Cambridge University Press, The North American Conference On British Studies Journal of British Studies

British Parliamentary Party Alignment and the Indian Issue, 1857-1858
Author(s): Angus Hawkins

Source: Journal of British Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Spring, 1984), pp. 79-105
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The North American Conference
on British Studies
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British Parliamentary Party Alignment
and the Indian Issue, 1857-1858
ANGUS HAWKINS
During the unusually hot summer of 1857 English society was shocked
and outraged by reports of atrocity and mass murder. News of the out-
break of the Indian Mutiny reached London on June 26, 1857 and, during
the succeeding months, tales of massacre and torture followed.' Polite
Victorian society was incensed.2 This article examines Parliament's
response to this crisis. It reveals that there exists no simple relation
between events occurring outside Westminster and the response within.
Parliamentary perception passes through the medium of public rhetoric,
established policy, party circumstance, and the private concerns of
prominent personalities. This creates less a refractive distortion of events
than a new aspect to their understanding. Issues such as India acquired
significance within a continuing context of parliamentary circumstance
long preceding the immediate cause of substantive concern. This article,
then, is not about India as such, but about the particular form the Indian
question assumed within Westminster. This is a significant concern in
itself because of the insight preoccupation with India provided into the
tensions, antagonisms, aspirations, and hopes shaping party alignment
during the mid-nineteenth century.
A further aspect of this translation of external circumstance into par-
liamentary perception is that an issue only became the occasion of crisis
when it was portrayed as critical. Once again, there existed no simple
relation between external events and the response within Westminster.
Popular moral outrage over native atrocities became a political crisis over
administrative reform. This particular parliamentary response was
Mr. Alan Beattie, Dr. Andrew Jones, Mr. Stephen Lawrence, and Professor John
Vincent advised, cautioned, and encouraged me during the writing of this article.
Anything of worth owes much to them. I am also grateful to the Social Science
Research Council for the grant that made the research upon which this article is
based possible.
'National Register of Archives, London, Palmerston Diary, June 26, 1857,

Broadlands Mss. D/4. I am grateful to the Trustees of the Broadlands Archive Trust
for permission to quote from this collection. Throughout this article I have referred
to the events in India during 1857-8 as the Mutiny. This was the term within which
events were perceived in Britain, despite Disraeli's unsuccessful attempt in July
1857 to broaden the terms of debate. Note should be made of the fact that some
historians of India prefer to speak of a war of independence or rebellion.
2A parliamentarian who gave eloquent expression to popular outrage was the
seventh Earl of Shaftesbury. See Edwin Hodder The Life and Work of the Seventh
Earl of Shaftesbury K. G. 1 vol. ed. (London, 1887) pp. 544-47.
80 JOURNAL OF BRITISH STUDIES
neither necessary nor inevitable. The recognition of crisis and the

ticular crisis perceived are themselves historical events that re
explanation.
As the nature of the parliamentary response to the Indian issue d
1857-58 is neither simple nor self-evident this article examin
complexity of that political concern. It reveals that a response exp
in administrative terms was conducive to Palmerston's parliament
anxieties. Moreover the administration of India provided an oppor
for the Conservative party to substantiate a redefinition of rheto
purpose, while the same issue vividly advertised deep divisions
Whig-Liberal ranks made manifest in the bitter antagonism b
Palmerston and Lord John Russell. In short, the complexity of the
issue came to express the intricacy of party calculation and, for a
months, the subtle purposes of the preeminent.
Despite symptoms of military unrest during the preceding months

British authorities in India were caught by surprise when, on May 10 at
Meerut, native troops mutined and killed British officers and their fam-
ilies. The mutineers subsequently marched on Delhi and seized the city.
On June 7 a native siege of Cawnpore began and, by June 26, the British
had surrendered to Nana Sahib who promptly broke his word and mur-
dered his prisoners. On June 30 the city of Lucknow was put under siege
by the mutineers.3 The Mutiny, fragmented in effect and largely nostalgic
in origin, was a traumatic and anguished protest against the westernizing
policies of the British authorities. Military revolt came to provide a focus
for Muslim and Maratha revivalism and agrarian grievances.4 Because of
the profoundity of these tensions the fighting occasioned great ferocity
and savage reprisals by both sides. Such extremity of emotion was echoed
in England when reports of massacre and murder were received. The
country, Lord Minto observed in October 1857, "is running wild ... with
passion and regards the natives of India (the few allowed to survive) as
monsters only to be held in slavish subjection by the sword."5
In contrast to popular outrage Lord Palmerston's government paraded a
3For detailed studies of the Mutiny in its military and Indian contexts see G. B.
Malleson's standard History of the Indian Mutiny (1878-80); and the more recent
studies ofS. N. Sen 1857 (1957); Christopher Hibbert The Great Mutiny;India 1857
(London, 1978). For a perceptive Indian viewpoint see S. Ahmad Khan The Indian
Revolt (London, 1873). Other works of interest are Thomas R. Metcalf The After-
math of Revolt: India, 1857-1870 (Princeton, N.J., 1965); S. B. Smith Life of Lord
Lawrence (London, 1883); J. L. Morrison Life ofHenry Lawrence (London, 1934); M.
Maclagan Clemency Canning (1962); and S. B. Chadhuri English Historical Writ-
ings on the Indian Mutiny (Calcutta, 1979).
4See Peter Spear A History of India (London, 1970), 129-44.
5PRO, Minto to Russell, October 31, 1857, Russell Mss., 30/22/13/D fol. 209.
PARLIAMENTARY PARTY ALIGNMENT 81
calm confidence.6 Cabinet attitudes towards the Mutiny were charac-

terized by an inability immediately to influence events, the fact that
intelligence took six weeks to reach London from the subcontinent, and a
confident optimism about the final result.7 Only Clarendon, as Foreign
Secretary, and later the Duke of Argyll as Lord Privy Seal emerged as
dissentient voices within the Cabinet.8 Their foreboding made little
impression upon those ministers directly, if distantly, involved with the
Mutiny: Palmerston as Prime Minister, Vernon Smith as President of the
Board of Control, Lord Panmure as Secretary for War and Sir Charles
Wood as First Lord of the Admiralty.9 Throughout the crisis Palmerston
was confident that "the Mutiny [would] be put down, and [British] author-
ity more firmly established than ever."10 Clarendon feared that "Palm-
erston believes all he wishes, and [he] therefore believes all that Panmure
tells him" and that consequently Palmerston would not countenance the
possibility of "a great disaster."" On July 12, the Cabinet dispatched Sir
Colin Campbell to India as Commander-in-Chief and on July 25 sent a
number of troops by steamer and sailing ship (rather than the swifter
6"The Queen, the House of Lords, the House of Commons, and the press, all call
out for vigorous exertion, and the Government alone take an apologetic line,
anxious to do as little as possible, to wait further news, to reduce as law as possible
even what they do grant, and reason as if we had at most only to replace what was
sent out." The Queen to Palmerston, August 22, 1857, cit. H. C. Benson and
Viscount Esher (eds.) Queen Victoria's Letters (hereafter Q.V.L.) (London, 1907)
1st. series. III, 309-10. For a more sympathetic biographical assessment see H. C.
Bell Lord Palmerston (London 1936) II. 172-75.
7Palmerston to the Queen, June 26, 1857 Q.V.L., III, pp. 297-98.
8National Register of Archives, London, Clarendon to Palmerston, September 11,
1857, Broadlands Mss. GC/C1 1087. See also Clarendon to his wife, October 1, 1857
cit. Sir Herbert Maxwell The Life and letters of George William Frederick, Fourth
Earl of Clarendon K. G., G.C.B. (London, 1913) II, p. 153.
9Palmerston's cabinet colleagues, with a few notable exceptions, emphasized the
2nd XI aspect of "Palmerstonianism." Vernon Smith was "very unpopular and
totally useless." (B. L., Greville Diary, February 25, 1855, Greville Mss. 41121). cit.
H. Reeve (ed.) The Greville Memoirs (London, 1888) VII, 251.) One colleague
thought him to be "a fool, a damned fool." (PRO, Granville to Canning, March 10,
1857, Granville Mss., 30/29/21/2 fol. 7) Lord Panmure, "one of the dullest men
Granville ever knew," was "prejudiced, slow and routiner." (BL, Greville Diary,
August 21, 1855, Greville Mss. 41121, cit. Greville Memoirs VII, 288.)
'?Bodleian Library, Palmerston to Clarendon, September 17, 1857, Clarendon
Mss., C. 69 fol. 494. I am grateful to Lord Clarendon for permission to quote from
this collection.
"PRO, Granville to Canning, September 9, 1857. Granville Mss., 30/29/21/2 fol.
32. Clarendon feared that "if great disasters occur... the first thing that John Bull
will as usual do is to look for a victim and that victim will be the government who is
more to be charged with want of energy and for having lagged behind public opinion
and for not having availed itself of the readiness which the country has mani-
fested." National Register of Archives, Clarendon to Palmerston, September 1,
1857. Broadlands Mss. GC/CL 1083. Argyll feared that sufficiently active and
vigorous measures were not "being carried into effect with the necessary expedi-
tion." Argyll to Palmerston. September 29, 1857. Broadlands Mss. GC/AR 16.
screw vessels) to the troubled sub-continent.12 Other troops, on th

to China, were diverted to India. With this the majority of the C
firmly maintained that all that needed to be done had been done.
imparting a callous nuance to such confidence, had no "very s
apprehension for the present. It may be shocking to contemplate
longation of the horror of things as they are, and the murder of Euro
but one or two bodies of unfortunate people will not turn the sca
events."13
Two other concerns influenced Palmerston's response to the situat
India. First, Palmerston harbored "the suspicion . . . that our In
disturbances were not without some Russian origin."14 In Octo
conveyed to Lord Canning "some information . . . received from a
agent as to Russian intrigues in India as to the names of persons e
in plots and as to certain hidden stores of arms and ammunit
Calcutta, held ready for insurrection. ..."15 Palmerston also received
information of a possible imminent insurrection in Ireland.16 For this
reason the Irish militia were stationed in England, "away from the
influence of Priests and Traitors," and the Guards regiment, a "sufficient
Anglo-Saxon" force to quell any "Celtic movement," was not sent to India
so that "the best troops could be kept in England to form the foundation of
an Irish force in case of need."1
The immediate causes of the Mutiny and the measures taken to sup-
press it occasioned little debate in Parliament during 1857. The cursory
discussions that did occur were occasioned by opposition enquiry and
quickly curtailed by ministerial assurances.18 The government con-
sistently sought to exclude the question of the Mutiny in India from the
arena of political controversy. Among the opposition only two Con-
servatives, Lord Ellenborough in the Lords and Disraeli in the Commons,
attracted notoriety by attacking what they saw as the government's
complacent response to the revolt.19 Without a committed personal fol-
12Wood's choice of vessels for conveying the re-enforcements also came to cause
much concern. Prince Albert commented bitterly upon Palmerston's "juvenile
levity." cit. Bell Palmerston II, 173.
'3National Library of Scotland, Wood to Ellice, October 6, 1857, Ellice Mss. 15060,
fol. 180. I am grateful to the Trustees of the National Library of Scotland for
permission to quote from this collection.
'4Bodleian Library, Palmerston to Clarendon, July 12, 1857, Clarendon Mss. c.
69, fol. 346.
'5Leeds Record Office, Palmerston to Canning, October 11, 1857, Canning Mss.
2/10.
"6Scottish Record Office, Palmerston to Panmure, October 5, 1857, Dalhousie
Mss. GD45/8/50 fol. 93.
17Scottish Record Office, Palmerston to Panmure, October 11, 1857, Dalhousie
Mss. GD45/8/50 fol. 95.
18Granville, 3 Hansard CXLVI: 1331-1333 (July 13, 1857). See also, Palmerston,
3 Hansard CXLVI: 1367-1371. (July 13, 1852).
"9On June 9, 1857, Ellenborough, speaking in the Lords, had drawn notice to the
apprehension felt among the native troops in India that the Government intended
to interfere with their religion, warning that if this was attempted "the most bloody
lowing both men pronounced a distinctive line that others might

follow.20 Other members of the opposition, however, were conten
events. Lord Stanley found the debates "unsatisfactory and purp
"Palmerstonian" argument suggested that the crisis demanded a
otic," non-partisan confidence in the government.22
With the Indian Mutiny the government faced what it presen
"national crisis" because too few of importance wished to m
occasion for a "political crisis." The "national crisis" prompt
Crimean War in 1855 had occasioned the downfall of the existin
try: Palmerston's appeal to "patriotic duty," though his rhetor
acknowledge it, was not a prescriptive political right. That, in J
it might be automatically understood as such was a tacit yet po
comment upon political circumstance within Westminster.
Initially, Palmerston had hoped to keep Parliament sitting un
decisive news arrived from India;23 a "general desire" prevailing
grouse [could] wait for a fortnight."24 However, on August 5,
Premier informed the Speaker that he wished "to wind everyth
allowing ample time for the Divorce Bill in Committee, and [to]
on the 20 or 22...."25 At the end of the session Granville felt confident that
"the Government [was] safe for a time ... "26 During the recess Cabinet
confidence was evident in ministerial absence. In September Dallas found
revolution would occur." Ellenborough, 3 Hansard CXLV: 1393-1396 (June 9,

1857); see also, Ellenborough, 3 Hansard CXLVI: 512-520 (June 29, 1857). Disraeli
argued that the forcible destruction of native Princedoms, the disturbance of the
traditional settlement of property and interference with the religion of the people
had prompted "a national revolt" which the Government insisted on regarding as
merely a military mutiny. Disraeli, 3 Hansard CXLVII: 440-481 (July 27, 1857).
See also commentary in W. F. Monypenny and G. E. Buckle The Life of Benjamin
Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield. (London, 1910-20) IV 83-94 and Robert Blake
Disraeli (London, 1969) pp. 375-7.
20Edward Law, second Baron Ellenborough (1790-1871) had been Governor-
General of India from 1841 to 1844, but because of his rather stringent and
summary manner the East India Company requested his resignation and he
returned to England and a place in Peel's cabinet in 1844. Thereafter, as a Peelite in
outlook but a Conservative by habit, Ellenborough concerned himself with Indian
military affairs and education. Disraeli throughout the 1850's was always anxious
to instigate new initiatives and strategies. See John Vincent Disraeli, Derby and
the Conservative Party: the Political Journals of Lord Stanley 1849-69 Hassocks,
Sussex, (1978).
2'Liverpool City Record Office, Stanley Diary, August 11, 1857, Stanley Mss. 920
DER (15) 46/1.
22Baring, 3 Hansard, CXLVII: 542-543 (July 27, 1857). See also Palmerston, 3
Hansard CXLVII: 543-545 (July 27, 1857).
23National Library of Scotland, Denison to Ellice, August 6, 1857, Ellice Mss.
15012 fol. 5.
24Dallas to Cass. August 7, 1857, cit. G. M. Dallas Letters from London Written
From the Years 1856-1860. (London, 1870) I, 191.
25National Library of Scotland, Denison to Ellice, August 6, 1857, Ellice Mss.
15012 fol. 5.
26PRO, Granville to Canning, August 26, 1857, Granville Mss. PRO 30/29/21/2
fol. 2.
"[n]ot a single member of the Ministry in town; unless he had stray

for a few hours to or from scenes of social enjoyment."27 Four week
Parkes was still able to report that "[n]ot a Minister was in London
II
It was moral outrage that constrained the variety of possible poli

responses in Britain to the news of the Indian Mutiny during 1857
outbreak of the Mutiny was never granted credence as a critica
liamentary issue. This was a direct result of political circumstance w
Westminster itself.
The general election of March 1857 had done little to stablize the
unsettled state of parliamentary parties that had existed since 1846.
Palmerston remained Prime Minister as temporary arbiter of a transient
accommodation of political aspiration. Palmerston's age (he celebrated
his 73rd birthday in October 1857) was recognized as sufficient to deny
permanence. Moreover, the results of the 1857 election were of sufficient
ambiguity so as to allow credibility to differing expectations and hopes.29
Palmerston's government welcomed the return of a majority of avowed
"Palmerstonians" but recognized that avowed loyalty concealed a diver-
27Dallas to Cass, September 14, 1857, cit. Dallas Letters from London I, 201.
28National Library of Scotland, Parkes to Ellice, October 20, 1857. Ellice Mss.
15042 fol. 80. By September 1857 the cabinet was beginning to be "assailed for
absenting themselves on grouse plains, stalking moors and watching places, at a
moment when the Empire was being shaken to its foundations." (Dallas to Cass.
September 14, 1857, cit. Letters from London I, 201.) Those outside the cabinet
noted and repeated Clarendon's complaints "of a want of energy and exertion."
(University of Nottingham Library, Aberdeen to Newcastle, September 15, 1857,
Newcastle Mss. NeC, 12, 450,) Russell observed that Palmerston "thought little
evidently of the danger." (PRO, Russell to Dean of Bristol, October 1, 1857. Russell
Mss. 30/29/21/2 fol. 29.) Dallas perceived "much effort and dexterity in preventing
really bad news from striking too suddenly upon the public mind." (Dallas to Cass,
October 5, 1857, cit. Dallas Letters from London I, 210.) The Cabinet's "puzzled"
rejoinder that "the India business had not yet reached a stage at which anything
could be attributed to the fault of the Home Government" was sounding distinctly
lame. (BL, Argyll to Aberdeen, September 3, 1857, Aberdeen Mss. 43199 fol. 95.)
29The general election of 1857 has been conventionally perceived as a triumphant
'plebiscite' in support of Palmerston's premiership. The Annual Register provided
the first and most uncompromising statement of later orthodoxy: The Annual
Register for 1857 chapter IV, 84. See also P. Guedalla, Palmerston, pp. 391-92;
Monypenny and Buckle Disraeli IV, 74. and the narrative histories of Molesworth,
Paul and Walpole. Recent scholarship, however, has revealed such a view to be too
simple and often plain misleading. See John Vincent's comments upon the election
in The Formation of the British Liberal Party 1857-1868 (London, 1966). Also, R.
W. Davis Political Change and Continuity, 1760-1885: A Buckinghamshire Study
(London, 1966). Also, R. W. Davis Political Change and Continuity, 1760-1885; A
Buckinghamshire Study (London, 1972); T. J. Nossiter Influence, Opinion and
Political Idioms in Reformed England (London, 1975). See also an important
unpublished London University Ph.D. thesis, 1949, by J. K. Glynn "The Private
Member of Parliament, 1833 to 1868." Certainly the correspondence and private
opinions of parliamentarians revealed a wide variety of differing views and inter-
pretations of the election results.
sity of opinion and allegiance. The issue of parliamentary reform

particular, offered an immediate threat to the very fragile unanimity
ministerial support.30
Lord John Russell, former Liberal Prime Minister and former par
leader, saw advantage for his own position in an imminent disruptio
the "Palmerstonian" backbenches.31 Around an issue of obvious Liberal
rectitude, such as parliamentary reform, a realignment of Whig, Liberal,
Peelite, and Radical party connection might, once again, focus upon the
leadership of Russell. By April 1857 Russell had decided to passively
await an inevitable dissolving of"Palmerstonian" party connection. This
would avoid the taint of collusion which might compromise his sub-
sequent candidacy for prominence.32 Lord Derby, as leader of the Con-
servative opposition, saw Conservative opportunity in Whig-Liberal
differences. With "two rival [Liberal] chiefs in the field" opposition stra-
tegy appeared "obvious"; "to wait till both [Palmerston and Russell had]
committed themselves to some course."33
Thus emerged, between the political leaders of differing sections, a
consensual strategy of inaction. Palmerston favored inactivity as the
safeguard of "Palmerstonian" unity and the deferment of concern with
reform. Russell favored non-commitment and inactivity so as to allow
time to act as a catalyst for an imminent and favorable realignment of
party connection. Derby favored inactivity in the expectation of Liberal
division and Whig acquisitions to Conservative ranks. Watching and
waiting proffered a positive strategy in the expectation that others would
be forced to act. Those uncertain and insecure in their political position-
Peelites such as Sir James Graham, Lord Aberdeen, and Gladstone or
Conservatives such as Disraeli-found themselves forced to acquiesce in a
consensual inactivity that sustained a variety of differing expectations
among the preeminent. Thus the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny did not
occasion a domestic political crisis because the politicians of influence
preferred calm.
An absence of political initiative, however, became an increasingly
difficult stance to maintain, particularly for a government that, in May
1857, had pledged itself to a Reform Bill the following year.34 Because of
this pressure, Palmerston began to consider bringing forward the ques-
30PRO, Palmerston to Granville, March 25, 1857. Granville Mss. 30/29/19/22 fol.
13. See also, Bell Palmerston II, 170.
31PRO, Clark to Dean of Bristol, n.d. (April, 1857) Russell Mss., 30/22/13/C fol. 19.
See also, University of Nottingham, Newcastle to Hayward, April 20, 1857, New-
castle Mss. NeC 12,369: PRO, Russell to Dean of Bristol, April 8, 1857. Russell Mss.
30/22/13/C fol. 201.
32PRO, Russell to Dean of Bristol, n.d. (April, 1857) Russell Mss. 30/22/13/C fol.
223. See also, National Library of Scotland, Russell to Ellice, April 7, 1857. Ellice
Mss. 15052 fol. 191: Dallas to Cass. April 7, 1857, cit. Dallas Letters from London I,
149.
33Bodleian Library, Derby to Disraeli, April 24, 1857, Hughenden Mss.
B/XX/S/148.
34Palmerston. 3 Hansard CXLV: 65-68 (May 7, 1857).
tion of India in such a way as to elicit support and defer divisio

October 1857 the Prime Minister tested Cabinet reaction to the immedi-
ate abolition of the East India Company and the establishment of a new
administrative system in India, thus concentrating political interest upon
administrative and constitutional amendment rather than military and
security difficulties. Granville discerned Palmerston's motives to be, first,
"to do something great which [might] distinguish his premiership", and
second "to have something that [would] act as a damper to reform."35
Clarendon, with what was dismissed as characteristic gloom, urgently
objected to the notion of proposing change in the government of India
before the insurrection had been suppressed.36 Palmerston, however,
became increasingly committed to the issue of reforming the government
of India as an alternative political concern to domestic reform.
Whigs, Liberals, and Radicals antagonistic to Palmerston's leadership
gave much consideration to parliamentary reform during the recess of
1857. Earl Grey published an essay on the subject.37 The Radical M. P.
Roebuck (with Cobden absent from the Commons and Bright seriously ill)
sought to rally radical opinion under his own auspices.38 Lord John Russell
privately devised various reform schemes, tested sources of potential
support, and remained insistent that Palmerston could not "swamp"
reform with the government of India question.39 Yet, even on the possi-
bility of achieving a unity of opinion over changing the government of
India, those outside the ministry became sceptical. Russell, it was sug-
gested, would "chuckle at his possible change out of the new rupee."40
Derby sensed the danger not only to Palmerston's support, but also to
Conservative unity. For that reason his son, Lord Stanley, feared "hasty
35PRO, Granville to Canning, October 24,1857. Granville Mss. 30/29/21/2 fol. 41.
By bringing forward the Indian issue in the form of administrative reform Pal-
merston may also have been hoping to associate his government with the mood of
post-Crimean liberalism as revealed in the crisis of February 1855; a mood much
preoccupied with administrative reform.
36National Register of Archives, Clarendon to Palmerston, September 23, 1857,
Broadlands Mss. GC/CL 1096: see also, Clarendon to Palmerston, September 28,
1857. Broadlands Mss. GC/CL 1099.
37Henry, 2nd Earl Grey The Reform of Parliament (London, 1858). Grey's e
was "not a plan, but rather an attempt to show what ought not to be done." P
Grey to Russell, November 24, 1857. Russell Mss. 30/22/13/D fol. 262. See
University College London, Grey to Brougham, September 30, 1857. Broug
Mss. 7084: Grey to Brougham, October 22, 1857. Brougham Mss. 14566.
38BL, Morley to Cobden, June 17, 1857. Cobden Mss. 43669 fol. 158. For a report
a Radical meeting chaired by Roebuck see The Times November 18, 1857, p
39Towards this end Russell, in public meetings at Sheffield and Birmingh
emphasized the need for parliamentary reform. S. H. Walpole The Life of Lord
Russell (London 1889) II, p. 292 cites the comment of the Spectator that there
"reviving interest" in Russell personally. "He finds himself still recognized
welcomed, and is evidently inspired with new life." See also, C. S. Parker Life
Letters of Sir James Graham, 1792-1861 (London, 1907) II, 313-320.
40National Library of Scotland, Parkes to Ellice, November 28, 1857. Ellice M
15042 fol. 94.
legislation about India even more than apathy."4' Once again

favored an initiative; but as before, Derby suffering from gout,
the merits of inaction.
A momentary scare prompted an emergency session of Parliament in

December 1857. The government front bench concentrated debate on the
commercial crisis while reform and the government of India were scarcely
touched upon. The brief session in December and the weeks before Par-
liament met again in February 1858 did reveal, however, that some
legislative initiative would be demanded from the government and that
any initiative would be received by an increasingly hostile Parliament.
The injudicious appointment of Lord Clanricarde as Lord Privy Seal in
December 1857 added to the ministry's unpopularity. Granville came to
"dread" the approaching session "as a great breaker up of parties and
making the future very difficult."42 Cabinet apprehension was a sincere
acknowledgment of Russell's predicament: "waiting for an inheritance at
66 years of age is a sorry game."43
Those, such as the celebrated diarist Charles Greville, who interpreted
the parliamentary calm after May 1857 as testament to Palmerston's
political ascendancy neglected the acquiescence of "anti-Palmerstonian"
sentiment. By February 1858 such compliance had ended and the vulner-
ability of the government's position was to be ruthlessly exposed. During
January 1858 an increasing number of the Cabinet came to question the
wisdom of legislating upon the government of India, the particular bill
devised during the recess and, by implication, the adequacy of Pal-
merston's leadership.44 Indeed, Sir Richard Bethell as Attorney-General,
for whom "the Indian Bill [had] absorbed almost [his] whole time and
attention", came to regard the bill as "a suicidal measure."45 Nevertheless,
Palmerston remained committed to the notion that by introducing the
India Bill at the beginning of the session, discussion of parliamentary
reform would be postponed until at least after Easter.
Vernon Smith's introduction of the "East India Loan Bill," on February
5, 1858 to raise monies to meet the expenses occasioned by the continuing
Mutiny, was only agreed upon after prolonged clause by clause debate.46
The government's motion on February 8, to move a vote of thanks to the
military and government officers in India for the energy and ability so far
4"Bodleian Library, Stanley to Disraeli, October 10, 1857, Hughenden Mss.

B/XX/S/630.
42PRO, Granville to Canning, December 23,1857. Granville Mss. 30/29/21/2 fol.
72. See also, PRO, Bessborough to Granville, December (1857). Granville Mss.
30/29/23/10 fol. 729.
43PRO, Graham to Cardwell, December 13,1857. Cardwell Mss. 30/48/8/47 fol. 39.
44BL, Greville Diary, February 3, 1858. Greville Mss. 41122 cit. Greville Memoirs
VIII, 162. See also, Bodleian Library, Argyll to Clarendon, January 19, 1858,
Clarendon Mss. C82 fol. 204: National Register of Archives, Cornewall Lewis to
Palmerston, January 2, 1858, Broadlands Mss. GC/LE 109.
45Bodleian Library, Bethell to Clarendon, January 29, 1858. Clarendon Mss. C82
fol. 244.
46See the report of the debate in 3 Hansard CXLVIII: 780-794 (Feb. 5, 1858).
shown in suppressing the insurrection, revealed further div

opinion.47 On February 18, after two nights of Commons' deb
government's India Bill passed its second reading, despite Conse
opposition, because of Russell's qualified and independent suppo
sell's speech, however, obscured that which was left unsaid.48
division Bethell, well aware of the perilous condition of the go
majority, advised Palmerston that, like a Roman Consul at a Triu
should be attended by a slave to remind him that he was "a Minister
mortal."49 The next evening the government's Conspiracy to Murder Bill,
opposed by Russell, Radicals, Peelites, and most Conservatives, was
defeated on its second reading and Palmerston immediately resigned.
Lord Grey, with characteristic indiscretion, reminded Russell of 1852,
"when Palmerston had tripped up Lord John's heels ... saying [Russell]
had now paid Palmerston off-a joke [Russell] by no means like[d].""0
Palmerston's resignation should not be accepted as dutiful compliance
with the verdict of what was, he insisted, a chance defeat. The adverse
vote came as a surprise to the government whips.51 At the close of the
debate Palmerston "lost his temper"52 and "actually shook his fist at the
Manchester clique."53 The act of resignation, in such circumstances,
assumed the character of a deliberate attempt to embarrass the "acciden-
tal combination of parties" opposing the ministry.54 As Lady Palmerston
observed to her husband:55
The House has behaved so abominably that I am glad they should

find the difficulties of what they have done, and you go out on a
subject to which no blame attaches, merely a sham reason and an
excuse used by the crafty to catch the fools. In my belief I think
Derby will not be able to form a Government that will stand, and,
if they try a dissolution the cry will be Palmerston and no base
coalitions.
Derby confessed to the Queen his fear that "the resignation of the Pal-
merston Cabinet might only be for the purpose of going through a crisis in
47See the report of the debate in 3 Hansard CXLVIII: 810-931. (Feb. 8, 1858).
48Russell, 3 Hansard CXLVIII: 1687-1696 (Feb. 18, 1858).
49National Register of Archives, Palmerston Diary, February 18, 1858, Broad-
lands Mss. D/18.
50University of Durham, Grey Diary, February 20, 1858, Grey Mss. C3/20.
51BL, Greville Diary, February 20, 1858, Greville Mss. 41122 cit. Greville
Memoirs VIII, 167. See also, University of Durham, Grey Diary, February 20, 1858
Grey Mss. C3/20.
52Kent County Archives, Knatchbull-Hugessen Diary, February 19, 1858, Bra
borne Mss. F. 29.
53Earl of Malmesbury Memoirs of an Ex-Minister: An Autobiography (London,
1884), II, 96.
54Prince Albert Memo, February 21, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, 337.
55Lady Palmerston to Palmerston, February 21, 1858. cit. Tresham J. Lever (ed
The Letters of Lady Palmerston, London, (1957) pp. 352-3.
order to come back again with new strength, for there existed di
kinds of resignations .. .56 If such expectations lay behind the un
decision of Palmerston's cabinet to resign they were to be disappo
III
The Conservative ministry formed by Lord Derby in February 1858 an

the general policies it immediately espoused were a conscious repudiatio
of that which Whigs and Liberals held to be true. After 1846 "Liberals
regarded themselves in some degree as the heirs in fee simple of power."
It had become a Whig truism, little contradicted by the experience of 185
that the Conservatives, shorn of Peelites, lacked the talent, experience
and ability to form an effective government. Such a belief, accompanied
a fear of the unrespectability of Radicalism, granted Whigs and Liberals
common attitude of mind that purveyed a unity of purpose. This, in tur
concealed the absence of common or coherent principle. The Conservativ
government consciously sought to subvert and deny such attitudes
mind. "[T]here can be no greater mistake," Derby informed the Lords,
"than to suppose that a Conservative Ministry necessarily means a
stationary ministry,"59 and he "relaxed the rigid character of his Con
servative party by defining it as ready to introduce safe improvements
every sort."60 Disraeli taunted Whigs and Liberals with their pretence t
be the monopolists of all plans for the amelioration of society.61 Such
statements echoed Peel's "Tamworth Manifesto" of 1835 in their appeal t
the maintenance of order and good government. Their purpose, in 185
was the same: to identify the Conservative party as the source of efficie
and "safe" government rather than reactionary prejudice, and intelligen
"moderation" rather than atavistic bigotry.62
56Prince Albert Memo, February 21, 1858. cit. Q.V.L. III, p. 337.
57National Register of Archives, Palmerston Diary, February 20, 1858, Broa
lands Mss. D/18.
58Count Vitzhum St. Petersburg and London in the years 1852 to 1864: the
Reminiscences of Count Charles Frederick Vitzhum von Eckstaedt (London, 1887
Trans. E. F. Taylor, ed. H. Reeve. I, 235.
59Derby, 3. Hansard CXLIX: 41 (March 1, 1858).
60Dallas to Cass, March 5, 1858, cit. Letters from London I, 262.
61Disraeli, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 198 (March 15, 1858).
62Lord Derby's leadership of the Conservative party and his second minority
ministry, 1858-59, warrant historiographical consideration. During and after hi
lifetime Derby was ill served for posterity by hostile contemporaries such as
Greville (BL., Greville Diary, March 20, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123 cit. Greville
Memoirs VIII. p. 182), excluded subordinates such as Lord Henry Lennox (Bodle-
ian, Lennox to Disraeli, January 7, 1857, Hughenden Mss. B/XX/LX/86) and Tory
historians creating a Beaconsfield tradition such as T. E. Kebbel, A History of
Toryism (London, 1886) chap. VII, 332). W. D. Jones in his study Lord Derby and
Victorial Conservatism, (Oxford, 1956), used a number of Mss. collections other
than Derby's own. After the mid-1840s Jones creates a portrait of Derby as an
uninteresting politician uninterested in politics. This was the view of Knowsley
from Hughenden with seclusion compounding seclusion. Jones's dull portrayal was
affirmed by J. B. Conacher's "Party Politics in the Age of Palmerston" in 1859:
Palmerston's resignation seemed to promise that realignment of

connection expected in differing forms by various politicians. Derb
Prime Minister, envisaged Whig-Liberal disarray and the establishm
of the Conservative party on a wider basis with acquisitions from
merstonian" opinion.63 Indeed, courted by the centrist rhetoric the
servative government espoused, Palmerston and a number of Peelit
Whigs such as Clarendon, Newcastle, Argyll or Lord Grey were cre
candidates for adhesion. Derby, in February 1858, unsuccessfully in
the Duke of Newcastle, Lord Grey, and Gladstone into the governme
attempt to induce "a new division of parties, with the old-fashioned
... or at all events the moderate Liberals on one side, and the Radic
the other."64
The differing realignment of Whig, Liberal, and Radical connecti
envisaged by Palmerston and Russell emphasized differences in tim
Palmerston favored an immediate offensive against the new govern
before his credibility as a focus for centrist allegiance became diss
by opposition disorder and Conservative policy.65 Russell favore
toleration of a short-lived Conservative government that would
time for the realignment of Whig, Liberal, Peelite, and Radical conn
under his own auspices. Though he saw no immediate prospect of a u
of the Liberal Party Russell predicted in six months "a union of the
party which [would] be a foundation for the future."66 In the mean
Russell intended to "keep below the gangway that [he might] not app
Entering an Age of Crisis (London, 1959) Appleman, Madden and Wolff (eds.), p.
166. More recent scholarship has confirmed those fewer, but better informed,
contemporary sources that reveal Derby to be an astute and committed, if
ultimately skeptical, player of the political game. Even when he felt the "game was
lost" he remained determined that "it ought to be played and that he would play it
out to the last." (Liverpool City Record Office, Stanley Diary, December 28, 1852,
Stanley Mss. 43/2). See Lytton Memo, n.d. (?1869) Hertfordshire County Record
Office, Lytton Mss. c. 13 fol. 21: W. Pollard The Stanleys ofKnowsley (London, 1868)
p. 177: Malmesbury Memoirs of an Ex-Minister, p. 33 and p. 360: see also the
authoritative insight of Derby's son, Lord Stanley, in Vincent, Disraeli, Derby and
the Conservative Party. In essence detractors failed to appreciate the very positive
and creative advantages Derby often perceived in inaction. Derby's second minis-
try is also often dismissed. But such retrospective wisdom is to distort the variety of
expectations entertained in 1858. Professor Gash, in Solon January, 1970,
observed that despite differing myths, the Conservatives in power have "almost
invariably been Peelite" in practice. Derby's second ministry was not only Peelite
in practice, but Peelite in rhetoric too. This was a strong pose to adopt in the face of
Palmerston's rapid demise and Russell's re-emergence. See Lord Butler (ed.), The
Conservatives: A History from their Origins to 1965 (London, 1977). Best of all are
Robert Stewart The Foundation of the Conservative Party 1830-1867 (London,
1978) and, once again, Vincent, Disraeli, Derby and the Conservative Party.
63Dallas to Cass, March 26, 1858, cit. Dallas Letters from London II, 7.
64University of Durham, Grey Diary, February 22, 1858, Grey Mss. C3/20.
65BL, Greville Diary, March 6, 1858, Greville Mss. 41122, cit. Greville Memoirs
VIII, 177.
66PRO, Russell to Dean of Bristol, February 23, 1858, Russell Mss. PRO
30/22/13/E fol. 238.
to compete for the load with Palmerston" while contemplating the

existence" of Derby's ministry.67 Palmerston sensed the impera
for immediate action. Russell perceived contingent opportun
deferred activity. These divergent strategies determined the dis
nature of Whig, Liberal, and Radical opposition to Derby's fa
centrist Conservatism.
The issue of reforming Indian government, left in legislative limbo by
Palmerston's resignation, was the first major executive challenge to the
new Conservative cabinet and their first opportunity to translate "mod-
erate" rhetoric into "responsible" legislative detail. The bill the govern-
ment proposed revealed the extent to which they were willing to
substantiate rhetorical assertion. It also bore the marks of its author, the
new President of the Board of Control, Lord Ellenborough. Ellenborough
had an air of enlightened opinion and administrative efficiency marred by
a putative weakness ofjudgment.68 The scheme he proposed abolished the
existing system of "double government," and substituted a Minister of the
Crown occupying the rank of a Secretary of State and serving as President
of a Council of India made up of eighteen members. The composition of the
Council and the introduction of the elective principle into the nomination
of this executive characterized Ellenborough's design. Half the Council
were to be appointed by the Crown with the moiety elected. Originally
Ellenborough intended to grant three elected members to large cities in
India, but, upon Lord Stanley's advice, five members were granted to
urban constituencies in Britain.69 The remaining four elected members
were to be chosen by a constituency formed from those resident in India for
at least ten years as either members of the Civil Service or as proprietors
of at least ?2,000 of stock: a constituency estimated at about 5,000
persons.
An enlarged council of eighteen with nine of its members elected-a
five of those by popular urban constituencies-bore little relation t
parliamentary expectation of a Conservative scheme. Incredulous s
prise typified reaction when Disraeli introduced the bill into the Com
mons on March 26, 1858.70 Bright, neither wanting to revive Palmerst
India Bill nor Palmerston's prestige, urged the government to reconsi
their measure and, in private observed that the bill resembled
Ellenborough: "all action and no go."7 Roebuck decried the bill as "a
67PRO, Russell to Dean of Bristol, 26 February 1858, Russell Mss. PRO

30/22/13/E fol. 238.
68Often self-willed, vehement and impatient of checks and contradictions (see
footnote 19 above) Ellenborough maintained a strong conviction in his own opinion
that rendered him either an unmanageable colleague or valuable ally.
69Carnavon Memo. 1858, cit. Sir A. Hardinge Life ofH.E.M. Herbert, Fourth Earl
of Carnavon 1831-1890 (London, 1925) I, 115. See also, PRO, Ellenborough to
Derby, March 29, 1858. Ellenborough Mss. 30/12/9/ fol. 1891.
7Disraeli, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 818-833 (March 26, 1858).
7Bright, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 843-845 (March 26, 1858). BL, Bright to Cobden,
March 31, 1858. Bright Mss. 43384 fol. 121.
sham."72 Despite Ellenborough's belief that the bill would be "a

success" Greville noted that it was received "with general aversion
contempt."73 The government discovered that the translation of rhet
assertion into credible legislation was a difficult process in the fac
opposition hostility and disquiet among their own back benches
same evening the Commons adjourned for the Easter recess.
Palmerston saw in the government's India Bill the cause he require
an immediate attack upon the ministry. "Pam [was] both willing
anxious to turn [the government] out immediately. This [was] of c
his best, if not only, chance of a return to office."74 On the mornin
March 29 a meeting was held at Cambridge House attended by Pal-
merston, Lansdowne, Clarendon, Cornewall Lewis, Labouchere, Gran-
ville, and Vernon Smith. Most declared themselves ready to oppose the
bill vehemently with Granville, Lansdowne, and Labouchere appearing
to be rather more "timid."75 Russell's exact intentions were crucial to the
securing of a majority opposed to the second reading of the bill. Cornewall
Lewis was therefore authorized to communicate with Pembroke Lodge.
Russell, however, continued to perceive patience as the best safeguard of
his own future prospects. Lord Aberdeen, Newcastle, Graham, and Glad-
stone advised against hastily destroying the Conservative Bill and thus
reviving Palmerston's scheme and its author.76 At a party on the evening
of March 31 held for the purpose of bringing Russell and Palmerston
together, Russell made it clear that he was "[flearful of turning the
government out if he succeeded in throwing out their India Bill." Pal-
merston ruefully observed that Russell "was not so squeamish when we
were in."7
The critical reception given to their India Bill drew a practical moral to
the attention of the government. "It would be damaging to the govern-
ment to withdraw or change their Bill, but it would be fatal to the
government and to the party to run the risk of its rejection by the House."78
Agreeing with Derby that the five popularly elected members of the
Council formed the weakest part of the bill, Ellenborough reduced their
number to two.79 Derby also opened private communication with Radical
72Roebuck, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 842-843 (March 26, 1858).
73BL, Greville Diary, March 30, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123, cit. Greville Memoirs
VIII, 185.
74University of Nottingham Library, Newcastle to Hayward, April 3, 1858,
Newcastle Mss. NeC 12, 372.
75National Register of Archives, Palmerston Diary, March 30, 1858, Broadlands
Mss. D/18.
76BL, Aberdeen to Russell, March 30, 1858, Newcastle Mss. 43192 fol. 207. See
also, University of Nottingham, Newcastle to Hayward, April 3, 1858, Newcastle
Mss. NeC 12,372; B.L. Russell to Aberdeen, April 1, 1858, Aberdeen Mss. 43068 fol.
293.
77National Register of Archives, Palmerston Diary, March 31, 1858. Broadlands
Mss. D/18.
78Bodleian, Earle to Disraeli, March 28, 1858, Hughenden Mss. B/XX/E/34A.
79PRO, Ellenborough to Derby, March 29, 1858. Ellenborough Mss. 31/12/9 fol.
1891.
opinion, using Bulwer-Lytton as an intermediary.80 Radicals suc

Milner Gibson, the government discovered, felt unable to support t
Conservative scheme but at the same time objected to the notion that
should be "made use of to give Palmerston a political triumph o
Derby-perhaps even to restore the former to office."81 Bulwer-Lytt
communication of the government's readiness to modify and change t
scheme, Milner Gibson assured Bright, would "extricate [the Rad
from the Palmerston danger."82
On April 3 Milner Gibson informed Russell that the Radicals "wou
like to be invited to a course which would avoid any sanction to
Derby's Bill, preserve them from a Palmerston restoration, and offer a
chance of a good Bill for India."83 Disraeli subsesquently received fr
"the Independent Liberal Party" a clandestine suggestion that, in orde
prevent the defeat of the government, "some person of comman
position" move a series of resolutions as to the opinion of the Comm
over the principles of a satisfactory India Bill.84 Disraeli believed Ru
was both the prominent person referred to and the anonymous sourc
the suggestion. On April 5, in a speech at the Mansion House dinn
Derby announced his Cabinet's readiness to modify the proposed Ind
scheme and a wish to raise the question of Indian government above "
sport of political parties or the battlefield of rival disputants."85 The spe
was a public invitation to cross-bench compromise, and offered an op
tunity to Russell to assume a nonpartisan prominence.
When Parliament reassembled on April 12, 1858 what had emerged
the plan of conciliation, with Stanley negotiating directly with Russe
was acted out. Disraeli briefly opened the debate proposing the secon
reading of the government's India Bill.87 Immediately after Disraeli
finished speaking Russell suggested the withdrawal of all earlier sch
and that resolutions, as a basis for an India Bill, be discussed in a
Committee of the Whole House.88 It was desirable, Russell maintained,
that the question be discussed without raising a party debate. As Disraeli
reported, Russell, "wishing to defeat the prospects of Lord Palmerston"
and hoping "himself to occupy a great mediatory position," announced his
intention "to propose the mezzotermine of Resolutions."89
80Bodleian, Bulwer-Lytton to Derby, March 3, 1858, Hughenden Mss.

B/XX/S/166A.
81BL, Milner Gibson to Bright, April 1, 1858, Bright Mss. 43388 fol. 75.
82BL, Milner Gibson to Bright, April 4, 1858, Bright Mss. 43388 fol. 77.
83PRO, Milner Gibson to Russell, April 3, 1858, Russell Mss. 30/22//13/F fol. 13.
84Disraeli to Derby, n.d. (April 4, 1858) Derby Mss. 145/5, in the possession of the
Earl of Derby, Knowsley, Prescot.
85Derby at the Mansion House, April 6, 1858, The Times. See also, PRO,
Ellenborough to Derby, March 29, 1858. Ellenborough Mss. 30/12/19 fol. 1891.
86Bodleian, Stanley to Disraeli, n.d. (April ?, 1858), Hughenden Mss. B/XX/S/662.
87Disraeli, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 857. (April 12, 1858).
88Russell, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 858-861. (April 12, 1858).
89Disraeli to the Queen, April 12, 1858, Q.V.L. III 354.
Disraeli swiftly accepted Russell's proposal, but Wood, from the "Pa
merstonian" benches, denied Russell the full fruits of victory. W
expressed himself astonished that a subject of such importance should
left in the hands of a private member and perceived it as an abdication
its duties by the government.90 Disraeli saw Wood's speech as an attem
"to deprive Lord John of the mediatory position" and, despite Russel
being "greatly mortified," Disraeli found himself able to accept respo
sibility for the proposal without grounds for the charge of"arrogance
intrusion" into Russell's personal initiative.91 With a copy of the reso
lutions already privately received from Russell, Disraeli agreed to mo
the resolutions from the Treasury Bench.92 Bipartisan compromise su
denly assumed the appearance of Conservative rather than Russell
enterprise and, though denying Palmerston prominence, Russell a
found himself denied the opportunity to advertise his own statesmansh
It was only left to Palmerston to jeer that Disraeli "like Anthony came
bury his bill and not to praise it," while it appeared that Disraeli had b
"assisting at a sort of Irish Wake."93
Between April 12 and 28, 1858 the Cabinet decided upon the pre
form and wording of the resolutions that might stand as proof of th
"perserverance of [their] intentions once announced."94 Subsequen
debate of the resolutions in Parliament revealed that the "Liberal party
the Commons resemble[d] a pack of hounds in full cry when the huntsm
and the whipper-in [had] been thrown at a fence or immersed in jumpi
wide brook."95 Indeed, further discussion only served "to strengthen t
roots of dissension among the Liberals."9 What was apparent was
"the breach between [Russell] and the Palmerstonian Whigs [was] muc
widened, and [had] become more difficult to heal."97 Russell conjectu
that "[flifty lies, 300 invectives and 900 lashes from The Times" would
"ordered as a fit punishment" for his apostasy.98 What Russell did ens
was that during discussions he be seen to play the part of"umpire," rat
than becoming "a party in the suite," it being prudent not unnecessa
"Wood, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 864-866 (April 12, 1858).

9lDisraeli to the Queen, April 12, 1858. Q.V.L. III 354.
92Disraeli, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 873 (April 12, 1858).
93Palmerston, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 871-873 (April 12, 1858).
94Bodleian, Derby to Disraeli, April 30, 1858, Hughenden Mss. B/XX/S/171
95University College London, Parkes to Brougham, May 3, 1858, Brougham M
20080.
96Dallas to Cass, May 7, 1858, cit. Letters from London, II, 17. See also, Pal-
merston, 3 Hansard CXLIX 1673-1680 (April 26, 1858); Russell, 3 Hansard
CXLIX: 1673-1680 (April 26, 1858); Russell, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 1695-1701;
Horsman, 3. Hansard CXLIX: 1710-1713 (April 26, 1858); Vane, 3 Hansard
CXLIX: 2016-2023 (April 30, 1858); Palmerston, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 2038-2041
(April 30, 1858).
97BL, Greville Diary, April 16, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123, cit. Greville Memoirs
VIII, 189.
98PRO, Russell to Dean of Bristol, April 28, 1858, Russell Mss. 30/22/13/F fol. 62.
"to show [his] hand and to lay [his] cards on the table."99 The essen
political truth was this: "though party objects [were] universlly
claimed, yet in reality it [was] a struggle for power."'00
IV
Cabinet strategy was to emphasize opposition division through Trea-

sury Bench concession. Disarray might, in turn, throw loosened talent
and votes into the ministerial orbit. This created the intended impression
that "a positive conflict upon a cabinet question" would be "hard to bring
about."''? The limits to such concession, however, existed in executive,
rather than legislative, decision. On April 12, Lord Ellenborough received
from Lord Canning the draft of a proclamation to the People of Oudh that,
with certain exceptions, "the proprietry right in the soil of the province
[was] confiscated to the British government."'02 Canning, however, as yet
unaware of the change of ministry, sent the explanatory letter accom-
panying the draft to Vernon Smith in the belief that he was still the
responsible minister. Vernon Smith, consistent with earlier behavior,103
failed to forward this vital letter to Ellenborough. Ellenborough thus
received the apparently punitive draft with an incomplete understanding
of its purpose and character.
Ellenborough's reaction to the proclamation was as severe as his literal
understanding of its intent. Arguing that threatening the disinheritance
of a people would create almost insurmountable difficulties in re-
establishing peace in India, Ellenborough forcefully rebuked Canning for
castigating, "with what they [would] feel as the severest punishment, the
mass of the inhabitants of the country."'04 The rebuke was sharp, severe
and, in retrospect, might be seen as heavy handed. On April 17, the day
after the Cabinet had discussed the matter, Derby approved Ellenborough's
reply "saying 'it was very proper and not too strong for the occasion."'0"
Disraeli, Sir John Pakington and Lord John Manners also individually
endorsed the reply, but pressure of business prevented Ellenborough sub-
mitting it to the whole Cabinet on April 24: nor was the despatch submitted
for the approval of the Queen. Misjudgment compounded procedural over-
sight when Ellenborough sent, in anticipation of approval, copies of his
despatch to Lord Granville and John Bright. At once publication became
inevitable and the whole episode was exposed to hostile political scrutiny.106
99PRO, Graham to Russell, April 25, 1858, Russell Mss. 30/22/13/F fol. 58.
"1Ibid.
?'Dallas to Cass, April 30, 1858, cit. Letters from London II, 15.
02The draft of the proclamation was printed in The Times, May 6, 1858.
I03PRO, Granville to Ellenborough, February 23, 1858, Ellenborough Mss.
30/12/9 fol. 276.
04Ellenborough's dispatch to Canning was printed in The Times, May 8, 1858.
"05Ellenborough to Derby, May 13, 1858, cit. Monypenny and Buckle Disraeli, IV,
141.
06See Monypenny and Buckle Disraeli IV, 141-143: W. D. Jones Lord Derby and
Victorian Conservatism chap. IX, pp. 234-235. See also, The Queen to Derby, May
9, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, p. 358.
Ellenborough's severe, if partially uninformed, despatch prov

opposition with an opportunity for "positive conflict." The elem
chracteristic of moral polemic were eagerly and easily cast
emerged as an abused martyr to ministerial folly and Ellenborou
as the personification of Conservative ineptitude. Enmity and
were further inflamed when, in early May, different versi
Ellenborough's despatch were put before each House.107 The Ci
Directors of the East India Company went into "a state of fren
"[a]ll the Government people," Granville noted with satisfaction,
a very bad case."'08 At a meeting in Cambridge House on M
merston and Granville decided to move a motion attacking the
ment's treatment of Canning which, on Granville's suggestion, w
to two "independent" members: Cardwell in the Commons
tesbury in the Lords.'09 The limited terms of the motion reve
desired focus of the debate. No reference was made to the character of
Canning's proclamation; no comment was passed on Canning's policy of
confiscation; no allusion was made to Vernon Smith's withholding of
information received from Canning. What might be conveniently avoided
in the composed form of a written motion, however, was little safeguard
against the unpredictable course of a parliamentary debate.
Of more immediate significance was the timing of the occasion for
"positive conflict." The ten weeks that the Conservatives had been in
power was sufficiently short a time for Palmerston to believe he was
acting before his prestige and authority were irretrievably dissipated by
severance from office and internal division."0 It was, however, sufficiently
long a time for Russell to believe that it was an opportunity to assert his
studiedly high-minded and uncompromised preeminence over a lead-
erless and demoralized opposition."' Such contingent ambiguity tolerated
those contrary and incompatible intentions that came to underlay osten-
sibly concerted opposition maneuver. Covert differences were implied in
Lord Henry Lennox's report to Disraeli, on May 1, that "no arrangement
had been entered into by Palmerston and John Russell except their simple
vote for Cardwell.""' Russell was subsequently "irritated" by Bright's
suggestion, in the Commons, that "a renewed political alliance" existed
between Palmerston and Russell and was only dissuaded from making a
public denial by it being pointed out "that it would be very far from being
for his interest to do so.""3
Debate of Shaftesbury's motion in the Lords, on May 10, focused on
Ellenborough's putative misjudgment and Vernon Smith's laxity. On May
11 Ellenborough announced his personal responsibility for the whole
'0Malmesbury Memoirs, May 8, 1858. II, p. 11.7.

108PRO, Granville to Canning, May 10, 1858, Granville Mss. 30/29/21/2 fol. 118.
0lgIbid.
"?See Bell Palmerston II, 187-188.
"'See John Prest Lord John Russell (London, 1972), p. 382.
"2Bodleian, Lennox to Disraeli, May 1, 1858, Hughenden Mss. B/XX/LX/109.
"3University of Durham, Grey Diary, May 24, 1858, Grey Mss. C3/21.
episode and his resignation from the government in the hope, as De

informed the Queen, that an act of self-sacrifice might prevent debat
Cardwell's motion in the Commons.14 On Lord Grey's insistence Shaf
tesbury persevered in his motion which, in the event, was defeated on
14 by a majority of nine.15 In the Commons, though some minis
affected "to regard the self-immolation of Ellenborough as an adequ
atonement," the government's "great hope . .. seemed to be the extr
difficulty, if not impossibility, of combining a sufficient number of Rad
votes with the Whigs.""6 Derby also came to appreciate the deter
effect of"a march to the last Tory pitched battle," a dissolution which,
twelve months after the previous election, was calculated to excite p
niary and local anxieties among many Whig and Liberal back benche
uncertain of re-election and anxious to avoid the expense of the
hustings."7
On May 11 Derby enquired whether, in the event of a government
defeat in the Commons, the Queen would grant a dissolution. Lord
Aberdeen, to whom the Queen turned for advice, provided a portrayal of
affairs that revealed much about Peelite intentions. If Derby went, Aber-
deen asserted, Palmerston would have to be recalled."8 Aware of the
Crown's dislike for Palmerston Aberdeen ignored his own hope, a Russell-
Peelite collaboration appeasing Radical sentiment, because he believed
an immediate government defeat too precipitant for the realization of that
hope. Derby's immediate survival was, in Aberdeen's mind, Russell's
future opportunity.
Despite Ellenborough's resignation, Palmerston retained a deter-
mination to persevere with Cardwell's motion. But "a numerous and
noisy""9 meeting of the opposition at Cambridge House, on May 14,
revealed to Palmerston that if he returned to the premiership his ministry
would have to be on "a broader basis, and more liberal measures should be
adopted" than before.'20 Such realization was also an acknowledgment of
Russell's future opportunity in being able to coalesce a broader basis of
support, and advocate more liberal measures with greater credibility,
than Palmerston.
"4Derby to The Queen, May 10, 1858, Derby Mss. 184/1 fol. 151. See also
Ellenborough to The Queen, May 10, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, 358.
"University of Durham, Grey Diary, May 13, 1858, Grey Mss. C3/21.
"6Dallas to Cass, May 14, 1858, cit. Letters from London II, 20.
"'See Lord E. Fitzmaurice The Life of SecondEarl Granville K. G. (London, 1905
I, 308-9.
"'PRO, Granville to Canning, May 17, 1858. Granville Mss. 30/29/21/2 fol. 124.
See also, Prince Albert Memo. May 11, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, 359-60. For a dis-
cussion of Prince Albert's position see C. H. Stuart "The Prince Consort and
Ministerial Politics, 1856-90, in Hugh R. Trevor-Roper ed. Essays in British
History presented to Sir Keith Feiling (London, 1964) pp. 247-70.
"9Somerset County Record Office, Fortescue Diary, May 14, 1858. Carlingford
Mss. DD/SH 358.
'"2National Register of Archives, Palmerston Diary, May 14, 1858, Broadla
Mss. D/18.
The effectiveness of government speeches, especially from Sir Hugh

Cairns, and divergent opinion expressed from the opposition bench
began to further compromise Palmerston's position. Observing this, afte
the first night of debate on May 14, Disraeli decided to prolong the debat
until May 21:121 "everyday [the government's] prospects as to the divisi
appeared to be mending and public opinion more and more inclinin
against the Opposition and the Proclamation, though still blaming
Ellenborough's letter."22 Finally, on May 16, after her consultation wit
Aberdeen, the Queen informed Derby that a dissolution would be grante
to him if he asked for it.123 The discreet dissemination of this assurance
further undermined the cohesion of "Palmerstonian" purpose.
The second and third nights of debate on May 17 and 20 betrayed
increasing opposition dissension. The Radical Roebuck delivered "a vio-
lent speech against Cardwell and the Whig party."124 Bright, deriding
Cardwell's motion as a party maneuver, poured bitterness and sarcasm
upon the "arcana" of the "Palmerstonian" Whigs.125 Cornewall Lewis'
defence of the motion126 was, in turn, countered from the benches behind
him by Sir Arthur Elton who believed Ellenborough's despatch, though
deficient in courtesy, was "substantially right."127 Graham's statement,
which had "very great effect,"'28 provided confirmation of"some solvent at
work that [was] rapidly disintegrating the Opposition."12 It also con-
firmed the growing agreement among those sympathetic to Russell that
Derby's defeat would be synonymous with Palmerston's success. Graham
prefaced his speech with a declaration of attachment to the notions of
Liberalism as evinced by Russell. It was, Fortescue shrewdly noted,
Graham's "hatred of Palmerston" that "decided his course.""' On behalf of
the Peelites (with the exception of Herbert13") Graham declared Canning's
proclamation "impolitic" and Ellenborough's reply merely indiscreet.l32
Graham's statement was complemented by the arrival, that same day, of
further mail from India revealing that Sir James Outram, Chief Com-
missioner of Oudh, had expressed a decided disapprobation of Canning's
proclamation. Derby immediately authorized the new despatches to be
'21Disraeli to Derby, May 16, 1858, Derby Mss. 145/5.

122BL, Greville Diary, May 23, 1858. Greville Mss. 41123, cit. Greville Memoirs
VIII p. 200.
'23Phipps Memo. n.d. (May 15, 1858) cit. Q.V.L. III, 363-366. See also, Prince
Albert Memo. May 16, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, 367-368.
'24BL, Broughton Diary, May 18, 1858, Broughton Mss. 43761 fol. 84.
"2Bright, 3 Hansard CL: 959 (May 20, 1858).
126Cornewall Lewis, 3 Hansard CL: 831-840. (May 17, 1858).
'27Elton, 3 Hansard CL: 974-976 (May 20, 1858).
128Disraeli to The Queen, May 21, 1858, cit. Q.V.L. III, 368-369.
'29W. White The Inner Life of the House of Commons (London, 1897) ed. J.
McCarthy, I, 73.
"30Somerset County Record Office, Fortescue Diary, May 20, 1858, Carlingford
Mss. DD/SH 358.
31BL, Herbert to Gladstone, May 17, 1858, Gladstone Mss. 44211 fol. 10.
32Graham, 3 Hansard CL: 985-1003 (May 20, 1858).
laid before the Commons133 which, he believed, "exercised a powerful

influence" on the opinion of the House.'34
On the morning of May 21 Disraeli received a letter from Cardwell
requesting permission to withdraw his motion.'13 Disraeli refused the
request: the opposition's abandonment of the motion would have to be
public, protracted, and self-avowed. At a meeting on the morning of the
21st attended by Palmerston, Wood, George Grey, Cornewall Lewis, and
Russell it was decided to continue with the motion unless "the temper of
the House [was] against doing so."'36 What "Palmerstonians" feared was
the "particularly mortifying" spectacle of Palmerston involved in "inevi-
table defeat, and without the power of rallying a second time."'37 The
course of debate on the evening of May 21 realized exactly those fears and
Disraeli's wish to maximize opposition embarrassment. During the even-
ing a steady succession of opposition back benchers pressed Cardwell to
withdraw his motion. Finally, as "the whole of the Opposition benches
became one great dissolving view of anarchy,"'3 Palmerston asked Card-
well to withdraw the motionl39 and Cardwell agreed to do so.140
The withdrawal of Cardwell's motion was a watershed for the Derby
ministry: the "affair [had] been the battle of Marengo of political
warfare."'14 Gathorne Hardy rejoiced that the opposition "bubble [had
been] burst."'42 Disraeli excitedly reported that when "the very heat of the
battle was to rage, the enemy suddenly fled in a manner the most
ignominous! Never was such a rout!"'43 Derby found the debate analogous
to "the explosion of a well constructed mine under the feet, not of the
assailed, but of the assailants."'44 Nor was this merely the self-
congratulation of the victors. Broughton, attending a party at Cambridge
House on May 22, found it "pretty well attended, but very different from
the gay happy circle of a week before."'45 Knatchbull-Hugessen saw the
withdrawal of Cardwell's motion as "a great triumph to [the] Ministers
33Derby to Jolliffe, May 20, 1858, Derby Mss. 184/1 fol. 158.
'34Derby to The Queen, May 21, 1858, Derby Mss. 184/1 fol. 159.
135 BL, Greville Diary, May 23, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123, cit. Greville Memoirs
VIII 201.
'36National Register of Archives, Palmerston Diary, May 21, 1858, Broadlan
Mss. D/18.
'37BL, Greville Diary, May 23, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123, cit. Greville Memoirs
VIII 201.
138Disraeli at Slough, The Times, May 27, 1858.
39Palmerston, 3 Hansard CL: 1040-1042 (May 21, 1858).
406Cardwell, 3 Hansard 3rd CL: 1042 (May 21, 1858).
'4'BL, Greville Diary, May 23, 1858, Greville Mss. 41123, cit. Greville Memoi
VIII 201.
142East Suffolk Record Office, Gathorne Hardy Diary, May 24, 1858, Cranbro
Mss. T501/291 fol. 142.
'43Disraeli to Mrs. Brydges Willyams, May 22, 1858, cit. Monypenny and Buckle
Disraeli IV, 149.
44Derby to The Queen, May 23, 1858, Derby Mss. 184/1 fol. 165.
'45BL, Broughton Diary, May 22, 1858, Broughton Mss. 43761 fol. 86.
[which] strengthened their position for a time."'46 Palmerston him

without qualification, recognized the debate as "a great triumph for
Government."147 Lord Grey found among the members of Brooks "
eral feeling that the party had received a most mortifying defeat, an
the business had been deplorably managed."s48 Graham predicted t
"the faction fight," which had "ended in a farce," would "carry Derb
the session if [the premier made] no great mistakes. At all even
danger of [Derby] being trodden down by his own 'wild elephant' [w
an end; and Johnny [would] think twice, if he ever [thought] twice,
he embark[ed] on a second Cambridge House foray."'49
Parliament's concern with the question of India during 1857 and

revealed many of the underlying tensions, antagonisms, and aspir
shaping party politics during the 1850s. It also revealed what m
expected to happen, what nearly did happen, but what in the event
occur."50 First, it revealed the conscious and earnest attempt b
Conservative party, under the leadership of Derby, to establish itse
credible, moderate, and responsible party of good government:
sought to achieve in the 1850s what Peel had achieved in the 1830s.
the failure of Cardwell's censure "the Government floated on top
wave. [They] suddenly found [them]selves in the confidence apparen
the country, the newspapers, and the House of Commons, where [
hardly ever" during the rest of the session "met with defeat."'51
resumption of the Indian debate in June provided further demonst
of Conservative ascendancy and Whig-Liberal differences so that, by
Lord Lyndhurst observed the "Tories [were] getting on admirably
"nothing to oppose them, and majorities in every division."'52
Disraeli pronounced that "seldom [had there] been [a session] in wh
greater number of excellent measures [had] been passed than the p
ent."'3 As well as a new India Act the Conservative government
146Kent County Archives, Knatchbull Hugessen Diary, July 30, 1858, Bra
Mss. U951, F. 29.
147National Register of Archives, Palmerston Diary, May 21, 1858, Broadlands
Mss. D/18.
'48University of Durham, Grey Diary, May 20, 1858, Grey Mss. C3/21.
149BL, Graham to Aberdeen, May 28, 1858, Aberdeen Mss. 43192 fol. 218.
"50It has often been an assumption underlying received narrative that Derby's
second ministry, because it was in a minority, was inevitably destined to a short-
lived existence and that the consequent Liberal consolidation that occurred in 1859
was thus a natural outcome of party feeling. This is to ignore much contemporary
speculation. Palmerston's ascendancy by the summer of 1859 was neither certain
nor necessary.
"'Carnarvon Memo. 1858, cit. Hardinge Carnarvon I, 115.
152University College, London, Lyndhurst to Brougham, July 23 (1858) Br
gham Mss. 13317.
'53Disraeli to Mrs. Brydges Willyams, July 26, 1858, cit. Monypenny and Bu
Disraeli IV, 168.
guarded a bill abolishing the property qualifications for M.P.s an

lation allowing practising Jews to sit in the Commons: a bill
Machin considers "the most symbolic religious liberty measure o
1850's."'54 During the recess of 1858 Derby's Cabinet framed a Par-
liamentary Reform Bill that was more "liberal" than the bill favored by
Palmerston a year earlier."'55 This was legislative substantiation of the
government's studiedly fabian rhetoric:'56
Lord Derby has shown wisdom, tact and statesmanship, far

beyond what was expected of him, and the natural result is a
corresponding triumph over public opinion. The spirit of exterior
conciliation is quite distinct. He soothes and satisfies every-
where. ... At home he has ceased to fight with the age [and]
concedes more liberally than he ever promised.
This, in turn, substantiated the Conservative leadership's strategic

aspirations. "We are now endeavoring to reconstruct the party on a wider
basis and trying to lay the foundation of a permanent system."157
The resumption of the Indian debate in June 1858 also threw public
attention onto that individual member of Derby's cabinet who most
effectively represented intelligent and moderate probity: the Prime Min-
ister's son, Lord Stanley. As Ellenborough's successor at the Board of
Control Stanley successfully steered the Indian resolutions through the
Commons.l58 Disraeli came to regard his thirty-two year old colleague as
"a source of great strength and popularity" and "a man of first rate
abilities and acquirements'159 Making more frequent extra-parliamentary
speeches during the 1850s than either Cobden or Bright, Stanley discerned
that "Tory Democracy" which Palmerston subsequently left as a legacy to
54"G.I.T. Machin Politics and the Churches in GreatBritain, 1832 to 1868 (Oxford,
1977) p. 292. Derby's government also passed Acts facilitating the drainage of the
Thames, reforming municipal government and conferring self-governing status on
British Columbia. See Stewart The Foundation of the Conservative Party
1830-1867, pp. 318-21.
"55See H. C. Bell, "Palmerston and Parliamentary Representation," The Journal
of Modern History 4 (June, 1932), 186-213, and Bell Palmerston II, 178-180. For
details of the Conservative Reform scheme see Disraeli, 3 Hansard CLII: 966-1005
(Feb. 28, 1859). See also, R. W. Davis Disraeli (London, 1976) pp. 128-37, although
allowance should be made for the natural biographical overemphasis of Disraeli's
part in framing the scheme at the expense of others, in particular Derby. See C.
Seymour Electoral Reform in England and Wales (London, 1915) pp. 234-79, for a
discussion of the 1859 Bill and other schemes of the period, although Palmerston's
proposed measure of 1857 is not considered.
56Dallas to Cass, August 13, 1858 cit. Dallas Letters from London II, 44.
"7Disraeli to Derby, August 13, 1858, Derby Mss. 145/5.
15Carnarvon Memo. 1858, cit. Hardinge Carnarvon I, 115.
I59Disraeli to Mrs. Brydges Willyams, August 28, 1858, cit. Monypenny and
Buckle Disraeli IV, 175.
Disraeli.160 Increasingly after 1854 Stanley came to represent

public integrity as "a calm philosophical statesman" never inclin
"to party what [was] meant for mankind."'61 Such a guarantee o
was the perfect complement to Derby's conciliatory progressivi
end of the 1858 session Stanley seemed "completely the man of
day, and in all human probability [was] destined to play [an] imp
conspicuous part in political life."'62
In September 1858 the Duke of Bedford, Russell's elder b
believed that the political future would "all depend on a ch
accidents, and that those accidents are as likely to be in favour,
the government.""63 In the event, by June 1859 the particular a
circumstance associated with the Reform issue and the Italian
prompted the defeat and resignation of Derby's government. T
means predictably, Derby's government and the tenure of offic
bers of his Cabinet such as Stanley came to an abrupt end.64 Al
opposition, Derby swiftly resumed his strategy of masterly ina
that between 1859 and 1866 the Conservative leadership patien
"6Stanley's journal provides important insights into his perception

ened Conservative appeal. In 1853 Stanley visited Bury and "found rem
almost feudal respect for our family, which has not been duly cultivat
with self-made industrialists of the town: "their force and shrewdness of character
greatly impressed me: in these requisites for success no class that I know in English
life equals them. The contact of this visit fixed me in a purpose which general
considertions had prompted: that of shaping my political course so as not to lose
their support, if it can once be gained-and I think it can.... They seemed to have,
except in Church matters, many Conservative tendencies, but are kept aloof by the
mingled timidity and pride of the country gentlemen." Liverpool City Record Office,
Stanley Diary, November 22,1853 Stanley Mss. 920 DER (15) 43/3 cit. Vincent (ed.)
Disraeli Derby and the Conservative Party. p. 112. This was the same snobbish
flunkeyism Cobden despised in Palmerstonianism, and the audience Disraeli
sought in the 1870s. For Stanley's speeches during the 1850s on the merits of study
for working men, the needs of the great towns, Mechanics Institutes and women's
work see Baron Sanderson and E. H. Roscoe (eds.) Speeches and Addresses of
Edward Henry, XV Earl of Derby, K. G. (London, 1894)
161White Inner Life of the House of Commons I, 79. See also Vincent (ed.) Disraeli,
Derby and the Conservative Party pp. 142-47.
"62BL, Greville Diary, November 4, 1858 Greville Mss. 41123 cit. Greville
Memoirs VIII, p. 216.
"63University College London, Bedford to Brougham, September 30, 1858,
Brougham Mss. 30406.
"64See D.E.D. Beales England and Italy, 1859-60 (London, 1961). See also,
Monypenny and Buckle Life of Disraeli IV, 178-253: J. Morley Life of Gladstone
(London, 1903) I, chap. XI, pp. 621-28: H. C. Bell Lord Palmerston (London, 1936)
chap. XXVIII, pp. 202-19: W. D. Jones Lord Derby and Victorian Conservatism
(1956) chap. IX, pp. 241-58: John Prest Lord John Russell (London, 1972) chap.
XVI, pp. 382-84. See also A. B. Hawkins, (Ph.D. thesis, University of London,
1980), "British Parliamentary Party Politics, 1855-1859," pp. 411-54. In December
1858 the Radical and well informed Charles Villiers observed: "The Liberal party is
too much divided and scattered at present to offer the least expectation of returning
to power next year, and the people who are now in must be great blunderers if they
cannot at least secure themselves for another year or two." (BL, Villiers to Bright,
December 8, 1858, Bright Mss. 43389 fol. 224).
for Whig, Liberal, and Radical differences to instigate a mor

realignment of party connection. As between 1853 and 1858, the
servative front bench attempted to prove to Whigs and moderate
that their real friends sat opposite them, rather than alongside
the House of Commons.l65 Both these developments served to ob
Derby's aims and achievement: the rehabilitation of the Cons
party after 1852, shorn of Peelites, as a party "steadily support
moderate policy recommended by the educated caution of the so
men of both parties."166
The parliamentary debates over India during 1858 also affirme
determining tension in mid-nineteenth-century party politics w
rivalry between Russell and Palmerston, and their respective pe
of Whig, Liberal, Peelite, and Radical alignment. The antagonism
between these two men dominated the party politics of the 1850s. After
the withdrawal of Cardwell's motion, in May 1858, the resumed Indian
debate in June 1858 only served to advertise their animosity:'67
When Lord John proposed that the number of the Council for
Indian Affairs should be 12 instead of 15 ... many Liberals ...
voted with the Government, and he was beaten by 50 or 60 votes.
When in committee Lord Palmerston proposed that the clauses
relating to the Council should only be in force for 5 years... Lord
John opposed him and the result was that 25 Liberals followed
[Russell] and the Government had a majority of 34 against Lord
Palmerston. And when, on the same evening, Russell proposed to
negative the clause which provided that secret orders might be
sent out without the knowledge of the Council. Lord Palmerston
opposed him - was followed by about 30 Liberals and the
government had a majority of 173 to 149 upon a point which...
should have united all Liberals against them.
Such a spectacle only enforced Herbert's reluctance to compare "the faults

of possible prime ministers. There [was] too much material of that kind to
make it either difficult or pleasant."'68 By July 1858 Wood was eloquent
about "the miserable condition of the [party] and condemned Palmerston's
recent conduct." 69Graham intoned in January 1859 that the "broken
fragments of the old Whig party [were] so shattered that they [could not]
i65It is this particular strategic impulse that led to the years 1859-1865 being
referred to as a period of 'party truce' or 'party logomachy' as Lord Campbell
described it.
"66Walter Bagehot "Lord Salisbury on Moderation," cit. E. I. Barrington (ed.) The
Life and Works of Walter Bagehot (London, 1915) IX, p. 174.
"67Kent County Archives, Knatchbull Hugessen Diary, July 30, 1858, Brabourne
Mss. U951 F. 29.
"68Herbert to Argyll, March 15, 1858, cit. Argyll Autobiography and Me
121.
'69BL, Broughton Diary, July 6, 1858. Broughton Mss. 43761 fol. 104.
be pieced together again. The old stagers [had] known each other to
and too well; and they disliked each other too much."70 To many
seemed no prospect "of the formation of an efficient party, let a
government, out of the chaos on the opposition benches.""'7
The rivalry between Palmerston and Russell for Whig-Libera
eminence disrupted the last years of Russell's first ministry, the Ab
coalition, Palmerston's first ministry, and the opposition to Derby i
In May 1858 it appeared that Palmerston had lost the struggle. Be
"greatly disliked by a number of Liberal M.P.'s"172 it seemed that
merston [had] lost his chance."'73 Wood was convinced "that P. would n
again be prime minister."'74 Despite Palmerston's enfeebling loss of
bility and the concern with the issue of Reform in 1859, however, R
because of Conservative concession, Radical reticence, and Palmers
patience, failed to affirm his authority over former Peelite, Libe
Radical sentiment. Russell's failure proved to be Palmerston's
tunity and Russell had to wait for Palmerston's death in 1865 to a
his inheritance. The fact remains, however, that one of the most
prising political events of the 1850s was the alignment of Whig, L
Peelite, and Radical party connection under the leadership of Palm
rather than Russell, in 1859, with the consequent repudiation
alternative aspirations of Derby, Russell and a wide variety of see
realignment including Disraeli, Stanley, Aberdeen, Graham, Glads
Clarendon, Cornewall Lewis, Bright, Cobden, and Lord Grey.'75
The Indian debates during 1858 revealed the potential alignm
party sentiment sought by an important few and expected by many
that Palmerston would become leader of the Conservative party in
Commons under the moderate centrist leadership of Derby; that f
Conservatism and Whig realignment would, in turn, be challenged
consolidation of Liberal, Peelite, and Radical sentiment under the
gressive" rectitude of Russell. Little expected, and sought by very f
Palmerston's recovery of his personal pestige by June 1859 so as to
a credible focus for centrist alignment while, at the same time, acq
nominal Peelite and Radical allegiance. In turn, Palmerston's p
style, an emphasis on executive rather than legislative activity an
consequence, a preference for domestic quiescence to allow promine
foreign affairs, came to characterize the mid-nineteenth-century p
scene.
On July 8, 1858 peace in India was proclaimed. L
'70National Library of Scotland, Graham to Ellice, Janua

15019 fol. 46.
'71Herbert to Graham, January 10, 1859, cit. Lord Stanmore Sidney Herbert of
Lea: A Memoir (London, 1906) II, 25.
'72Leeds Record Office, Clanricarde to Canning, May 9, 1858, Canning Mss. 4.
73BL, Forster to Goderich, May 23, 1858. Ripon Mss. 43536 fol. 142.
'74BL, Broughton Diary, July 6, 1858, Broughton Mss. 43761 fol. 104.
175See Hawkins, "British Parliamentary Party Politics, 1885 to 1859." pp.
411-541.
recaptured and Gwalior regained. On August 3, the last day of the 1

session, the Government of India Bill received the Royal Assent and
passed into law. The Act created a Minister of the Crown, responsible for
Indian affairs, assisted by a Council. The Council was to number fifteen
members who held office for life. Seven members were to be elected by the
Court of Directors of the East India Company, the remaining eight
members to be nominated by the Crown. On matters requiring secrecy the
Minister was empowered to create a Secret Committee while Indian
financial accounts were to be periodically laid before the Commons.
Furthermore, at Lord Derby and Lord Stanley's insistence, the scientific
sections of the Indian Army were made open to competitive examination.
In this form the parliamentary concern with India prompted by the
Mutiny, in terms of legislation and policy, came to an end. The admin-
istrative character of that concern; the reformist nature of the Con-
servative response; the bitter divisions within Whig-Liberal ranks; the
withdrawal of Cardwell's motion in May; and subsequent parliamentary
debate, however, betrayed those preceding and persistent political con-
cerns that shaped transient legislative preoccupation with the Asian
subcontinent.
LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY,

LOS ANGELES

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British Parliamentary Party Alignment and the Indian Issue, 1857-1858

Author(s): Angus Hawkins

'National Register of Archives, London, Palmerston Diary, June 26, 1857,

neither necessary nor inevitable. The recognition of crisis and the

Despite symptoms of military unrest during the preceding months

calm confidence.6 Cabinet attitudes towards the Mutiny were charac-

screw vessels) to the troubled sub-continent.12 Other troops, on th

lowing both men pronounced a distinctive line that others might

revolution would occur." Ellenborough, 3 Hansard CXLV: 1393-1396 (June 9,

"[n]ot a single member of the Ministry in town; unless he had stray

It was moral outrage that constrained the variety of possible poli

sity of opinion and allegiance. The issue of parliamentary reform

tion of India in such a way as to elicit support and defer divisio

legislation about India even more than apathy."4' Once again

A momentary scare prompted an emergency session of Parliament in

4"Bodleian Library, Stanley to Disraeli, October 10, 1857, Hughenden Mss.

shown in suppressing the insurrection, revealed further div

The House has behaved so abominably that I am glad they should

The Conservative ministry formed by Lord Derby in February 1858 an

Palmerston's resignation seemed to promise that realignment of

to compete for the load with Palmerston" while contemplating the

67PRO, Russell to Dean of Bristol, 26 February 1858, Russell Mss. PRO

sham."72 Despite Ellenborough's belief that the bill would be "a

opinion, using Bulwer-Lytton as an intermediary.80 Radicals suc

80Bodleian, Bulwer-Lytton to Derby, March 3, 1858, Hughenden Mss.

"Wood, 3 Hansard CXLIX: 864-866 (April 12, 1858).

Cabinet strategy was to emphasize opposition division through Trea-

Ellenborough's severe, if partially uninformed, despatch prov

'0Malmesbury Memoirs, May 8, 1858. II, p. 11.7.

episode and his resignation from the government in the hope, as De

The effectiveness of government speeches, especially from Sir Hugh

'21Disraeli to Derby, May 16, 1858, Derby Mss. 145/5.

laid before the Commons133 which, he believed, "exercised a powerful

[which] strengthened their position for a time."'46 Palmerston him

Parliament's concern with the question of India during 1857 and

guarded a bill abolishing the property qualifications for M.P.s an

Lord Derby has shown wisdom, tact and statesmanship, far

This, in turn, substantiated the Conservative leadership's strategic

Disraeli.160 Increasingly after 1854 Stanley came to represent

"6Stanley's journal provides important insights into his perception

for Whig, Liberal, and Radical differences to instigate a mor

Such a spectacle only enforced Herbert's reluctance to compare "the faults

On July 8, 1858 peace in India was proclaimed. L

'70National Library of Scotland, Graham to Ellice, Janua

recaptured and Gwalior regained. On August 3, the last day of the 1

LOYOLA MARYMOUNT UNIVERSITY,

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