G.R. No.

159507             April 19, 2006

ANICETO G. SALUDO, JR., Petitioner, 

vs.
AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and/or IAN T. FISH and DOMINIC
MASCRINAS, Respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before the Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr.
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated May 22, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69553. The assailed decision directed the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25 thereof, to vacate and set aside
its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 in Civil Case No. R-3172, and
enjoined the presiding judge2 thereof from conducting further proceedings in said case,
except to dismiss the complaint filed therewith on ground of improper venue. The petition
also seeks to reverse and set aside the appellate court's Resolution dated August 14,
2003 denying the motion for reconsideration of the assailed decision.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against the American Express
International, Inc. (AMEX) and/or its officers Ian T. Fish, Vice-President and Country
Manager, and Dominic Mascrinas, Head of Operations, with the RTC of Maasin City,
Southern Leyte. The case was raffled to Branch 25 of the said court.

The complaint alleged, inter alia, that plaintiff (herein petitioner Saludo) "is a Filipino
citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of
Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines." On the other hand, defendant (herein
respondent AMEX, Inc.) "is a corporation doing business in the Philippines and engaged
in providing credit and other credit facilities and allied services with office address at 4th
floor, ACE Building, Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City." The other defendants
(herein respondents Fish and Mascrinas) are officers of respondent AMEX, and may be
served with summons and other court processes at their office address.

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of petitioner
Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his daughter. The first
dishonor happened when petitioner Saludo's daughter used her supplementary credit
card to pay her purchases in the United States some time in April 2000. The second
dishonor occurred when petitioner Saludo used his principal credit card to pay his
account at the Hotel Okawa in Tokyo, Japan while he was there with other delegates
from the Philippines to attend the Congressional Recognition in honor of Mr. Hiroshi
Tanaka.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted from
respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure to pay
its balance covering the period of March 2000. Petitioner Saludo denied having received
the corresponding statement of account. Further, he was allegedly wrongfully charged for
late payment in June 2000. Subsequently, his credit card and its supplementary cards
were canceled by respondents on July 20, 2000.

Petitioner Saludo claimed that he suffered great inconvenience, wounded feelings,

mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation and besmirched political and professional
standing as a result of respondents' acts which were committed in gross and evident bad
faith, and in wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. He thus prayed that respondents
be adjudged to pay him, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further,
they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue. On
the latter, respondents averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that
venue was improperly laid because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte. They
alleged that respondents were not residents of Southern Leyte. Moreover,
notwithstanding the claim in his complaint, petitioner Saludo was not allegedly a resident
thereof as evidenced by the fact that his community tax certificate, which was presented
when he executed the complaint's verification and certification of non-forum shopping,
was issued at Pasay City. To buttress their contention, respondents pointed out that
petitioner Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the
said city. Respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint a quo.

Thereafter, respondents filed an Opposition to Ex-Parte Motion (to Set Case for Pre-Trial)
and Motion for Preliminary Hearing (on Affirmative Defense of Improper Venue) to which
petitioner Saludo filed his Comments and/or Objections to the Affirmative Defense of
Improper Venue. He asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte
was baseless and unfounded considering that he was the congressman of the lone
district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. He urged the court a quo to take
judicial notice of this particular fact. As a member of Congress, he possessed all the
qualifications prescribed by the Constitution including that of being a resident of his
district. He was also a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Southern Leyte
Chapter, and has been such ever since his admission to the Bar. His community tax
certificate was issued at Pasay City only because he has an office thereat and the office
messenger obtained the same in the said city. In any event, the community tax certificate
is not determinative of one's residence.
In the Order dated September 10, 2001, the court a quo denied the affirmative defenses
interposed by respondents. It found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against respondents. The court a quo likewise denied
respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid. It reasoned, thus:

x x x [T]he fact alone that the plaintiff at the time he filed the complaint was and still is,
the incumbent Congressman of the Lone District of Southern Leyte with residence at
Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, is enough to dispell any and all doubts about his
actual residence. As a high-ranking government official of the province, his residence
there can be taken judicial notice of. As such his personal, actual and physical habitation
or his actual residence or place of abode can never be in some other place but in Ichon,
Macrohon, Southern Leyte. It is correctly stated by the plaintiff, citing the case of Core v.
Core, 100 Phil. 321 that, "residence, for purposes of fixing venue of an action, is
synonymous with domicile. This is defined as the permanent home, the place to which,
whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on the
facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent. A person can have but
one domicile at a time. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose
at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. Venue could be at place of
his residence. (Masa v. Mison, 200 SCRA 715 [1991])3

Respondents sought the reconsideration thereof but the court a quo denied the same in
the Order dated January 2, 2002. They then filed with the appellate court a petition for
certiorari and prohibition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding
judge of the court a quo in issuing the September 10, 2001 and January 2, 2002 Orders.
Upon respondents' posting of a bond, the appellate court issued on March 14, 2002 a
temporary restraining order which enjoined the presiding judge of the court a quo from
conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. R-3172.

On May 22, 2003, the appellate court rendered the assailed decision granting
respondents' petition for certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid. It directed
the court a quo to vacate and set aside its Orders dated September 10, 2001 and
January 2, 2002, and enjoined the presiding judge thereof from further proceeding in the
case, except to dismiss the complaint.

The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against
respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on
venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced
and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.

Venue was improperly laid in the court a quo, according to the appellate court, because
not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically, it declared that
petitioner Saludo was not a resident thereof. The appellate court pronounced that, for
purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.4

The appellate court quoted the following discussion in Koh v. Court of Appeals 5 where the
Court distinguished the terms "residence" and "domicile" in this wise:

x x x [T]he term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term
residence, for it is [an] established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the
relatively more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay
of a person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those
cases where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in
cases involving stateless persons.

xxxx

"There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a

place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not
by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining
will constitute domicile."6 (Italicized for emphasis)

In holding that petitioner Saludo is not a resident of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, the
appellate court referred to his community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint's
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, which was issued at Pasay City.
Similarly, it referred to the same community tax certificate, as indicated in his complaint
for deportation filed against respondents Fish and Mascrinas. Under Republic Act No.
7160,7 the community tax certificate shall be paid in the place of residence of the
individual, or in the place where the principal office of the juridical entity is located. 8 It also
pointed out that petitioner Saludo's law office, which was also representing him in the
present case, is in Pasay City. The foregoing circumstances were considered by the
appellate court as judicial admissions of petitioner Saludo which are conclusive upon him
and no longer required proof.

The appellate court chided the court a quo for stating that as incumbent congressman of
the lone district of Southern Leyte, judicial notice could be taken of the fact of petitioner
Saludo's residence thereat. No evidence had yet been adduced that petitioner Saludo
was then the congressman of Southern Leyte and actual resident of Ichon, Macrohon of
the said province.
The appellate court held that, based on his complaint, petitioner Saludo was actually
residing in Pasay City. It faulted him for filing his complaint with the court a quo when the
said venue is inconvenient to the parties to the case. It opined that under the rules, the
possible choices of venue are Pasay City or Makati City, or any place in the National
Capital Judicial Region, at the option of petitioner Saludo.

It stressed that while the choice of venue is given to plaintiff, said choice is not left to his
caprice and cannot deprive a defendant of the rights conferred upon him by the Rules of
Court.9 Further, fundamental in the law governing venue of actions that the situs for
bringing real and personal civil actions is fixed by the rules to attain the greatest possible
convenience to the party litigants by taking into consideration the maximum accessibility
to them - i.e., to both plaintiff and defendant, not only to one or the other - of the courts of
justice.10

The appellate court concluded that the court a quo should have given due course to
respondents' affirmative defense of improper venue in order to avoid any suspicion that
petitioner Saludo's motive in filing his complaint with the court a quo was only to vex and
unduly inconvenience respondents or even to wield influence in the outcome of the case,
petitioner Saludo being a powerful and influential figure in the said province. The latter
circumstance could be regarded as a "specie of forum shopping" akin to that in Investors
Finance Corp. v. Ebarle11 where the Court mentioned that the filing of the civil action
before the court in Pagadian City "was a specie of forum shopping" considering that
plaintiff therein was an influential person in the locality.

The decretal portion of the assailed Decision dated May 22, 2003 of the appellate court
reads:

UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the challenged orders must be, as
they hereby are, VACATED and SET ASIDE and the respondent judge, or any one acting
in his place or stead, is instructed and enjoined to desist from further proceeding in the
case, except to dismiss it. The temporary restraining order earlier issued is hereby
converted into a writ of preliminary injunction, upon the posting this time by petitioners
[herein respondents], within five (5) days from receipt of this decision, of a bond in the
amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00), to answer for all damages that private
respondent [herein petitioner] may sustain by reason of the issuance of such injunction
should the Court finally decide that petitioners are not entitled thereto. Private
respondent, if he so minded, may refile his case for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City or Pasay City, or any of the Regional Trial Courts of the National
Capital Judicial Region. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner Saludo sought the reconsideration of the said decision but the appellate court,
in the Resolution dated August 14, 2003, denied his motion for reconsideration. Hence,
he filed the instant petition for review with the Court alleging that:

The Court of Appeals, (Special Fourth Division), in promulgating the afore-mentioned

Decision and Resolution, has decided a question of substance in a way probably not in
accord with law or with applicable decisions of this Honorable Court.

(a) the Court of Appeals erred in not taking judicial notice of the undisputed fact that
herein petitioner is the incumbent congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte and
as such, he is a residence (sic) of said district;

(b) the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the basis of improper venue
due to the alleged judicial admission of herein petitioner;

(c) the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint ignored applicable decisions of this
Honorable Court; and 1avvphil.net

(d) the Court of Appeals erred in deciding that herein petitioner violated the rules on
venue, and even speculated that herein petitioner's motive in filing the complaint in
Maasin City was only to vex the respondents.13

In gist, the sole substantive issue for the Court's resolution is whether the appellate court
committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo in
Civil Case No. R-3172 because not one of the parties, including petitioner Saludo, as
plaintiff therein, was a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of the complaint.

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is
a personal action. As such, it is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Courts
which reads:

SEC. 2. Venue of personal actions. - All other actions may be commenced and tried
where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he
may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but
not to plaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court.14 The rule
on venue, like other procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly
administration of justice, or the impartial and evenhanded determination of every action
and proceeding.15 The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is
either the place where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff
resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.16
Following this rule, petitioner Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint with the
court a quo which is in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his complaint that he
was a member of the House of Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon,
Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the rule.

However, the appellate court, adopting respondents' theory, made the finding that
petitioner Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his
complaint. It hinged the said finding mainly on the fact that petitioner Saludo's community
tax certificate, indicated in his complaint's verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, was issued at Pasay City. That his law office is in Pasay City was also taken
by the appellate court as negating petitioner Saludo's claim of residence in Southern
Leyte.

The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was not a
resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint, and consequently
holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. In Dangwa Transportation Co.,
Inc. v. Sarmiento,17 the Court had the occasion to explain at length the meaning of the
term "resides" for purposes of venue, thus:

In Koh v. Court of Appeals, we explained that the term "resides" as employed in the rule
on venue on personal actions filed with the courts of first instance means the place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as
distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when
absent, one has the intention of returning.

"It is fundamental in the law governing venue of actions (Rule 4 of the Rules of Court)
that the situs for bringing real and personal civil actions are fixed by the rules to attain the
greatest convenience possible to the parties-litigants by taking into consideration the
maximum accessibility to them of the courts of justice. It is, likewise, undeniable that the
term domicile is not exactly synonymous in legal contemplation with the term residence,
for it is an established principle in Conflict of Laws that domicile refers to the relatively
more permanent abode of a person while residence applies to a temporary stay of a
person in a given place. In fact, this distinction is very well emphasized in those cases
where the Domiciliary Theory must necessarily supplant the Nationality Theory in cases
involving stateless persons.

"This Court held in the case of Uytengsu v. Republic, 50 O.G. 4781, October, 1954,
reversing its previous stand in Larena v. Ferrer, 61 Phil. 36, and Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil.
645, that -

'There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a

place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have
but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous
places of residence. His place of residence generally is his place of domicile, but is not
by any means, necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining
will constitute domicile.' (Italicized for emphasis)

"We note that the law on venue in Courts of First Instance (Section 2, of Rule 4, Rules of
Court) in referring to the parties utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' and not 'is
domiciled,' thus:

'Sec. 2(b) Personal actions - All other actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any
of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.' (Italicized for emphasis)

"Applying the foregoing observation to the present case, We are fully convinced that
private respondent Coloma's protestations of domicile in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
based on his manifested intention to return there after the retirement of his wife from
government service to justify his bringing of an action for damages against petitioner in
the C.F.I. of Ilocos Norte, is entirely of no moment since what is of paramount importance
is where he actually resided or where he may be found at the time he brought the action,
to comply substantially with the requirements of Sec. 2(b) of Rule 4, Rules of Court, on
venue of personal actions." (Koh v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 304-305.)

The same construction of the word "resides" as used in Section 1, Rule 73, of the
Revised Rules of Court, was enunciated in Fule v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. L-
40502) and Fule v. Hon. Ernani C. Paño, et al. (G.R. No. L-42670), decided on
November 29, 1976. Thus, this Court, in the aforecited cases, stated:

"2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term 'resides' mean? Does it refer
to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down
the doctrinal rule that the term 'resides' connotes ex vi termini 'actual residence' as
distinguished from 'legal residence or domicile.' This term 'resides,' like the terms
'residing' and 'residence' is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purposes of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue
statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature -
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the
word 'domicile' still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms 'residence' and 'domicile' but
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term 'inhabitant.' In other words, 'resides' should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary."18

There is no dispute that petitioner Saludo was the congressman or the representative of
the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a
quo. Even the appellate court admits this fact as it states that "it may be conceded that
private respondent ever so often travels to Maasin City, Southern Leyte, because he is its
representative in the lower house."19

As a member of the House of Representatives, petitioner Saludo was correctly deemed

by the court a quo as possessing the requirements for the said position, 20 including that
he was then a resident of the district which he was representing, i.e., Southern Leyte.
Significantly, for purposes of election law, the term "residence" is synonymous with
"domicile," thus:

x x x [T]he Court held that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term
"residence," as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for
business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. x x x21

It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is
more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose,
the term "residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention."22When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1)
intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the
place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain,
i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for
the purposes of election law."23

On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is
adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily
presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."24

Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of

Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in
relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence
therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern
Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is
understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time."

Reliance by the appellate court on Koh v. Court of Appeals25 is misplaced. Contrary to its
holding,26 the facts of the present case are not similar to the facts therein. In Koh, the
complaint was filed with the Court of First Instance in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte by
plaintiff who admitted that he was a resident of Kamias, Quezon City. Save for the fact
that he grew up in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte and that he manifested the intent to return
there after retirement, plaintiff therein had not established that he was actually a resident
therein at the time of the filing of his complaint. Neither did he establish that he had his
domicile therein because although he manifested the intent to go back there after
retirement, the element of personal presence in that place was lacking. To reiterate,
domicile or residence, as the terms are taken as synonyms, imports "not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention."27

In contrast, petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of Southern Leyte

at the time of filing of his complaint with the court a quo. Absent any evidence to the
contrary, he is deemed to possess the qualifications for the said position, including that
he was a resident therein. And following the definition of the term "residence" for
purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to reside in
Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in
Southern Leyte, was sufficient for petitioner Saludo to be considered a resident therein
for purposes of venue.

The following ratiocination of the court a quo is apt:

Residence in civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in
a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a
city residence. (Quetulio v. Ruiz, S.C. Off. Gaz. 156, Commentaries and Jurisprudence in
Civil Law, Vol. 1, page 211, Tolentino). Residence is acquired by living in a place; on the
other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention
to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other place.

Thus, if a person lives with his family habitually in Quezon City, he would have his
domicile in Quezon City. If he also has a house for vacation purposes in the City of
Baguio, and another house in connection with his business in the City of Manila, he
would have residence in all three places (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
Civil Law, Vol. 1, Page 212, 1990 Edition) so that one[']s legal residence or domicile can
also be his actual, personal or physical residence or habitation or place of abode if he
stays there with intention to stay there permanently.

In the instant case, since plaintiff has a house in Makati City for the purpose of exercising
his profession or doing business and also a house in Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte,
for doing business and/or for election or political purposes where he also lives or stays
physically, personally and actually then he can have residences in these two places.
Because it would then be preposterous to acknowledge and recognize plaintiff Aniceto G.
Saludo, Jr. as congressman of Southern Leyte without also recognizing him as actually,
personally and physically residing thereat, when such residence is required by law.28

The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City
is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident
therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for
purposes of venue. A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at
any time, but he may have numerous places of residence.29

That petitioner Saludo was the congressman or representative of the lone district of
Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint was admitted as a fact by the
court a quo. In this connection, it consequently held that, as such, petitioner Saludo's
residence in Southern Leyte, the district he was the representing, could be taken judicial
notice of. The court a quo cannot be faulted for doing so because courts are allowed "to
take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions." 30 Courts are likewise bound to take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the law in force in the Philippines, 31 including its Constitution.

The concept of "facts of common knowledge" in the context of judicial notice has been
explained as those facts that are "so commonly known in the community as to make it
unprofitable to require proof, and so certainly known to as to make it indisputable among
reasonable men." 32 Moreover, "though usually facts of 'common knowledge' will be
generally known throughout the country, it is sufficient as a basis for judicial notice that
they be known in the local community where the trial court sits." 33 Certainly, the fact of
petitioner Saludo being the duly elected representative of Southern Leyte at the time
could be properly taken judicial notice of by the court a quo, the same being a matter of
common knowledge in the community where it sits.

Further, petitioner Saludo's residence in Southern Leyte could likewise be properly taken
judicial notice of by the court a quo. It is bound to know that, under the Constitution, one
of the qualifications of a congressman or representative to the House of Representatives
is having a residence in the district in which he shall be elected.
In fine, petitioner Saludo's act of filing his complaint with the court a quo cannot be
characterized as a "specie of forum-shopping" or capricious on his part because, under
the rules, as plaintiff, he is precisely given this option. 

Finally, respondents' claim that the instant petition for review was not properly verified by
petitioner Saludo deserves scant consideration.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court reads:

Sec. 4. Verification. - Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule,

pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records.

A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and

belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading. 

Petitioner Saludo's verification and certification of non-forum shopping states that he has
"read the contents thereof [referring to the petition] and the same are true and correct of
my own personal knowledge and belief and on the basis of the records at hand." The
same clearly constitutes substantial compliance with the above requirements of the Rules
of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May
22, 2003 and Resolution dated August 14, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 69553 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated September 10, 2001 and
January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Maasin City, Southern Leyte, Branch 25
thereof, in Civil Case No. R-3172 are REINSTATED. 

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125901            March 8, 2001

EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:
For review is the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 6, 1996, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 39056, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court in a petition for habeas
corpus of Edgardo Tijing, Jr., allegedly the child of petitioners.

Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The youngest is Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse
Lourdes Vasquez in Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman
of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a resident of Tondo, Manila.

According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an
urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked
Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr.,
under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while
Bienvenida was doing laundry.

When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone.
Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to Angelita's house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find
them there. Angelita's maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and
told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelita's house after three days,
only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained
to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for
assistance.

Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could not imagine how her spouse
would react to the disappearance of their youngest child and this made her problem even
more serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband reconciled and
together, this time, they looked for their missing son in other places. Notwithstanding their
serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts.

Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of
Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were
lying in state in Hagonoy, Bulacan.

Bienvenida lost no time in going to Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son
Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed
out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named
John Thomas Lopez.1 She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her
demand to do so.

Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court in order
to recover their son. To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two witnesses,
namely, Lourdes Vasquez and Benjamin Lopez. The first witness, Vasquez, testified that
she assisted in the delivery of one Edgardo Tijing, Jr. on April 27, 1989 at her clinic in
Sta. Ana, Manila. She supported her testimony with her clinical records. 2 The second
witness, Benjamin Lopez, declared that his brother, the late Tomas Lopez, could not
have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that
Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca causing
him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further
declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son
and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children.3

For her part, Angelita claimed that she is the natural mother of the child. She asserts that
at age 42, she gave birth to John Thomas Lopez on April 27, 1989, at the clinic of
midwife Zosima Panganiban in Singalong, Manila. She added, though, that she has two
other children with her real husband, Angel Sanchez. 4 She said the birth of John Thomas
was registered by her common-law husband, Tomas Lopez, with the local civil registrar
of Manila on August 4, 1989.

On March 10, 1995, the trial court concluded that since Angelita and her common-law
husband could not have children, the alleged birth of John Thomas Lopez is an
impossibility.5 The trial court also held that the minor and Bienvenida showed strong
facial similarity. Accordingly, it ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are
one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners. The trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING

the petition for Habeas Corpus, as such, respondent Angelita Diamante is ordered to
immediately release from her personal custody minor John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn
him over and/or surrender his person to petitioners, Spouses Edgardo A. Tijing and
Bienvenida R. Tijing, immediately upon receipt hereof.

Branch Sheriff of this Court, Carlos Bajar, is hereby commanded to implement the
decision of this Court by assisting herein petitioners in the recovery of the person of their
minor son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., the same person as John Thomas D. Lopez.

SO ORDERED.6

Angelita seasonably filed her notice of appeal.7 Nonetheless, on August 3, 1994, the

sheriff implemented the order of the trial court by taking custody of the minor. In his
report, the sheriff stated that Angelita peacefully surrendered the minor and he turned
over the custody of said child to petitioner Edgardo Tijing.8

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial
court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus. In
its view, the evidence adduced by Bienvenida was not sufficient to establish that she was
the mother of the minor. It ruled that the lower court erred in declaring that Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person, 9 and disposed of the
case, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower court dated March 10, 1995 is
hereby REVERSED, and a new one entered dismissing the petition in Spec. Proc.
No. 94-71606, and directing the custody of the minor John Thomas Lopez to be returned
to respondent Angelita Diamante, said minor having been under the care of said
respondent at the time of the filing of the petition herein.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioners sought reconsideration of the abovequoted decision which was denied.

Hence, the instant petition alleging:

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR

WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE PETITIONERS' ACTION FOR HABEAS CORPUS IS
MERELY SECONDARY TO THE QUESTION OF FILIATION THAT THE PETITIONERS
HAD LIKEWISE PROVEN.

II

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE

DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
"HABEAS CORPUS" AND DIRECTING THAT THE CUSTODY OF THE MINOR JOHN
THOMAS LOPEZ WHO WAS PROVEN TO THE SAME MINOR AS EDGARDO R.
TIJING, JR., BE RETURNED TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.11

In our view, the crucial issues for resolution are the following:

(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?

(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same
person and is the son of petitioners?

We shall discuss the two issues together since they are closely related.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by

which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto.12 Thus, it is the proper legal remedy to enable
parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third
person of his own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors,
the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for
the availability of the writ as a remedy. Rather, it is prosecuted for the purpose of
determining the right of custody over a child. 13 It must be stressed too that in habeas
corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumptions including those as to identity of the person.
In this case, the minor's identity is crucial in determining the propriety of the writ sought.
Thus, it must be resolved first whether the Edgardo Tijing, Jr., claimed by Bienvenida to
be her son, is the same minor named John Thomas Lopez, whom Angelita insists to be
her offspring. We must first determine who between Bienvenida and Angelita is the
minor's biological mother. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two
persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one
and the same.14 Petitioners must convincingly establish that the minor in whose behalf
the application for the writ is made is the person upon whom they have rightful custody. If
there is doubt on the identity of the minor in whose behalf the application for the writ is
made, petitioners cannot invoke with certainty their right of custody over the said minor.

True, it is not the function of this Court to examine and evaluate the probative value of all
evidence presented to the concerned tribunal which formed the basis of its impugned
decision, resolution or order.15 But since the conclusions of the Court of Appeals
contradict those of the trial court, this Court may scrutinize the evidence on the record to
determine which findings should be preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary
facts.

A close scrutiny of the records of this case reveals that the evidence presented by
Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son,
Edgardo Tijing, Jr.

First, there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. From her very lips,
she admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation at the
Martinez Hospital in 1970, before she lived with Tomas Lopez without the benefit of
marriage in 1974. Assuming she had that ligation removed in 1978, as she claimed, she
offered no evidence she gave birth to a child between 1978 to 1988 or for a period of ten
years. The midwife who allegedly delivered the child was not presented in court. No
clinical records, log book or discharge order from the clinic were ever submitted.

Second, there is strong evidence which directly proves that Tomas Lopez is no longer
capable of siring a son. Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was
sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez
was only an adopted son. Moreover, Tomas Lopez and his legal wife, Maria Rapatan
Lopez, had no children after almost fifteen years together. Though Tomas Lopez had
lived with private respondent for fourteen years, they also bore no offspring.

Third, we find unusual the fact that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed
by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife and on August 4, 1989, four months after the
alleged birth of the child. Under the law, the attending physician or midwife in attendance
at birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or
midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. The certificate must be filed with the
local civil registrar within thirty days after the birth.16 Significantly, the birth certificate of
the child stated Tomas Lopez and private respondent were legally married on October
31, 1974, in Hagonoy, Bulacan, which is false because even private respondent had
admitted she is a "common-law wife".17 This false entry puts to doubt the other data in
said birth certificate.

Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were
both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head
shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material
evidence to establish parentage.18 Needless to stress, the trial court's conclusion should
be given high respect, it having had the opportunity to observe the physical appearances
of the minor and petitioner concerned.

Fifth, Lourdes Vasquez testified that she assisted in Bienvenida's giving birth to Edgardo
Tijing, Jr., at her clinic. Unlike private respondent, she presented clinical records
consisting of a log book, discharge order and the signatures of petitioners.

All these considered, we are constrained to rule that subject minor is indeed the son of
petitioners. The writ of habeas corpus is proper to regain custody of said child.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test19 for identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. 20 Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge.21 Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule
on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results
of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said
result is to deny progress.22 Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA
testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage
and identity issues.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed DECISION of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED. Costs
against the private respondent.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-11-2979               November 18, 2014
[formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3352-P]

ELLA M. BARTOLOME, Complainant, 
vs.
ROSALIE B. MARANAN, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 20, IMUS, CAVITE, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This administrative matter started through the sworn affidavit complaint  in the vernacular,
1

dated December 16, 2009, that Ella M. Bartolome (complainant) filed against Rosalie B.
Maranan [respondent, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20,
Imus, Cavite], charging her with extortion, graft and corruption, gross misconduct and
conduct unbecoming of a court employee.

The complainant alleged that the respondent asked money from her in the amount of
₱200,000.00, which was later reduced to ₱160,000.00, to facilitate the filing of her case
for annulment of marriage. She further alleged that the respondent undertook to have the
case decided in her favor without the need of court appearances during the proceedings
of the case. For a clear and complete picture of the accusations against the respondent,
we quote verbatim the pertinent portions of the complainant’s narration of the incidents
that gave rise to the filing of the present administrative complaint –

xxxx

2. Na noong October 21, 2009 nakilala ko si ROSALIE MARANAN na

isang stenographer sa Regional Trial Court ng Imus, Cavite. Nasabihan
ko siya ng aking kagustuhan na magsampa ng annulment of marriage
case. Agad niya akong inalok at pinangakuan na kaya niyang ipasok ang
aking annulment case sa RTC, Br. 20, Imus, Cavite kung saan siya
nagtratrabaho. Noong una ang hinihingi niya sa akin ay halagang TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (₱200,000.00) pero humingi ako
sakanya ng discount at pumayag siya sa ONE HUNDRED SIXTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱160,000.00). Ako po ay naengganyo na
magtiwala sa kanya dahil nangako siya na siya na ang bahala sa lahat.
May kausap na daw siyang abogado na pipirma sa petisyon koat di ko na
daw kailangan pang umappear sa korte. Sinabi niya na malakas daw siya
sa judge at sa fiscal at siya lang daw ang pinapayagan na magpasok ng
mga aaregluhin na kaso sa kanilang korte. Sinabi niya din na kasama na
sa ₱160,000.00 ang para sa judge at sa fiscal kaya siguradong
maaaprubahan ang aking annulment case sa mabilis na panahon.
 Kasama po ng Affidavit Complaint na ito ang transcript at ang SIM
Carday aking ipadadala kapag ako ay makasigurado na ang Korte
Suprema ay poprotektahan ang mga ebidensya laban kay MARANAN
sapagkat rito lahat nakatagon (sic) ang mga text messages at nakarecord
lahat ng calls nitong si ROSALIE MARANAN sa akin na nagpapatunay ng
panghihingi niya sa akin ng pera at pangako na aaregluhin niya ang aking
annulment of marriage case. Ang cellphone number po na nagaappear
dito sa SIM ay kay ROSALINA MARANAN, ang numero niya
ay 09175775982. Maaaring nagpalit na ng numero ang inirereklamo ko
kung kaya’t maganda rin na ipag-utos ang pag-alam ng detalye mula sa
Globe Telecoms kung saan post-paid subscriber ang may-ari ng numero
na iyan. [Emphasis supplied]

To put an end to the respondent’s extortion activities, the complainant decided to report
the matter to the police authorities. During the entrapment operation conducted by police
officers of Imus Police Station, the respondent was apprehended inside the premises of
the RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, in the act of receiving the money from the
complainant.

In support of her allegations, the complainant attached to her affidavit-complaint the

transcribed electronic communications (text messages) between her and the
respondent;  a copy of an Electronic Psychiatric History form given to her by the
2

respondent for her to accomplish in filing the petition for annulment of marriage;  a copy
3

of the Imus Police Station Blotter showing that the respondent was apprehended during
the entrapment operation conducted by police officers of Imus Police Station on
November 11, 2009 at 2:40 p.m.;  and a versatile compact disc (VCD) containing the
4

video taken during the entrapment operation conducted against the respondent. 5

The Court, in a 1st Indorsement  dated March 19, 2010, required the respondent to
6

comment onthe complaint against her.

In her Comment dated May 27, 2010,  the respondent denied the accusations against
7

her. She alleged her belief that Bartolome is a fictitious name as the affidavit-complaint
does not indicate the complainant’s exact address. She asserted that her detention at
Imus Police Station does not prove her culpability since no actual criminal charges were
filed against her. She claimed that the lapse of six (6) months from the time of the alleged
incident indicates that the complaint is pure and simple harassment orchestrated by a
lawyer or litigant who has a grudge against her and who wants to publiclybesmirch her
reputation. In support of her defense, the respondent mentioned that even Judge
Fernando L. Felicen (Judge Felicen), Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite
interceded for her release from detention.

On July 29, 2010, the complainant sent a letter to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA),  without indicating her address, alleging that she has to constantly change
8
residence because unidentified persons had been seen in their neighborhood asking
questions about her. She has also been receiving text messages from the respondent
telling her that her complaint would only be dismissed because she knows people in the
Supreme Court. The respondent also threatened retaliation against her after the case is
terminated. The complainant further claimed that the pieces of evidence she submitted
are sufficient to prove the respondent’s anomalous activities, and prayed for the
immediate resolution of her complaint.

Based on the complainant’s pleadings and evidence, the OCA, (through then Deputy
Court Administrator Nimfa C. Vilches and OCA Chief of Legal Office Wilhelmina D.
Geronga) submitted its Report to the Court dated May 9, 2011,  finding enough evidence
9

to prove the respondent’s involvement in anomalous activities and recommending that –

1) OCA IPI No. 10-3352-P be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

2) respondent Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court,

Branch20, Imus, Cavite, be found GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial
to the Best Interest of the Service; and

3) respondent Maranan be immediately DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of

retirement benefits except her accrued leave credits, and withperpetual disqualification
from employment in any government agencies or instrumentalities, including government
owned and controlled corporations.

In a Resolution dated September 5, 2011,  the Court required the parties to manifest
10

whether they were willing to submit their case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadingsfiled. The respondent filed her Manifestation dated November 17,
2011  submitting the case for resolution by the Court. She reiterated her complete
11

innocence and "vigorous" and "vehement" denial ofthe allegations against her. She
insisted that the present complaint against her is plain and simple harassment and a
vexatious suit by the complainant who either has a grudge against her or must have been
used by another person with a grudge against her. All she did was tosecure the services
of a lawyer at the complainant’s request; this act, she claimed, does not constitute graft
and corruption, gross misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a court employee and
extortion.

The complainant did not respond to our September 5, 2011 Resolution as it was returned
unserved on her. Wenevertheless considered the case submitted for resolution
considering her letter of July 16, 2010 praying for the immediate resolution of her
complaint.

In our Internal Resolution dated December 7, 2011,  we resolved to refer the complaint to
12

the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.

The OCA responded through its Memorandum of July 16, 2012,  finding that the pieces
13

of evidence on record establish the guilt of the respondent on the charges of Gross
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service filed against her. It
recommended that the respondent be found guilty of the offenses charged and be
dismissed from the service, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except her accrued leave
credits and with perpetual disqualification from employment in any government agency.

The Court fully agrees with the OCA’s recommendation.

The respondent’s bare denial cannot overcome the evidence supporting the
complainant’s accusation that she demanded money on the promise that she would
facilitate the annulment of her (complainant’s) marriage. The respondent’s actions from
the time the complainant started communicating with her on October 21, 2009 and
thereafter through a series of messages they exchanged via SMS,  until the entrapment
14

operation on November 11, 2009, showed that the complaint is indeed meritorious. The
respondent’s text messages sent to the complainant corroborate that she promised to
expedite – in exchange for a monetary consideration of ₱160,000.00 and that she would
provide the lawyer who would file the annulment case – the complainant’s annulment
case once it is filed:
15

21/19/09 8:40pm

Sino po to

21/10/09 8:53pm

Sino nagrefer sayo sakin ano pangalan?

21/10/09 8:54pm

San mo nakuha # ko

21/10/09 9:05pm

Ako rin magbibigay lawyer sayo

21/10/09 9:13pm

D kaba tlaga makakatawag ngayon

21/10/09 9:18pm

Ako n lang tatawag sayo kc mahirap ang txt lang

21/10/09 9:24pm
Tawag n lng ako ha

21/10/09 9:49pm

Natitiwala ako sayo ha dahil hindi lahat pinagbibigyan namin. Sally n lang tawag mo
sakin nagtataka lng kc ako kanina kc buong buong buo yung txt ng name ko e.

21/10/09 9:51pm

Ay sorry mali pala sabi ko sayo 160k pala singil namin

22/10/09 10:05am

Gud am. Ano pwede k bukas

22/10/09 10:25am

ls txt bak naghihintay po kme

22/10/09 10:51am

Bukas lng available si atty

22/10/09 10:56am

Sana kung makakagawa ka daw paraan bukas kahit 40k n lng muna down tapos 3pm
bukas

22/10/09 11:04am

Ok pero d kita pilipilit ha nasayopa din and decision yan ang sakin lng kc nagmamadali k
at tsaka yun ang free time ng lawyer ha

22/10/09 11:11am

Ella pakihusto mo n daw pala 50k at ibabayad daw mua sa psychiatrist at osg kahit sa
susunod n lng daw yung sa kanya

22/10/09 1:09pm

The complainant described the respondent as an influence peddler in the courts of Imus,
Cavite who acts as a conduit to judges, prosecutors and private law practitioners.

In her comment to the complaint,the respondent admitted that "she suggested to the
complainant the name of a lawyer friend, Atty. Renante C. Bihasa (Atty. Bihasa), and
forwarded to her the cell phone number of this lawyer so that theycould discuss the
case." While she was in detention at Imus Police Station, she called Atty. Bihasa, who
told her that he was on his way and assured her that he had already asked his lawyer
friends to assist her. Atty. Bihasa arrived at about five o’clock in the afternoon. As it was
already beyond office hours, she was told by Atty. Bihasa of the possibility that she would
be detained pending investigation. Atty. Bihasa returned the following day and was joined
by Judge Felicen and her officemates. Judge Feliceninterceded in her behalf that she
begiven permission by the police officers to leave her detention in order to take a bath
and change clothes. She was granted permission, with the full guaranty of Judge Felicen
that she would return.16

In an affidavit  dated May 28, 2010, Atty. Bihasa corroborated the respondent’s
17

allegations. In his affidavit, he narrated that upon receiving a call from the respondent
that she was being detained, he immediately called up two (2) of his lawyer friends based
at Imus, Atty. Wilfredo P. Saquilayan and Atty. Jose Emmanuel Montoya, to assist the
respondent. As he arrived at Imus Police Station at around past four o’clock in the
afternoon, he told the respondent of the probability of her detention until formal charges
were filed against her. According to him, "[he] took it upon [himself] to assist[the
respondent] on that date and accompanied her while the police officers of Imus PNP
were doing their routine work on suspects."

Atty. Bihasa further narrated thaton the next day at about five o’clock in the afternoon, he
went backto Imus Police Station to wait for the complainant. After a few hours, the
respondent’s co-workers, including Judge Felicen arrived. They waited for the
complainant until seven o’clock in the evening but she failed to come. Only the
complainant’s lawyer arrived who informed the police investigator that the complainant
cannot come out of fear because of the death threats she received. 18

The concern that Atty. Bihasa and Judge Felicen showed to the respondent while under
detention at Imus PNP Station gives rise to the suspicion that they have knowledge and
tolerate the respondent’s anomalous activities. The respondent’s text messages to the
complainant support this suspicion: 19

At tsaka alam mo naman nakailang appointment n tayo sa abogado hiyang hiya nga ako
kahapon e

7/11/09 3:13pm

Tawagan ko muna si judge kung pwede pa kami tumanggap hanggang wed

7/11/09 3:15pm

Try ko lng
7/11/09 3:25pm

Hanggang Tuesday na lg tayo after nun nxt year na. Yan ang sabi

7/11/09 3:28pm

Sayang kc ang haba n ng time mo dp natuloy sabi ko naman sayo e kapag inabot ng
naghigpit dn pwede none appearance. Yun nagan nagpatulong sakin kahapon lng
tumawag yun d sana nagka sabay n kayo

7/11/09 3:59pm

Ok po mit po tayo bukas 10 am sinabi ko napo kay atty. Tnx po. See you po

Ephemeral electronic communications are now admissible evidence, subject to certain

conditions. "Ephemeral electronic communication" refers to telephone conversations, text
messages, chatroom sessions, streaming audio, streaming video, and other electronic
forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.  It may be
20

proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the communications or has
personal knowledge thereof.  In the present case, we have no doubt regarding the
21

probative value of the text messages as evidence in considering the present case. The
complainant, who was the recipient of the text messages and who therefore has personal
knowledge of these text messages, identified the respondent as the sender through
cellphone number 09175775982. The respondent herself admitted that her conversations
with the complainant had been thru SMS messaging and thatthe cellphone number
reflected in the complainant’s cellphone from which the text messages originated was
hers. She confirmed that it was her cellphone number during the entrapment operation
the Imus Cavite Police conducted 22

Sally:

Halika dito sa office, sa clerk of court. Pupunta ka ngayon? O sige, sige, pupunta ka
ngaun? Ah sige OK, salamat! Ang number ko …

Lalaki:

Ibigay ko sa kanya?

Sally:

Oo, ang number ko ay 09175775982, ok thank you.

The complainant submitted two (2) copies of the VCD  containing pictures taken during
23

the entrapment conducted by the Imus Cavite Police on November 11, 2009. 24
Under Section 1, Rule 11 of A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC, audio, photographic and video
evidence of events, acts or transactions shall be admissible provided it shall be shown,
presented or displayed to the court and shall be identified, explained or authenticated by
the person who made the recording or by some other person competent to testify on the
accuracy thereof.

We viewed the VCD and the video showed the actual entrapment operation. The
complainant herself certified that the video and text messages are evidence of her
complaint against the respondent, "Sapat at malinaw ang lahat ng ebidensya na kasama
ng aking reklamo na nagpapatunay na totoo lahat ang nakasaad sa aking reklamo.
Kitang kita sa video at sa mga text messages niya ang kanyang modus operandi at
paggamit niya ng pwesto sa gobyerno upang makapanghingi ng malaking pera sa mga
inosenteng tao." It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.  A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC specifically
25

provides that these rules shall be liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a
just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases.

The Court totally agrees with the OCA’s finding that the respondent is guilty of grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The respondent’s
assertion that Bartolome is a fictitious name because the complainant has not stated in
her complaint her exact address is preposterous in light of the evidence of direct personal
and text message contacts between them. In the absence of supporting evidence, the
claim that the complaint against her is pure and simple harassment orchestrated by
persons with grudge against her, is mere conjectural allegation.

As a public servant, nothing less than the highest sense of honesty and integrity is
expected of the respondent at all times.  She should be the personification of the
26

principle that public office is a public trust.  The respondent unfortunately fell extremely
27

short of the standards that should have governed her life as a public servant. By soliciting
money from the complainant, she committed a crimeand an act of serious impropriety
that tarnished the honor and dignity of the judiciary and deeply affected the people’s
confidence in it. She committed an ultimate betrayal of the duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the judiciary by peddling influence to litigants, thereby creating the impression
that decision can be bought and sold.  The Court has never wavered in its vigilance in
28

eradicating the socalled "bad-eggs" in the judiciary.  We have been resolute in our drive
29

to discipline and, if warranted, to remove from the service errant magistrates, employees
and even Justices of higher collegiate appellate courts for any infraction that gives the
Judiciary a bad name. To stress our earnestness in this pursuit, we have, in fact, been
unflinching in imposing discipline on errant personnel or in purging the ranks of those
undeserving to remain in the service. 30

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Rosalie B. Maranan, Court Stenographer Ill,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite, GUILTY of Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and is accordingly DISMISSED
from the service, with prejudice to re-employment in any government agency including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Her retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits are ordered forfeited.  This decision shall be immediately executory.
1âwphi1

The Court further Resolves to REQUIRE Judge Fernando L. Felicen, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 20, Imus, Cavite and Atty. Renante C. Bihasa, to file their Comments on
their alleged participation in the anomalous activities of the respondent, within fifteen
( 15) days from notice. This directive is without prejudice to the investigation of all or
selected employees and officials of the Branch, who may have participated in anomalous
transactions relating to annulment of marriage.

The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby directed to submit to this Court, within
thirty (30) days, a list of the annulment of marriage decisions of Judge Fernando L.
Felicen for the past ten (10) years, indicating therein the judgments made and the names
of participating lawyers and prosecutors.

The Office of the Chief Attorney shall analyze the submitted data, including the records of
and the proceedings in the listed cases, and recommend to the Court the actions it
should take in the event a pattern of corruption involving annulment of marriage cases
emerges. The Office of the Chief Attorney is given ninety (90) days from receipt of the
Office of the Court Administrator's list, within which to submit its recommendations to the
Court.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall likewise refer this administrative case and its
records to the Ombudsman for whatever action it may take within its jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 149366-67             May 27, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHIILPPINES, appellee, 

vs.
FLORENTINO ESCULTOR, appellant.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before this Court for automatic review is the Decision 1 dated 5 June 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court of Barili, Cebu, Branch 60 ("trial court"), in Criminal Case Nos. CEB-BRL-478
and CEB-BRL-479. The trial court found Florentino Escultor ("appellant") guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

JUDGMENT is therefore rendered declaring the accused, FLORENTINO ESCULTOR,

GUILTY of STATUTORY RAPE and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death
for each of two (2) counts rape (sic). The accused is further ordered to pay the victim the
sum of ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.2

The Charges

The prosecution charged appellant with two counts of rape committed against the
daughter of his common-law wife. The Informations read:

In Criminal Case No. CEB-BRL-478:

That sometime in the year 1995, at Sitio Canlatumbo, Barangay Giloctog, Municipality of
Barili, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused who is the step father of the victim, with lewd design and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie
and succeed in having carnal knowledge with Jenelyn Alcontin, a minor who is only
seven (7) years of age, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

In Criminal Case No. CEB-BRL-479:

That on the 13th day of January, 2000, at Sitio Canlatumbo, Barangay Giloctog,
Municipality of Barili, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused who is the step father of the victim, with
lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge with Jenelyn
Alcontin, a minor who is only eleven (11) years of age, against her will and consent.4

Arraignment and Plea

When arraigned on 18 July 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded not
guilty to the charges.5 Joint trial of the cases followed.

The Trial
 Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented two witnesses: the victim Jenelyn Alcontin or Jennylyn
Manansad Lomaino ("Jenelyn")6and Dr. Noli Yap ("Dr. Yap"), the municipal health officer
who conducted the physical examination on Jenelyn.

In the People’s Brief, the Solicitor General summarized the prosecution’s version of the
two incidents as follows:

Sometime in 1995, Jenelyn Alcontin (private complainant), then 7 years old, was lying on
the floor of their house in Sitio Canlatumbo, Giloctog, Barili, Cebu when Florentino
Escultor (appellant), common-law husband of private complainant’s mother Linda
Alcontin, undressed her (at the time, Linda was out of the house). After removing all her
clothing, appellant, who was already naked, placed himself on top of her and forcibly
inserted his organ on her vagina. Private complainant cried. After ejaculating, appellant
warned her not to reveal the incident to anyone otherwise he would kill her (TSN,
February 8, 2001, pp. 3-4).

The incident was repeated in the morning of January 13, 2000 (at the time, private
complainant’s mother and younger brother was (sic) in the market buying corn grits).
While the private complainant was inside the house, appellant asked her to remove his
moustache. Private complainant complied (private complainant was then 11 years old)
(TSN, February 8, 2001, p. 7).

After shaving his moustache, appellant ordered the private complainant to sleep as he
would follow her mother to the market (ibid). After a while, appellant returned (ibid).

Private complainant was lying on the floor when appellant sat beside her. He pulled off
his pants and ordered her to undress. When private complainant ignored him, appellant
forcibly removed her clothes (TSN, February 8, 2001, p. 8).

After undressing her, appellant thrust his genital organ toward her private part and made
successive pumping motions. After ejaculating, appellant threatened private complainant
with harm should she divulge the incident to anyone (TSN, February 8, 2001, pp. 8-9;
February 22, 2001, p. 8).

Unable to bear anymore appellant’s bestiality, private complainant confided her ordeal to
her elder brother Jerry (private complainant’s half-brother from her mother’s first
marriage). Her brother immediately accompanied her to the DSWD. Said office helped
the private complainant in filing the complaint against the appellant (TSN, February 8,
2001, p. 9; February 22, 2001, p. 5).

The medical examination of appellant showed the presence of an old healed hymenal
laceration. The examining physician concluded that the private complainant could have
been raped in 1995. It is also possible that the sexual assault was repeated in 2000
(TSN, October 12, 2000, pp. 3-4).7

Version of the Defense

The defense presented appellant as its only witness. The Public Attorney summarized
appellant’s testimony as follows:

FLORENTINO ESCULTOR testified that he is innocent of the charges imputed against

him. He knew the complainant personally because she is the daughter of his common-
law-wife. He had an agreement with her mother that he can instill discipline on the
complainant whenever she commits any wrong. There were instances that he used a
broom or a piece of wood or stick in hitting the complainant. Every time, he would
discipline the complainant, she would run away from home. 

He learned that a certain Montano brought the complainant to the Municipal Hall and
then charges were filed against him. (TSN, March 8, 2001, pp. 1-4)8

The Trial Court’s Judgment

The trial court found Jenelyn’s testimony positive, credible, spontaneous and
straightforward. The trial court was fully convinced that she was telling the truth when she
testified in court. On the other hand, the trial court found appellant’s denial unworthy of
belief. The trial court held that appellant committed statutory rape since the prosecution
established that appellant had sexual intercourse with the victim who was below twelve
(12) years old. In imposing the death penalty, the trial court considered appellant’s live-in
relationship with the victim’s mother coupled with the victim’s age as attendant
circumstances. 

Issues

Appellant seeks the reversal of his conviction on the following grounds:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT IN CRIM. CASE

NO. CEB-BRL-478 DESPITE THE DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF THE CRIME

OF RAPE IN CRIM. CASE NO. CEB-BRL-479 DESPITE LACK OF SPECIFIC DETAILS
ON HOW APPELLANT COMMITTED THE RAPE.

III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH FOR EACH COUNT OF RAPE DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
INFORMATIONS WERE DEFECTIVE.9

The Court’s Ruling

The Court has reviewed the records of this case and has found appellant’s contentions
partly meritorious. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any
question, including one not raised by the parties.10

Allegation of Exact Date or Month in the Information

Appellant points out that the first information merely alleged that appellant committed the
rape in 1995. There was no mention of the exact date or at least the month the incident
happened. Appellant contends that as a result, he had no opportunity to defend himself
of the rape allegedly committed in that year because the information did not specify the
date. He could not interpose the defense of alibi for the whole year of 1995. 

This contention is untenable. 

Rule 110 of the Rules of Court (before the amendment by the Rules on Criminal
Procedure that took effect on 1 December 2000) provides:

Sec. 11. Time of the commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except
when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the acts may be alleged to have
been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was
committed as the information or complaint will permit.

We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential
element of the crime.11 It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was
committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape,
time is not an essential element.12 What is important is that the information alleges that
the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and that the accused had carnal
knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on her or deprived
her of reason.

The allegation in the first information in CEB-BRL-478 that appellant committed the rape
"sometime in the year 1995" was sufficient to inform appellant that he was being charged
of rape of a child who was 7 years old. The allegation adequately afforded appellant an
opportunity to prepare his defense. Thus, in People v. Espejon,13 the Court convicted the
accused of rape under an information charging him with rape perpetrated "sometime in
the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto" and "sometime in the year 1995 and
subsequent thereto." Thus, appellant in the present case cannot complain that he was
deprived of his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. 

The time of the commission of the crime assumes importance only when it creates
serious doubt on the commission of the rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for
purposes of conviction.14 The date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only
when the accuracy and truthfulness of the victim’s narration almost hinge on the date of
the commission of the crime.15 In this case, the defense raised by appellant is plainly
denial. However, there is no dispute that when the alleged first rape occurred in 1995,
appellant was living with Jenelyn’s mother and Jenelyn in one house. Appellant himself
testified that they were all living in one house since 1989. 16 Thus, the veracity of the rape
charge is not dependent on the time of the commission of the offense but on Jenelyn’s
credibility. The trial court considered the following testimony of Jenelyn on the 1995 rape
incident as believable and truthful:

Q: What did Florentino Escultor do to you in 1995 as contained in the information? 

A: He abused me.

Q: To be specific how it was done by Florentino Escultor when you said you were abused
by him?

A: I was raped by him.

Q: How did Florentino Escultor raped (sic) you?

A: While I was lying he undressed me.

Q: And upon being undress (sic) what did Florentino Escultor do to you?

A: He placed himself on top of me.

Q: What other thing did he do to you?

A: I was then molested.

Q: How did Florentino Escultor molest you?

A: He also undressed himself.

Q: You mean you were naked so do with (sic) Florentino Escultor?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Did he Florentino Escultor succeeded (sic) in his lewd desire?

A: Yes.

Q: According to you, you were molested and Florentino Escultor succeeded in his
intention to rape you. After that did he tell you anything if any?

A: He told me not to tell to anybody about what he had done to me.

Q: How did you know that Florentino Escultor succeeded in his intention to rape you?

A: He inserted his penis to my sexual organ.

Q: How did you know that the penis of Florentino Escultor was inserted to your sex
organ?

A: Because I was awaken.

Q: And what did you feel during that particular time when the organ of Florentino Escultor
was inserted to your vagina?

A: I felt pain.

Q: Did you not shout for help?

A: No, because Florentino Escultor told me not to shout and he will kill me if I will do.

Q: Where was your mother during that time?

A: She was out of home working.

Q: Where was your mother working?

A: At Poblacion, Barili, Cebu.

Q: What time was that in 1995 when Florentino Escultor molested you?

A: In the evening.

Q: Can you estimate the time?

A: I could no longer recall.

Q: In 1995 you were sexually abused by Florentino Escultor by inserting his penis to your
sex organ, where did this incident happen?

A: At Latumbo, Barili.
Q: In what particular place?

A: At the house.

Q: The same house where your mother and Florentino Escultor were living?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Do you have brothers and sisters?

A: Yes.

Q: How old were they?

A: I do not know because they are living in Iligan.17

When it comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is
even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. 18 The reason is obvious. Having the full opportunity
to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in
a better position than the appellate court to evaluate properly testimonial
evidence.19 Appellant has not given us any reason, and we find none, to depart from or
give exception to this principle. 

Testimony of Victim is Lacking in Details

Appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the second rape beyond reasonable
doubt. Appellant points out that Jenelyn’s testimony on what transpired on 13 January
2000 was nothing but a mere general narration without specifically telling the chain of
events. There was even no mention of penetration or the insertion of appellant’s penis in
her vagina. 

Jenelyn testified on direct examination as follows:

Q: Another information for rape against Florentino Escultor which refer to an incident on
January 13, 2000, where did this incident happen?

A: Also at Giloctog, Barili.

Q: In what particular place?

A: Also at the house.

Q: You mean the same house where the first incident happen?
A: In a different house.

Q: Who owns that house?

A: It was owned by Florentino Escultor.

Q: And during that date on Jan. 13, 2000 you were living at that house?

A: Yes sir.

Q: How many are you living at that house?

A: The four (4) of us.

Q: You mean you, your mother and Florentino Escultor?

A: With my younger brother.

Q: How old is your younger brother?

A: He was then six (6) years old when the incident happen.

Q: What is the name of your brother?

A: Jr. Escultor.

Q: Who is the father of Jr. Escultor?

A: Florentino Escultor.

Q: And the mother is your mother?

A: Yes sir.

Q: You claimed that you were abused by Florentino Escultor on Jan. 13, 2000 were was
your mother at that time?

A: She was in the market buying corn grits.

Q: How about your younger brother, where was he?

A: He was together with my mother.

Q: Who was left in the house?

A: Me and Florentino Escultor.

Q: What were you doing at that time?

A: I was told by Florentino Escultor to pull up his moustache.

Q: Can you recall what time was that?

A: About 9:00 o’clock in the morning.

Q: What did he (Florentino Escultor) do to you on Jan. 13, 2000 at 9:00 o’clock in the
morning, while you were pulling his moustache?

A: After that he told me to sleep because he will follow my mother.

Q: In effect, did Florentino Escultor follow your mother?

A: No.

Q: And what did he do instead of following your mother?

A: After I laid on the floor, Florentino Escultor placed himself on top of me.

Q: Was he dressed when he placed himself on top of you?

A: He was wearing shirt but he pulled off his pants.

Q: How about you, were you naked?

A: I have my dress.

Q: What did Florentino Escultor do to you?

A: He commanded me to undress but I did not obey so he undress (sic) me because at

that time my mother was about to arrive.

Q: Can you tell if during that time Florentino Escultor was able to commit the sexual act
to you?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Can you tell if there was push and pull move (sic)?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And what did you feel?

A: I cried because of pain.

Q: Why did you not tell Florentino Escultor to stop?

A: I did not tell him to stop because I was afraid.

Q: Did you not shout for help?

A: I did not.20

On continuance, Jenelyn’s testimony established that appellant succeeded in sexually

abusing her. She testified:

Q: During the first rape which an information was filed in March 21, 2000 regarding an
incident that happen (sic) in the year 1995 when you were still seven (7) years old and
during that time you were threatened, can you remember if the organ of Florentino
Escultor was actually inserted to your sex organ?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And the same is true also on the second information on Jan. 13, 2000 when you
were eleven (11) years old when you were also actually raped the organ of
Florentino Escultor was actually inserted to your sex organ?

A: Yes sir.21 (Emphasis supplied)

Jenelyn testified that appellant placed himself on top of her while she was lying on the
floor. He pulled off his pants and undressed Jenelyn. Appellant made push and pull
movements at which point Jenelyn cried because she felt pain. When asked by the
prosecutor whether "the organ of appellant was actually inserted into her sex organ,"
Jenelyn replied "Yes."

A question that suggests to the witness the answer, which the examining party wants, is
a leading question.22 As a rule, leading questions are not allowed. However, the rules
provide for exceptions when the witness is a child of tender years 23 as it is usually difficult
for such child to state facts without prompting or suggestion.24 Leading questions are
necessary to coax the truth out of their reluctant lips.25 The prosecutor asked leading
questions to Jenelyn as she was young and unlettered, making the recall of events
difficult, if not uncertain. Jenelyn was only 11 years old the second time appellant
sexually assaulted her and 12 years old when she testified in court. Her educational
attainment is only Grade 1.26 As explained in People v. Daganio:27

The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts in exercising control over
the questioning of a child witness. The reasons are spelled out in our Rule on
Examination of a Child Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that questions are stated in a form
appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) to protect children from
harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading questions in
all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the same will further the interests of
justice.

Although Jenelyn’s testimony was not perfect in all details, it bore the earmarks of truth.
She was not sophisticated enough to fabricate the crime of rape against her mother’s
live-in partner. The revelation of a young and innocent child whose chastity was abused
deserves full credit.28 Surely, Jenelyn would not concoct a story of defloration, allow the
examination of her private parts and expose herself to the humiliation of a public trial if
she was not motivated solely by a desire to vindicate her honor. As the Court has
stressed in numerous cases, when a woman or a child victim says that she has been
raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed
committed.29 At any rate, if the defense wanted to object on the ground that leading
questions were being asked the victim, they could have done so. However, they did not.
Thus, appellant waived the defense based on this ground.

Lastly, appellant contends that the doctor who examined Jenelyn only a week after the
alleged second rape on 13 January 2000 testified that the laceration was already old,
which shows that no rape was committed on that date. In crimes against chastity, the
medical examination of the victim’s genitalia is not a necessary element for the
successful prosecution of the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in
nature.30 The fact that Dr. Yap did not find fresh lacerations when he examined Jenelyn a
week after the alleged commission of the second rape does not negate rape. Absence of
fresh hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is a
child.31 To prove rape, it is sufficient that the penis touched the labia of the pudendum of
the victim.32

In his defense, appellant merely denied raping Jenelyn. Appellant insinuates that the
charges were filed because he punishes the children of Linda Alcontin, including Jenelyn,
to discipline them. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense, which the accused must
buttress with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.33 Appellant did not
even attempt to corroborate any material allegation in his testimony. A mere denial
constitutes negative evidence, which does not deserve greater evidentiary weight than
the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.34

Penalty and Damages

The trial court convicted appellant under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 765935 and Republic Act No. 8353,36 which reads:

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. – Rape is Committed - 

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
circumstances:
 x x x.

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above is present.

x x x.

Article 266-B. Penalties. - x x x.

x x x.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;

x x x.

We hold that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty of two (2) counts of statutory
rape. The prosecution established Jenelyn’s age during the trial with the presentation of
her birth certificate showing that she was born on 15 July 1988. Hence, when appellant
raped Jenelyn in 1995, she was only 7 years old. When appellant raped her a second
time on 13 January 2001, she was 11 years old. Where the victim is below 12 years of
age, violence or intimidation is not required, and the only subject of inquiry is whether
"carnal knowledge" took place.37 Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary,
not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but the absence of free
consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of twelve.38

Nevertheless, the death penalty is not the correct penalty for the two counts of rape
committed by appellant because the two informations in Criminal Case Nos. CEB-BRL-
478 and CEB-BRL-479 failed to correctly state appellant’s relationship with Jenelyn. To
justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and
prove during the trial the qualifying circumstances of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender.39The information must jointly allege these qualifying
circumstances to afford the accused his right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.40 Sections 841 and 942 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure expressly mandate that the qualifying circumstance should be
alleged in the information.

Although the prosecution proved that appellant was the common-law spouse of Jenelyn’s
mother, what appears in the informations is that the victim is the stepdaughter of
appellant. A stepdaughter is the daughter of one’s spouse by a previous marriage.43 For
appellant to be the stepfather of Jenelyn, he must be legally married to Jenelyn’s mother.
However, appellant and the victim’s mother were not legally married but merely lived in
common-law relation. The two informations failed to allege specifically that appellant was
the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother. Instead, the two informations erroneously
alleged the qualifying circumstance that appellant was the stepfather of the victim.
Hence, appellant is liable only for two counts of simple statutory rape punishable
with reclusion perpetua for each count. 

Lastly, we affirm the trial court’s award of civil indemnity of ₱100,000 or ₱50,000 for each
of the two counts of simple statutory rape in accordance with recent case law.44 In
addition, appellant shall pay the victim ₱100,000 in moral damages or ₱50,000 for each
count of rape, which are awarded to rape victims without need of pleading or proof of its
basis. 

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 5 June 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Barili,
Cebu, Branch 60, in Criminal Case Nos. CEB-BRL-478 and CEB-BRL-479 is MODIFIED.
Appellant Florentino Escultor is found guilty of two (2) counts of SIMPLE RAPE. He is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape. He is also
ordered to pay the victim, Jenelyn Alcontin, ₱100,000 as civil indemnity and ₱100,000 as
moral damages for the two counts of rape. 

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127240             March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner, 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision
1 

of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner
Ong Chia to Philippine citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy,
he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed
in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business,
married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he
filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his
qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the
law, stated —

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter
of Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted
after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three
witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V.
Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the
State intended to present any witness present any witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather
surprising, in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the
history of the Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that
petitioner really deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this
reason, we do not wish to present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of
the witnesses for the petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself. 3 

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted
petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor
General, appealed all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all
his former placer of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct
himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in
violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes
have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to
support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence. 4 

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization
filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No.
031767, in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had
5 

likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed
to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his
petition must fail. The state also annexed income tax returns allegedly filed by petitioner
6  7 

from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself and his
family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner
claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in
1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the
benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that
petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also
annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract and a Joint-Affidavit executed by
8  9 

petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona
Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance
with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living
together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according
to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had
already been married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of

Residence,  petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said
10 

address in the petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already
noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It
ruled that due to the importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from
raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on
appeal.  The appellate court held:
11 

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to
state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG,"
which name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270.
Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to
include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory
requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come
forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his
application for citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former
places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to
comply with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the
provision is to give the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government,
upon the publication of the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their
objections against the petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is
depriving the public and said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of
the law. . .

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when
he lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has
been the consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without
the benefit of clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far
from being proper and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law",
and therefore disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization
...

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an
income tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is
low. . . "It is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary
necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that
there is an appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for
an adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and
thus avoid one's becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are
in their old age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to
them by their children. The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant
cannot be added to his income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions
and allowances, said pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT

IN NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN
APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT
PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE
RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN
KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER

STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES
OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO
CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the
documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on
the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been
presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of
any evidentiary value,"  so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised
12 

Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143  of the Rules of Court
13 

which provides that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election

cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now
being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a
petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy
or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the
case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on
appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action
considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule
on res judicata.  Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
14 

from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the
same documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against
their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due
process.  We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the
15 

admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party
the chance to object to their admissibility.  Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived
16 

of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court
by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed
with the Court of Appeals. thus:

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which
was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the
case number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number
of the petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally
unreliable and should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant
appeal. 17 

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be
accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case
No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is
confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet  of the Special Committee on Naturalization which
18 

was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no
evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case
No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his
wife, and petitioner's income tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have
been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a
satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of
these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon
them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case,
but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure
to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A.
No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a
document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for
naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but
argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published,  with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
19 

substantial compliance with §7.  This is allegedly because the publication effectively
20 

satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give

investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of
the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior
on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another.  It is 21 

settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed
in favor of the government and against the applicant.  As noted by the State, C.A. No.
22 

473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition
his present and former places of residence.  This provision and the rule of strict
23 

application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial

compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground
alone, the instant petition ought to be denied. 1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.