Cuizon v. Remoto, G.R. No.

143027 October 11, 2005

Petitioners rely heavily on TCT No. RT-3121 issued in their names. In the first place, the issuance of the
title was made pursuant to the 1983 Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale. At the time this document was
entered into by the heirs of Placida, the latter was no longer the owner of the property, having earlier
sold the same to Angel. No one can give what one does not have -- nemo dat quod non habet.
Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more
than what the seller can transfer legally. Such being the case, the heirs of Placida did not acquire any
right to adjudicate the property unto them and sell it to Encarnacion.

De Guzman v. CA, G.R. No. L-46935 December 21, 1987

While the appellate court misapplied Article 1544 of the Civil Code in this case, its ultimate conclusion
that private respondent should be declared owner of the land in question is correct. As stated earlier,
the transaction between Deogracias Queriza and private respondent was a true pacto de retro sale. The
essence of a pacto de retro sale is that title and ownership of the property sold are immediately vested
in the vendee a retro, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the vendor a retro within the
stipulated period. Failure thus of the vendor a retro to perform said resolutory condition vests upon the
vendee by operation of law absolute title and ownership over the property sold and failure of the
vendee a retro to consolidate his title under Article 1607 of the Civil Code does not impair such title or
ownership for the method prescribed thereunder is merely for the purpose of registering the
consolidated title.

In the case at bar, absolute ownership of the land in question was vested on private respondent in 1962
upon failure of Deogracias Queriza to repurchase said land. Thus, in 1967 when he allegedly donated the
same to Miguel Queriza, he was no longer the owner thereof. Settled is the rule that a donor cannot
lawfully convey what is not his property.  There being no title to the property which Deogracias Queriza
could convey to Miguel Queriza, it necessarily follows that no title to the property could be conveyed by
the latter to petitioners. The registration of the deeds under which they claimed to have acquired
ownership of the land in dispute was a useless ceremony. Registration does not vest title. It is not a
mode of acquiring ownership but is merely evidence of such title over a particular property. It does not
give the holder any better title than what he actually has. 

Consolidated Rural Bank (Cagayan Valley), Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 132161, January 17, 2005

The provision (Article 1544) is not applicable in the present case. It contemplates a case of double or
multiple sales by a single vendor. More specifically, it covers a situation where a single vendor sold one
and the same immovable property to two or more buyers. According to a noted civil law author, it is
necessary that the conveyance must have been made by a party who has an existing right in the thing
and the power to dispose of it. It cannot be invoked where the two different contracts of sale are made
by two different persons, one of them not being the owner of the property sold.  And even if the sale
was made by the same person, if the second sale was made when such person was no longer the owner
of the property, because it had been acquired by the first purchaser in full dominion, the second
purchaser cannot acquire any right. Xxx

In a situation where not all the requisites are present which would warrant the application of Art. 1544,
the principle of prior tempore, potior jure or simply "he who is first in time is preferred in right," should
apply. The only essential requisite of this rule is priority in time; in other words, the only one who can
invoke this is the first vendee. Undisputedly, he is a purchaser in good faith because at the time he
bought the real property, there was still no sale to a second vendee. In the instant case, the sale to the
Heirs by Gamiao and Dayag, who first bought it from Rizal Madrid, was anterior to the sale by the
Madrid brothers to Marquez. The Heirs also had possessed the subject property first in time. Thus,
applying the principle, the Heirs, without a scintilla of doubt, have a superior right to the subject
property.

Moreover, it is an established principle that no one can give what one does not have, nemo dat quod
non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can
acquire no more than what the seller can transfer legally. In this case, since the Madrid brothers were

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no longer the owners of the subject property at the time of the sale to Marquez, the latter did not
acquire any right to it.

Miranda v. CA, G.R. No. L-46064 September 7, 1989

Petitioners' reliance on the registration of the entire Lot 581 in 1961 to secure their ownership over the
disputed portion is misplaced. The deed of donation (Exh. F) which Almoro made in favor of the
petitioners, was void with respect to the one-third portion which he had already sold. The petitioners
acquired only the portion, which still belonged to their donor-benefactor. The portion which he no
longer owned but conveyed to the petitioners was impressed with a trust in favor of the true owners,
the private respondents (Amerol, et al. vs. Bagumbaran, 154 SCRA 396).

While land registration is a proceeding in rem and binds the whole world (Moscozo vs. CA, 128 SCRA 70),
the simple possession of a certificate of title under the Torrens system does not necessarily make the
holder a true owner of all  the property described therein. If a person obtains a title under the Torrens
system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no longer be registered under the
system, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone, become the owner of the lands illegally included
(Coronel vs. IAC, 155 SCRA 270, citing Ledesma vs. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil. 769, 773; Caragay-Layno
vs. CA, 133 SCRA 718).

Registration does not vest title. It is not a mode of acquiring property. It does not give the holder any
better right than what he actually has, especially if the registration was done in bad faith. The effect is
that it is as if no registration was made at all.

... Settled is the rule that a donor cannot lawfully convey what is not his property. (De Guzman vs. CA,
156 SCRA 701.)

Alvarico v. Sola, G.R. No. 138953, June 6, 2002

The crucial issue to be resolved in an action for reconveyance is: Who between petitioner and
respondent has a better claim to the land?

To prove she has a better claim, respondent Amelita Sola submitted a copy of OCT No. 3439 in her name
and her husband's, a Deed of Self-Adjudication and Transfer of Rights over the property dated 1983
executed by Fermina in her favor, and a certification from the municipal treasurer that she had been
declaring the land as her and her husband's property for tax purposes since 1993.

For his part, petitioner Castorio Alvarico presented a Deed of Donation dated January 4, 1984, showing
that the lot was given to him by Fermina and according to him, he immediately took possession in 1985
and continues in possession up to the present. xxx

Given the circumstances in this case and the contentions of the parties, we find that no reversible error
was committed by the appellate court in holding that herein petitioner's complaint against respondent
should be dismissed. The evidence on record and the applicable law indubitably favor respondent.

Petitioner principally relies on Articles 744 and 1544 of the New Civil Code, which provide:

Art. 744. Donations of the same thing to two or more different donees shall be governed
by the provisions concerning the sale of the same thing to two or more different
persons.

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it

who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

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 Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who
presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner claims that respondent was in bad faith when she registered the land in her name and, based
on the abovementioned rules, he has a better right over the property because he was first in material
possession in good faith. However, this allegation of bad faith on the part of Amelita Sola in acquiring
the title is devoid of evidentiary support. For one, the execution of public documents, as in the case of
Affidavits of Adjudication, is entitled to the presumption of regularity, hence convincing evidence is
required to assail and controvert them. Second, it is undisputed that OCT No. 3439 was issued in 1989 in
the name of Amelita. It requires more than petitioner's bare allegation to defeat the Original Certificate
of Title which on its face enjoys the legal presumption of regularity of issuance.  A Torrens  title, once
registered, serves as notice to the whole world. All persons must take notice and no one can plead
ignorance of its registration.