Maternity Children's Hospital vs. Secretary of Labor, 174 SCRA 632
DRILON 
Facts: The petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by the Board of Directors of the
Cagayan de Oro Women's Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera Dorado, as
holdover President. The hospital derives its finances from the club itself as well as from
paying patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly subsidized by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office and the Cagayan De Oro City government.
On May 23, 1986, ten employees of the petitioner employed in different
capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of theRegional Director of Labor
and Employment for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAs, which was docketed as ROX
Case No. CW-71-86. On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of his Labor
Standard and Welfare Officers to inspect the records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of
the allegations in thecomplaints. Payrolls covering the periods of May, 1974, January, 1986,
November, 1985 and May, 1986, were duly submitted for inspection. On July 17, 1986, the
Labor Standard and Welfare Officers submitted their report confirming that there was
underpayment of wages and ECOLAs of all the employees by the petitioner. As a result, the
petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of Labor and Employment, Hon. Augusto
S. Sanchez, who rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying the said Order in that
deficiency wages and ECOLAs, should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23, 1986.
On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the Secretary of Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for lack of merit. Petitioner likewise
maintains that the Order of the respondentRegional Director of Labor, as affirmed with
modifications by respondent Secretary of Labor, does not clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which the award was based. In its "Rejoinder to Comment,” the petitioner
further questions the authority of the Regional Director to award salary differentials and
ECOLAs to private respondents, alleging that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over
money claims is properly lodged in the Labor Arbiter, based on Article 217, paragraph 3 of the
Labor Code.
Issue: Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction over the case.
Held: This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art. 128 of the Labor Code. Labor
standards refer to the minimum requirements prescribed by existing laws, rules, and
regulations relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living allowance and other monetary and
welfare benefits, including occupational, safety, and health standards. Under the present
rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and enforcement power over labor
standards cases, and is therefore empowered to adjudicate money claims, provided there still
exists an employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not
contested by the employer concerned.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS VS.
G.R. NO. L-81958 
JUNE 30, 1988 
FACTS: The Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) challenges the
Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor
and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY
SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in this
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination
against males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic
helpers and females with similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held
likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and
not executive, in character. 
In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution,
providing for worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law." Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was
passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to be in violation of the
Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced. 
ISSUE: Whether or not the Department Order No. 1 in nature of the police power is valid
under the Constitution? 
HELD: In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed. 
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. In the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands. 
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be
nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-
settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a perfect
Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1)
such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of
the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class. 
The Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force abroad,
especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by physical and
personal abuse. As precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to
protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts. 
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no
evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with
an identical predicament. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned,
this Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is
justified. 
There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the
measure. Unquestionably, it is the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance
the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" this Court has no quarrel that in the
midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own good and welfare.  manning its ladies' comfort room. Yap (owner of Bodega) alleged that Lopez have acted in a
The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply
indefinitely so long as those conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending
review of the administrative and legal measures, in the Philippines and in the host
countries . . ."), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a
greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. 
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas
deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has not
been contemplated. 
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The
right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may
be provided by law. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain
of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully delegated.
As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment
with rule-making powers in the enforcement whereof.  easily shown other pieces of evidence such as a contract of employment, SSS or Medicare
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the
loftier purposes targeted by the Government. Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all
other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire
has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.  Control - It is true that petitioner was required to follow rules and regulations prescribing
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of
recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits
of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the
impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary
relief prayed for.
Lopez vs. Bodega City [G.R. No. 155731. Sept 3, 2007]
Facts:
Under a concessionaire agreement, Lopez was the "lady keeper" of Bodega City tasked with
hostile manner against a lady customer after the customer informed the management that
Lopezwas sleeping while on duty. Yap later informed Lopezof the termination of the
concessionaire agreement between them. Lopez sued for illegal dismissal.
Issue:
Was Lopez an employee of Bodega City?
Held:
Payment of wages
She presented a petty cash voucher showing that she received an allowance for five (5) days.
However, this solitary petty cash voucher did not prove that she had been receiving salary
from respondents or that she had been respondents' employee for 10 years. If she was really
an employee of respondents for that length of time, she should have been able to present
salary vouchers or pay slips and not just a single petty cash voucher. Also, she could have
forms, or certificates of withholding tax on compensation income; or she could have
presented witnesses to prove her contention that she was an employee of respondents. But
she failed to do so.
appropriate conduct while within the premises of Bodega City. However, this was imposed
upon petitioner as part of the terms and conditions in the concessionaire agreement
embodied in a 1992 letter of Yap addressed to petitioner.
The concessionaire agreement merely stated that petitioner shall maintain the cleanliness of
the ladies' comfort room and observe courtesy guidelines that would help her obtain the
results they wanted to achieve. There is nothing in the agreement which specifies the
methods by which petitioner should achieve these results. Respondents did not indicate the
manner in which she should go about in maintaining the cleanliness of the ladies' comfort
room.
Fact that she did not sign document does not negate existence of agreement; estoppel
applies
While she did not affix her signature to the letter – the document evidencing the subject
concessionaire agreement, the fact that she performed the tasks indicated in the said
agreement for a period of three years without any complaint or question only goes to show
that she has given her implied acceptance of or consent to the said agreement.
The principle of estoppel in pais applies wherein -- by one's acts, representations or
admissions, or silence when one ought to speak out --intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and to rightfully rely and act on
such belief, so as to be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of those
facts.
ID card alone not sufficient proof of employment
It is true that the words "EMPLOYEE'S NAME" appear printed below petitioner's name.
However, she failed to dispute respondents' evidence that other "contractors" of Bodega City
were also issued the same ID cards for the purpose of enabling them to enter the premises of
Bodega City.
People’s broadcasting v Labor Sec
Facts:
Respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed with the DOLE a complaint against Bombo
Radyo Phil. Inc. for illegal deduction; nonpayment of service incentive leave, 13 th month pay,
premium pay for holiday and rest day; illegal diminution of benefits; delayed payment of
wages; and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. After the conduct of summary
investigations, the DOLE regional director held that Juezan was an employee of Bombo Radyo,
and was therefore entitled to his money claims. Bombo Radyo appealed the decision, but the
DOLE dismissed the same. The CA affirmed such dismissal.
When the matter reached the SC, the CA decision was reversed and set aside. The
court found that there was no er-ee relationship between Bombo Radyo and Juezan. It was
held that while the DOLE may make a determination of the existence of an er-ee relationship,
this function could not be co-extensive with the visitorial and enforcement power provided in
128 LC as amended by 7730. The NLRC was held to be the primary agency in determining the
existence of an er-ee relationship.
From this decision, the PAO filed a motion for clarification of decision (with leave
of court). The PAO sought to clarify as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the
DOLE can be considered as co-extensive with the power to determine the existence of an er-
ee relationship. The court treated the motion for clarification as a second motion for
reconsideration, granting said motion and reinstating the petition.
Issue:
WON the DOLE has the power to determine the existence of er-ee relationship in
its exercise of its visitorial and its enforcement power
Held:
No limitation in the law was placed upon the power of the DOLE to determine the
existence of an er-ee relationship. No procedure was laid down where the DOLE would only
make a preliminary finding, that the power was primarily held by the NLRC. The law did not
say that the DOLE would first seek the NLRC’s determination of the existence of an er-ee
relationship, or that should the existence of the er-ee relationship be disputed, the DOLE
would refer the matter to the NLRC. The DOLE must have the power to determine WON an er-
ee relationship exists, and from there to decided WON to issue compliance orders in
accordance with 128 of LC as amended by 7730.
The determination of the existence of an er-ee relationship by the DOLE must be
respected. The expanded visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE granted by 7730
would be rendered nugatory if the alleged employer could, by the simple expedient of
disputing the er-ee relationship, force the referral of the matter to the NLRC. The court issued
the declaration that at least a prima facie showing of the absence of an er-ee relationship be
made to oust the DOLE of jurisdiction. But it is precisely the DOLE that will be faced with that
evidence, and it is the DOLE that will weigh it, to see if the same does successfully refute the Orozco vs CA, PDI and Magsanoc
existence of an er-ee relationship. Facts:

Orozco was hired as a writer by the Philippine Daily Inquirer in 1990. She was the
columnist of “Feminist Reflections” under the Lifestyle section of the publication. She writes
on a weekly basis and on a per article basis (P250-300/article).

In 1991, Magsanoc as the editor-in-chief sought to improve the Lifestyle section of the paper.
She said there were too many Lifestyle writers and that it was time to reduce the number of
writers. Orozco’s column was eventually dropped.

Orozco filed for a case for Illegal Dismissal against PDI and Magsanoc. Orozco won in the
Labor Arbiter. The LA ruled that there exists an employer-employee relationship between PDI
and Orozco hence Orozco is entitled to receive backwages, reinstatement, and 13 th month
pay.
PDI appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC denied the appeal
because of the failure of PDI to post a surety bond as required by Article 223 of the Labor
Code. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between PDI and

Orozco. Whether or not PDI’s appeal will prosper.
HELD: Under Article 223 of the Labor Code:
ART. 223. Appeal. – Decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory
unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders.

In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be

perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary
award in the judgment appealed from.

The requirement that the employer post a cash or surety bond to perfect its/his appeal is
apparently intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case, they will receive
the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It was
intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their
obligation to satisfy their employees’ just and lawful claims.

But in this case, this principle is relaxed by the Supreme Court considering the fact that the
Labor Arbiter, in ruling that the Orozco is entitled to backwages, did not provide any
computation.

The case is then remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the computation. This necessarily pended
the resolution of the other issue of whether or not there exists an employer-employee
relationship between PDI and Orozco.