-Africanists were optimistic that some form of African
interdependence would replace the irrational and anti-People organization
of Africa that was characteristic of the colonial era. They did not want to
leave the recognition of the liberation-unification connection to chance
discovery, however. Conference after conference was held, with various
levels of collective African agents invited so as to drive home the point of
the required step for greater unity as insurance for genuine liberation from
colonial forces.
This Pan-African nationalism that characterized Nkrumah’s idiosyncratic

approach as an African independence freedom fighter, and later head of
state, deserves careful inspection. Nkrumah knew that his ideological
association with the Pan-African movement was not an automatic trait of
the African Liberation Movement. He had experienced petty micro-
nationalism, a form of tribalism, between African students from different
colonies when he matriculated at Lincoln University in the 1930s. He
spoke on the conflict in his Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, 1970 ,p.
36. He would experience resistance to African unity again as the struggle
to unite independent African states got underway.
While the desire for speedy liberation became a common-sense quest
among most leaders of the African Liberation Movement, the required
linkage to a new African Union escaped many. African unity was accepted
as a tactical necessity to support the liberation movement, but was not
broadly accepted as an exigency for the sustained independence of African
territories. Nkrumah and other Pan-African nationalists postulated that
speedy liberation required speedy unity for consolidation, but their
arguments did not win over the majority of the new heads of state nor their
organizations. The most achieved was a compromise giving rise to an
organization known as the Organization of African Unity.
The Pan-African movement threatened the development of capitalist
imperialism in Africa by redirecting the resources of Africa for the
development of the African masses. Serving the needs of the African
masses was never the goal of European imperialism, regardless of
propaganda to the contrary. The true intentions of the imperialists are
made clear when one observes their response to Pan-African nationalists
and plans for African unity. In the face of gaining popularity for rapid
unification, the global capitalist agents accelerated neo-colonial
developments. Their first strategic goal was to ensure the slowing of the
African revolution. Resistance to Pan-African nationalism came not just
from the colonialists and neo-colonialists. The perceived nationalist
interests of the USSR, combined with Marxist dogma, caused its leading
party to resist Pan-African nationalism. Conflict between China and the
USSR, caused by their ideological disagreements, took on the form of
proxy conflicts in African territories attempting to achieve or consolidate
independence. These challenges from the Socialist Bloc often led to a
reduction in material support to the Pan-African nationalists that attempted
to toe the “non-aligned” position.
Besides the external challenges to the establishment of liberation and
unity with a retarding impact on the African revolution were challenges of
petrified micro-nationalism, nostalgic irredentism and the concealed
28 Chapter One
imperialist manoeuvres of intelligence agencies. Nkrumah’s premonitions

were ringing true. The African intelligentsia had been saturated with
counter-productive self-identifications, and these were guiding, or
misguiding, their political actions. In the face of general continental
disorganization and OAU ineffectiveness, some local groups operating
under the notion of “we could do bad all by ourselves” advocated war if
their pre-colonial borders and political structures were not reinstated. The
military technology of imperialists increased their ability to spy and to
wreak havoc in African societies not under favourable leadership. Pan-
African nationalists thus remained targets for annihilation.
A new and insidious attack on African identity was launched by “aid”
organizations as they reversed their policy on reducing expenditures in
education for African youth. In some cases, grants and loans required set-
asides for education programs that would use approved curricula. The
imperialists were going directly for the hearts and minds of the Africans
and attempting to bypass their government spokespersons. In line with this
approach, active fifth columns were encouraged under the guise of “non-
government organizations.” These organizations could funnel monies from
capitalists without the oversight of African governments. While the
original aim was to limit the effectiveness of Pan-African nationalists, the
attack widened to weaken all African sovereignty not in line with neo-
colonialism. The era of digital communication ushered in a level of
penetration that Nkrumah may have never imagined. The impact of this
development on African youth in terms of identity formation is still to be
assessed.
While much of the assessment above paints a bleak picture, the battle
is far from over. Capitalist metropolises are experiencing economic
entropy while Pan-African exemplars such as Libya and Senegal are
attempting to develop resistance to Western cultural seduction. Continuous
shifts in capitalist leadership as well as ongoing competition between the
United States of America and elements of the European Union are
compounded with the growing market strength in China. This offers
opportunities to escape monopolistic forces and potentially provides
breathing space for African producers of wealth.
As more territories in the world shake off the control of European and
United States colonialism they will offer new partners for Africa’s global
relationships as well as healthy connections to bolster genuine
independence. Cuba has long played an important part in Africa’s
liberation efforts and at times participated directly in wars on the side of
African freedom fighters. Venezuela and Bolivia may soon add to that
cross-oceanic force of alternatives to European neo-colonialism. The
strongly anti-imperialist president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, has visited

a number of African states, advocating an African, South American and
Caribbean Alliance reminiscent of Nkrumah’s suggestions in his text
Class Struggle in Africa.
Contrary to imperialist propaganda, the American empire is neither
omnipotent nor omnipresent. The satellite belt that provides surveillance
around neither the Earth nor the web of on-the-ground information
networks of intelligence gathering organizations can prevent the blind
spots that develop in revolutionary activity. African culture has proved
resilient in its resistance to annihilation through all forms of enslavement
and imperialist encroachment. The voice of the African masses will
eventually find its medium, and when it does it will mobilize the people’s
class in ways that will challenge the neo-colonial order and resurrect the
concept of African unity.
The masses of African persons are already breaching the arbitrary
borders established during the colonial epoch in search of sustainable
livelihoods. This movement across borders has the long-term potential of
eroding the rabid microstate nationalisms as African workers tackle the
bureaucracy of interstate travel. The general discomfort with border
bureaucracy is visceral at the level of common sense, but remedies to the
situation will take higher-level calculations seldom available to it. The
higher awareness of collective consciousness, employing wisdom and
organization, is needed. To concretize its authority, the African Union, a
more Pan-Africanized version of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), should take steps to facilitate the seamless transportation and
communication of the African masses.
Only the African “people’s class,” a self-conscious organized cadre
primarily concerned with the well-being of the masses, has the character
potential to erect a nation-state with the spatial coordinates of the African
continent, the temporal coordinates of human history, and the ideological
coordinates of the Pan-African revolution. With the support of the AU, the
people’s class can build a functioning United States of Africa that is able
to withstand the wrath of inhumane natural disasters and social threats.
This class, however, must encourage a resolute will among the masses and
support institutions that undergird an organic national structure of a
magnitude never before seen. The successful creation of the United States
of Africa will be no less a world wonder than the great pyramids of Giza.
30 Chapter One
The Intentional Utility of the United States of Africa

Africa, the richest continent on the face of the earth, yields its riches
only through the great collective effort of human organization. Africa’s
strategic minerals require the accumulated technique and appropriate
technology that is accessible only to massive and optimal social
organization. To maximize the value of these minerals, an even higher
level of technique and technology is required for finished processing. This
all presupposes the major organization of labour and capital. The same
needs are required to yield the potential of Africa’s flora, fauna and energy
sources. In the hands of a united Africa, even the sun, rivers and wind
provide energy to the lives of the African masses.
On the other hand, without a United States of Africa the African
masses suffer as victims from many parasites. Bloodsuckers, from
mosquitoes to foreign imperialists, inject all types of deadly diseases into
Africa. Without the edification of functional unity, strategic minerals
become lethal materials that kill the populations that touch them. These
include blood diamonds, war-causing coltan and ecologically destructive
petroleum. Without proper continental unity, even the Sun, the rivers, and
the winds become forces of death. The edifice of the African nation must
make the African continent more “user friendly” for its inhabitants.
The collective intellect of the United States of Africa could rationalize
the resources of Africa to eradicate scarcity and provide for the needs of
humanity, beginning with the Africans. Solar power and hydroelectric
power alone could provide the energy needs for the African masses to be
on par with the so-called super nations of today. With the building of the
United States of Africa there will no longer exist the concept of a “land-
locked nation” or a non-viable balkanized territory. The bountiful wealth
of the Continent could allow the common African to take on the higher
level challenges of human development and peaceful coexistence, with the
problems of basic survival long put to rest.
The protective shadow of a united African nation would extend beyond
the borders of Africa and hover over African citizens and affiliates in
every part of the world. These emboldened African members would reflect
a new sense of security against all threats of arbitrary mistreatment and
danger. A powerful African nation bolstered by the principles of right
ordering, righteous order and justice will engender powerful Africans that
will counter disharmonious behaviour inside and outside of Africa. In this
way the edification of the African Nation will contribute an incubating
environment for the African personality. Such a state will allow the
African Personality to develop in the ways that Kwame Nkrumah
envisioned. Using the protective shelter of a United States of Africa, the

African personality can positively impact the global world order in the
interests of the masses of humanity.
The utility of the edification of the African nation will affect the global
world order dialectically. On the one hand, such an edifice will liberate the
will and genius of the African masses. On the other, this liberated African
genius will contribute greatly to the improvement of human culture in
general by expanding the techniques and knowledge base of humanity.
The world is currently in awe of gadgetry and ignorant of life-bearing
traditions. Old discoveries are often overlooked by the ignorance of
arrogance and the arrogance of ignorance. This imbalanced gnosis has the
potential to threaten human survival. The historical depth of the African
experience has the potential of enriching the self-awareness of humanity.
The resurrection of ancestral respect and ecological reciprocity, resident in
the general culture of the African masses, can imbue the contemporary
intellect with the wisdom of collective memory. Collective memory is the
fundamental lodestone of collective consciousness and collective
consciousness is the steering force of human progress. The utility of a
United States of Africa has global implications and should be a
development welcomed by people’s classes throughout the world.
Finally, the utility of an African Nation united across African regions
and organized in unified states has the ability to fortify African liberty by
shoring up African agency at all levels: the personal, the familial, the
local, the micro-state, the regional, and abroad. Such an edifice will instil
hope and a sense of security in all its members and affiliates while it
receives respect and deference from its peers and adversaries. This is the
real meaning of African Independence for the Pan-African nationalist.
References
Nkrumah, K. 1973. Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, Panaf ed. N. p.:
Panaf. Original edition: New York, Nelson, 1957. Page 36.
Meyer, H. E. J-F. N. 1990. Dr. Nkrumaha’s last dream: Continental
government of Africa: Osagyefo, dreamer, philosopher, freedom
fighter, analyst, strategist, political architect, hero of the wind of
change. Accra, Ghana: Advance Publishing Company Limited.
32 Chapter One
Notes
The following is the content of the Atlantic Charter, which was the product of
the Atlantic Conference which took place on the USS Augusta in August 1941.
The charter was issued on August 14, 1941.
The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr.
Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom,
being met together, deem it right to make known certain common
principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which
they base their hopes for a better future for the world.
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the
freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; Third, they respect the
right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they
will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government
restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them; Fourth, they
will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the
enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on
equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are
needed for their economic prosperity; Fifth, they desire to bring about the
fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the
object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic
advancement and social security; Sixth, after the final destruction of the
Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all
nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and
which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out
their lives in freedom from fear and want; Seventh, such a peace should
enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;
Eighth, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well
as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force.
Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments
continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten,
aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the
establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the
disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and
encourage all other practicable measures, which will lighten for peace-
loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.
Signed by: Franklin D. Roosevelt & Winston S. Churchill
Some have attributed the OAU to Kwame Nkrumah, but in fact the OAU was
formed as a counterproposal to Nkrumah’s recommendation for an African Union
as advocated in his text, Africa Must Unite. 1970, pp. 145 -149. That text was
written and distributed to the heads of state prior to the OAU’s founding meeting
in an effort to persuade the leaders to take a more resolute path of political union.
To dampen these Pan-African efforts, all but two delegations voted for a more
gradual approach toward African unity. The utter ineffectiveness of the gradual
approach would lead to a constitutional upheaval of the organization in 1999.
1The transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African
Union was encouraged by a generation of African heads of state desiring to speed
the integration of African society and eliminate the vestiges of colonialism. During
an extraordinary summit in Sirte, Libya, on September 9, 1999, these heads of state
took the decision to amend the constitution of the OAU and put it more in line with
recommendations that Nkrumah had urged during the initial formation of the OAU
in 1963. These changes were guided by the influence of Muammar Gaddafi, but
the essential commitment of political union has been avoided by African heads of
state as of the time of writing. Thus, the frustration and lack of implementation
remain. Interestingly enough, the arguments that the go-slow heads of state
employed previously are echoed today.
CHAPTER TWO
GLOBAL AFRICAN UNITY

IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION:
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PLACE OF THE NEW
PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT
(NEPAD)
DR (BARR.) ASOGWA FELIX CHINWE

SENIOR LECTURER, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
ENUGU STATE UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY,
ENUGU STATE, NIGERIA
AND AKACHUKU ANNY AGU
LECTURER II, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, EBONYI
STATE UNIVERSITY, EBONYI STATE, ABAKALIKI, NIGERIA
Abstract
There is no doubt that globalization has assumed an indisputable
reality in today’s world. But globalization has been perceived differently
by different people in the various regions of the world, essentially as a
result of the differing impacts of the phenomenon on these people. Based
on these divergent perceptions of globalization, especially as it affects the
prevailing economic, political and socio-cultural arrangements in these
societies, the people have tended to design peculiar institutional
mechanisms to tackle the problems associated with it.
The African region has not been an exception to this emerging trend in
the relation to globalization. Hence, African leaders conceived the New
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as one of the veritable
instruments or strategies to effectively checkmate some of the negative
impacts of globalization. NEPAD has been hailed by Africans and some
Global African Unity in the Era of Globalization 35
world leaders as a necessary panacea for the problems of Africa’s

development and regional integration in the face of the phenomenon of
globalization.
Against this backdrop, this paper examines the fundamental philosophy
of NEPAD, providing a critical analysis of its potentials as a strategy for
Africa’s development and integration in the era of globalization. This has
become imperative in placing Africans and African leaders in the correct
perception of the realities of globalization. This paper, therefore, will x-ray
the African condition in relation to the global realities orchestrated by
globalization.
Introduction
First and foremost, I must commence by expressing our profound
gratitude to the organizers of this conference in commemoration of one of
the greatest heroes of the African continent. There is no doubt that the late
Kwame Nkrumah epitomized visionary leadership, of which the people of
the African region are in dire need, but which is in such short supply. The
topic for our discussion is quite apt, as what Africa, more than any other
region, needs at this moment of our development is greater African unity.
Africa’s development will be greatly hampered in the face of the threats of
globalization unless there are concerted efforts to achieve unity among its
various nation-states.
This was the vision such a leader like Nkrumah had for the African
region. When Nkrumah made his very early plea for the establishment of a
United States of Africa, a significant number of people thought it to be
utopian. This vision has remained largely unachieved as a result of diverse
centrifugal forces in the African continent. It is therefore a truism that
Nkrumah, in his strong advocacy for African union long before the
emergence of globalization, was quite prophetic in foreseeing the danger
in the divisive tendencies in Africa. Thus, the need for African unity is
now more pressing than ever before as a result of the threats of
globalization.
The idea of globalization connotes the unification of the world into a
common market. Hence, globalization drums home the ideas of a global
village or a shrinking world, or even one world. Under this emerging
scenario, unification, rather than balkanization or atomization, becomes
the best coping strategy for entities in the global village fostered by
globalization. African regions cannot afford to be divided when the world
is uniting, because of the negative consequences. Global African unity is
therefore sine qua non in the order of needs for African development.
36 Chapter Two
Other regions of the world have long appreciated unification as very

strategic in contemporary international relations. Hence, the European
Union is a reality and both the South Americans and Asians are moving in
that direction.
It is against this background that we analyze the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) as a mechanism for enhancing global
African unity in the era of globalization. This paper is divided into the
following sections: Re-thinking Unity—A Theoretical Perspective;
Perceptions of Global African Unity; Globalization and Global African
Unity; and NEPAD and Global African Unity.
Re-Thinking Unity—A Theoretical Perspective

The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (2000) defines the concept
of unity as the “state of being in agreement and working together; the state
of being joined together to form one unit.” The concept of unity is
therefore a state of being rather than a process. It is this static character of
the concept of unity that makes it less attractive for political scientists. The
concept is viewed as lacking in scientific explanatory power. This is
largely because the term “unity” emphasizes the end product rather than
the processes leading to it. In fact, one needs to appreciate the processes
leading to an end in order to understand and explain it.
In place of the concept of unity, political scientists have preferred to
employ the concept of integration because of its higher scientific
explanatory potentials. The two concepts have similar meanings, but the
latter is conceived more as a process than a state. Integration has been
defined as a process of ever-closer union between states in a regional or
international context (Asogwa & Omemma 2001, 208). It has also been
explained to mean: “The act or process of combining two or more things
so that they work together" (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary
2000). According to Deutsch (1957, 5), a foremost exponent of integration
theory, integration means the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of
community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread
enough to assure dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its
population. By sense of community, we mean a belief that common social
problems must and can be resolved by a process of “peaceful change.”
Ernest B. Haas, another integration theorist, does not stress the
development of communal values per se, but rather the plural character of
modern society composed of competing elites and conflicting interests
(Haas 1966, 94). Integration here is seen as a process and not a condition
in which politically significant elites, both in and outside government,
redefine their interests in regional terms rather than in a purely national

orientation. Haas therefore defines integration as: “The process whereby
political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift
their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new and
larger centre whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the
pre-existing national state.” Haas’s model follows that significantly
political actors in different national societies within a given regional area
would first decide to collaborate, and beyond that confer authority or a
decision-making framework beyond the nation-state.
The other major contributor to the discourse on integration is David
Mitrany (1966, 62), whose work has been referred to as functionalism. He
thought that the best way to achieve integration was through the creation
of international organizations whose exclusive role would be to deal with
human welfare tasks at the global level. Such welfare tasks include
technical and politically neutral functions such as health and
manufacturing, which cannot be performed at the national level but only at
the global level. Such tasks should be left to non-political experts rather
than government officials (ibid.). By this, Mitrany means that if you avoid
a head-on confrontation with the nation-states, you get federalism by
instalments. Subsequently, nationalism will be replaced by allegiance to
the world community (83). The neo-functionalists, led by Keohane & Nye
(1974), formed the spill-over from economic cooperation to political
integration.
Another means by which theorists had articulated the integration of
nations is through the federal process. This arises where nation-states are
prepared to cooperate with one another through the national regulation of a
limited number of matters, and at the same time retain their separate
identities and retain the competent authorities in their own territories for
the regulation of other matters. Federalism satisfies the desire for a
national identity which coincides with the retention of separate local
identities and for the concomitant distribution of governmental power,
both nationally and locally (Echezona 1998, 34).
Integration in the African context and that of other developing
countries has been said to be an imitation of European integration.
Integration theory, as we have seen, has different approaches but for the
sake of this study the neo-functionalist view to integration was adopted to
explain the extent to which the New Partnership for Africa’s Development
has brought about integration in the African continent. This is because the
integration project in Africa has placed greater emphasis on economic
unification as a prelude to political integration. Integration in the continent
does not mean the creation of a federal African state, but rather working
38 Chapter Two
cooperatively towards pulling together all energies and resources in the

region to enhance development (Okeke 2000). This is the main essence of
the creation of NEPAD.
Perceptions of Global African Unity

The formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963
was the culmination of the search for African political and economic unity
or integration, which began outside the shores of Africa. In the course of
its formation, contending socio-political forces in Africa pursued divergent
and very often conflicting national and regional strategic interests. In spite
of these divergent pursuits, the OAU fundamentally represented Africa’s
collective efforts in search of continental unity and development.
Paul G. Adogamhe (2008, 2) contends that Africans’ search for unity
did not just start with the formation of the OAU in 1963. According to
him: “Since the late 1950s, African states have experimented with various
forms of formal integration arrangements to promote African unity and
economic development.” Adogamhe further argues that the search for
African unity was a consequence of Pan-Africanism.
By now, it is generally agreed among scholars and commentators on
African affairs that the more than four hundred years of the trans-Atlantic
slave trade left remarkable landmarks in the pages of African history.
Needless to say, this trade compelled the forced emigration of millions of
Africans as slave labourers to Europe, the Americas and the Caribbean
Islands, but more importantly, as Nwankwo (2005, 14) argues, the African
slave labourers never lost touch with their African roots, even in their new
environments. C. L. R. James (1986) gave a graphic description of how
African slave labourers in Haiti, Santo-Domingo and Trinidad and Tobago
retired into secret enclaves after labouring on the plantations to recreate
their African lores, traditions and cultures. Pan-Africanism was therefore a
spontaneous feeling that developed into an ideology out of a longing and
nostalgic feeling for the African homeland. According to Robert Chrisman
(1973, 2–5): “It was precisely the capture and uprooting of millions of
Africans and conditions of slavery, which laid the foundations for Pan-
Africanism and Black Nationalism in the United States and West Indies.”
In the words of Marcus Garvey (1969):
The masses of the Negroes in African, the West Indies, South and Central
America are in sympathetic accord with the aspirations of the native
Africans. We desire to help them build up Africa as a Negro Empire,
where every black man, whether born in Africa or the Western world, will
have the opportunity to develop on his/her own lines under production of

the most favourable democratic institutions.
But Adogamhe (2008) observed that at a point in its development,

especially in the 1930s, Pan-Africanism was strongly influenced by the
ideology of Marx, Lenin and Socialism. In those early days of Pan-
Africanism, Europe and America were the focus points of the movement
until 1945 when it shifted to Africa as an outcome of the Fifth Pan-African
Congress in Manchester, England. According to Walters (1993, 13), these
periodic Pan-African congresses provided useful insights and corresponding
experiences for African nationalist leaders, who then assumed the mantle
and historical responsibility of ensuring continental de-colonization and
integration and unity of Africa. These nationalists, many of whom
encountered Pan-Africanism as students abroad, ensured the emergence of
a new breed of Pan-Africanists destined to play different but remarkable
roles in African’s emancipation from the vile grip of colonialism. Ayodele
(1973, 13) described the emergence of this new brand of Pan-Africanists
thus: “It was after the historic Manchester Congress that the determination
of black people to organize and unite against the ‘oppressors’ and to make
radical Pan-Africanism the ideology of the new liberation movement
throughout colonial Africa.”
Thus stimulated, the need for political independence in the aftermath of
the Second World War grew. The emerging African nationalists (who had
travelled to Europe and America to study and consequently came into
contact with the ideology of Pan-Africanism) adopted the concept of Pan-
Africanism in their struggle for the de-colonization and reclaiming of
Africa for Africans. Therefore, the idea of continental Pan-Africanism
became a battle cry, as it were, for these nationalists. For the late Ghanaian
leader, Kwame Nkrumah, the ideology of Pan-Africanism became a
radical and revolutionary movement and platform for the total unification
and emancipation of Africa. In his epic work on the need for African unity
Africa Must Unite, Nkrumah (1970, 88), submitted that:
The total liberation and unification of Africa under an all-African socialist
government must be the primary objective of all black revolutionaries
throughout the world. It is an objective which when achieved will bring the
fulfillment of aspirations of Africans and people of African descent
everywhere. It will at the same time advance the triumph of international
socialist revolution.
Even at the time of Ghana’s independence in 1957, Nkrumah was not

excited because, according to him, the independence of Ghana would be
meaningless unless it was linked with the total liberation of the African
40 Chapter Two
continent (Nkrumah 1980, 77). In 1958, Ghana under Nkrumah threw its
weight behind Guinea when it refused to join the French community and
declared independence. Nkrumah’s dream of a United States of Africa was
on course as far as he was concerned. In 1959, both Ghana and Guinea
formed the nucleus of a prospective union to be known as the “United
States of Africa,” and Mali briefly joined the Union in 1961. It is
interesting to note that despite the different colonial backgrounds of most
African states, the emerging class of nationalists all identified with the
ideology of Pan-Africanism.
According to Francis David (2006, 5–6): “In spite of those differences,
African states, at independence, shared important commonalities that were
to serve as stimulus for unity.” The newly independent states shared the
common experiences of having been subjected to slavery, colonialism and
neo-colonialism. On securing political independence, as sovereign states
they were thrust into the international economic and political system in
which the rules and regulations were not designed by and for them, and
were called to participate on terms disadvantageous to their progressive
development. Their collective historical experiences and memories of
marginalization and socio-cultural and racial affinities developed a
collective solidarity—a sense of oneness and the consciousness of
belonging to Africa. This became a powerful mobilizing and unifying
force for African peoples and societies rooted in Pan-Africanism.
The Ideological Struggle of African unity

It is worth noting that the exposure of the newly independent African
states to the global economic and political system, which conditioned their
disadvantaged participation, also brought upon the leaders of these nations
new challenges and pressures of achieving the destinies of their respective
countries. It was not surprising that many of them began to play down the
radical and Socialist bent of Pan-Africanism; some still held on to the
radical and Socialist views of DuBois, Padmore, etc., while others
preferred a Pan-Africanism anchored on Western capitalist values. There
was palpable tension and crisis among the emergent African leaders on the
interpretation of African unity in relation to the ideological underpinning
of Pan-Africanism. It was little surprise, then, that soon after the political
independence of most of these African states, the Pan-African continental
movement split into four blocs, which included the Brazzaville group, the
Casablanca group, the Monrovia group, and the Pan-African Freedom
Movement of East Central and South Africa (PAFMECSA) (Kloman
Erasmus 1962, 387–404). The Casablanca group, led by Ghana, was
regarded as progressive while the Monrovia group, led by Nigeria, was

regarded as conservative. According to K. B. C. Onwubiko (1973, 430), it
was at this stage that a new development appeared in the Pan-African
movement, namely the rise of rival groupings of independent African
states. The first of these was the Brazzaville group, which consisted of the
twelve former French territories of West and Equatorial Africa, with the
exception of Mali, Guinea and Togo. The other was the Casablanca group,
which comprised Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, the United Arab
Republic and Libya. These two groups disagreed bitterly over such issues
as measures to end the Congo crisis, the question of Algerian
independence, and the framework for the political union of African states.
A third overlapping group known as the Monrovia group was formed in
1961, and it comprised the Brazzaville group together with Nigeria,
Liberia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, Libya and Togo. This loose
group made tremendous and positive contributions to African unity when
its members met in Lagos, Nigeria, in January 1962, and drew the Charter
of an Organization of Inter African and Malagasy States. The charter was
approved at a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the new organization in
June 1962, in Lagos, which was a preparatory ground for the formation of
the OAU in 1963.
However, the OAU was an institutional experiment based on the
African states system with a functional approach to regional cooperation.
That the OAU failed to address many of Africa’s problems was neither
surprising nor accidental. The organization was formed during the era of
the Cold War and belonged to what Hettne (1994) classified as Cold War-
influenced “old” regionalism.
Globalization and African Unity

Our first task here should be to understand the meaning of
globalization in the context of African unity. For one thing, it could be
argued that the end of the Cold War took scholars of politics and policy by
surprise in more ways than one. One fundamental way in which this
element of surprise manifested itself was in the obvious exposure of the
limitations of the social sciences on its claims of predictions. Secondly,
because of these limitations, the foundation upon which the study of
international politics was anchored became remarkably shaken, and
scholars scurried for a new paradigm of explaining global events in the
past Cold War era. According to Simon Reich (1988, 1–2):
The parsimony and simplicity of bipolarity signaled the hegemony of
structural arguments on international studies and a corresponding
42 Chapter Two
ascendancy of questions posed by security studies over those relating to

international and comparative political economy. Scholars and policy
analysts alike thus favoured these approaches, employing theories such as
deterrence, compellence or compliance, and modernization in political
science, while policy analysts often subsumed critiques of American policy
in the Third World for the sake of strategic advantage over the communist
bloc.
The implication of this tendency, according to Simon Reich, was the

intellectual vacuum created by the end of the Cold War. It was only
natural that scholars of international studies should evolve new paradigms
or organizing principles on which to anchor their work. So it was not
surprising that scholars in this field isolated the concept of globalization as
the most comprehensive paradigm for explaining contemporary global
events with such factors as democratization, development, good governance,
market deregulation, privatization, economic reforms and security as the
organizing principles. Even with these terms so generously in use today,
the meaning of globalization remains vague and very often confusing. So
the question as to what is the real meaning and definition of globalization
rages on. In this paper, it is not our intention to offer a simple definitive
solution to this problem but to offer a concise conceptual definition of
globalization, the aim of which is to equip leaders in their policy
formulation. In the words of Jan Aart Scolte (1995): “Globalization stands
out for quite a large public spread across the world as one of the defining
terms of late 20th century social consciousness.” Simon Reich (1988)
argues that the term “globalization” is often distinguished more by what it
is not rather than what it is. James Roseneau (1996, 3–4) is a typical
example of a scholar who distinguishes globalization by stating what it is
not. According to Roseneau:
Globalization is not the same as globalism, which points to aspirations for
an end state of affairs wherein values are shared by or are pertinent to all
the world’s five billion people, their environment; their roles as citizens,
consumers or producers with an interest in collective action designed to
solve common problems. Nor is it universalism—values which embrace all
humanity, hypothetically or actually.
According to Anthony McGrew (1990):

Globalization constitutes a multiplicity of linkages and inter-connections
that transcend the nation-states (and by implication the societies) which
make up the modern world system. It defines a process through which
events, decisions and activities in one part of the world can come to have
significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant

parts of the globe.
Philip Cerny (1995, 596) asserts that:

Globalization can be defined as a set of economic and political structures
and processes deriving from the changing character of the goods and assets
that comprise the base of the international political economy—in
particular, the increasing structural differentiation of those goods and
assets.
Examining the plethora of definitions associated with globalization,

Reich (1988) has categorized four definitions of globalization that are
increasingly radical in their understanding of the change it represents and
thus its relational implications. These relate to definitions of globalization
as a historical epoch; globalization as a confluence of economic phenomena;
globalization as the hegemony of American values; and globalization as a
technological and social revolution. In relation to African unity, we will be
looking at globalization as both a historical epoch and a confluence of
economic phenomena. We cannot deny the fact that our world today is
witnessing far-reaching structural changes. From the collapse of the Cold
War to the present onslaught of global terrorism, we are witnessing the
profound impacts of globalization that are not just far-reaching but also
have greatly affected our economies and societies, and our policies and
security. As these changes develop, the global community seeks ways to
respond to the challenges.
However, in the midst of these rapidly occurring changes, African
nations are grappling to respond positively to them. But if we take a
critical look at the history of Africa—at least in terms of its political and
economic development—it would appear that the continent has always
been at the mercy of changing global systems. Among some scholars and
analysts, it is apt to see Africa as an object of manipulation or a mere pawn
on the political and economic chessboard of the great powers of this
world. This is not surprising, according to Saduharu Kataoka (2006),
because:
Africa has been historically beset by the trends of the international
community as seen in the slave trade and colonization by the European
super-powers whose legacy lingered long after their independence in the
form of artificial barriers/borders drawn by the imperial powers. Rough
fortune continued after the political independence as the African continent
experienced strategic involvement by Cold War super-powers and the
withdrawal of financial support following the end of the Cold War. The
1990s saw diminished interest in Africa without the international
44 Chapter Two
community and their political and economic marginalization led to the

intensification of civil unrest and regional conflicts, including ethnic wars
and power struggles.
Marginalization of Africa used to be a common issue recognized

within the international community framework in the face of post-Cold
War structural reforms. However, with the increasing current of
globalization, African unity is receiving new attention from both African
and other world leaders. The independence and autonomy of Africa, long
regarded as a passive player in the international community, is now being
called upon more than ever before. Africa has responded to the challenges
and demands of globalization with the successful transition of the former
OAU into the African Union (AU) and the formulation of NEPAD as the
blueprint of the continent’s unity and development. Africa has
consequently emerged as a top priority on the global arena as issues
concerning the continent become increasingly global in nature. The
implication of this is that Africa has emerged as an actor on the global
arena in its own right, and now stands on the frontline in a number of areas
on the international agenda including security, resources, migration,
economic cooperation and health issues. In this age of globalization,
Africa is becoming a beautiful bride among the international economic
powers who are in search of resources. But if we understand globalization
as the expansion of economic links through the borderless transfer of
goods, services, people, information, labour power, technology and
capital, it would appear that Africa is benefiting the least from the wave of
globalization.
However, Africa has done well in this age to consolidate its unity
more than the years of the OAU. The formulation of NEPAD, the
formation of AU, the institutionalization of APRM and concerted
interventions in crisis areas like Darfur, Congo, Somalia and Cote d’Ivoire
are indications that Africa is responding positively in this age of
globalization. Yet there is a lot to be done in areas of the continental
agenda on good governance, good electoral reforms, transparency,
accountability in governance, and the maximization of internal resources.
The Genesis of NEPAD

The formation of the African Union (AU) and the consequent
formulation of NEPAD were anchored on the conviction that the OAU had
outlived its usefulness and demonstrated an inability to promote peace,
unity and the development of Africa. NEPAD has been severally described
as a “home-grown” African programme, and an African-based broad
framework through which the continent hopes to address its many

challenges. NEPAD is an amalgam of roughly three separate development
initiatives begun between 2000 and 2001. The first of these initiatives was
the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery (MAP), which was
developed by the former President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki. The
main objective of MAP was to address Africa’s debt crisis. Involved in the
formulation and crafting of the MAP document were former Nigerian
President, Olusegun Obasanjo and Abdelaziz Boutflika of Algeria. The
second document from which NEPAD emanated was the Omega Plan for
Africa’s Economic Recovery, which was developed by the Senegalese
President Abdoulaye Wade, alongside other leaders from the French-
speaking African countries. Apart from its focus on economic recovery,
the OMEGA plan was also concerned with building regional infrastructure
and educational projects. A third document which eventually gave birth to
NEPAD was the Global Compact for Africa Recovery (GCAR), which
was the brainchild of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). The
mandate to develop this document was given to the ECA by African
Ministers of Finance in 2000, and the final GCAR document incorporated
the idea of Peer Review, where the African leaders can assess each other
periodically. At the AU Summit in July 2001, in Lusaka, Zambia, these
three documents were merged to form the New African Initiative (NAI). In
October 2001, the NAI was renamed the New Economic Partnership for
African Development (NEPAD). At the Lusaka Summit, a fifteen-member
Head of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC),
representing all the regions of African and chaired by Nigeria, was
appointed and had its first meeting in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 2001.
Thus was formed the AU’s broad framework for Africa’s integration and
development known as NEPAD.
African Unity & NEPAD in the Age of globalization

There is no doubt that NEPAD has been hailed as a thoroughbred
framework for Africa’s development in this age of globalization, but there
are still deep-seated reservations over its ability to supervise a
comprehensive African unity in this period of world history. Not many
Africans believe in NEPAD as the authentic framework for African unity
because, according to critics, contrary to the claim that NEPAD is a home-
grown document, it is rather a document designed and imposed by the
capitalist West. According to Bond (2003, 12):
NEPAD surfaced only after extensive consultations with the World Bank
President and IMF Managing Director in November 2000, and in February
46 Chapter Two
2001 with major transnational corporate executives and associated

government leaders at the Davos World Economic Forum in January 2001;
G-8 Leaders at Tokyo in July 2000 and Genoa in July 2001; and the
European Union President and individual Northern Heads of State between
2000 and 2001.
The implication of this is that NEPAD is designed to sustain the

clientelist nature of African development and ensure a continued master-
servant relationship between Africa and the developed economies of the
West. In this context, the African continent is condemned to perpetual
servitude, even in the broad context of globalization. A consequence of
this state of affairs is the continued siege mentality on African economies,
and the enthronement and sustenance of a predatory class of an African
comprador bourgeoisie that has little respect for democratization nor
human rights, transparency, or accountability in governance and the
inauguration of good governance.
This view is given life by the subtle but harsh conditionality underlying
NEPAD which, according to Adesina (2002), has everything in common
with the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Yet there are people
who view NEPAD with great suspicion as a weapon of control in the
hands of international creditors. Aredo (2003, 30) is one such scholar, and
his aversion to NEPAD is premised on the fact that one major obsession of
the developed economies of the West is to find ways to prevent African
leaders from reversing the donor-imposed policies of economic
liberalization. In the view of Aredo, NEPAD is conceived to lock in policy
reforms and further contain any sort of non-compliance with structural
adjustment policies.
The above argument, according to Matlosa (2002), is very salient in
understanding the inner logic, content and form of NEPAD, because in
examining the document one cannot but appreciate the absence of visible
linkages between NEPAD and Africa’s previously home-grown
development programmes like the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the
African Alternative for the Structural Adjustment Programme (AA-SAP),
which was developed by no less an institution than the ECA. Matlosa also
expresses concern about the sudden and inexplicable change of name from
the New African Initiative (NAI) to NEPAD and the obvious strong
partnership of NEPAD with international creditors rather than with the
African people.
Bratton (1989, 410–11), on the other hand, believes that the new global
forces of democratization, good governance and global security unleashed
in the wake of the collapse of the Cold War emphasized good governance
and respect for human rights. Hence, Akokpari (2004, 247) argues that in
regards to good governance, the timing of NEPAD was auspicious. Yet

there is a great deal of doubt and pessimism about NEPAD, especially
regarding its tenacity to generate good governance. NEPAD is more than
seven years old and, in spite of the huge prospects which the proponents
advertised so generously, we have yet to see good governance in most
African states. The absence of this has generated a lot of tension and
political uncertainty in these states. According to Akokpari:
While NEPAD may be able to attract some foreign direct investments
(FDI) and overseas development aids (ODA), conditional on the adoption
of liberalization policies by Africa states, this may not be the case for good
governance.
This argument appears palatable in view of the fact that NEPAD was
not formulated with the consultation or inputs from Africans. This
contention informs Alex de Waal’s assertion that NEPAD has been
designed by experts and adopted by government with little public
consultation: “There is some popular discontent over this and the
weakness of consultation means that opportunities are being missed for
strengthening popular ownership and ensuring that NEPAD promoted
democracy” (2002, 474).
There also seems to be a disconnect between NEPAD and AU.
Contrary to the assumption that AU is the initiator and owner of NEPAD,
NEPAD is under the control and management of HSGIC, which meets
quarterly at NEPAD’s headquarters in Pretoria, South Africa—far away
from the AU and ECA’s Secretariat in Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia. All these
tend to rub off on the capacity of NEPAD to guarantee African unity in
this age of globalization.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we recommend that NEPAD needs to be refashioned in
such a way that it would operate with the popular mandate of the people;
our leaders should lay less emphasis on politics of neo-patrimonialism
with its capacity to subvert well-intended development programmes. The
headquarters of NEPAD should also be relocated to Addis-Ababa and
efforts should be made to functionalize the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM) as an article of faith in NEPAD.
48 Chapter Two
References
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NEPAD—Post Washington Consensus and Beyond. Paper Presented at
the South African Sociological Association Congress, Regent Hotel,
East London, South Africa June 30–July 3.
Adogamhe, G. Paul. 2008. “Pan-Africanism Revisited. Vision and Reality
of African Unity and Development.” Journal of African Review of
Integration 2 (2): 2.
Akokpari, K. John. 2004. “The AU, NEPAD and the Promotion of Good
Governance in Africa.” Nordic Journal of African studies 13 (3): 245.
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50 Chapter Two
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CHAPTER THREE
COLONIALISM, ETHNICITY AND NIGERIA’S

NATIONAL INTEGRATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF IMPACT RELATIONSHIP
PROFESSOR O. S. A. OBIKEZE
AND CHARLES ARINZE OBIORA
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, ANAMBRA STATE
UNIVERSITY, IGBARIAM CAMPUS, ANAMBRA STATE, NIGERIA
Abstract
At the root of the dilemmas of national integration in Nigeria are the
legacies of colonialism and ethnicity. This paper studies the relational
impact of colonialism and ethnicity on Nigeria’s integration with a view to
making suggestions. With the aid of the theory of federalism and
documentary research, the paper observes that, rather than multi-
nationality, the deliberately divisive policies and the structure of Nigerian
federalism introduced by Britain under colonialism are the major problems
hindering Nigerian integration. The paper therefore recommends the
convocation of a sovereign national conference where the nationalities will
put forward new relational formulae, decentralisation from power and
responsibilities, and equity in public issues as the panaceas to the problem.
Introduction
Nigeria, like many countries in the world, is made up of more than four
hundred ethnic nationalities (Bangura n.d.) that existed prior to European
penetration as independent states. They engaged in trans-border relations
with each other in matters of trade/commerce, production, security and
socio-cultural relations devoid of phobic activities. These nationalities do
not only have varied demographic profiles, cultures, mores, values and
52 Chapter Three
traditions, they also have different religious, development and historical

experiences.
The artificial and forced unification of these groups by Europeans for
their own economic advantages engendered several dimensions of
pluralism, complexity and corporatism in the country, with a built-in
phobic competition and struggle for power, domination and exploitation
among them. Therefore, the existence of multiple ethnic nationalities does
not by itself constitute a problem or an issue in national integration; rather,
Nigeria’s integration trauma can be found in the policy and process of
social transformation that characterized European forced integration. The
character of European transformation and integration of the socio-political
and economic structures of these nationalities into Nigeria specifically
elevated ethnic nationalities to economic and political organizations with
rivalry for domination. Politics and governance have continued as
exercises in destroying or weakening ethnic groups or sub-groups to the
advantage of others.
This created an increasing consciousness and activism on the part of
ethnic nationalities in a manner that led to a resurgence of ethnic
nationalism, a drive for loose federalism, and separatist tendencies. Ethnic
nationalism has been intrinsically associated with the political process,
economy and statecraft of Nigeria. Alemazung (2010, 66) summarized this
in the following words:
Ethnic groups who feel marginalized often develop feelings of revenge and
hatred against those who enjoy socio-economic well-being from the
resources of their states because of their affiliation to the ruler (the
“owner” or “controller” of the national cake): based on clientelist
politicking. Since there are rarely any state guided structure and political
arrangements or functional governance procedures for rational and
appropriate distribution of state resources and power, there is usually a
resort to conflict.
Colonialism gave rise to the Willink Commission, which in itself

became the precursor of multiple state creations in the country between
1963 and 1996. To date, there have been many agitations for more states
in pursuit of ethnic balancing (Amuwo et al. 1998). Immediately after
independence this led to a national census crisis, a regional political crisis
particularly in Western Nigeria, and the deadly three-year Nigeria-Biafra
civil war of 1967–1970. It is equally responsible for many ethno-religious
wars in Nigeria, such as the Zango-Kataf conflict (Akinteye et al. 1999).
Today, Nigeria has more than twenty ethnic militant groups agitating for
one issue or the other.
Colonialism, Ethnicity and Nigeria’s Integration 53
Consequently, ethnicity is currently a source of huge human

investment across the country as political appointments and employments
are distributed along ethnic lines (Akinyemi, et al. 1998). Ethnic loyalty is
today more preferred and guarantees social security more than loyalty to
the country of Nigeria. It has been legitimized and become a system of
social insurance. Thus, some dominant ethnic nationalities like the
Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, Ijaw and Igbo are known, or alleged, to have
articulated and established institutions and symbols of autonomy together
with armed militias for the defence of their ethnic territories and for
offence against other nationalities. Such groups include the Oodua
Peoples’ Congress (OPC), Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger
Delta (MEND), Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of
Biafra (MASSOB), Boko Haram, Egbesu Boys, and the Northern Peoples’
Congress (NPC).
At this instance, the contemporary ethnic nationalism has led to the
following issues, among others:
x Intense call for a sovereign conference of ethnic nationalities to

renegotiate the foundations of the Nigerian national project
x ethnically inspired violence and destruction of human lives and
properties
x the creation of phobism and destruction of social relations among
ethnic nationalities
x disinvestments across ethnic nationalities by others who are not
indigenes
x the erosion of legitimacy, fragility and an unstable political process.
These aspects threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria and limit its
integration process. Thus, this paper examines the integration that
originated under and was moderated by European colonialism, and
evaluates the dynamics and impact of the process on the post-colonial
integration process in Nigeria.
Research Methodology
This paper explores related and relevant studies and research carried
out at national and international levels on integration, particularly in
Nigeria, colonialism and its impact or contribution to integration in
Nigeria, and efforts and policies adopted by the Nigerian state to achieve
genuine integration since independence. Special attention was devoted to
several federalist policies pursued both by the colonial master and
54 Chapter Three
Nigerian government. Thus, the paper adopts the documentary method of

data gathering.
Consequently, data from the internet, public and private libraries,
textbooks, journals, conference proceedings, workshop/seminar papers,
official government gazettes, civil liberty publications, newspapers and
magazines form the main sources of data. Our method here is to explore
integration policies and their criticisms and relate them with colonialism or
perceive them as colonial legacies where they are related. The paper
adopts content analysis as its method of making inferences from the data
generated from these sources.
Review of Literature
Colonialism and Ethnic Nationalism in Africa
There is consensus among scholars that the colonization of Africa and
other nationalities in the Third World led to the unification of peoples of
diverse cultures into one single political entity, but in a manner that
deterred integration (Osaghae 1986; Vandenberg 1998; Nwosu 1999). This
colonially originated unification of multiple nationalities generated
struggle and tensions that resulted in ethnic nationalism (Ottawa 1999).
Such nationalism breeds ethnic passions, ethnic hatred, ethnic cleansing
and genocide, and agitation for ethnic autonomy or separation, which are
products of oppression, deprivation, alienation marginalization and threats
to ethnic security in the union (Ibrahim 1995). Thus, ethnic nationalism
causes conflict and disunity (Diamond 1988; Snyder 1993; The United
Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD) 1995;
Kazah-Toure 2000).
This colonially originated ethnic rivalry had been the major
disintegrating factor of all African countries, particularly Nigeria (Nugent
2004; Meredith 2005). The foundation of the ethnic consciousness and
rivalry was first laid by the colonialists through the creation of arbitrary
boundaries and the imposition of Euro-cultural differences on these
peoples in the name of state formation (Mahoso 2010). This was further
aggravated by the polarization of ethnic communities and the imposition
of amenable group leaders (Taras & Ganguly 2002; Clapham 1985).
According to Shillington (1989), these were consolidated by the divide
and rule policy, which emphasized the distinctions between ethnic groups.
This strengthened tribal differences and created rivalries, and hindered the
emergence of a united opposition against the colonizers and the
development of real national identity/values (Nnoli 2000), entrenching an
unmitigated struggle for power and inventing tribalism in all public

activities. Thus, Ogunbadejo (1979) correctly argued that colonialism
created ethnic divisions and separatist feelings among ethnic nationalities.
As correctly argued by Nnoli (1978) and Nwaezeigwe (1998), ethnic
nationalism is divisive because it is an instrument of group consciousness
and mobilization in the socio-political process of multi-ethnic nations like
Nigeria. He stated that: “Ethnicity in its fundamental sense is an exhibition
of common ethnic identity in difference to the members of other cultural
groups within a definable geo-political setting.” Agbese (1985) and
Obiatuegwu (1985) concurred that the over-sharpened ethnic sensitivities
of Nigerian peoples have continued to threaten the harmony, progress and
integral nationhood of Nigeria since unification.
Ethnicity and Integration

Integration, which relates to nation building, unites people under a
government and creates an enabling environment in which their cultural,
economic and political aspirations are respected and accommodated.
Integration is loosely interpreted to mean the process of bringing together
culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit, under a
national central authority with subordinate political units that link
government with the governed, to establish minimum value and a
consensus necessary to maintain social order and establish national
identity for a common purpose (Weiner 1965; Etzioni 1965; Coleman &
Rosberg 1964). Weiner (1965) therefore notes that national integration
encompasses territorial integration, value integration, elite-mass
integration and integrative behaviour. In the same light, Weiner (1976)
identified territorial, national, elite mass, value and behavioural issues as
the five major factors fundamental to integration.
Duverger (1976, 177) defines integration as “the process of unifying a
society which tends to make it a harmonious city, based upon an order its
members regard as equitably harmonious.” Jacob & Tenue (1964, 9)
perceive it as: “a relationship of community among people within the same
political entity … a state of mind or disposition to be cohesive, to act
together, to be committed to mutual programmes.” However, Zolberg
(1967) contended that the meaning of national integration should inculcate
the interrelationship between the primordial and the secular institutions,
which, according to Shakir (1982), include the inherent class divisions,
dominant economic and political classes, and social inequalities.
Larson (1984) and Hyden & Williams (1994) argue that integration
depends on the extent of the ties between local and national communities,
56 Chapter Three
and explicit national government policies and programs directed towards

the development of local communities. However, Nigeria’s effort for
national integration adopted educational measures as the model for
national integration (Akpan 1990). Davis & Kalu-Nwiwu (2001) noted
such educational measures like recruitment of university students and staff
from diverse communities in Nigeria’s north and south divide, and the
introduction of the National Youths Service (NYSC) as examples.
Wallerstein (1960) argues that ethnicity enhances national integration
through four related channels: it diminishes the role of kingship; provides
the basis for re-socialization; keeps the social class fluid; and serves as an
outlet for political tension. In his subsequent work, Wallerstein (1961)
provided the platform or modalities for integration through these channels.
Theoretical Framework of Analysis

This paper adopts the federalist theory of integration as its tool of
analysis. Its principal proposition is that the integration of several national
actors takes place as a consequence of wilful political decisions taken by
multi-ethnic nationalities based on common political and socio-economic
norms and objectives. A written and given constitution by the groups
defined the mode of relationship that characterised their union. Such union
usually takes the form of a federal state with horizontal and vertical
separation of powers; the formerly autonomous units give up their claim to
sovereignty and submit to a common will.
Federalism according to this theory is an effective way of achieving
and preserving both integration and stability in deeply divided societies
(Duchacek 1970, 13). Ali Mazrui called it: “An institutionalization of
compromise relationship. It is not only democratic, complete with the
institutionalization of most essential ingredients; it is creative and flexible
enough to incorporate several accommodation formulas” (Mazrui 1971,
300). It ensures unity in diversity (Osaghae 1987; Osaghae & Onwudiwe
2001). Scholars consider it to be the most appropriate framework for
governing multi-ethnic societies (Glazer 1997).
This theory enables us to understand the intricacies and dynamics of
the British amalgamation of independent territories that culminated in the
1914 consolidation of the north and south to form Nigeria. It explains
clearly the policies that followed this amalgamation which should, in the
objective reasoning, integrate/unite the ethnic diversities in a manner that
ensures stability, continuity and development, but has failed to do so. The
colonial government adopted federalism as its framework of
administration in Nigeria. Therefore, this paper objectively studies the

relational impact of colonialism on ethnicity and integration in Nigeria.
Data Collection and Discussions

The emergence of Nigeria as a country started with the British
subjugation of people from diverse nationalities by virtue of its superior
technology and economy, first in 1906 to form the colony and protectorate
of Southern Nigeria, and later in 1914 with the amalgamation of the
northern and southern protectorates. Characteristically, these groups were
not effectively integrated to evolve a true sense of national identity and
commitment to the survival and development of the nation (Olukoju 1997,
12–13). The goal of the British colonialists was not to establish a nation-
state, construct a new national identity, loyalty, unity of purpose and
convergence of the interests of various nationalities that make up Nigeria,
but simply to create an area of influence distinct from those of other
European colonialists in the West African sub-region (Ajayi 1992, 8).
Their goal was to ensure the actualisation of the economic interest of
British imperialists.
The first task pursued by the imperial administration was to ensure that
the various ethnic nationalities that make up Nigeria remain remained
disunited (Ekanola 2006, 189). The simple technique that was adopted and
translated into public policy was the technique of divide and rule (Ajayi
1992), which greatly affected nationalist movements and the formation of
political parties in Nigeria. The nationalists and early politicians code-
named it power sharing, and later ethnic balancing (Olopoenia 1998),
federal character (Suberu 1995; 1996), quota, and rotational political
appointments/elections into key political positions. The implementation of
these policies in Nigeria generated crises and created feelings of
marginalisation among many ethnic groups, which led to agitation for
resource control, continual revision of fiscal federalism (Enahoro 2002),
agitation for the creation of more states, the emergence of ethnic militant
groups, and secession attempts such as the Isaac Adaka Boro and Biafra
declarations of independence.
The consequences have also included the various ethno-religious
conflicts such as the Ife-Modakeke crisis and the Zango-Kataf crisis,
military coups d’état (Elaigwu 1998; Oluleye 1985), political
assassinations, and the emergence of terrorist groups such as the Boko
Haram set, political instability and massive public corruption. Mediocrity
and underdevelopment, together with economic sabotage, have been the
bane of the Nigerian state. These have collectively moved public policy
58 Chapter Three
and programmes away from the pursuit of a national identity, loyalty,

unity of purpose and convergence of the interests of various nationalities
that make up Nigeria. Every integration project or programme has become
a project in disintegration. The integrative National Youth Service Corps
scheme has become an object for attack following the failure of the
Hausa/Fulani to win the 2011 general elections at the presidential level.
None of the Hausa/Fulani graduates now refuse their postings to such
nationalities, and identify with their own kinds.
It is on record that there are many constitutional provisions that were
intended to guarantee the federal character of the Nigerian state so as to
foster national unity notwithstanding the diversities of ethnic nationalities
and their cultures, languages or religions. These constitutional provisions
have not been respected in the history of the country (Yakubu 1999, 10).
Conclusion and Recommendations

The nature and character of the unification of more than four hundred
ethnic nationalities to form Nigeria created division in unity among these
nationalities. This inherent division caused phobic sentiments and intense
rivalry. Quite often, these groups have resorted to struggling for state
power as a means of exploitation and subordination, fighting brief wars to
settle primordial scores (Omuabor 2000). The problems of inequality,
marginalisation, exploitation, internal colonialism and the misuse of
majoritarian democracy and national government (Otite 2000) are closely
associated with this, and exacerbated the divisive policies and
administration of the colonial master, leading to pervasive tribalism and
ethnicity.
To date, public policies at the federal level, which are intended to
eliminate ethnic divisions, have in themselves advanced the cause of
ethnic consciousness, struggle and autonomy. Such policies include a
quota system, a federal character, ethnic balancing, and rotational
presidency. These have increased and consolidated the problems of
building a nation from a collection of ethnic groups created by the colonial
masters.
It is a truism that ethnic ties/affiliations are stronger in Nigeria than a
national consciousness and national goals. The pervasive resurgence of
ethnic militias and agitation for limited autonomy across many groups is a
case in point. Thus, this paper recommends the convocation of a sovereign
national conference wherein all the ethnic nationalities will consciously
agree on a self-originated modality for their union.
Secondly, Nigeria should evolve a neutral, objective and practical

framework for sharing the burdens and rewards of citizenship with equity.
Thirdly, the principles and application of federalism in Nigeria should
be restructured and changed from absolute centralization to high-level
decentralization of power and functions. This would reduce the surge for
power, position and authority at the federal level which breeds ethnic
sentiments and hatred.
References
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Legs.” Newswatch Magazine, 14.
Ajayi, J. F. 1992. “The National Question in Historical Perspective.” The
Fifth Guardian Newspapers Lecture, delivered at the NIIA on
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CHAPTER FOUR
ETHNIC INTEGRATION AND CONTINENTAL

UNITY
VINCENT DODOO
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL STUDIES, KNUST,
KUMASI, GHANA
AND AMISAH ZENABU BAKURI
DEPARTMENT OF MODERN HISTORY & INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN, NETHERLANDS
Abstract
People across the African continent are remarkably diverse in many
senses. They belong to fifty-four different countries, hundreds of ethnic
groupings, speak a variety of languages, live in a variety of dwellings and
engage in a wide range of economic activities. Some countries in Africa
have suffered sharp ethnic divisions which have consumed much of the
national energies. Continental unity has been affected negatively by these
realities. The concern of this paper is to explore practical ways to achieve
the integration of all the ethnic groupings on the continent in order to
promote continental unity. A united and stable state has a better chance of
attaining self-sustaining growth and development. When the individual
African countries become united and are free, it will be possible to utilize
all the energies and resources on the continent for the good of the people.
Kwame Nkrumah made this call with the independence of Ghana in 1957,
but that dream remains a dream. This paper submits that the absence of
ethnic integration accounts for most of the conflicts on the continent and
that these conflicts have contributed immensely in slowing down the
growth of the continent. It is suggested that practical steps towards
achieving ethnic integration on the continent would remove the obstacles
64 Chapter Four
in the way of the unification of the continent. If Africans begin to think of

themselves as one people, union can easily be attained.
Introduction
Ethnic diversity is a subject which cannot be overlooked in Africa.
Ethnic tensions account for many of the conflicts on the continent. There
are currently forty-three ongoing ethnic confrontations in about eighteen
countries out of the fifty-four countries in Africa. Kenya tops the list with
nine ongoing ethnic confrontations, and Nigeria is next with eight (see
Appendix 1). Integration of the several ethnic groupings on the continent
is one certain way in which ethnic tensions on the continent can be
reduced. Integration is a conscious process which would not mean the
absorption of some ethnic groups by others or the imposition of the will of
some ethnic groups on others. It involves the harmonisation of people and
resources for the good of the whole, and that is the way Africa must go.
Some countries in Africa have suffered sharp ethnic divisions which have
crippled the prospects for sustained economic, political and social
progress. And yet, despite these negative implications of ethnic diversity
on the continent, the phenomenon could also promote some fine
opportunities for the people of Africa. This paper explores how the
challenges of African ethnic diversity can be overcome, whilst
highlighting the opportunities that African countries can derive from the
wealth of their diversity. When analysing ethnic diversity in Africa, some
scholars (Buhaug 2006; Easterly & Levine 1997; Kimenyi 2006) consider
the portmanteau of challenges with which it comes, including poor
economic growth and political instability and conflicts.
According to Tongkeh (2009) the concept of ethnicity stands like a
‘birthmark” on the body of Africa. Africa is the only continent that
ethnicity has left with such a deep scar.1 Most of the past and ongoing
crises in Africa—like the Rwandan genocide, the crisis between Sudan
and South Sudan, the 2007–08 Kenyan election disputes, the civil wars in
Nigeria, the 2010 crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, and the ever-changing Tutsi-Hutu
conflict that is spawning new flashpoints and destabilising much of
Africa’s Great Lakes region—show evidence of the role that ethnicity
plays as both a trigger and motivator of conflicts in many parts of Africa.2
Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) 3 have observed that an
ethnically diverse society has the potential to generate ethnic conflicts,
which may in the worst scenarios lead to civil wars. This notwithstanding,
ethnic diversity can also be a means and an opportunity for unifying the
people of Africa. This paper will present the success stories of stable
Ethnic Integration and Continental Unity 65
multi-ethnic African states as well as some of the ways they have

overcome the challenges associated with ethnic diversity. The focus of the
paper will be on the potential opportunities and advantages that ethnic
diversity can provide for Africa and its people.
The Concept of Ethnicity

The concept of ethnicity is discussed in two parts. The first part
discusses the theory of ethnicity, while the second focuses on the
philosophy of African culture as espoused by Kwame Anthony Appiah,
the Cambridge-educated philosopher, in his 1992 book In My Father’s
House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture.
It is noted that the terms ethnicity and African identity can be
confusing. In colonial times, the Europeans often viewed Africans as one
people and, when describing African groups, did not consider their
language variations or ethnic diversity as important. They often referred to
Africans as "black people" or the "black race." 4 However, Africans in
general identify themselves according to their ethnic or linguistic groups,
just like Europeans with Irish, Italian or German speakers. For instance,
the Kamba people who speak the Kikamba language or the Kikuyu people
who speak the Gikuyu language belong to two different ethnic groups in
Kenya and identify themselves as such. 5 Interestingly, when all these
groups travel outside the African continent they regard themselves as one
people. African students in Groningen have a community and all identify
themselves as Africans. In several instances, people regard themselves as
Africans when they are outside the continent of Africa and do not see
themselves as belonging to a specific country in Africa.
Ethnicity is a complex concept with many different definitions. It is
directly derived from the terms “ethnic” or “ethnic group.” Weber (1968)
defined an ethnic group as “those human groups that entertain a subjective
belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type,
custom, or both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration.
This belief must be important in group formation and furthermore it does
not matter whether an objective blood relationship exists.” 6 Weber’s
definition of ethnicity is broad and makes it possible to speak of a
common identity of a specific country or Africa as a whole because of the
common colonial history.
Nnoli (1978) defined ethnic groups as social formations distinguished
by the communal character of their boundaries and membership, especially
language, culture or both. Ethnicity, according to Barth (1969), is a set of
delineated boundaries between neighbouring groups and individuals
66 Chapter Four
primarily concerned with maintaining these boundaries in order to explain

one’s identity, often in a relative comparative manner (Hutchinson &
Smith 1994).7 Barth identified four basic theoretical features of an ethnic
group. First, the group must be biologically self-perpetuating; second, the
members of the group should share basic cultural values manifest in overt
cultural forms; third, the group is a bounded social field of communication
and interaction; and finally, the members should identify themselves and
are identified by others as belonging to that group (Jenkins 2001). The
three definitions from Weber, Nnoli and Barth actually qualify an ethnic
group with features of identity and boundary. They are also the features
that distinguish the concept of ethnicity. 8 These three definitions of
ethnicity collectively allow a wide range of people who are together
because of their history, culture and boundary to qualify as ethnic
groupings on the African continent.
There appears to be a consensus on the identity feature of ethnicity, but
the boundary of an ethnic group may not be that rigid. It seems that in
many cases the boundary is applied haphazardly to keep an individual
inside or outside a group at any point in time. Cohen (1978)9 supports this
view by asserting that ethnicity is not so concrete but rather a fluid concept
by which members distinguish “in-groups” from “out-groups,” and which
can be in a state of constant change due to various situational
applications.10 The concept of “border” in the ethnicity discourse actually
became a point recognised by various scholars, especially Cohen and
Barth. The boundary of an ethnic group creates the exclusiveness which is
jealously guarded by its members. The boundaries may include criteria
like descent, language, physical traits, occupation, economic activities and
other cultural attributes which may not be fixed or used intermittently to
keep individuals outside or inside the group. While Barth emphasised rigid
boundaries, Cohen supported the idea that borders are fluid and flexible
with members able to change identity especially when they live among
other groups.11 Barth agrees with identity change, which he says comes in
terms of failure. The individual can simply change to the alternative ethnic
group by adopting their culture but the welcoming group will not forget
about their origin. He explains that ethnic groups will erect a physical
boundary to distinguish and maintain their identity from other groups in a
way to indicate that identity is rigidly tied to their location. However, for
Cohen, in most ethnic groups physical location may not be an important
factor as many are scattered in different locations and retain their identities
and boundaries. 12
Africans historically consider themselves as part of pluralist societies,
in linguistic and in ethnic terms. African efforts to promote a pluralist
society led to the attempts to create a Pan-African State using Pan-

Africanism as the vehicle (Dodoo & Donkoh 2013). Appiah (1992)
believes that a better basis for solidarity in Africa is needed to replace
decaying philosophies such as that of negritude. This paper will begin the
search for a better basis of solidarity in Africa by identifying the
opportunities which ethnic diversity can present for the journey to
continental unity.
In In My Father’s House, Africa in the Philosophy of Culture, Appiah
(1992) agrees with Chinua Achebe, the Nigerian novelist, that: "African
identity is still in the making." For this reason, the burden of In My
Father's House must replace the ideas that Africans have operated with
relating to the ethnic group, the nation, and Africa. This philosophy is
relevant to this study because the several ethnic groups on the continent
are in contact with other cultures within nations and within and beyond
Africa, and therefore these identities are still in the making and there is a
need to accept and respect the differences of others belonging to other
ethnic groups. Appiah argues that political and economic interests make
people organise themselves on ethnic, religious or linguistic lines. For
example, the Akans (Asante, Fante and Akuapem) and Ewes exist in
Ghana, while Nigeria is made up of a Muslim north and a Christian south.
These identities become real and functional when people believe in them,
especially in situations where their interests are not safeguarded. The issue
of identity is very complex and multiple and becomes an opportunity or
challenge due to responses to cultural, political and economic forces.
Aapengnuo (2010)13 argues that ethnic diversity is typically not the driving
force of conflicts in Africa but rather a lever used by politicians and other
selfish individuals to mobilize supporters in pursuit of power, wealth, fame
and resources. Though the ethnic group is the predominant means of social
identity formation in Africa, most ethnic groups do co-exist peacefully
with high degrees of mixing through inter-ethnic marriages, economic
partnerships and shared values.
In conclusion, this section has looked at the definitions of the concept
of ethnicity by Weber, Nnoli, Barth and Cohen, emphasising that ethnic
groups always have something in common, such as language, culture or
history. These definitions of ethnicity make Africa a pluralist society in
linguistic, ethnic and religious terms. Based on Appiah’s book In My
Father’s House, it becomes clear that to talk about an African identity is a
complex matter which can best be appreciated through solidarity rather
than race. African identity can empower Africans when the differences
between them are acknowledged and respected.
68 Chapter Four
The Challenges and Opportunities that Ethnic Diversity

Presents to Africans
We have become not a melting pot but a beautiful mosaic. Different
people, different beliefs, different yearnings, different hopes, different
dreams.
—Jimmy Carter, 39th US President
It is time to downplay the challenges which ethnic diversity presents to

Africa and rather focus attention on the opportunities it opens. Ethnic
tensions and anxiety continue to flare up, and Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi,
Somalia, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria and Cote
d’Ivoire are some of the countries witnessing brutal conflicts and wars as a
result of ethnic diversity.14 This is one of the negative sides that ethnic
diversity brings, and has to be addressed. However, there is a positive side
as well. The co-existence of diverse cultures, religious, linguistic and
ethnic communities with multiple and sometimes competing identities
raises profound moral, philosophical, legal and practical questions.15 This
section will look at the different approaches that could be employed to
accommodate ethnic diversity, representing some of its opportunities for a
country. Learning to respect and appreciate each other’s cultural differences
and becoming aware of unconscious assumptions and behaviours that may
influence interactions with other groups will minimize the challenges of
ethnic diversity. It will also engender the huge socio-economic
development characteristic of interactions of diverse actors.16
Research shows that diverse working groups are more productive,
creative and innovative than homogeneous groups, and suggests that
developing a diverse society will enhance development. 17 This is also
applicable in a country with diverse ethnic groups. Several opportunities
can be found in ethnic diversity. In a country where there are several
ethnic groups—which is the case in almost all African countries—
education, sports and entertainment, religious organisations and inter-
marriage, among many other approaches, create opportunities.
Education is one major way to overcome challenges of ethnic diversity.
The UNESCO18 International standard classification of education defines
it as comprising organized and sustained communication designed to bring
about learning (UNESCO 1975). In a diverse society where education is
open to all, it serves a very good platform for the students themselves and
the nation as a whole. Numerous research studies (Smith et al. 1997; Gurin
1999; Pascarella et al. 1996) have examined the impact of diversity on
students and educational outcomes. Cumulatively, these studies have
provided extensive evidence that diversity has a positive impact on all
students, minority and majority groups alike. 19 According to Ameny-

Dixon, 20 multicultural education increases productivity because it
increases creative problem-solving skills through different perspectives,
and promotes cognitive and moral growth among all people.
Many countries in Africa have tried to make their schools national
schools whereby an individual could attend any school of their choice so
as to interact with people of different ethnic backgrounds. Worsyanju
(2008) 21 points out that in 1963, when Kenya gained independence, a
commission was set up to make changes to the formal educational system.
The focus of the commission was on building a national identity and
unifying the different ethnic groupings through the study of subjects in
school, such as history and civic education. This was the path Kenya took
to solve its problem of ethnic diversity and incorporate all ethnic
groupings in their educational system while focusing much attention on
the national identity rather than ethnic identity. After 1909, schools in
Kenya were established on separate educational systems for Europeans,
Asians and Africans. 22 Today in Kenya there are national schools
comprised of different ethnic groups benefitting from each other’s
specialties and views. The same can be said of the educational systems of
most African schools. In Ghana and Tanzania, for example, boarding
schools are made up of different ethnic groupings which mingle and
interact and learn from each other. This allows inter-ethnic friendships,
respect for diversity and tolerance to be fostered among the various
groupings. The concept of Ivoirité was introduced by students in Dakar to
push forward national pride and identity. The idea of these students was to
generate a national consciousness based on common cultural notions
confirming educational opportunities in ethnic diversity.23
Another opportunity of ethnic diversity comes from inter-marriage. In
most African countries, despite ethnocentrism and all its negative effects,
most people marry from different ethnic groups and live peacefully. That
is to say, ethnic diversity is not bad in itself, but largely depends on the
end to which it is put. Historically, most African states have not been
endogamous.24 According to Goody (1971), an examination of spouses’
estates in 515 Gonja marriages shows that men of all groups take a large
proportion of wives from estates other than their own.25 He points out that
the princesses of the matrilineal Asante preferred the lighter-skinned males
from the north. This historical precedence is still pervasive in most parts of
Africa, and the patronage has increased tremendously in recent times.
The different ethnic groups are bound together by a network of inter-
marriages which has profound implications for national unity. In Ghana,
for instance, the first president of the Fourth Republic, Jerry John
70 Chapter Four
Rawlings, a Ewe, is married to Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings, an

Asante. Similarly, the current president of Ghana, John Dramani Mahama,
a Gonja, is married to Lordina Mahama, a Bono. These are some of the
beautiful stories that ethnic diversity can showcase. Such inter-marriages
foster unity. These two examples from Ghana are noted (especially that of
Jerry John Rawlings and Nana Konadu) because of the Asante-Ewe
hostility which has been capitalized upon by ill-meaning politicians26 for a
long time in Ghana. Today, most Ghanaians are the offspring of ethnic
inter-marriages and would like to be called Ghanaians and not Akan or
Ewe or Gonja or Ga. These offspring from the inter-marriages usually
have difficulty in deciding on their ethnic origin and attempt to simplify
things for themselves by invoking their nationality rather than their ethnic
origin. Aapengnuo (2010) 27 points out that in Rwanda, after the well-
orchestrated 1994 genocide, it is difficult to distinguish between Tutsis
and Hutus as a result of inter-marriages. Today, the Hutus and Tutsis
speak the same language and share the same faith. It could be argued that
people in Africa are placing less emphasis on their ethnic identities and
looking at the broader picture. This is an opportunity that exists in ethnic
diversity; inter-marriages bring unity, peace and enforce national unity and
identity.
Again, one major way to overcome the challenges of African ethnic
diversity is through sports and other recreational activities:
… sports can make a difference in people’s lives and can help make the
world a better, safer place to live ….
—Adolf Ogi (former president of Switzerland and Special Adviser to the
UN Secretary-General on Sports for Development and Peace)
There are several benefits that can be derived from sports. Sports in
general help to develop a strong and positive community and national
identity. Sports increasingly cross cultural, ethnic and political boundaries
in a way that few other activities can.28 The United Nations Report on the
International Year of Sport and Physical Education (2005)29 highlights the
benefits that sports can bring about in building national identity. Sports
can provide a positive image of a nation to the international community. It
is important to mention that sport entertains, imparts a sense of pride and
belongingness, unifies and contributes to the integration or cohesion of the
identity of a state. 30 Traditional and modern sporting activities are one
major way which has brought different ethnic groups together. During
such sporting activities, people tend to forget their differences and see
themselves as one people. In an act of friendliness, soccer players and
other sportsmen alike have come together to play games in order to raise
money for several worthy causes, mainly charities. A very good example
is the African Volunteer Football Academy for the Less Privileged
(AVFAL), which is a Charitable Football Organisation based in Limbein,
Cameroon, Freetown in Sierra Leone, and Nakuru in Kenya. AVFAL's
major objective is to provide soccer training to less privileged African
children. This is one major way they are uniting people from diverse
ethnic backgrounds and cultures. They have even gone an extra step
beyond the national identity to continental identity, and have students from
every corner of Cameroon, Sierra Leone, Kenya and neighbouring
countries such as Nigeria, Senegal, Chad, Benin, Central Africa Republic
and Gabon.31
During the World Cup Soccer series, people travel from different
countries to support their teams, and many stay at home to watch them on
television. Usually at the beginning of the World Cup competition, there is
a strong attachment to one’s national team. In Ghana, people wear the
national colours and religious leaders say prayers for their national team.
This binds all people within the state together in a unique way. With
football it goes beyond nationalities and this is so because, with time, the
gap narrows and differences between countries cease to exist. For instance,
if seven African teams qualify for the playoffs during the World Cup, only
one team can advance to the next round. The remaining countries end up
supporting the advancing team. There have been many times when
opponents exchange their jerseys as a sign of respect for their counterparts.32
A case study of football in Liberia by DeLancey (2000) shows that
football is considered a “neutral” pursuit—a common cultural property
unspoiled by war.33 During the civil conflict, football tournaments were
considered the only occasions that produced a sense of national unity.34
The 2009 Clint Eastwood film Invictus deals with this subject. In 1995, the
newly released Nelson Mandela saw the rugby world cup team as a vehicle
to help bring the country together with a shared purpose. By eventually
winning the competition, the team’s success provided a huge boost to his
government and helped the society make the transition from the Apartheid
dictatorship to democracy. 35 Cameroonians take pride in victories at
international competitions, making sports an important source of national
unity.36 These are some of the great opportunities of ethnic diversity with
particular respect to modern and international football. The programme
Bridging Divides in South Africa uses basketball to bring children and
communities together. An assessment of the programme has shown that
the majority of participants expressed fewer racial stereotypes and less
racism compared to children who were not part of the programme.37
72 Chapter Four
Traditional sports and games in Africa are also major ways to

overcome the challenges of ethnic diversity. UNESCO has identified that
Traditional Sports and Games (TSG) can be a central cohesive source of
support and stability of a community, and UNESCO is driven to protect
and promote these sports because they bring peoples together and install a
sense of pride in a society’s cultural roots. 38 These games are also an
efficient means to convey values of solidarity, diversity, inclusiveness and
cultural awareness. 39 TSG constitutes an intangible heritage which
requires protection and its importance should be reinforced for unity,
peace and development. African wrestling, which seems to be losing its
importance and value, used to be widespread throughout Africa. Wrestling
provided one way in which ethnic groups that spoke different languages
could come together. All ethnic groups in Africa had one thing in common
when they wrestled. The rules were the same but the techniques differed.
Also, it was a way to solve a dispute. 40 In recent times, wrestling in
Senegal has become a national obsession. 41 Youths of diverse ethnic
backgrounds get involved in it and, apart from it being fun, it unites them.
This is the beauty of diversity. These examples are not exhaustive but they
collectively reinforce the point that ethnic diversity can bring about
positive opportunities for all.
Another way to overcome the challenges of ethnic diversity is through
music. Darko, Darko & Roach (1983) indicate that African music consists
of an extensive range of native musical resources found all over its
11,700,000 square miles. African music brings both unity and diversity to
its 250,000,000 people who belong to 2,000 or more ethnic groups and
who converse in hundreds of different languages or dialects.42 In spite of
the challenges that come with the diversity of the African people, music
has been used to foster national unity. Several music forms today are made
up of collaborations of musicians from different ethnic groups to portray
national unity or to sell their music. Some of these songs encourage living
peacefully and in harmony, despite the fact that some musicians use music
to divide people. A majority has tried to focus on the positive side. During
the Ghana elections in 2012, musicians collaborated to promote national
unity before, during and after the elections. During state functions several
different songs are played and performed to portray that people belong to
different ethnic groups—but in all, they are one people.
The singing of the national anthems of African countries also
emphasizes national unity and the opportunities of ethnic diversity.
Among the fifty-four African countries, fifty-two anthems have words; the
anthems for Somalia and Mauritania do not.43 The lyrics of the anthems
urge people to unite and see themselves as one to ensure nation building.
Others speak of continental unity. The first stanza of the Tanzanian

national anthem invokes God’s blessing on Africa before going on to ask
for His blessing for Tanzania in the second.44 The Tanzanian anthem is a
very good example because it starts with continental unity and then moves
to the unity of Tanzania. Most African national anthems are partly
fossilised reminders of the ideologies and events of the periods when most
nations gained independence and wanted national unity. However, in
whatever period they were written, the basic nationalist purpose of
attempting to unite all ethnic groups remains a constant feature. This is
affirmed by the call for unity on Monday, February 28, 2011 by Kenyans
to sing their national anthem in unison after the long period of ethnic
violence that ensued due to disputed political elections that claimed the
lives of thousands (“Sing and Unite”). 45 Citizens within the nation and
other parts of the world took a break to collectively sing the anthem.46 The
new leaders of independent Africa set about building nations from multi-
ethnic peoples that they inherited from the colonial powers, and used the
National Anthem as a vehicle to build national identities. 47 Singing the
National Anthem during state functions and at school is also a way to
foster unity. In Ghana, Tanzania and Nigeria, for example, students sing
their national anthems during assembly to emphasise national identity.
Broadcast media throughout the countries of Africa start and end the day
with their national anthems. In short, the singing of national anthems
brings about patriotism, whilst the collaboration of musicians from several
ethnic groups emphasizes unity for national development.
Food is another major way to benefit from ethnic diversity. There is
beauty in the many African menus. They are made from almost the same
ingredients but cooked differently. A national cuisine is a useful part of
building a national culture. In considering what to include on national
websites, governments have to extract what they believe to be the essential
components of their national identities and cultures.48 In this discussion,
the usual problems related to the diversity of Africa arise. It is difficult to
generalize because it is inappropriate for large sections of the continent to
have a common food. African cuisine is also a major way to emphasise
opportunities in diversity. This is because the various foods are packaged
and well known to all in the country, and people understand the national
outlook of others from different ethnic groups. The Cape Verdean
embassy in the United States, which hosts the Cape Verdean national
website, promotes the idea that “Cape Verdeans express their uniqueness
in their cuisine.”49 Ugali is the national dish of Kenya and the Ethiopian
national food is Injera, though the same cannot be said for all countries in
Africa. Countries with a common cuisine can always use it to emphasise
74 Chapter Four
national unity, whilst those with several kinds of cuisine like Ghana,
Senegal and Nigeria need to advertise the entire menu for all to know what
is available.
Ethnic and cultural diversity can always be celebrated in Africa
through tourism. Diversity is a tourist attraction in itself, and when
celebrated and strengthened by the different ethnic groups within a
country, it can be refreshing, while at the same time promoting unity.
Ghebrihiwet (2009) has suggested that Eritrea, home to nine different
ethnic groups, is gifted with fascinating landscapes and locations that
serve as tourist destinations, including marine resources, historical and
archaeological sites, and many buildings of colonial legacies that include
Turkish and Italian designs.50 It is this shared experience of harmonious
co-existence that constantly enriches and strengthens the African common
values and unity. The unity in diversity is in fact the basic social fibre for
uniting all the African states.
Religion is another major opportunity for promoting ethnic diversity.
In Africa there are several religions, grouped into three major categories:
traditional, Christian and Islamic. These religions are widespread
throughout Africa. People of different ethnic groups belong to these major
religions and other minor religions. The teachings of these religious
groups all speak about unity. Religion has sometimes triggered conflict in
some parts of Africa, such as Nigeria and Sudan. Arguably, most people of
different ethnic backgrounds in Africa are religious and go to church or the
mosque. In these congregations, they meet as one people, the sons and
daughters of God or Allah. Religion adds to the wealth of African
diversity. During state functions, different religious groups are represented
and sit together as one, and followers of these religions can emulate them.
Prayers for national unity, peace and development are often said by leaders
of these religious groups for their nations.
These and many more are some of the opportunities to overcome the
challenges of ethnic diversity in Africa and to benefit immensely from
diversity. However, cultural opportunities in ethnic diversity in Africa
alone cannot ensure a holistic development which will translate into
African identity and unity. Therefore, there is a need to look at economic
and political developments that would enhance the opportunities of
African ethnic diversity and overcome the challenges of ethnic diversity.
Political developments are some of the opportunities that exist in the
ethnic diversity of Africa. Politics is perhaps one of the most important
arenas for ethnic identity in Africa. The advent of multi-party politics and
democracy in Africa has made it very necessary to get opportunities in
diversity. This is because it is the basis around which ethnic-related
conflicts usually find mobilisation and expression. African countries

practising multi-party democracy have multiple ethnic groupings which
reflect different ideological, cultural, societal and regional differences.51
Governments of African states have the responsibility to be as
democratic as possible, and must embrace an all-inclusive form of
democratic government. A truly democratic African state should comprise
all of the ethnic groups and not just a majority at the expense of minority
groups. Political parties in each country should be fewer with membership
cutting across ethnic lines. Tanzania can be cited as a case in point. The
country’s first president, Julius Nyerere, insisted on creating a nation of
citizens who would have a national identity and banned ethnicity from
official records. To this day, Tanzania still does not allow political parties
founded on religion, race, colour, ethnicity or gender.52 The same can be
said of most African countries such as Ghana, Kenya, Liberia and South
Africa. The implications of ethnic diversity within politics are extremely
real and if they are not well managed they can destroy national harmony
and cohesion. A comprehensive legal system that protects minorities from
the abuse of state power, respects their rights and ensures that their
grievances are addressed must be taken seriously. Mahtma Ghandi
observed that: “If through our wisdom we could secure elementary human
needs, there would be no need for weapons of war."
To enjoy all the benefits of ethnic diversity there is a need for
economic development. The challenges of ethnic diversity manifest
themselves because people cannot afford the basic necessities of life.
Arguably, poverty is continuously cited as one of the principal factors
responsible for instability, conflict and insecurity in many parts of
Africa.53 If attention is given to economic development through exploring
the several opportunities that exist in ethnic diversity economically,
development will be assured. Africa is a continent abundant in resources—
a real place where social relations between groups can have significant
economic implications. Resources both natural and human are not
possessed by one ethnic group. This makes the opportunity very prudent
because all resources, especially natural resources, can be exploited for the
benefit of all ethnic groups for national development. According to Wax
(2011), the colonial and post-colonial political economy of Ghana
benefited more from the resource-rich south.54 However, Ghana’s Fourth
Republican Constitution (1992) provides the legal framework for the
pursuit of socio-economic development and nation building throughout the
country. In Tanzania, Nyerere’s policy of “Ujumaa” centred on collective
agriculture. Ujumaa also called for the nationalization of banks and
industry and an increased level of self-reliance at both individual and
76 Chapter Four
national levels. While the moral and economic prospects of Ujumaa may
be controversial, they enhanced national unity and emphasized different
peoples working together.55 Among other things, the equitable access to
civil service jobs and the various services that the state provides would
also ensure peace, unity and development.
In conclusion, this section has looked at the several ways that African
countries benefit from ethnic diversity. Religion, food, tourism, music and
inter-marriage are some of the cultural opportunities that African countries
can benefit from. However, it was also noted that economic and political
development is very crucial for the opportunities of ethnic diversity to
become manifest in all fifty-four African countries. This is because
poverty, economic inequality and poor political leadership are the main
grounds for challenges to African ethnic diversity. Therefore, to enjoy all
the opportunities of ethnic diversity in Africa, there is a need for economic
and political development.
Conclusion
We can create a harmonious society out of many different kinds of
people. The key is tolerance, the one value that is indispensable in creating
community (Barbara Jordan 1936–1996). This paper has explored the
ways in which ethnic diversity in Africa comes with opportunities and
benefits, and that these opportunities have to be pursued for the integration
of the various ethnic groups in each country. When these countries identify
and develop their national identities an African identity is possible. We
have pointed out that the challenges of ethnic diversity can be overcome in
several different ways. In order to end the problems that come with
ethnicity, the broader picture of being African should be stressed and
similarities promoted whilst differences are addressed.
Ethnicity in Africa should not disappear. However, its challenges can
be tamed through education, music, sports, food, inter-marriage, good
governance, justice and increased economic development. It must be
understood that African identity and unity can be realized only when each
African country is made up of people who think of themselves as one, and
it is important that politicians unite the various ethnic groups by creating a
strong sense of nationhood and patriotism by their actions, utterances and
policies.56
Finally, ethnic diversity is a double-edged sword. It has the potential to
do harm to a society. Nevertheless, it also has abundant prospects for
helping the continent achieve its desired goal of becoming a single entity.
Appendix 1
Some countries in Africa that have had communal minority groups
engaged in armed rebellion/civil disturbances of one form or another.
Angola
Bakongo – Kimbundu
Bakongo – Ovimbundu
Kimbundu – Ovimbundu
Burundi
Tutsis – Hutus
Cameroon
Kirdis – Hausa
Bamileke – Beti/Bulu
Central African Rep.
Kaba – Yakoma
Congo
Lari – M’Boshi
Democratic Rep. of Congo
Luba – Lunde/Yeke
Hema – Lendu
Hunde – Hutus
Hutus – Tutsis
Ethiopia
Anuak – Gambella
Ghana
Mossi-Dagomba – Konkomba
Guinea
Guerze – Mandingo
Ivory Coast
Bete – Burkinabe
Burkinabe – Guere
Diola – Guere
Kenya
Borana – Gabra
Kalenjin – Kikuyu
Kalenjin – Kisii
Kalenjin – Luhya
Kalenjin – Luo
Kikuyu – Maasai
Kisii – Maasai
78 Chapter Four
Luhya – Maasai
Luo – Maasai
Mali
Arabs – Tuareg
Nigeria
Fulani – Tarok
Hausa/Fulani – Ibo
Hausa/Fulani – Yoruba
Ibo – Yoruba
Ijaw – Yoruba
Ijaw – Itsekeri
Ijaw – Urhobo
Urhobo – Yoruba
Rwanda
Hutus – Tutsis
Sierra Leone
Mende – Temne
South Africa
Xhosa – Zulus
Sudan
Arabs – Black-Muslims
Arabs – Black Non-Muslims
Nuer – Shilluk
Togo
Ewe – Kabre
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Notes
1
Joseph Fowale Tongkeh, (2009), How Africa was Streamlined into Tribes and
Ethnic Groups,
http://suite101.com/article/colonialism-and-ethnicity-in-africa-a147040.
2
Sebastian Porter, (July 2011), Ethnicity in Africa: A Road to Conflict or a Path to
Peace?http://www.afjn.org/focus-campaigns/other/other-continental-issues/80-
democracy-and-governance/982-ethnicity-in-africa-a-road-to-conflict-or-a-path-to-
peace-.html.
3
Garcia-Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, (2002), Why Ethnic Fractionalization?
Polarization, Ethnic Conflict and Growth,
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~montalvo/wp/mes_pol.pdf.
4
Kenya—History, Background, Education, People, Percent, and Africans, State
Universitycom, http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/770/Kenya-HISTORY-
BACKGROUND.html#ixzz2F1bfP7j9.
5
Ibid.
6
Michael Olajide Ilori, (2008), Ethnic Nationalism and Conflicts: Challenges to
West Africa’s Integration,
http://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/16351712/THE_THESIS.doc.
7
T. H. Eriksen, (1994), Ethnicity, Race, Class and Nation (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
8
Michael Olajide Ilori, Ethnic Nationalism and Conflicts.
9
Ronald Cohen, (1978), “Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology,” Annual
Review of Anthropology, 379–403.
10
Meredith Modzelewski, Ethnicity Analyzed: An Application of Barth and Cohen,
http://www.counterpop.net/~meredith/Ethnicity%20Analyzed%20Barth%20and%
20Cohen.doc.
11
John Hutchinson & Anthony Smith, (1994), Ethnicity (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
12
Meredith Modzelewski, Ethnicity Analyzed.
13
Clement Mweyang Apengnuo, (2010), “Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in
Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief 4 (NDU Press,
April 2010).
14
The Kenyan Section of the International Commission of Jurists, (2008),
Ethnicity, Human Rights and Constitutionalism in Africa, Nairobi, ix.
15
Ibid.
16
Benefits and Challenges of Diversity in Academic Settings,
http://wiseli.engr.wisc.edu/docs/Benefits_Challenges.pdf.
17
Ibid.
18
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO).
19
Daryl G. Smith et al., 1997, Diversity Works: The Emerging Picture of How
Students Benefit (Washington, D.C.: Association of American Colleges and
Universities).
20
Gloria M. Ameny-Dixon, Why Multicultural Education is More Important in
Higher Education Now Than Ever: a Global Perspective
http://www.nationalforum.com/Electronic%20Journal%20Volumes/Ameny-
Dixon,%20Gloria%20M.%20Why%20Multicultural%20Education%20is%20More
%20Important%20in%20Higher%20Education%20Now%20than%20Ever.pdf.
21
Chris Worsyanju, (2008), The System of Education in Kenya
http://international.iupui.edu/kenya/resources/Education-in-Kenya.pdf.
22
Ibid., 2.
23
Sebastian Porter, Ethnicity in Africa.
24
Jack Goody, (1971), “Class and Marriage in Africa and Eurasia,” American
Journal of Sociology 76 (4): 588, January. The University of Chicago Press,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2776430.
25
Ibid., 589.
26
Agyemang Attafuah, Ethnic Diversity, Democratization and Nation-Building in
Ghana, October 16, 2009,
http://thefutureofafrica.wordpress.com/2009/10/16/ethnic-diversity-
democratization-and-nation-building-in-ghana.
27
Aapengnuo, Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in Africa.
28
Ashton Matt, (2010), NTU World Cup, The Importance of Sport in Forming a
National Identity, http://ntuworldcup.wordpress.com/2010/06/09/the-importance-
of-sport-in-forming-a-national-identity-by-dr-matt-ashton.
29
International Year of Sport and Physical Education (IYSPE). 2005,
http://www.un.org/sport2005/a_year/fact_sheet.pdf.
30
Emmanuel Amenuvor, “Promotion of Cultural Diversity and Unity in the World
Through Sports,” http://emefa.dyndns.org/culturaldiversity/articles/sports_div.htm.
31
The African Volunteer Football Academy for the Less Privileged (AVFAL),
http://www.avfal.org/b.
32
Emmanuel Amenuvor, “Promotion of Cultural Diversity and Unity in the World
Through Sports.”
33
International Platform on Sport & Development, Sports and Peace Building
www.sportanddev.org.
34
Ibid.
35
Matt Ashton, (2010), The Importance of Sport in Forming a National Identity,
http://ntuworldcup.wordpress.com/2010/06/09/the-importance-of-sport-in-
forming-a-national-identity-by-dr-matt-ashton.
36
Mark W. DeLancey, (2000), Historical Dictionary of the Republic of Cameroon
(3rd Ed.) (Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press).
37
Sport and Devorg, The Role of Sports in Peace Building,
http://www.sportanddev.org/en/learnmore/sport_and_peace_building/the_role_of_
sport_in_peace_building.
38
UNESCO website, Traditional Sports and Games,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/physical-
education-and-sport/traditional-sports-and-games.
39
Ibid.
40
Things Fall Apart 5, Wrestling http://thingsfallapart5.wikispaces.com/Wrestling.
41
World Wrestling As a Solution to Poverty in Senegal,
http://www.theworld.org/2011/06/wrestling-as-a-solution-to-poverty-in-senegal.
84 Chapter Four
42
Samuel F. Darko, Mercy O. Darko & Donald W. Roach, (1983), “Ghana Music
Education: A Merging of Cultures,” International Journal of Music Education os-
2: 11.
43
Ibid.
44
Embassy of Tanzania, Beijing website, National anthem of Tanzania,
http://www.tanzaniaembassy.org.cn:8081/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item
&layout=item&id=65&Itemid=214&lang=en.
45
Sing and unite, stand for Kenya, http://28feb.co.ke/stand-for-kenya.
46
Radio Netherlands, African desk, “Kenyans Worldwide Sing for National
Unity,” http://www.rnw.nl/africa/article/kenyans-worldwide-sing-national-anthem-
unity.
47
Igor Cusack, (2005), “African National Anthems: 'Beat the Drums, the Red Lion
Has Roared',” Journal of African Cultural Studies 17 (2): 235–251.
48
Igor Cusack, (2000), “African Cuisines: Recipes for Nation-building?” Journal
of African Cultural Studies 13 (2): 207–225.
49
Ibid.
50
Kesete Ghebrihiwet, (2009), “Cultural Diversity: an Asset for Tourism,”
http://www.shabait.com/articles/nation-building/140-cultural-diversity-an-asset-
for-tourism.
51
A. Attah-Asamoah, Overview of the Nature and Management of Diversity in
Africa, http://www.un.org/africa/osaa/reports/Diversitypercent20inpercent20Africa
_finalper cent20version.pdf.
52
Commonwealth of Nations, “Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group:
Tanzania General Elections,” October 31, 2010, 3–9,
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/files/232431/FileName/FinalReport-
TanzaniaCOG.pdf.
53
Rasheed Draman, (2003), Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a Complex
Relationship (final draft) Experts Group meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary
Strengthening Program, Addis Ababa. May 19–23.
54
Emily Wax, “Reaching out a Cyber-hand from Africa to the World: Ghana’s
Vice President Seeks to Broadcast the Country’s Benefits,” The Washington Post,
June 22, 2011.
55
Sebastian Porter, Ethnicity in Africa.
56
Opondo Abiero, A Cause of Political Instability in Africa,
http://www.grandslacs.net/doc/2731.pdf.
CHAPTER FIVE
PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN DECOLONIZATION

AND DEVELOPMENT:
THE CASE OF KENYA
OMOSA MOGAMBI NTABO

DEPT. OF CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIAL WORK
MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY, KENYA
AND KENNEDY ONKWARE
DEPT. OF PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES
MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, KENYA
Abstract
Ethnicity is a concept used in Kenya with a negative connotation, yet
Kenya is a country with diverse communities. Kenya has 42 communities
referred also as “tribes or natives” with different cultural, linguistic,
religious and social organization. Kenya gained her independence in 1963
with a combined effort of all 42 communities with much hopes that the
communities will receive equal treatment from the independent
government of the day in resource distribution, jobs in the government and
equal development in all spheres of life including education, roads, health,
economic development and appointment to government service. The
communities have not been given the equal treatment they expected in
terms of power and resources causing animosity among the communities
and strengthening the ethnic divide within the communities leading to
undesired consequences such as conflict and intertribal wars .This is
contrary to the architects of Pan-Africanism and their ideals. Kenya
promulgated a new constitution in 2010 along with other laws to deal with
86 Chapter Five
ethnic divide in power and resources distribution It is yet to be seen

whether it will narrow the gap between the ethnic communities in Kenya.
The purpose of the paper is to critically analyze the ethnicity and
distribution of power and resources and whether the new constitution and
other laws will enhance tribal harmony or enhance ethnic divide among
Kenyan communities.
Introduction
Since 1960, African states have become independent and self-
governing, with their own heads of states and governments, founded on
the principles of their colonial masters. The states assumed that they were
politically, socially, culturally and economically independent from their
masters. The reality is that Africa is still colonized in many other spheres
with its own consent. The present African states were colonized courtesy
of the 1884–5 Berlin conference. The African people were neither
consulted nor did they consent to be colonized. African states have since
gained independence; therefore, it is assumed in theory that the states
would develop economically, socially, culturally and politically without
assistance from developed countries through the provision of any kind of
foreign aid. However, the paradigms of development advanced by the
developed nations seem to have very little relevance in the African
context; hence, the dependency and modernization theories advanced by
classical economists and sociologists (Adu 1987) do not seem to hold
water in the African context.
There are many reasons for this. The conditions are different from the
developed states. The renaissance of China and the fall of the Soviet
Union heralded a new dawn for African states. African states, with their
own consent, are still “colonized” by the newly developed world in the
political, economic, social and cultural spheres, and the states are
struggling to emancipate themselves from neo-colonisation.
Kenya, for example, gained its independence from Britain in 1963, and
was declared a republic. Kenya was, and to a large extent is, governed by
the Westminster constitution; it has just promulgated a new constitution,
which it is in the process of implementing. There are forty-two
communities in Kenya with different cultures and languages and economic
activities. Kenya is a multilingual country with forty-two languages
spoken there. The country has a population of about forty million. The
GDP is about $783 per capita. The economic growth is 1.2% per year.
Kenya has seven public universities and about fifteen private universities.
It has forty-seven registered political parties that follow different political
Perspectives on African Decolonization and Development 87
policies, some of which are Western oriented and have little relevance.
This paper looks at the perspectives of the African development vis à vis
the principles advocated by Kwame Nkrumah and Pan-Africanism.
Development theories here have significant roles to play in explaining how
Africa has failed in development.
The Historical Overview of Kenya

Through trading and settlements for many centuries, East Africa
experienced the imposition of alien restraints, initially by Arab and Persian
states, and later by Europeans. Formal external control was imposed by the
colonial powers of Europe in The General Act Agreement Of 1885,
followed by the Anglo- German Agreement of 1886, which arbitrarily
imposed boundaries on the region by allocating, for example, what is
known as Tanzania to Germany and Kenya to the British. The British
chose to use the East African Company (later Imperial East Africa Trading
Company), which was operating in the region, as a vehicle to help expand
British interests without investing any national resources.
The company established an administration with an armed security
force in 1896 with fortified stations to protect its trading routes and
centres, stocks and staff. The security personnel were largely acquired
from the Indian police and watchmen, and were governed by Indian police
statutes, giving the security force a quasi-police status. Towards the end of
the eighteenth century an additional security force was set up, which was
employed to protect the building and maintenance of the Kenya-Uganda
railway systems. This required centres at Kisumu and Nairobi, as well as
Mombasa. The colonial presence was thus expanding.
During the 1880s the British Colonial Office increasingly took over the
administration of the region from the Imperial East African Company. The
commissioner of the region was given the right to establish a police or
other force for the defence of the protectorate, and armed forces were
established. There was opposition to the colonial outsiders and a police
force was needed to suppress it.
The Delimitation Agreement of 1886 established the approximate
boundary to the south, separating it from the German sphere of influence
in Tanganyika. Buganda was already identified as a kingdom. Its borders
and neighbours in Uganda came under the nominal British control
following the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890. The Imperial British
East Africa (IBEA) was chartered to administer the interior of the British
sphere and continued with its expansionist policies until it reached Uganda
in 1893, and eventually took over that country in 1895.
88 Chapter Five
In 1902, the boundaries that were earlier fixed were redefined, and the
East African Protectorate was finally separated from the Uganda
Protectorate. In June 1920, Britain formally annexed Kenya as a crown
colony with the same boundaries as the 1902 East African Protectorate.
This arrangement did not include the coastal region, which another
authority governed.
The East African coast had many inhabitants with a lot of trade,
including slaves. Greeks, Portuguese, Arabs, Persians, Italians, Indians and
Turks introduced their cultures, languages and religions to the indigenous
peoples, and they still exert a very strong influence in present-day Kenya.
On May 24, 1887, the Sultan of Zanzibar granted the concession to Sir
William Mackinnon on behalf of the IBEA. In 1895, the Sultan of
Zanzibar signed a treaty that declared the ten-mile coastal strip as
belonging to current and future Sultan of Zanzibar.
The foregoing scenario lasted up to 1914. The First World War (1914–
1918) played a significant part in forcing the pace of change among the
African peoples. The British conscripted about 160,000 men from the East
African Protectorate—among them Luo, Kikuyu, Luhya and Kamba—to
conquer German East Africa. When these people came back they
demanded greater rights and freedoms, as well as the land that they had
left behind.
The Crown Colony and its Institutions 1920–1963

According to the 1920 Order-in-Council, Kenya and the ten-mile
coastal strip were legally recognized. The declaration of crown colony
created several organs that have now been done away with by the passing
of the new constitution.
Kenya was administered on two levels: central and local government.
The governor was appointed as head of government by the Queen, the
head of state. The governor had executive and legislative powers over the
colony.
The provinces were divided into districts, which were further divided
into divisions, locations and sub locations—the remnants of colonialism.
The local units formed the basic areas of government, and their day-to-day
administration was the responsibility of the executive—from provincial
commissioners to district commissioners, district officers, chiefs and
assistant chiefs. The provincial administration was in charge of
maintaining law and order in each province, assisted by the above-named
officers. The central government, which was created in Nairobi,
administered the departments. These departments were eventually changed

to ministries.
These arrangements have remained to this day. The courts of law were
also established by the colonial government and were initially manned by
officers of the provincial administration, or by judges and magistrates
seconded from the colonial legal service. Kenya continued to have judges
until 1988, when the last one was dismissed because of incompetence and
gross misconduct.
The land that belonged to Africans was alienated by several
legislations in 1915 by The Crown Lands Ordinance, which stated:
All public land in the colony which is for the time being subject to the
control of His majesty by virtue of any treaty, convention or agreement or
by virtue of his majesty’s protectorate and all lands which shall have been
acquired by His majesty for the public service or otherwise and shall
include all lands occupied by Native tribes of the colony and all lands
reserved for the use of members of any native tribes.
The above ordinance vested all the land to the governor. The African
communities now turned to be the tenants of the crown. The colonialists
introduced the land tenure system, which is still held for a period ranging
from 99 years to 999 years. Section 5 of 1915 Crown Land Ordinance
provides that:
Since land is a commercial commodity for economic purposes it must be

distributed equitably among the citizens. The agricultural activities were
geared towards production of cash crops for export neglecting the domestic
crops. There were agricultural extension officers sent to the grassroots to
intensify the production of cash crops to feed European industries.
The land has been commercialized, as with any other commodity in a

free market economy until now, and was the major cause of political
rebellion in Kenya during the 2007–08 post-election violence.
Neo-colonialism
Nkrumah defines neo-colonialism as:
A process of giving independence to African people with one hand only to

take it away with the other hand. Clientele sovereignty, fake independence,
the practice of granting a sort of independence by the metropolitan power,
with the concealed intention of making the liberated country a client-state
and controlling it effectively by means other than political ones … The
90 Chapter Five
greatest danger at present facing Africa is neo-colonialism and its major

instrument balkanization. Under colonial imperialism there was something
like public accountability but neo-colonial imperialism was the most
irresponsible form of imperialism because of a lack of an inner constraint
of accountability.
Wanjala (2000) observes that:
Colonialism’s economic concerns led to the alienation of large tracts of

land for agricultural exploitation—in that enterprise, the colonial
government embarked upon the systematic imposition of English property
law and a transformation of indigenous patterns of land tenure and use.
Nkrumah explains the reasons for the European conquest for African
kingdoms:
The imperial powers need the raw materials and cheap native labor of the
colonies for their own capitalist industries. The problem of land ownership
in colonies has risen because the colonial powers have legally/illegally
seized valuable mining and plantation rights. The British are more careful
than other imperialists to legitimize their seizure but even their semi-legal
methods do not disguise the fact that they have no right to rob the native of
this birthright.
Nkrumah urged all Ghanaians to “seek ye first the political kingdom

and all things will be added to it ….” The African states must actually
follow—to the letter—the philosophy of Nkrumah in order to be effective
and free from neo-colonialism.
Introduction of Colonial Rule in Kenya and the Rise

of the Mau-Mau
There was the creation of an all-European legislative council which
was to make laws for the peace and good government of the protectorate
in 1907, introducing English law as it existed on August 12, 1897. The
imparted law was applied subject to the local conditions of inhabitants.
This English law still applies to our legal system today.
Section (3) of The Judicature Act of the laws of Kenya states:
The Jurisdiction of High court, court of Appeal and subordinate courts

shall be exercised with specific Acts of the parliament of the United
Kingdom, India, Common Law, doctrine of Equity and English statutes of
General application in force in England on 12 August 1897, the procedure

and practice observed by courts of justice in England on same date.
The legal system, legal practices and judges of the court are still the
English models, with very few modifications.
The Education System in Kenya 1900–1963

African societies provided and transmitted their norms, values and
belief systems through an informal education system over generations by
several methods different from the European type. The missionaries
brought schools and evangelization that were elitist in nature, creating a lot
of inequality. The school system has been reformed several times to meet
the challenges of the society. However, English as the language of
instruction still remains as a reminder of colonialism in Kenya. The school
system in Kenya changed slightly, from racially segregated segments to
cost elements, creating a different form of inequality. There were schools
for Europeans, African, Arabs and Indians with different curricula and
examination systems. These have now been transformed to high-cost
schools for the super-rich and low-cost ones for poor people. The two
systems have different examinations and curricula. The current system was
based on the Mackay Report, which removed the Advanced level and
introduced the 8-4-4 system, which was modelled on the Canadian
Education system. However, it has maintained the colonial legacy of
compulsory English language as the medium of instruction.
Reports That Reformed the Education System

x The Report of the Kenya Education Commission (1964). The Ominde
Commission sought to reform the inherited system in order to foster
natural unity and creation of critical human capital for national
development.
x The Gachathi Report (1976) aimed to foster national unity and fulfil
the economic, social and cultural aspirations of the people.
x The Report of the Presidential Working Party on the Second University
in Kenya (1981).
x The Mackay Report led to the abolition of Advanced level and
introduced 8-4-4, which was a Canadian schooling system and is
applicable even today.
x The Report of the Presidential Working Party on Education and
Manpower Training for the next decade and beyond (Kamunge Report)
92 Chapter Five
introduced cost sharing between government, parents and

communities.
x The report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Education system of
Kenya (2000 Koech Report).
The Kenyan Government has never introduced its own education

system to suit the needs of its population.
Political Systems in Kenya 1902–2010

The colonialists introduced a bicameral parliament represented by
elected members of parliament for constituencies, which is a colonial form
of government. Where East Africa previously had kingdoms that were
self-governing, such as Buganda, the Kingdom of Wanga and Nandi,
parties and multi-party systems of government wee introduced. The
introduction of many parties and tribal-based competition for power has
led to bloodshed in Kenya when the elections are held every five years.
The idea of giving a lot of freedom to communities who have not matured
in terms of oneness and have not achieved social solidarity is a great
mistake. The violence that erupted in 2007–2008 following disputed
elections was the result of too much freedom on the part of the citizens.
Mass media, respect for basic freedoms and freedom of expression fuelled
the chaos. These indicators are said to be values of Western civilization.
China has managed to suppress the freedom of its citizens but has a
very robust economy, and has colonized African states with their own
consent. In a typical Kenyan household, everything is made in China. The
Chinese government has introduced the Chinese Confucius Institute and
the Chinese Language Institute at the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta
University to boost its culture and trade by making it easy for
businesspeople to understand the language. Moreover, China has awarded
Scholarships to Kenyan students to study in China.
It is true that African states tried as much as possible to be independent
politically, yet they are colonized socially, economically, culturally and
politically. This stands in contrast to the events of the scramble for Africa,
in which they did not participate.
The Development Theory

The term "development" has been looked at from several dimensions.
Walter Rodney (1972) argues that: “Development in human society is a
many-sided process. At the individual level, it implies increased skills and
capacity, greater freedom, creativity, self-discipline, responsibility and

material well being.” In the Economic Argument, Todaro Michael (2002)
notes:
Development has traditionally meant the capacity of a national economy,

whose initial economic condition has been more or less static for a long
time, to generate and sustain an annual increase in its gross national
income (GNI) at the rate of 5 percent to 7 percent. It is seen in terms of
planned alteration of the structure of production and employment so that
agriculture’s share of both declines and of the manufacturing and service
industries increase.
Kenya gained political independence from Britain in 1963 and was to

develop and match the colonial masters of the time. However, the theories
that were applicable then have failed to realize the required development.
The modernization development theory does not explain underdevelopment
in the Third World, including Kenya, which is due to economic
imperialism and consequent dependency.
This paper will now briefly explain the traditional theories of
development and their limitations in explaining the failed development in
the African context and social setting. When Kenya gained her political
independence in the 1960s, the first priority the founding fathers
undertook was to fight the three enemies of the Kenyan people, namely
poverty, disease and ignorance. This means that Kenya was to transform
itself from poverty to a modern state through development programmes.
Several theories explain development theory; namely, modernization
theory and dependency theory.
Modernization theory
This theory tries to explain the case of poverty in the Third World. The
exponents of this theory state that society undergoes several stages before
it is developed. Four stages are expounded by W. W. Rostow (1963):
traditional society, the pre-conditions for take off, drive to maturity, and
the age of high mass-consumption. It has been argued that Europe and
North America passed through the stages many years ago, and it is
reasonable and fair to give African states time to reach such levels.
Isbister (2001) makes a passionate appeal for modern or advanced
states to help the Third World reach the level of an advanced state:
The challenge to modernize is one that faces each country separately, as it

tries get its plane into the sky. What Britain, the United States, and Japan
94 Chapter Five
did, Zimbabwe, Colombia, and China can do. Their methods may differ
somewhat, depending on national factors but in each case they may find a
way to break away from tradition, to free the innovative spirit and direct
their human, physical and financial resources towards productivity and
growth. Their task is to follow the example of those airplanes that have
already taken off, perhaps not in detail but in broad measure.
Dependency Theory
This is the theory advanced by Theotonio Dos Santos (1988), who
describes it as a situation in which a certain group of countries have their
economies conditioned by the development and expansion of another
economy to which the former is subject. The relation of interdependence
between two or more economies and between these and world trade
assumes the form or dependence when some countries (the dominant) can
expand and give impulse to their own development, while other countries
(the dependent) can only develop as a reflection of this expansion. This
can have positive and/or negative effects on their immediate development.
In all cases, the basic situations of dependence lead to a global situation in
dependent countries that situate them in backwardness, exploited by the
dominant countries who have had technological, commercial and capital
resources and social-political dominance in various historical settings.
While Europe and North America developed from the slave trade, there
was no Marshall Plan to develop Africa after this or the two world wars.
The above theories do not apply to the Kenyan situation because of the
prevailing conditions. Hence, Kenya has adopted new methods for
development. These include:
The Harambee method includes:
x District Focus for a Rural Development strategy

x Self-Help Groups
x A Constituency Development Fund (CDF)
x A Local Government Transfer Fund
x Devolved funds under the new constitution.
Each of these aspects is analysed below.
(1) The Harambee method
Harambee is a Kiswahili term meaning “let us pull together or

cooperate in carrying out individual groups or community improvement
activities.” Kenya has used this method extensively in raising funds for
various projects, ranging from aiding schools, hospitals and institutes of
technology, to raising fees for sending students overseas for further
studies. Politicians, companies and major state corporations also made
massive contributions towards the achievement of particular goals.
However, Harambee became a den of corruption leading to forced
contributions. This resulted in a mass protest that led to abandonment of
this method of development.
(2) Self-Help Groups
These groups consisted of women carrying out self-improvement

activities, or youth groups standing for self-sustainability. The activities
were in the form of merry-go-rounds for buying utensils, paying school
fees for members' children, or youth groups fundraising for their
respective members. Many self-help groups sprung up to help women in
the society.
(3) The Constituency Development Fund (CDF)
This fund was created in 2003 to: “fight poverty at the grassroots level
through the implementation of community-based projects which have
long-term effects of improving the people’s well-being.” This is a fund
accounting for 2.5% of the Gross Domestic Production (GDP), created to
develop constituencies all over the country. This fund has had a tremendous
effect at the grassroots level. It needs to be understood that CDF is a
home-grown concept unlike all the other World Bank programmes and
donor-tailored programmes which have not taken Kenya anywhere for
decades. This is a new mode of development for Kenya. It is up to
Kenyans to find out where 97.5% of the revenue collected has disappeared
to every financial year for more than forty years.
(4) Local Government Transfer Fund
This fund has been a success story in the development efforts of the
government in collaboration with the people. This is a fund made directly
to the local authorities to help them deliver services to the residents of
municipalities in the republic of Kenya. The fund incorporates the local
people in identifying projects which are a priority and which help local
people to find employment.
96 Chapter Five
(5) District Focus for Rural Development strategy
This strategy was introduced in 1971, and was a precursor to the

District Grant program of 1966 and the Rural Development Fund, District
Development Planning and District Focus for Rural Development in
1983–4. The main argument for decentralization was to enhance the
process and speed of development through the provision of social and
economic services. Development must therefore mean enhancing the
capacity of the society to cope with challenges and meet its needs.
Conclusion
From the foregoing discussion of development theories, we can draw
the conclusion that Western-based theories may not provide the ideal
development paradigm for Africa. Instead, they are a way of guiding
development for their former colonies. There is, therefore, need for
appropriate theories that are uniquely African-centred. While we must
acknowledge the progress made by Africans based on Western
development theories in the last few decades, the idea of developmental
progress generally is a logical outgrowth of the consequences of scientific
technology in the Western world. A distinction should be made between
development and technology. When people talk of development they
mistakenly identify it with the effects of scientific technology, thereby
committing the fallacy of non-causa pro causa. Development is all
encompassing and it should be viewed as an enhancement of the capacity
of societies to cope with their unique problems.
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Resistance in Kenya. Nairobi: Mvule Africa Publishers
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Mazrui, A. A. & T. Michael. 1989. Nationalism and New States in Africa.
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in Kenya. Nairobi Literature Bureau.
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Nkrumah, K. 1946, 1960. Towards Colonial Freedom. London: William
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CHAPTER SIX
NKRUMAH AND HIS “CHICKS”:

AN EXAMINATION OF WOMEN
AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGIES
OF THE CPP
DR. WILHELMINA J. DONKOH

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND POLITICAL STUDIES
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, KNUST, KUMASI, GHANA
Abstract
It has been argued that colonialism reorganized African societies
through an alliance between European men and a small group of African
men, and in the process destroyed or changed beyond recognition existing
power structures and social organizations. 1 In this scheme, colonialism
created new “racialized” and gendered hierarchies in which European,
Western ideals and culture were held to be superior, while Africans and
their ideals were deemed to be inferior. Central to this structuration was
paternalism which implied superior male authority over females, thus
placing African women and children on the bottom rungs of the social
order.
This paper proceeds from a premise that contradicts such assertions
that women did not find their political inclusion empowering.2 It argues
that Kwame Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party (CPP) that he
led sought to reverse the colonial social arrangement that marginalized
females and negotiated with “a select group of African men” by
empowering otherwise marginalized females in giving them a voice at the
regional, national and even global levels. This was done through sharing
political platforms and relying on their sheer numbers and group cohesion.
They competed with males and carved out leadership positions for
themselves, while demonstrating unique organizational skills and
100 Chapter Six
presenting themselves as the real backbone of the party by providing

support with their resources. In doing this, Nkrumah and the CPP relied on
indigenous African values and ideals, while at the same time using the
language and practices of Western political systems to achieve their
objectives.
Introduction
It has been argued that colonialism reorganized African societies
through a process of male collaboration between Europeans and a select
group of Africans. 3 Further, it has been argued that the restructuring
process destroyed, or changed beyond recognition, existing power
structures and social organizations. In this reordering of society and
values, Western ideals and culture were held to be superior to African
cultures, whose ideals were deemed inferior. Central to this structuration
was paternalism, which implied superior male authority over females, thus
placing African women and children on the bottom rungs of the social
order.
This paper is titled “Nkrumah and His Chicks” in reference to a
derisive tag originally used by members of the Asante-based National
Liberation Movement, arch-opponents of the CPP, to describe female
members of the party who subsequently adopted it as honorific.4 In fact,
supporters of the CPP, who were generally considered less educated and
unsophisticated compared to their opponents in the United Gold Coast
Convention (UGCC) and its successor parties, attracted many negative
labels. One of the most popular tags, usually used for the male CPP
supporters, was the “Verandah Boys,” inferring that they were young, poor
people who slept rough because they could not afford to rent rooms. The
tag “Nkrumah’s Chicks” was derived from the CPP emblem, which was a
red crowing cockerel symbolizing the announcement of a new dawn.5 It is
a truism that chicks usually followed the hen (mother/female) but not the
cock (father/male). In the CPP, Nkrumah as the leader was symbolized by
the cockerel. The female members labelled as “chicks” followed a
cockerel, which implied that they had gone against tradition and the
natural order in following a cock. Rather than being put off by the
derogatory tag, they turned it around and accepted this labelling, proudly
referring to themselves as “Kwame nkokэmma” (chicks). This paper
proceeds from a premise that contradicts assertions that women did not
find their political inclusion empowering.6 It argues that Nkrumah and the
Convention People’s Party (CPP) sought to reverse the colonial social
arrangement that marginalized females and negotiated with “a select group
Nkrumah and His “Chicks” 101
of African men” to empower otherwise marginalized females by giving

them a voice at the regional, national and even global levels. This was
done through sharing political platforms and relying on their sheer
numbers and group cohesion. They competed with males and carved out
leadership positions for themselves while demonstrating unique
organizational skills and presenting themselves as the real backbone of the
party by providing support with their resources. In doing this, Nkrumah
and the CPP relied on indigenous African values and ideals while at the
same time using the language and practices of Western political systems to
achieve their objectives.
This paper references diverse sources, including life histories, oral
narratives, newspaper reports, archival materials and physical evidence, as
well as secondary sources. It demonstrates that Ghanaian women have
been active in the evolution of the country's history from pre-colonial
times to the present. Although the paper is a minuscule contribution to the
development of African women’s history, it shows that their experiences
cannot be represented in a static manner.
Women in Traditional Ghanaian Society and during

the Colonial Period
Generally, women have played diversified roles in Ghanaian society, in
particular in carving out a unique but central role in the economy as
traders and cultivators. 7 There are remarkable and courageous female
political leaders in Ghana’s pre-colonial and colonial history, among them
Naa Dodi Akaibi, ruler of Ga Mashie, Nana Dokua, Ohemaa of Akyem
Abuakwa, and Edwesohemaa Nana Yaa Asantewaa. Historically,
depending on the prevailing lineage system in a given society, Ghanaian
women enjoyed different statuses and roles in the political processes. For
example, women among the matrilineal Akan have been highly esteemed
for their role in replenishing the lineage. Consequently, they were the
custodians of the lineage’s history and intimate genealogical knowledge.8
Thus, it was the ohemaa, or the female traditional ruler, who nominated
the ohene, her male counterpart. Female traditional rulers also functioned
as counsellors on their traditional councils. Their advice was considered so
valuable that it became the basis for the traditional practice, where
adjournment on a stalemated matter was referred to as Yѓ rekэ besa
aberewa (“We are going to consult the old woman”). Aberewa was the
personification of wisdom and was valued for her feminine qualities,
which included knowledge, emotion and compassion. In addition, the
female ruler also operated in a special social space as arbitrator in such
102 Chapter Six
matters as marriage disputes, land matters and litigations involving the

invocation of curses. 9 In this realm, she operated as the principal
functionary with the support of both male and female advisors. As moral
guardian of society and conciliator in the political process, she was also
the principal record keeper in the society and was informed of all
important rites of passage, such as girls’ attainment of puberty, births,
marriages and deaths. In sum, her role required her on the one hand to
advise, defend, nurture and protect, and on the other to serve as a
disciplinarian who punishes or reprimands when appropriate. Scholars like
Beverly Stoeltje suggest that the ohemaa and the role she plays do not
reflect the real position of the generality of Akan women. 10 A careful
observation of Akan social practices sustains the reverse of Stoeltje’s
position.
Outside of politics, women also played an important role in the
economy as cultivators and traders. Socially too, as mothers, they played a
key role in transmission of the morals and values of the society to future
generations. Within the lineage they were responsible for the organization
of social events, including funerals and puberty rites. In general, women
had the responsibility for food or subsistence farming that fed the
household by working marginal lands reserved for food farming.
Africanist scholars such as Beverly Grier have observed that the transition
to cash cropping in West Africa was accomplished on the backs of women
as farmers and porters.11 However, the processes that took place distanced
women from greater benefits in the expanding market opportunities of the
nineteenth century. For example, during the early colonial period, when oil
palm trading became a dominant economic activity on the Gold Coast, the
preparation of the harvested product became the work of women, even if it
was considered as an extension of domestic chores. They also worked as
porters to convey oil palm to buying centres.12 Cracking of palm kernels
and extraction of the oil was considered women‘s work until the 1860s,
while they continued with their responsibility for food production or
subsistence farming that fed the household.13
Polly Hill has observed women's contributions to migrant Krobo and
Akuapem farmers' search of farmland for cocoa. That search caused the
economic revolution which lead to Ghana becoming the world's leading
producer of cocoa by 1911. Scholars such as Christine Okali, Gwendolyn
Mikell, and Gareth Austin14 also discuss women's contributions.
In Asante, for example, Jean Allman has observed that in the 1920s
and 1930s many women opted to create their own cocoa farms instead of
working for their husbands.15
During the colonial period new parameters developed for socializing

young people, and new measures of social control and political authority
emerged. During that era, Western ideals and culture were held to be
superior, while Africans and their ideals were deemed inferior. The
existing power structures and social organizations were restructured to
accommodate the British viewpoint. 16 Christian and education agencies,
working in tandem with the British colonial government and European
trading firms, spearheaded change in this era by foisting Western culture
and values on indigenous Ghanaians. Christian missionary activities,
influenced by Victorian Christian values, continental pietism and racial
prejudice undermined African institutions, culture and gender relations,
and sought to remake African families into monogamous and nuclear
units. The Christian missions, through the schools and residential patterns,
ensured that African converts shunned their cultural ties. In this scheme,
the ideal women were wives and mothers who worked in the home. As
Tsikata has observed, education provision during the colonial period was
gendered and “accentuated discrimination against women.” 17 Feminine
skills included crochet, cooking, needlework and knitting. 18 Such novel
concepts as “middle class respectability,” as observed by Oppong, were
introduced in this era. 19 Consequently, training for girls in the mission
schools focused on domestic skills aimed at preparing them for marriage
and motherhood. Over time, a new breed of Ghanaian elite who were
literate and Westernized in dress, names and outlook emerged. A majority
of this group were male as generally fewer females were enrolled in the
schools, with a ratio of about six boys to one girl being enrolled by 1915.20
Lower female enrolment was partly due to the concern in the traditional
system for a greater need of supervision of the girl child as the progenitor
of succeeding generations and future custodians of the norms and values
of the society. European and Christian mission trading companies, and
stations such as the Bremen Mission Factory established among the Ewe
in southeastern Ghana, experimented with crops such as cocoa and coffee
that would become cash crops.21 This exercise enhanced the expansion of
the cash economy and also pioneered some of the first savings and loan
schemes. As Robertson observes: “Daughters educated by the proceeds of
their trading mothers chose middle class marriages that took them away
from … family businesses instead of investing their education in assisting
and scaling up female trading activities.” Thus, formal education, rather
than enhancing family businesses, undermined the existing system by
diverting competent members into other ventures such as homemaking.
Colonial policies and the colonial economy reinforced the historical
appropriation and marginalization of female labour. It could be argued that
104 Chapter Six
it was in this period that the perception that Ghanaian women were
automatically subservient to men developed.
In general, Victorian British culture was rather individualistic and
tended to marginalize women. Central to this structuration was paternalism,
which implied superior male authority over females, thus placing African
women and children at bottom of the social order. The few parents who
educated their daughters were, in the words of Mabel Dove: “not
interested in the higher education for women for something useful, such as
nursing … [but] to acquire what is known as ‘polish,’ no doubt to be
charming and well-bred and be able to play a good game of tennis.”22 In
other words, education was to refine the woman and make her glamorous
to attract a husband. This kind of attitude fostered the emergence of a more
gendered society in which women were marginalized to the extent that in
Ghana women were expected to play a less vociferous role in the early
nationalist agitations and organizations, such as the Aborigines Rights
Protection Society, the West African Students Union, and the United Gold
Coast Convention. A few elite women like Mabel Ellen Dove and Mrs.
Evelyn Mansa Amarteifio broke the glass ceiling in publishing their
views—both political and social—in the press and organizing women as a
potential political force.
There are significant inferences to be drawn from the shifts and
transformations in women’s lives in Ghana from pre-colonial times to the
post-independence era. Arguably, the traditional view of women was
characterized by complementarity across the sexes that sought to create
balance and generate synergy. This is the background against which
Nkrumah’s female political allies are viewed.
Nkrumah’s Female Partners

Rowland (1997, 14)23 writes that Nkrumah’s female partners tended to
go against the grain of social norms of the time, stating that:
Empowerment is thus concerned with the processes by which people
become aware of their own interests and how these relate to the interests of
others, in order to both participate from a strong decision making position
and to actually influence such decisions. It therefore goes beyond
participation in decision-making to include the processes that make people
perceive themselves as being able and entitled to make decisions.
Kwame Nkrumah himself was a renowned Pan-Africanist and was

widely viewed as a visionary. Under his leadership, the CPP commenced
as a mass party with a support base that cut across the spectrum of
Ghanaian society, particularly embracing ordinary people like farmers,

fishermen, rural folks, the youth, the urban poor and a large female
followership. At the same time, the party evolved as a vehicle of
emancipation of Ghana and the whole of Africa. Among the significant
supporters of the party were the emergent urban youth and women with
little or no education, who were usually marginalized within society. 24
How did these women supporters of the CPP negotiate the complex
political, economic and social forces of the times? Faced with challenges
including fundamental notions of work, sexuality, marriage, motherhood
and family, how did they cope? Among Nkrumah’s staunchest supporters
were women, including market traders, professional sex workers,
housewives and a few female elites.25 Kofi Dei’s observation below draws
attention to a fact which was characteristic of many of these women:
When the nationalist struggle gathered momentum, the nation’s human
resource shortfall was very huge. Very few of Dr Nkrumah’s Verandah
Boys and Girls, as their elitist opponents called them, had high formal
education enough to take national leadership roles. The worse hit in his
human resource base were the women. That was an era when very little
attention was given to female education.26
These keen female supporters of the CPP offered financial assistance

as well as supportive services.27 They formed the Women’s Section of the
CPP simultaneously with the party itself. Arguably, although the majority
of these women could be characterized as marginalized, the CPP provided
them with opportunities for a wider involvement in politics within the
country.28 It has also been argued that although some of these women were
economically independent, they were disabled by their low academic
attainment.29 Against this background could it be said that the opportunity
that the party offered them was insufficient to empower them politically?
Scholars like Rowland have argued that empowerment, particularly with
regard to women, is vital for poor and marginalized people in changing
their situations. 30 Specifically, it is a process that enhances in the
underprivileged individual such qualities as self-reliance, inner strength,
assertion of independence for self-determination and the liberty to make
life choices. Empowerment is thus perceived as directing change in the
marginalized through the provision of control over all types of resources
that ultimately challenges and eliminates their sense of subordination.
These women were able to establish their presence publicly by making
themselves heard while gaining control over aspects of the prevailing
power structures and establishing themselves as key players in power
relations.31
106 Chapter Six
In 1951 the CPP selected Leticia Quake, Hanna Kudjoe, Ama Nkrumah
and Madam Sophia Doku as propaganda secretaries who travelled around
the country conducting political education meetings and recruiting people
to the party. 32 Writers like C. L. R. James have observed that: “In the
struggle for independence, one market woman … was worth any dozen
Achimota [college] graduates ….” 33 Others, like Takyiwa Manuh,
commenting on women within the party during the CPP era in Ghana’s
history, noted that workers, together with the unemployed, primary-
educated young men and women became some of Nkrumah’s “ablest,
most devoted and most fearless supporters.”34 It has been observed that
female party activists, including Hannah Kudjoe, were on the platform
alongside their male counterparts when the party was launched at Saltpond
in June 1949. Hannah Kudjoe, together with other women like Akua
Asabea, Christiana Wilmot, Ama Nkrumah and Sophia Doku, toured the
country alongside their male colleagues, including Komla Gbedemah, Kofi
Baako and Sacki Schek, to propagate the message of the CPP. It is
revealing that in 1949, many benevolent and mutual associations, credit
unions and market voluntary groups emerged, comprising mainly
females. 35 The membership of these organizations, though not at the
forefront of the independence struggle, gradually became involved in
activities which were politically significant, and they declared staunch
support for Dr Nkrumah and the CPP. In May 1951, Hanna Kudjoe,
Sophia Doku, Ama Nkrumah and Letitia Quaye were appointed
propaganda secretaries and were tasked with organizing the women’s wing
of the party by grouping the women in tiered subsections as branches and
wards. They toured the urban and rural areas to spread the party’s
instructions, including the message of freeing the country from colonial
domination alongside improvement in the conditions of women. Among
their mobilizing strategies were house visits, rallies, dances and picnics.
They also directed literacy campaigns and led child welfare classes.
Despite the strong support provided by women and the diverse roles they
played in the political struggle, no female was elected to the Legislative
Assembly until 1954, and in the cabinet until 1960. Nonetheless, it has
been acknowledged that collectively these women brought their
organizational and unique skills to enhance and facilitate the execution of
the party’s agenda. Who were these women and what were their unique
contributions? A select few are profiled below to draw attention to the
ways in which they contributed to the party.
Mabel Ellen Dove and Female Representation in Ghana

Mabel Ellen Dove defied the common characteristics of the rank-and-
file members of the CPP. Dove was the ex-wife of Dr J. B. Danquah, and
in 1954 became the first African woman to be elected to the national
Legislative Assembly. Her opponent, though, was a male candidate. Her
nomination went through despite very stiff opposition and the accusation
that she was a foreigner. She was an elite woman who was educated in
Sierra Leone and England. Dove was born to a Sierra Leonean father,
Francis Dove, a barrister who was domiciled in the Gold Coast, but her
mother was Ga and from a prominent commercial family. Even as a young
woman, Mabel demonstrated independent-mindedness by going against
the norms of her social class and even her father’s wishes. As a teenager,
she abandoned her elitist education in a girls’ finishing school in England
that would have prepared her for her expected future role as an ideal
middle-class wife. Instead, she opted for training as a secretary, one of the
few employment openings available to educated women at the time, to
prepare herself for the job market. When she eventually returned to the
Gold Coast in her early twenties, she sought paid employment in the
commercial world. She also wrote as a freelance journalist, focusing on
women’s affairs and interests. Reportedly, Dove’s articles were so popular
that several newspapers sought her services. Among the papers she wrote
for was the Times of West Africa, the first daily newspaper in the Gold
Coast, which was founded by Danquah who became her husband in 1933.
She later became estranged from Danquah and divorced him in 1936, but
continued with her journalistic career. She joined the CPP in 1950.
Inspired by the party’s nationalist message, Dove started writing for its
newspaper, the Evening News, and was appointed its editor in 1951 by
Nkrumah.
During the 1954 elections, Mabel Ellen Dove was nominated as the
only female CPP Parliamentary candidate. She contested the Ga Rural
against a male opponent. However, Nkrumah’s personal support saw her
through on the ticket of the CPP. 36 Dove stands out from others. It is
remarkable that despite the strong support provided by women and the
diverse strong roles they played in the political struggle, before Dove there
was no female elected to the Legislative Assembly. Thus, Dove’s
achievement was historic. Could it be that she was able to exercise her
political rights because of her education and profession as a journalist?
Was this influenced by her marriage to Danquah and her close association
with Nkrumah? Would more women in the pre-independence era have
stood for political office if they were educated? It is noteworthy that
108 Chapter Six
female political leaders were even less visible in the opposition UGCC and
its successor parties.
Nineteen-sixty marked a major watershed in the history of Ghana, in
general with the attainment of Republic status in July, and more
specifically for the history of women’s political access in the country.
Although by 1957 more women such as Ruth Botsio, Hawa Banda, Adwoa
Frema, Ramatu Baba, Sophia Doku and Evelyn Mansa Amarteifio were
playing leading roles as organizers and politicians, there were none in the
cabinet until 1960. This situation was not caused by the low educational
attainment of the female activists, because several of their male
counterparts, such as Krobo Edusei, who had equally low academic
backgrounds, were elevated to cabinet positions. The answer can be traced
to cultural considerations. It is also instructive that she was not returned to
the Assembly in 1956. Reasons given included that she had travelled to the
United States at the time of nominations. What is equally significant is that
Kwame Nkrumah had not sanctioned her trip on the grounds that it was
not ideologically timely. Tellingly, no female replacement was found and
a male candidate took her place.
By the time of independence in 1957, women such as Dove, Ruth
Botsio, Ama Nkrumah, Ramatu Baba, Sophia Doku and Amarteifio were
playing leading roles as organizers, politicians and journalists. In 1960,
they consolidated the various women’s mass organizations into the
National Council of Ghana Women. Later, the party attracted several
educated and professional women including nurses, broadcasters, judges
and lawyers, and educators such as Dr Letitia Obeng (neé Asihene), as
special efforts were made to create a visible space for the women in the
political leadership and governance system. When Ghana became a republic
in 1960, possibly as an acknowledgement of the contribution of women to
Ghanaian politics, the Representation of the People (Women Members) Bill
was introduced. The bill was passed and it received the Governor-General’s
assent on June 16, 1960. As a result of the Act, ten women were elected
unopposed as members of Parliament. Ghana thus became one of the first
African countries to introduce a quota system for women.
Susana Al-Hassan, Ayanori Bukari and Victoria Nyarko represented
the Northern Region; Lucy Anin, Brong Ahafo and Comfort Asamoah
represented the Ashanti Region; Sophia Doku and Mary Korateng
represented the Eastern Region; Grace Ayensu and Christiana Wilmot
represented the Western Region, and Regina Asamany represented the
Volta Region.
In July 1960, the Conference of Women of Africa and of African
Descent was convened in Accra, the capital of Ghana. At that forum the
All-African Women’s Conference (AAWC) was formed. In his address to

the gathering Nkrumah noted: “Who would have thought that in the year
of 1960, it would be possible to even hold a conference of all Ghanaian
women, much less of women of all Africa and women of African
descent?”37 (Evening News 1960) Nkrumah asked rhetorically: “What part
can the women of Africa and the women of African descent play in the
struggle for African emancipation? You must ask these questions not by
word of mouth but by action—by positive action, which is the only
language understood by the detractors of African freedom.”38
The women’s conference and formation of the AAWC was an
acknowledgement of the female activists as international actors capable of
holding their own on the international stage by hosting women of African
descent from across the world. Shirley Graham DuBois, wife of the
renowned Pan-Africanist W. E. B. DuBois, who was in Ghana when the
First Republic was founded and both the NCGW and AAWC were
inaugurated, addressed the maiden gathering. Graham DuBois, an
accomplished writer, organizer and committed Socialist in her own right,
in an address before the Women Association of the Socialist Students
Organizations in Ghana, stated that: “The advancement of Ghanaian
women in recent years has been amazing and now with ten women
Parliamentarians in Republican Ghana, this country had achieved what
took Europe centuries to accomplish”39 (Evening News 1960). Subsequently,
women like Winnie Mandela and Graça Machel played pioneering roles in
other African liberation struggles in countries like South Africa and
Mozambique.
Hannah Kudjoe and Women’s Mass Organizations

in Ghana
Mabel Dove’s candidature to the Legislative Assembly had been
opposed. It is also instructive that she was not returned to the Assembly in
1956. The reasons given included that she had travelled to the United
States of America at the time of nominations. What is equally significant
is that Kwame Nkrumah had not sanctioned her trip on the grounds that it
was not ideologically timely. Tellingly, no female replacement was found
and a male candidate took her place.
Kudjoe is acknowledged as the first woman to set up day nurseries and
day care centres throughout Ghana, and also one of the first women
political activists and agitators for independence. 40 Reportedly, she
became a household name in the mid-1950s and early 1960s because of
her campaign against nudity in certain parts of the country. 41 She was
110 Chapter Six
introduced to active politics by her older brother, Emmanuel Dadson, a

member of the UGCC in the 1940s. By then a divorcee, Kudjoe became
the women’s organizer of the party at Tarkwa in 1947. When the Big Six
of the UGCC were arrested in 1948, she abandoned her work as a popular
dressmaker in Tarkwa, breached colonial law by raising funds, and
organized demonstrations for their release. From 1948 she became a full-
time political activist in the UGCC movement with the objective of
liberating the Gold Coast from British colonial and imperial control.
Hannah Kudjoe joined Nkrumah’s entourage on the extensive tour
throughout the country to create awareness about the UGCC’s objective of
gaining independence for the country, opening branches and getting
people to sign up as members in the movement. It was on these trips that
she became very familiar with the country and its many socio-economic
problems. Particularly, she was shocked by the culture of nudity that
characterized parts of the Northern Territories and she decided to work to
eradicate the problem. When the Committee of Youth Organization (CYO)
was formed in April 1948 by the UGCC, Hannah Kudjoe was made a
member in charge of organizing the young women. She played this role
until June 1949 when the CPP was formed at Saltpond after the radical
group led by Nkrumah split the mainstream of the UGCC, which they
considered too conservative. Although she held various leadership
positions within the party hierarchy to organize the massive support of
women for the party, Kudjoe never sought any ministerial, parliamentary
or other prestigious positions. Instead, she championed the causes of
women and children. She persuaded the CPP leadership to provide her
with the necessary funds, logistics, and support that would enable her to
travel to the north to fight nudity among women and children. By using
tact and diplomacy, she overcame traditional taboos and customs through
educating and convincing the chiefs and the people of the necessity for the
women and children to be clad.
Several of the veteran female CPP activists and their organizational
activities have not been captured in the historical record, and this is
particularly the case of women in the provinces. Two of them, Edith
Andoh and Ataa Baasi, from Kumase, are captured here and their
contributions analyzed.
Andoh, known to her family and friends as Ewuradwoa, was born in
November 1920 in Kumase to J. E. Andoh, the first and only African
Army Paymaster before World War II, and Juliana Ama Anyima Coker.
As a little girl, Andoh was raised by her parents until their marriage
dissolved and she was dispatched with her younger sister Grace to live
with her maternal grandmother Kate Aba Anowah Abban and her husband
Chief Thomas Aggrey, the first Headman of the Fante Community

appointed by the British in Kumase. Andoh’s pedigree and early exposure
to party politics prepared her in a unique way for her future political
career. She was first enrolled in the Government Girls’ School in Kumase
but her grandmother later withdrew her because she disapproved of the
activities of the Girl Guides Movement, which she considered to be vulgar
and anti-Christian.
Andoh was subsequently enrolled in the African Methodist Episcopal
(AME) Zion School. It was here that she first came into contact with the
leadership of the proto-nationalist organization, the Aborigines’ Protection
Rights Society (APRS). The AME Zion Church, introduced to the Gold
Coast by the Reverend Osam-Pinanko, was adopted by the leadership of
the ARPS as the nationalist church. Thus they visited the AME Zion
Church annually to educate the pupils about the nationalist aspirations and
to instil in them a sense of patriotism. When she completed standard seven
in 1938, she turned down her uncle’s offer to go to Nigeria to train as a
nurse, opting instead to join her mother and grandmother in trading. In
1942, she married J. M. Donkoh, a storekeeper of SCOA. Contrary to the
aspirations of educated women of the time, which was to contract marriage
under ordinance or have their marriages blessed in church, Andoh was
content to accept customary marriage and insisted on using her father’s
name rather than her husband’s. All the while, her incipient nationalist
instincts remained dormant while she became engulfed in domesticity and
continued her commercial activities. The trigger was in 1948 when the Big
Six were arrested. Edith was particularly touched by the plight of the
young man Kwame Nkrumah, who had abandoned his studies abroad to
work for the nationalist movement in Ghana.
In 1949, when Nkrumah’s faction broke away from the UGCC, Edith
decided to support him, but her involvement was low-key. She persuaded
her friends and family members to vote for the CPP in 1951 because,
according to her, that party had the best message for the future of the
nation. By 1953, Edith, then living in Ashanti New Town, the hotbed of
political activism in Kumase, had become a fully-fledged CPP activist.
This was when her instincts as a child of the army barracks shone through
very strongly. She mounted political platforms at rallies to address crowds.
She travelled into the hinterlands to propagate the party’s message and to
recruit members for the party. One of the measures she used to win
support for the party was to forge a strong network of people from
different backgrounds who showed solidarity by sharing meals, supporting
members during bereavement by travelling to their respective hometowns
to attend funerals, providing employment opportunities for those in need,
112 Chapter Six
and lending financial support to the Action Troopers. 42 By her own

account, she was not afraid for her life.
One of the ways in which Edith and her female colleagues in the CPP
operated was in the arena of information management and dissemination,
which they aptly referred to as “propaganda.” Edith, along with other
female CPP supporters like Hawa Banda and Adwoa Frema, attended
regular meetings, actively participating in discussions about the decision-
making process and propagating it by passing down information to the
grassroots level. Significantly, even though Edith had sufficient education
to have contested parliamentary elections, she much preferred to work in
the “propaganda space” because the early days of the party coincided with
the fecund phase of her life and she needed sufficient time to supervise her
young family. Her position incorporated the historic role of the Ghanaian
women mediated by the language of modern politics.
Another interesting CPP activist in this category is Maame Ataa
Baasi. 43 She was the leader of the professional sex workers located at
Adum in Kumase. Ataa Baasi was born circa 1900 to Asante farmers. It is
not very clear how she became associated with the sex industry. However,
by the 1930s she had identified herself as leader of the group. After the
restoration of the Asanteman (Ashanti Confederacy) in 1935, she was one
of the people who presented their credentials to Asantehene Agyeman
Prempe II, offering him the support of their groups. 44 In her
communication, Ataa Baasi indicated that her group had interacted with
the colonial authorities and would like to collaborate with the Asantehene
on similar terms. Most of the women under Ataa Baasi’s patronage were
non-Asante.45 Several of them originated from either Nkonya or Krobo in
the Eastern Region. During the period of political tensions in the early
1950s that preceded Ghana’s independence, Ataa Baasi and her protégés
pledged their allegiance to the CPP, as opposed to the NLM that was led
by the Asante traditional leadership:
After the [restoration of the] Ashanti Confederacy [1935], we did not hide
ourselves. We appeared before Nana Asantehemaa [the queen mother], and
Otumfuo, Osaagyefuo, Asantehene [king of Asante] in Kumasi, and
introduced ourselves to him and explain[ed] to him our unity with our aim
to substantiate [sic] to him Otumfuo, Asantehene, that our acts and doings
in the City of Kumasi, are not of the same scale as that of the Corner-Side
women [ambulant prostitutes]. Otumfuo, Asantehene, having accepted us,
handed [us] over to one of his chiefs called Oheneba Bempah-
Worakosehene of Kumasi. Oheneba Bempah had since then becomes [sic]
our chief patron.46
This move is instructive. It demonstrated the negotiating skills of Ataa

Baasi and her group, as well as their ability to identify and forge alliances
with the winning side. Significantly for the CPP, their allegiance was
important, since these women constituted an identifiable community and
their support could almost certainly guarantee their block vote for the
party. In the 1960s, Ataa Baasi was one of the selected women sponsored
by the state to visit the United Kingdom on a familiarization tour.
Nkrumah’s Women and Pan-Africanism

Another example of the international exposure that Nkrumah’s female
collaborators gained was that which resulted in the friendship between
Amy Jacques Garvey, widow of Marcus Garvey, the arch Pan-Africanist
and Amarteifio, founder of the Federation of Ghana Women. Mrs. Garvey,
as a women’s activist, was interested in the Women’s Division of the CPP.
She had met and befriended Amarteifio earlier on. When Jacques Garvey
visited Ghana in 1960 she brought to the attention of her friend the need to
expand the Federation to include women in the diaspora. She therefore
advised Amarteifio to: “explain to Dr Nkrumah how important such an
organization would be as a link between all Units of the [African] Race—
in the West Indies, United States, and the Homeland, not only for
women’s pursuits but as a means of publicizing Africa’s national activities
to the Western world.”47 The ultimate objective of this advice was to make
it possible to source financial aid for social services as well as “technicians
and scientists” in Africa. As an activist who always looked toward
securing the future, she appealed to her natural constituency—women—to
serve as leaders. Stability and prosperity in Ghana required a thriving
economy that was coordinated with regional development. Such
collaboration also provided the CPP female activists with the skills of
soliciting funds from the international community to carry out a
developmental agenda. This was remarkable for an African country in the
1960s, when most other sub-Saharan African countries were just emerging
from the shadow of colonialism. The Ghanaian women involved thus
blazed a trail that was followed by women from other emergent African
nations, while providing a real example on the continent for their
counterparts in the diaspora.
Challenging Gender Inequality

In several ways, the opportunities given to the CPP female activists
helped challenge the gender inequality that had prevailed under the
114 Chapter Six
paternalistic colonial regime, where the ideal that educated women were
encouraged to aspire to was matrimony. To allow women to mount
political platforms alongside their male counterparts and to support them
in their extensive travels throughout the country as the party’s agents was
to acknowledge their competence and acceptance them as different but
equal. Thus, in 1954 Dove was permitted access to the hitherto exclusive
male domain of legislation for the nation. The passage of the cutting-edge
Representation of the People (Women Members) Bill in June 1960 was
outstanding. Under the aegis of this legislation, as noted above, ten women
were admitted into the law-making body. This was followed up in 1965
with Nkrumah’s appointment of three women into his Cabinet while others
were appointed as District Commissioners. For example, Madam Susan
Al-Hassan was appointed Minister of Social Welfare and Community
Development.
The question could be asked of whether these were mere “acts of
tokenism” or “recognitions of abilities.”48 It seemed this was an example
of the latter. Some of these women had earlier worked as Board Members
of the various state-owned corporations set up by the CPP government. In
fact, Lucy Anin had chaired the board of the Jute Factory in Kumase and
in this capacity had signed agreement contracts with international partners
from Eastern Europe before her appointment as a Parliamentarian and
Minister of State. Admittedly, the roles played by women politicians
during the CPP’s tenure tended to focus on the well-being of women and
children. The CPP tried to redirect the emphasis of the legislative policy
objectives in Ghana by empowering the women in giving them a strong
voice in national affairs to challenge gender inequality and their
marginalization. Ultimately, these measures were aimed at impacting
social dynamics in Ghana, and then in Africa and its diaspora. As
Abayomi Azikiwe has observed:
To fully challenge gender inequality and the impoverishment of women
and children in Africa, the struggle must be directed against Western
domination and capitalist relations of production. This struggle in Africa
can be supported by anti-imperialist forces in the industrialized states when
they demand that their own imperialist governments honor the right of self-
determination and sovereignty of the oppressed, postcolonial nations.49
There was a caveat, though. It seemed that female activists had to toe a
line. Their personal allegiances and obedience to Nkrumah had to be
unquestionable. Dove’s career in the Legislative Assembly ended early
due to the fact that she had disobeyed Nkrumah’s directive to not travel
internationally. Nevertheless, it could be argued that her initial
appointment was on the basis of distinguishing herself as a professional

through her work as a journalist.
Conclusion
It can be concluded that the CPP female political activists succeeded in
negotiating the complex political, economic and social environments of
the late colonial and the early post-independence era. How did they make
meaningful lives for themselves in a world that challenged fundamental
notions of work, sexuality, marriage, motherhood and family? They tended
to be assertive in their own unique but subtle ways. They were keenly
aware of everything happening around them. Where they had families they
managed to keep close contact, and where necessary maintained the
traditional role of the woman in keeping their place at home by their
husbands. Apart from their concern for the welfare of their families, these
women discussed the critical political issues of their time, and took up
such political responsibilities as women’s organizers for the CPP at the
ward, constituency, regional and national levels. They attended rallies,
organized strategic home visits and helped with grassroots organization
within the CPP. Their personal dedication to Nkrumah was undisputed,
and they campaigned relentlessly for him and the CPP.
It was typical for these women to stand alongside their male political
counterparts on the platforms to campaign and address political rallies.
Before the advent of the CPP, women were marginalized in political
activities. This situation changed completely when the CPP came into the
picture. Many of these women were financially independent at the time.
Whether married, divorced, or single, they maintained their own identities
and generally asserted their financial independence. Outside politics, many
of these women chose careers that would enable them to retain some level
of control over the care of their households. Regardless of their level of
understanding of such issues as human, civil, political and socio-economic
rights, they voted in the various pre- and post-independence elections for
the CPP while persuading others to do the same. Nkrumah’s female
supporters were from diverse socio-economic backgrounds. However, the
context of their particular conditions during the pre-independence and the
period immediately after contradicts the notion of a homogeneous
"African women's experience."50
116 Chapter Six
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Notes
1
Trevor R Getz & Liz Clarke, Abina and the Important Men: A Graphic History
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 145–148.
2
Gracia Clark, “Gender Fictions and Gender Tensions Involving ‘Traditional’
Asante Market Women,” African Studies Quarterly 11 (2–3) (Spring 2010): 43–65
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/pdfs/v11i2&3a4.pdf.
3
Getz & Clarke, Abina and the Important Men: A Graphic History.
4
Interviews with Edith Andoh, an octogenarian CPP activist, at her residence,
Adum, Kumase, November 24, 2001, and S. K. Danso, former Propaganda
Secretary of the CPP, at his residence in Ahodwo, Kumase, September 29, 2009.
5
During the period of acute political tension that preceded independence in 1957,
members of the CPP and their arch-rivals the NLM frequently clashed. During
rallies, the NLM chanted the slogan “Ogya oo, ogya, ei ei ogya, ogya ooo!” [“Fire
oh, oh, fire, ei ei fire, oh fire!”], to which their CPP opponents retorted “Akoto ei
nsuo bѓdum gya! Akoto ei nsuo bѓdum gya!” [“Akoto, (leader of the NLM) water
will quench fire! Akoto, water will quench fire!”]. On occasions when the CPP
females attended their party rally, the NLM members in turn would taunt them by
chanting “Kwame nkokэmma, suei suei” [“Kwame’s chicks, shoo! shoo!”]. The red
cockerel symbol was of such psychological significance to the CPP that when the
party and its paraphernalia were banned after the 1966 coup, adherents struggled
for many years and even took court action to have it restored.
6
Clark, "Gender Fictions and Gender Tensions Involving 'Traditional' Asante
Market Women."
7
See Elspeth Huxley, Four Guineas: A Journey through West Africa (London:
Chatos and Windus, 1954), 79–80 for her account of the economic activities of
women in Accra.
8
In interviews with Oheneyere Nana Akua Durowa, ex-wife of Asantehene
Agyeman Prempeh II (who subsequently installed Apagyahemaa in succession to
her mother after the latter’s demise) at her residence in Kumase in September
1991, she confided that she was specially trained as the custodian of her lineage’s
history during her training to assume her role as wife of the Asantehene. She had to
live in the palace of the Asantehemaa during that period.
9
The author sat in several sessions of the Asantehemaa’s court between January
and September 2005 to study the indigenous Asante adjudication system.
10
Beverly J. Stoelje, “Asante Queen Mothers: A Study in Female Authority,” in
Queens, Queen Mothers, Priestesses and Power: Case Studies in African Gender¸
ed. Flora Edouwaye S. Kaplan (New York: New York Academy of Sciences,
1997), 4–71.
11
Beverly Grier, Pawns, Porters and Petty Traders: Women in the Transition to
Export Agriculture in Ghana (Boulder, CO.: Westview Press, 1992).
12
Martin Lynn, Commerce and Economic Change in West Africa: The Palm Oil
Trade in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
34.
13
Ibid.
14
Hill, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana; Christine Okali, Cocoa
and Kinship in Ghana: the matrilineal Akan of Ghana (London: Kegan Paul for
the International African Institute, 1983); Gwendolyn Mikell, Cocoa and Chaos in
Ghana (Washington DC: Howard University Press, 1992); Gareth Austin, Labour,
Land and Capital in Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante, 1807–1956
(Rochester, NY.: University of Rochester Press; Boydell & Brewer, UK, 2005).
15
Jean Allman, “Rounding up Spinsters: Gender Chaos and Unmarried Women in
Colonial Asante,” Journal of African History, 37 (1996): 195–214.
16
See for example Getz & Clarke, Abina and the Important Men: A Graphic
History.
17
Dzodzi Tsikata, “Women’s Political Organization, 1951–1987,” in The State
Development and Politics in Ghana, eds. Emmanuel Hansen & Kwame A Ninsin
(London: CODESRIA Book Series, 1989), 75–76.
18
Takyiwa Manuh, “Women and their Organizations during the Convention
Peoples’ Party Period,” in The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah. Papers of a
Symposium Organized by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana,
Legon ed. Kwame Arhin, (Sedco Publishing Ltd.: Accra, 1991), 110–111.
19
Christine Oppong, “Conjugal Resources, Power, Decision Making and Domestic
Labour: Some Historical and Recent Evidence of Modernity from Ghanaian
Families,” Occasional Research Paper Series (Accra: Institute of African Studies,
University of Ghana, 2005), Issue 7.
20
Although there are educational statistics and records over the colonial period for
Ghana, it has been observed that enrolment rates were extremely low and exhibited
a strong gender bias. While primary enrolment rates for boys averaged 0.52% of
the total population in 1901, girls’ enrolment rates were even lower at less than
0.11%. Over the first decades of the twentieth century the gender gaps in primary
enrolment widened, with more boys attending schools (0.84%) than girls (0.18%).
Interestingly, that gender gap inherited in the colonial era has persisted over time.
21
Sandra Greene, Gender, Ethnicity and Social Change on the Upper Slave Coast:
A History of the Anglo-Ewe (London: Heinemann Books, 1996); Emmanuel
Akyeampong, Between the Sea and the Lagoon: An Eco-Social History of the Anlo
of Southeastern Ghana, 1850 to Recent Times (Athens: Ohio University Press
2001).
120 Chapter Six
22
Andrea Cornwall (ed.), Readings in Gender in Africa (Bloomington: Indiana
Press, 2005), 218.
23
Jo Rowland, Questioning Empowerment: Working with Women in Honduras
(UK and Ireland: Oxfam, 1997), 14.
24
Convention People’s Party, Official Website “Our Party”
http://conventionpeoplesparty.org.
25
In Kumase, Ataa Baasi, leader of the commercial sex workers who had their
base at Adum, became a staunch member of the CPP and brought on board her
members.
26
Kofi Dei, “Women In Politics in Ghana,” The Ghanaian Times, July 25, 2005.
27
Interview with Edith Andoh.
28
K. Budu-Acquah, Toll for the Brave: Tribute for Fallen Comrades, part one
(Accra: Graphic Packaging, 1988).
29
Robertson, Sharing the Same Bowl, A Socioeconomic History of Women and
Class in Accra, Ghana (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1990). 18
30
Rowland, Questioning Empowerment, 16
31
Beatrix Allah-Mensah, Women in Politics and Public Life in Ghana (Accra:
Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, 2005),
27.
32
Kofi Dei, “Women in Politics in Ghana.”
33
C. L. R. James, Nkrumah and the Ghana Revolution (London: Allison & Busby;
1977), 131.
34
Takyiwa Manuh, “Women and their Organizations during the Convention
Peoples’ Party Period,” in The Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah, Papers of a
Symposium Organized by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana,
Legon, ed. Kwame Arhin (Accra: Sedco Publishing Ltd, 1991), 110.
35
Beatrix Allah-Mensah, Women in Politics and Public Life in Ghana (Accra:
Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, 2005).
36
Information provided by Edith Andoh, November 24, 2001, and corroborated by
S. K. Danso, September 2009.
37
Evening News, Ghana, July 19, 1960.
38
Ibid.
39
Evening News, July 14, 1960.
40
A. B. Chinbuah, “Heroes of Our Time: Hannah Cudjoe—Freedom Fighter and
Social Worker,” Daily Graphic (Friday, November 30, 2007), 11.
41
Ibid.
42
The Action Troopers were the supporters on the ground who engaged in armed
confrontations with their party opponents when required. Today, party supporters
who play a similar role in Ghana are referred to as “foot-soldiers.”
43
Today, “Baasi” is euphemistically used to refer to commercial sex workers and
women with loose morals.
44
PRAAD, Kumase, ARG6/7/28 “Petition from Ataa Baasi—Head-Woman of the
Baasi-Women or Community in Kumasi, for herself & about 30 other Women
Company,” July 19, 1943.
45
Information given by Kumiwaa, a 78-year-old resident of Adum. Her father,
Kofi Baawuah, popularly known as “Abaakade,” was an Adum resident and a
staunch CPP activist.
46
"Petition from Ataa Baasi, Headwoman of the Baasi-women or Community in
Kumasi, for herself and about 30 other women company," Kumasi, 1943: NAG
(Kumasi), item 2,339.
47
Ula Yvette Taylor, The Veiled Garvey: The Life and Times of Amy Jacques
Garvey (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 217–218.
48
Manuh, “Women and their Organizations,” 109; Tsikata, “Women’s Political
Organization,” 75.
49
Abayomi Azikiwe, “Editorial”, Pan-African News Wire
http://www.workers.org/2010/world/women_africa_0819/wwnews-subscribe@
workersworld.net.
50
Jean Marie Allman et al., Women in African Colonial Histories (Bloomigton:
Indiana University Press, 2002), 3
CHAPTER SEVEN
AFRICA UNITE:
A SLOGAN OF INTELLECTUAL AND CULTURAL
SIGNIFICANCE IN THE WORKS
OF KWAME NKRUMAH AND BOB MARLEY
B. STEINER IFEKWE, PH.D.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY/INTERNATIONAL STUDIES,
UNIVERSITY OF UYO, NIGERIA
Abstract
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana was a most influential figure in Pan-
Africanism throughout his lifetime and even beyond. His speeches and
writings have deepened our understanding of his desire for African
redemption. In 1963, his work Africa Must Unite called for the
coalescence of Africa into a continental union and for her peoples
globally. He called for the harnessing of Africa’s abundant resources at a
time when the mother continent was beset with myriad problems,
including colonialism and neo-colonialism. In 1979, this call spread
culturally when a Jamaican Reggae musical icon, Bob Marley, reinforced
Nkrumah’s advocacy for continental unity in the track “Africa Unite” from
his record Survival. Therefore, Nkrumah’s intellectual contribution to
African unity was of immense benefit to African Diasporic cultural leaders
such as Bob Marley many years after the former’s death. Against this
background, Nkrumah’s advocacy for African unity became a slogan for
African cultural leaders in the Diaspora who were searching for their
identity. It is within this context that we will deepen our understanding of
the intellectual and cultural impact of this slogan on African studies today.
Africa Unite 123
Introduction
The slogan “Africa Unite,” derived from Kwame Nkrumah’s Africa
Must Unite (1974) and Bob Marley’s album Survival (1979), is at the
forefront of this paper. The slogan represents the canon of Nkrumah and
Marley’s respective years of struggle for African redemption through
statements, publications, conferences, political actions and lyrical
compositions, among other efforts. These efforts left indelible marks
connecting mainland Africans and their counterparts in the diaspora.
During their lifetime, both Nkrumah and Marley intellectually and
culturally exerted much energy towards African emancipation; it could be
claimed that they ate, dreamt and drank thoughts of emancipation, but
failed to actualize them as fully as expected as a result of complexities
with African leaderships and politics.
Undoubtedly, Pan-Africanism during the lifetime of these men and
even now could be seen as an expression of the artistic, cultural,
economic, political and intellectual rejection of African subservience in
global affairs since their enslavement in the New World, as well as their
experience in colonialism. The struggle for black relevance globally,
therefore, compelled notable Pan-Africanists such as Edward Blyden,
Sylvester Williams, W. E. B. Dubois and Marcus Garvey to aim at the
unification of the peoples of Africa and their descendants in the Diaspora
through literary, artistic, economic and even political projects. Pan-
Africanism symbolizes the relevance of black pigmentation as a symbol of
pride and resistance at a time of intense struggle by the blacks against
racism and colonialism (Wright 2009). According to NgǊgƭ Wa Thiong’o
(1997, 152), these eminent persons articulated their programmes with “the
dignity of the African in mind.” These men were quite articulate and
consistent in their struggles, and therefore laid a solid foundation for other
Pan-Africanists such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Bob Marley of
Jamaica to follow.
Both Nkrumah and Marley pursued their Pan-African dreams through
different platforms. While Nkrumah used intellectualism through book
publishing to articulate his Pan-African philosophy, Marley used Reggae
music, most especially his lyrics. This, therefore, was the meeting point
between intellectualism and culture in spreading Pan-African unity, clearly
envisioned in the slogan “Africa Unite” which is extrapolated from the
works of Kwame Nkrumah and Bob Marley in this paper.
124 Chapter Seven
Kwame Nkrumah and Bob Marley—

Intellectual and Cultural Profiles
Frantz Fanon (1980, 166) once made the statement that “Each
generation must, out of relative obscurity, discover its mission, fulfill it, or
betray it.” It appears that Kwame Nkrumah and Bob Marley were Fanon’s
targets in that statement for providing an articulate intellectual and cultural
leadership which placed them within the realms of the major twentieth
century Pan-African leaders. Let us look at statements both men made at
the height of their careers to support Fanon. Nkrumah wrote as follows:
The history of human achievement illustrates that when an awakened
intelligentsia emerges from a subject people it becomes the vanguard of the
struggle against alien rule. (1974a, 43)
Bob Marley, on the other hand, elaborated on the cultural significance

of his work:
To make music is a life that I have to live. Sometimes you have to fight
with music. So it’s not just someone who studies and chats, it’s a whole
development. Right now is a more militant on earth, because it’s Jah Jah
time. But mi always militant, you know mi too militant. (in Salewicz,
2009, 347).
Against this background, in writing about the profiles of both Nkrumah

and Marley we have to look at some critical issues that moulded their
characters, such as their environments, educations (where applicable) and
influences.
Kwame Nkrumah—A Profile

Nkrumah’s intellectualism and political behaviour were products of
three continents: Africa, his birthplace, North America, the abode of his
studies, and Europe (Britain), where he solidified and expanded his
political and educational base.
Nkrumah was born on the Gold Coast (now Ghana) in 1909 where he
studied and had a spell as a schoolteacher. He later studied at Lincoln
University, Pennsylavania, in the United States, where he graduated in
Sociology and Economics in 1939. He also obtained post-graduate degrees
from the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia. In 1945, he studied at
the London School of Economics and Political Science (Uwechue 1991,
558–559; Smertin 1987, 10–69). Between 1945 and 1947, Nkrumah
worked hard in Britain in pursuit of his Pan-African vision. In 1945 he
Africa Unite 125
participated in the Manchester Pan-African Conference where he authored

the Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World, which was adopted
by the participants as an important document towards black liberation. In
that document, Nkrumah acknowledges the role of intellectuals towards
social and political change in Africa:
This Fifth Pan-African congress calls on the intellectuals and professional
classes of the colonies to awaken to their responsibilities. The long, long
night is over. By fighting for trade union rights, the right to form co-
operatives, freedom of the press, assembly, demonstration and strike;
freedom to print and read the literature which is necessary for the
education of the masses, you will be using the only means by which your
liberties will be won and maintained. Today there is only one road to
effective action—the organization of the masses. COLONIAL AND
SUBJECT PEOPLES OF THE WORLD-UNITE. (1973, 44)
Nkrumah has equally told us that his passion for radical politics was
anchored in anti-colonialism, and his Pan-Africanism was derived from his
exposure to some radical literature:
I read Hegel, Karl Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mazzini. The writings of these
men did much to influence me in my revolutionary ideas and activities, and
Karl Marx and Lenin particularly impressed me as I felt sure that their
philosophy was capable of solving these problems. But I think that of all
the literature that I studied the book that did more than any other to fire my
enthusiasm was The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey published
in 1923. Garvey with his philosophy “Africa for the Africans” and his
“Back to Africa” movement did much to inspire the Negroes of America in
the 1920s. (1976a, 45)
Nkrumah’s politics had already been shaped, and with time, most
especially while coming back to his country of birth to participate in
partisan politics, he exerted much energy to challenge colonial rule
through writings and activism until Ghana achieved independence under
his leadership on March 6, 1957. During this momentous event, he
proclaimed that Ghana’s “independence will be incomplete … unless it is
linked up with the liberation of other territories in Africa” (Nkrumah 1976,
ix).
Furthermore, he stated that his proclamation made its desired effect
because:
… the beating of drums sent this message across rivers, mountains, forests
and plains. The people heard and acted. Liberation movements gained
strength, and freedom fighters began to train. One after another, new
African states came into being, and above the world’s horizon loomed the
126 Chapter Seven
African Personality, African statesmen went to the United Nations;

Africans proudly wore the ancient regalia of their ancestral land; Africans
stood up and spoke on the rostrum of the world forum, and they spoke for
Africans and the people of African descent wherever they might be
(Nkrumah 1973, 425)
The above testifies to Nkrumah’s profile during his formative years.

Furthermore, out of his personal conviction on the importance of writing
to the propagation of his Pan African philosophy, he published Africa
Must Unite, which signifies a coalescence of his Pan-African vision in
1963.
Bob Marley—A Profile

Bob Marley was born in February 1945 of mixed parentage. His father,
Norval Sinclair Marley, a white man, married Bob Marley’s mother,
Cedella Malcolm, who was black. Early in life he was abandoned by his
father, but he never allowed the consequences of this abandonment, such
as poverty and squalor, to affect his perceptions and goals in life. Through
music and his Rastafarian beliefs, Bob Marley became a cultural icon,
whose creativity defied racism and underdevelopment in Africa and the
Caribbean. His first major album, Catch a Fire (1973), captured this trend
which was reinforced in 1979 with the release of Survival. This latter
album reflects his passion for Africa, African Unity and the cultural
contributions blacks in Diaspora could play in this perspective. The track
“Africa Unite” on that album could be likened to Nkrumah’s 1963 book
Africa Must Unite, because both works reflect their coherent positions on
African Unity.
Bob Marley’s relations with Africa were deeply rooted in the historical
link between Africa and Jamaica from the time of slavery. Jamaica,
Marley’s birthplace, is known globally for its music and culture, including
Reggae music, Dub poetry and its patois dialect (Robinson, cited in
Appiah & Gates Jr 1999, 1024). It is a society made up of blacks and
whites, with the blacks being offspring of the Atlantic slave trade. In the
post-colonial setting the country has remained volatile as a result of
political polarization orchestrated by two leading political parties, namely
the Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the Peoples National Party (PNP).
Other related issues such as poverty and gang warfare were equal sources
of conflict among Jamaicans. Although most black Jamaicans are poor,
their creativity in terms of Reggae music and Rastafarianism has provided
a platform for Bob Marley and his band The Wailers to express this
Africa Unite 127
continuum between Africa and the Caribbean in terms of creativity. This

was attested by Salewicz
From immensely humble beginnings, with his talent and religious belief
his only weapons, the Jamaican recording artist applied himself with
unstinting perseverance to spreading his prophetic musical message; he
only departed this planet when he felt his vision of One World, One Love,
which was inspired by his belief in Rastafarianism was beginning to be
heard and felt. (2009, 15)
Unlike Kwame Nkrumah, who was highly intellectually endowed, Bob

Marley acquired his education from the slums of Kingston, Jamaica, where
poverty and squalor were his inspirational teachers. According to Stephen
Davis:
In Trench Town Bob Marley found another family. The friends he made,
the people he lived with, the ghetto where he grew to his manhood would
be with him throughout his life. The “youts,” as he called them, with whom
he came of age and with whom he sang raw harmony in the starving hours
of his late teenage years would be Marley’s cronies, henchmen and
retainers until he died. (1985, 42)
Against this background, the early 1960s were paramount in the life
and career of Bob Marley. During this period Jamaica was undergoing
cultural transformation in terms of the music that came directly from the
poor black districts of Jamaica, and the Jamaican government took serious
interest in it. Thus, one prominent politician, Edward Seaga, in 1964 sent
Byron Lee and the Dragonaires to the World’s Fair in New York in order
to promote this emerging Jamaican music (Davis 1985, 70–71).
Some Jamaican teenagers, such as Bob Marley, Peter Tosh and Bunny
Wailer, jumped on the train conveying this cultural renaissance. These
personalities worked assiduously to give Reggae music its African rhythm,
content and global acceptability. However, it was Bob Marley and Byron
Lee who best symbolized the vehicle for the global knowledge and spread
of Rastafarianism as a black religion embedded in Emperor Selassie I of
Ethiopia as the god of Africa. The revolutionary message of Pan-
Africanism was trumpeted through the instruments of Reggae.
Kwame Nkrumah and Pan-Africanism

While the majority of African states gained independence in the 1960s,
not much changed in their economic, social and political relationships with
the former metropolitan powers. According to Wangari Maathai (2009,
128 Chapter Seven
44): “The new national-states were given a name, a flag, and then handed
over to a selected group of western-educated elites, most of whom were
sympathetic to the colonial administration.”
This assertion was a major pitfall towards post-colonial African
Development plans, and Nkrumah, the visionary, pragmatist and political
theorist, understood these pitfalls and therefore plunged himself into
exploring ways towards genuine African development. He adopted a two-
pronged approach, namely Political and Theoretical actions, which remain
critical in our understanding and appreciation of his stance on African
Unity.
Nkrumah saw his vision of African Unity as a lifelong commitment,
and he took some practical steps to bring this to fruition. He explained, in
his autobiography Ghana (1976a, 43–44), a Pan-African front after
realizing that his colleagues, mainly nationals of other West African
States, opposed his Pan-African vision. He saw the struggle for colonial
freedom along individual states as potent dangers to African Unity, and
opposed it. Therefore, Nkrumah insisted that:
… unless territorial freedom was ultimately linked up with the Pan African
movement for the liberation of the whole African continent, there would be
no hope of freedom and equality for the African and for the people of
African descent in any part of the world. (1976a, 44)
Against this background, Nkrumah formulated three strategies aimed

at the attainment of this Pan-African dream:
(a) total liberation of Africa from colonial rule

(b) fighting neo-colonialism in the independent African states, and
(c) creating world conditions favourable to African posterity and
independence and the happiness of mankind (Panaf 1975, 74–75).
In April 1958, Nkrumah organized a conference of Independent

African States. In attendance were the following countries: Egypt,
Ethiopia, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. This conference
endorsed the concept of African unity, a common foreign policy
articulated through: non-alignment and positive neutrality; co-ordination
of economic development towards sustainable and economic policies; and
joint African action aimed at the liberation of African colonial entities
alongside the liberation of South Africa (Panaf 1975, 72–73). Similarly, in
December 1958 he organized the first All-Africa Peoples Conference in
Accra, where he stated:
Africa Unite 129
What is the purpose of this historic conference? We are here to know

ourselves and to exchange views on matters of common interest, to explore
ways and means of consolidating and safe-guarding our hard-won
independence to strengthen the economic and cultural ties between our
countries, to find workable arrangements for helping our brothers still
languishing under colonial rule. (in Uwechue 1991, 564).
In May 1959, Nkrumah assisted in the formation of a Ghana-Guinea

Union at a time when Guinea was in crisis following her independence
from France. Similarly, during the Congo crisis of 1960 Nkrumah threw
his weight behind Patrice Lumumba, and when the latter was killed he
called for the establishment of an Africa High Command for the repulsion
of any threat against any independent African State. Similarly, Nkrumah
broke off diplomatic relations with Britain in 1965 under the auspices of
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) resolution, when Britain failed
to stop Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), under Ian Smith, from declaring
unilateral independence (Uwechue 1991, 564–565).
Nkrumah also took some theoretical steps in his Pan-African vision
mainly through writings and statements. In Africa Must Unite he
underscores this vision, when he stresses:
Our freedom stands open to danger just as long as the independent states of
Africa remain apart … our essential bulwark against such sinister threats
and other multifarious designs of the neo-colonialists is in our political
union. If we are to remain free, if we are to enjoy the full benefits of
Africa’s rich resources, we must unite to plan for our total defence and full
exploitation of our material and human means in the full interests of all our
peoples. (1974a, xvill)
In another work, Nkrumah identified neo-colonialism as the major

pitfall to African Unity:
The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in
theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international
sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is
directed from outside … Neo-colonialism is based upon the principle of
breaking up former large united colonial territories into a number of small
non-viable states which are incapable of independent development and
must rely upon the former imperial power for defence and even internal
security. Their economic and financial systems are linked as in colonial
days, with those of the former colonial ruler. (1974b, ix, xiii)
To thwart the influence of neo-colonialism on African affairs,

Nkrumah advocated for the creation of an African Parliament, made up of
Upper and Lower Houses, with clearly defined functions. He called for a
130 Chapter Seven
continental government, saddled with the control of the economic, defence

and foreign affairs of the Pan-African states while the individual states
would continue to have their national flags, anthems and coats of arms,
etc. (Panaf 1975, 83).
We have to add at this juncture that, as a result of Nkrumah’s Pan-
African vision, he began to receive accolades from black radical groups in
the United States, such as the Black Power advocates who made him the
patron of their group. Generally, he represented, in the eyes of these
groups, a symbol of the African revolution. As Walter Rodney has
explained in an unpublished paper “Southern Africa and Liberation
Support in Afro-America and the West Indies,” one such black advocate,
Stokely Carmichael (later known as Kwame Ture), arrived in Tanzania in
1965 from the United States, posing for the press with a rifle held high.
The aim of the gesture, according to Rodney, was to clamour for support
between continental Africa and their Diaspora brothers for the armed
struggle in Southern Africa. Kwame Ture later arrived in Conakry, Guinea
in 1968, where he studied under Nkrumah, then in exile, the principles of
the African Revolution. Nkrumah had published Handbook of
Revolutionary Warfare in 1968, advocating for the formation of the All-
African People’s Revolutionary Party (A-APRP) as the armed phase of the
African Revolution. Ture became an organizer of this party from then until
his death in 1998.
Similarly, in the twilight of his life, Nkrumah received countless
messages and letters from other groups and individuals within Africa and
Britain for his Pan-African vision, even when he was out of power
(Nkrumah 1976b, 160–222). To one such group in Britain, he told them
squarely that he had remained resolute in the efficacy of the African
Revolution. In 1968, he put up a statement for them, which partly reads
thus:
I want you to understand that I am not in exile in Conakry. Every country
and town in Africa is my home and so I am at home in Conakry, Guinea, as
I would be at home in any part of the black world … the struggle for the
political unification of Africa has never been clearer and better charted.
(Nkrumah 1973, 431)
The above analyses of Nkrumah’s Pan-African vision are quite

significant for exploring Nkrumah’s commitment to African unity
throughout his adult life. He left much legacy to Africans at home and
abroad, and such legacies have remained consistent in our historical
studies today and in the present efforts by African leaders to remain
Africa Unite 131
relevant in global affairs, most especially under the auspices of the African
Union (AU).
Bob Marley and Pan-Africanism

Amilcar Cabral and NgǊgƭ Wa Thiong’o spoke eloquently on the
significance of culture to social and political change in Africa, which is a
pointer to our understanding of Marley as a cultural Pan-Africanist. Cabral
writes:
Culture is simultaneously the fruit of a people’s history and a determinant
of history by the positive or negative influence it exerts on the evolution of
relations between man and his environment and among men or human
groups within a society, as well as between different societies. (1980, 141)
Similarly, NgǊgƭ explains that:

Culture is a product of a people’s history. It is also a reflection of that
history. The quality of a given culture is therefore a measure of the quality
of that history. This means that we cannot look at culture as an abstract
generality. We do not live in a uniform commonality of human beings
either within a nation or between nations. A specific history of which
culture is simultaneously a product, a reflection and a measure is a
continuous working out of the contradictions within a given society and
between that society and others with which it is in contact. (1997, 126)
Marley, the Jamaican Reggae icon of whom Cabral and NgǊgƭ have
spoken, as reflected above, represents a continuum between the
intermingling of cultures within Africa and the Caribbean because he used
music as a vehicle for social and political change in Africa. His use of
music in this regard was quite novel in Pan-African studies, and probably
activism as well, because of its global acceptability, even though it
developed from a Third World country like Jamaica. Jamaica, since
independence in 1962, has remained a country to be reckoned with in
terms of creativity, specifically in the form of Reggae music, in spite of
major insoluble contradictions such as racism, poverty and
underdevelopment which beclouded its political landscape. Under these
pressures, black Jamaicans within ghettos such as Trench Town
transformed their deprivation into a musical form from which Marley’s
career was internationalized (Ifekwe 2005, 108–123).
Similarly, the role of two major political parties in Jamaica, namely the
Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the People’s National Party (PNP), led
by two eminent white Jamaicans, had a deep influence in shaping the lives
of black Jamaicans who saw such institutions as the vehicles to drive them
132 Chapter Seven
aground racially. Therefore, they receded to their Rastafarian faith and

wrote their lyrics around Africa and their plight within the new world
order. Bob Marley had been labelled as “Reggae's Shining Prince,” a
“Revolutionary Artist,” a “First Third World Superstar,” “the most
important cultural figure of the seventies” and “a righteous campaigner for
truth and justice” (Davis 1985, 262) for his contributions to this genre. He
used music to spread his message of peace and love within his Rastafarian
creed, and proclaimed himself an eminent cultural leader of the Pan-
African tradition. For clarity, two major areas about him are noteworthy:
(a) The lyrics from his various albums reflect his Pan-African leaning,
most especially his 1979 album Survival and its most vital track
“Africa Unite.”
(b) Some of the interviews he granted and statements credited to him
during his seven-year global tour to promote his music are
testimonies to his Pan-African vision.
Let us elaborate.
Bob Marley, His Lyrics and Survival

Bob Marley remains one of the greatest cultural leaders ever to emerge
in the African Diaspora in the last century. He was not educationally
formidable like some of his forebears in the Pan-African tradition, which
had a deep influence on him. During his lifetime, the whole world
recognized him as a great African Diasporic leader who criticized the
West and their lackeys regarding the plight of Africans and African-
Americans, and had fans and record sales all over the world.
The lyrics of Bob Marley’s music were probably derived from the
following sources: the Bible, his personal life experience, speeches, and
the writings of eminent Pan-African leaders such as Selassie, Nkrumah, C.
L. R. James, Marcus Garvey and W. E. B. DuBois. The Bible, specifically
the Old Testament, was very important to Rastamen. The Bible revealed
the deification of Emperor Selassie as an African god, as well as more
revelations about their ancestry from Africa. Selassie was seen as the
symbol of this emerging consciousness in Africa for having presided over
the ancient kingdom of Ethiopia that was never colonized (Cashmore
1984; Saleewicz 2009; Davis 1985; Booth & Goldman 1981). Marley
quoted several verses in Psalms to support his lyrics which were
reflections of his abandonment as a child. They focused on children,
depression, alienation and hopelessness. Marley’s revolutionary move to
Africa Unite 133
fight against these forces in his music was illustrated through his call for
freedom not only in Africa, but all over the world, and was his outlet to
express his feelings (Davis 1985, 35, 78).
Marley’s lyrics on “Africa Unite” from his 1979 album Survival are
quite profound. They highlight the major post-colonial problems which
had undermined Africa’s search for fundamental economic, social and
political developments. The first dance of freedom for African nations,
according to Martin Meredith (1984), was characterized by, for instance,
natural disasters, civil wars, drought, human rights violations, a weak
economy, poverty, coups d'état, dictatorship, corruption and frontier
disputes. Bob Marley studied these complex developments and
implications and offered a solution to them through “Africa Unite.” Below
are excerpts from the lyrics:
Africa Unite
‘cause we are moving right out of Babylon
And we are going to our father’s land
How good and pleasant it would be before God and man
To see the unification of all Africans
As it’s been said already,
Let it be done right now
We are the children of the Rastaman
we are the children of the Higher man
So Africa Unite, Africa unite yeah,
Africa unite
cause we are moving right out of Babylon
And we’re grooving to our father’s land …
So Africa unite, Africa unite yeah
Africa unite ‘cause the children want
To come home, Africa unite
Africa unite
It’s later, later than you think
It’s later, later than you think
Unite for the benefit of your people
Unite for the Africans abroad
Unite for the Africans a yard.
(in Campbell 1981, 20)
The concept of "Africa Unite" remains part of Marcus Garvey’s Back-

to-Africa philosophy, which reminds Diasporic Africans of the need to
repatriate to Africa in order to rebuild the continent and to face the
challenges of underdevelopment. Bob Marley’s lyrics on this track were
inspired by the philosophies of Garvey and Nkrumah, as both remained
consistent for being Pan-African advocates during their lifetimes. Today,
134 Chapter Seven
Bob Marley’s widow, Rita Marley, is now in Ghana, where she has
launched two foundations in honour of her late husband which aim to
support youth and rural development in Ghana, and by extension in other
Third World countries.
Against this background, Bob Marley in “Africa Unite” was much
perturbed by post-colonial developments within Africa. According to
Timothy White in an online article entitled “Bob Marley and the Book of
Revelations”:
Africa Unite is, like many of Bob’s songs, a prayer of hope. When Bob
says Jamaica is too small for him and points toward Africa, it is about his
impact and how he could deliver his message to do the most good with it.
In fact, he very clearly was successful in planting seeds of his message to
much of humanity worldwide and that message continues to be vital.
Bob Marley used his Survival album to confirm the link between
Africa and Jamaica when the flags of independent African countries were
drawn on the jacket of the album. It also illustrated the African experience
in the Middle Passage clearly reflecting Africans packed like sardines
inside a slave ship (Davis, 1985:288).
Bob Marley’s Interviews and Statements

Apart from the above, some of the interviews that Bob Marley granted
as well as his messages during concerts were equally vital in our
understanding of his Pan-African messages. Bob Marley’s tours lasted for
seven years and took him to many parts of the globe (Marley 2005, 124).
This was also a period of deep reflection on his person, music, message
and Africa. According to Davis:
Bob regarded his interviews as an important part of his Rasta ministry, and
he generally approached them with great earnestness intending to use them
to spread the message of Rasta in his music. His seriousness was often
rewarded with dozens of questions regarding his hair, the amount of dope
he smoked, and whether he really wanted to go back to Africa. Bob usually
countered these reporters by quoting from the Bible, his own lyrics and
Jamaican street sayings of the time. (1985, 213)
On the importance of his music to Pan-African Unity, he said:

… my music defends righteousness. If you’re black and you’re wrong,
you’re wrong. If you’re white and you’re wrong, you’re wrong. It’s
universal (in the original) … my music fight against the system … and I
Africa Unite 135
will keep on doing it until I am satisfied the people have the message that
Rastafari is the Almighty, and all we black people have redemption, just
like anyone else. (Davis 1985, 219)
Against this background, Bob Marley’s Pan African Vision took him
to Gabon, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe as part of his global tour. He was in
Gabon on the invitation of Omar Bongo, the president of the country, then
celebrating his birthday. His visit to Ethiopia enlivened his belief in
Rastafarianism after he visited some sites associated with the late Selassie.
While there, he lived on a communal farm called Shashamani, which was
occupied by Rastafarians and given to them by the late Emperor in support
of the Back-to-Africa philosophy. According to Davis (1985, 277), Bob
Marley’s Ethiopian visit broadened his perception about Africa because he
went:
… to night clubs featuring the brazen and passionate Ethiopian pop-singing
style and attended a giant rally staged by Ethiopia’s Marxist government in
support of the liberation movement in Rhodesia, which Ethiopians were
already calling by its African name, Zimbabwe. The mass rally broadened
Bob’s understanding of the issues in Zimbabwe, which he had been
following for years, and made a deep impression on his identity as an
African. The visit changed his life and music. He started to work on a song
called “Zimbabwe” while he was still in Ethiopia, which like most African
states was preoccupied with the bitter guerrilla war being fought by black
nationalists against a racist white regime.
He wrote this song “Zimbabwe” as part of his Pan-African album

Survival. The song represents Marley’s own cultural contribution to the
political liberation of Zimbabwe, which had been dominated by white-
minority rule since the Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) in
1965. Even members of the Zimbabwean African Patriotic Union forces
(ZAPU), fighting against Ian Smith and his white minority rule, claimed
that the song “Zimbabwe” became part of their resistance (Campbell 1981,
14). Therefore, as a result of Marley’s cultural influence, the new
Zimbabwean government invited him to attend the independence
celebration. A veteran of the Zimbabwean struggle, Edgar Tekere, told
Marley not to return to Jamaica again but to remain in Africa because he
had “become part of the destiny of the continent” (Davis 1985, 302).
While concluding the Zimbabwean concert, Marley uttered:
I and I made our contribution to the freedom of Zimbabwe. When we say
Natty going to dub it up in Zimbabwe, that’s exactly what we mean “give
the people of Zimbabwe what they want,” now they got what they want do
136 Chapter Seven
we want more? “Yes,” the Freedom of South Africa. So Africa Unite,

Unite, Unite. You’re so right and let’s do it. (Campbell 1981, 14)
Bob Marley was in the United States in 1979 as part of his numerous
tours to propagate his Pan-African vision. He was contracted by an
American-based activist named Chester English who called at Marley’s
business premises in Kingston, Jamaica, requesting a concert for African
freedom fighters. The concert was called “Amandla,” meaning “Power to
the People” in the Shona language of Zimbabwe. Bob Marley and the
Wailers played before a capacity crowd of twenty-five thousand at the
Harvard University football field. Marley entertained them with one of his
numerous statements about Africa:
Third World struggling, yunno, and we must come together for Zimbabwe
… yeah! … women and children shall fight this revolution … we can be
free, we must be FREE, yunno. Four hundred years plus, this captivity, so
we must go home to we yard … Rastafari know that … Yes! … Don’t let
propaganda lead you astray, false rumours and false propaganda. Selassie I
the Almighty … Zimbabwe must be free by 1983, Jah seh, Africa must be
free! (in the original)… so everyone have a right to decide his own destiny
yeah! …. (Davis 1985, 287)
These concerts in Boston, the United States and Zimbabwe, as well as

other areas, including some of Bob Marley’s interviews and comments,
were deep reflections of his search for African freedom through his music.
Unfortunately for him, he never lived to see 1983, the year for which he
predicted African redemption, as he died two years earlier at the age of
thirty-six. He was relatively young, but his contributions to Pan-African
studies have become quite symbolic for using culture to strengthen the ties
between the Diaspora Africans and their counterparts in the mother
continent.
Conclusion
The slogan “Africa Unite” is adapted from the philosophies of
Nkrumah of Ghana and Marley of Jamaica. It is based on their consistent
belief that African unity, both at the continental level and the Diaspora,
was a precursor to the liberation of the continent from colonialism,
imperialism and neo-colonialism, and therefore advocated for the
exchange of ideas between black groups all over the world.
Nkrumah represents an intellectual and political wing of this slogan for
writing several books on this genre, with Africa Must Unite, published in
1963, representing a major contribution to his Pan-African Unity. His
Africa Unite 137
leadership of Ghana from 1957 to 1966 provided a platform to hold

several conferences, along with using his base in Accra to influence or
champion his stand on Pan-Africanism.
Marley, on the other hand, represents a cultural icon of the Pan-African
tradition, as his lyrics, interviews and concerts testify to his profound
influence within this perspective. He spoke in patois but conveyed his
position on Pan-Africanism to whichever part of the world he visited. A
few years before his death, he told an audience:
People want to listen to a message, word from Jah … this could be passed
through me or anybody. I am not a leader. Messenger. The words of the
songs, not the person, is what attracts people [to me]. (in Salewicez 2009,
323).
From the above perspectives, by choosing this slogan we have

established the intellectual and cultural importance of Kwame Nkrumah
and Bob Marley to African historical studies today. Both men are dead
now, but their ideas still thrive. That is why, even in the millennium to
come, Nkrumah and Marley will still be recognized as some of the greatest
personalities to emerge in Africa and the Caribbean within the twentieth
century.
References
Booth, A. & V. Goldman. 1981. Bob Marley: Soul Rebel, Natural Mystic.
London: Hutchinson.
Campbell, H. 1981. Bob Marley Lives: Rasta, Reggae and Resistance. Dar
es Salaam: Tackey Publishing.
Cashmore, E. E. 1984. The Rastafarians. London: Minority Rights Group.
Davis, S. 1986. Bob Marley: The Definitive Biography of Reggae’s
Greatest Star. London: Granada Publishing.
Fanon, F. 1980. The Wretched of the Earth. Middlesex: Penguin.
Maathai, W. 2009. The Challenge for Africa: A New Vision. London:
William Heinemann.
Marley, R. 2005. No Woman No Cry: My Life with Bob Marley. London:
Pan Books.
Meredith, M. 1984 The First Dance of Freedom: Black Africa in the
Postwar Era. London: Hamish Hamilton.
NgǊgƭ Wa Thiong’o. 1997. Writers In Politics: A Re-engagement with
Issues of Literature and Society. Oxford: James Currey
Nkrumah, K. 1973. Revolutionary Path: London: Panaf.
—. 1974a. Africa Must Unite. London: Panaf
138 Chapter Seven
—. 1974b. Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. London:

Panaf.
—. 1974c. Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare. London: Panaf.
—. 1976a. Ghana: Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. New York:
International Publisher.
—. 1976b. Dark Days in Ghana. London: Panaf.
Panaf Books. 1975. Some Essential Features of Nkrumanism. London:
Panaf.
Patterson, O. 1986. The Children of Sisyphus. Harlow: Longman.
Robinette, R. & T. Pasqua. 1993. Historical Perspectives in Popular
Music. Dubuque: Kendal/Hunt Publishing.
Robinson Jr., A. J. 1999. “Jamaica.” In Africana: The Encyclopedia of the
African and African American Experience, edited by K. A. Appiah &
H. L. Gates, Jr. New York: Basic Civitas Books.
Rodney, W. 1983. The Groundings with my Brothers. London: Bogle-
L’ouverture Publications.
Salewicz, C. 2009. Bob Marley: The Untold Story. London: HarperCollins
Publishers.
Smertin, Y. 1987. Kwame Nkrumah. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Uwechue, R. (ed.). 1991. Makers of Modern Africa: Profile in History.
London: Africa Books.
Woddis, J. 1971. Introduction to Neo-Colonialism: The New Imperialism
in Asia, Africa and Latin America. New York: International Publishers.
Wright, K. (ed.). 2009. The African-American Experience: Black History
and Culture Through Speeches, Letters, Editorials, Poems, Songs and
Stories. New York: Black Dog and Leventhal Publishers.
Journal Articles
Ifekwe, B. S. “Reggae Music In Jamaica As a Form of Resistance, 1960–
1987.” Ndunode, Calabar Journal of Humanities 6 (1).
—. “Peter Tosh As An African Ideologue 1976–1987.” Uzu: Journal of
History and International Studies, The Department of History and
International Studies. Nnamdi, Azikiwe University, Awka, Nigeria.
—. 2007/08. “Rastafarianism. In Jamaica As a Pan-African Protest
Movement.” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria 17.
Africa Unite 139
Unpublished Papers
—. 1998. “Remembering Kwame Ture.”
—. 2004. “Influence of Some African Americans in Diaspora on Bob
Marley’s Career.”
Rodney, W. 1975. “Southern Africa and Liberation Support in Afro-
America and the West Indies.” Conference on the Socio-Economic
Trends and Politics in Southern Africa, Dares Salaam, November 29–
December 7.
CHAPTER EIGHT
THE INTELLECTUAL AND POLITICAL LEGACIES

OF KWAME NKRUMAH
AMA BINEY
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, PAMBAZUKA NEWS
Abstract
Integral to Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of Pan-Africanism was the
concept of a Continental Union Government for Africa. Nkrumah was one
of several leading radical Pan-Africanists of the 1960s, such as Julius
Nyerere, Modibo Keita, Patrice Lumumba and Sékou Touré. Aside from
his passionate commitment to building and realising continental unity,
Nkrumah’s prolific written work and speeches contain other equally
important bequests. These intellectual and political legacies are the focus
of this article. For analytical purposes, whilst the two (i.e. the intellectual
and the political) are inextricably linked, they will be interrogated
separately, and examined in no order of priority. The objective of this
article is to critically examine these legacies and illustrate their continuing
relevance to acute developmental problems and issues confronting
Africans today.
The first intellectual legacy Nkrumah bequeathed is his employment of
the conceptual tool of neo-colonialism and its corollary of class analysis.
Nkrumah defined neo-colonialism as follows:
The essence of neo-colonialism is that the State which is subject to it is, in
theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international
sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is
directed from outside.
He went on to expound that: “More often, however, neo-colonialist

control is exercised through economic or monetary means.”2 Nkrumah was
certainly ahead of this time, for as far back as April 1958, during the
The Intellectual and Political Legacies of Kwame Nkrumah 141
Conference of Independent States (CIAS), he had warned of: “new forms

of colonialism which are now appearing in the world, with their potential
threat to our precious independence.”3
The concept of neo-colonialism remains as valid now as in 1965. There
is ample evidence of the anti-democratic manifestations and operations of
neo-colonialism on the continent, in which an African neo-colonial elite
has collaborated—and continues to collaborate—with Western finance
capital, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. Such
operations continue to remain a fundamental obstacle to creating Pan-
Africanism in the twenty-first century.
Nkrumah’s book Neo-colonialism: The Highest Stage of Imperialism
offended the American government to the extent that the United States
Ambassador, Mennen Williams, registered a formal protest to the
Ghanaian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Accra in 1965.4 Nkrumah wrote
that: “The State Department followed up its protest with the rejection of a
request from my government for 35 million dollars’ worth of surplus food
shipments.”5 Neo-colonialism was a book replete with details on the
operations of Western multi-national companies and institutions in Africa
and the extent of the imperialist economic stranglehold over African
economies that were weighted against African interests, and therefore
sustained the continuing economic poverty and degradation of African
societies. To cite Nkrumah at some length from Neo-colonialism:
American and European companies connected with the world’s most
powerful banking and financial institutions are, with the consent of African
governments, entering upon major projects designed to exploit new sources
of primary products. In some cases these are allied to long-term ventures
for the establishment of certain essential industries. In the main, however,
they are confirming themselves to the production of materials in their basic
or secondary stages, with the object of transforming them in the mills and
plants owned and run by the exploiting companies in the metropolitan
lands. Africa has failed to make much headway on the road to purposeful
industrial development because her natural resources have not have been
employed for that end but have been used for the greater development of
the Western world.6
Nkrumah proceeded to examine in detail some of the primary

resources—such as phosphates, coal, zinc, diamonds, copper, tin,
manganese and gold—that have been exploited by Swedish, French,
American, Belgian, British and West German companies in many African
countries, including the Congo and South Africa, where the Union Miniére
du Haut Katanga and the Anglo-American De Beers groups operated,
respectively.7
142 Chapter Eight
He illustrated the complex interlocking commercial links between

Western multi-national companies in Africa, such as Union Miniére du
Haut Katanga, which was a conglomeration of numerous companies such
as Compagnie du Katanga, Société de Recherche Miniére du Sud-Katanga
(SUDAT), Katganga Special Committee, Sociétié Général, Anglo-
American, and many others.8
Nkrumah ends chapter six, “Primary Resources and Foreign Interests,”
with the following prophetic words:
Africa is still paramountly an uncharted continent economically, and the
withdrawal of the colonial rulers from political control is interpreted as a
signal for the descent of the international monopolies upon the continent’s
natural resources. This is the new scramble for Africa, under the guise of
aid, and with the consent and even the welcome of young, inexperienced
States. It can be even more deadly for Africa than the first carve-up, as it is
supported by more concentrated interests, wielding vastly greater power
and influence over governments and international organisations.9
As Africa enters the second decade of the twenty-first century, it is

indeed “paramountly an uncharted continent economically.” Since
Nkrumah’s death, the continent has continued to experience prolonged
military conflict, political instability and declining poverty that have been
exacerbated, if not profoundly worsened, by new socio-economic issues
that Nkrumah never lived to see. Among these are: economic strangulation
by continuing indebtedness; HIV-AIDS; child soldiers used in ethnic
conflicts in countries such as Liberia, Uganda and Sierra Leone; the
devastating threat and impact of worsening climate change; land-lease
deals that have initiated what some have called “agri-colonialism” or “land
grabbing” in Africa; efforts to entice African countries to introduce
genetically modified food production (GMF); resistance to this by the
majority of African countries (with the exception of South Africa); and the
rise of Chinese investment in Africa. Many of the aforementioned
developments have entrenched the partnership between Africa’s neo-
colonial African elite and the industrialized countries to the detriment of
the African masses. A current example of this deplorable and rampant neo-
colonial devastation is in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Between 2006
and 2010, more than 2,400 oil spills occurred in the region, in addition to
gas flares that have released millions of tons of toxic methane into the
atmosphere of the rural community of farmers and fishermen.10
Nowhere more deadly is the current “carve-up” of the African
continent, which is continuing at a rapacious pace between Africa’s neo-
colonial self-serving leaders and agents and Western companies, than in
the present day Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
In 1967, Nkrumah wrote Challenge of the Congo, which illustrated

how the neo-colonial forces were destabilizing the country for political
and economic interests. Tragically, those forces remain in a reconfigured
manifestation to deny material prosperity for the masses of Congolese
people who have never experienced prolonged peace since formal
independence in 1960 and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba in 1961.
The DRC is a country that has borne witness to one of Africa’s worst
humanitarian crises of the twentieth century, seeing more than five million
Congolese people die between August 1998 and April 2000. This figure is
close to the six million Jews who were killed in the Nazi concentration
camps. The devastation of the DRC continues via the eighty-five
(predominantly Western) companies who retain extensive commercial
interests in the DRC. Among them are Cogem (Belgium), Chpistopa Floss
(Germany), Afrimex (United Kingdom), Chimie Pharmacie (Netherlands),
Kemet Electronics, Kinross Gold Corporation (United States), and
International Panorama Resources Corporation (Canada), to name just a
few.11 They are all currently involved in the extraction and processing of
the DRC’s five key mineral resources: coltan, diamonds, copper, cobalt
and gold. The access to such resources by multinationals of the North is
facilitated by the warlords inside the DRC. Among them are: the Forces
Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR); the Congrés
National pour la Défence du Peuple (CNDP); the Patriotes Résistants
Congolais (PARECO); several Mai-Mai groups; the Forces Républicaines
Fédéralistes (FRF); and the Forces Armées de la République
Démocratique du Congo (FARDC).12 In short, these warring factions
continue to viciously exploit and control the mines in the country,
particularly in the north and south Kivu regions. The minerals are
transported to trading houses in Europe, and are then sold to these foreign
corporations who make colossal profits from them. The factions use the
money to buy weapons from Western companies or from the governments
neighbouring the DRC to continue to plunder, rape and pillage as they pay
their soldiers. Ultimately, the wanton looting of the country’s enormous
economic resources maintains their power bases in the DRC.13
The 2006 Hollywood film Blood Diamond, starring Leonardo
DiCaprio and Djimon Hounsou, illustrated the argument that every lengthy
war in Africa is financed by such minerals and gain direct and indirect
support from foreign governments or private interests (or both).
Alongside what Nkrumah aptly refers to as “the Trojan horses of neo-
colonialism,” which he states “must be stoutly resisted,”14 is the
phenomenon of “the Trojan horses” of globalization. In short, the forces of
globalization are both negative and positive. “Globalization is positive
144 Chapter Eight
when it enhances human communication, improves levels of human

productivity, enhances our awareness of being inhabitants of a fragile
planet, and facilitates empathy between societies across vast distances,”
contends Mazrui.15 Furthermore: “Globalization is negative when it allows
itself to be handmaiden to ruthless capitalism, increases the danger of
warfare by remote control, deepens the divide between the haves and
have-nots, and accelerates damage to our environment.”16 In our current
epoch, the negatives of globalization appear to outweigh the positives.
The Nigerian economist Claude Ake correctly defined globalization as
the march of capital all over the world in pursuit of profits. It is a process
reflected in the reach and power of multinational corporations (MNCs).
The committed Pan-Africanist Tajudeen Abdul-Raheem also defined
globalization as a form of re-colonization of Africa. He wrote:
What Africa is going through now is a recolonization, not by individual
European countries anymore but under the aegis of the IMF/World Bank
and the supportive and collaborative service of Western bilateral/multilateral
aid increasingly run and channelled through Western NGOs.17
As Horace Campbell writes: “If anything, in the era of globalization

the exploitation of the masses of the people has intensified. This exploitation
is being carried out under the neo-liberal ideas of liberalization that
redistributes wealth from the exploited to the powerful.”18
Nowhere has the reach of multi-national companies and the neo-liberal
market ideology penetrated Africa more than in the neglect and
dismantling of African agriculture from the 1980s to the present day. As
Holt-Giménez and Patel cogently argue:
At the time of decolonization in the 1960s, Africa was not just self-
sufficient in food; it was actually a net exporter with exports averaging 1.3
million tons a year between 1966 and 1970 (BBC 2006). Today, the
continent imports 25 percent of its food, with almost every country being a
net food importer (Green Revolution 2008). Hunger and famine have been
recurrent phenomena, with the last three years alone seeing food
emergencies break out in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, Southern Africa,
and Central Africa.19
The 1980s saw the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes

(SAPs) by African governments seeking loans from this body. The IMF
“is basically an institutional surrogate of the United States government”20
which dictates neo-liberal policies coercing African governments to divest
from the health and education sectors, in order that private and market
forces provide such services; it also dictates liberalization of trade, which
means removing or reducing tariffs and trade barriers with the

consequences of African markets, being undercut and often destroyed by
companies in the industrialized North. In the words of Holt-Giménez and
Patel:
Trade liberalization simply allowed low-price, subsidized EU beef to enter
and drive many West African and South African cattle raisers to ruin. With
their subsidies legitimized by the WTO’s Agreement on Agriculture, US
cotton growers offloaded their cotton on world markets at 20–25 percent of
the cost of production, bankrupting West African and Central African
cotton farmers in the process. (Business World 2003)21
It is the agrifood complex of the countries of the rich industrialized

North, such as Monsanto, the chemical giant, and Dow AgriSciences, that
controls 41% of maize seed and 25% of soy production in the world,
whose domination of the world’s food production means hunger and
starvation for many in Africa. Similarly, the overproduction of cheap
grains by American farmers which are subsidized by the American
government undercut African farmers. Companies in the United States
continue to dump cheap American long-grain rice on the West African
market. West African farmers simply cannot compete with such cheap
prices. The consequence is an abandonment of farming, with an exodus of
farmers to the cities to find alternative livelihoods for their families. In
essence, liberalization works for large Western agri-corporations, but
African farmers—wedded to traditional agricultural technologies and
dependent on importing Western pesticides, tools and herbicides—cannot
compete in a rigged system which determines the price at which African
agricultural goods should be sold on the world market.
Currently, the entire global production of food is dominated by
agribusiness, particularly Monsanto, DuPont, Dow Chemical, Hercules
Powder and other large companies who coined the term “Green
Revolution” in order to unleash their search for new markets for the
American petrochemical industry, Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO
crops) and grain cartels.22 Underpinning the objectives of agribusiness is
the conviction of former United States Secretary of State and National
Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, who declared in the 1970s: “Control
the oil and you control nations. Control the food, and you control the
people.”23
In short, the neo-colonialism that Nkrumah perceptively analyzed in
great detail continues to co-exist with the forces of globalization that
presently seek to homogenize the world at the economic, ideological,
political and cultural levels. Neo-colonialism continues to manifest as an
146 Chapter Eight
unequal system that ensures the economic subservience of Africa to the

economic interests of the industrialized richer nations in the guise of “free
trade” and “neo-liberal policies.” Central to such policies is the dogma of
privatization of state services; therefore, privatization was made a
condition of African states receiving IMF loans. One of the most
pernicious privatizations in Africa has been that of water in at least eight
Sub-Saharan African countries in the last ten years. The intense struggle
over deregulation of the water supply has been most acute in South Africa,
a country whose liberation movement, the ANC, held sacred the
conviction that the national wealth of the country belongs to all who live
in it. A fierce resistance against water privatization began in 2003. It was
led by Richard Mokolo, leader of the Crisis Water Committee, in the
township Orange Farm, south of Johannesburg. He declared:
“Privatization is a new kind of apartheid. Apartheid separated whites from
blacks. Privatization separates the rich from the poor.”24 In essence,
privatization by foreign interests in Africa is a reconfiguration of new
forms of economic monopoly of African resources for foreign benefit.
Five years after the publication of Neo-colonialism, Nkrumah
published a much understated but very important book, Class Struggle in
Africa. It remains as important as Neo-colonialism for what he was
attempting to do, which was to analyze class differences in an African
context in the era of the 1960s. He argued that five main social classes
emerged in the post-independent Africa (however, some had been in
existence in the pre-colonial era): the peasants; the rural and industrial
proletariat; the urban and rural petit bourgeoisie; traditional rulers; and the
bourgeoisie.
Class Struggle in Africa, written forty years ago, provides a pertinent
theoretical perspective that requires updating in our present times. Critical
questions that need to be asked include: What broad class forces exist in
Africa today? What are the intra-class dynamics between these class
forces? How do they relate to the ruling and working classes in the
Northern countries and elsewhere, for example in the BRIC countries
(Brazil, Russia, India and China)? Furthermore, in Class Struggle in
Africa, Nkrumah contends that class divisions in modern African society
became obfuscated in the period leading up to independence. All classes
were united with the common purpose of seeking to eject the European
colonial master. In the post-independence phase, Nkrumah argued that
over time the African middle class came to constitute “the class ally of the
bourgeoisie of the capitalist world,”25 a “subordinate partner to foreign
capitalism.” Nkrumah appeared to concur with Fanon that: “the African
bourgeoisie remains therefore largely a comprador class, sharing in some

of the profits which imperialism drains from Africa.”26
In a series of discussions with ordinary Jamaicans (otherwise known in
Jamaica as “groundings”), Walter Rodney remarked that: “the black
intellectual, the black academic must attach himself [and, I will add,
herself] to the activity of the black masses.”27 The question today is—to
what extent are those Africans who work for international NGOs, or
African NGOs and the African middle classes in the universities and other
sectors of the economy, attached to “the activity of the black masses”?
And, are they servicing their own class interests as well as those of neo-
imperialism?
A second important intellectual legacy Nkrumah left behind was of
“Consciencism.” The central emphasis of the book with the same title is
that Africa needs to evolve its own ideology and philosophy to solve “the
crisis of the African conscience” afflicting African society.28 Nkrumah
wrote this book in 1964 and edited it in 1970 with a reprint. He contends
that Africa needs to harmonise the three cultural currents that exist within
African societies. These three currents are the traditional African, Euro-
Christian and Islamic. Mazrui aptly characterised this triad as “the triple
heritage.” In short, like the Japanese who can modernise and industrialise
and continue to retain their Japanese identity, Africans must re-assert an
African Personality on the world stage in a mode that positively
harmonises these cultural currents in achieving the “African Revolution”
for which Nkrumah called.29
A third important legacy that has fallen into historical obscurity was
stated in Nkrumah’s Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare, written in 1968.
Nkrumah called for the creation of the Organisation of Solidarity with the
People of Africa, Asia and Latin America (OSPAAL).30 He did not
provide a blueprint for this organisation. He considered that it would:
“provide an organic link with the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin
America who are struggling against imperialism.”
It seems the existence of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the
World Social Forum (WSF) mirrors the kind of organisational and
ideological links that Nkrumah wanted to build between Africa, Asia and
Latin America. Nkrumah participated in the NAM during the 1960s
alongside his contemporaries—Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Ahmed
Sukarno of Indonesia, Josef Tito of the then Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdel
Nasser of Egypt, and U Nu of Burma. As the Cold War raged, the NAM
was preoccupied with taking a stand against pacts and blocs that divided
the world into hostile camps of East and West. With the Cold War at an
148 Chapter Eight
end, the NAM is currently preoccupied with the issues of HIV/AIDS,

trade, investment and globalization.
Similarly, the WSF is a broad platform upon which progressive forces
and social and political movements in the South can build alternatives to
the current neo-liberal economic order. Despite criticism in 2007 that it
was dominated by “NGO-ization,” co-option and lack of participation of
real social movements, the challenge for African social and political
movements is to align themselves with other progressive movements in
the South—in Asia, Brazil and Latin America—in order to alter the
representation and participation of grassroots movements in the WSF.
The WSF typifies the kind of “organic links” that Nkrumah urged
people of Africa, India and Latin America to forge in order to challenge
what he considered to be the enemy of the time—imperialism. Today,
imperialism’s guises of neo-liberalism and capitalist globalisation are the
enemies of African people and Pan-Africanism. Currently, the region in
the world where imperialism and neo-liberalism are being directly
challenged is in Latin America, where a “pink revolution” of
progressive/Socialist orientated governments has taken power over the last
two decades. The governments of Evo Morales in Bolivia, Hugo Chavez
in Venezuela, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua,
Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, and the
Brazilian successor of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Dilma Rousseff, can
show Africans that there is an alternative to IMF/World Bank market
policies that places paramount control of a country’s assets in the interests
of its poor and underprivileged for economic development.
A fourth important intellectual legacy was Nkrumah’s commitment to
“scientific Socialism.” At the Second Conference of Non-Aligned States in
Cairo in October 1964, Nkrumah proclaimed: “Socialism does not belong
to the Soviet Union or China, or for that matter to any other country; it is
an international idea.” Nkrumah had made unequivocal in his writings that
he considered capitalism to be antithetical to the interests of ordinary
people; he considered it a vulturistic system that relentlessly exploited the
labour and economic resources of African people during the colonial era.31
In light of the global economic crisis ushered in with the credit and
housing crisis during 2008, increases in food prices led to violent food
riots in more than twenty countries around the world, including Senegal,
Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Somalia and Mozambique.
The year 2008 saw record levels of hunger for the world’s poor,
particularly in Africa, where the majority of the continent’s people live on
less than a dollar a day. At the same time, there were record profits for the
world’s major agri-food corporations.32 During the crisis, Alan Greenspan,
the head of the United States Federal Reserve for eighteen years, was
questioned by the United States Congressional hearings. He admitted that
he had found a “flaw in the free market theory.” When Greenspan was
probed further by representative Waxman, who asked whether his “view
of the world, [his] ideology was not right; it was not working?”,
Greenspan responded with candour and said: “Absolutely, precisely. You
know that’s precisely the reason I was shocked, because I have been going
for forty years or more with the very considerable evidence that it was
working exceptionally well.”33
The unfolding economic crisis provides Pan-Africanists and progressive
forces an opportunity to critique the prevailing economic system, and
more importantly to put forward a more just alternative economic system
to capitalism that meets the needs of ordinary people throughout the world.
Now is the time for such forces to patiently critique, educate and mobilize
ordinary people towards dreaming of a new world; to seek alternative
paradigms. This demand for a more just egalitarian economic world order
is in keeping with Nkrumah’s vision for Africa and the world. As Walter
Rodney pointed out in his book, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa:
Capitalism has created its own irrationalities such as a vicious white
racism, the tremendous waste associated with advertising, and the
irrationality of incredible poverty in the midst of wealth and wastage even
inside the biggest capitalist economies, such as that of the United States of
America.34
Capitalists around the world are currently seeking to sustain an

unsustainable economic system. They are trying to fix a system in severe
crisis with a variation of further fiscal controls, budgetary austerity and
calls for greater banking regulations. The international financial crisis has
eroded the credibility of the neoliberal economics that provided its
intellectual underpinnings. Despite this, neo-liberalism continues to
exercise a strong influence on economists in Africa (and the South
generally) and in the global North particularly (e.g. in the institutions of
the IMF, World Bank and WTO).
In other words, Nkrumah’s writings, particularly his Class Struggle in
Africa, envisioned a new world economic order, of which “scientific
Socialism” was a central part. He did not provide a detailed blueprint of
this new economic and social system, but outlined that it would be based
on particular egalitarian principles in which the profit motive of capitalism
would not exist. Nkrumah ends his book Class Struggle in Africa with a
call for “The total liberation and unification of Africa under an All-African
Socialist government.” He believed that this: “Must be the primary
150 Chapter Eight
objective of all Black revolutionaries throughout the world.” Nkrumah

states that the total liberation and unification of Africa under an All-
African Socialist government: “Will at the same time advance the triumph
of the international Socialist revolution, and the onward progress towards
world communism, under which, every society is ordered on the principle
of—from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.”35
Therefore, Nkrumah’s commitment to “scientific Socialism” remains
profoundly relevant as the current capitalist economic system implodes
from within and seeks to sustain its globally exploitative character. An
alternative equitable economic system is imperative in our current times.
A fifth intellectual legacy is one that we constantly need to remind
ourselves and peoples of African descent around the world of, particularly
as the forces of globalization seek to impose a global universal identity.
The current ubiquity of Coca Cola and McDonald's in all four corners of
the globe is a manifestation of the economic and cultural impact of
globalization with its consequent impact on the health of people of the
South. In the diaspora, where issues of African identity remain and have
manifested in forms of internalized racism, we should not forget that we
are Africans in a global village of humanity, regardless of where we live.
Nkrumah proclaimed that: “All peoples of African descent whether they
live in North or South America, the Caribbean, or in any other part of the
world are Africans and belong to the African nation.”36
In addition, on the African continent, issues of citizenship have been at
the heart of political conflicts in the Ivory Coast, particularly in the
expression of “Ivorité” (who is an Ivorian?) and in South Africa, where
attacks on African immigrants in March 2008 led to the deaths of more
than sixty immigrants in townships close to the city of Johannesburg.
These developments indicate the imperative to cultivate a Pan-African
citizenship and identity that recognizes the rights and responsibilities of all
Africans, regardless of where they are born, as possessing a right to live,
work and settle in any part of the African continent. These rights should be
protected by African governments, but more importantly, African
governments are responsible for cultivating a Pan-African awareness and
Pan-African global community of peace and tolerance as they fulfil the
basic needs of all African people.
A sixth intellectual legacy is Nkrumah’s principled opposition to
nuclear weapons. Today there are nine countries in the world that possess
nuclear weapons37; in addition, biological and chemical weapons have
been added to the accumulated arsenal. In his time, Nkrumah made known
his condemnation of the detonation of an atomic bomb in the Sahara desert
by the French government in February 1960. He characterised the actions
of Charles De Gaulle’s government as one of “nuclear imperialism” and

“atomic arrogance.” He seized French assets in Ghana and recalled the
Ghanaian ambassador to France. Nkrumah was relentlessly committed to
the principle of peace because he believed that nuclear weapons and the
hostile climate they engendered were inimical to security and peace, not
only in the world but also in Africa. His government hosted the June 1962
World Without the Bomb Conference in Accra. A hundred delegates,
largely from the Eastern bloc, attended. This example is indicative of one
of the lesser-known intellectual legacies of Nkrumah—his opposition to
the destructive purposes of nuclear weapons. He believed that financial
resources allocated to procuring nuclear, biological and chemical weapons
could be diverted to the establishment of schools, hospitals and roads that
productively benefit human beings rather than destroy human life. Today,
genuine Pan-Africanism must support peace for all of humanity and
oppose the insistence of some nations to continue to possess and increase
their nuclear weapons.
In summary, Nkrumah’s analytical and conceptual contribution to class
struggle, neo-colonialism, Consciencism, the necessity for greater and
meaningful solidarity between Africa, and the social movements of Latin
America and Asia, the necessity for Socialism, and his principled
opposition to nuclear weapons, are intellectual legacies that remain highly
pertinent to African people today.
In terms of the political legacy of Nkrumah, there are those such as Ali
Mazrui who argue that he did not score favourably on this front. Mazrui
contends that Nkrumah was the progenitor of “black authoritarianism,”
particularly in his employment of the Preventive Detention Act (PDA) to
incarcerate his political opponents.38
In seeking to challenge this argument—but certainly not to exonerate
Nkrumah, there are three reasons that can be presented to account for his
actions. First, Nkrumah’s decline into authoritarianism was driven not
only by what Mazrui characterises as “pragmatic, cultural and Leninist
considerations,” but cannot be separated from the real acts of violence
pursued by the opposition groups that threatened both the security of the
state and Nkrumah personally.39
Secondly, there were a number of intrigues and rumours to overthrow
Nkrumah’s government in December 1958. In addition to this were the
explosions in various public venues from 1951 onwards, as well as the
assassination attempts of 1955, 1962 and 1964, which all justified in
Nkrumah’s mind the need for strong measures to safeguard his person and
the security of the state.
152 Chapter Eight
Thirdly, when comparing the political measures Nkrumah adopted

from 1958 to 1966 with that of his contemporaries—such as Sékou Touré
of Guinea, Lépold Senghor of Senegal, Modibo Keita of Mali, Felix
Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Julius
Nyerere of Tanzania—one finds that they were not the progenitors of
single party rule in Africa, as Mazrui argues. A critical regional
comparison of how various African states sought to wield political order in
the post-independence phase of Africa’s history illustrates that none of
these post-colonial states could escape the authoritarian structures of the
colonial state they had inherited.
Zolberg’s study shows that, independent of Nkrumah, his contemporaries
were also consumed with mechanisms that would produce cohesive
nation-states among diverse ethnic communities within the boundaries of
the nation-state bequeathed at independence.40 This was the challenge of
all post-colonial African states, and it appears that authoritarian measures,
rather than genuine democratic ones, were adopted as leaders and parties
sought to maintain their grasp on power and the trappings of the state.
Nkrumah cannot be accused of what Mazrui defines as “starting the whole
tradition of Black authoritarianism in the post-colonial era.”41 The
contention is that Nkrumah’s authoritarianism is more complex than
simply attributing it to megalomania. Even if there were some elements of
the latter involved in the motivation of his actions and policies, we must
equally address the material and political forces of an opposition that even
prior to independence used terror to achieve political ends.42
In terms of the more positive political legacies Nkrumah left behind,
several among them are the CPP’s newspaper, the Accra Evening News,
and his sponsorship of the Encyclopaedia Africana Project—important
institutions in which Nkrumah played an initiating and significant role. His
government contributed to the establishment of many primary and
secondary schools, therefore raising the levels of literacy in Ghana, the
building of roads and motorways, the building of Tema Harbour, the
construction of the Akosombo dam to provide electricity for Ghana and
the West African region in the Volta River Project, as well as many other
socio-economic projects that laid the economic foundations of a modern
Ghana.
Lastly, Nkrumah’s most important political legacy lies in his vision of
a Continental Union Government of Africa or Pan-Africanism. His vision
of African unity is not only a political legacy seeking to empower Africans
and the African continent; it is also an intellectual one. Integral to his
notion of African unity was the establishment of a Joint African
Command, which he first called for during the Congo crisis of 1960.
Nkrumah is the ideological father of the notion of an African Command,

and the formation of the United States Africa Command, or AFRICOM,
by George W. Bush in October 2007 is anathema to Nkrumah's memory
and must be resisted by all Pan-Africanists.
Nkrumah’s vision of an African High Command was wholly organised
by Africans for Africans against the enemies of imperialism, neo-
colonialism and balkanisation of the continent. He did not envisage that
such a command would be established to conceal America’s global war
against terrorism (GWOT), or that AFRICOM would be set up as a means
to secure America’s oil supply from Africa as the United States seeks to
lessen its oil dependence on the Middle East in the forthcoming decades.
Nkrumah has left a valuable intellectual legacy, comprising an
essential analytical framework in which to comprehend our present reality.
Such a legacy and framework remain unmitigatedly relevant for Africans
and the African continent today.
Notes
1
K. Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Panaf,
1965), ix.
2
Ibid.,.ix.
3
K. Nkrumah, Conference of Independent States, April 15, 1958, Second Edition,
1.
4
K. Nkrumah, Revolutionary Path (London: Panaf, 1973), 311.
5
Ibid., 310.
6
K. Nkrumah, Neo-colonialism, 84.
7
Ibid, Chapters 6 and 8.
8
Ibid., 205.
9
Ibid., 109.
10
Ike Okonta and Oronto Douglas, Where Vultures Feast Shell, Human Rights and
Oil (Verso, 2003).
11
For a list of these eighty-five corporations, see Robert Miller, “The Vile
Scramble for Loot How British Corporations are Fuelling War in the Congo,”
November 19, 2009, http://www.zcommunications.org/the-vile-scramble-for-loot-
by-robert-miller.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
K. Nkrumah, Consciencism (London: Panaf, 1970), 105.
15
A. Mazrui, Nkrumah’s Legacy and Africa’s Triple Heritage between
Globalization and Counter Terrorism (Accra: Ghana Universities Press, 2004), 1.
16
Ibid., 1.
17
T. Abdul-Raheem, “An African Perspective on Globalization,” in The Society
for International Development, (1998), 23–26.
154 Chapter Eight
18
H. Campbell, Pan-Africanism, Pan-Africanists, and African Liberation in the
21st Century Two Lectures (Washington DC: New Academia Publishing, 2006),
39.
19
E, Holt-Giménez & R. Patel, Food Rebellions! Crisis and the Hunger for Justice
(Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2009), 45–46.
20
C. Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire
(London: Sphere, an imprint of Little & Brown, 2000), 6.
21
Holt-Giménez & Patel, Food Rebellions!, 47.
22
F. William Engdahl, Seeds of Destruction The Hidden Agenda of Genetic
Manipulation (Montréal: Global Research, 2007).
23
Ibid., xiv.
24
P. Bond, “A Battle over Water in South Africa,”
http://africafiles.org/printableversion.asp?id=4564.
25
K. Nkrumah, Class Struggle, 33.
26
Ibid., 56.
27
W. Rodney, Groundings With my Brothers (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture, 1975),
63.
28
K. Nkrumah, Consciencism (1970 edition), 70.
29
K. Nkrumah, Class Struggle, 84–88. Nkrumah discusses the objectives of the
“African Revolution” and how it will be a contribution to anti-imperialist struggles
around the world.
30
K. Nkrumah, Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare (London: Panaf, 1968), 57.
31
K. Nkrumah, Towards Colonial Freedom (London: Panaf, 1962). This small
book is a critique of capitalism and particularly what Nkrumah defined as the
damaging operations of “colonial economics.”
32
E. Holt-Giménez & R. Patel, Food Rebellions! Crisis and the Hunger for Justice
(Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2009), 6.
33
Cited in Y. Tandon, Development and Globalisation: Daring to Think
Differently (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2009), 8.
34
W. Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington DC: Howard
University Press, 1982), 10.
35
K. Nkrumah, Class Struggle in Africa (1970), 88.
36
Cited in ibid., 87.
37
The nine countries currently in possession of nuclear weapons are: Russia
(15,000); United States (9,600); France (350); China (200); Israel (100–200);
United Kingdom (160); Pakistan (60–70); India (50–60); and North Korea (2–10).
See New Internationalist (June 2008), 9.
38
A. Mazrui, Nkrumah’s Legacy & Africa’s Triple Heritage Between
Globalization & Counter Terrorism (Accra: Ghana University Press, 2004), 4.
39
Ibid., 5.
40
A. R. Zolberg, Creating Political Order The Party-States of West Africa
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966).
41
Mazrui, Nkrumah’s Legacy, 4.
42
In a forthcoming article to be published by the Ghana Studies Council, I
examine Nkrumah’s use of Preventive Detention and contest the argument that he
started “the whole tradition of Black authoritarianism,” as posited by Mazrui.
CHAPTER NINE
PAN-AFRICANISM, FEMINISM
AND SOCIO-SEXUAL POWER
DR ANNECKA LEOLYN MARSHALL

LECTURER, INSTITUTE FOR GENDER AND DEVELOPMENT STUDIES,
UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES
Abstract
Pan-Africanism and feminism are vibrant and dynamic areas of multi-
disciplinary scholarship and grassroots activism that promote solidarity
among Black men and women in Africa and the diaspora. Examining the
cultural, religious and moral regulation of gender and sexual identities is
important to understanding the perpetuation of power inequalities.
Independent self-definitions empower Black men and women to reject
exploitative historical stereotypes about hyper-sexuality, promiscuity,
exoticism and lovelessness that originated during enslavement. As
revolutionary and visionary social movements Pan-Africanism and
feminism oppose racism, patriarchy, heteronormativity and class
subordination. Thriving and exciting African and African Diaspora Studies
criticise the exclusion of African phenomena from epistemological
assumptions about the diasporic space. African Studies helps us to learn
from our radical resistance against colonialism and neo-colonialism to
understand our shared histories, our cultures, our experiences and
ourselves. This greatly contributes to commitment to Black consciousness,
pride, respect and liberating community building. Pan-Africanism and
feminism inspire us to support the psychological, intellectual and spiritual
upliftment of African and diasporan people. The development of
ideologies and practices that promote global struggles for social, economic
and political progress is essential. Black women’s unity with Black men
necessitates them tackling their own patriarchal beliefs. Feminism offers
new, liberating and alternative identities that create equal, passionate and
loving relationships. Raising progressive, individual and collective
156 Chapter Nine
consciousness that defies sexist expectations about the masculinity and

femininity of African people and those of African descent is integral to
preventing the policing of gender roles and erotica. Social transformation
is intricately linked to orgasmic freedom.
Pan-Africanism and feminism are vibrant and dynamic areas of multi-

disciplinary scholarship and grassroots activism that promote solidarity
among black men and women in Africa and the diaspora. Pan-Africanism
and feminism encourage us to support the psychological, intellectual and
spiritual uplift of African and African diasporic people. Examining the
social, religious and moral regulation of gender and sexual identities is
important in creating awareness of the perpetuation of power inequalities.
This paper explores the contribution of combining Pan-Africanism with
Black, Caribbean and African feminisms. I consider ways to enhance the
liberating connections between Pan-African and feminist academia and
mobilization, as the revolutionary and visionary social movements of Pan-
Africanism and feminism reject racism, patriarchy, heteronormativity and
class subordination.
Thriving and exciting African and African Diaspora studies oppose the
exclusion of African phenomena from epistemological assumptions about
the diasporic space. African Studies helps us to learn from our radical
resistance against colonialism and neo-colonialism in order to understand
our shared histories, our cultures, our experiences, and ourselves. This
greatly contributes to a dedication to black consciousness, pride, respect
and liberating community building. Independent self-definitions and
coalition politics empower black men and women to reject exploitative
historical stereotypes about hyper-sexuality, promiscuity, exoticism and
"lovelessness" that originated during enslavement. Merging the paradigms
of Pan-Africanism, African, Caribbean and Black feminisms inspires us to
recognize our united interests in supporting the human rights of people in
continental and diasporic Africa. Developing ideologies and practices that
promote global struggles for civil, cultural, economic, political and sexual
progress is essential.
Highlighting the need for Pan-Africanism to dismantle power
inequalities in Jamaica demonstrates the importance of scholarship and
advocacy in supporting communities. Similar struggles exist elsewhere for
black people when the practical application of Pan-Africanism and
feminism need to be reconsidered. My focus on the commonalities and
differences in Africa and the diaspora addresses the significance of
creating equal racial, class, gender and sexual identities that are not
Pan-Africanism, Feminism and Socio-Sexual Power 157
regulated by cultural expectations. Black women’s unity with black men

necessitates males tackling their own patriarchal beliefs and conduct.
Feminism offers original, emancipating and alternative identities that
enhance passionate and loving partnerships. Raising a progressive,
individual and collective consciousness that defies sexist expectations
about the masculinities and femininities of African people and those of
African descent is integral to preventing the policing of gender roles and
erotica. Social transformation is intricately related to orgasmic freedom.
Pan-Africanism in Jamaica And Beyond

“Very few Jamaicans can appreciate the success of one of their own.
Jamaicans are like crabs, no one must climb out of the basket, or out of the
barrel. All will unite to pull him back as he climbs ….” (Garvey 1977)
In Jamaica, like Africa and the rest of the diaspora, it is important to
empower voiceless, vulnerable, marginalized and poor communities.
Addressing the problems of extra-judicial killings, fatal shootings,
beatings and torture during the detention of young men by security forces
and possible solutions is incumbent. Challenges to the power imbalances
that are apparent in brutal and heavy-handed “crime-fighting” methods of
policing are necessary. Exposing the deficiencies in the justice system and
the accountability mechanism which prevents legal reform is pivotal. The
judicial system’s failure to convict corrupt police officers makes for
distrusting, threatening and insecure communities. It is essential to
mobilize change within Jamaican society by inspiring leaders and gaining
global recognition and support. The provision of teaching and support
mechanisms to educate Jamaicans about their rights and the ways they can
play more proactive roles as citizens is central, and a priority to foster
democracy, liberty and freedom of opinion. Increasing Jamaicans’
responsibilities to respect the humanity, dignity and welfare of themselves
and each other is crucial. There is an urgent need to advocate honour,
peace and fair treatment to improve living standards. Human rights
education in schools is vital to sensitise students and teachers about
adopting good governance and ensuring progressive change in Jamaica.
Jamaican women’s faith and commitment to seeking justice against the
abuse of Jamaican men’s rights is inspirational:
These women, who are mothers, sisters and wives of the deceased, refuse
to accept that the killings, which they believe to be extra-judicial, will go
unpunished. The deaths of their family members at the hands of the state
are too often viewed, at a comfortable distance of privilege, as “collateral
damage” of the “war against crime” in Jamaica. These women put their
158 Chapter Nine
lives at risk in their search for justice. They persist in challenging the
system and exemplify compelling integrity, courage and persistence.
(Jamaicans For Justice 2000)
It is important to address these issues within the larger context of the

necessity to create different solutions to deal with issues relating to crime
and violence. These atrocities are occurring amongst Jamaicans almost a
century after Marcus Mosiah Garvey founded the Universal Negro
Improvement Association (UNIA) in Kingston, Jamaica, in 1914. Garvey
moved to the United States in 1916 to spread his opinions about black
separatism and self-reliance. Historically, the Universal Negro Improvement
Association was the largest civil rights movement of people of African
ancestry. Garvey was the first black leader in history to gain massive loyal
support in the United States, becoming Jamaica’s first and most popular
national hero. Pan-African nationalism is the fundamental principle of
Garveyism. As Garvey proclaimed: “Africa for Africans, those at home
and those abroad” (Garvey 1977).
Garvey believed that the issue of repatriation was important. Africans
and descendants of Africans who live in the diaspora have to unite and
liberate Africa from foreign domination. Garvey urged taking charge of
the industrial development of the African homeland for the benefit of
Africans. He advocated the return of black citizens in the diaspora to
Africa. He explained that Africans must emancipate their minds from an
inferiority complex. He demonstrated the need to re-educate Black people
about the rich history of African civilization. Garvey demanded: “Up you
mighty race, you can accomplish what you will. Our ancestors created
great civilizations of the past. We shall create another that will astonish the
world” (Garvey 1977).
Today, the UNIA continues Garvey’s work on race consciousness and
community building. The motto of the organization is “One God! One
Aim! One Destiny!” Pan-Africanism increases the knowledge of
continental Africans and those of African heritage of their common
backgrounds, which is integral to advancement. In Jamaica, it is important
to incorporate Garvey's philosophy into popular culture in order to learn
from our resistance against racial subordination. However, when I ask
most university students about Garvey it is obvious that they do not know
the relevance of his work to contemporary Jamaica. Teaching Garveyism
in Jamaican schools, colleges and universities is a controversial issue
within an American and Eurocentric educational status quo. It is vital that
at educational institutions students learn about Garveyism and its impact
on governance. Garvey’s role in moulding a collective sense of black
identity and accomplishments needs to be emphasized because his
philosophy is not known by most Jamaicans. Despite major strides in

music and sport, as demonstrated by Bob Marley and at the Olympics in
2012, Jamaican society is struggling with the legacy of enslavement,
comprising such aspects as poverty, crime and violence. There is an urgent
need to take heed of the merit of Garvey’s famous teachings, for instance:
“If you don’t have confidence in yourself, you are twice defeated in the
race of life”; “with confidence you have won before you began”; and “we
are going to emancipate ourselves from mental slavery because whilst
others might free the body, none but ourselves can free our minds (Garvey
1977).
Demonstrating the feminist tendencies of Pan-Africanism, Marcus
Garvey declared: “A reading man and woman is a ready man and woman,
but a writing man and woman is exact” (Garvey 1977).
During the 1960s and 1980s, the daring Guyanese historian and
revolutionary Walter Rodney promoted Black liberation among poor
people in Guyana, Jamaica and Tanzania. Walter Rodney, as a lecturer in
African Studies at the Mona Campus in Jamaica, greatly contributed to
students’ struggles for black consciousness and pride in the Black Power
Movement (Dabydeen, Gilmore & Jones 2007). Pan-Africanism dismantles
dominant Western and Eurocentric theories and methods to offer new,
self-reflective and anti-establishment thinking about our hopes for the
present and the future. It builds on the works of intellectuals such as
DuBois, Cox, Fanon, James and Cabral to implement initiatives for Black
emancipation. The comparative analysis of racial identities examines how
oral history, art, popular culture and embodied and ritual memory are also
affected by social factors such as class, gender, sexuality, religion and the
environment (Olaniyan & Sweet 2010). Pan-Africanism queries issues
around power, development, progress and sovereignty.
Maureen Warner-Lewis has conducted extensive research on the ways
that the origin and transformation of cultural thought and customs in
Trinidad, Jamaica, Guyana and Cuba have been formed by Central African
culture. Oral narratives document the communal consciousness, cultural
continuity and identity in the traditional values and social relations
surrounding labour patterns, language, food, musical instruments, religion
and the masquerade tradition. The effect of internal migrations, the
transatlantic slave trade and multiple ethnic identities is evident in
personal names, lexical cognates, and artistic and motor behaviours. The
influence of Central African history, ethnicity and customs on
contemporary Caribbean lifestyles is also displayed in folktales, proverbs
and songs that use phrases from Central African languages (Warner-Lewis
2003). Carolyn Cooper asserts that Jamaican dancehall culture is a
160 Chapter Nine
ritualized celebration of African female sexuality and fertility, maintaining

that here working class women’s sexual independence adopts Yoruba
fertility rituals (Cooper 2010).
Ifi Amadiume calls for a new history, vision and understanding of
Africa that does not mirror Western anthropologists’ racist, elitist and
patriarchal concepts. She examines matriarchal systems of autonomous
rule in West Africa. She states that traditional women’s movements in
Nigeria were characterized by control of the subsistence economy and the
marketplace, self-government and maintenance of their own religion and
culture. The replacement of the Eurocentric elite with African elites
enforced the masculinization of state power and militarization. Amadiume
explains that colonialism instigated appropriation, male domination,
fragmentation, dependence, exploitation, violation and violence that have
been internalized. She thinks that diasporic African communities must
construct alternatives to oppressive imperialist and masculinist structural
power. Grassroots leadership involving women and young people
indicates a positive legacy (Amadiume 1997).
African women have been central to Pan-African struggles. In general,
the contribution of African women to Pan-Africanism has not been
recognized due to a failure to admit women’s autonomy outside of the
domestic realm. Solidarity between black women and men requires the
rejection of patriarchal power and privileges. bell hooks asserts that
African American men and women should unify as “comrades in struggle”
for equal rights, justice, peace and liberation; however, women’s needs are
neglected (hooks 2000). Throughout the African continent, patriotism,
democracy and national identity are defined in patriarchal terms that
restrict female participation (Mama 1996). Viewed as submissive wives
and mothers to serve male needs, the influence of African women on Pan-
Africanism is ignored (Lewis 2006). Feminists tackle the male bias that
excludes women from the benefits of Pan-African campaigns for
independence and reduces their impact. Women condemn the perpetuation
of androcentric, racial and class interests that do not meet the concerns of
African people (McFadden 2005).
Feminism in West Africa and the Diaspora

I must point out that I have retained the term feminist in spite of the
controversy regarding to whom it refers and what is meant by it. The
meaning of the word as I have used it is a political consciousness by
women, which leads to a strong sense of self-awareness, self-esteem,
female solidarity and, consequently, the questioning and challenging of
gender inequalities in social systems and institutions. (Amadiume 1987,

10)
African, Caribbean and black feminisms encourage self-reflexivity.

Critically examining its status in terms of their privileged or exploited
position by social categories such as race, class and sexuality is useful for
Pan-African consciousness. Additionally, such knowledge is a source of
empowerment. Amina Mama argues that African women articulate their
own awareness of feminism as an inclusive social movement that is
dedicated to women’s emancipation. African women’s survival is
premised on fighting against patriarchal ideologies that restrict them from
realizing their aspirations beyond domestic roles. National liberation,
feminist and anti-capitalist strategies improve women’s access to
democracy and social justice. Eliminating the feminization of poverty,
supporting women’s rights to choose their sexuality and eradicating sexual
abuse are integral feminist issues. The increase of African women in
activist scholarship improves women’s decision-making and social
mobility. Feminism discredits patriarchal norms which reduce the number
and influence of female academics. Feminist research ethics prioritize
equality, critical thought, accountability and social transformation.
However, more African women are necessary in leadership positions
(Mama 1996).
Patricia McFadden explains that feminism is an ideology of resistance
that evolves from confronting unequal gender hierarchies in African
societies. Women fight against patriarchy for rights, dignity and
responsibilities that develop their lives and the wider society. African
women refute the belief that male authority, injustice and misogyny are
natural. African women reclaim integrity and personhood. Their presence
in public arenas improve women’s self-concepts and how they are
perceived within institutions. Reaffirming their entitlement to citizenship
and social advancement empowers them (McFadden 2005).
African women in the diaspora validate their unique, defiant and
positive self-concepts and relationships (hooks 1991). Patricia Hill Collins
explains that African American women resolve the contradictions between
externally defined negative images and their daily lives. Black women
challenge controlling myths and redefine themselves. Their empowerment
through independent self-perceptions enables them both to cope with and
surpass their oppression. Self-affirmation is developed within the
collective consciousness of familial relations and black communities that
provide the assertiveness, self-reliance and autonomy that are central to
the emancipation of black women (Collins 1990).
162 Chapter Nine
Collins argues that black feminism is based on the understanding that

shared subordination and concrete experiences are the foundations of
wisdom and well-being, offering a holistic approach that encompasses
dialogue about black women’s subjectivity. Black feminist thought
focuses on the ethic of taking care of local communities. This involves
personal expressiveness, empathy, unification and sharing of mutual
interests. Black feminist standpoints incorporate personal accountability so
that black women are responsible for claiming knowledge, ethics,
individual empowerment and societal transformation (Collins 1990). Black
feminism is not anti-male. It encourages dialogue between black men and
black women so that they can help each other to meet the socio-economic,
political and sexual needs of all black people.
Collins argues that Black women occupy an “outsider within status” in
the academy that allows them to recognize the injustices that those who
are part of the dominant culture are unable to comprehend. The
widespread repudiation of black women’s knowledge and lives leads to
radical insight. Black feminists have the advantage of a unique standpoint
for examining black women’s contradictory experiences in dealing with
dominant social structures. Marginalized scholarly black women creatively
use the “insider outsider” viewpoint to research the familiar world from
the perspective of the unfamiliar (Collins 1990). The usefulness of
feminism for rethinking Pan-Africanism is evident in the issues that it
examines, such as sexuality.
Sexuality in the Diaspora and Africa

… we need an erotics of being that is founded on the principal that we
have a right to express sexual desire as the spirit moves us and to find in
sexual pleasure a life-affirming ethos. Erotic connection calls us away
from isolation and alienation into community. In a world where positive
expressions of sexual longing connect us we will all be free to choose
those sexual practices which affirm and nurture our growth …. (hooks
2003, 92)
In England and Jamaica I use Collins's analysis of “outsider within” to

investigate the historical, social and psychological regulation of black
male and female sexuality in Britain and the Caribbean region. Enslaved
African men were depicted primarily in terms of sexual prowess, sexual
aggression and virility, being denied family lives and used as studs
(Collins 1990). Enslaved African women were portrayed as immoral,
lascivious, diseased and breeders. During slavery, images of African
women as licentious, animalistic and with uncontrollable sexual appetites
served to justify the exploitation of their labour and their sexual abuse by
white men (Bush 1990). The stereotype of black women as prostitutes
allowed white male slave owners to gratify their sexual and economic
needs (Collins 1990). The historical misrepresentation of African men and
women legitimated their oppression from the sixteenth century. An exotic
mythology of promiscuity endures in contemporary Caribbean and African
societies, in exploitative sex tourism, whereby Western tourists assert
racial and sexual authority. Black men and women are thereby racially and
sexually denigrated by notions of hypersexuality, inferiority and
corruption (Kempadoo 2003).
I conduct research on the ways that male and female views of diverse
sexual fantasies, identities and relationships are influenced by cultural,
moral and religious beliefs in British and Caribbean societies. Frequently
in the diaspora, Black men who are unable to be financial providers
reassert their masculinity by having many female partners and children.
Monogamy and fidelity are regarded as indicating male weakness, while
manhood is characterized by hatred of homosexuality (Chevannes 1997).
Often, black females engage in early sexual activity, around the age of
thirteen, by being forced by an older man in their community or through
incest with a relative. The economic dependency of girls and women on
men is shown by them having transactional sex with men for money, food,
clothes, jewellery, cell phones and other gifts (Kempadoo 2003). I am
interested in extending my analysis to critically examine the
commonalities and differences between gender and sexual relationships in
Africa and the diaspora.
Sylvia Tamale probes the depth, complexity and multiplicity of
African sexualities, explaining that it is vital to refute the effects of
colonialism, imperialism, globalization and religious fundamentalism on
the meanings of sexual experiences. Patriarchy, class, religion, age and
law influence the cultural, economic and political construction of sexual
relations in ways that lead to prejudice. Tamale criticizes internalized
oppression and encourages self-reflexivity, respect, empathy and tolerance
for sexual diversity. This entails recognizing one’s previous acceptance of
stereotypes and learning new ways to eradicate the control of fluid sexual
identities (Tamale 2011).
Caribbean feminists criticize repressive Western and male control over
black female sexuality. Patricia Mohammed investigates rigid ordering in
Caribbean societies that prioritizes men’s domination, their multiple
partnerships and sexual satisfaction. Although religion, popular culture
and language regulate female sexual desire to please men, women are
reasserting control of their sexuality by disrupting accepted patriarchal
164 Chapter Nine
expectations (Mohammed 1992), confronting the policing of sexuality

through sexist double standards maintaining men as sexually active and
women as passive. However, many girls and women cannot negotiate safer
sex practices in relationships in which men are the main decision-makers
in condom use (de Bruin 2008). It is necessary to bring Pan-Africanism
into critical contact with feminist activism to solve these problems.
Do We Have Socio-Sexual Power?

… when we begin to live from within outward, in touch with the power of
the erotic within ourselves, and allowing that power to inform and
illuminate our actions upon the world around us, then we begin to be
responsible to ourselves in the deepest sense. For as we begin to recognize
our deepest feelings, we begin to give up, of necessity, being satisfied with
suffering and self-negation, and with the numbness which so often seems
like their only alternative in our society. Our acts against oppression
become integral with self, motivated and empowered from within. (Lorde
1984, 58)
It is essential to strike a balance between power in the social and sexual

realms. Since enslavement, the historical, social and psychological
construction of gender and sexuality has stereotyped and marginalized
black men and women. African, Caribbean and black feminists and male
pro-feminists explore informed choices about social status and sexuality
that are not determined by dominant cultural norms. Changes in black
people’s mental and sexual self-perceptions and realities must be allowed
to flourish for advancement. In public and in private, being open-minded,
respectful, honest and sensitive to achieving socio-sexual success on
personal and communal levels is central. In safe environments, the
expression of lust, pleasure and satisfaction is connected to control in the
wider society. Feeling sexually free contributes to enjoying life.
Debates about cultural and financial empowerment imply that it is
critical to re-evaluate the significance of Pan-Africanism in relation to
Black, Caribbean and African feminisms. Audre Lorde maintains that
sexual love has personal, social, economic and political power, urging
women to rearticulate eroticism as a dynamic force for private and social
transformation (Lorde 1984). Women’s love, creative energy and
imagination have more far-reaching consequences than their intimate
choices. The assertion of radical forms of femininity, sexuality and
knowledge enriches all areas of women’s existence. Lorde reasons that
women’s arousal of harmony, joy and cooperation offers exciting well-
being that is revolutionary. Erotic energy goes beyond intimate
partnerships, and contributes to social liberty for both men and women
(Lorde 1984).
Conclusion
Pan-Africanism, as well as African, Caribbean and Black feminisms,
are radical and subversive social movements that engender awareness,
pride, commitment and optimism. Effectively counteracting racism, class
exploitation, patriarchy and heteronormativity maximizes the potential for
individuals to have egalitarian social and sexual partnerships. Pan-
Africanism and feminism challenge the regulation of black men’s and
women’s lives. Overthrowing power inequalities in Africa and the
diaspora, popular culture and academia needs sustainable strategies and
solidarity among black people. We all have a personal accountability for
destroying wider systems of domination, starting with changing our own
personal lives. Black consciousness, individual sexual healing and
community welfare are essential to eradicating oppression. The development
of happy and independent self-concepts as well as collaborative politics
must recognize our differences and organize around our shared goals of
obtaining social and sexual power. We require open dialogue among black
men and women to analyse the connections between erotica and social
uplift in sensitive, non-prescriptive and non-exploitative ways. It is
necessary to resolve the ignorance, segregation, insecurity and
ambivalence that currently surround gender and sexual realities in Africa
and the diaspora. Re-creating Pan-Africanist and feminist expressions of
love strengthens black societies.
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CHAPTER TEN
AFRICA AND THE GENDER DEBATE TODAY:

BASIS OF DIVISION AND FUTURE UNION
HENRY KAM KAH

UNIVERSITY OF BUEA, CAMEROON
Abstract
This paper examines the gender debate as it affects, divides and unites
the people of Africa. Gender has become an important area of scholarship
where male orthodoxy is challenged, and since the UN decade for women
in the 1970s the level of debate about gender has been profound and
divergent. In some circles the debate is not an important issue, while in
others, advocacy and affirmative action are the norm. Ramphele argues
that male dominance in the gender discourse is a result of little knowledge
of the degree of social interaction between the sexes in many African
societies. Oyबwùmi, on the other hand, contends that African gender
discourse is a European invention, and Ifi Amadiume holds, using Nnobi
in Nigeria as a case study, that in pre-colonial Africa different activities
were not performed on the strict distinction between being feminine or
masculine. Using a content analysis of data, we examine the salience of
the debate and the lessons that could be drawn from it to promote the
greater unity of African people, both now and in the future.
Introduction—Africa and the Gender Discourse

Gender is not just an issue of concern for the Western world; it is a
global issue which has engaged the whole of the human race in diverse
arguments. Some authors have criticised the reliance on Western theory,
concepts and methodology, as well as the slowness in the development of
alternative theories and methodological approaches (Oyबwùmi 1997;
Anyidoho 2005; Randriamaro 2008:13). This is complimented by
170 Chapter Ten
Amadiume’s (1987) position that in the pre-colonial period in Nnobi,

Nigeria’s different activities were not performed on a strict distinction
between being feminine or masculine. The South African scholar
Ramphele (2006: 2) holds the view that male dominance in the gender
discourse in Africa is a result of little knowledge of the degree of social
interaction between the sexes in many African societies. The diverse
position of these women and gender scholars notwithstanding, the debate
is on and not likely to abate in the near future. There is no uniformity
about the positions that different scholars take, which only goes to show
that the future of the African continent depends on how this debate is
translated into an improvement in the roles that men and women of the
continent play in bringing about the development and unity of the people
of Africa.
Scholars of Africa are debating the concept of gender. There is,
however, emphasis on the ideological and material relation between them,
which has been historically described as unequal. While the concept of
gender connotes some form of socially constructed inequality between
men and women, it goes beyond that to include the political, economic and
cultural contexts of relations. This is because it is generally held that
women are subordinated to men (Omotola 2007, 35) within African
societies, even if there are exceptions to this rule. According to feminist
scholars, the perception of gender relations in the world today is
disproportionate and sometimes deliberately arranged by men to favour
them against women. This has made feminists the world over embark on a
struggle to advance women and their interests and perspectives, as well as
to correct the existing inequalities in nearly all domains of life. In spite of
this determination to correct gender imbalances, critics of the feminist
school argue that this risks reinforcing the same gender stereotyping that
they want to overcome. They also argue that feminism pushes a global
agenda of liberation and sisterhood based on imperialist constructions of
women (Anyidoho 2005; Omotola 2007, 35) and not necessarily on the
realities of the African people.
The debates and discourse on gender have been very tense and critical
in Africa, not only among scholars but also among the common people
who interact on a daily basis in different professions. In many instances,
men have rejected any talk of it across the continent, adopting a defensive
stance on the issue. Some of them think that it is a means for women to
destabilise the social order and push the men to the position of observers.
Such men have deliberately refused to negotiate with women on the best
way of handling the affairs of society. Other men of differing Christian
denominations have used Biblical texts that allege that God created
Africa and the Gender Debate: Basis of Division and Future Union 171
woman from the rib of man and thus is inferior. God has therefore
appointed man as the chief who deserves the respect of the woman in
society (Tietcheu 2005, 116; Badejo 2007, 16). Still, other men are bitter
about the ideology from the West which seeks to destabilise what they
consider secure African societies where gender was not an issue to the
extent of preoccupying and dividing people. This argument notwithstanding,
the gender discourse has also seen authors like Ebeku (2004, 176) argue
that women have played only subordinating roles, which are more
pronounced in the countries of Africa, as well as Asia, especially in the
rural areas. Ebeku seems to suggest that in the urban areas of Africa and
Asia, women have played leading positions. This again is debatable if one
goes by the challenges women face in the urban milieux in these two
continents daily.
Adesina’s (2010, 16) position on the gender debate is that the
exclusion of women from economic and/or the public realm of politics and
sociality in Africa is not inherently human or African. From this, one may
rightly and/or wrongly say that it is what men and other agencies in Africa
have done, and continue to do, that has excluded women from many areas
of the decision-making process. This is, however, a deviation from the
ways things were organised in Africa in the past, where life in many parts
of the continent was organised around the woman within the family.
Agarwal (1997, 1) presented another dimension to the debate about
gender relations, arguing that the nature of gender relations—that is,
relations of power between women and men—is not easy to grasp in its
full complexity. This dimension of the debate as presented by Agarwal
shows that the nature of gender relations in Africa, like elsewhere in the
world, is a very complex one that does not allow for any hasty and wrong
conclusions. Fonchingong (2006, 145–60) presented the same argument,
opining that the relations of power between men and women are not static.
These have changed over time in Africa and in other places, although there
is always the tendency to draw hasty conclusions on the dilemma of the
African woman. Both authors caution researchers of this gender
phenomenon not to make sweeping statements about the generality of
these relations of power across the continent and in all societies. While it
is generally held that men exercise more power than women, this has not
always been the case in all societies and at all times, as women like those
of eastern Nigeria, the Gold Coast and Kenya mobilised against the abuse
of power by their menfolk and other external forces in the colonial period.
Barr et al. (2009, 22) have also challenged the argument that gender
sorting in the villages of sub-Saharan Africa is driven by distrust between
men and women. These positions taken by Agarwal, Fonchinging and Barr
172 Chapter Ten
et al. only buttress the fact that there is no uniformity of views about the
gender debate, which has divided scholars and ordinary people, and
explain that rather than divide the debate should point the way towards a
better future for gender issues.
One other area of gender difference is that human beings form their
social structures around gender-based biological differences between men
and women. It is argued that biology influences the behaviour of people. A
gendered social structure is a universal accommodation to this biological
fact, or so goes the argument (Kennelly et al. 2001, 603). Some
contemporary scholars have, however, debunked this idea of discussing
gender relations on the basis of biology. In spite of this, there are still large
numbers of people in the rural and urban areas of Africa who feel that
women should not be included in certain decision-making processes. Even
when women brave all odds and get into professions that were hitherto the
preserve of men, they are slighted and abused by the men who feel that
women are invading the male space. Such is the complexity in gender
relations, which remains a source of disunity today. How can a group of
people be made to feel that they cannot perform certain functions simply
because of their biological composition? While the intensity of this
argument has been considerably reduced in some areas, it has not
completely gone away.
One domain of the gender talk or debate is the role of colonialism in
creating it in the first place. Barnes (n.d.) argues that colonialism
transmitted the traditional European distinctions between labour of the
mind and labour of the body directly to Africa. This argument of
colonialism and the West influencing gender discourse has also been
elaborately discussed by Amadiume (1987) and Oyबwùmi (1997).
Through this, men and masculinity were associated with labour and
women and femininity with the body. In fact, through the reproduction of
colonial-like policies supported by international financial institutions and
international corporate laws, the patriarchal ideologies of colonisation are
being reproduced through globalisation (Steady n.d., 1). Afonja (2005, 9)
also argues that gender and patriarchy originated from Western European
epistemologies and misrepresented African women’s realities. Although
the role of colonialism may be said to have exacerbated the gender debate,
one can, however, say that gender differences existed in the pre-colonial
era but were not a subject of intense debate and division between the sexes
across Africa, some exceptions notwithstanding.
Although still subject to debate in Africa’s pre-colonial era, there is a
general consensus that women had important public decision-making roles
in their positions as queen mothers and upper-class women in many of the
kingdoms. Some of them also exercised authority in occupations and

leadership in community associations. The households were important
production units, and the contribution of women to their success as
farmers, traders, craft persons and healers, among other things, worked in
their favour and gave them recognition and respect among the population.
Even in many patriarchal systems, women ran their own public affairs
without obstruction or interference from men. In some instances, there
existed dual political systems between the men and women. Those who
raise this argument, like Pearce (2000) and Taiwo (2010, 229), show that
gender talk during this period was not as divisive at it is today. Currently,
it is characterised by serious inequalities between men and women and has
led women to generally occupy secondary positions to men, especially in
public places. Taiwo argues that gender issues were not important because
everyone in the family and society had a role to play. Gender inequality
did not exist because any role, regardless of who performed it, was
considered equally important since it contributed to the fundamental goal
of the survival of the community. Gender inequality is a creation of
colonialism.
In spite of these arguments about gender differences and inequalities,
many African countries have ratified global and regional protocols which
aim at increasing gender equality in all domains, so that women, men, girls
and boys can participate in and benefit equitably from development
processes. Even within the founding legal instruments of the African
Union and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981, the
principle of equality and non-discrimination between men and women is
enshrined. This provides for the elimination of discrimination against
women and the protection of their rights (Kabur 2002, 4). The ratification
of these protocols has, however, not led to advancements in the gender
discourse towards equality. There are still arguments indicating that the
effective participation of women in governance structures and processes
and gender equity in governance outcomes remains limited in the majority
of African countries (Good Governance 2005, I; The Road 2004, 51). It
takes more than the ratification of these protocols and political will to see
a move towards the realisation of equality as enshrined in these protocols.
Some efforts have been made towards the promotion of gender equality as
a way of halting the widening division.
Promotion of Gender Equality

The gender debate in Africa today essentially centres on the gross
inequalities between men and women in the political, economic and socio-
174 Chapter Ten
cultural domains. These inequalities are at the base of the division,

although such disagreements could be turned into agreements and unity for
both men and women for the collective good of the society. In spite of the
present disagreements, some efforts and proposals to promote equality in
all spheres of life in Africa and its people in different ethnic groups have
been made. Some feminist scholars, both male and female, have advocated
gender balance through affirmative action. They argue that elective and
appointive seats and offices should automatically be allocated to women
so that they can be seen to participate in decision making. Affirmative
action, as advocated in South Africa and other African countries, is
focused on a system of political tools used to level the playing field,
focussing on the policies and strategies needed to redress past racial
imbalances in the workplace, education and gender equality, among other
things (Naidoo & Kongolo 2004, 124; Omotola 2007, 34). In fact, gender
equality, they argue, should play out in power politics where real problems
can be identified and appropriate measures taken to handle them. These
scholars are aware of the importance of political leadership and control
because they can lead to positive changes in the economic and socio-
cultural sectors. If women occupy many political and decision-making
positions, they can use them to enact policies that will see the practical
implementation of equality.
There is a rationale for strengthening women’s political effectiveness
in Africa. Afonja (2005, 9) argues that women’s political effectiveness
will enhance their capabilities and promote gender equality in policy
making, and cultivate male allies to advance the women’s cause. In South
Africa, the constitution emphasises gender equality and allows women
politicians to represent political parties through which they can press the
women’s agenda. Still, in South Africa men at the workplace try to
negotiate their roles in a manner that would help them be seen as in favour
of equal opportunities with women, though in private they are seemingly
against the notion altogether (Mdanda 2009, 89). The paradox of the
political effectiveness of women lies in the fact that when they are chosen
by their parties to attend and speak at political meetings, many of them are
tempted to toe the party line, which might not necessarily reflect their own
aspirations as women.
Other efforts have been made to promote gender equality in Africa in
the twenty-first century. Several women's groups and organisations are
emerging to demand equal participation in all issues involving members of
the society. In addition, conferences have been organised on a regular
basis to advocate women’s rights, duties and positions in the societies
(Alubo 2011, 78). Through these groups and conferences it is hoped that
society will come to terms with the fact that women generally need to be
brought into the mainstream of development and other activities in the
community for its own good. The conferences which have taken place
often target policy formulators and implementers to convert them to the
women’s cause and promote the equality of sexes in different walks of
life.
In the domain of higher education, efforts have also been made to
make gender equality a reality. There is, for example, an effort to promote
women’s social rights as equal to educational opportunities in many
African countries (Assie-Lumumba 2006, 50). Although this is not
vigorously pursued in all cases inAfrican countries, the fact that equal
opportunities in education have been made possible is a form of
commitment towards the promotion of gender equality in the educational
sector. One can only hope that such a policy is pursued and sustained for
the good and progress of the different African countries. Education is a
permanent asset that can contribute to a society redefining itself towards
what unites rather than what divides. The pursuit of meaningful and non-
discriminatory education will arm the people of Africa in addressing the
many things that unite them, rather than the few that divide them, like
gender inequality.
Throughout the African continent, several women’s organisations have
emerged and are involved in peace-building efforts at the grassroots level.
These groups have the intention of ensuring that a gender perspective is
considered when belligerents sign peace accords after devastating wars.
Through these female organisations, the needs and expectations of women
in a male-dominated process are brought to the surface. The Mano River
Women’s Network (MARWOPNET), for example, participated effectively
in a grassroots peace-building process in West Africa, which was greatly
appreciated, even if not by every stakeholder involved in the peace process
(Puechguirbal 2005, 1). Whenever women’s groups have actively
participated in talks and influenced their outcomes, a temporal situation of
equality is said to have existed. This needs to be sustained if gender
equality is anything to go by in peace-building discussions following the
devastating impacts of war, which often affect women and children more
than men.
Like Affirmative Action, there has also been gender mainstreaming to
promote gender equality in African countries and ethnic groups. Gender
mainstreaming ensures that gender perspectives and attention to the goal
of gender equality are at the centre of all activities of states, and include
policy development, research advocacy/dialogue, legislation, resource
allocation and planning, implementation, and monitoring of programmes
176 Chapter Ten
and projects (Kabonesa 2005, 14). If all African states and societies were
to pursue these shortcomings, gender inequality, which animates the
gender talk today, would not even arise. This does not, however, mean that
this policy of gender mainstreaming is not without problems affecting the
goal of promoting equality. Even with the problems associated with
gender mainstreaming, it is better to implement it than do nothing about
the promotion of equality in order to establish a kind of equilibrium in
different African countries.
Still, in relation to the promotion of gender equality, Mung’ong’o
(2003, 130) argues that the political opportunity structure under which
women have operated in Tanzania is fairly favourable to their
empowerment. Even if this same political structure has not benefitted
women elsewhere in Africa, it has done so here. Women have seized the
opportunity to get into domains that were initially reserved for men. There
have been attempts to promote women’s participation in politics as
decision makers in other countries, but these have been few and far
between. While there is still a struggle for female empowerment within the
political realm, they have relative independence in the economic sector in
many sub-Saharan Africa countries. This is due to the traditional practice
of wives receiving land from their husbands’ lineage to grow cassava and
other subsistence crops for feeding the family (Kritz and Gurak 1989,
100). All these notwithstanding, there are still impediments to gender
parity in Africa today.
Impediments to Gender Parity

The gender debate is one of the foundations of division in the African
continent today which has led to efforts to make gender a more acceptable
concept and phenomenon. In spite of this, many hurdles have undermined
these uncoordinated lofty efforts, and there are still grave gender
disparities which have reduced the growth potential of Africa. In the
domain of production, the capacity of women is hampered by inequality in
education and agriculture and lack of access to information, skills, assets,
credit and technology to reverse the trend. They also experience unequal
access to land and the productive inputs therein, which has hindered them
from seizing opportunities to expand trade. A large number have therefore
remained subsistence producers (Drew 1995, 1–2; Mainstreaming Gender
2008, iii; Ziso 2009, 313; Matsa & Matsa 2010, 153). In the domain of
business, women entrepreneurs form a minority compared to their male
counterparts (Arbache et al. 2010, 377). The statistics for some countries
are very discouraging. In Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania,
for instance, only 10% of women own firms. Although 40% of women
own firms in Cameroon, Botswana, Cape Verde and Mozambique (Sedey
& Barnett 2004, 96; Bardasi et al. n.d., 70), this is still below average. As
long as they remain marginalized in the business sector, women cannot
make much money and carry out other activities within their countries and
communities.
Some authors have argued that women are generally oppressed and
marginalized in the political (Kamau 2010, 1), economic and socio-
cultural sectors, such as inheritance practices in the states and societies of
Africa. The relegation of women to the background in some cultural and
other practices has in some situations met with very little response from
the governments (Suda 2000, 31; Sedey & Barnett 2004, 87; Naidoo &
Kongolo 2004, 124; Omotola 2007, 33–4; Alubo 2011, 78). In the
educational sector, for example, women in Nigeria are prohibited from
wearing body hugs and other attire which reveal their curves. Significant
gender gaps in this domain exist because more often than not education is
male-centred in many parts of the continent (Aderinto 2001, 176; Omotola
2007, 44; Gender Inequality 2008, 8). Alubo (2011, 82) speaks of the
failure of official and unofficial responses to the feminist challenge in
Nigeria as a result of the fact that the country’s leaders proceeded from
faulty institutional and procedural devices. Balogun (2010, 21),
concerning the Yoruba society in Nigeria, argues that there are elements of
oppression in some of its proverbs that violate the rights and dignity of
women. The impact has been a struggle for gender balance within this
society. This is a cultural issue that continuously animates debate among
women and men of Yoruba origin.
The political domain has been very unfair to women, some of whom
have withdrawn from it (Drew 1995, 1). In general terms, the number of
women in government is small. In Nigeria, for example, during the thirty
years of military rule there was no female governor nor any women in the
highest policy-making body, the Armed Forces Ruling Council. Even
when democracy was reintroduced their situation within the political arena
did not significantly change, although women could vote and stand for
elections. They are also very poorly represented in boards and parastatals,
which are crucial agencies that implement government policies and
promote development. Some of the women who run for politics are even
ridiculed, and their husbands are asked to stop them from running. Most
pathetically, women receive less support from the communities and parties
to which they belong (Alubo 2011, 90–1). Such is the predicament of
women not only in Nigeria but also in other African countries, where lip
service is paid to the equal representation of men and women in the
178 Chapter Ten
institutions of state. Very few countries have made progress like Rwanda
and South Africa in parliamentary representation, and these remain
isolated situations within a continent of many countries. There is more
talking than action as far as women's representation in the political arena is
concerned. Many women themselves have not helped matters, and
statistics show that while they are in the majority wrangling has prevented
them from using this to their advantage in parliamentary and local council
elections.
The emphasis on gender roles in many African societies has negative
consequences. This creates in women a sense of dependence, passiveness
and a feeling of inferiority. This passiveness and inequality between
women and men have given men the advantage of enjoying power and
status (Anthonissen 2011, 81). The feeling of inferiority has also allowed
room for violence to be orchestrated against women, including those living
with HIV/AIDS (UNDP and Gender, www.sl.undp.org/1_doc/fast_
fact_genderafrica.pdf). It has been argued, rightly or wrongly, that gender-
based violence has been a cause and consequence of HIV transmission
(From Talk to Action 2011). Sadly, a significant number of sub-Saharan
African countries have not enacted legislation to address it (Horvath et al.
2007, 3). Women have also suffered from other human rights abuses, like
denial of inheritance rights and exclusion from participation in the
governance of their countries and female genital mutilation (Ebeku 2004,
264).
Male headships in different African societies and religious organisations
are synonymous with male dominance. There is presently a monolithic
concept of patriarchy in Africa which hinders a nuanced analysis of the
meaning and function of male headship in local contexts (Taiwo 2010,
229; Van Klinken 2011, 104). Some men have used the Biblical texts
alleging that God created woman as inferior to man and made her a
servant to him, as God had appointed man as the chief, for their defence
(Tietcheu 2005, 116). This use of the Bible is intended to keep women out
of decision-making processes in the church and society. These categories
of men ignore and disallow the expression of women’s opinions. The
consequence of this has been the promotion of the same norms, values and
gendered division of labour that has historically benefitted men in Africa
(Feinstein et al. 2010, 107) and elsewhere. The tutelage of women by
fathers, uncles, brothers and husbands is a major impingement on
independent resource management by women in Tanzania and other
countries of Africa (Mung’ong’o 2003, 130).
Drawing from the experience of South Africa, men have always tried
to curb and undermine the empowerment of women to advance their own
agendas (Mdanda 2009, 89). In the workplace, these men have tried to
negotiate their roles in a manner that would help them to be seen by
society as in favour of equal opportunities. In spite of this, in private these
men are seemingly against the whole notion altogether. This experience is
not limited to South Africa, and it takes place in many other African
countries. While in South Africa some men may pretend to fight for the
cause of women or be seen to sympathise with them, elsewhere in Africa
there is outright contempt toward women in the workplace. This is a
problem which needs a change of attitude to be overcome.
There is gender inequality in war and peace in different parts of Africa.
The positions and roles of women have been made invisible or irrelevant,
and their experiences have been marginalised (Ngufor, www.ifuw.org/
seminars/2007/ngufor.pdf; Mpoumou 2004, 121). Women’s participation
in official peace negotiations has not been enhanced, as national and
international actors have continued to define them as victims and as
belonging to vulnerable groups, as well as always being associated with
children. This has deprived women of agency as autonomous individuals
(Rodriguez & Natunda-Togboa 2005, 9). Cases abound of the disparity
between women and men in conflict-ridden areas. The Marcoussis peace
agreement, which mediated the crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, surprisingly did not
contain any gender-sensitive language. Its emphasis on security, violation
of human rights and humanitarian assistance to the population did not take
into consideration the fact that the needs and priorities of women, men,
boys and girls, as far as the conflict and coping mechanisms were
concerned, were different. Puechguirbal (2005, 3) also argues that
although Liberian women made all efforts to end the war, the peace
agreement did not contain a gender perspective. It was taken for granted
that vulnerable groups and victims of war, including women, children, the
elderly and disabled, would be rehabilitated. Women are seldom brought
to the negotiation table to discuss the way forward after war. They are
considered as footnotes of any peace agreement, and their opinions are
never given a chance. This is a clear indication of the inequality that exists
between them and those who sit at the table.
The higher education sector has generally undermined women and
their contribution towards the advancement of knowledge. Very little
attention has been paid to transforming the structures and practices which
actively discriminate against women in the academy and have reproduced
combative and exclusionary intellectuals. However, this discrimination
does not mean that women have been underachievers in higher education.
Many have gained important handholds in tertiary education and have
made impressive achievements, but have remained a marginalised
180 Chapter Ten
minority (Kennelly et al. 2001, 602–3). This is rather unfortunate and has
had repercussions on knowledge production and advancement in different
African countries. This discrimination has made it difficult to address
issues through research that effectively handles or addresses the concerns
of women as a key factor in the development process.
Another complication related to the gender debate in Africa is its
appeal to African womanism. Although this has pretensions which seek
cooperation or an emphasis on advocacy for interdependency between
men and women, it has its base in the Marxist conscientization of women.
This kind of orientation is foreign to Africa and there is a risk of
obscurantism, vulgarism, inauthenticity and irrelevance when addressing
the disparities or inequalities (Mwale 2002, 136). The Marxist orientation
calls for a kind of extremism that might meet with stiff resistance rather
than approval by men, some of whom are chauvinistic. If this becomes the
case, their struggle for equality might be a long time coming. In spite of
these hurdles, there is a future which should unite Africans over gender
discourse.
Towards Future Gender Agreement

Gender disparities and other forms of inequality continue to animate
the gender discourse in Africa at varying degrees, the efforts made to
mitigate them notwithstanding. In spite of this, there is need for a new way
of handling the inequalities between men and women. This should focus
on making both genders equal, accepting one another and working
together in all spheres of life with the aim of moving African countries and
communities forward. While some suggestions have been made in this
direction for the future of Africa, we also suggest more pragmatic ways of
handling these issues for practical rather than theoretical results. If the
future of African development and advancement must become a reality,
these suggestions are as imperative today as they will be in the future of
the continent.
One way of handling the inequalities in the gender discourse is to
leverage the full participation of men and women in the development of
the private sector in Africa. This has the capability of unleashing the
continent’s productive potential and strengthening economic growth
(Bardasi et al. https://members.weforum.org/pdf/gcr/Africa/1.4.pdf).
Poverty, which often has a heavy toll on women and children, would be
handled through this strengthening of the economic base of the continent.
This leveraging should not be limited to the private sector but should also
be extended to the public sector, where there are great disparities between
men and women in positions of control and policy implementation. A

crucial way to re-establish equilibrium and harmony in society and move it
forward is to give equal value and importance to the roles played by both
males and females. Meaningful cooperation between man and woman, and
their interdependence on one another, are fundamental for the attainment
of a well-ordered African society (Taiwo 2010, 237). Fashina (2009, 71) is
more forthright in his postulation of the new direction in gender issues.
According to him, bisexual, co-sexual and joint gender heroism is the best
and most harmonious approach to a true post-colonial African nationalism.
Although in some areas women are now more equipped and empowered
because they are abandoning the traditional care-giving, home-making and
nurturing roles (Taiwo 2010, 229), there is a need for more of them to be
empowered in different fields of life so they can help to shape and mould
society. Promoting gender equality, women’s empowerment in Africa and
ending gender violence, among other factors, will create a harmonious co-
existence between the sexes. Afonja (2005, 2) argues that the transformation
of the underdevelopment and poverty of women requires a much more
radical approach than what has been done so far. One thing that has
happened is the provision of micro-credit as a means of improving
women's economic status (Mainstreaming Gender 2008, 11). In spite of
this, many women are still disempowered because of their low level of
education. There is also discrimination in the education of male and
female children, which is to the advantage of men.
In some parts of Africa, like the northwest region of Cameroon,
women are already doing things that call on academics to redefine the
debate. In the domain of food security, women are visible and active while
men are invisible and disinterested. What is actually happening there, as
posited by Awasom (2005, 1) and elsewhere in Africa (Ziso 2009, 315), is
that while many women are agents of development, some men are agents
of underdevelopment. Some people consider this as inconsequential, and
fail to understand that if these women decide to starve the population by
giving scant attention to agriculture and the production of goods from the
farms, this will have adverse effects on the population. The way forward in
this important sector of the African economy is for men to commit
themselves to agricultural production—not just for cash crops, but more
importantly in food crop production—if food security is to be tackled in
the continent. The agricultural sector will continue to limp along if only
women are visible while men are invisible, and this is not good for gender
parity or equality.
The social structure in Africa must be constructed to give men and
women possibilities to enjoy and live up to their potential entirely. This
182 Chapter Ten
will enable them to express the best of themselves with regard to the
talents each is gifted with (Tietcheu 2005, 116). The social structure is
constructed in such a way that women are at the bottom rung of the
society. They are seldom active in decision-making positions, and the few
who are in such positions are swallowed up by the majority—men. Being
at the bottom of the social ladder means that women are excluded from the
advantages that go with a higher position and/or status within the social
structure of many African societies. This picture is pathetic in
communities where the scholarly rate is very low for girls. The social
structure must be deliberately deconstructed and reconstructed to handle
these gross inequalities in the status and representation of men and
women. There is more to gain by doing this than by allowing things to
remain the way they are. Women are likely to give their best effort if the
social structure allows room for their mobility and sharing in the affairs of
the society. Reconstruction of a deconstructed social system will likely
give rise to new paradigms for a new society where women and men are
reconciled.
Something also needs to be done to engender governance in African
countries where women and men will share key decision-making roles.
This will contribute to the fight against poverty in Africa in several ways.
It will make room for a people-oriented poverty reduction strategy, where
the greater role of women will be taken into consideration. The tendency
has always been to overlook the important role of women in the
development process in African countries. Engendering governance will
give them room for policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation of
reforms and other activities of the government which directly impact
women and children in society. At the moment, governance is largely
preserved by men who are not ready to give up an inch of their
responsibilities to women. When engendering women’s governance
becomes an official policy and is implemented, the problem of exclusion
from policy implementation and evaluation will have been addressed once
and for all.
Measures can also be taken to address gender violence against women,
although the existing discourse seems to be silent on violence against men.
Horvath et al. (2007, 3–4) is of the opinion that culturally sensitive
awareness campaigns directed at both men and women can provide long-
term solutions to violence against women. They also add that the
enactment of law can effectively address this issue because it will become
a deterrent to any form of violence, as the law provides appropriate
safeguards in dealing with them. Violence has also been committed
against men but this has not been highlighted in the gender talk. The future
of Africa should take care of this and address not only violence against
women but also against men. This will provide room for the harmonious
co-existence of women and men in both rural and urban areas.
Priority programmes to address gender discrepancies should also be
created. One area of concern should be the encouragement of the retention
of girls in schools. Such programmes should also stop early marriages and
create opportunities for women to work and earn a living. Family planning
programmes and services, which focus on gender-sensitive rural development,
should work towards cultural revolution for gender equality in all aspects
(Gender Inequality 2005, 9). Such policies should propose and recommend
an institutional framework that facilitates equal access to goods and
services for both men and women (Kornegay n.d.). This is one way
through which the gender talk can step forward in handling development
issues in a holistic manner, as they address the concerns of men and
women.
Zenebeworke (2002, 18) suggests ways towards unity in the gender
talk in the future of Africa. The author argues that for gender equitable
development to become a reality, the capacity building and confidence
building of women are imperative training opportunities within a gender-
balanced civil service and private sector. She also argues that concerted
efforts are necessary to foster gender awareness and competence among
men and women in the civil service, the policy process and planning
practices. Above all, authors like Assie-Lumumba (2006, 51) and Mama
(2006, 53) recommend a much more committed effort towards
substantially increasing the number of women in the tertiary level of
education, and also toward making higher education sensitive to the
challenges of gender equality, social justice and democratisation. She
firmly believes that these can result in an increase in the representation of
women in government decision-making and managerial positions. Such
are the efforts of the promotion of gender equality as well as the
involvement of men and women in the process of development in their
respective countries.
Other authors like Fonchingong (2006, 146) have recommended that
male and female writers retrace their roots. In doing so, they are likely to
find a point of convergence that will provide greater meaning to their
interactions in the search for the construction of an African feminist
standpoint based on African people’s cultural specificities. Related to this,
men, women and young people should be educated about the need to
retain positive traditional practices. Above all, equal value and importance
should be given to the roles the females and males play so that the balance
and harmony that once existed can be re-established (Aderinto 2001, 184,
184 Chapter Ten
237). The full participation of men and women, regardless of class, age,
race and ethnicity in the maintenance of peace, has been recommended by
the African Union and other writers as a means of achieving lasting peace
in Africa (Mpoumou 2004, 120; The Road to Gender Equality 2004, 52;
King 2005, 47; Kabonesa 2005, 13). Mwale (2002, 114) posits that the
conscientization of women vis-à-vis men will not be complete if it does
not lead to an appropriate re-positioning of the benefits for men.
One thing that stands out from the debate about gender relations is the
disadvantaged position of women vis-à-vis men in the political, economic
and socio-cultural domains. Again, the impression of a past that did not
really consider gender as a problem in the activities of women and men is
given, and that if there is a problem with gender today it is a problem
created by the colonialists when they divided Africa among themselves.
While authors like Afisi (2010, 237) have acknowledged the advancements
towards the socio-economic empowerment of women, there is still an
overwhelming view among writers that the place of the woman has not
significantly improved since the independence of African countries. There
is yet another view that the structures of society manned by men should be
restructured to give women greater representation and influence as far as
decision making is concerned.
These varying positions show that there is no uniformity of voice in the
gender discourse. It should, however, be noted that if men stop violence
against women but some women continue to be violent towards men, the
future will continue to witness disagreements and diverse opinions about
gender relations in Africa. Besides, as long as women continue to remain
divided they cannot expect to make gains in gender equality. The way out
is for women to consciously embark on policies that will empower them
for the general good of society. The situation calls for more debate, as
some of the women who have gained status in society behave more or less
like the men. They discriminate against fellow women, paradoxically
calling for equality when they cannot behave as equal to other less-
privileged women. The male-dominated institution should become gender-
inclusive, especially in decision-making processes, in order to move all of
society forward.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the basis of the gender debate in Africa
today, in which there is no uniformity. Different explanations have been
given to explain the differences in opinions of the scholars interested in the
gender phenomenon in Africa. Such differences have created division
between scholars on the one hand and ordinary women and men on the
other.
The hurdles to gender parity in the private and public sectors have,
however, led to suggestions and attempts to improve the situation. While
these proposals have contributed towards agreement in the gender debate,
they have also opened up other wounds of discontent. Such hurdles have
been many and have permeated the fabric of African society, though their
intensity differs from place to place. Other, more meaningful suggestions
have been made to create a situation of agreement in the gender discourse
and practical existence in the future of the people and countries of Africa.
In spite of these, there is still a need for a more direct discussion rather
than suggestions which have yet to produce results. Women must see the
need for uniting and not discussing their predicament in dispersed ranks.
Men should be made to feel the power of women during electoral
consultations so that they can become more sensitive to their demands and
needs, listening to them and enlisting their full participation in decision-
making processes.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
SINO-PESSIMISM VERSUS SINO-OPTIMISM:

WHICH WAY FOR CHINESE AFRICANA?
ABDUL-GAFAR TOBI OSHODI

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, LAGOS STATE
UNIVERSITY, NIGERIA
Abstract
Africa remains a land of paradox and failed policies. Yet its historical
trajectory has thrown up a number of opportunities, the latest of which is
what has been termed the “Chinese option.” The Chinese option is itself
marked by three interrelated realities. First is Chinese Domestica, which
relates to the internal or domestic factors that occasioned the current rise
of China. Second is Chinese Internationa, which are international
manifestations and implications of the aforementioned domestic events.
Third is Chinese Africana, which is merely an African version of Chinese
Internationa. Literature on Sino-Africa relations has subsequently
reflected two broad positions: Sino-optimism and Sino-pessimism. This
paper highlights the positions of Sino-optimists (who see the Chinese
option as a “partnership,” an “opportunity” and “south-south” solidarity)
and the Sino-pessimists (who consider China’s “invasion” as “colonialism,”
“neo-colonialism,” “predatory capitalism,” a “second scramble” or de-
industrialisation). It argues that, for Africa to benefit from the Chinese
option, there is a need to move beyond extreme pessimism and naive
optimism towards an Africanisation of relations. Its usage of Africanisation
is represented by PISSA (Pan-Africanism, Industrialization, Scientific
communalism, Strategic engagement and Agriculture).
Today, few appear to have noticed that a second “scramble for Africa” is
underway. This time, only one giant country is involved, but its ambitions
are every bit as momentous as those of Rhodes and company. With every
day that passes, China’s economic tentacles extend deeper into Africa.
Sino-Pessimism versus Sino-Optimism 191
While Europe sought direct political control, China is acquiring a vast and
informal economic empire. (Blair 2007)
I have found that a contract that would take five years to discuss,
negotiate and sign with the World Bank takes three months when we have
dealt with Chinese authorities. I am a firm believer in good governance and
the rule of law. But when bureaucracy and senseless red tape impede our
ability to act and when poverty persists while international functionaries
drag their feet, African leaders have an obligation to opt for swifter
solutions. I achieved more in my one hour meeting with President Hu
Jintao in an executive suite at my hotel in Berlin during the recent G8
meeting in Heiligendamm than I did during the entire, orchestrated
meeting of world leaders at the summit where African leaders were told
little more than that G8 nations would respect existing commitments.
(Wade 2008, 20)
The Chinese are doing more than the G8 to make poverty history [in
Africa]. If a G8 country had wanted to rebuild the stadium, we’d still be
holding meetings! The Chinese just come and do it. They don’t hold
meetings about environmental impact assessment, human rights, bad
governance and good governance. I’m not saying it’s right, just that
Chinese investment is succeeding because they don’t set high
benchmarks.1 (Bosshard 2008, 8).
Introduction
Years after the demise of Kwame Nkrumah, multiple levels of
divisions in Africa still exist. These divisions, which vary across states in
Africa, often gain expression in terms of violent manifestations of cultural
pluralism, ideological contestations, class differentiations and gender
imbalances, among other things. The opening quotes above summarise this
paper as they speak to Sino-pessimism, Sino-optimism and the need for
Africanisation. In interrogating what has been termed as “the most
momentous event” in Africa after the Cold War (Taylor 2009, 1), while
the first two portray the divisions within “China in Africa” scholarship and
engagement, all the quotes portray the socio-economic and even political
challenges facing Africa. Africa remains a land of paradox. It has a large
amount of fertile landmass, but thousands of its people are malnourished.
It is endowed with massive reserves of natural resources, but its people are
among the poorest in the world. It is surrounded by water but thousands
thirst for drinkable water. Most importantly, it has been the focus of
numerous developmental initiatives and strategies,2 but the majority of its
toiling people, pathetically, remain poor. Africa’s historical trajectory
shows that a number of opportunities have arisen over the years, but the
attendant rising expectations that meet these opportunities have tragically
192 Chapter Eleven
lead to multiple levels of rising frustration, which rather than culminate in

development, have largely contributed to Afro-pessimism as represented
by such lamentations as “Africa Doesn’t Matter” (Bolton 2007),
“Insecurity in Africa” (Joseph 2003), “De-democratisation” (Momoh
2006), “Africa in Crisis,” (Zack-Williams, Frost & Thomson, 2002) and
“The Hopeless Continent” (The Economist 2000). The latest in this string
of opportunities is what has been termed the “Chinese option.”
The Chinese option speaks to the thinking that China’s rise could
positively impact Africa, as well as the thin and thick ecology of Sino-
Africa relations. The thin perspective situates China’s presence in Africa
as an end in itself. In restricting Sino-African relations to bilateralism,
emphasis is not necessarily placed on the impact of international realities
in shaping the behaviours of both China and Africa. Other versions of the
thin theory assume that China’s behaviour in Africa is different from its
behaviour elsewhere. In spite of the advantages of this approach to
understanding and interrogating China’s activities in Africa, this paper
elects to engage China in Africa within a thick context, particularly in
terms of what has been termed the three interrelated realities: Chinese
domestica, Chinese internationa and Chinese Africana. It is based on this
understanding that the paper engages two interrelated questions. First,
what have been the arguments of pessimists and optimists on China in
Africa? Second, how should Africa engage China? To engage these
questions, the rest of this paper is divided into four parts: a conceptualised
clarification of the Chinese option, a highlight of the pessimistic and
optimistic arguments on China in Africa, Africanisation of the Chinese
option, and a conclusion.
The Chinese Option—Some Clarifications

Even as this paper resists the temptation of repetition as a more
comprehensive interrogation of the Chinese option, as has been variously
presented elsewhere (see Oshodi 2009; 2010a; 2010b; 2011; 2012a;
2012b; Oshodi & Ajayi 2012; Oshodi & Bonu 2012), the “three
interrelated realties” need some brief contextualization. The “three
interrelated realities” in understanding the Chinese option are a product of
an attempt to escape from the largely popular but reductionist interrogation
of China’s activities in Africa. This approach in engaging the Chinese
option maintains that a holistic understanding of China’s activities in
Africa presupposes an understanding of African, Chinese, and
international realities. First is Chinese Domestica which relates to the
internal or domestic factors that occasioned the current rise of China. The
logic behind this reality is not new, as it is grounded in the argument that a
grasp of a state’s foreign policy presupposes an understanding of its
domestic political economy (Akinboye & Ottoh 2005; Fawole 1999).
Chinese domestica therefore relates to the domestic ecology of China’s
rise, as represented by internal propellants on the one hand, and hindrances
as well as threats on the other.
There is no single propellant for China’s rise after it closed its borders
to the outside. Thus, it encompasses such factors as: leadership, education
or what Amartya Sen terms “Eastern strategy,” centralisation, state
capitalism or new left economy, culture or Confucian ethics, decentralisation,
currency manipulation, geographic location, timely convergence, saving
culture, popular nationalistic sentiment and history (Angang 2011; Breslin
2009; Hogg 2009; Feltenstein & Iwata 2005; Lardy 2007; Lin & Liu 2000;
Robinson 2010; Sen 1999; Yao 2010). The sum total of these propellants
and the attendant potentials that speaks to some sort of Chinese model has
been popularly referred to as the “Beijing Consensus” (Ramo 2004). The
hindrances and threats to China’s continuous rise include those of
management of its large population, unemployment, environmental
concerns, rural poverty, corruption, widening social disparities among
regions, human right abuses and the challenge of nation-building (as in
Tibet). It is the perceived potency of these hindrances and threats that has
led some to acknowledge the difficulty of what is regarded as the “China
Brand” (Ramo 2007), while some have thought of “The End of the Beijing
Consensus” (Yao 2010).
In spite of these challenges, China’s domestic prosperity has had a
resounding global acknowledgement. Beyond the spectacular and world-
acclaimed Olympic Games in 2008, beyond the statistical 10% growth in
GDP for close to three decades, and beyond the media hype of massive
industrialisation, the rise of China has impacted the lives of millions of
Chinese citizens. China remains the only country that has removed about
400 million people from poverty in thirty years (BBC 1999a; 1999b; Gaye
2008; Lammers 2007). Up to 170 million Chinese citizens were lifted from
“absolute poverty” between 1990 and 2000 (Nee, Opper & Wong 2007,
19). Based on these figures, it becomes easy to accept the World Bank’s
estimate that extreme poverty fell from 835 million in 1981 to 208 million
in 2005 (World Bank 2011). Thus, even as Europe took close to a century
to achieve an increment in life expectancy from forty to seventy years,
China has taken only fifty (Wang 2010).
Yet, even as China has risen to become the second largest economy in
the world, as well as the second-largest consumer of energy (Angang
2011), China’s foreign exchange reserves total US $3,000 billion and is
194 Chapter Eleven
forecasted to hit US $6,000 billion in 2016 (Yang 2011). Being one of the
fastest producers of billionaires3 and only coming second to the US with
271 Chinese compared to 400 American billionaires (Moore 2011),
between 2005 and 2009 China spent US $145 billion on overseas
acquisitions, and US $50 billion in 2010 alone (Yang 2011). Statistically
speaking, and as a result of the buying of American treasury bonds, the
United States owes every Chinese citizen about US $1,000. It is these
domestic manifestations, particularly in terms of advancement, that propel
an international expression—Chinese internationa.
Chinese internationa revolves around the manifestations and
implications of Chinese domestica. Among these manifestations is the rise
of Chinese state-owned multinational corporations (MNCs) that have gone
a long way to help project China’s soft power, sometimes through some
most unorthodox processes. Propelled by the policy of “going global,”
massive Chinese MNCs have emerged. Some of the leading MNCs
include Huawei Technologies, ZTE, the China Civil Engineering
Construction Corporation (CCECC), Minmetals Resources, the Chinese
National Offshore Corporation (CNOOC) bid for UNICAL in 2005, the
Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), the Chinese Petroleum
and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec), the Citic Group, Aluminium of
China (Chalco), the Haier Group, Sinochem, Baosteel, the BOE
Technology Group, the China WorldBest Group, Hisense, the Holley
Group, the Jincheng Group, the Lenovo group, NFC, Shanghai Electric,
the Shougang Group, Shanghai Motors, the TCL Corporation, and the
Wanxiang Group.
A number of Chinese firms have acquired Western firms. Chinese
automobile manufacturer Geely acquired the Swedish carmaker Volvo.
Just as Cifa, the Italian concrete-pump maker, was acquired by Zoomlion,
the Chinese machinery group Shanghai Motors bought Rover of the
United Kingdom. Similarly, just as the IBM PC business was bought by
Lenovo, China’s Wanda Group recently bought AMC Entertainment
Holdings Inc., the second largest movie theatre chain in the United States,
with over 350 theatres, 5,000 screens and 20,000 employees. China’s
growing influence has also been supported by such soft power as state-
owned media such as The China Daily, China Central Television (CCTV)
and Xinhua (the government controlled newspaper, which has branches in
105 countries). In other instances, the more than 120 Confucius Institutes
spread over forty countries have supported the foreign policy of China
through a soft propagation of Chinese culture. China has also used the
hosting of such events as the Beijing Olympics in 2008, the Shanghai
World Expo and Guangzhou Asian Games in 2010, and sponsorship of

south-south dialogues to show its growing influence.
Though official Chinese statements have popularised the cliché
“peaceful rise,” China’s rise has been fraught with mutual suspicion and
antagonism. Not only is it involved in border disputes with its neighbours
(such as Japan, Russia and even India), there is mutual suspicion between
it and the sole existing superpower—the United States. In spite of areas of
cooperation such as North Korea, international terrorism and peace
keeping, mutual suspicion between the United States and China has led
some Western scholars to expect some sort of clash between the two. For
instance, Peter Navarro (2006) sees a “Coming China War.” John
Mearshimer notes that “The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful At All”
(Mearshimer 2005), while Bernstein & Munro (1997) see “The Coming
Conflict With America.” Yet in spite of this sense of suspicion, as noted
elsewhere (Oshodi 2012a), Chinese internationa has been marked by the
three Cs (cooperation, conflict and competition). Generally speaking, there
is a growing feeling that it is merely a question of time before China
assumes global (economic) hegemony. For instance, while some have
argued that the Chinese economy will be bigger than (or as big as) the
United States in 2015 (Carmody & Owusu 2007), the IMF and World
Bank forecast 2016 and 2030, respectively (Arends 2011; Hutchinson
2011). Goldman Sachs forecasts 2041 (Sørensen & Østergaard 2005), The
Economist forecasts 2040 (Nee, Opper & Wong 2007, 20), and others
forecast 2050 (Pei 2006). Some have simply said that: “Whoever is elected
US President this year—Barack Obama? Mitt Romney? Donald Trump?—
will be the last to preside over the world’s largest economy” (Arends
2011).
Third is Chinese Africana, which is merely an African version of
Chinese Internationa. Chinese domestica covers the extent to which the
actual and potential capacities of China could bring about a different
development trajectory to Africa’s socio-economic plight. This speaks to
China’s activities in Africa. The historical trajectory of Sino-African
relations has often been variously periodized. For instance, while Li
Anshan periodized these relations into ideological beginnings (1949–
1978), diversification (1979–1982) and the spirit of co-development of the
current era (Anshan 2007), Piet Konings periodized these phases into the
Maoist era of ideological and strategic considerations, the Deng Xiaoping
era of economic modernisation, and the era of neo-liberal globalisation
(Konings 2007). Others have noted the colonial phase (1850–1950), the
political phase (1960–1980) and the economic phase (1990 to date)
(Adisu, Sharkey & Okoroafo 2010, 3). Though these periodizations seem
196 Chapter Eleven
to assume that China’s relations with Africa are compartmentalized, in

reality contemporary relations between China and Africa are fluid and
evolving in such ways that there are elements of all these eras.
But unlike the era prior to the Forum for China and Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), China’s relations with Africa has been more economic than
political, as there are only a handful of African states that still recognize
Taiwan, just as direct colonisation of African states by foreign powers no
longer sustains China’s anti-colonial support for Africa. Today, China’s
presence in Africa is often marked by massive infrastructural projects, the
promise of loans and aids, as well as an increasing number of Chinese
people, now numbering about 800,000. Most importantly, China’s
presence in Africa is often located within the context of the “non-
interference policy,” which dictates that China will not be involved in the
domestic activities in African countries. With the burgeoning of Sino-
African relations in economic (particularly trading) partnerships,4 China
inaugurated its China African Plan in 2006. This era has thus seen Chinese
firms buying into South African coal and gold, mopping up Zambia’s
copper industry, dominating Nigeria’s computer villages, striving to
dominate Zimbabwe’s tobacco industry, flourishing in Kenya’s mobile
phones, operating in Botswana’s hotel businesses, and increasing its oil
and gas deals in Sudan, Gabon, Nigeria, Algeria, Angola and Egypt. It is
also not uncommon to see millions of “made in China” products, including
telephones, toys, drugs, plastic items, books, insecticides, inverters,
generators, laptops, fans and others, in African households. However, how
has Chinese Africana been captured in literature?
Un-identical Twins—
Sino-Pessimism versus Sino-Optimism
On the question of what the foregoing means for Africa, the literature
on what is euphemistically referred to as “China in Africa” has broadly
reflected two extreme positions: Sino-optimism and Sino-pessimism.
Sino-optimists consider the Chinese option as an opportunity for Africa to
develop.
Optimists maintain that China’s activity in Africa is a “win-win”
partnership (Naidu 2007) where both China and Africa would benefit. Li
Anshan is quick to point out that Western scholars have often found it easy
to negatively label the Chinese presence in Africa (Anshan 2007). While
noting that most of these Western perceptions have changed with the
current nature of Sino-African relations, Anshan maintains that China had
always been a supporter of Africa, to the extent that, even when faced with
a precarious economic situation between 1956 and 1978, China still aided
Africa with billions of dollars in the period (Anshan 2007, 74). She
stresses that China’s foreign policy towards Africa had always reflected
equality, mutual benefit and summit diplomacy. It is also argued that not
only does China provide the needed funds for Africa’s development that
had largely been sourced from the West, who have often placed economic
and political conditions within the context of the Washington and post-
Washington consensus, some optimists have, in fact, noted “the threat
perception and phobia about China in Africa as largely products of
Western inspired hypocrisy and arrogance” (Le Pere 2007, 6). It is based
on this thinking that optimists often described Sino-Africa relations as a
“partnership,” an “opportunity” and “south-south” solidarity.
Similarly, because China’s experiences were similar to Africa’s, others
have argued that the relationship provides Africa with the opportunity to
copy Chinese technology, and affords it the opportunity of adapting the
Chinese development model (Dollar 2008). Other benefits identified in
Sino-Africa relations are the Chinese cancellation of millions of dollars of
African debt, aid in medicine and healthcare and peace keeping, while also
investing in the education of Africans through scholarships. With China’s
foreign policy principles of equality, mutual benefit and summit
diplomacy, and in spite of a number of challenges,5 optimists have largely
seen a “promising future” (Anshan 2007, 86). It is perhaps in recognition
of this promising future that a former President of Nigeria had noted:
“From our assessment, this 21st century is the century for China to lead
the world. And when you are leading the world, we want to be close
behind you. When you are going to the moon, we don’t want to be left
behind” (Nwoke 2007, 46).
The Sino-pessimists not only consider Sino-African relations as a
negative development towards the developmental goal of Africa, but as
Nwoke (2007, 32) lamented, it is considered: “misleading and uninformed
to attempt to respond to the so-called ‘new’ scramble for Africa by asking:
what can we do to gain more from the new scramble, that is, than we did
from the old one.” Simply put—China will not help Africa. Proponents
note that China’s activities pose the danger of further under-developing
and de-industrialising Africa, especially bearing in mind that China’s pace
of industrialisation allows it to mass produce items at a cheaper cost,
throwing international competitors out of both developing nations and
developed states (Lee 2007). An example is the case of Chinese shoes in
Zimbabwe, where Margaret Lee had reported that the cheapest cost $5
each, and $3 if one buys five pairs, while those sold by Zimbabweans cost
198 Chapter Eleven
$24 each (Lee 2006, 321). What happens to Zimbabwean sellers if the
importation of cheaper Chinese shoes continues unabated?
Furthermore, pessimists contend that the non-interference policy of
China, rather than encouraging development, has the capacity to foster
dictatorship and insecurity, as exemplified in the cases in Zimbabwe and
Sudan, where in spite of poverty and insecurity the Chinese regime sold
arms and built three arms plants (AFP 2005; Campbell et al. 2012; Rogers
2007). Apart from assisting Sudan in building three weapons factories near
Khartoum, one estimate states that the Sudanese government expended
about US $500 million annually for several years—which amounts to
about 80% of oil revenue from sales to China—for the purchase of
weapons to subdue rebels in the southern part of the country (Brookes &
Shin 2006, 5). Rather than invest in socio-economic advancement or
human security, it is noted that the Sudanese government, between 1997
and 2010, spent US $210 million in buying Chinese weapons (Campbell et
al. 2012, 98). As noted by Vines: “China does not usually impose political,
human right, or humanitarian conditions on arms sales” (Vines 2007, 216).
Cases of antagonism against China’s policies have often been cited, with
the kidnapping of Chinese nationals in the Niger Delta in Nigeria by the
Movement for Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) to pressure the
federal government into not selling arms to the Federal Government, and
in Zambia, where public antagonism followed the deadly copper mine
explosion causing many deaths. There is also the case of Sudan where the
public displayed anger at the Chinese dam construction in northern Sudan
(Vines 2007, 218–219).
With the likelihood that China’s presence would further impoverish the
toiling masses of Africa, and coupled with China’s African environmental
footprint as well as issues of counterfeit, adulterated and sub-standard
(CAS) products, a good number of pessimists have argued within the
context of the Chinese colonization thesis (CCT)6 (Oshodi 2012a). This
thesis maintains that rather than a promising future, China is set to
(economically and/or politically) colonize Africa. As such, contemporary
China in Africa is nothing but a second scramble for Africa’s resources
(Lee 2006; Nwoke 2007). This scramble, as portrayed by Nwoke: “is
nothing but inter-imperialist rivalries to dominate and control the pillaging
of the continent, and the exploitation of its people and resources” (Nwoke
2007, 31). Some pessimists have noted the systematic manner in which
China transfers its citizens to Africa. Citing the example of Nigeria,
Richard Behar (2008) posits that: “There are already more Chinese living
in Nigeria than there were Britons during the height of the empire.” He
adds that not only are there as many as one million Chinese citizens
“circulating” Africa, but that each megaproject announced by China’s

government creates “collateral economies” and “population monuments.”
All this, it is contended by proponents, would eventually lead to, or has
already led to, Chinese colonialism.
The CCT becomes a convincing argument when it is located within the
context of Ekeh’s (1983) epochal dimension of colonialism and the
attendant criticisms of new calls for colonisation of states in Africa (see
Adejumobi 1995; Mafeje 1995), as advocated by Ali Mazrui (1994; 1995),
William Pfaff (1995) and Stephen Harrison (1995). Thus, with antagonism
to any form of colonisation of Africa, while some Sino-pessimists have
noted that a scramble is indeed in progress, David Blair (2007) claims to
know Why China is Trying to Colonise Africa. Some have diplomatically
conceptualised this brand of Chinese colonialism as “re-colonisation by
invitation” (Cheru 2007; Cheru & Obi 2010). Some pessimists have thus
lamented an expectation of help from China as a display of the “poverty of
ideas, poverty of strategizing and strategic thinking, [and] poverty of
engaging in scientific long-term planning” (Nwoke 2007).
Africanising Chinese Africana7

Unflinching Sino-optimism and Sino-pessimism suffer from naive
fatalism. Two examples of this naivety are noteworthy. First, extreme
optimism refuses to acknowledge that tying Africa’s development to
China is expecting too much from China. This is a logic that only supports
the argument that Africa is a basket case for advanced societies who may
or may not choose to develop it. Meanwhile, China is fraught with its own
problems and assuming that Africa’s problems are more important to
China than Chinese problems is both laughable and dangerous. Second,
extreme pessimism is naive to the extent that not only does it deny
globalisation and states’ interconnectedness, it also mistakenly places the
blame in Sino-Africa relations on China rather than African state
managers. The argument that Africa should not engage China because the
latter has an ulterior motive is, to say the least, begging the question and is
an unnecessary denial of the process of globalisation where states are
growing more interdependent, even those they do not expressly wish to. It
must, however, be pointed out that while it has been argued that
scholarship and even developmental projects could be hijacked, truncated
and domesticated by foreign powers for specific interest that may not be
African (Ake 1979), both Sino-optimism and Sino-pessimism may not be
free from external instigators and agents; hence, the need to Africanise.
200 Chapter Eleven
As noted elsewhere (Oshodi 2011a; forthcoming), the concept of

Africanisation is not new. It has been used in religious and educational
terms to mean the inculcation of African culture into no, or only partial,
African phenomena. Here, I use it to mean a “strategic approach to
Africa’s development in which case focus is placed on Africa’s peculiar
needs, aspirations and condition in its relations with non-African
principalities and powers” (Oshodi forthcoming). This is in the same but
broader sense as Mays (2003), who talks about Africanisation of
peacekeeping, Mkandawire & Soludo (1998), who talk about “African
Perspectives on Structural Adjustment,” and Broadman (2007), who
attempts to locate Africanisation in economic terms. In this way, to
“Africanise” is to have a strategic plan that reflects Africa’s peculiar
condition in dealing with both the inside (i.e. internal challenges and
contradictions) and the outside (external realities as represented in
propellants and hindrances to development, as occasioned by foreign
principalities and powers). Development paradigms or options will be
Africanised if focus is not placed on imported concoctions, methodologies
and agendas. Instead, emphasis is placed on those developmental
initiatives that are African in origin, agenda and contextualisation. While it
is obvious that Africanisation, especially when viewed as “the mantra of
African solutions to African problems” (Albert 2011), has its own
challenges, I contend that its usage here is not in isolation of externalities
(such as, in this case, China), but rather it mainly speaks to the need to
engage China from an internally driven logic, just as China’s activities in
Africa are a reflection and an aftermath of Chinese domestica. It is in this
regard that Africanisation of the Chinese option stands on five interrelated
legs relating to pan-Africanism, intellectualism, strategic engagement,
scientific communalism, and agriculture (PISSA).
First, Africanisation requires a more conscious and targeted effort to
seriously unify Africa. This consciousness, which speaks to pan-
Africanism, is one that must understand that Africa’s future is not
individual but collective. In spite of the artificial divisions, Africa’s
interconnectedness is often exposed in conflict situations. Why, for
instance, will instability inside Rwanda affect peace in Burundi? Or why
will crisis in Eritrea mean instability in Ethiopia and Somalia? Why did
the Liberian civil war have financial and humanitarian implications for
Nigeria? Why will the economic decline in Zimbabwe affect South
Africa? Why will the Somali pirates cause an increase in the cost of
Chinese phones in African countries? The single most holistic answer to
these questions is that Africa, though without integration, needs to be
integrated, as the events in a sister African country will normally affect its
immediate and extended neighbours. It thus becomes a strategy to

collectively engage issues and realities as a people rather than as
individual states, especially given the artificial nature and imperialist
imposition of boundaries.
What does Pan-Africanism require in real policy terms? It requires a
hastened economic integration of African economies. The failure of
NEPAD will be decided by the level of integration of Africa’s economies.
To this extent, the potential of the Multilateral Programming and
Operation Centres (MULPOCs) as advocated by Adebayo Adedeji in his
African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programme
(AAF-SAP), should be reconsidered. This implies that the eight Regional
Economic Communities (RECs) in Africa—the Arab Maghreb Union
(UMA), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the
Eastern African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central
African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(IGAD), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)—
must be integrated, monetarily and fiscally. This must precede any hope of
an African Monetary Union or a United States of Africa. Pan-Africanism
will also ensure a more robust collective engagement of China in the sense
that it will provide a wider regional population and market, which is as
much of a potential leveraging factor as Africa’s natural resources.
Unfortunately, the functional regional economic integration that is
characterised by forward and backward linkages has been a major
challenge in Africa. Pan-Africanism will also mean that an African
strategy similar to China’s African Policy, in existence since 2006, must
be initiated. Without an African plan, China will benefit from the varied
standards and an exploitative strategy across Africa.
Second, Africanisation also dictates that Africa possesses the
intellectual stamina to engage China. Through the instrumentality of
FOCAC, China has trained and still promises to train thousands of
Africans annually to build up Africa’s manpower needs. Apart from
Chinese firms that provide some levels of expertise and training to
Africans employed by them, China also has scholarship schemes to train
young Africans in China. For instance, between 2007 and 2009 China has
given between 2,000 and 4,000 scholarships to Africans in various fields
(Wenping 2007). As of 2004, Chinese institutions had trained 15,000
Africans (Lammers 2007). But aside from the paltry number of
scholarships, more fundamental questions arise. What specific roles do
these Chinese-trained Africans play in the development of the continent?
202 Chapter Eleven
In what specific areas do they find relevance? Did they return to Africa
after their training, or did they settle in China and move to “greener
pastures?” What has been their level of usefulness in the transfer of
Chinese technology? Answers to these questions will help to understand
the overall usefulness of Chinese education. Chinese-trained Africans may
be part of the brain drain, in which case they return to Africa only to move
abroad to utilise their training for other societies, making such training a
waste. Africa will need to engage the highest level of Chinese
intelligentsia in all fields, but particularly in the areas of science and
technology. Meanwhile, African intellectuals must also rise to the
occasion of understanding China and advance arguments that would help
Africa benefit from Sino-Africa relations more greatly.
Third, Africanisation requires the strategic engagement of China.
China has the capacity to dialectically propel industrialisation through the
provision of funds and copy-technology or by propelling de-
industrialisation through dumping cheaper substitutes for indigenous
African products and the strangling of indigenous industries. Similarly,
China does not commit itself to any responsibility should its engagement
with Africa further complicate the African crisis. This has made it quite
possible for China to sell arms to Zimbabwe, a nation that is fast becoming
a major failed project, and Sudan, a country that witnessed genocide or
near-genocide in Darfur. But how can Africa strategically engage China?
Africa can benefit from the cheap technology China offers in the areas of
transportation, power and energy. Africa is in dire need of industrialisation.
The UN-Habitat Executive Director, Dr Ann Tabaijuka, quite rightly noted
that a major challenge in Africa is the cost of production. Noting that
“China has a deep industrial base,” she was quick to contrast this by
adding that: “the cost of construction is 25 percent of that in Kenya”
(Tabaijuka 2008, 22). In this light, Africa has a lot to learn from China.
With China’s massive advancement in power generation, agriculture and
other technology-related areas, Sino-Africa relations provide an
opportunity for states in Africa to learn and share experiences with China.
African governments should also create a Science and Technology Forum
(STF), in which case there will not only be partnership among African
scientists, but also between them and their Chinese counterparts. The
gauge of the STF, rather than being another forum for fruitless meetings,
should be in terms of its ability to solve the pertinent and peculiar
challenges facing Africa in the areas of energy and power, health and
agriculture. Under this arrangement, the STF should be held not less than
biannually with emphasis placed on practical inventions. This thirst for
technology must, however, recognise Africa’s peculiar situation in terms
of ruggedness, durability, maintenance and local content and indigenisation.

China also practices this indigenisation of technology to such an extent
that if a foreign company wants to bid for lucrative government contracts,
it must be willing to share its technology and intellectual property, as well
as do its latest research and development (R&D) in China (Robinson
2010).
By implication, though China already plays a critical role in
infrastructural development in Africa, strategic engagement requires that
Africa’s infrastructure needs are addressed. Africa needs to see the
development of infrastructure, which will not only generate the needed
local empowerment, but will also help in the development of its untapped
capacities. These capacities include those of power, steel, cement and
other aspects. Apart from governments, Africa’s private sector should also
be encouraged and supported to expand. Even as Africa’s private sector
remains largely developing compared to those in more advanced societies,
a typical potential of this is located in the recent Nigerian Dangote Group
and the Chinese Sinoma US $3.9 billion cement deal. The deal will help
the Dangote Group increase its cement output across Africa to 50 million
metric tonnes per annum in two and a half years (The China Monitor
2011).
Similarly, Africa’s oil and raw materials should also be incorporated
into the strategic mix. China unquestionably needs oil for its fast-growing
industries. This provides an opportunity for oil-rich African states to
benefit from the emerging and certain competition between China and the
West. For instance, in Nigeria, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and
ExxonMobil are increasingly being pushed back by one of the three large
Chinese state-owned oil corporations, the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC), to renegotiate oil deals under the threat of an
impending invasion of the Chinese oil giants (Bello et al. 2009). Though
the other two large Chinese oil corporations have yet to join in the
competition for Nigeria’s oil, Royal Dutch Shell’s response was that it will
“fight off Chinese over Nigeria’s oil” (Alike & James 2009, 1). China’s
full-force entrance into Africa’s oil equation will thus provide Nigeria,
Angola and the so-called “new oil economies” of Ghana, Ethiopia,
Uganda, Sierra Leone and Sao Tome and Principe (Aryeetey & Asmah
2011, 22) with an increase in oil revenue, owing to the competition that it
will bring in the international oil market. Other non-oil economies in
Africa could also benefit from the implications of China’s rising interest in
their natural resources.
Rather than side with any of the contenders (i.e. China or the hitherto
dominant international players), resource-rich African states must leverage
204 Chapter Eleven
the current scenario while maximally benefiting from their finite

resources, and must be ready to promote and benefit from the emerging
strategic confrontation between China and the early players (SCCEP).
Strategic engagement will thus require Africa to exploit and benefit from
the SCCEP that will see China compete for resources and relevance
against early players like the United States, Japan, France and the United
Kingdom, who had dominated strategic relations with Africa on the bases
of primary resources. As of today, not only has China dislodged some of
these early players in terms of volumes of trade, but it is also heading to
become Africa’s biggest trading partner in a few years if the current pace
of trade continues. For instance, Sino-Africa trade has galloped from $4.5
billion in 2001 to US $50 billion in 2006, and currently stands at about
$150 billion. African leaders must strategize to benefit from both the
Washington Consensus and the Beijing Consensus, while making its own
route to development by relating with China to encourage the early players
to compete for attention and vice versa.
Strategic confrontation will also presuppose checking the problem of
counterfeit, adulterated and substandard products (CAS), and protecting
Africa’s infant industries. Despite the sophistication of the South African
textile industries, if they are still outshone by the Chinese textiles
manufacturers leading to the unemployment of about 25,000 people in
about two years (Wenping 2007), what then happens to Nigeria, Ghana,
Uganda, Togo or Burkina Faso’s textile industries? There must be a policy
to ensure that a substantial manufacturing investment is set up within
Africa, so that instead of importing finished products like finished textiles
into Africa, Chinese firms are encouraged to set up production plants in
Africa. The case of Ogun state in Nigeria is therefore laudable. The
executive governor of the state, Mr. Gbenga Daniel, led an investment
mission to China in 2009, which had visited the Quindao Phoenix Printing
and Dyeing Company in Shandong province. The company produces the
popular Phoenix Hitarget Ankara range of wax products, and the governor
had encouraged its Chairman, Dai Zhihua, to invest in Ogun in the area of
adire cloth making. The encouragement is hinged on the company’s
participation in the Ogun-Shandong Park in Ogun State, Nigeria (Andrews
2009). The logic in this transfer of production from China is even more
convincing when situated in an emerging argument that the continuous
growth in China and India will, based on the fundamentals of labour cost
and location, begin to favour Africa as the next point for cheap labour
(Page 2011).
There is also the need to engage labour issues. Apart from inhuman
labour practices in some Chinese companies operating in Africa, Chinese
state-owned companies operating in Africa often import their top labour

cadre from China rather than employing locals. For instance, in a study of
Chinese Construction Firms (CCFs), it was reported that though about
51% were Africans (while the remaining were 48% Chinese and 1% from
other countries), there was evidence that such firms overwhelmingly
employed Chinese nationals for managerial positions (about 90% are
Chinese nationals) and only 10% of the skilled workforce are locals (Chen
et al. 2007).
Fourth, Africanisation will also require some sort of popular and
humanist governance. China does not interfere in other countries’
domestic issues, which explains, in spite of Western criticisms, its cordial
relations with anti-Western regimes and other reactionary regimes such as
El Bashir (accused of genocide in Darfur, Sudan), semi-dictatorial and
highly personalised regimes such as Yoweri Museveni (Uganda), Meles
Zenawi (Ethiopia) and Paul Kegame (Rwanda) (Lumumba-Kasongo
2007). In spite of Western opposition to the Robert Mugabe regime in
Zimbabwe, Mugabe pays regular state visits to Chinese leaders and has
received a red carpet welcome, an honorary Professorship by the Beijing
Foreign Affairs University, and was also promised arms by the Chinese
government (AFP 2005). The simple message from the foregoing is
simple—China does not mind whether or not a government violently or
economically oppresses it citizens. Just as China deals with Sudan and
Zimbabwe, so it deals with South Africa and Nigeria.
But if China is not interested in the role of governance on the toiling
masses of Africa, should states in Africa, on their part, also be
disinterested? Needed resources are continuously being wasted on
persuing wars in Africa. For instance, peace-keeping cost the UN US
$2.86 billion in the first half of 2005, humanitarian aid between 1995 and
2001 was US $7 billion, the cost of material damage in Rwanda genocide
is US $1 billion, reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
is estimated to cost US $20 billion, and the Somali crisis has cost more
than US $7 billion (CFA 2005). China may not directly suffer a
humanitarian catastrophe when law and order breaks down or when there
is failure of governance in Africa, thus states in Africa must view
themselves as first having a responsibility to improve the lives of their
people. In this sense, there must be a system of government in operation
that continentally views the people as the top priority in governance. I call
this “scientific communalism.”
Though there is the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), which
is meant to ensure peer-review among African states, such a review stops
short of having the needed bite and is at best a self-accepting mechanism
206 Chapter Eleven
for evaluation. Scientific communalism is hinged on the thinking that

without peace and security there cannot be development, and that conflicts
in Africa often spill across borders owing to their artificiality and the
natures of contemporary states. Unlike the APRM, therefore, states must
be ready to send troops to fellow African nations in need of military
assistance. There must be a fund for an African army with one command
and control (C&C). Scientific communalism also presupposes responsible
governance and the need to evolve and strengthen continental anti-
corruption agencies. While the call for a standing army is not new in
Africa and the usefulness of such is clearer now than ever, there is also a
need to improve transparency and accountability. With transparency and
accountability, revenue from China will increasingly be used for the
general good of the African masses. There is as much the need to fight
conventional corruption as much as representational corruption (Oshodi
2011b). African representatives must be paid within the economic
buoyancy of individual states and reflect the social indicator of the
majority of their people. In the long run, scientific communalism is
important to China, as it cannot afford to provoke anti-Chinese sentiment
across a whole continent. Already, Chinese businesses in Africa have been
deliberately attacked by ordinary people for their perceived support for
irresponsible governments or for inhuman practices. Two instances
include the copper mine crisis in Zambia that witnessed violent protests
and the Niger Delta in Nigeria, where Chinese oil workers were kidnapped
for days by armed militants. These attacks directly impact Chinese
businesses and create uncertainty, which will eventually negatively affect
China.
The fifth leg of Africanisation of the Chinese option is focused on
agriculture. Between 60% and 70% of Africans are employed in the
agricultural and allied sector, and this sector provides about 50% of some
countries’ GDP as well as 30% of Africa’s GDP (Asmah & Kimenyi
2011; Collier, Conway & Venables 2008). As such, there is no way that
Africanisation will neglect the millions of lives to which agriculture caters.
Paradoxically, though Africa is endowed with land and water, it still relies
on the importation of food items, and some states still rely on food aid
from outside Africa. This paradox becomes pathetic when discussed by
Carmady & Owusu (2007, 506): “Africa has the potential to substantially
meet this demand, as it is three times larger than China and rich in
resources.” It becomes even more so if one bears in mind that Africa can
feed itself (Durham 2011). Yet, so far, China has sourced very little of its
foodstuffs from Africa (Kaplinsky, McCormick & Morris 2007).
Sino-African relations provide states in Africa with the opportunity to

improve their agriculture and export some of their products in their raw
and processed forms to China. Some facts stand in support of Africa. For
instance, China has a landmass of about 9.5 billion sq. kilometres but has
yet to address the feeding needs of a population of about 1.4 billion
inhabitants. It is also conscious of the fact that it has only 7% of the
world’s arable land and fresh water, 3% of its forests, and just 2% of its oil
(Gaye 2008). Conversely, Africa unquestionably has a comparative
advantage in agriculture. Though Africa has not been a major factor in
China’s agriculture needs, its largely un-exploited fertile land could
address some of its needs, as could be viewed in the potential of the
Cassava Initiative of former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration
in Nigeria.
Obasanjo inaugurated a committee on August 7, 2002 with the mandate
to generate US $5 billion per annum from the export of cassava products.
The idea was to make use of cassava tubers, stems and leaves. Following
the gradual implementation of the policy it was soon discovered that
cassava-based ethanol production alone is capable of generating up to US
$6.1 billion by 2012 from exports to other countries, the primary recipient
being China. The impact of the Cassava Initiative was massive and
impressive, though it met many challenges.
Some of the most critical observers, such as Kaplinsky, McCormick &
Morris (2007), state that China’s interest in Africa’s agriculture may be
less urgent than its interest in oil. Yet even these writers rightly note that a
number of questions can only be answered with more data to prove or
disprove the level and specific needs to be raised in Africa. For instance,
will China continue to produce its own meat? Will its growing per capita
income lead to an increased importation of horticultural products, fish
and/or chicken? If they do, will these imports come directly from eastern
and southern African economies, which have a demonstrated comparative
advantage in some of these sectors? In spite of these questions, Chinese
investors are beginning to pioneer soy production in Mozambique
(Kaplinsky, McCormick & Morris 2007). Africa must, however, not rely
on such Chinese investment in export-aimed agriculture. Rather,
contemporary African actors must be supported to mechanise agriculture,
especially as rain-fed agriculture is forecasted to reduce in yield to 50% as
early as 2020 in some African countries (Muller et al. 2011). On
mechanisation, the Chinese Agriculture Bank of China remains one of the
richest in accessing such funds. Chinese tourists also serve as an untapped
source of revenue to Africa. Campaigns could be launched to increase the
208 Chapter Eleven
number of Chinese tourists, 70,000 of which visited Africa in just twenty

months (Kaplinsky, McCormick & Morris 2007).
Conclusion
This paper has argued that two extreme positions have developed on
the question of the Chinese option and on whether or not to engage China.
While the Sino-optimists argue that Chinese Africana holds the hope for
Africa’s development, the Sino-pessimist counters with contrary arguments.
Beyond these extremities, this paper has argued for the Africanisation of
the Chinese option in Africa’s development through Pan-Africanism,
industrialization, scientific communalism, strategic engagement and
agriculture, collectively abbreviated as PISSA. However, on whether or
not Africa leaders would prove themselves to be capable of benefiting
from Chinese Africana, only time will tell. Unfortunately, based on the
current living standards of the majority of Africans and Africa’s inability
to internally engage and resolve some of the major problems facing the
continent, as represented by insecurity and corruption, it seems that the
current crop of leaders are not currently ready (or perhaps not willing) to
effectively leverage the evolving Chinese option through its Africanisation.
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Notes
1
This is a statement made by Sahr Jonny, a Sierra Leonean ambassador to China.
2
Among the numerous developmental strategies, partnerships and initiatives are:
Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI); Export Promotion Strategies (EPS); the
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) “Africa’s Strategy for
Development in the 1970s” adopted by the ECA Conference of Ministers in
Tunisia, February 1971; “African Declaration on Cooperation, Development, and
Economic Independence” (otherwise known as the Addis Ababa Declaration)
adopted by the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) Assembly of Heads of
States and Governments in 1973; the “Revised Framework of Principles for the
Implementation of the New International Economic Order in Africa” adopted in
Kinshasa by the OAU Council of Ministers and Heads of States in Libreville in
December 1976 and July 1977, respectively; the Monrovia Declaration adopted by
OAU Heads of States and Governments in July, 1979 in Monrovia, Liberia; the
“Lagos Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the
Economic Development of Africa” (LPA) of 1979; the African Priority
Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER); the United Nations Programme of
Action for African Economic Recovery and Development (UNPAAERD); the IMF
and World Bank foisted Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP); Adebayo
Adedeji’s Alternative Framework to SAP (AAF-SAP); and the current New
216 Chapter Eleven
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Governments of more developed

states have initiated such projects as the US’s African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA) and the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), the European Union’s
Economic Partnership for Africa (EPAs), the Britain African Commission, the
Japanese Tokyo International Conference for Africa’s Development (TICAD) of
Japan, and China’s Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).
3
China produced about 141 new billionaires between 2009 and 2011 (Moore
2011).
4
Trade moved from $4.5bn in 2001 to $18.5bn in 2003, $50bn in 2006, $73bn in
2007 and to over $100bn and $150bn in 2008 and 2011, respectively.
5
Anshan identifies these challenges as including labour practices and market
strategies, Chinese national versus corporate interest, and Western suspicions
(Anshan 2007, 81–85).
6
The history of CCT is not a new one. For instance, about 140 years ago, Francis
Galton in a letter to The Times entitled “Africa for the Chinese” argued for the
establishment of a Chinese colony in East Africa to replace the “lazy Africans”
(Galton 1873). Others have suggested that the eunuch Muslim admiral Zheng He’s
(“colonising”) ships and voyages around the world (to Asia, the Americas and
Africa) were not on an adventure mission but seeking Chinese colonies (Wade
2004). With this background, the Galtonian theory in the twenty-first century
becomes understandable when positioned with the “Chongqing experiment” and
the mysterious “Baoding village” (Bloom 2010).
7
This section is based on three works by Oshodi (2011a; 2012b; forthcoming).
CHAPTER TWELVE
RACIALIZATION OF ASIA, AFRICA

AND THE AMERICAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE IDEAL IRANIAN CITIZEN:
LOCAL AND GLOBAL REPRESENTATIONS
OF COLONIALISM, GEOGRAPHY, CULTURE
AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN IRANIAN
SCHOOL TEXTBOOKS
AMIR MIRFAKHRAIE
KWANTLEN POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY, CANADA
Abstract
In this paper I analyze and deconstruct the 2004 and earlier editions of
Iranian school textbooks for how official knowledge about the ideal
Iranian citizen, Africa, Asia and the Americas is constructed and presented
to students. I examine “how [the images and representations of the ideal
Iranian citizen, Africans, Asians and the inhabitants of the Americas are]
composed of different textual elements and fragments” that, in their
discursive formation, present a coherent and universal view and language
about the world to students (Thompson 1996, 570). I focus on the four
main recurring educational themes of identity politics, diversity,
“citizenship” and development in analyzing how national identity and the
ideal citizen find racialized local and global representations. I provide data
on how school knowledge differentiates between human beings, groups
and nations through the invocation of racialized, nation-centric and
xenophobic discourses. I utilize the tools and insights of antiracism,
transnationalism and post-structuralism to highlight the various forms of
absent and present discourses and categories of otherness that are
218 Chapter Twelve
employed in simultaneously constructing an image of the ideal citizen and

national identity that ends up dominating and erasing these various forms
of global otherness. In deconstructing the meanings of texts, I draw upon
deconstruction, discourse analysis and qualitative content analysis.
Introduction
Through the narration of nation, citizens of a country are confronted
with a “set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events,
national symbols, and rituals which stand for, or represent, the shared
experiences … that give meaning to [their nations]” (Hall 1996a, 613).
Narrations require conformity to the already established norms and
discourses about the nation, the country and the ideal citizen (Heater 2004,
77; Osborne 1991, 20–22; Kedourie 1966, 83; Nasser 2004). Textbooks
construct identities and produce: “meanings about the nation with which
we can identify; [and] … are contained in the stories which are told about
it, memories which connect it with its past, and the images which are
constructed of it” (Hall, in Henry et al. 1998, 31). As Hall (1996a, 612)
argues, identity formation is a process that involves power relations
between “us” and “them” and within each category. The national elite: “is
reluctant to include identities of ‘others’ that it has constructed,
perpetuated, and used to its advantage” (Henry et al. 1998, 31). They
selectively organize history into sets of simplified coherent stories about
the nation (Francis 1997, 11; Hall 1996a, 614). Narrations also represent
romanticized images of the ideal citizen that discursively reproduce
official stories about dominant cultures (Hall 1996a, 613). They consider
certain events, individuals and cultural artifacts as important, elevate the
dominant society “to the status of legend,” and idealize the founding
nation(s) by demonizing “otherness.” They also vilify and marginalize
individuals and groups that are considered as undesirable historical others
(Francis 1997, 11).
Global relations require global citizens who are open to diversity and
can interact with individuals from various parts of the world. Schools and
education systems are now being conceptualized and utilized as effective
transnational/global tools in institutionalizing “global” and/or “civic and
citizenship” education by scholars, civil society, government organizations,
non-government agencies and the United Nations (i.e. UNICEF and
UNESCO; Smith, Fountain & McLaren 2002; Lee 2005). “Global
education” in Iran and the Middle East, “civic and citizenship education”
in Europe, “antiracism education” in the United States, Canada, the United
Kingdom and Australia, and “critical multiculturalism” in the United
Racialization and the Construction of the Ideal Iranian Citizen 219
States all point to the need for the inclusion of diversity and the
oppositional discourses that reflect the experiences of everyday people and
the conditions of the working classes and the working poor. The aims of
these diverse yet similar educational theories and approaches to teaching,
pedagogy and curriculum construction are to promote critical thinking and
equality through praxis-oriented and child-centred pedagogy that is
inclusive of difference and promotes democracy, justice and peace,
locally, nationally and globally (Dei et al. 2005; Banks 2001; Visand &
Jakubowski 2002; Mehran 1999). These emancipatory and inclusive
educational approaches to cultural, political and economic
diversities/inequalities and social justice and human rights issues warrant
moving beyond the conceptualizations of the nation-state and educational
issues as “well-bounded system[s]” to an approach that “concentrates on
how social life is ordered across time and space” (Hall 1996a, 619) by
accounting for how “identity develops via difference and by exclusion of
others” (Nasser 2004, 224).
During the process of nation building in countries such as Iran
influenced by nationalism and restructured through the introduction of
modernization projects, “citizenship education” and national identity were
constructed based on a conception of the ideal citizen that emphasized
similarity to establish categories of insiders based on universal shared
values (Sadiq 1931). As Sadiq (1931, 84) argued, the aim of the education
system was to provide Iranian citizens with a cultural capital that would
enable Iran to enter the age of modernity as a powerful contender in the
region. He proposed a nationalistic education system based on the
principles of progressive education with a strong basis in science and
technical knowledge (Banani 1961, 109). Sadiq’s solution to
traditionalism in Iran was to teach and re-socialize the students and
citizens of Iran based on new conceptions of the self in modernity and on
the culture of the Persian “race.”2 The racialized and ethnocentric
connotations of nationalistic discourses in Iran (Banani 1961) were
important elements of the process of nation building despite the multi-
ethnic-religious characteristics of Iranian society (Atabaki 2000; Shaffer
2002), and were opposed by minority groups in Iran as a hegemonic way
of “Persianizing” the population. Persian hegemony has resulted in ethnic
inequalities such as mass poverty, a high level of illiteracy and
underdevelopment in various non-Persian provinces (Mojab & Hassanpour
1995, 234). The most evident aspect of the Persianization process is the
usage of Persian as the official language of instruction in schools and
textbooks. This emphasis on Persian as the national language of all
Iranians was accompanied with the proliferation of racist and chauvinistic
220 Chapter Twelve
myths that assumed all Iranians to be part of the “pure or genuine Aryan
race” (Mojab & Hassanpour 1995, 231), resulting in “genocide, ethnocide,
and linguicide” (ibid., 232).
Following the Islamic Revolution of 1978–79, Islamic principles and
ideology began to be influential in devising educational policies (Mohsenpour
1988, 83). The Islamization of Iran, as a modern “reaction” to the process
of Westernization, conceptualized as gharbzadegi (“West-toxication” or
“West-struckness”), was initiated through the implementation of the
“Cultural Revolution” that aimed at cleansing and purging the educational
system (especially the universities) in terms of pedagogical goals,
curriculum content and staff that were considered as gharbzadeh (“West-
struck”), pro-Shah/Western, non-Muslim and tyrannical (Rastegar 1995,
220; Mohsenpour 1988; Shorish 1988; Menashri 1992; Sanasarian 2000).
However, as Spivak reminds us: “No perspective critical of imperialism
can turn the ‘Other’ into an insider (i.e. the national self and the ideal
citizen) and a member of the ‘us’ category, because the project of
imperialism has always already historically refracted what might have
been the absolutely ‘Other’ into a domesticated ‘Other’ that consolidates
the imperialist self” (in Henry 1996, 378). As Mazzini (in Bowden 2003,
355) also argues, revolutionary movements often: “seek to make the centre
of the movement their own country or their own city. They do not destroy
nationality; they only confiscate all other nationalities for the benefit of
their own. [Their conception of] a chosen people …” often homogenizes
the past and limits reflections of diversity in the construction of who
belongs to the nation and who does not (Abrahamian 1993, 60–110).
As Said (1994, 270–271; 298–299) points out, being critical of
imperialism needs to be read in the context of also being critical of anti-
imperialist movements and their hegemonic policies towards the Western
other, minorities and their constructions of “insiders” and “outsiders”
across the world. It is just as important to scrutinize Eastern conceptions of
the self and the other for their oppressive depictions of sameness and
difference (Rahnema & Behdad 1995, 9). In “Orientalist in reverse”
literature, the West is depicted as the nemesis and as the other of the East
due to its exploitation of Easterners politically, socially, culturally and
economically (Rahnema & Behdad 1995, 5–7). An emphasis on
highlighting Islamization as a form of non-Western modernity also hides
the extent to which Westernization and modernist nationalistic sentiments
remain central characteristics of the Iranian education system. In fact,
educational studies have not fully explored the extent to which the
Persianization and the Westernization of the population within the context
of the nation-building process and the uneven economic development of
Iran, which began during the Pahlavi era, have been advancing under the
Islamic Republic (Higgins & Shoar-Ghaffari 1995; Ferdows 1995; Vaziri
1993; Mehran 2002; 1999; 1997). The Persianization process in the
curriculum and the education system, with its consequences in terms of
unequal outcomes, warrants scrutiny in light of a critical analysis of the
process of racialization. Most post-revolutionary research has studied the
effects of the Islamization process on the representations of gender
relations, national identity and the ideal citizen without accounting for
how the processes of racialization and ethnicism are portrayed in the
narration of nation (Mehran 2002; 1999; 1997; Higgins & Shoar-Ghaffari
1995; Ferdows 1995). It is significant to highlight the ways in which the
processes of racialization and ethnicism position school-aged readers in
relation to the national self and to internal and external others, who may be
constructed as friendly and/or enemy insiders/outsiders, and also produce
positioned readers that make sense of the narration of nation and those
privileged present and non-present discourses that frame the ways students
come to understand themselves in relation to various forms of otherness
locally, nationally and globally.
This paper deconstructs Iranian school textbooks in terms of how
power relations are represented at the national and international levels and
how, in constructing the ideal citizen, certain groups “are commonly
forced into structural positions lacking formal authority and power”
(Camino & Krulfeld 1994, xv). I offer a textual analysis of various
editions of Persian, social studies, geography, religious studies and history
textbooks and account for how the other, in its multiple and (trans)national
forms, has been constructed in the narration of the nation. I analyze how a
racialized conception of Iran, Africa, the Americas and Asia informs the
narration of the self by exploring how the concept of “race” has been
imagined and embodied in the textbooks’ figures, maps and texts since the
Revolution of 1978–79. I expose the ways through which the processes of
racialization and ethnicization, and how social, cultural and economic
relations, are affected by the “signification of human biological” and
socio-cultural characteristics, resulting in the categorization and
stigmatization of racialized-ethnicized groups as the other by viewing and
constructing them in unequal and different ways in informing the
construction of “social collectivities” (Dei 1996, 21; Henry & Tator 2006,
351–352). I examine how the ideal citizen is positioned, both similarly and
differently, in relation to other ethno-nationalities, race groups and various
forms of otherness. I explore the extent to which such positionalities are
limited in offering holistic, emancipatory, inclusive and non-prejudicial
accounts of diversity within and between these groups.
222 Chapter Twelve
I also analyze the image of the Iranian self as the sum of the dialectical
interactions between various forms of us and them categories within the
discursive formations of Islam, Persianization, and/or Western educational
theories and perspectives that invoke and reflect specific interpretations of
pre-Persian Empire, post-Persian Empire, Islamic, pre-colonial, colonial,
anti-colonial, post-colonial, revolutionary and imperialist interactions.
This requires an exploration of how, during which historical epoch, under
what kind of political atmosphere and for what ideological purposes
contradictory us and them relations are invoked. The various relationships
between insiders and outsiders are constructed within a hierarchy that is
already established by the discourses used, through which social difference
categories are essentialized by references to certain fixed attributes that are
then considered as characteristics of the whole group. These discourses
that highlight differences between groups are given significance in the
context of the construction and legitimization of Iran as a nation-state in
Iranian school textbooks.
I argue that school knowledge about the ideal Iranian citizen is
produced through a narration of nation that draws upon Islamized,
Orientalist, ethnocentric, nationalistic and racialized discourses in
depicting who is Iranian and who is an outsider and alien. I maintain that
multiple racialized images in light of other political and apolitical
categories are presented to students in various lessons through the
invocations of diverse discourses that, in their dialectical and discursive
relations to one another, represent politicized relations between the West
and the East in the construction of the ideal Iranian citizenship. In
deconstructing how the term “race” (“nizhƗd”)3 has implicitly or explicitly
been employed in conjunction with other factors/categories such as
culture, skin colour, face (chahrah), religious diversity, civic responsibility
and language in portraying geographical spaces in Asia, Europe, Africa,
and the Americas, I argue that they function as hegemonic tools of
domination that highlight the ideal Iranian citizen as the leader in anti-
colonial and anti-imperialist movements.
It is through a racialized conceptualization of Iran that Iranian elite
groups’ positions are legitimized through the normalization of conflicting
binary oppositions in light of various socio-political and cultural
discourses that continue to depict a homogenized, essentialized and
polarized world as official knowledge about Iran and other continents.
They divide the world’s population into multiple groupings that are
conceptualized according to a narrow understanding of the forces of
“good” and “bad” from both highly critical and ideological and dogmatic
perspectives. Despite the recent revisions of textbooks introduced in 2001
that are based on the discourse of Global Education, the constructions of

otherness in Iranian school textbooks are racialized, nationalist and
Islamic-centric, and problematize and highlight oppression and diversity
only as textual tools to dominate various forms of otherness. These various
forms of otherness are constructed in light of the diametrically opposite
categories of exploiters and exploited that are positioned discursively in
relation to Islamic revolutionary Iranians as the symbol of an independent
and free non-Western nation.
This paper is divided into three parts: “‘Race,’ the Aryan Myth,
Whiteness and the Ideal Citizen—Depicting Diversity in Asia and Iran,”
“‘Race,’ Language, Colonialism and the Americas in the Construction of
the Ideal Iranian Citizen,” and “Africa, Religious Diversity, Racialization
and the Discourse of MustƗĪafƯn” [the oppressed]. I argue that economic
relations, religious diversity and views about Africans and Asians are
informed by a set of discourses that further divide the world into neat and
discrete divisions employing Cartesian opposites within a Manichean
construct of “good” and “bad,” and oppressed and oppressors, reproducing
the dominant positions of Iran and Iranians in relation to Asians, Western
societies and Africans in light of the discourses of revolutionary Islamic
ideology and anti-colonialism. I maintain that critical forms of pedagogy
implemented within a nation-centric approach to identity construction and
depictions of the ideal citizen “cannot be sustained without some
component of … cultural othering and inferiorizing” of the self and
otherness, nationally and globally (Razack 1998, 125).
“Race,” The Aryan Myth, Whiteness and the Ideal

Citizen—Depicting Diversity in Asia and Iran
The textbooks offer “racialized” images of Asia and the rest of the
world to students (Social Studies 5, Geography Section, 1993, 64–69;
2001, 47–52). In the pre-2004 editions of Social Studies 5, the term “race”
was one of the main topics of discussion. Asians were divided into
identifiable categories and raced, and each raced group was associated
with a specific geographical area within Asia. They were given racialized
identities based on, for example, the criterion of skin colour. In a lesson
entitled, “Asia: the Most Populated Continent” (Social Studies 5,
Geography Section, 1993; 2001, 47), the authors maintain:
More than half of the world’s population lives in Asia. [They are mostly
yellow skins rather than white skins]. A number of black skins are also
seen in Asia [A number of black skins also live in Asia]. In some parts of
224 Chapter Twelve
Asia, white skins have mixed with yellow skins and blacks … The people
belonging to each [racial group] (tƯrah) speak their specific language. (66–
67)
Students were also taught about racial diversity in Asia through the
inclusion of a map entitled The Map of Racial (nizhƗd) Diversity in Asia
(Social Studies 5, Geography Section, 1993, 66–68).4 At first glance, the
diversity of the human “race” seems to be the only important information
that represents the extent of racial diversity in Asia as a factual and
apolitical characteristic of this continent. The colour yellow is used to
represent the “Yellow race” (nizhƗd-i zard), white is used for the “white
race” (nizhƗd-i safƯd), and black for the “Black race” (nizhƗd-i siyƗh). The
authors provide an example of the black “race” by referencing the
Dravidian group. According to this map, Arabs and Iranians both belong
to the white skin groups. However, Iranians are also distinguished from
other groups due to their Indo-European characteristic. In depicting India,
Indo-Europeans in northern India are also portrayed as different from
black Dravidians in the south and mixed “White and Black” and “Black
and Yellow” Indians. In the assignment section of these lessons, students
were also asked to name and determine the specific locations of various
racial groups in Asia and to distinguish between different types of White
groups that live in western Asia (Social Studies 5, Geography Section,
1993, 66–67). The fact that students are asked to distinguish between
different white groups has significant textual importance in light of the
narration of the origin of the Iranian nation in Social Studies 4.
The discourse of Iran as “the land of Aryans” is both a present and
non-present aspect of the narration of nation in elementary and junior-high
textbooks. The construction of the Aryan birth of Iran as an important
aspect of cultural knowledge about its history reifies “race” as an objective
category of dividing human groupings, and reproduces Orientalist
discourse about the self that ends up othering the Iranian-self as the Other
in the discourse of Orientalism. The narration of nation is told in the
language of whiteness through which the Persians are identified as the
rightful founding nation of Iran, and Iranian as the dominant ethnic group
that has populated and administered the Persian Gulf region for about
3,500 years. Students are informed about how the story of the nation began
in antiquity as an objective knowledge about the self (See also Social
Studies 4, History Section, 2004, 88).
Although the Aryan category represents a distinct and rich identity,
reflecting the historical dreams and desires of the ideal citizen, it is the
Pars category that is depicted as the true historical leader of the country
and the centre of the Aryan segmented identity, which is composed of
several competing selves: the Iranian self, the Indo-European self

(occupying Northern India), the European/Western self, the Parthian self,
the Medas self, and the Pars self. The textbooks celebrate the history of
Iran with references to the establishment of the Achaemenian Dynasty
(550–331) by Cyrus the Great, who is characterized as the first King of
Iran despite the fact that the Medas had already established their kingdom
here. The ideal citizen is constructed as descending from the likes of Cyrus
the Great, who allowed for the co-existence of various local cultures such
as “the Hebrews whom the Persians encountered in Babylon” (Tragert
2003, 41). The history of Iran and its civilization is situated not as an
example of an expansionist and hegemonic empire; rather, it is constructed
as the outcome of the efforts of peaceful "men" who sought truth (asha or
rƗst-qǌƯ) and fought evil and "lies" (druj or durǌgh) (Vaziri 1993). The
Achaemenian Empire is characterized as a liberating political system due
to the importance of equality, honour and freedom amongst the “Aryans”
(History 6, 2002, 40; Iranian and World History I, 2005, 58, 59).
The Aryan discourse is also utilized to distinguish Iranians from other
invaders, despite their supposed shared Aryan ancestry. The authors
historicize the desire to defend one’s country by emphasizing the role of
the Pars tribe in preserving Iran from the influences of foreign elements.
The cultural, political and social supremacy of Iran and Iranians is
maintained. Iran is depicted as more civilized and more geographically
important than Egypt and Greece, and as an important centre for Islamic
and scientific explorations and knowledge (History 6, 2004, 51; History 6,
2002, 51; 1999, 46; 1994, 43). The message is clear—despite being
geographically dominated by a number of ethno-racialized groups,
Iranians, due to their Pars Aryan civilization, have continued to dominate
the “invader other” both culturally and politically. The category “Pars” is
the “trace” in all the discussions about the category “Iran.” “Iran” is
defined as “the land of Aryans” and the discourse of Aryan migration is
Persianized from a nationalist perspective that also invokes the discourse
of whiteness.
Another non-present discourse in these depictions of the birth of Iran is
the argument that the name “Iran,” denoting a nation-state in modernity,
was used to refer to the same geo-political boundary some 3,500 years
ago. According to Vaziri (1993), this misconception is based on the
incorporation of Orientalist knowledge. He (1993, 80) maintains that the
term “Iran,” in its pre- and post-Sassanids/Shi’a usage, does not refer to a
well-established Iranian ethno-racialized community. Through the
incorporation of the discourse of the Aryan, students read about how the
story of the nation began in antiquity. The birth of the nation is glorified in
226 Chapter Twelve
light of whiteness as a non-present “trace” that excludes critical

discussions on how various forms of historical ethnic identities have been
shaped and affected due to policies of the Pars group (read—Persian
majority). In fact, the textbooks do not discuss in any detail how and in
what contexts other groups/peoples have also settled and called Iran their
homeland and, thus, have legitimate historical claims to this geographical
space. This is a racialized conception of history that assumes Iranians are
white and Indo-European but different from Greeks, Indians and other
Aryan sub-tribes.
In both the 2004 and pre-2004 editions of Social Studies 4 and 5 and
History 6, it is inculcated in Iranian students that “race” is an important
and scientific criterion in differentiating between the populations of Asia
(and the world) based on the attribute of skin colour and ethnicity (i.e.
cultural differences). Asians were constructed by references to four criteria
of difference/sameness: “race” (nizhƗd), religion, civilization, and culture
(Social Studies 5, Geography Section, 1993, 64–69; 2001, 47–52). In fact,
the three categories of “race,” language and skin colour were
intersectionally used in the depiction of diversity in Asia in such a way as
to demonstrate how similar (i.e. sharing anti-colonial attitudes with a
strong base in religious beliefs) and different (i.e. due to skin colour
differences, racial composition and religious diversity) Iranians are from
other Asians (Social Studies 5, 1993, 69). The two most important criteria
considered in categorizing the population in Asia were the terms “race”
and religion. The textbooks portrayed the majority of Muslims as “white
skin,” Brahmans as “Black skin” or hybrid (black and white), and
Buddhists were represented as mainly “Yellow skin.” The reification of
“race” and its association with specific geographical locations and
religions functions as a hegemonic tool since the most important white
Muslim group is intertextually defined and objectified as the Pars-Aryan-
Shi’a category. Also, these categories of sameness were depicted without
reference to the internal divisions, diversities and conflicts and their
effects on “white” Muslim groups or “Yellow skin” Buddhist groups.
Furthermore, a significant omission is any reference to the followers of
Christianity and Judaism.
The division of Asia’s population into discrete religious and skin-
colour categories was also reinforced through textbook pictures of
individuals representing these various racial/cultural groups.5 In the 1993
edition of Social Studies 5 (66–67), the pictures of Japanese, Indo-
Chinese, Mongol, Dravidian, Western Asian and Indian (HandƯ) faces
distinguish between Asian peoples and visualize the “diversity” of the
peoples of Asia for students. In the maps, the Dravidian category is also
presented as non-white, non-Aryan, non-Indo-European and non-Muslim.

Furthermore, the picture of the Dravidian people qualifies them as slim,
partly clothed, rural and traditional. The end result is not simply apolitical
representations of “diversity”; rather, these pictures essentialize the facial
characteristics of non-Iranian and non-Aryan Asians and portray them as
objective representations of diverse groups of people that are specific to a
time/space without critically accounting for facial, skin colour, linguistic,
class, cultural, religious and political diversities within each group.
Diversity and difference are turned into homogenized constructed images
of sameness that have political consequences. The authors invoke skin
colour differences using Indo-European language/racial classifications to
divide Asians into distinct groups in light of an anti-colonialist perspective
that is influenced by Orientalist knowledge about the Iranian self and the
other. By representing Iranians as white and Muslim, they are viewed as
more superior then other Asians despite being constructed as both similar
and different in relation to various Asian nationalities and ethnicized
groups.
Although economic inequalities due to colonial efforts were
acknowledged, contemporary internal and national class divisions and
conflicts were ignored and not deemed as useful knowledge. Students are
informed that oppressed groups in Asia have resisted their oppressors,
especially Western oppressors, and that the West is represented and
viewed as a homogenized category and considered as the “dangerous
other” in relation to the Asian self that is also divided based on skin
colour, geographical location and religion. In these representations,
exclusion of diversity within each oppressed and oppressor group
constructs them as essentialized entities, which “reduc[es] the complex
identity of a particular group to a series of simplified characteristics and
denying individual qualities” (Henry et al. 1998, 408). Essentialism is:
“the simplistic reduction of an idea or process to biological or cultural
characteristics,” or in this case to rural/urban and modern/non-modern
distinctions (Henry et al. 1998, 408). As such, the authors end up
constructing Asia as a traditional society that lacks modernization due to
the effects of colonialism. The inclusion of the pictures of most Asians in
their traditional clothing reproduces stereotypical snapshot representations
of the “authentic” others that are assumed to represent the other eternally
and accurately in the late twentieth century. This discourse of the “noble
other” is the non-present aspect of these lessons, which constructs images
of individuals who live within a primordial and unspoiled natural order
that preceded Western and Eastern “civilizations” (See Noel Dyck’s
discussion of the discourse of “Noble Savage” in Dyck [1995, 31]). The
228 Chapter Twelve
image of the “noble other” is constructed in opposition to the harsh

conditions brought about by the industrialization process and urbanization.
Such an image also assumes that Aboriginal peoples, and in this case the
non-white and non-Aryan peoples of India, have been “incapable of
coping with the changes triggered by the coming of white people” (Dyck
1995, 33).
Another non-present discourse in these representations of Asia is the
discourse of modernization that assumes and requires a certain degree of
cultural change in order to be considered as advanced and “modern.”
These pictures reproduce Orientalist and imperialist attitudes that have
historically depicted Asia as undeveloped, poor, non-industrialized and
traditional. Clothing, in this sense, symbolizes tradition within “non-
Western modernity.” However, by tradition, the reference is not to the
cultural values or religious beliefs of Asians per se, but to their lack of
inclusion of Western forms of modernity that characterize technologically
advanced (Western) societies.
In the 2004 edition of the elementary textbooks, terms such as nizhƗd
(“race”) or aqaliyat (“minority”) are no longer used as the main criteria of
understanding population diversity. In fact, all racial references/pictures in
the lessons dealing with Asia are omitted from Social Studies 5 (2004).
However, this does not mean that the ideas of “race” and skin colour are
not employed in representing who is Iranian in the 2004 editions. For
example, skin colour distinctions and rural/urban differences are employed
in portraying cultural and population diversity within Iran in Persian
elementary textbooks. Students in Persian 1 (2004), in a lesson entitled
“Our Country,” read that “Iran belongs to all of them” (118). Students are
instructed that, regardless of where they live in Iran, they are Iranians and
“like (dǌst-dƗrƯm) Iran and Iranians.” This lesson is accompanied by a
drawing of Iran that depicts ethnic minority children in their traditional
clothing living in various parts of the country. The ethnic diversity of Iran
also finds expression in another drawing in a lesson entitled “Iran”
(Persian 1, 2004, 48). Tribal boys and girls are depicted as different
because of their traditional clothing, yet similar because they are Iranian.
In Persian 3 (2004, 24), students are asked to look at four drawings of
individuals playing different musical instruments. The first two are
pictures of tribal and village boys/men playing traditional ethnic
instruments. In one of these pictures, a shepherd is shown playing the flute
while his herd is grazing in the background. In another depiction of ethnic
diversity in the corresponding Persian Writing 3 (2004, 106), students are
asked to look at four drawings and determine which geographical regions
the “men and women” in the pictures are from. All the pictures depict
ethnic minorities in their traditional clothing: a tribe migrating; women

and a young boy working in rice paddies in northern Iran; and a Kurdish
father and child with a horse. In addition, a young (Arab) boy drawn with
a darker complexion (black skin) is shown climbing a tree. Their answer to
the question depends on the stereotypical representations of diversity
through clothing in wider society. The terms “men and women” are
apolitical references to ethnicity that identify rural residents and
individuals in their traditional clothing as ‘ashayir or agriculturalist. The
style of dress is often used to depict ethnic minorities or non-Persians in
rural settings. They are not presented as city-dwellers. Such depictions
imply that outside their rural regions and without their traditional clothing,
the non-Persian (read—non-Iranian) ethnicity does not exist. Such
depictions are not inclusive of diversity; rather, they homogenize diversity
based on a romanticized conception of the other and his or her relationship
with the land and nature, without accounting for how this relationship has
been mitigated by the state’s economic and modernization policies and the
Iran-Iraq War, resulting in the migration of many ethnic groups into major
urban centres. These representations of ethnic diversity are based on a
non-political worldview that sanitizes the conflicts experienced by
ethnic/tribal groups.
The depiction of the Arab other in their traditional clothing and with
references to skin colour differentiates him or her as an “outsider-within”
in relation to the modern Aryan/Muslim who is, by definition, white. This
is a racist construction that reduces the internal Arab other to blackness,
which is often depicted in light of the discourses of slavery, poverty,
colonialism and hunger in other lessons about Africa and the United States
(see below). In these representations of Iran, ethnicity, religion, Aryan
ancestry and rural and urban diversity/differences are intertwined in the
depictions of the ideal citizen, as well as who has historical and political
legitimacy to rule Iran. The ideal of “loving Iran” invokes the discourses
of the Aryan migration, the ‘ashayir and “noble other” in narrating the
nation. The narration also relies on global representations of “race” and
ethnicity. One of the racialized references that is still retained in Social
Studies 5 (2004) is to the indigenous populations of the Americas and
Australia. Students read that in these continents:
In the distant past, only a small number of these indigenous people lived
[in a low density over a large area] … Later on Europeans migrated to
these continents and occupied (taǆarruf) them. Do you know what the
indigenous and tribal people of the Americas who lived in this land were
called before the arrival of the Europeans? (Social Studies 5, Geography
Section, 2004, 61)
230 Chapter Twelve
In previous editions, this type of information was used only to describe

the indigenous population of Australia. Students read that: “Almost all of
the residents of Australia are descendants of those people who came to this
land from England and other countries. The indigenous people (bumƯyan)
live sparsely in the forests” and in the desert (Social Studies 5, Geography
Section, 2001, 65). In the 2004 edition, however, Europeans are
constructed as “occupying” indigenous land rather than “discovering” it.
Also, the picture of the aboriginal Australian is replaced with a picture of a
research outpost at the South Pole. Regardless, in the 2004 edition, the
authors still ask students to name the indigenous peoples of the Americas
before the arrival of the Europeans (Social Studies 5, Geography Section,
2004, 61). One of the possible answers to this question is the term
“redskin” (“surkh-pǌst”), a non-present aspect of these representations,
which is explicitly introduced to students in Geography 7 (2004).
Guidance-level textbooks have also been revised for how they portray
“race” and discuss human diversity. The sections dealing with “Human
Geography” (Geography 8, 1999, 65–77) “Races and Languages”
(Geography 8, 1999, 71–72) and the “Natural Characteristics Differentiate
between Races” have been omitted. In the 1999 edition of Geography 8
(1999, 71–72), the authors maintained that, despite diversity amongst
populations, it is possible to distinguish between racial groups by
employing certain characteristics and applying them to the population of
the world, including factors and attributes such as height, colour of skin,
hair texture and size of skull. The authors asserted that scientists had
divided humans into sixty groups. Students were instructed that, based on
the criterion of skin colour differences, it is possible to divide humans into
three distinct “races”: white, black and yellow, which is also how the
racial divisions were portrayed in the 2001 edition of the social studies
textbooks. In a subsection entitled “A Shared Language Often Unites the
Members of Different Races” (Geography 8, 1999, 71–72), as the title
implies, the authors state that language is the main source of connection
and communication between different “races” and groups. The examples
provided are: Persian in India, Afghanistan and Tajikistan; Spanish in
Mexico; Portuguese in Brazil; and English in the United States of
America. In constructing the ideal citizen as a speaker of the Persian
language that has transnational manifestations, the linguistic diversity of
the Iranian non-Persian student population has been ignored. The
dominant role of the Persian language and the racist policies of the
Persianization of ethnic minorities are disguised. The textbooks do not
explore the hegemonic, nationalistic and internal-colonial histories of
national languages in Iran and in various parts of the world.
The authors did not discuss how the concept of “race” has been
criticized by people of colour across the world. Students did not read about
the lack of scientific validity of “race” as a concept and category of
distinction, nor were they informed about its ideological and biased
suppositions influencing biological categorization and their usages as
objective facts. As a result, the authors reified “race” as a real, objective
and tangible entity, and language was viewed apolitically as a unifying
tool. Biological differences were used as justifiable elements to categorize
people of the world. In being critical of colonialism, the authors failed to
provide spaces for students to discuss the ways in which ethnocentric/
racist views affect students’ perceptions of otherness and other nations.
The apolitical and racially constructed images of the ideal citizen
become more apparent due to the fact that the textbooks do not discuss the
migration patterns and emigration of Iranians to various parts of the world
since the 1850s. In the lesson on human geography (Geography 8, 1999,
71–72), global migration trends were discussed.6 Arrows of different
colours representing different national, cultural and racial groups and
origins show the patterns as well as the direction of the movements of
people between different parts of the world, and depict the contemporary
migration routes of English, Portuguese, German, Chinese, Spanish,
Italian, Slovak, Russian, Japanese and Indian nationals to various parts of
the globe (Geography 8, 1999, 70–71).7 However, no arrows were directed
towards or originated from Iran, indicating there was no migration to or
from there, despite the fact that non-White Iranians are represented in the
Persian 1, 2 and 3 (2004) textbooks. The textbooks also show that many
foreign dynasties and tribal groups such as Turkish groups have invaded,
occupied and remained in Iran. Yet, students are told that these invading
groups became assimilated into the Iranian culture due to their reliance on
Persian administrators in governing the country. The main message is that
Iran’s culture and “race” have remained “pure.” The textbooks continue to
portray Iranian ancestry as “noble” and hierarchically distinct from Arabs,
Europeans or Indians.
Although most direct references to the term “race” are now omitted
from elementary textbooks, other factors such as religion and skin colour
are still employed in both Persian elementary and middle school history
and geography textbooks to represent diversity within Iran and across the
world. In Geography 7 (2004, 16), students are still presented with three
faces of youth in Asia: the “Chinese Face” (Chahrah-i ChƯnƯ), the “Indian
Face” and the “Russian Face” (this map is also included in the pre-2004
editions of Social Studies 5).8 Chahrah (face) is a racialized and gendered
term that uses skin colour, sex and other attributes in categorizing various
232 Chapter Twelve
groups of people into three main colour schemes represented through male
bodies. Colour pigmentation of the face is considered an important
criterion of difference in dividing Asia’s population into three distinct
“nationalized” and homogenized groups: Indian (black), Chinese (yellow),
and Russian (white). The same “racial-logic” informs how chahrah and
facial characteristics are still employed to distinguish between humans in
Geography 7 (2004).
To construct the ideal Iranian as white but never critically problematize
this construction is in itself a racist construction. The “trace” that also
defines the heroes of the nation is whiteness, and all the male heroes are
depicted as having light skin tones. Despite the fact that non-Iranian Arabs
(external Arabs) are depicted as white skinned people, Arab Iranians are
represented as having darker skin. Skin colour is employed to exclude
Arab-Iranians as the founding nation of Iran due to their non-Aryan origin
and exclusion from the white category. The histories of past and present
racist policies are ignored in light of a politically colour-blind approach to
contemporary ethnic relations. The absence of discussions regarding
whiteness often entails not being taught to see the privileges that are
associated with being white in the same way that men do not see the
privileges associated with being male (Macintosh, in McIntyre 1997, 16;
Rothenberg 2002). Ignoring how whiteness influences self-identity
distances those who identify with whiteness from understanding/
investigating its hegemonic meanings locally and globally. To be
“unaware of one’s racial identity” and to not be able “to conceptualize [the
effects of] the larger system of whiteness” on marginalized people result in
being unable to experience oneself and one’s culture as “it really is” (Katz
& Levy, in McIntyre 1997, 14). Subverting white power in its visible,
invisible and textual forms is a necessary step that can be achieved by
showing how marginalized others—in this case minority groups in Iran
who are defined as non-white (i.e. the internal Arab population)—have
historically understood and viewed the manifestations of power and “the
working of the powerful” (hooks 2002, 21; hooks 2003). However, in Iran
racism is manifested through the process of knowledge production that
represents the “power held by one group over … [others] to dominate and
control [representations of] other[s] … often by establishing what is
normal and necessary, desirable and acceptable” (Fleras & Elliot 2002,
238), which here revolves around who is Aryan-Pars-White and who is
not. As such, school textbooks, as pedagogical tools that are supposed to
be based on the ideals of child-centred pedagogy and global education,
turn into discourses of scientific and political repression.
“Race,” Language, Colonialism and the Americas

in the Construction of the Ideal Iranian Citizen
Culture, gender, language and “race” intersect with facial features,
nationality and national origin to position the ideal Iranian citizen against
other Asians, Africans and people of the Americas. A narrow
conceptualization of cultural diversity is also drawn upon as an important
criterion of difference in depicting racialized and ethnic groups in North
and South America. In Geography 7 (2004, 51), the text states that there
are two main cultures in the Americas (Geography 7, 2004, 51; See also
Geography 7, 1999, 51). The authors assert that due to British
immigration, the Anglo-Saxon culture and English language prevail in
North America. Central and South America is referred to as Latin America
and students read that Latin culture dominates the southern hemisphere
due to the immigration of the Spanish and Portuguese people.9 The text
maintains that after the discovery of the Americas and with the migration
of white European settlers to this continent, many wars occurred between
these two groups. The authors conclude that the end result of these wars
was the decimation of many “redskins” and that today only a small
number of these “HandƯ” (“Indian”) people still remain (Geography 7,
2004, 51; Geography 7, 1999, 51). The references to “HandƯ” and
“redskin” people are not contextualized in a discussion about the effects of
colonialism and the consequences of colonial relations after the invasion
of the “New World” by white and non-white settlers. Students are not
presented with an historical analysis of the effects of genocide and racism
on Indigenous peoples. Rather, one more colour scheme is introduced to
the divisions of the world population into discrete (racialized) groupings.
In the 2004 edition of Geography 7, the indigenous peoples of North
America are still depicted as on the margins of American society, implying
that they are dying out, which is similar to prevalent views promoted by
many Canadian historians until the 1950s (Francis 1992). More
importantly, they are racialized in a sense that their “red colour” is used as
an ideological tool to represent the brutality of Westerners and the racial
division of the world’s population to students. The two pictures included
in this lesson depict a “redskin” and two “Black skin” individuals
(Geography 7, 2004, 52; Geography 7, 1999, 51). The native person’s face
is painted and he is wearing a “headdress,” which essentializes “redskins”
as traditional. The two black individuals, on the other hand, are dressed in
modern clothing and shown conversing in front of a store. As Heinrich
(1998, 32) argues, teachers should refrain from showing Indigenous
peoples in the context of popular images put forth by Hollywood movies.
234 Chapter Twelve
She also points out that it is recommended that teachers abstain from
“talking about [Aboriginal peoples] as though they belong to the past”
(Heinrich 1998, 32), as they also live in the modern era. The text does not
account for differences amongst native peoples in terms of nationality,
cultural differences, linguistic differences and religious diversity. The
authors neither discuss how native people lived in the past nor offer
Aboriginal historical memories regarding their struggles and experiences
before and after the colonial era. Rather, they are only referred to in light
of a focus on how Western influences across the world have negatively
affected different groups in relation to the construction of the ideal citizen
as the leader in fighting imperialism. In limiting the representation of
difference to two pictures of “everyday” individuals from black and native
backgrounds, students are not presented with images of important well-
known black and native American individuals such as Rosa Parks, Big
Foot and Martin Luther King, or black intellectuals such as W. E. B. Du
Bois. Students are not informed about the important influences of the
Black Renaissance on transnational black communities (Banks 2001). In
contrast, most of the pictures and drawings in school textbooks depict
either white Iranians or white male Europeans as scientists. There are no
historical or contemporary discussions of either Black or Aboriginal
resistance movements against colonial encroachment and structural
inequalities, such as the Massacre at Wounded Knee and the Civil Rights
movement. The discourse of whiteness informs these texts in such a way
that white Christian Europeans are also celebrated for their scientific
achievements but demonized for their exploitation of resources and
peoples.
The text labels all “Black skinn” Americans as descendants of African
“slaves” who were brought by force by “White skins” during the colonial
era to work in the mining and agricultural sectors (Geography 7, 2004, 51;
See also Geography 7, 1999, 51). The text states that today a large number
of “Black skin” people live in both South and North America. The authors
write that in the United States, the majority of “Black skin” people live in
the southeastern parts of the country and in urban centres such as Chicago
and New York (Geography 7, 2004, 51; See also Geography 7, 1999, 51).
Students read that the standard of living of the black population in terms of
economic and social factors is not comparable to those of whites
(Geography 7, 2004, 51; Geography 7, 1999, 51). The knowledge and
information that students read in this part of the text are also emphasized
in the activity section (Geography 7, 2004, 52; Geography 7, 1999, 51),
where students are asked to explain “the origin of Black skin people who
now live in the United States.” The Black population in the United States
is identified based on its residential locations, class relations and their

origins as “slaves,” and positioned against the dominant society in the
West, ignoring how black Americans participate in promoting the
imperialist position of the United States vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The
authors do not account for diversity within diversity and ignore the
immigration of African nationals to the United States over the last fifty
years. The textbooks do not distinguish between Caribbean blacks, Cuban
blacks and African-American categories, and do not reflect the white-
European cultural diversity in the Americas. The black population of
America is homogenized as a collective entity to construct the colonial
Western as the historical enemy of the oppressed of the world, without
informing students about their struggles and the present day consequences
of racism in the United States. In all these depictions, the non-present
discourses that are important parts of the “slave” trade are the lack of any
discussion about the role of African and Arab merchants (Lovejoy 1983)
and a critical exploration of the history of slavery in Iran during and after
the Safavids Dynasty (1501–1722) (Babaie et al. 2004). The emphasis on
economic inequality and the role of European immigrants in exploiting
peoples, their labour and natural resources also intersects with religious
depictions in relating the ideal Iranian citizen to other groups across the
globe. In Iranian school textbooks, white Christian-Euro-Westerners are
constructed as those who solve problems through science and exploit the
world due to their colonial legacy. Africans and Asians are constructed as
incapable of solving their problems despite efforts in those directions due
to neo-colonial relations and the role of the West. Students are presented
with a stratified image of the rest of the world.
Africa, Religious Diversity, Racialization

and the Construction of MustƗĪafƯn [The Oppressed]
In this section, I show how religion, in light of a discussion of global
inequality and human diversity, is further racialized in depictions of
minority groups in Africa through the invocation of the discourse of
mustƗĪafƯn [the oppressed]. In a lesson entitled “Africa: A Rich Continent
with a Poor Population,” the authors maintain that: “Due to years of
colonization of Africa by Europeans, the people of the African continent
live in dire and horrible poverty and hunger” (Social Studies 5, Geography
Section, 1993, 76–77). In the 2001 edition of Social Studies 5, this
statement was deleted and the title of this lesson was changed to “What Do
You Know about the Continent of Africa?” (2001, 59). Nevertheless, both
editions state that most Africans live in agricultural settlements and move
236 Chapter Twelve
from one grazing area to another. The authors also maintain that there are
very few industrial and overcrowded cities in Africa. Africa is
conceptualized as “underdeveloped” and rich in natural resources but
poverty stricken. These lessons state that African people try hard to
“exploit” their resources but the fruit of their “hard” labour is abused and
plundered (ghƗrat) in the form of raw materials by large/powerful
industrialized nations (Social Studies 5, Geography Section, 1993, 76–77;
2001, 59).10 In the 2004 edition of Geography 7 (2004, 30–31; See also
Geography 7, 1999, 30–31), in a lesson entitled “Why is Africa an
Exporter of Raw Agricultural and Mineral Products?”, the economic,
social and political problems in Africa are also considered to be the end
result of the effects of the European colonial legacy, the exploitation of
Africa’s raw resources by multinational companies, and drought.
In another lesson in the 2004 edition of Geography 7 entitled “What
Do We Know about the Race, Language and Religion of Africa?”, the
authors assert that the low population growth in this continent is due to
years of internal wars, a lack of public sanitation, the prevalence of various
diseases, a lack of adequate food supplies, and the effects of drought on
the production of agricultural goods (Geography 7, 2004, 28–29; See also
Geography 7, 1999, 28–29). The picture chosen to depict poverty in Africa
is of malnourished children eating from bowls without utensils.11 In this
and other similar lessons in present and past editions of elementary and
guidance school textbooks, Africa is depicted as black, a victim, and in
need of assistance. Global inequality is further explored only in the context
of a discussion of the effects of colonialism and post-colonial relations on
the African continent.
European encroachment and “race” are not the only criteria used to
describe Africa and Africans. Islam is also emphasized as the religion of
most Africans in both present and past elementary and guidance levels
textbooks. The map used in the textbook (a similar map was also included
as part of the curriculum in Social Studies 5 on Africa, Geography Section,
1993, 77; 2001, 59) divides African nation states into Islamic Africa and
non-Islamic (Christian and Pagan) Africa (Geography 7, 2004, 28).12 In
both the 1993 and 2001 editions of Social Studies 5 (Geography Section,
76, 58, respectively), students were asked to identify the Muslim nations
of Africa, especially those located near the Mediterranean Sea, which are
mainly African Arab Muslim nations. In fact, Northern Africa is
represented as populated by white skinned Muslims, since they are mainly
described as being of Arab origin. In this way, difference in terms of
nationality is used once again to distinguish between Islamic countries in
light of the racial similarities that divide Africa’s Arab, white, and Muslim
populations from other black, Christian, and pagan Africans. In addition,

several different identifications are invoked in this lesson. On the one
hand, as Muslims, Africans are considered as brothers and sisters of
Iranians. And Iranians, as Muslims, have the responsibility to assist them
since they are poor and hungry. At the same time, starving Africans are
constructed in light of blackness. Furthermore, in the pre-2004 elementary
social studies textbooks, students were instructed that the “black race” has
been negatively affected by colonial and neo-colonial policies of past and
present European countries. The reference is not to white African-Arabs.
Rather, only white European Christian colonialists are considered as
responsible for black African starvation. The “black race” of Africa is
constructed as part of, and given the status of, the mustƗĪafƯn [the
oppressed], but they are distinguished from the rest of the members of the
oppressed group due to their nationality, “race” and colour of skin. At the
same time, Islamic Africans, including White Arabs, are also considered
as members of the oppressed category.
Discussions of colonialism and the effects of imperialism invoke
religion as a criterion of difference, distinguishing between groups and
individuals across the globe in light of implicit and explicit references to
“race.” The world is constructed based on colour of skin distinctions that
are reified within a critique of colonialism and inequality, but the authors
of the textbooks reproduce certain assumptions about these groups that end
up mimicking colonial views about others, and reproduce those hegemonic
views about otherness that reflect the ways in which Iran and Iranians are
represented in Orientalist and colonial literature. Nevertheless, the
emphasis on Islam has ideological considerations. For example, in
Geography 7 (2004, 17) students are educated about minority groups by
reading about religious diversity across the world. In fact, the term
“minority” (aqalƯyat) is only employed to refer to religious groups and not
to ethnic or racialized groups. In the map used to illustrate religious
diversity in Asia, the authors show that in Islamic countries (depicted by
the colour green), only Christian minorities reside. Also according to this
map, Muslims are minorities in different parts of Asia, living mostly
adjacent to Islamic lands. Christian minorities are shown to live mainly in
four general geographical areas, including along the Black Sea and the
Mediterranean Sea.13 However, this map also does not show any religious
diversity in Iran. The textbooks acknowledge that there were non-Islamic
religious groups in pre-Islamic Iran, but in modern Iran they are not
presented, thus denying their existence. However, the division of Asia and
Africa into Muslim and non-Muslim identifies a specific area for Iranian
students to focus on.14
238 Chapter Twelve
This gaze is given a specific meaning in light of the racialized

construction of Africa and Asia in Social Studies 5 (1999; 2001) and
Geography 7 (2004) and has a hegemonic consequence since students are
also informed that:
All of the Moslems who live in different countries of the world are
members of a large family. This very [large] family is called “Ummat-i
IslamƯ.” The population of this [large] family is more than one-milliard
[billion] individuals. (Social Studies 4, Civic Studies Section, 2004, 131;
Social Studies 4, 1999, 144)
The authors expand on this by stating that “Moslem people of Iran, in

addition to being [members] of ‘Ummat-i IslamƯ’ [Global Islamic
Nation/Community], must strengthen their bonds with Moslems of other
countries” (Social Studies 4, 2004, 131–132; See also Social Studies 4,
1994, 162).
In emphasizing sameness and equality between Iranians and other
Muslims, the authors point out in Social Studies 4 (2004, 131–132; 1994,
161) that the Islamic world is like one’s home and family in the same way
that “Iran” is compared to one’s family in various textbooks across grade
levels. All Muslims, regardless of their skin colour, ethnicity or
nationality, are considered as part of this “global nation” (Social Studies 4,
Civil Studies Section, 2004, 131–132; Social Studies 4, Civil Studies
Section, 1994, 161). National boundaries that divide Islamic nations are
symbolically reconstituted in light of the greater Muslim world, as
identified by the colour green in various maps of Asia and Africa.
However, despite the fact that Asia and Africa are demarcated in terms of
Muslim and non-Muslim populations, Islamic nations in other countries in
other continents are not discussed. Students are explicitly told that if all
Muslims of the world unite, their enemies will not be able to control them
(Social Studies 4, Civil Studies Section, 2004, 132; Social Studies 4, Civil
Studies Section, 1999, 144). But, if they allow their differences in terms of
“race,” ethnicity, culture and nationality to divide them, their enemies will
be able to rule Muslim countries (Social Studies 4, 2004, 131–132; Social
Studies 4, Civil Studies Section, 1994, 162). The discourses of colonialism
and imperialism define the enemies of Islam and all Muslims. The unity
amongst Muslims is viewed as necessary, mainly due to Western
interventions and oppressive policies rather than due to the intrinsic values
of Islam, i.e. peace and harmony.
Social Studies 4 (Civil Studies Section, 2004, 132) ends with the
following quotation from the Prophet Mohammad: “Whenever an
oppressed [a subordinated person] cries, ‘O’ Moslems, come to my relief
[help] and a Moslem person hears this call for help and chooses not to do
so, then he/she [cannot be considered] Moslem” (Social Studies 4, Civil
Studies Section, 1994, 162), which is a pervasive theme across grades and
subjects.15 These representations relate Iranian citizens by distinguishing
them from other Muslims within the limits of a gaze that identifies certain
Islamic groups as in need of assistance and as members of oppressed
groups. The message of unity first requires establishing the reason why
“Iranians” are different from other Muslims and why these other Muslim
groups need the help of “Iranians” to fight oppression. Racial differences,
linguistic characteristics and national origins are non-present aspects of
these lessons.
The data shows that the images and meanings about Africa that
students read and/or are asked to apply to Africa, Europe and Iran are
multiple, but the text implies that white Europeans are exploiters, black
Muslims live in undesirable conditions, and white Iranians, as Muslims,
have the duty to fight against colonialism and injustices. This is the main
ideological message of the textbooks. In fact, in the questions section at
the end of this lesson (Social Studies 4, 2004, 133; Social Studies 4, 1994,
162), students are asked: “Who are the members of this nation? Why
should Moslems of the world unite? Are Moslems outside Iran members
of the Ummat-i IslamƯ?” An important distinction is made between being a
member of Iran and being a member of the global Muslim community.
The criteria “Moslem” qualifies Iranians as members of this community.
However, according to Iranian textbooks, being a Muslim alone does not
guarantee membership in the “nation of Iran.” Nationality is a legitimate
criterion to separate Muslims into discrete groups that are not open for
membership to other Islamic people. Imagined constructs—for example
Iran as a nation state and Iranian as the national identity of its members—
are presented as legitimate ways of situating the self in relation to
outsiders. At the same time, these constructs divide Iranian Muslims from
other groups of Muslims, who, in the process are also othered as they are
often depicted as fixed and eternal. However, the images of these outsider
groupings are not fixed or unchanged but multiple. They are depicted
differently at different historical periods. Yet, despite such differences, the
other is always reflected upon as what the Iranian self and the ideal citizen
are not—in need of help from outsiders. The meanings associated with
these images are determined by the discourses employed and limit how
students can interpret the information.
The discourse of Islamic revolutionary leadership also informs the
logic and content of the textbooks, which invoke the idea of “Iran” as
symbolized as one’s home that needs to be protected from the influences
240 Chapter Twelve
of foreigners (the discourse of enemy outsider) and their attempts to

plunder its wealth and resources (Social Studies 5, Civic Studies Section,
2004, 133). The textbooks emphasize that the role of Iranians is to secure
their revolution and independence by avoiding waste (the discourse of
isrƗf [wasting]) and by becoming prudent, parsimonious and economical
consumers (the discourse of ǆarfa-jǌƯ [conservation]) (Mirfakhraie 2008).
The Islamic Republic is reincarnated as the protector of Islam and of
Iranians in light of its constructed role as a major player in implementing
modernization policies and in introducing reforms since the 1850s. The
constitution of the Islamic Republic is depicted as in accordance with
Shari’ah laws and the will of God. Students are told that there is general
consensus and agreement among the population that Islamic laws must
inform private/public relations. The idea of freedom is conceptualized
within the limits and confinements of Islamic law, which behaves as a
non-presence. Anyone who questions the legitimacy of Iran is construed as
undermining the will and efforts of the nation, the leader and thus the
commands of God. The discourse of leadership becomes an important
aspect of the narration of nation and in relating the ideal citizen to national
and regional identities (ibid.). The dominant message of the texts
emphasizes students’ obligations to develop Iran and to express one’s
allegiance to it by protecting its boundaries from foreign invasion.
The emphasis on Islamic and leadership unity based on the binary
opposition of Muslim and non-Muslim is reiterated in the religious
textbooks used between 1994 and 1999 (Religious Studies 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
Students were presented with a view that constructed Islam as the most
progressive and best religion in the world. In a lesson entitled “The Great
Prophets” (Religious Studies 2, 1999, 27), students were instructed: “But
our prophet is better/superior (bartar)” than/to the rest of the Prophets.
Prophet Mohammad, the authors state: “is the last prophet and after him
there will not be another chosen messenger from God” (Religious Studies
2, 1999, 27), and in: “The Religion of Islam: The Best Religion for the
Best Lifestyle” (Religious Studies 2, 1999, 31), the authors stated that,
“The religion of Islam is the best and the most complete of all religions.”
Respect for other Prophets is framed in a hierarchy of religion, with Islam
and its Prophet at the top (See also Religious Studies 3, 1999, 12–23). The
“ideal friendly insider/outsider Moslem” (and the “ideal friendly Moslem
other”) is conceptualized as an individual who believes in one God and the
afterlife, who accepts Prophet Mohammad as the last prophet, who accepts
and obeys (itƗ‘at) the instructions and teachings of God and the Prophet in
every aspect of life, and who is a friend of all Muslims and the enemy of
the oppressors {sitamgarƗn} (Religious Studies 3, 1999, 22). Although the
non-Islamic other is not overtly portrayed in a negative light, the other is

nevertheless depicted as needing to change his or her religion to Islam
At the same time, by overemphasizing Islamic unity, certain groups of
Iranians such as Zoroastrians and other religious minority groups are
othered and placed outside the global community of Muslims. As a result,
the global community discussed in the textbooks is selective in terms of its
membership—national membership of an Islamic society is not a
sufficient criterion. The ideal citizen is a member of the Ummat-i IslamƯ
(Islamic Nation/Community), which does not include non-Islamic friendly
“insiders” and “outsiders” who either live in the region or in Iran.
Members of minority religious groups are also denied an important space
in acknowledging their resistance to imperialism as a political force
against tyranny due to their exclusion from membership in the global
Muslim community.
Conclusion
Iranian school textbooks are very powerful ideological and hegemonic
tools in the hands of the elite group(s)’s construction of an essentialized
image of the ideal citizen. Iranian school textbook knowledge, as an
avenue to express identity politics, is: “deeply affected by how the past is
already (re)presented in dominant discourses” of the revolutionary elite, as
well as how official knowledge used to talk about “us” and “them”
categories highlights and invokes specific understandings of differences
between groups with moral, economic and political consequences
(Manicom 1992, 369). The world continues to be conceptualized in light
of the forces of “good” and “evil,” which determine the ways in which
images and representations of the ideal citizen are constructed and
represented (Mehran 2002, 247; Siavoshi 1995, 208). However, such
constructions evoke contradictory binary oppositions and present as well
as non-present discourses that, in isolation, offer more than a simple uni-
linear division of the world based on a Manichean understanding. Religion
and Islam are presented in light of nationalistic discourses, economic
policies/considerations and racialized and political ideologies. Several
forms of symbolic local, national and global identities or memberships are
promoted as important to the ideal Iranian citizen. The ideal Iranian citizen
is constructed as a national Shi’a anti-colonial self that has historically
played important global roles in resisting imperialism and inequalities and
whose task is to support other nations and oppressed groups that are
identified as in need of help or reform.
242 Chapter Twelve
The official knowledge about the self and the other is narrated in a way
that provides students with a single, stable, sequential and concrete
discourse in relating to other groups and nations across the world. School
knowledge situates and fixes the meaning of the ideal citizen as Muslim,
Shi’a, white and Aryan in light of an essentialist understanding of “race”
relations and a single-cause explanation for racial and economic
inequalities without accounting for gendered forms of oppression and
inequality (McCarthy 1993, 35). The ideal citizen is portrayed as the
“dominant” figure in relation to Eastern and Western others by placing
them in a hierarchy based on factors such as religion, “race,” economic
development, concepts of progress, nationality and language. Such a
construction ends up gazing at specific groups of peoples in both the East
and West based on logocentric views that are characterized by
paternalistic, Shi’ite, Persian and morally superior perspectives which are
informed by the discourse of whiteness. It is in the context of these
contradictory discursive approaches to representations of “us” and “them”
divisions in light of an essentialist construction of the narration of nation
that students are taught about their socio-economic and political roles and
obligations as citizens of Iran and the world (Turner 1995, 15).
Despite the fact that the textbooks are critical of colonialism and neo-
colonial relations and their effects in different parts of the world, the West
is discursively depicted as the other of Iran, and as the antagonist to the
ideal Iranian citizen. The anti-imperialist ideology is presented through a
set of philosophical and dogmatic assumptions that elevate the Iranian-
Islamic character as morally superior to the white-Anglo-Christian-
Western other. Yet, this Occidentalism becomes a secondary character and
factor in light of the need to develop Iran as an independent and self-
sufficient Islamic nation in order to achieve the same level of
technological advancement and accomplishment as the West. In this light,
Rostowian assumptions of the textbooks used during the previous regime
(Siavoshi 1995, 206) are, in fact, the non-present “trace,” reflecting the
“modernist” approach to the development of Iran and solving global
poverty. This Rostowian “mindset” is accompanied by a set of racialized,
dogmatic and problematic discursive representations that are based on the
lack of critical approaches to diversity. As such, they end up judging and
categorizing identities according to highly ideological and material
conceptions like central building blocks in establishing an “order of truth”
that identifies the Islamic leadership as more superior to its many forms of
otherness. It is through the process of idealization and sanitization of
historical facts and events that Iranian students are provided with political
and ideological positions upon which boundaries within and beyond Iran
are also imagined and investigated (Said, in Hall 1996, 209).
In representing and discussing diversity by invoking differences, the
ideal citizen is depicted from a perspective and vision of an alternative
society, where equilibrium, sameness, order and consensus are highlighted
as more important and essential than diversity and difference. Despite the
fact that the authors of the textbooks argue and inform students that
irrespective of their “race” or nationality, all Muslims are equal, the
assumption within this statement is a discursive modern trace that
indirectly reinforces the idea that, for the sake of unity, differences should
be put aside. The assumption is that global equality will be achieved as
Muslims unify, just as Iranian Muslims did in 1979. Inequalities and
differences within the Muslim category are not explored, except by
invoking homogenized and essentializing terms such as mustƗĪafƯn [the
oppressed].
The deconstruction of the representations of the ideal citizen shows
that depictions of othered groups, and the messages that identify the West
as the exploiter, are important aspects of the political socialization of
Iranian students. Discussions on the nations and countries that have been
affected by colonial policies and American imperialism are based on
discourses that do not voice the concerns or histories of these groups and
cultures. Categories such as “Iran” and “Iranian” inadvertently become the
object of the processes of othering and “gazing.” “Iranians,” as
“Orientals,” in their relationships with the non-Persian/non-Western
populations of Iran and the globe, recreate the position of the Iranian
Oriental other in the context of global relations in respect to the West and
Western epistemology. The textbooks fail to discuss that the nationalist
movements’ constructions of the Iranian national identity locate its roots in
Orientalist knowledge. The discourse of denial informs the depiction of
the images of the ideal citizen that ignores how the processes of nation
building in Iran and other Islamic and non-Islamic nations have been
marred by massacres, inequalities, racisms and sexism (Kohn 1965;
Kedourie 1966).
There is a hierarchy of difference employed in constructing and
reproducing the ideal citizen that “traces the limit that will define
difference in relation to all other differences, the external frontier of the
abnormal” (Foucault 1977, 183). The ideal citizen and national identity are
represented through a lens that divides the world into Muslim and non-
Muslim, Shi’a and non-Shi’a, developed and non-developed, industrialized
and non-industrialized, white and non-white, believer and unbeliever,
Aryan and non-Aryan, Pars and non-Pars, and colonizer and colonized.
244 Chapter Twelve
These dichotomies not only inform how knowledge is presented and

organized in the textbooks but also provide neat divisions that are also
further “spaces of differentiation.” These “spaces of differentiation”
classify individuals in relation to otherness as members of “us.”
Membership of the “us” category requires Iranians to willingly conform to
the values already pre-established in the school textbooks. The end result
of the process of reproducing the official knowledge about Iran and
Iranians in relation to other groups and nationalities is what Pinar calls a
“fractured self” (Pinar 1995, 23). School textbooks function as both
Orientalist and Occidentalist texts. Iranian school textbooks play the role
of “both discourse and the speaker as constructed objects” (Pinar 1995,
23). In constructing the ideal citizen, Iranian school textbooks reproduce
various forms of stigmatized selves that are gazed at and employed as
tools of social, political and textual control and for “manufacturing
consent.” The meanings of the identities of other groups in the
construction of the ideal citizen change as the political and historical
contexts in which they are discussed change, pointing to the shifting
qualities of the identities of the other that are employed in producing a
stable image of the self. Relations between the self and the other are
represented through the exposition of “self-other-other” sets of relations.
Related to these issues is how “space” is represented and constructed
for students. Geographical space is represented as enclosed “territories”
not based on imagined national boundaries depicted as “lines” on various
maps of the world. They are also represented through religious divisions
that divide the populations of various countries into discrete and
identifiable categories with diverse belief systems without explaining the
basis of their values and world-views. These images of diversity are coded
with racialized descriptions based on biological distinctions of raced
groups and portrayed in light of anti-colonial sentiments that profess
economic and political independence without accounting for their effects.
The outcome is the “territorialization” of difference and its essentialization
in terms of characteristics that are imposed on both Iranians and non-
Iranians by the authors of the textbooks. Appropriating Grossberg’s (1993)
discussion of “territorialization,” “a territorializing machine distributes
subject positions in space” that, in the context of Iranian school textbooks,
become objectified, knowable and distinguishable based on real moral and
ethical principles (100). Such a machine: “diagrams lines of mobility and
placement; it defines or maps the possibilities of where and how [students]
can stop and place themselves” (ibid.). In the context of the imposition of
the discourses of the Aryan origin and Shi’a identity of Iranians, the
geographical representations of the population of the world depict the:
“subaltern [and Westerners as social categories and not as statement(s) of

(their) power (of agencies)]” that are diverse and fragmented due to
historical specificities (ibid.). They distinguish human beings from one
another, localize differences and essentialize communities through a coded
language that is gendered, Shi’a-centric and racialized. In imagining Iran,
students are presented with an image of the world that combines social and
geographical spaces in order to situate students’ identities as Iranians as
unique and different from all other forms of identities, despite similarities
(i.e. the effects of colonialism or the importance of religion).
Iranian school textbooks: “no longer refer to any reality; they create the
idea of a reality which simultaneously claims to represent it” (Seidman
1994, 210). Representations of the ideal Iranian citizen resemble what
Baudrillard refers to as “simulacrum” (Seidman 1994, 210). This is
constructed by references to conflicting discourses of mustƗĪafƯn [the
oppressed], the “noble other,” ‘ashayir [nomadic tribes], Ummat-i IslamƯ
[the Islamic Nation/Community], ƮrƗn-dǌstƯ [loving Iran], the Aryan
migration, Islamic leadership and colonialism. In their discursive
formations, nationalist, anti-imperialist, Islamic, middle-class and
Orientalist narratives construct a homogenized Iranian citizenry which has
always been active in regional and global relations of power. The ideal
citizen is represented through the invocation of several forms of “shifting
collectivities” that identify it as “white,” male, Shi’a, Aryan-Pars,
progressive, independent, moral and a leader in the Islamic world.
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Notes
1
Sociology Department, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, 12666-72nd Avenue,
Surrey, British Columbia V3W 2M8, Canada. Email:
amir.mirfakhraie@kwantlen.ca.
2
Although in popular discourse in the West, “Iranian” and “Persian” are used
interchangeably (Shaffer 2002, 1), in this paper the category “Persian” refers to the
dominant ethnic group and “Iranian” to the national identity.
3
Since there is no universal system for transliteration from Persian to English, I
have followed the transliteration style adopted by F. Steingrass in A
Comprehensive Persian-English Dictionary (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul
Limited, 1963) with the following modifications: z is used for ν; Ī is used for χ; s
is used for Κ; ǆ is used for ι; h is used for ϫ; Ʃ is used for Ρ; y is used for ϯ; kh is
used for Υ; v is used for ϭ; t is used for ς; aw, au and ay are used to represent
combined vowels and diphthongs; only the three elementary vowels a, i, u are
used; and the silent ϭ (v) following Υ (kh) is retained.
4
By “raced group” I mean the ways in which a non-dominant and marginalized
group is defined by non-group members who have the power to depict them in
light of a racial epistemology.
5
In “The Map of Racial Diversity in Asia” the colour yellow is used to represent
the yellow race (nizhƗd-i zard), white is used for the white race (nizhƗd-i safƯd),
and black for the black race (nizhƗd-i siyƗh). An example of the black race,
according to the map, is the Dravidian group in India. Arabs and Iranians are
constructed as white. Iranians are also labelled as Indo-European (Social Studies 5,
Geography Section, 1993, 67).
6
The illustrations in “Face (Chahrah)” show pictures of various “Racial” groups in
Asia. From top right to bottom left: The Face of a Japanese, The Face of an Indo-
Chinese, The Face of a Mongol, The Face of a Dravidian, The Face of a Western
Asian, and The Face of an Indian (HandƯ), (Social Studies 5, Geography Section,
1993, 67–68).
7
This drawing of a map of Iran shows historical and religious spaces as well as
economic and agricultural activities, and depicts male and female youth in their
traditional non-Persian clothing and adult males in non-traditional attire (“We Like
Iran and Iranian”, Persian 1, 2004, 118).
8
The legend for “The Map of Contemporary Migration Routes” used in this lesson
reads as follows: Red = English; Yellow = Portuguese; Orange = Italian; Blue =
German; Purple = Chinese; Darker Orange = Japanese; Dotted Black Line =
Russian; Black Line = Polish). The receiving immigrant countries are Indonesia,
China, Madagascar, South Africa, Ivory Coast, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Canada,
the United States, Australia and New Zealand (Geography 8, 1999, 71).
9
The legend for “The Map of Contemporary Migration Routes” (Geography 8,
1999, 71) reads as follows: Red = English; Yellow = Portuguese; Orange = Italian;
Blue = German; Purple = Chinese; Darker Orange = Japanese; Dotted Black Line
= Russian; Black Line = Polish). The receiving immigrant countries are Indonesia,
China, Madagascar, South Africa, Ivory Coast, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Canada,
the United States, Australia and New Zealand.
10
The captions for each picture in “Illustration 20-Faces in Asia” (Geography 7,
2004, 16) read as follows (from top to bottom): The Face of a Chinese; The Face
of an Indian; a Russian Face.
11
In Geography 8 (2004, 82) students, by references to a map, are informed that
central America, in addition to North Africa and Asia, is home to one of the first
civilizations in the world. The map that accompanies this lesson in Geography 8,
however, does not refer to the existence of other early civilizations in North
America, in southern Africa, or in Europe.
12
The ironic part is that students are also informed that one of the aims of the
Islamic Republic is to become industrially advanced and competitive in the world
market. Yet there is no discussion on how an industrialized Iran that is competitive
in the world market will not contribute to exploitation in other parts of the world.
13
“Illustration 39-The Provision of [and Access to] Food in Africa Is Still a
Central Problem” (Geography 7, 2004, 28).
14
The legend for “Illustration 41-The Map of Moslem Countries in Africa reads as
follows: Green Box: Moslem countries, Yellow Box: other countries” (Geography
7, 2004, 29).
15
The legend for “Illustration 23-Religious Territories in Asia” (top map) reads as
follows: green: the land of Moslem people; yellow: the land of Buddhist people;
pink: the land of Hindu people; purple: the land of Pagans; the hollow black dots
denote religious centres (from right to left, clockwise): Lhasa, Benares, Mecca and
Jerusalem; the cross refers to Christian-minority communities and the black
crescent refers to Moslem minority populations (Geography 7, 2004, 17).
16
“Illustration 41-The Map of Moslem Countries in Africa” shows those
geographical spaces that Iranian students are directed to gaze at in the textbooks
(the green areas of Illustrations 23 and 41) (Geography 7, 2004, 29).
17
See Persian 2, 1993, 100–102; Social Studies 5, History Section, 1993, 183;
Social Studies 5, Civic Studies Section, 1993, 204; Social Studies 5, Civic Studies
Section, 1993, 248.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
THE UNITED STATES PEACE CORPS

AS A FACET OF UNITED STATES-GHANA
RELATIONS
E. OFORI BEKOE
THE COLLEGE OF NEW ROCHELLE,
ROSA PARKS CAMPUS-NEW YORK
Abstract
The Peace Corps, established by the United States Kennedy
administration, became an important foreign policy instrument for US-
Ghana relations during the nascent stages of Ghana’s post-independence
democracy. Ghana was the first country to be a beneficiary of the program,
and President Kwame Nkrumah was initially sceptical of this United
States foreign policy, but he eventually warmed to the concept. In this
paper, I will explore some underlying factors that contributed to the
eventual transformation of the Peace Corps into an important element of
bilateral collaboration and partnership for both the United States and
Ghana during the Nkrumah administration. I will also discuss important
formative flashpoints that led to the inauguration of the program, from the
speech given by John F. Kennedy at the University of Michigan at Ann
Arbor to the Cow Palace official proclamation in San Francisco and the
ensuing diversity of trainings in which the earlier volunteers participated.
All these chronological analyses are constructed within a broader
geopolitical purview which emphasizes the realist power contentions that
characterized the Cold War East-West political dichotomy. The question
undergirding this paper is: Was the Peace Corps a Cold War foreign policy
instrument critical to the execution of the United States’ proxy wars with
the Soviets or was it a foreign policy crafted solely for the altruistic
purpose of carrying out humanitarian assistance in Third World nations?
Or, was it intended to serve both purposes?
The United States Peace Corps as a Facet of US-Ghana Relations 255
Introduction
The diplomatic relations that existed between the United States and
Ghana in the late 1950s and 1960s centred mostly on three issues: The
Peace Corps, the Volta River Project, and the personality of Dr Kwame
Nkrumah, the communist-branded president of Ghana. It is evident that
this US-Ghana relation also had ideological connotations mostly because it
was at the height of the Cold War and tensions were high between
countries that aligned themselves with one or the other of the Cold War
rivals—the United States or the Soviet Union. As is well known, the
United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
emerged as the most powerful nations in the world after the Second World
War. With many of Africa’s nation states asserting their political
independence, the rivalry of these two superpowers was heightened, with
each struggling to gain a foothold in Africa. Two revolutions challenging
the West were Asian-African nationalism and the evolving Communist
expansion into “fertile grounds” like Ghana, where the Communists
preached against the activities of the West (including the racial oppression
of blacks) and urged to be embraced. In this paper, I propose to investigate
the relations between the United States and Ghana, keeping in mind the
issues of the East-West dichotomous rivalry as well as the role of the
Peace Corps. I will also seek to ascertain whether ideology was the only
reason for the formation of the Peace Corps, or if it was merely a foreign
department organization. I intend to study not only the role of politics by
the various governments of the United States and Ghana, but also to
ascertain the views of historians and determine how Nkrumah saw or
depicted the volunteers, and what the volunteers themselves thought of the
program. For instance, did they see themselves as vehicles of ideological
tools? Were they playing the role of humanitarians in another country? Or
did they join the Peace Corps as a way of escaping the brewing Vietnam
confrontation, or even the United States and the tumultuous 1960s?
The Peace Corps was founded in 1961, a year after it was officially
declared as one of the idealistic manpower resources that the United States
set up to supply aid to developing countries. For the John F. Kennedy
administration, it provided an opportunity to send American youth to
developing countries to spread American ideals and help with
development. Established via Executive Order 10924, the Peace Corps
concept was announced to students at the University of Michigan in Ann
Arbor and was subsequently made official at the Cow Palace in San
Francisco in November 1960, with three major objectives:
256 Chapter Thirteen
a) It can contribute to the development of critical countries and

regions
b) It can promote international cooperation and goodwill toward this
country, and
c) It can also contribute to the education of America and to more
intelligent American participation in the world.
The Peace Corps as Ideological or Moral Tool

Kennedy, in my opinion, saw the Peace Corps as an ideological tool to
inform the developing world about American ideals of liberty, equality
and democracy before the Soviets had a chance to take over, as both
countries were fighting for ideological favour in Africa. This is evident in
the various speeches that Kennedy gave. In his inaugural address in
January 1961, he reiterated his desire to “outsmart” the Soviets:
To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to
break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts, to help them
help themselves, for whatever period is required, not because the
Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because
it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot
save the few who are rich.2
Could it be that President Kennedy had a moral justification for the

Peace Corps? Possibly, but it did not carry as much weight as his
ideological reasons. Harris Wofford, one of the directors of the Peace
Corps, agreed that it had ideological connotations when he recalled that
Kennedy remarked: “I want to demonstrate to Mr. Khrushchev and others
that a new generation of Americans has taken over this country … young
Americans who will serve the course of freedom as servants around the
world, working for freedom as the Communists work for their system.”3
Charles J. Wetzel, a historian at Purdue University, clearly stated that: “the
Peace Corps is a product of American anti-Communist foreign policy. But
more than that, it is an expression of an ongoing American optimism in the
fate of man.”4 Nevertheless, the training given to volunteers before their
departure had included information about Communism and warned the
volunteers to watch out for it. Fritz Fisher wrote that each volunteer was
given a pamphlet entitled: “What You Must Know About Communism.”5
In trying to investigate why Ghana was the first country to receive the
Peace Corps Volunteers (PCVs), it is imperative to note that before
Senator Kennedy became the president of the United States, he was also
on the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and might have known
Nkrumah’s political orientation very well. This is evident in his address to

the students at the University of Michigan, where he asked them if they
were willing to give up a part of their lives to work in Ghana as
technicians for up to ten years in the Foreign Service. He believed that the
creation of the volunteer service was to serve the cause of freedom and
help fight poverty, disease, hunger and ignorance, and of course to ward
off the Soviet ideological implant. 6
Julius Atemkeng Amin, a political scientist and a native of Cameroon
in West Africa, interviewed several PCVs and wrote about the Peace
Corps in his country. He undertook a comparative study between its
activities in both Ghana and Guinea, two countries said to be leaning
politically toward the Russians. Amin observed that the Peace Corps,
despite its contribution to altruistic goals, was also a flexible response to
Communism.7 R. Sargent Shriver, the brother-in-law of Kennedy, became
the founding director of the Peace Corps and was mandated to travel the
world to propagate the idea of the corps for the benefit of developing
countries. For Shriver, “the Peace Corps volunteers make their
contribution to American foreign policy by staying out of the foreign
policy establishment … they are not trained diplomats, not propagandists
… they represent our society by what they are, what they do, and the spirit
in which they do it. They scrupulously steer clear of intelligence activities
and local politics.”8 This remark is particularly interesting because
although the volunteers were ordinary American citizens, many of the
countries they were assigned to, notably Ghana, Libya and Guinea,
suspected them as operatives of a United States counter-intelligence
organization.
Nkrumah’s Response to the Peace Corps

R. Sargent Shriver, in sharing and promoting the idea of the Peace
Corps to foreign leaders, made trips to several countries to convince their
leaders to accept the volunteers. In Ghana, their first port of call, the
Ghanaian president was exceptionally sceptical of the volunteers. He just
did not understand why the United States wanted to send such a large
volunteer force to his country, and remarked to Shriver and his entourage:
Powerful radiation is going out from America to all the world, much of it
harmful. Some of it innocuous, some beneficial. Africans have to be
careful and make the distinctions, so as to refuse the bad rays and welcome
the good. The CIA is a dangerous beam that should be resisted. From what
you have said, Mr. Shriver, the Peace Corps sounds good. We are ready to
try it, and will invite a small number of teachers. We can use plumbers and
electricians, too. Can you get them here by August?9
Nkrumah’s acceptance of the Peace Corps is worth investigating, given

the background of his life in the United States between 1935 and 1945
when he attended American universities and left with four different
degrees in different disciplines. It is evident that he was familiar with
Central Intelligent Agency (CIA) operations and was therefore wary of the
volunteers, thinking they were CIA operatives. More so, Nkrumah had
read Andrew Tully's book CIA: The Inside Story (1962), which outlined
CIA global activities against the Communists. A few years earlier, US-
Ghana relations had gone sour during the Eisenhower administration
because the then Secretary of State, Christian Herter, had branded
Nkrumah a Communist, thus making it difficult for Nkrumah to accept
many Americans in his country as he knew that they were against
Communism.
Nkrumah's response was also revealing of his way of thinking; his
unpredictability during his presidency was a vexation for the United States
administration. Historian Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman wrote that before
Shriver and his entourage arrived in Ghana, the Ghanaian Times had
written a scathing editorial about the visitors. They were denounced as an
“agency of neo-colonialism, [and a] clever mode in [the] vicious game of
teleguide company.” 10 Nkrumah was not happy with the publication and
was forced to call the American ambassador to Ghana and personally
apologize for it. Nkrumah later called on all Ghanaians to accept the Peace
Corps volunteers and not do anything to discourage them. On the other
hand, he addressed students of The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute
to be cautious of the volunteers since they were probably CIA operatives.
In fact, he prevented the PCVs from teaching English or history in
Ghanaian schools because he believed they would use such courses to plan
subversive activities against his government. For this reason, he banned
the teaching of George Orwell’s Animal Farm (1945) by PCVs.11
However, volunteers he brought in from Canada and the Soviet Union
were at liberty to teach the same book. In Neo-Colonialism: The Last
Stage of Imperialism (1965), Nkrumah explained that he believed the
PCVs were like the United States Information Agency (USIA)—they were
engaged in spreading propaganda and psychological warfare on behalf of
the United States.12 He explained further that he was also aware that R.
Sargent Shriver, the Peace Corps Director, and Allen Dulles, the CIA
Director, were personal friends, and President Kennedy had asked them to
keep their jobs separate from their friendship. Nkrumah also accused the
United States and the CIA of being involved in the assassination of his
protégé, Patrice Lumumba of the Congo. Hence, he had watchful eyes on

the PCVs.
Why Ghana?
The first group of PCVs went through a series of orientations before
their departure to Ghana and Tanzania. As part of their orientation,
Africanists were assembled to lead, including the political scientist David
Apter, who wrote a book on Ghana, sociologist St. Clair Drake, who
taught in Ghana, and anthropologist Robert Lystad, who had also written a
book on Ghana, among others. Probably the most difficult question to
answer is why the Kennedy administration had laid so much emphasis on
just one African country when volunteers were sent to other parts of Africa
as well. Several reasons can be summoned to explain the anomaly. It is the
view of Gerard Rice that Ghana as the first Peace Corps destination was
symbolic. Ghana, regarded as a militant Third World nation, had gained
independence only four years earlier. “Its dynamic leader, Kwame
Nkrumah, was the self-appointed ‘savior’ of African freedom
movements.”13 However, in my view, the major reason is enshrined in
Nkrumah’s ideology, which he sought to impose on rising African leaders.
Nkrumah’s ideology, also known as Nkrumahism, rested on four major
tenets: Positive Action, Pan-Africanism, Anti-Colonialism and Anti-
Imperialism, and (African) Socialism. It is my observation that Nkrumah
can never be understood without taking these into account and the ways in
which he tried to enforce them on all African leaders. I believe that
Positive Action, which called for non-violent acts against colonial
governments, was the only tenet that the United States could afford to
ignore. As the "show boy" of Africa, as historian David Birmingham calls
him, Nkrumah wanted to unite all of Africa to form the Union of African
States like the United States of America. This is because Nkrumah
believed that Africa had all the resources to be a major economic and
political force on the world stage. Nkrumah also wanted to turn Africa
towards a form of Socialism, which did not sit well with the United States
because the idea had the backing of the Soviets. To further emphasize his
stand, Nkrumah aligned himself with both Americans and foreigners who
had openly proclaimed they were against American ideals and capitalism.
Some of the Americans and foreigners who made Ghana either their home
or paid frequent visits included W .E. B. DuBois, George Padmore, Paul
Robeson and Richard Wright. In addition, Nkrumah was critical of the
United States in all the thirteen books he authored. It could be that the
Peace Corps was sent to Africa to contradict Nkrumah and show Africans
that Americans were peace-loving people who deserved to be welcomed

by all.
Volunteers’ Response
While the United States administration saw the Peace Corps as a form
of manpower to promote American ideals, not all the volunteers saw it that
way. Alan Guskin and his wife Judith, who were students at the University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, opined that the students accepted Kennedy’s
Peace Corps proposal and speech because:
The 1960s was a time in which students like us were consumed with
concern for social values, as well as strategies for change. We were
determined not just to participate, but to have an impact on the events that
affected our lives. The message he left behind was that young people could
make a difference in helping to create a better and more peaceful world.
We responded.14
One of America’s foremost anthropologists, Margaret Mead, agreed

and commented that the idea was an “ethical enterprise, a way for an
excessively fortunate country to share its optimism and generosity.”15
While the Russian volunteers outnumbered the Americans in Ghana,
Gerard Rice claims that this number asymmetry rather boosted the morale
of the volunteers because of the ongoing Cold War. He said a Peace Corps
evaluator named Richter sent a report to Washington DC in which he
stated:
There is a Volunteer in almost every school where there is a Russian

teacher. In fact, the Volunteer without a Russian pet feels cheated. The
presence of Russians, while perhaps somewhat distressing politically, can
be viewed favorably in just about every other respect. It adds an unusual
dimension in the Volunteers’ experience and gives us an opportunity to
influence some Russians.
In the report, Richter also explained that the Ghanaians accepted the
PCVs better than their Russian counterparts.16 This is a notably different
opinion from that of Fisher, who observed that the volunteers were open-
minded and co-existed with the Russians. The PCVs, however, saw Ghana
as the battleground for the Cold War competition in Africa.17 Hoffman
cites many examples of volunteers who really enjoyed their experience in
Ghana. In fact, they were not bothered by the Cold War rivalry that existed
at the time. Coates Redmon documents the excitement of the PCVs in
Ghana and how they worked in the community in the 1960s mostly
because they were young, energetic and idealistic.
United States Politicians’ Response

It could be that politicians in the 1960s did not see the Peace Corps as
a useful tool in the fight for global hegemony between East and West
ideologies or as a humanitarian or moral justification, as Kennedy
intended. Hence, most of the senators and congressmen made fun of the
whole idea during debates over the bill. Republicans Frances Bolton,
Richard Nixon, Ellis O. Briggs, Alex Wiley, Barry Goldwater and Dwight
Eisenhower were all pessimistic about the Peace Corps program and made
unwelcome remarks about the concept. On the other hand, Democrats
including Edmund Muskie, Gale McKee and Stephen Young, among
others, saw the Corps as the embodiment of the spirit of the New
Frontier.18
Ghanaians’ Response to the Peace Corps

On a large scale, while Ghanaians accepted the Peace Corps, it was
those who attended the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute who saw
the corps as strange United States Foreign Service employees who needed
to be watched. In fact, one of Ghana’s foremost diplomats and a Minister
of Education during Nkrumah’s presidency agreed that the Peace Corps
were in Ghana to augment the teachers that the nation needed. He thus
gave the program the thumbs up. Hoffman quotes another diplomat, K. B.
Asante, as saying that: “Nkrumah’s imprimatur meant that the Peace
Corps was a good thing.”19 As the fifty-one person volunteer force arrived
in Accra, it was warmly welcomed. In fact, Nkrumah himself hosted the
volunteers at a reception at which he exhorted Ghanaians to welcome
them. Nkrumah accepted the Peace Corps in good faith so that his
compatriots could benefit from the American educational system, of which
he himself was a product. The acceptance of the Peace Corps (by Ghana
and later Guinea) came as good news to President Kennedy, who
remarked: “If we can successfully crack Ghana and Guinea, Mali may
even turn to the West. If so, these would be the first communist-oriented
countries to turn from Moscow to us.” The United States administration
saw Ghana, Guinea, Algeria, Libya and Mali as Communist-oriented
countries that formed the Casablanca group with the aim of a complete
union of African states, while the rival Western capitalist-oriented
countries, including Nigeria and Liberia, formed the Monrovia group.
Arnold Zeitlin, now of the Associated Press and a former volunteer,

points out that even though Ghanaians accepted the volunteers, most of the
population could not internalize why white Americans had left their
wealthy country to come to a poor country to ride in mummy trucks. This
was but one of the scepticisms expressed by the ordinary Ghanaian in the
1960s.20 Thomas A. Hart from Howard University, one of the very few
African Americans who served in Ghana, comments that Ghanaians held
Americans in high esteem and that before Kennedy’s administration, anti-
American sentiment in Ghana had been very high. Hart makes a
provocative statement that really depicts who Nkrumah was. When asked
about his impression of Nkrumah in the United States, he answered:
Osagyefo is appreciative of the aid given and of the interest shown recently
by the United States towards his country. Nevertheless, he believes that the
aid offered and accepted should not interfere with his purpose: to liberate
the entire continent of Africa from foreign domination; to establish
ultimately a Union of African States and to develop a strong, powerful
spirit of African nationalism; besides adopting a foreign policy of positive
neutrality and non-alignment.21
Nkrumah, popularly known as “Osagyefo” (“Saviour”) by Ghanaians,

would not permit any activities that would derail him; hence, he kept a
watchful eye on the Peace Corps and engaged in confrontations with the
Johnson administration later. Even today, the positive impact of the United
States Peace Corps in Ghana is felt, and volunteers are still being accepted.
Other Responses to the Peace Corps

The New York Times published an editorial a day before Kennedy’s
assassination praising the Peace Corps on its second anniversary, noting
that it: “has come to be recognized as the most idealistic arm of our
foreign effort and one of its most successful expressions.”
Hoffman, who focused less on geopolitics than on the activities of the
volunteers, believes that the Peace Corps was a response to both a political
reason to win the ideological war for the West, as well as “Kennedy’s
genuine determination to respond to the needs of … nations.” She also
argues that the Cold War and decolonization intersected constantly, and
that the threat of Communism forced developing countries to gain
financial and political support from the West; yet, these same countries
resented the West. Such was the behaviour of Nkrumah, who swam back
and forth between Russian and American hooks, confident that neither
side would cut bait. 22 Historian Fritz Fisher has shown that most of the
PCVs were not given the peace of mind to do their work properly because
the Peace Corps administration constantly interfered with bureaucracies,
which prevented the volunteers’ egalitarian friendship with the people and
the community they served. Fellow historian Michael E. Latham agrees
with Fisher. In his book, Modernization as Ideology (2000), he adds that
many people joined the Peace Corps to fulfil their humanitarian aspirations
in a meaningful way. He also points out, however, that the Peace Corps
was placed in the context of the Cold War. An interesting historiography
added to the topic by Latham is how the Peace Corps fit into the views of
social scientists and modernization theorists of the 1960s. P. David
Searles, a former deputy Peace Corps director, shifts from the “showers of
blessings” poured on the volunteers during the Kennedy era for lack of
general directives. His neutral assertion praises the Nixon-appointed
director, Joseph Blatchford, who revitalized the organization. Searles also
acknowledges Cold War sentiments in the formation of the Peace Corps.
Leading diplomatic historians contributed to a book, Empire and
Revolution (2000), which argues that United States relations with Third
World countries drastically became a concern derived from an interrelated
set of economic, geostrategic, political, ideological and psychological
factors, many of which predated the Cold War, and all of which were
further magnified by US-Soviet antagonism. Since the Peace Corps fits
very well in United States foreign policy, this book gives several indirect
insights into understanding the concept. Rupert Emerson and Waldemar
Nielsen both agreed that the Peace Corps promoted idealism in Third
World countries but did not emphasize the ideological part of it.23
Conclusion
Overall, the containment policy of the United States, of which the
Peace Corps was believed to be a part, was a measure to prevent Nkrumah,
who had superb organizational skills, influence and capabilities, from
turning newly independent African countries towards the Soviet orbit.
Communism appealed to many newly independent African countries
because of its offer of political, social, economic and cultural changes,
among other things, and the new leaders wanted to create a “new
international order” that would not depend on the West. The Norwegian
Cold War historian Odd Arne Westad explains: “The Soviet world offered
politically induced growth through a centralized plan and mass
mobilization, with an emphasis on heavy industry, massive infrastructural
projects, and the collectivization of agriculture, independent of
international markets.”24
Obviously, the Peace Corps came to stay in Ghana despite the fact that
Nkrumah declared, through his intentions or actions, that he was a
Communist-Socialist and was moving the country in that direction.
President Kennedy and his administration knew this, yet their mantle of
where to go first still fell on Ghana. It met with different responses from
the Ghanaian administration as well as the general populace because their
intentions were not very well known, or they suspected it as something
other than humanitarian, but they were still embraced and enjoyed
Ghanaian hospitality. The PCVs did not see themselves as interfering in
Ghana’s political administration more than being there as American
idealists to engage purely in volunteerism. They co-existed with their
political opponents on the other side of the ideological spectrum and
integrated very well with them. Largely, it was the Osagyefo who was
wary of the Peace Corps, but did not have an iota of implicating evidence
with which he could expel them, as his political ally Ahmed Sekou Toure
of Guinea did. Truly, the Cold War made Ghana a geopolitical staging
ground between the East and West. Nkrumah did not change his intention
of Socialism, despite the different kind of assistance that he received from
the capitalist West.
Notes
1 Sargent Shriver, Point of the Lance (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 14. It
should also be noted that the original idea was mooted by William James in 1904
and was taken on by President F. D. Roosevelt in the Civilian Conservation Corps
in 1933. It was later refreshed by Senator Hubert Humphrey and Congressman
Henry S. Reuss before being taken over by John F. Kennedy.
2 Inaugural Address on January 20, 1961. Public Papers of the President of the US
(Washington DC: GPO. 1962), 1.
3 Harris Wofford, Of Kennedy & Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties (New York:
Farrar Straus Giroux, 1980), 257.
4 Charles J. Wetzel, “The Peace Corps in our Past,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 365 (1966): 1.
5 Fritz Fisher, Making Them Like Us: PCV in the 1960s (Washington DC: The
Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), 38; Gerald Rice, The Bold Experiment:
JFK’s Peace Corps (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1985), 158.
6 Robert G. Carey, The Peace Corps (New York: Praeger, 1970), 3.
7 Julius A. Amin, The Peace Corps in Cameroun (Kent, OH: Kent State
University, 1992), 117.
8 R. Sargent Shriver, “The Vision,” in Making a Difference: The Peace Corps at
Twenty-Five, edited by Milton Viorst (New York: Weiden & Nicholson, 1986),
21.
9 Harris Wofford in Making a Difference: The Peace Corps at Twenty-Five, edited

by Milton Viorst (New York: Weiden & Nicholson, 1986), 34.
10 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, All You Need is Love: The Peace Corps and the
Spirit of the 1960s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 153.
11 Animal Farm is about insurrection, hence Nkrumah’s reaction. He thought it
was too revolutionary to be taught by Americans, who might use it to incite his
overthrow.
12 Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism(New York:
International Publishers, 1965), 248–249.
13 Rice, The Bold Experiment, 201.
14 Alan Guskin, “Passing the Torch,” in Making the Difference: The Peace Corps
at Twenty-Five, edited by Milton Viorst (New York: Weiden & Nicholson, 1986),
28.
15 Margaret Mead, Cultural Frontiers of the Peace Corps, edited by Robert B.
Textor (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1966), ix.
16 Cited in Rice, The Bold Experiment, 262–263.
17 Fisher, Making Them Like Us, 88.
18 Paul A. Laudicina, World Poverty and Development: A Survey of American
Opinion (Washington DC. ODC 1973), 77.
19 Hoffman, All You Need is Love, 157.
20 Quoted in Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social
Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press,
2000), 133.
21 Arnold Zeitlin, To the Peace Corps, with Love (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday &
Co. Inc., 1965).
22 Thomas A. Hart, “Ghana, West Africa As I See It, ” The Journal of Negro
Education 31 (1) (1962): 95.
23 The New York Times, November 21, 1963.
24 Hoffman, All You Need is Love.
25 Peter L. Hahn & Mary Ann Heiss (eds), Empire and Revolution: The United
States and the Third World since 1945 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University
Press, 2000).
26 Rupert Emerson, Africa and United States Policy (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1967), 42, and Waldemar A. Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (New
York: Praeger, 1969), 300.
27 Steven W. Hook & John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II
(15th ed.) (Washington DC: CQ Press, 1988), 100.
28 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the
Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 92.
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Praeger.
Nkrumah, Kwame. 1965. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of
Imperialism. New York: International Publishers.
Redmon, Coates. 1986. Come As You Are: The Peace Corps Story. New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Rice, Gerald. 1985. The Bold Experiment: JFK’s Peace Corps. Notre
Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press.
Searles, David P. 1997. The Peace Corps Experience: Challenge and
Change, 1969–1976. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.
Shriver, Sargent R. 1964. Point of the Lance. New York: Harper & Row.
Textor, Robert B. Ed. 1966. Cultural Frontiers of the Peace Corps.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Westad, Odd Arne. 2005. The Global Cold War: Third World
Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Wetzel, Charles J. 1966. “The Peace Corps in our Past.” Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 365 (1966): 1–11.
Wofford, Harris. 1980. Of Kennedy & Kings: Making Sense of the Sixties.
New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.
Zeitlin, Arnold. 1965. To the Peace Corps, with Love. Garden City, NJ:
Doubleday & Co. Inc.
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
SOUTH-SOUTH COOPERATION:
A NEW POST-COLD WAR DIVIDE
OR A TRUE POST-NORTH-SOUTH DIVIDE?
DR CATHERINE SCHITTECATTE
VANCOUVER ISLAND UNIVERSITY
Abstract
The paper questions whether African foreign investment partnerships
with Global South countries will benefit Africans and, as such, escape past
North-South patterns of exploitation. Given Kwame Nkrumah’s awareness
of such exploitative partnerships, the paper begins with an explanation as
to why, in spite of such forethought, did projects such as the Volta River
Project fail to deliver benefits to Africans. The results of that analysis lead
to question whether today similar factors might not be at play as South
South Cooperation ventures grow on the continent. Are Africa’s new
partners still informed by the old SSC ideals or might they not also be
influenced by self-interest related to global considerations. As such, the
paper probes new post-Cold War divides and their influence on
exploitative relations and provides observations and recommendations for
the development of African negotiating positions within such contexts.
Introduction
More than fifty years ago, Kwame Nkrumah sought to diversify
Ghana’s economy and foster its economic development through a path of
modernization and industrialization. One of the main foundations of that
plan was the Volta River Project (VRP), which included the construction
of the Akosombo dam. Decades and numerous analyses later, most agree
that the Akosombo dam did not bring the anticipated benefits to Ghana.
The project suffered from what critics would identify as a familiar pattern
South-South Cooperation 269
of development endeavours undertaken with Northern partnerships—an

exploitation of domestic resources that benefit the North with little
concrete economic development for the host country. This is in spite of the
fact that, at the time, Kwame Nkrumah, along with other prominent
leaders of newly independent countries, was well aware of the challenges
they faced given their colonial past, established economic ties with
developed Western countries, and the structure of the international
economic system.1 Thus, as they sought Western financing for projects
such as the VRP, they also created multilateral fora to discuss alternatives
to global economic structures which were seen as skewed against them.
Endeavours such as South South Cooperation (SSC) were to palliate these
obstacles, and Nkrumah was among the prominent initiators of such
alternatives.
This paper questions why, in spite of such forethought, did projects
such as the VRP fail to deliver? To answer that question this paper
emphasizes parties’ respective interests and the relevance of the global
context. I subsequently question whether today, as SSC is growing, the
interests of Africa’s new partners are still informed by the old SSC ideals
or whether they might not also be influenced by self-interest related to
global considerations. Thus, the paper compares the VRP partners’
interests to the contemporary implementations of SSC by looking at
China’s engagements in Africa. As such, the case of the VRP and reasons
for its failure to bring about the anticipated results are compared to the
current implementations of SSC projects and actors’ interests. The
conclusion provides observations and recommendations for the
development of African negotiating positions.
I. The Volta River project

Since the completion of the dam at Akosombo over forty years ago,
much ink has been used on debating its costs and benefits. Rather than
revisiting these, the following discussion focuses on the respective
objectives of various parties interested in the Volta River Project (VRP),
and how these changed over time along with transformations in domestic
and global political contexts. This specific emphasis is not intended to
underestimate the relevance of previous studies that examine, for example,
the relative costs and benefits of the project by focusing on the relocation
of some 80,000 villagers versus the employment of some 9,000
Ghanaians. Likewise, the numerous evaluations of Ghana’s economic
planning and related policies provide important contributions. Rather, the
following discussion builds upon Hart’s (1980) salient point, and related
270 Chapter Fourteen
analysis, that Ghana is the only party involved in the VRP that did not
realize its objectives. Why this might be the case is important given our
interest in assessing whether contemporary development projects with
Global South partners might face a similar plight. Therefore, the broader
question at stake relates to the much-observed pattern that, although Africa
enjoys an abundance of natural resources, it is non-Africans who have
gained from these with little return to Africans themselves. The case of the
Akosombo dam on the Volta River illustrates very clearly why such
outcomes might come about.
Nkrumah’s main economic development objective was the
industrialization of Ghana, and the Volta River Project (VRP) was to be its
main pillar (Boahen 1975, 21).2 The reasoning behind this plan lay in the
understanding that Ghana’s unique combination of natural resources
provided an opportunity to develop a domestic integrated aluminium
industry.3 In fact, the original idea to dam the Volta River, as stated in the
1956 Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Volta River Project
(Chapter 1, paragraphs 4 and 5), was to “develop large-scale aluminium
production in the Gold Coast … [and] the development and operation of
bauxite mines.” Thus, Nkrumah’s plan was to diversify Ghana’s economy
away from primary commodity exports that were typical of colonial
economies at the time of independence. It would provide Ghana with a
basis from which to become not just politically independent but also less
economically dependent on developed countries, and the past colonial
powers in particular.
In order to grasp this potential for Ghana’s economic development, the
significance of the country’s unique abundance of bauxite close to a
potentially large source of hydroelectric power needs to be explained. In
sum, two distinct processes are required for the production of aluminium
from bauxite: raw bauxite is first transformed into alumina at an alumina
plant, then the alumina is then processed into aluminium proper at a
smelter. The second step, from alumina to aluminium, requires an
inordinate amount of electricity: “so much so that aluminium metal has
been called ‘packaged power’” (Killick 1966, 40`1).
Thus, Ghana’s economic development potential lay in its mix of key
natural resources in close proximity. Not only did Ghana possess key
ingredients for the development of such an industry, but it could also do it
at a clear competitive advantage. That is, the proximity of bauxite and
large quantities of hydroelectricity represented significant advantages for
Ghana, given that few countries in the world enjoy such a combination. As
Killick (1966, 404) pointed out: “Most aluminium producers in the world
have to ship their bauxite or alumina, or both, long distances to their

smelters.”4
The benefit of producing aluminium rather than exporting bauxite is, in
and of itself, economically advantageous. Revenues to the country would
be superior to those generated from exporting the raw material. Thus,
according to Killick (1966, 405): “The export earning power of bauxite
processed into aluminium ingots is at least seven times as large as
unprocessed bauxite.”
In addition, in terms of Ghana’s economic development, capturing
such potential represented the difference between exporting a value-added
product and exporting raw material—a clear departure from the
exploitative colonial form of raw material exports. In addition to greater
revenues, jobs related to several backward and forward linkages could be
derived from various stages of aluminium production within Ghana.5
Ghana’s natural advantages for the production of aluminium became
evident to the British at a time when Ghana was still a colony and when
British needs for aluminium increased dramatically.6 In 1928 the British
Aluminium Company was granted a concession to mine bauxite at Awaso
in the Western Region of what was then called the Gold Coast. Thus:
“[t]he key people who were influential in developing the idea [of the VRP]
represented either the interests of the colonial government or its
metropolis, the United Kingdom, or the financial interests of private
corporations willing to invest in the project as an economic venture”
(Perritt 1988, 11). As Hart (1980, 36) explains: “The U.K.’s consumption
[of aluminium] in 1951 was about 203,000 tonnes … Of this, 27,000
tonnes were produced in the U.K. and 176,000 tonnes were imported,”
with projections of a 5% increase per year. However, most of the post-
WWII British aluminium had to be bought in the “dollar zone” which was
not advantageous for the British (Killick 1966; Jackson 1970; Krassowski
1974; Hart, 1980). Thus, the British White Paper Cmd 8702 of November
1952 states: “It is important that additional supplies [of aluminium] should
come as far as possible from the Sterling Area” (Hart 1980, 36).
Therefore, developing the capacity for aluminium production in the Gold
Coast would meet that objective. Indeed, the main purpose of the White
Paper Cmd 8702, titled “the Volta Aluminium Scheme,” was to support
the VRP for the production of 564 MW of electric power, 514 of which
would be for a smelter (Hart, 1980: 36).
However, from that time until February 1962, when all financial and
legal arrangements were eventually finalized for the Akosombo dam and
the related aluminium production, much had changed, both in terms of the
project and the partners. Ten years of global economic and political
transformations had impacted the way in which the VRP eventually

evolved. Looking at various parties’ dis/interest in the VRP explains the
impact of such global changes.
The first global impact resulted in British disinterest in the VRP. As
Krassowski (1974, 50) explains: “[b]y 1956 … the British government …
had second thoughts [about the VRP], following the rapid expansion in
world aluminium output and the easing of post-world war dollar shortage.”
Likewise, given the 60% increase in world production of aluminium
between 1952 and 1956, the aluminium companies originally interested in
the VRP “were not so expansion-minded” anymore (Killick 1966, 392).
Thus, a search for alternative sources of funding began in October 1957,
when Nkrumah’s government approached the United States government
and the engineering branch of the Henry J. Kaiser Company of California
(Killick 1966; Moxon 1969). Eventually, when final agreements were
reached, the new partners for the VRP were: the governments of Ghana,
the United States, and the United Kingdom (albeit by then the United
Kingdom was a very minor partner), the World Bank, and Volta
Aluminium Company (Valco, a consortium of two American aluminium
companies; 90% of smelter shares belonged to the Kaiser Aluminium and
Chemical Corporation and 10% to Reynolds Metal Co.).
Significantly, the structure of the new agreements consisted of two
distinct schemes: one, a hydroelectric dam at a new location that would
yield more power; and the second, which concerned Valco, a smelter plant
on the coast, far from Ghanaian bauxite deposits and the dam. Of
significance regarding the new Ghanaian partners’ interests was that while
the new American corporate partners received financial support from their
government to finance the building of a smelter, Ghana was not able to
obtain financial support for shares in that part of the project. As such,
Ghana was out of the aluminium production scheme.
The reason for this United States government loan to Valco was that
both the VRP as a whole and the involvement of American corporations in
developing countries fit with United States foreign policy objectives.
Indeed, every aspect of the American government’s interest in the VRP
was based on Cold War foreign policy calculations. Ghana’s search for
new partners in the VRP came at a time when both Cold War superpowers,
the Soviet Union and the United States, began their competition for Third
World allegiance—so much so that “the slightest gain in presence or
influence for one side was seen as transforming immediately into a
comparable loss of presence or influence for the other” (Kanet 2006, 34).
Not only was Ghana the first sub-Saharan colony to gain independence,
giving it a significant leadership role for others, but at that time,
Khrushchev initiated Soviet economic aid to the “Third World” for the
declared purpose of promoting a “peaceful transition” to Socialism (Guan-
Fu 1983).
Research shows that Ghana’s choice between American or Soviet
partnership for the VRP was quite significant to superpower interests in
Africa and that the United States was carefully watching Nkrumah’s
relations with the Soviet Union (Thompson 1969).7 Given the Soviet
commitment of assistance for Egypt’s Aswan Dam in the mid-1950s,
Ghana’s financial needs for a dam provided an opportunity to avoid
further Soviet gains. The new Kennedy administration was keen on
changing the orientation of United States foreign policy towards Africa,
and: “instead of abandoning Nkrumah to the Soviets as Eisenhower had
done to so many other Third World nationalists, JFK decided ‘winning’
Nkrumah back a top priority and the cornerstone of his African policy”
(Muelhenbeck 2012, 77). The British were also concerned about Ghana
turning to the Soviets for the VRP and: “impressed upon the American
president the importance of giving Nkrumah a positive response regarding
the VRP prior to his trip to the Soviet Union … British fears were
reinforced by Radio Moscow broadcasts and NSA [National Security
Archive] intercepts of Soviet diplomatic traffic, which indicated that
Moscow was eager to replace Washington as the financier of the VRP, just
as it had done at Aswan in Egypt in 1956” (Muehlenbueck 2012, 82). In
addition, the United States was seeking to open up new markets for
American goods and services and, in order to achieve such objectives,
encouraged private investments that would foster a free enterprise system
where United States corporations could prosper. Thus, the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was created to recognize and
foster successful models of private investment in developing countries,
and Valco’s successful Ghanaian smelter operation was rewarded with the
first OPIC Development Award (Hart 1980, 45).
The new VRP agreement was very profitable for Valco as it allowed it
to import its own alumina (duty free for thirty years) to be processed at the
Ghanaian smelter, and included an understanding for Ghana to not: “insist
on a firm commitment on the part of Valco to install, in due course, an
alumina plant in Ghana” (Killick 1966, 403). In addition, the main
advantage for Valco was the unusually low price of electricity that it could
rely upon for the transformation of its Jamaican alumina into aluminium.
Hart (1980, 63–73) provides a comprehensive and well-documented
analysis of the very advantageous price of electricity that Valco benefitted
from over the course of its use of the Ghanaian smelter plant. His analysis
provides several conclusions. The first is that, over time, Valco benefitted
from a much lower price of electricity than global prices, including the
United States prices that Kaiser’s competitors in the aluminium industry
had to pay. Not only does Hart demonstrate this with ample statistical
evidence, he also provides further evidence of Valco’s advantages when
he mentions that: “[t]he Valco smelter was operated at full capacity during
the 1975 recession in the world aluminium market, in contrast to many
smelters elsewhere, including the U.S.A.” (ibid., 64). A second conclusion
is that the Ghanaian government’s “revenues from the sale of electricity to
Valco [did] not meet the cost of supply” (Hart 1980, 65). Finally, of all the
consumers of Ghanaian electricity in Ghana, Togo and Benin, be they
businesses, governments or individual consumers, none benefitted from
rates as favourable as those enjoyed by Valco (ibid., 66).
There is reason to question whether the Kaiser Aluminium and
Chemical Corporation (the majority partner in the Valco smelter) ever
intended to foster Ghana’s objectives, given that this would have enabled a
highly competitive Ghanaian aluminium production to compete with its
own. Indeed, as Killick (1966, 402) pointed out, the Kaiser Industries
Corporation, of which Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical Corporation was a
subsidiary, provided: “a good example of vertical integration, for it
embrace[d] every stage of aluminium production, from bauxite mining to
the fabrication and marketing of finished aluminium products.” Hart’s
(1980, 46–47) research also reveals that Kaiser was a global conglomerate
that owned aluminium production facilities around the world. Among
these he lists bauxite mines in Australia India, and Jamaica; alumina plants
in Australia, India, Jamaica and Sardinia; and aluminium smelters in
Australia, Bahrain, West Germany, India, New Zealand and Wales. In
addition, the Kaiser Corporation included a shipping line to transport these
various products from one processing stage to the other (Killick 1966, 405
not 3). Kaiser’s overseas production, including the Ghanaian smelter,
allowed it to remain competitive with Alcoa, a large North American
producer that controlled the American bauxite deposits and hydroelectric
resources (Girvan 1970, in Hart 1980, 48). Thus Hart (1980, 49)
concludes: “The Kaiser Corporation had specific aims to fulfill when it got
involved in the VRP and it did not sacrifice those aims, or itself, for the
benefit of the people of Ghana.”
As for the World Bank’s interests in the VRP, much has been written
regarding the influence of the North, and the United States in particular, on
its policies and operations. Such influence has always been in stark
contrast to that of the Global South. Given its weighted voting system
based upon financial contributions to the bank, the Global South has had
little voting power over long periods of time, let alone in the 1950s. The
United States, for its part, has always had veto power on Bank decisions
(Thomas 2000). Given these realities, Hart (1980, 50) reasons that in terms
of the bank’s role in the VRP, it took a “diplomatic rather than a
commercial stance” as it acted as “an arm of the US government,” paying
attention to the “desires of the US government, that is, primarily a
successful foreign policy, and secondarily a commercial economic return.”
Hart (1980, 50) also suggests that there were close ties between the Kaiser
Corporation and high executive levels of the bank, given that one of its
directors and the chairman of the family foundation, George D. Woods,
became President of the World Bank in 1963.
As such, the motivations and interests of Ghana’s main partners in the
VRP were informed by self-interest rather than Ghana’s economic
development objectives and, at times, even presented a conflict of interest
between Ghana’s objectives and their own. By all accounts, it was the final
agreement with Valco that jeopardized Ghana’s hopes of developing a
domestic integrated aluminium industry. The size of the Kaiser
conglomerate suggests that its involvement from the start—which included
a reassessment of the 1956 Commission recommendations, and,
eventually, the building of the dam at Akosombo by its own engineering
division—was problematic. Given the interests of the Kaiser
conglomerate, it seems unlikely that Valco would ever have agreed to
develop the Ghanaian bauxite deposits. Furthermore, while corporate
profits may explain Kaiser’s motivations, other factors related to the
United States government’s interests contributed to undermine Ghana’s
national development plans. Thus, Muehlenbueck (2012, 84) reports that
Kennedy had been warned by Senator Albert Gore Sr., who had led a
congressional delegation to Accra to assess the VRP, that: “the prime
beneficiaries of the project would be neither Nkrumah nor the people of
Ghana but Kaiser and the other American companies of the Valco
consortium.” Not only was the development objective of a domestic
integrated aluminium industry never realized, but the electricity component
of the project, which was also to promote industrial development “had a
zero or negligible influence … on Ghana’s industrialization” (Hart 1980,
70). The employment aspect of the whole scheme also fell short of
expectations. As Jones (1976, 160) points out, the smelter’s: “impact on
Ghana’s unemployment problems was insignificant.”
The changes to the original VRP plans reflected not only the interests
of the new parties but also, according to some, unequal bargaining power.
Ghana’s weak position lay in its need for capital and its lack of success in
raising long-term loans at low interest rates (Krassowski 1974; Ewusi
1973; Mikkel, 1989). As Thompson (1969, 164) points out: “In its [first]
three years of independence, Ghana had sought aid for only one major
project, the Volta scheme, and had spent two full years in negotiations
with the Americans.” In addition, given that only a smelter could absorb
the large quantities of electricity to be produced, the American and British
governments and the World Bank indicated that they would make loans
available to Ghana on the condition that private partners interested in
investing in the building and operation of a smelter are found. While
Ghana struggled to find financing for the dam, the United States Export-
Import Bank provided the Valco consortium a US $96 million loan for the
smelter project, and the United States government, through the
Development Loan Fund Act, fully guaranteed the remaining investments
by Kaiser and Reynold (Hart 1980, 45). The American government loaned
Ghana US $37 million for the building of the Akosombo dam only (Hart
1980, 31). Since, as explained earlier, few aluminium companies were
interested in expanding their aluminium production, Ghana was constrained
to come to an agreement with Kaiser and Reynolds. Thus, Killick (1966,
393) points out that “Ghana needed Valco more than Valco needed
Ghana.” According to that view, the lack of available funding for Ghana
turned the VRP into a catch-22. The result was a hard bargain on the part
of all of Ghana’s partners.
Nevertheless, in terms of its negotiating position, one could still ponder
whether Ghana’s advantageous position, given the particular timing,
superpowers’ geopolitical calculations, and its natural resource advantages
might not have allowed it to negotiate from a position of strength. Given
the focus of this paper on the global context, analyses that emphasize such
factors will be briefly highlighted. Was there room for Ghana to negotiate
a better deal given Kaiser’s needs and United States’ global interests?
Some have argued that Nkrumah’s deep belief in Ghana’s need of foreign
capital for its industrialization placed the country in a weak position
(Thompson 1969; Hart 1980). His anxiety and eagerness to secure capital
was evident as early as the 1957 Commonwealth Prime Ministers’
Conference, where it was observed that Nkrumah was very cautious not to
jeopardize his search for economic help, as he appeared to be: “unwilling
to take a contentious stand on any issue, and it was even reported that he
was in harmony with South Africa’s foreign minister, Eric Louw, on the
question of the ‘danger of Communism’,” (Thompson 1969, 42). On the
other hand, Ghana’s position at that particular time in world affairs was of
extreme importance to the United States due to Soviet competition for
spheres of influence and Egypt’s turn to the Soviets for the Aswan Dam
(Muehlenbueck 2012).8 This surely should have indicated the United
States’ eagerness. Given the global context, some attribute Ghana’s weak
position to its lack of a clear position regarding the two superpowers.

Genoud (1969, 139) argues that Ghana’s weak bargaining position was
due to its inability to: “balance better her economic relations with the rest
of the world, viz., had the Socialist countries eventually come to represent
a real alternative … it may well have been that the attitude of the Western
capital (both private and public) might have altered in favor of Ghana.”
Genoud (ibid., 140) attributes Ghana’s inability to achieve this balance to
the fact that it was a “weak neutralist country.”9 Had Ghana been more
clearly neutral, Genoud argues, it would have been able to free itself from
its dependence on the West thanks to assistance from Socialist countries.
For his part, Hart (1980, 104) sees the outcome of the VRP as a “basic
clash of conflicting interests” and Ghana’s predicament as related to an
“inegalitarian world system” where “the resolution of any conflicts of
interests will be in favour of those with more political might or economic
power or technical expertise, or all three.” Whether one sees Genoud’s or
Hart’s argument as having most merit, both point to the relevance of
Ghana’s position in the world at this particular juncture.
These analyses bring forth the issue of negotiations with outsiders and,
in some aspects, how to consider enhancing one’s strengths. Was
Nkrumah sufficiently aware of what was at stake for superpowers’
interests and the value of what Ghana had to offer, both politically and
economically? In fairness, given the profound global political changes
taking place at the time, from the numerous countries that were still to gain
independence to the relatively new competition between superpowers, it is
understandable that, from the new leaders’ perspective, the situation must
have been far from clear. Judging from the indecisions of the Americans,
and Kennedy’s in particular, in agreeing to provide financial support for
the VRP (Muehlenbueck 2012) the superpowers themselves were
uncertain about the best course of action. Nevertheless, Nkrumah had a
solution for Africa’s position of weakness. As explained in a previous
paper (Schittecatte 2012), part of Nkrumah’s vision for a united Africa
was the strength that this would lend in dealing with much more powerful
partners.
Nevertheless, today we must ask ourselves whether, given past
experiences, African negotiations with foreign investors, be they public or
private, should pay more heed to the other side’s interests and to the
position Africa takes in negotiations. Looking at SSC, it seems that global
power distribution still plays a role in foreign policy calculations of
Africa’s “new partners.”
II. Africa and its New Partners

a. South-South Cooperation
Nkrumah, along with other leaders of the newly independent countries,
was well aware of the inequalities of the international system and, as he
was seeking foreign investments from the West, was also among those
who fostered alternatives to that system. One of these was the idea of
South-South Cooperation (SSC) which emerged in the early 1960s at a
time when what were then called “Third World” countries institutionalized
their solidarity. This solidarity was based upon shared struggles against
Northern neo-colonialism, and concerns regarding global political and
economic structures that, they argued, were skewed in favour of developed
countries (also referred to as the “First World, the “West” or the “North”).
Thus DeHart (2012, 1367) explains that at the root of the concept of
South-South cooperation is the understanding of a shared history,
experience with colonialism, and “desire for sovereignty and equality.”
From that standpoint, the author points out, the concept of “South” has
more to do with an understanding of the global divide between developed
and developing countries than with geographical regions. Others go
further, seeing in early conceptualizations of SSC “suspicions of the
‘hegemonic’ character of North-South transfers, and a desire to promote
more ‘mutuality’ in exchanges among countries and peoples united in their
experience of ‘Northern’ oppression” (Vickers 2009, 680).
Two significant events, which have been linked to the emergence of
the SSC concept, explain these views (DeHart 2012; Rampa, Bilal &
Sidiropoulos 2012, 249). The first was the Asian-African Conference that
took place in Bandung in 1955; the other was the United Nations
Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, held
in Buenos Aires in 1978 (UN 2009; UNCTAD 2010). Significantly, these
two dates frame a period that saw the birth of a growing number of
independent countries on the international scene, along with their
increased political strength and pressures through the United Nations (UN)
for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). To summarize, the 1955
Bandung meeting is seen as a watershed in that it initiated Third World
solidarity, also known as “Third Worldism,” and ideas that eventually led
to the creation of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961, the creation
of the pro-South United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), and the G-77 in 1964.10 For its part, the Buenos Aires
conference took place during a decade when the North felt vulnerable due
to the successful increase in oil prices by Southern oil producers and the
related pressures for a NIEO (Cohn 2012). Thus, the 1970s have been
referred to as the “golden age of Third Worldism” (Berger 2004, 10). The
1978 conference in Argentina is also significant because it saw the
adoption of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPOA), which gave SSC a
strategic framework (UNCTAD 2009, 7).
SSC is still relevant today for the development strategies of the Global
South, policy references in various multilateral bodies, and foreign policy
rationales of emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil (CIB).
Significantly, the political objectives expressed at the height of Third
Worldism have not waned in current expressions of SSC formulations.
Thus, according to the UN Secretary General Report on South-South
Cooperation, submitted at the October 27, 2009 General Assembly
meeting (UN 2009,4), the BAPOA: “Articulated the same three strategic
aims that developing countries have collectively pursued over the past six
decades: to strengthen their economic, social and political interdependence,
accelerate development, and correct distortions in international systems
caused by the asymmetrical power relations of the colonial era” [emphasis
added]. The G-77, which still exists and has grown to 131 members, has
played a lead role in establishing a: “conceptual framework and guiding
principles for South-South cooperation” (UNCTAD 2010, 7). Thus, the
2009 Ministerial Declaration of the 33rd meeting of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the “Group of 77 and China”
[emphasis added] reiterated the principles of SSC adopted at the June 2008
Yamoussoukro (Côte d’Ivoire) conference (G-77.org 2009). The latter
were used as a guide for the December 2009 United Nations High Level
Conference on South-South Cooperation that took place in Nairobi,
Kenya. Among these we find ongoing themes such as:
(article a)
South-South cooperation is a common endeavour of peoples and
countries of the South and must be pursued as an expression of
solidarity and a strategy for economic independence and self-reliance
of the South based on their common objectives and solidarity;
(article f)
South-South cooperation is a development agenda based on premises,
conditions and objectives that are specific to the historic and political
context of developing countries and to their needs and expectations.
South-South cooperation deserves its own separate and independent
promotion;
(article m)
South-South cooperation seeks to enable developing countries to play a
more active role in international policy and decision-making processes,
in support of their efforts to achieve sustainable development (G-
77.org 2009).
SSC has been implemented in a number of pragmatic ways. As the UN

Secretary General report describes it, SSC: “runs the gamut of
development activities, from distributing single products, such as deep
borehole hand pumps and oral rehydration salts, to complex programmes
for combating HIV/AIDS, building electronic systems and conducting
scientific research” (UN 2009, 7). Also, the Bank of the South was
established in 2009 as an alternative lending institution for and by Latin
American countries, and the recent creation of a single market among
Caribbean countries known as Caribbean Single Market and Economy
(CSME) aims to: “foster sustained economic growth and build capabilities
of their industries” (Clairzier 2011, 74). Another example was the
creation, in 2003, of the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA
Forum), which was intended to “strengthen trilateral relations and
cooperation (especially through practical and technical cooperation
agreements)” (Dauvergne & Farias 2012, 910). Quantitative evidence of
the growing impact of SSC estimates that: “South-South development
cooperation in 2010 reached between $12.9 billion and $14.8 billion,
making it some 50 percent higher than it was in 2006" (Rampa et al. 2012,
250).
While these initiatives and progress are welcome, the principles of
SSC and its uses as foreign policy rationales by CIB do leave the door
open for controversy. As “traditional donors” (from the North) seek to
improve their development endeavours through “aid effectiveness”
mechanisms, similar activities from emerging economies are exempt from
such scrutiny, given other SSC principles. Although SSC is clearly
associated with “development,” such activities are not to be assessed by
the same standards as traditional (Northern) development donors’ efforts.
Indeed, among the recent SSC principles published by the G-77 and China
is the idea that: “financial contributions from other developing countries
should not be seen as Official Development Assistance [and that]
cooperation between countries of the South must not be analyzed and
evaluated using the same standards as those used by North-South
relations” (G-77.org 2009). Furthermore, as acknowledged by the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP): “[i]nsofar as finance forms part
of a South-South relationship altruism is not at issue: emerging
economies’ aid programs are driven by vital national interests (e.g. energy
security) and commercial considerations (e.g. market penetration)”
(Rampa et al. 2012, 250–51).
As a result, questions have been raised regarding the difference
between “development” and/or “aid” with Global North assistance and
Global South “cooperation.” At the 2011 Fourth High Level Forum on Aid
in Busan (South Korea), traditional donors, such as the United States:
“bent over backwards to get new aid donors, China and India, to sign on to
terms of a global aid effectiveness partnership” (Dehart 2012 ,1359).
Traditional Western donors are also encouraging recipients of new donors’
aid to be cautious. Thus, United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is
quoted as stating: “Be wary of donors who are more interested in
extracting your resources than in building your capacity” (Dehart 2012,
1360). While, given the analysis of the Akosombo case study, such
cautionary statements from a United States official appear hypocritical,
they also indicate the significance of the broader global context within
which Africa again finds itself.
Fuelling the controversy is evidence of a changing global power
distribution and the fact that these three countries are also part of the
BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa)—a new category
of countries that share several characteristics, one being “aspiration to a
global role” (Dauvergne & Farias 2012, 905). Not surprisingly, these
aspirations trigger concern among traditional development donors. Just as
the competition of the Cold War among great powers affected their
interests in Africa, analysts are now considering the challenges and
opportunities that this emerging world order presents for the continent.11
The case study of Ghana’s Akosombo dam is illustrative of the relevance
of such contexts and the importance of development partners’ motivations.
Thus, according to some, SSC has: “recently gained wide currency in
the international development community, for both ideological and
pragmatic reasons” (Vickers 2012, 680). Three themes animate CIB
relations with the Global South and debates around SSC in particular: the
historical legacy of North-South relations, including some 60 years of—
some would say, failed—development in Africa, often interfering in the
internal affairs of host countries; the colonial and neo-colonial experiences
that CIB share with their host countries, and the related beliefs in the
benefits of South-South Cooperation; and the potential global power shifts
that CIB players represent.
As is clear from the discussion above, the historical roots of SSC
provide the CIB with a rationale to deepen their ties with the Global South.
Today, however, these ideological rationales have shifted from struggles
pertinent to the Cold War period, to the growing CIB appetite for natural
resources and concerns for their position in the emerging world order. For
example, Brazil’s Foreign Minister was quoted as saying that “South-
South Cooperation is a diplomatic strategy that originates from an
authentic desire to exercise solidarity toward poorer countries[;] at the
same time, it helps expand Brazil’s participation in world affairs”
(Dauvergne & Farias 2012, 909). The growing presence of CIB and the
multiplicity of alternative “partners” for Africa and competition among
them have generated many questions regarding the benefits of CIB
presence on the continent. China has been of particular interest given that
it is: “by far the most important ‘new’ partner of Africa in terms of
politics, trade, investment and development support” (Rampa et al. 2012,
247–248).12
Thus, labels used to describe the nature of Chinese presence in Africa
take different connotations. Some Western governments and pundits
negatively depict Chinese activities with terms such as the “China model”
or the “Beijing consensus.” Likewise, in Latin America, those who are
critical of the growing Chinese presence there speak of the “China model”
to refer to a form of environmentally destructive development that only
serves the interests of a “resource hungry” China (Dauvergne & Farias
2012, 1365). China, for its part: “has rejected these models … offering
instead South-South cooperation to describe its goal of a harmonious
world order based on nation-state sovereignty and partnerships with
mutual benefits” (Dehart 2012, 1360). Nevertheless, there are a number of
reasons why the SSC label for Sino-African relations might be
problematic.
b. China in Africa
Debates around China’s use of the SSC rationale for its economic
activities in Africa revolve around the nature and purpose of Chinese
“aid.” In particular, the distinction between Chinese aid and other Chinese
commercial activities on the continent, such as trade and investments, is
not clear (De Haan 2011, 887). Making matters worse, from a
development perspective, is that these are usually linked to favourable
commercial relations with recipients that range from Chinese access to
natural resources to Chinese migration to the continent. Within the
development field of study, such practices have been criticized in the past
as a form of “tied aid”—one that has most often benefitted the donor
rather than the recipient. Thus, it has been pointed out that: “50–80 percent
of Chinese FDI in Africa” go to natural resource exploitation and resource
rich countries … [and that] China’s African Development Fund … was

launched in June 2007 with $1 billion of a projected $5 billion fund to
encourage and support Chinese business operating in Africa” (Alden et al.
2008, 14). Rupp (2008, 74) also observed that: “[t]he link between trade
and aid is unambiguous; packages of aid to African partners have proven
influential in securing trade deals for external partners … [I]n 2004 China
extended $2 billion in soft loans to Angola in exchange for Angola’s
promise of unrestricted flows of crude oil to China.”
Given such evidence, Rampa et al. (2012, 250) point out that:
“Southern donors in general and China in particular exercise a much closer
strategic integration between aid, trade and their direct investments. This is
most clearly evident in China’s comprehensive aid package negotiated
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo in late 1997 and early 2008.”
As was the case for Angola, Devon Curtis’ (2008, 98–101) case study of
the China-DRC agreement indicates a link between aid, access to natural
resources and opportunities for Chinese companies to undertake projects
in the DRC with advantageous conditions regarding taxation, employment
and material:
A US $3 billion loan for mining development, along with other loans from
China’s Exim Bank to the Chinese companies CREC and Sinohydro, to
finance over US $5 billion in infrastructure projects … In return, a
Congolese-Chinese joint venture will be created [and] headquartered in
Beijing. The large state-owned Congolese mining company … will hold 32
percent of the shares … and the Chinese … will hold 68 percent … During
the repayment period … the joint venture will be exempt from the payment
of fees and taxes. It has the right to freely choose equipment providers and
to hire qualified personnel.
China has reached a number of similar agreements, known as the

“Angola model,” throughout Africa. As Rampa et al. (2012, 257) explain,
these agreements consist of concessionary loans, not from a cooperation
agency but from a public banking system. As such, it is, in effect: “a risk
management architecture, packaging infrastructure development with
arrangements to access natural resources as a guarantee in countries with
bad credit.” One recent agreement made between Ghana and China for
Ghana’s new oil discoveries created quite a stir in the country. Not only
has the minority in parliament said that the deal is a “rip off,” given the
prices of oil provided to China, but a former attorney general and minister
of justice, along with a member of parliament, have pointed out that the
agreement is in violation of Ghana’s Petroleum Revenue Management Act
2010 (Sackitey 2012).
c. African Observations on China in Africa

As in other parts of the world, Africans are questioning whether there
are benefits in having infrastructure facilities such as a football stadium
built by Chinese labour, using mainly Chinese imported materials
(Dauvergne & Farias 2012, 1369). Thus, the President of the Chamber of
Commerce of an African capital is quoted as commenting: “I have not
seen a single Chinese investment project that is productive in any way;
they are content with building infrastructure, especially stadiums and
congress halls, to get African states to recognize the PRC [People’s
Republic of China]” (Gaye 2008, 133). Such critiques are similar to those
directed at the Akosombo project. While seemingly “partnering” with
Ghana for its development objectives, American and Soviet motivations
for providing financial assistance were first and foremost self-interested,
mostly having to do with global political competition between the two
superpowers. Nkrumah’s unrealized objective was the development of an
integrated aluminium industry that would create employment for Africans,
thanks to backward and forward linkages, obtained through value-added
revenue from the transformation of domestic raw materials by domestic
industries. Likewise, Africans question today whether Chinese economic
activities in Africa will result in more of the same raw material exports
with few jobs and no diversification of the economy through the
development of African manufacturing capacity, increased knowhow and
technology transfer. Chinese interests are being served, but are Africa’s?
Are we witnessing a similar pattern with a new partner? Below are some
examples from the literature that illustrate these concerns.
One question that dominates these debates revolves around the
composition of Sino-African trade and whether, as in the 1950s, the
relationship will enable Africa to move away from raw material exports.
Indeed, among the most noticeable growth in Sino-African relations is
trade between the two regions. Thus, between 1999 and 2004: “exports
from the continent to China grew by 48 percent annually” (Broadman
2008, 96); by 2006: “African exports to China stood at $20.4 billion …
almost six times the exports of 2002, and accounted for 14 percent of total
Sub Saharan exports to the world” (Goldstein et al. 2008, 41). Likewise,
Chinese imports to the continent have grown exponentially. Unfortunately,
while up until the late 1980s some progress towards more value-added
exports was made, since then there has been no improvement (Broadman
2008, 92; Goldstein et al. 2008, 41). Broadman’s (2008, 99) statistics
indicate that African exports to China are made up of 63% oil and natural
gas, 17% ores and metals, and 7% agricultural raw materials. For its part,
China’s imports to Africa are 33% machinery and transport equipment,

18% manufactured materials, and 36% textile, apparel and footwear.
That Africa’s trade with the rest of the world has, since independence,
not succeeded in diversifying from raw material exports is not China’s
doing, and it is understandable that current trade relations show such a
contrast. However, there are issues related to Sino-African trade relations,
not just in terms of whether, in the long-term, Africa will be able to move
away from raw material exports thanks to Chinese investments, but also in
terms of the competition that Chinese imports present to the few
manufacturing sectors that Africa has developed. Thus, Chinese imports of
cheap manufactured products to Africa have attracted much attention,
particularly in the textile and leather industries where they have displaced
local products and merchants. Rupp (2008, 69) observed that: “[I]t is in the
market place that African anxieties and anger about Chinese ‘colonialism’
are most often and most vigorously expressed.” He provides the example
of Zimbabwe where, in 2005, bumper stickers called for the boycott of
Chinese products. According to that study, such sentiments are, in part,
related to the threat that Chinese imports represent for local producers.
Chinese competition in textiles on the continent has resulted in significant
job losses in the African textile industry whereby, among others: “In tiny,
landlocked Lesotho, six textile factories closed in 2005 alone, and over
10,000 workers lost their jobs, affecting tens of thousands of these
workers’ dependents” (Rupp 2008, 71). In the DRC, Utexafrica, the main
textile producer of the country, was sold to a Chinese corporation, and:
“some Congolese consultants believe that this was done in order to
undermine the domestic industry and allow Chinese products to flood the
country. In addition, there has been an increase in smuggled textile
products from China, which some people worry may destroy local
production” (Curtis 2008, 100).
For his part, Gaye (2008, 129–141) describes the transformation of one
of Dakar’s main thoroughfares “into one of the many tropical China
towns,” which turned what had been a residential neighbourhood into a
commercial area, pushing out the locals. As in Senegal, market people in
Cameroon, Ghana and Togo are worried about both competition from
cheap imports and the growing presence of Chinese entrepreneurs in
traditional markets (Ashan 2007; Rupp 2008, 73; Gaye 2008; Axelson &
Sylvanus 2010; Rampa et al., 2012). From traditional African print cloths
to “beignets Chinois” (Chinese doughnuts) and glittering ornaments,
Chinese traders are displacing African market merchants thanks to
competitive prices. So much so that the market women of Bamenda
(Cameroon): “expressed a collective anxiety about the lengths that
Chinese business people will go to in order to make a profit, fearing that

Chinese entrepreneurs will soon join them by the roadside selling roasted
plantain to passersby” (Rupp 2008, 73). In Senegal, Chinese merchants
eliminate the African competition: “by selling their wares at package
prices” (Gaye 2008, 131). While Gay (2008) acknowledges that there are
divergent views among Africans (for example, he recognizes that cheap
Chinese imports make the poverty-stricken Senegalese happy), he also
draws attention to the concerns of African business representatives. Thus,
he quotes “the President of the Chamber of Commerce of an African
capital” as saying “Africa gains nothing from the Chinese, there is no quid
pro quo with them. Europe can at least sell their Airbus planes to the
Chinese in order to recoup some of the damages they bring about to other
industrial sectors like textiles and manufacturing” (ibid., 133).
As the examples of the DRC and Angola illustrate, China has
penetrated African economies through a mixture of aid, concessional
loans, subsidies to its own corporations, infrastructure projects and the
like. Although many recognize the value of infrastructure reconstruction in
various African countries (De Haan 2011; Rupp 2008; Soares de Oliveira
2008), they seem geared to employing Chinese rather than African
workers. Zambia’s Minister of Commerce, Trade and Industry stated that
China is: “displacing local people and causing a lot of friction. You have
Chinese laborers here moving wheelbarrows. That’s not the kind of
investment we need. I understand that they have 1.2 billion people, but
they don’t have to send them to Africa” (Rupp 2008, 72). Observers have
also pointed out that there are few if any learning opportunities for African
workers, given that:
Chinese companies and officials have a unique opportunity to act in a
close-knit circle. Everything is done between them. Their interlocutors, or
“partners,” from the continent are marginalized in the management,
running and profit of companies. Silence is the watch-word … Similar
concerns have been voiced in Angola where “there is insufficient Angolan
participation in the steadily growing number of projects funded by the
Chinese.” (Corkin 2008, 117)
III. Recommendations and Conclusion

Sixty years of post-independence North-South relations have not
yielded the kind of economic modernization and diversification sought by
leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah. Africa’s trade with the rest of the world
still relies heavily on raw material exports while it imports finished
products, made from these very natural resources. As emerging economies
are increasingly able to implement SSC, many African government

officials “contrast the Asian approach of ‘building what’s needed now’
with the partial failure of previous more measured development
programmes” undertaken with traditional Western donors (Rampa et al.
2012, 256). The question, however, is whether the “new approach” will
actually deliver or whether we are witnessing a repeat of the past. In
assessing the benefits of Sino-African relations, the burgeoning literature
mainly falls into two camps: supporters who see “pragmatic cooperation
for mutual benefit,” and detractors who “perceive and portray Chinese
activities as economically predatory” (Rupp 2008, 65). More realistically,
however, it is too early to tell (Rampa et al. 2012; Taylor 2011; Goldstein
et al. 2008). Rather, what this paper has done is highlight concerns based
on observations in various African countries where governments have
entered into agreements with China in order to draw parallels with past
patterns. There seems to be a sufficient number of cases where Africa’s
development interests are not served and sometimes even undermined.
Cases where agreements for loans for infrastructure projects built by
Chinese businesses using Chinese labour in exchange for raw materials
perpetuate a path of dependent development, which is precisely what
Kwame Nkrumah was seeking to avoid over sixty years ago.
The analysis of the VRP case presented in this paper has focused on
the interests of Ghana’s “development partners” at a time when a new
world order was taking shape. Today, by all accounts, we are once again
witnessing significant global changes, not only in terms of the
globalization of the economy but also in terms of global power
distribution. As the West is weakened by economic crises, analysts are
predicting that emerging economies such as China, India and Brazil are
poised to be among tomorrow’s world powers. Neither is there any doubt
that these countries aspire to such status. Given these changes, Africa, as
in the past, plays a crucial strategic role in the foreign policy calculations
of these new “partners.”
Internationally, China’s involvement in Africa has provided support in
multilateral fora on a number of issues, and the “one China” policy in
particular. Thus, many past supporters of Taiwan in Africa have switched
to supporting China. Others have noted the support of African countries
for the successful Chinese bid to host the Olympics. Taylor (2011)
explained one motivation for China’s interest in Africa—after having lost
interest in the continent by the mid-1980s, China found itself isolated from
the West after the Tiananmen Square events, “and the Chinese leadership
reacted by an attentive courting of the developing world.” While some in
the West see the rise of China as concerning, China’s global agenda “is
driven by three imperatives: access to raw materials, market opportunities

and a greater role in international relations, in pursuit of which Africa
figures quite prominently” (Le Pere 2008, 24). As Le Pere (2008) points
out, from a theoretical perspective it is expected that, given the distribution
of state power in the world since the fall of the Soviet Union, other
aspiring powers will challenge dominant powers. In fact, China has openly
expressed its distrust of American hegemony and the need for China and
the developing countries to collaborate in order to prevent such global
domination (Taylor 2011; Tull 2008).
Just as the United States foreign policy objectives during the
competitive years of the Cold War, and the Akosombo dam negotiations,
were to expand markets for American companies and products, often tying
their aid to such objectives, so too is China today seeking to expand
markets for its manufactured products and businesses. Africa also plays a
crucial role given China’s needs for natural resources. As British needs for
natural resources informed its decisions towards Ghana, China’s needs in
natural resources include oil, of which Africa supplies 30% (Le Pere 2008,
25). Thus, Africa’s new oil discoveries are the subject of intensive
competition on the continent, but China needs other raw materials as well:
Between 1990 and 2003, China’s global imports of iron ore rose from 14
million tonnes to 148 million tonnes; of aluminium from 1 million tonnes
to 5.6 million tonnes; of refined copper from 20,000 tonnes to 1.3 million
tonnes. Platinum imports rose from 20,000 ounces to 1.6 million ounces
and China further imports an additional 40 million tonnes of steel per year.
(ibid., 25)
Not only does Africa hold many of these resources, but, as seen above,
its markets are important for the Chinese “export-led” development model
(Taylor 2011, 23). Thus: “[t]hat the domestic markets of many African
countries are relatively small and that there is relatively little competition
means that market share can be large almost from day one of operations”
(ibid. 22).
One difference perhaps is that, unlike traditional donors, the Chinese
do not pretend to be altruistic in their relations with Africa. As
demonstrated by the SSC principles that emanate from multilateral fora,
there is very clear language that SSC is considered as taking place between
equals and is meant to serve their mutual interests. In addition, China’s
policy of non-interference absolves it of any responsibility to ensure that
Africans’ interests are served.
Unfortunately, Africa finds itself in a similar position to the past, still
being in need of external capital to exploit its own natural resources. After
some sixty years of development aspirations, African societies and their

governments do not enjoy sufficient surpluses that enable them to invest in
their own continent. As in the past, while the new partner may seem
different given the historical solidarity with the Global South and China’s
own experience with colonialism, the relationship is asymmetric. Thus,
when describing the 2006 Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC),
Gaye (2008, 136) observes: “behind the discourse of equality and the
carnival atmosphere of the Summit, the Sino-African relationship is
characterized by an undeniable asymmetry.” The difference today,
however, is that the hindsight is 20/20, and while Nkrumah was facing the
additional challenges of being first among the sub-Saharan African
countries to not only gain independence but also deal with foreign
“partners” in an unknown global context, the leaders of today can and
should pay more heed to history lest it repeat itself.
Nevertheless, as Nkrumah pointed out at the outset of independence in
sub-Saharan Africa, an Africa united is stronger. Given that most of the
Sino-African agreements are conducted on a bilateral basis, many point
out that “to negotiate as one voice” would be a step in the right direction
(Rampa et al. 2012, 259). While the Chinese alternatives to Western
conditionalities are seen as an advantage by African elites, others: “see
competition fostering ad hoc reactions to each partner’s offer based on
that partner’s own policies and interests” (Gaye 2008, 260).
This paper has argued that avoiding a repeat of history with a strategy
of negotiations ensuring that Africans’ interests are secured should be
focused upon. Failures of past endeavours require that a healthy dose of
scepticism be applied when considering the nature of agreements with
China. Africans are right to ask whether their interests are served by these
exchanges or whether we are witnessing once more the extraction of
resources with little to show in terms of value added, employment
opportunities, technology transfer and overall economic development that
will alleviate poverty in Africa. Understanding better what Africa and its
resources represent in outsiders’ broader calculations might not only
prevent repetition of the errors of the past but also improve the continent’s
negotiating position and foster its interests more successfully than in the
past. Likewise, negotiating as one would provide Africans with a stronger
and more coherent position. Thus, how Africa as a whole handles this
renewed competition for its resources and strategic political support is
important to its future.
Notes
1
I described Nkrumah’s thinking to that effect in the paper published for the first
Kwame Nkrumah International Conference (KNIC1).
2
It is important to note here, given contemporary critiques of early development
projects, that little was known at the time regarding which development approach
would “work.” Debates still divide the field of “development studies.” More
importantly, as early as 1950, the individual research of two prominent economists,
Raul Prebisch and Hans Singer, indicated that in order to: “close the gap [between
North and South], LDCs [least developed countries] should … decrease their
emphasis on primary products and focus on industrialization” (Cohn 2008, 307).
Nkrumah, like many other leaders of newly independent countries, followed that
prescription. An “integrated aluminium industry” would achieve such an objective
as it would include all production processes from extraction of raw material to
production of finished products.
3
That is, a domestic production of aluminium, starting with the extraction of the
raw material bauxite, the smelting of alumina into aluminium metal and the
manufacturing of finished aluminium products for export and domestic markets.
4
As Kofoki (2011) of the Ghanaian Daily Graphic recently observed: “Ghana, I
am beginning to believe, has a special place in the heart of God. It is perhaps the
only country that has all the major raw materials needed for an integrated
aluminium industry. First, we have the bauxite in abundance; we have salt and
lime, which is needed at the refinery level and abundant resources for smelter.”
5
Backward and forward linkages are additional economic activities that derive
from an initial project. These could be, for example, construction-related activities
or manufacturing of finished products. In terms of the original VRP these included
“bauxite mining, irrigated agriculture, lake fishing and transport and industry”
(Krassowski 1974, 52). All these activities represent potential for job creation and
development of additional domestic economic sectors.
6
Relative to other metals, aluminium is a fairly new metal. It was not until the late
1800s and early 1900s that the process of transforming bauxite into aluminium
became efficient enough to increase its production and use. The new metal quickly
became popular due to: “its lightness, its strength in relation to its weight, its
resistance to corrosion, and its excellent electrical conductivity” (Killick 1966,
401). For example, its lightness made it attractive during World War I for soldiers’
canteens. After the war, its characteristics became much sought out for various
means of transportation ranging from bicycles to airplanes. It is around that time
that the idea of a VRP was conceived by a British geologist, Sir Albert Kitson,
after he discovered large amounts of bauxite near the Volta River and noticed its
energy potential (Moxon 1969; Hart 1980). As the following statistics from de
Graft Johnson (1955, 9) indicate, WWII saw a further increase in British demand
for aluminium: “During 1941–42, 6,300 tonnes of bauxite were produced; in
1942–23, 55,000 tonnes; and in 1943–4, 147,500 tonnes” (Hart 1980, 15).
7
Thus, Thompson (1969, 164) writes that in August 1960 a Ghanaian delegation to
Moscow returned with a number of offers from the Soviets, including: “the
establishment of hydroelectric stations of medium capacity.” He therefore observes
that after three years of searching for funding for the VRP and two years of
negotiations with the Americans: “Suddenly, £14,700,000 was offered to develop
Ghana, almost without asking and apparently with no strings attached.”
Krassowski (1974, 52) also reports that Nkrumah negotiated for a hydroelectric
dam with the Soviets, and that Russian experts continued their feasibility studies
for a power plant on the Volta River even after Nkrumah had agreed to the Kaiser
deal. Muehlenbueck (2012, 78) confirmed with archival evidence that Kennedy’s
Ambassador to Ghana, Francis Russell, cabled the State Department that:
“Nkrumah was under heavy pressure from the majority of his cabinet to reject US
aid for the VRP and instead invite Moscow to fund the project.”
8
Muehenbeck (2012, 82) explains that the British were also concerned about
Ghana turning to the Soviets for the VRP and that they “impressed upon the
American president the importance of giving Nkrumah a positive response
regarding the VRP prior to [Nkrumah’s] trip to the Soviet Union … British fears
were reinforced by Radio Moscow broadcasts and NSA [National Security
Archive] intercepts of Soviet diplomatic traffic, which indicated that Moscow was
eager to replace Washington as the financier of the VRP, just as it had done at
Aswan in Egypt in 1956.”
9
Thompson (1969, 298) confirms that view when he states that: “[i]n 1961, Ghana
was a state being blown from a ‘pro-West nonaligned stance’ to a ‘pro-East
nonaligned stance’.” Muehlenbueck (2012) also reports in detail Nkrumah’s
numerous public pronouncements either against the Americans or the Soviets over
the years, which definitely caused concerns among United States policy-makers.
10
Berger (2004, 12) lists Kwame Nkrumah among the “key figures at the (1955
Bandung) conference, and the main leaders of the first generation of Bandung
regimes.” Among other prominent leaders were Nehru, the Prime Minister of
India, Nasser, the Prime Minister of Egypt, and Zhou Enlai, Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China.
11
See, for example, Bhekinkosi Moyo (ed.), Africa in the Global Power Play
(London: Adonis & Abbey, 2007); Olayiwola Abegunrin, Africa in Global Politics
in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
12
See, for example, Ampiah Kweku & Sanusha Naidu (eds), Crouching Tiger,
Hidden Dragon? (South Africa: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008); Fantu
Cheru & Cyril Obi (eds), The Rise of China & India in Africa (London: Zed
Books, 2010); Ian Taylor, China’s New Role in Africa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,
2009); Gaye Adama, Chine-Afrique: Le dragon et l’autruche (Paris: L’Harmattan,
2006); Serge Michel & Michel Beurret, La ChinAfrique: Péquin à la conquête du
continent noir (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 2008); Linda Chisholm & Gita Steiner-
Khamsi (eds), South-South Cooperation in Education and Development (NY:
Columbia University, Teachers College Press, 2009); Stefan Halper, The Beijing
Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First
Century (NY: Basic Books 2010).
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN
PAN-AFRICAN EDUCATION:
A CASE STUDY OF THE KWAME NKRUMAH
IDEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, PRINT MEDIA
AND THE GHANA YOUNG PIONEER
MOVEMENT
MJIBA FREHIWOT
INDEPENDENT SCHOLAR
Abstract
Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana’s leader from 1951 to 1966, and his
Convention People’s Party (CPP), created formal and informal educational
institutions to promote Pan-Africanism in Ghana and throughout the
African world. Expanded to meet the needs of the country, the formal
education system retained the curriculum and features of British colonial
education. Informal educational institutions were created to supplement
the program of study offered at formal institutions and to promote Pan-
Africanism to Ghanaians and Africans alike. The Kwame Nkrumah
Ideological Institute, print media and the Ghana Young Pioneer Movement
represent a small portion of the informal institutions that operated during
the time period. This paper will critically examine the impact of education,
the features and curriculum of the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute,
the Ghana Young Pioneer Movement, the Accra Evening News and the
Daily Graphic as mediums exposing Ghanaians to Pan-African
consciousness. Included in the study will be a content analysis of print
media during the tenure of the Convention People’s Party (1961–1966) to
determine the depth of the impact of these institutions.
Pan-African-Education 297
Introduction—The Role of Education in Social

Transformation
As a carrier of society’s principles, values, history and culture,
education is responsible for shaping, directing and reinforcing a
community’s structure, leadership, government and inner workings. In
some African communities, chiefs, medicine men and women and elders
held higher levels of knowledge than the general population. The balance
of power and equality, in any given community or society, is dictated by
individuals who have access to higher education.
The ruling class typically controls the education system; as a result, the
content of the curriculum reflects its interests and allows a minority group
to dominate the power structure. While accessing education does not
necessarily guarantee that all students will hold leadership roles in
government, it does significantly increase the chances of the educated
rising to the top tier of the community or society. During the colonial
period, socio-political ideology reflected that of the colonial power. By
employing an ideological framework that strategically supported its
objectives, the regime used education to reinforce and advance its agenda.
Nkrumah discusses the role of ideology in his book Consciencism (1964)
in these terms:
The ideology of a society is total. It embraces the whole life of a people,
and manifests itself in their class-structure, history, literature, art, and
religion. It also acquires a philosophical statement. If an ideology is
integrative in intent, that is to say, if it seeks to introduce a certain order
which will unite the actions of millions towards specific and definite goals,
then its instruments can also be seen as instruments of social change.
(Nkrumah 1964, 59)
Described as a practice of freedom by Paulo Freire, education can be

used as a platform for humanization and/or dehumanization. As an
impetus for a paradigm shift towards liberated thought, formal and
informal education was a needed asset in pre- and post- independent states.
The Pan-African movement recognized this and used education to spread
knowledge to achieve its final objective which was the liberation and
unification of Africa and African people.
Education, as an instrument of culture, should be a direct reflection of
students’ backgrounds and aspirations. Culture, which embodies the
overwhelming majority of humanities interactions, leads the forward
movement of society. Sekou Toure, in “A Dialectical Approach to
Culture,” defines culture this way:
298 Chapter Fifteen
By culture, we understand all the material and immaterial works of art and
science, plus knowledge, manners, education, a mode of thought, behavior
and attitudes accumulated by the people both through and by virtue of their
struggle for freedom from the hold and dominion of nature; we also
include the result of their efforts to destroy the deviationist politico-social
systems of domination and exploitation through the productive process of
social life. (1969, 12)
Education, both formal and informal, serves as the primary venue for
disseminating and developing social standards, political agendas and
economic policies. The transfer of knowledge, norms, principles and
values also falls under the guise of education. In some cases, culture
disseminated through education can result in a dialectical relationship
between formal and informal education.
Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute

The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (KNIT), known originally
as the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science,
provided an avenue for Ghanaians, the CPP leadership and freedom
fighters to study Pan-Africanism and embrace an alternate way of thought
and practice. Officially established in 1961, the institute was the nucleus
of ideological education for the CPP and its leadership, who were
mandated to attend. The success of the new nation depended on the
unification of the CPP leadership and the support of the masses. The
central committee of the CPP coordinated KNIT’s functions as well as the
content of the curriculum as a result of its political nature and continental
significance. As a result, the Education Department and/or Education
Trust did not have jurisdiction over KNIT (Ministry of Information and
Broadcasting 1966, 44). Principally political, the purpose of the institute is
summarized as follows:
(1) To train Socialist Ghanaians capable of taking into their hands the
key posts in all sectors of the apparatus of the state and the
economy, and to take an active part in the Socialist People’s Party;
(2) To train African freedom fighters in the spirit of the African
revolution, Pan-Africanism and Socialism in such a way that when
they return to their homelands they will be better armed to take an
active part in liberating their countries from imperialism,
colonialism and neo-colonialism;
(3) To train Africans in the spirit of Pan-Africanism as a method of
making progress toward an African union;
(4) To train Africans in the spirit of Nkrumahism which is considered

the development of Marxism in conditions and circumstances
peculiar to Africa; and
(5) To train Africans in the spirit of proletarian internationalism (44).
Prior to the creation of the institute, the Bureau of African Affairs was
established in 1960. The Bureau worked in concert with the African
Affairs Centre and the African Affairs Secretariat. Ama Biney, in her book
The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah (2011), outlines the
evolution of these institutions: “The ramification for the first CIAS
(Conference of Independent African States) was Nkrumah’s subsequent
support for African liberation movements across the African continent
through the apparatus of the BAA (Bureau of African Affairs), and the
AAS (African Affairs Secretariat)” (144). Comprised of two sections, the
Positive Action Training Center and the Ideological Training Center, the
Institute offered courses for individuals interested in studying Pan-
Africanism, Socialism or Nkrumahism. The leading members of the CPP
attended courses at KNIT, as did general members of the CPP. It was
paramount that the leadership understood and embraced the party’s
ideology because of the volatile position of the government during the
transition to a Socialist state. This type of economic system was a dramatic
shift from the previous capitalist economy that operated in Ghana under
British colonialism. The transition would not be easy and it was vital that
all leading CPP members were intimately familiar with Socialism,
imperialism, capitalism and the road ahead. As such, members of the
central committee, ministers, regional commissioners and secretaries of
the subsidiary bodies of the party were required to attend a one-week
residential course at the institute conducted by Kwame Nkrumah. The
second group of students comprised the bureau of the party, the TUC,
ministerial secretaries, and corporation and board chairpersons. Finally,
the third group of participants comprised staff members of the regional
officers of the party, subsidiary organizations and other individuals who
may be considered significant (Ziorklue 1988, 38).
The rallying cry of Nkrumah and the CPP to liberate and unify Africa
became the mantra of the institute. As the only ideological institute on the
African continent, KNIT opened its doors to freedom fighters from any
liberation movement willing to study in Ghana. Additionally, it provided
monetary and political support for newly independent African nations.
Non-Ghanaian students were required to be affiliated with a political party
or organization fighting for independence. This was reinforced in the
300 Chapter Fifteen
prospectus published to educate potential students about the courses

available, tuition, room and board, and qualifications. It says:
(1) Admission into this institute is open to all students of popular

political parties of the various African countries, trade unions, youth,
women, and other political organizations which are struggling for national
independence as well as the unity of the entire African Continent.
(2) The students to be admitted must be sponsored by any of the
political organizations mentioned in paragraph (1) above.
(3) A prospectus containing list of subjects for study at the Institute
will be posted to the various organizations which will select and sponsor
the students. The students will be taught according to the subjects selected
as such (Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science, 6).
The principal and most noteworthy function of the Kwame Nkrumah

Ideological Institute was bequeathing Ghanaians and Africans with the
resources to choose an alternate ideology. However, the use of the institute
to provide ideological education and train the workforce also increased the
richness of the school and the diversity of students. The skills attained at
the institute were designed to equip students with the ability to be active
partners in the development of their community, nation and continent.
Workers could attend the institute for a short time to improve their skills
or take one of the two-year courses offered in political science, economics,
political institutions, African Studies, leadership, and many more.
In 1963, the institute had seventy-seven students enrolled in the two-
year diploma course taught by eight staff members (Folson 1963, 1).
Student enrolment increased each year, as did the expertise and number of
staff, particularly lecturers. Every year, the institute gained dramatic
increases and by 1965–6 it had 250 students enrolled for various courses.
In a memo to the principal secretary, the director, Kodwo Addison,
describes the diversity of the student population: “Many factors are
considered in the course of selection of students, such as party
membership, educational background, ability to pass the entrance
examination, experience in life, character, etc. Guided by the above
standard, we have tried to have students from all parts of the country”
(1965, 1).
In February 1966, the Institute had 546 employees. Students took
courses from twelve expatriate lecturers and nine Ghanaian lecturers
(Central Revenue Department 1966, 1). Expatriate lecturers were often
affiliated with institutes abroad and came to Ghana on appointment by the
Institute or the CPP. Students gained a greater sense of achievement and
empowerment, and were able to move forward professionally while
contributing to the development of their communities. With this incentive,

the government made an effort to increase the numbers at the institute.
Public officers who were admitted were given the option of attending
while still receiving full salary. This provision is outlined in a memo from
the office of the President dated January 14, 1963 to local government
offices, stating: “It has been decided that study-leave terms should be
granted to public officers who have been given admission to take courses
at the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science,
Winneba” (1). Government workers were released from their regular
duties and granted study-leave with pay while at the Institute. Freedom
Fighters, whose needs could not be met by the standard curriculum, were
offered specialized courses. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting
published a report titled “Nkrumah’s Subversion in Africa” (1966) which
outlined the courses offered for freedom fighters. The report stated that in
1962 the Institute housed forty-six graduates of the Mankrong Camp
training course. This course taught students how to handle weapons and
explosives (44).
The scope of the institute evolved and expanded from its original intent
as a result of popularity and demand. Its accomplishments, and the free
tuition and room and board, aided the expansion beyond the original plans.
The expansion served as a mechanism to provide more students with
ideological education in a non-traditional setting. Addison notified the
President in a letter on May 31, 1963 of the expansion of the duties of the
Institute:
A number of students have applied from other African States to study in
the Institute and a lot of them have been sponsored by friendly political
organizations of their respective countries. A number of orientation courses
must be held regularly for district commissioners and regional
commissioners in order to help them organize their areas on the basis of
Socialism. It has fallen to our lot in recent times to give orientation courses
to potential ambassadors also. (Addison 1963, 1)
The development of the institute provided vital political education in

Ghana and throughout Africa. The establishment of study groups
throughout the nation served as a mechanism to expose citizens to the
party’s ideology and Pan-Africanism. These groups were generally housed
at educational institutions. John K. Bonsu, the party attaché, was
responsible for organizing the study groups around Ghana. In
correspondences with the headmaster of the Keta School, Bonsu
reinforced the importance of creating study groups at corresponding
institutions.
302 Chapter Fifteen
Osagyefo, the General Secretary of the Party, Chairman of the Central

Committee and President of the Republic of Ghana, strongly advised that
special party branches without charters would be established in all
working places for the purpose of studying Nkrumahism and propagating
party decision, programmes, and policies, and that within educational
institutions party study groups shall be set up for the same purpose (Bonsu
1963, 1).
While these study groups were not operated by the institute, their
establishment reinforced the fact that the CPP utilized alternate avenues to
expose Ghanaians to Pan-African consciousness. According to Bonsu, the
study groups were also created to involve citizens with party decisions,
programmes and policies. The establishment of study groups absolves the
institute of the responsibility of providing political education to the entire
population. Rather, with this addition of study groups it was able to focus
on providing high-level political education and training for sustainable
development.
The institute and the study groups provided a large audience with
access to political education. Moreover, study groups engaged the
population in the political process and served as an apparatus to change the
political direction of the nation. However, the limited nature of this source
left a large percentage of the population without access to ideological
education. The Ministry of Education, on July 17, 1963, requested that all
secondary schools and higher institutions begin incorporating ideological
education into the curriculum. In response to this memo, the Conference of
Heads of Assisted Secondary Schools of Ghana pledged their willingness
to implement ideological education but sought further guidance: “As
already stated, the government’s programme of ideological education is a
new thing. We are therefore of the opinion that in order to make for the
effective teaching of the subject, some hints or guidance from the Ministry
as to the approach, methods of teaching and test of the subject would be
extremely helpful” (Conference of Heads of Assisted Secondary Schools
1963, 1).
Finally, the institute hosted conferences of independent states and
those individuals involved in the struggle against colonialism. Notably,
they hosted the Conference of Independent States in 1958, the All-African
Peoples Conference in 1958, and the Freedom Fighters Conference in
1962. Hosting various Pan-African meetings allowed Ghana to become the
centre of Pan-African activity on the continent, through which
incorporated it into their policies and extended assistance to struggling
African nations.
Ghana’s Young Pioneer Movement

Prior to independence, many youth organizations operated throughout
Ghana. The impact and direction varied greatly, depending on what entity
created the organization. There were the Boy Scouts and the Girl Guide
movements (from the United Kingdom), the Catholic Youth Organization
and the Boys Brigade, among others. Government-run youth organizations
such as the Boys Camp, operated by the Colonial Government, reinforced
a worldview through British cultural and historical lenses. In a memo
dated October 22, 1952, the purpose of the youth camp was described as:
It has been suggested that, in addition to associating the name of His late
Majesty with the new assembly buildings, there should also be a national
memorial to the late King in the form of a fund to be devoted to the
improvement of welfare and amenities for young people, which might take
the form of the encouragement and development of Boys’ Camps in the
Gold Coast. (Gold Coast Government File 1952, 1)
Primarily founded and facilitated by members of religious organizations

or the colonial government, youth clubs frequently embraced the parent
organization’s philosophy and ideology; they reinforced the status quo and
propagated the legitimacy of the colonial administration. M. N. Tetteh, in
The Ghana Young Pioneer Movement (1999), discusses the influences of
these organizations on Ghana and the need to create youth organizations
that benefited the nation:
There were the foreign and the religious youth organizations in the country
operating in the various schools, with their strong foreign support, doing
their own things in the country. It was needless, therefore, to point out the
need for a powerful youth organization that would mobilize the youth into
a disciplined, well educated, well informed, directed and prepared civil
body, which is able to defend their motherland at all times and under all
conditions without compromise. (59)
Prior to the establishment of the GYPM, the CPP created a youth

league comprised of children of current members. As a wing of the CPP,
the youth league stood for all of the objectives and aims of the larger party
since it was also intended as the source from which the party would be
replenished with a membership “already groomed ideologically and
culturally to maintain the progressive traditions of the CPP” (53). Much
like the Youth League, the Young Farmers League targeted a small sector
of the population. The list that follows contradicts that there was one
single purpose—dispelling the negative views on manual labour, training
young people, and increasing the number of farmers. However, these
304 Chapter Fifteen
organizations unintentionally excluded the overwhelming majority of

youth in the country. The formation of a multi-level nationwide youth
organization provided a much needed entity to organize and train
Ghanaian youth.
The GYPM was launched during Ghana’s first Republic Day
Celebration in 1961. It officially replaced the CPP Youth League and all
additional youth organizations in the country, both religious and
governmental. Prior to the creation of the GYPM, the CPP sent a
delegation of Ghanaian officials to several nations that had youth
organizations. The delegation included: (1) Minister of Information-Mr.
Kofi Baako; (2) Minister of the Interior-Krobo Edusei; (3) Professor
Abrahams, University of Ghana; (4) Mr. Kofi Batsa; (5) Mowbray Elliot;
and (6) Rev. J. A. Stephens. They visited East Germany, the USSR, the
United Kingdom, the United States and Israel to critically analyze the
youth organizations in these nations. Youth programs in Germany and the
USSR emerged as the most compatible models for Ghana. These two
programs were more appealing and directly in line with the new nation’s
future socially, politically and spiritually (Tetteh 1999, xii). The GYPM,
unlike other youth organizations, aimed to develop citizens loyal to the
African continent and masses. In a publication of the Ghana Young
Pioneers Regional Headquarters in Kumasi, Nkrumah said:
Place the young at the head of the awakened masses; you do not know
what strength, what magic influence the voices of the young have on the
crowd. You will find in them apostles of the new social order. But youth
lives on movement, grows great by example and emulation. Speak to them
of country, of glory, or great memories.
Most sectors of the GYPM released newsletters written by and about

members monthly to report to their activities to the community. In addition
to serving as a mechanism of information, the newspaper exposed Young
Pioneers to the power of print media under the assumption that this would
creat more trained reporters and editors for Ghana’s exploding field of
communication.
The GYPM operated in all regions of the nation originating in the
Western Region. Responsible for organizing the movements in each
region, two cadres were trained for six months prior to taking their posts.
Within two years the organization had branches all over the country with a
membership of 500,000, 190,000 of whom were female. Partnering with
local educational institutions, the GYPM chapters and curriculum were
integrated into the student’s educational experience. The curriculum also
included the introduction of auxiliary non-academic subjects that provided
a balance to the formal institution structure, that was an extension of the

British.
The marriage between the Ghana Young Pioneer Movement and the
formal school system legitimized the movement throughout the nation.
Each new branch was officially acknowledged through an inauguration,
often attended by local dignitaries, CPP representatives and the
community. This is demonstrated by the Asankrangwa Secondary School,
which in July 1964 invited Kofi Baako to be the keynote speaker at the
inauguration. Later that year, there was an inauguration of the Ghana
Young Pioneer Movement for three institutions: the Tarkwa Secondary,
the Royal Secretariat College and the Tarkwa School of Mines. The
secretary to the regional commissioner, in a memo to the ministry of
defence, described his request to speak at the event:
I have been approached by the regional organizer of the Ghana Young
Pioneers Sekondi to invite your minister to be the guest speaker at the
inauguration of the Pioneer Movement in the above institutions on
Saturday 31st October, 1964 at Tarkwa Pioneer Park at 2:00pm. (Ampaw
1964, 1)
The Young Pioneers received training in a wide array of subjects that

targeted their love and respect for Ghana and provided them with basic
skills. The training was well-rounded and included both ideological
subjects and hands-on, skills-based courses. These courses sought to
replenish the ranks of official government branches, local organizations
and small businesses. Several of the subjects focused on topics like
defence, culture, health care and communications. During the initial call
for the GYPM there were seven proposed key fields. Prime Minister
Nkrumah defined the scope of the GYPM in a memo on May 19, 1960
titled “The Young Pioneers.” In it, he stated:
About 300 school children, between the ages of 8 and 16, have formed the
nucleus of the Young Pioneers in Accra and it is intended to teach these
children elementary rudiments in: (1) Navel seamanship; (2) Flying; (3)
Airmanship; (4) Soldiering; (5) Tele-communications with particular
emphasis on Morse messages; (6) First Aid; and (7) Physical education. (1)
Instructors for these classes hailed from the ranks of the pre-existing
workforce in these particular segments. The GYPM appealed to members
of these branches and the general public for volunteer instructors, staff
members, coaches and leaders. This was evident in May 1962 when Z. B.
Shardow, the national organizer for the GYPM, requested that the ministry
of defence release service men to train the Young Pioneers.
306 Chapter Fifteen
Courses were offered in traditional professions like economics,

soldiering and first aid. However, the apprenticeship program also
provided opportunities for GYPM members to experience non-traditional
professions like transportation or telecommunications. In March 1962,
thirty-two members participated in an apprenticeship program with the
local municipal transport service in Cape Coast (Dadson 1962, 4). The
training of Young Pioneers alleviated dependence on a labour force
comprising a large number of expatriates. This planning could have
positioned Ghanaians to take full control of the nation in ten to twenty
years. Pioneers trained members in hard skills and also introduced
ideological education which was integrated with the curriculum.
Theoretically, these individuals would be intimately familiar with the
culture, history and people of Ghana and Africa, and would work to
improve the nation.
The movement was designed to accommodate young people ranging
from four to twenty-five. Pioneers were assigned to a cluster based on
their age and progressed through the association as they got older. The
African personality grouping catered to young people aged 4–8, the Young
Pioneers comprised individuals 9–16, and the Nkrumah Youth for
individuals 17–25. Activities planned at each Young Pioneer unit differed
based on age and level of ability and skill (Ghana, Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting 1966, 49).
Membership in the movement spanned the nation with chapters in all
regions. As a national organization, the Young Pioneers participated in
similar activities and operated from a uniform curriculum. However, at the
local level the GYPM implemented the curriculum based on their local
and cultural circumstances. The popularity of the movement mushroomed
within a year of its founding. The enrolment of new members and
retention of existing members soared in 1963, as reported in the Evening
News. The report identified that the GYPM had a membership of over one
million youths, with the largest percentage of members in the Ashanti
region. The graph below breaks out the numbers by region.
Ghana’s ability to successfully emerge from colonialism and
implement programs that would eventually be directed by Ghanaians
greatly depended on the success of the movement. The role of the youth,
within the fabric of the nation, heightened the importance of exposing
members of the Young Pioneers to Pan-African Consciousness. The
Young Pioneer code and pledge is an example of these efforts. It served as
a reminder to young people of the significant role they would play in
Ghana and Africa. The most significant line in the pledge is: “To be the
first ranks of men fighting for the total liberation and unity of Africa, for
Fig. 15.1.
Ghana Youngg Pioneer Moveement Member Statistics

(Accra Eveninng News, June 15, 1963, 2)
these are thee noble aims guiding the Ghana

G Youngg Pioneers” (143). This
not only reinnforced the Young
Y Pioneers’ commitmennt to Ghana but
b also to
Africa as a whole. The pledge was designed
d to seerve as an id
deological
foundation ffor the rest of their lives.
308 Chapter Fifteen
Young Pioneers participated in national events as representatives of

their movement and displayed their discipline, talent and determination.
The Young Pioneer National Band provided entertainment at events
throughout the nation. The movement was recognized and supported by
international youth wings such as those of Czechoslovakian and Bulgarian.
Czechoslovakia provided two instructors from their Union of Youth to
train the pioneers. The National Organizer of the GYPM crafted a memo
titled “Training of Ghana Young Pioneers for Mass Physical Training
Displays by Two Physical Training Instructors from Czechoslovakia” to
the minister, requesting approval of the exchange of instructors (Principle
Secretary 1964, 1). The movement was invited to participate in
international conferences targeting youth, including the Congress of the
Bulgarian Youth League held in Sofia, April 25, 1963, attended by Rev. J.
S. A. Stephens, the Chief Officer of the Kwame Nkrumah Training School
(Secretary to the Cabinet, Office of the President 1963, 1).
The GYPM participated in both Pan-African and international
conferences that focused on liberating the African continent and building
Socialism. The movement’s commitment to Pan-Africanism is evidenced
by the World Federation of Democratic Youth Executive meeting and the
Pan-African Youth Leaders’ seminar held April 15–24, 1965 in Accra.
The conference opened with the executive meeting of the World
Federation of Democratic Youth at the University of Ghana-Legon in the
Great Hall. The opening ceremony of the Pan-African Youth Leaders’
Seminar was held at the same location on April 20, 1965. The summit
ended on April 24, 1965 with a celebration of World Youth Day at Black
Star Square (Convention Peoples Party Greater Accra Regional Secretariat
1965, 1).
Print Media and the CPP

In September 1948, in the Gold Coast, Kwame Nkrumah established
the Evening News as a mechanism to engage Ghanaians and propel them
to become part of the independence movement. The Evening News
targeted all sectors of the population as potential readers and contributors
to the movement. By specifically recruiting youth, women and workers
into the ranks of the CPP, the associated paper reflected the views and
concerns of these sub-sections of the nation. Jennifer Hasty, in The Press
and Political Culture in Ghana (2005), articulates the role of the Evening
News in the years leading up to independence as follows:
As a mass medium, the press has long been associated with the popular
veranda boy politics of the African socialist tradition founded in Ghana by
Kwame Nkrumah. Breaking away from the more conservative and

conciliatory UGCC (United Gold Coast Convention) Party, the young
Nkrumah began to demand “Self-Government Now!” through his own
newspaper, shifting the heart of the nationalism movement from
professional bigmen to the “school leavers” and “veranda boys.” (117)
After independence, the Evening News became an official state-owned

newspaper, which seemingly served as a mode of transmitting political
education and Pan-African thought to Ghanaians and Africans alike. Mass
communication as a field was included in development plans created by
the CPP, from the Accelerated Development Plan in 1957 to the Seven-
Year Development Plan in 1964. The establishment of the Guinea Press
Ltd., funded by state and local businesses, was a milestone towards
establishing Ghana as a frontrunner in African mass communication. The
creation of an institution primarily responsible for promoting mass media
reinforced Ghana’s efforts to institutionalize mass communications during
Nkrumah’s tenure and beyond. The investment, both financially and
structurally, served as the foundation for mass media in Ghana today (33).
The use of mass media outlets in Ghana and Africa resulted in most
African nations having several newspapers operating simultaneously. The
mass of papers in Ghana, particularly pre- and post-independence,
heightened the consciousness of Ghanaians to embrace independence and
Pan-Africanism. Between 1957 and 1966, the Ghanaian Times, the
Evening News, the Sekondi Morning Telegraph, Ashanti Times and the
Daily Mail were operating and producing articles that promoted Pan-
Africanism.
These institutions were charged with exposing Ghanaians to local,
national and international news, African independence and Pan-
Africanism, and served as an agent of agitation for change. At a
symposium on Nkrumah at the Institute of African Studies at the
University of Ghana-Legon in 1991, P. A. V. Ansah argued that:
“Nkrumah saw the medium of print as an important tool for political
education and mobilization” (Ansah 1991, 90). Nkrumah and the CPP
were wholeheartedly committed to raising the political consciousness of
Ghanaians and used all means to achieve this goal. Naturally, they
gravitated towards resources that had the widest reach, and print media
notably proved to be that vehicle. As a form of informal education,
newspapers can reach all sectors of the population. Particularly in Ghana,
papers were multi-dimensional and catered to both the urban and rural
reader.
310 Chapter Fifteen
Analysis of Ghana’s Newspapers

This research was guided by a content analysis review of newspapers
published in Ghana, West Africa, in 1957–1966. The survey specifically
reviewed articles printed in the Daily Graphic and Evening News in the
month of February between 1961 and 1965. In total, 52 articles were
analyzed to arrive at the findings presented in this chapter. The Daily
Graphic yielded a total of twenty-six articles, or 50% of the total number
analyzed. The articles in the Evening News included news stories,
editorials, letters to the editor and daily columns. Editorials and letters to
the editor accounted for approximately 19.2% of the articles surveyed in
the Evening News. News stories were the most prevalent pieces surveyed,
making up 69.2%. Daily opinion columns accounted for 11.6% of the
articles examined.
The Daily Graphic sample comprised primarily news articles, with a
total of 84.6%. There were no editorials in the sample collected; however,
the sample did include opinion columns and special correspondent authors.
Both of these categories made up 7.7% of the reviewed sample. News
articles dominated the sample in both newspapers. However, in the Daily
Graphic there were a limited number of articles that could not be classified
as news articles. The Evening News sample, while still heavy with news
articles, had a small percentage of editorials and letters to the editor. News
articles comprised 76% of the total sample, with only 10% of the articles
in the editorial and daily column sections of the papers. Finally, the
remaining 4% of the sample of articles was found in the special
correspondent sections of both papers. The Evening News and Daily
Graphic were chosen as the primary target of this study primarily due to
their long-standing relationship with the liberation movement and the
previous government.
The data collected specifically addressed liberation movements
throughout the African continent and Pan-Africanism or African unity.
The content analysis was conducted based on three major criteria to
determine if Ghanaians were exposed to Pan-African consciousness
through print media. The following criteria were used to determine if the
articles et at least two following conditions: (1) What articles were written
concerning independence movements throughout the African continent;
and (2) Did the articles encourage readers to engage in the Pan-African
debate around continental unity?
Criterion 1—Independence Movements

The Daily Graphic sample of articles included 46% that
specifically addressed different independence movements throughout the
African continent. The content of the articles overwhelmingly supported
the independence of the nations in question. The coverage often spanned
editions over many months or years, depending on the pace of the
movement. The death of Patrice Lumumba and his comrades in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo gained international attention and
featured in two articles in 1961 and 1964. Both addressed independence in
the Congo, but also seemed to support Lumumba and his political party,
the Congolese National Movement (MNC). An article titled “Jack May
Ask for Lumumba’s Freedom,” printed in the February 7, 1961 Daily
Graphic, states:
Diplomats in Washington believe that agreement by the United States to a
Congolese Government including Mr. Patrice Lumumba, Prime Minister,
now held prisoner, would impress many African and Asian states which, in
the past, have been critical of U.S. policy and the Congo. (Daily Graphic
1961, 1)
The article outlined the importance of a union government in the

Congo, but also articulated the different parties in the Congo and the
varying positions. The article remained neutral and merely reported the
facts of the situation, and left the reader to make a decision about the
validity of the parties. In addition to this article about the Congo and
Patrice Lumumba in 1964—several years after his death—the Daily
Graphic printed an article about a probe taking place in the Congo to
uncover the truth about his death. This article, printed on February 6, 1964
on the front page of the paper with a picture of Lumumba was titled
“Lumumba—The Congo orders Probe.”
The majority of articles focused on independence movements and
openly supported independence from colonial regimes. Some of the
articles also reinforced the unity and liberation of the African continent.
Many leaders reiterated the sentiments of Kwame Nkrumah during the
March 6, 1957 independence speech when he emphasized the need for all
of Africa to be liberated. This was witnessed in several articles written
during the designated period. An example of this cross-continental
commitment to African unity and independence can be found in an article
in the Daily Graphic on February 2, 1963 titled “Banda Sworn in as
Premier,” in which the new Prime Minister was quoted as saying: “To me,
freedom and independence of this country is incomplete as long as
312 Chapter Fifteen
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) are not

free” (Daily Graphic 1963). The article said further that: “Dr. Banda
repeated previous warnings that civil servants, businessmen, missionaries
and other Europeans who were not prepared to accept African rule should
pack up and go” (Daily Graphic 1963).
The Daily Graphic pieces that highlighted independence movements in
African nations served as a mechanism to inform citizens of Ghana about
the parallel struggles taking place in other parts of Africa. The articles
could also be used to spark debate and discussion in Ghana about their role
in independence movements and supporting their comrades in other
African nations. This is indicated in the multitude of articles about Kenya,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Algeria and Uganda addressing specific
components of the internal independence struggles and offering
similarities between the struggles in Ghana and other parts of the African
world. The similarities in the stories of independence and the treatment of
the indigenous population could have been the spark that propelled
Ghanaians to continue to support Nkrumah and the CPP, as well as the
need for African unity.
The Evening News, much like the Daily Graphic, published articles
that specifically addressed National Liberation Movements throughout the
African continent. Although both papers printed articles about National
struggles, the Evening News sample comprised 19.2% of articles that
discussed national independence movements. The Evening News printed
significantly fewer articles on particular independence movements than the
Daily Graphic. This may be attributed to the Pan-African nature of the
Evening News and/or to the fact that the paper was established by Kwame
Nkrumah and the CPP, the primary proponents of Pan-Africanism. The
Evening News printed fewer articles on independence movements;
however, the articles that were published generally focused on both
national and continental independence. This was evidenced in an article
printed on February 6, 1964 titled “Algeria: We Choose Socialism and
Reject Capitalism,” in which the author discussed the choice of the
Algerian people to operate from a Socialist economic system. The article
states:
Capitalism, someone would tell us, has enabled the development of
Western European countries. It is true, but this development has been slow
and has only been possible at the price of the sacrifice the worst ill-
provided for classes made. Whereas eight years of war as well as the
contacts with the modes of modern life encouraged us to reject this
slowness and unfair distribution of the burden of development henceforth
incompatible with this conscience of our people. (Evening News 1963)
The article addressed the decision of the Algerian People to practice

Socialism and reject capitalism, and reinforced the position taken by
Nkrumah and the CPP on Socialism. It did not overtly address the
connection between Ghana and Algeria and the mutual desires to arrive at
a Socialist state. It did, however, provide an example of an African nation
much like Ghana that made the concrete decision to follow the Socialist
path. These types of articles reinforced the information presented to the
citizens regarding the need to embrace Socialism.
Similar to the Daily Graphic, the additional pieces highlighted specific
milestones and key events in the struggles reported. For example, on
February 7, 1963 the Evening News reported that Dr Banda took the oath
of office in a short piece highlighting the transfer of power and the victory
in Nyasaland (later, Malawi). Additional pieces were found in the sample
that addressed peace in the Congo and the Angolan struggle for
independence. These articles reported the facts of the movements based on
the respective areas and left the reader to draw the connection between
them and Ghana.
The sheer number of articles written about different independence
movements throughout the African continent reinforced the connection
between Ghana and the rest of the continent. More importantly, these
articles had the potential to spark the interest of Ghanaians in the
independence struggles of other nations. While the study did not
specifically address this impact, it can be assumed that some of the readers
identified with the struggles throughout Africa. Other citizens may have
committed to participating in anti-colonial movements and/or supporting
freedom fighters in Ghana from some of these nations.
Criterion 2—Pan-Africanism
The Evening News, during the research period, contained 57.7%
articles whose content included African Unity, Pan-Africanism, the All-
African Conference series and/or a unified government. Some of these
articles directly called on Ghanaians and Africans alike to embrace Pan-
Africanism. The conference of African Foreign Ministers held in Lagos,
Nigeria was covered by the Evening News on February 28, 1964. The
newspaper used the opportunity to cover a key political conference and to
infuse questions or comments about the merits of Pan-Africanism. The
sheer number of conferences in Ghana between 1957 and 1966 ensured
that regular readers were exposed to some type of Pan-African thought
regularly.
314 Chapter Fifteen
On February 10, 1965 the Evening News covered the meeting of the
African Trade Unionists who joined the ranks of political institutions that
embraced Pan-Africanism at the continental level. The article reported on
the important role of the African trade union in realizing African Unity. It
specifically discussed the decisive role of the rank-and-file of the trade
union movement. The piece addressed the need for unionists to understand
and have faith in the continental liberation and unity. The African People’s
Conference, reported on in the Evening News on February 26, 1964, also
called on African people to unite. The catchy and thought-provoking title
“People of Africa, Unite: You have nothing to lose but your chains”
challenged readers to discuss their role in African Unity. The piece called
on all people of African descent to unite, and since it was published in
Ghana it was also pleading with Ghanaians and Africans, generally, to
embrace African unity.
The Evening News also ran pieces that incorporated the call for African
unity from around the globe. Julius Nyerere, quoted in an article on
February 1, 1963, agreed that African unity was a necessary step to
achieving independence. It stated: “President Julius Nyerere of
Tanganyika appealed here yesterday for African unity and said boundaries
in Africa were ethnological and geographical nonsense” (Evening News,
1963, 9).
In addition to reporting on the importance of continental-wide unity,
the Evening News also ran articles that reported on the progress of small
acts of unity. The Ghana-Togo Union, covered in great detail in the
Evening News, served as a small step to achieving Pan-Africanism.
Another example of this reporting was an article printed in the “African
Revolution Today” section of the paper that addressed the Niger and Mali
Move for Unity. It discussed the progress of the movement but also
informed the public of the benefits of this union.
Editorials and letters to the editor were also key sections of the
Evening News. Many of the editorials examined and supported unity and
the road that Ghana took to African unity. Some pledged support for the
CPP and the work in Ghana. In a regular column called “Through African
Eyes,” a writer from Sierra Leone praised the work being done and asked
for copies of the Evening News to continue to read the paper:
It is obvious that if Ghana fails, no matter how many African states
become independent, they also will fail. But it is well-known to all Pan-
Africanists and even within the corroding ranks of the imperialists
themselves that so long as the seven million souls of Ghana stand
unflinchingly by the Redeemer of Africa, Ghana will never fail Africa.
(Evening News, February 27, 1963, 2)
The Evening News also used imagery to expose Ghanaians to Pan-

Africanism. Many of the pictures or illustrations that could be interpreted
as having a connection to African Unity generally called on the people of
Africa to react. The pictures below represent the call for Pan-African
Unity and for African people to liberate themselves from colonialism.
The picture of Nkrumah reinforces the importance of the people’s role
and African women in the liberation struggle. These pictures targeted the
entire population and do not require significant levels of literacy to be
understood. The call for unity in both reminded ordinary Ghanaians that
they had a key role to play in achieving Pan-African unity. Using multiple
ways to get the message across ensured that the Evening News and CPP
would be able to reach more people.
The Daily Graphic printed far fewer articles that specifically addressed
African unity. The total sample for the Daily Graphic contained 15.3% of
articles that directly discussed Pan-Africanism. While the paper did not
contain a large number of articles on Pan-Africanism, the few that were
printed focused on the day-to-day practice. For example, on February 23,
1963 an article was printed that supported the creation of an African
Common Market that could strengthen trade development and improve the
lives of Africans.
Unlike the Evening News, the Daily Graphic focused on informing the
public about independence movements throughout the African continent.
While these movements directly linked to African unity, they did not
explicitly draw that connection. However, the Evening News printed more
articles that were thought-provoking and may have engaged readers to
examine their role and responsibility in achieving African unity. Both the
Evening News and Daily Graphic served as vehicles to expose Ghanaians
to Pan-African consciousness. The method, style and content of the
articles differed, but the general sentiment of keeping the community at
large informed and engaged was consistent. While it is difficult to
determine if the articles raised the consciousness of Ghanaians between
1957 and 1966, it is clear that readers were exposed to Pan-African
consciousness during this time via the print media.
316 Chapter Fifteen
F
Fig. 15.2. Thee battle against neo-colonialism

m, subversion a nd exploitation
n (Evening
News, Feb 100, 1964, 3).
Fig. 15.3. Afrrica! Africa!

Conclusion
Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party in Ghana from 1951 to
1966 created traditional and non-traditional informal educational
institutions to expose Ghanaians and Africans alike to Pan-African
consciousness. The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, The Ghana
Young Pioneer Movement and the print media were among the institutions
that served as a conduit to provide Pan-African education throughout the
nation and continent. Targeting the CPP leadership and policy makers, the
KNIT provided the curriculum needed to run and manage a newly
independent African Socialist state. The institute expanded its reach to
include freedom fighters from sister nations who were in the throes of
liberation struggles. Reinforcing the call of Pan-Africanism, this approach
strengthened the Ghanaian state by creating allies on the continent and
highlighting the notion that colonialism anywhere meant colonialism
everywhere. The institute elevated the struggle for independence from a
micro-nationalist slant to a continental approach.
The Ghana Young Pioneer Movement targeted the next generation of
Ghanaians who would eventually take on positions in the government and
in educational institutions as community leaders, as well as many other
development positions in the country. The GYPM provided both political
education and skill-based training to prepare the future generation.
Creating a milieu that embraced Pan-Africanism throughout the country
appeared to promote a sense of empowerment among members of the
movement. At its peak, the movement had more than one million members
who were exposed to some sort of Pan-African education. Encouraged to
embrace Pan-Africanism, the youth membership could have greatly
impacted the nation and continent.
The print media was used as a medium to propagate the elements of
Pan-Africanism for the benefit of the people of Ghana and Africa. While
this study did not address the impact of print media, it is safe to say that
merely being exposed to Pan-African articles on the independence
movement and illustrations about Pan-Africanism encouraged Ghanaians
to become part of the Pan-African movement.
The creation of institutions such as the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological
Institute exposed Africans to Pan-Africanism and provided much needed
information about the political process. This information could be the
foundation for individuals to make independent and informed decisions
about the economy, the political process and social institutions. Kwame
Nkrumah promoted the idea that Pan-Africanism needed to be endorsed in
every country while creating local and continental Pan-African
318 Chapter Fifteen
associations. The future and success of the Pan-African movement are

contingent upon African-centred education that aims to expose Africans to
Pan-African consciousness. Transforming the collective consciousness of
the masses of African people and providing skills-based training can serve
as a mechanism to prop up the Pan-African movement and support
continental development.
References
Newspapers
Daily Graphic
—. February 1, 1961: Liberia Will Lodge Protest
—. February 1, 1961: Jack May Ask for Lumumba Freedom
—. February 17, 1961: Swaziland Prepares to Show Her Neighbors the
Right Way
—. February 1, 1962: Angola: Portugal Told to Hasten Reforms
—. February 22, 1962: Kenya on the Brink
—. February 27, 1962: Kaunda Calls for 6-month Strike
—. February 2, 1963: Banda Sworn in as Premier
—. February 10, 1963: Algeria: De Gaulle Will Keep His Word
—. February 13, 1963: Africa for Africans, Swaziland Will Be Free
—. February 15, 1963: Algeria, Tunisia Reconcile
—. February 23, 1963: Set Up African Common Market—UN Expert
—. February 26, 1963: Big Talks in Accra
—. February 27, 1963: South Africa: Profits From Gold and Poverty
—. February 27, 1963: Coming Clash in South Africa
—. February 1, 1964: Osagyefo is Given Full Support
—. February 4, 1964: Nyerere Seeks More Powers for Courts
—. February 7, 1964: Imperialist Intrigues Can’t Deter African Progress
—. February 10, 1964: Legon and the Revolution
—. February 13, 1964: Algerian Peace Talks Begin in Secret
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—. February 20, 1964: Peace Men Leave for Addis Ababa
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—. February 10, 1965: Today’s Meeting of African Trade Unionists
—. February 13, 1965: Neo-colonist Propaganda Cannot Divide Us:
Enemies of African Unity Will Fail
—. February 19, 1965: Gambia Achieves Freedom on February 18
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Africa's Many Divides and Africa's Future - Charles Quist-Adade

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Africa’s Many Divides

and Africa’s Future

Pursuing Nkrumah’s Vision

Charles Quist-Adade and Vincent Dodoo

Edited by Charles Quist-Adade and Vincent Dodoo

This book first published 2015

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Copyright © 2015 by Charles Quist-Adade, Vincent Dodoo and

ISBN (10): 1-4438-7662-3

Acknowledgements .................................................................................. viii

Welcome Addresses at the Opening Ceremony .......................................... 1

Keynote Address ......................................................................................... 5

Chapter One ............................................................................................... 14

Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 34

Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 51

Chapter Four .............................................................................................. 63

Chapter Five .............................................................................................. 85

Chapter Six ................................................................................................ 99

Chapter Seven.......................................................................................... 122

Chapter Eight ........................................................................................... 140

Chapter Nine............................................................................................ 155

Chapter Ten ............................................................................................. 169

Chapter Eleven ........................................................................................ 190

Chapter Twelve ....................................................................................... 217

Chapter Thirteen ...................................................................................... 254

Chapter Fourteen ..................................................................................... 268

Chapter Fifteen ........................................................................................ 296

Dr Charles Quist-Adade, Department of Sociology, KPU

DR. CHARLES QUIST-ADADE

From September 21–23, 2012, Kwantlen Polytechnic University (KPU)

development of their continent. A continental union government, Nkrumah

Nkrumah’s Continuing Relevance

Who Was Nkrumah?

His courageous and tactical (Gandhian passive non-resistance, or what

From Professor William Otoo Ellis,

From Dr Alan R. Davis,

From Professor Sam Afrane, Provost of the College of Art

Unfortunately, the policy objectives of many governments in Africa

From Dr Diane Purvey, Dean of Arts, KPU

from Pan-Africanism to Brazilian footballers. There is much on the table

PROFESSOR ATUKWEI OKAI

As a result of persistent misinformation and misinterpretation, the

nations’ development, and he values education and reading over

They observe that, of course, in the absence of any vision or ideology,

Governance and literature

The quest for self-recognition: the anti-palanquinity

liberation in which to see ourselves clearly in relationship to ourselves and

The Pan-Africanist Imperative

Nkrumah’s books have we read in order to ground our understandings

The universities on the continent themselves, he continues, are buffeted

PERSPECTIVES ON AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE:

(2) the consolidation of that freedom and independence;

Those comments came at a time when African independence was being

humanity according to an African worldview. All else, in these first few

has been a dialectical product of state-created nations often referred to as

The pre-colonial condition of African influences

Central Southern corridor civilizations show that Africa’s cultural

(1914–1945) destroyed a great deal of capital around the world. The

Ascendancy of the Pan-African Nationalists

The Pan-African nationalists organized a two-pronged approach toward

by “granting independence” to prevent the seizing of independence. That