Main Engine Fuel Pump Spill Valve Push-Rod Breakage: 1. Vessel Summary

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ME150
Main Engine Fuel Pump Spill Valve Push-Rod Breakage
Technical committee

1. Vessel summary

Ship type: PCC


Date of build: 1986
Main engine: Sulzer 6RTA62 14,940 PS, 102 rpm

2. Outline of breakdown

While sailing in the Pacific Ocean in April ’90, due to an exhaust gas temperature deviation (high) of
the main engine No. 1 cylinder, the main engine automatically decreased speed, and a main engine FO
pressure (low) and FO leak tank liquid level (high) alarm sounded.
After carrying out all checks of the main engine, FO leakage was discovered from the No. 1 cylinder
FO pump observation hole.
After stopping the main engine, the observation hole was opened, and breakage of the spill valve
push-rod of the FO pump was confirmed.
As there were no spare push-rods on board, repair was deemed impossible. Operation was carried out
with the No. 1 cylinder FO pump cut off, and an airlifted spill valve push-rod was received and re-
placed at the destination port.
Breakage of the spill valve push-rods successively occurred to the No. 6 cylinder FO pump in May, to
the No. 5 cylinder FO pump in June, and then to the No. 2 cylinder FO pump in the same month.

3. Damaged locations

a. Breakage of the top of the spill valve push-rod of the FO pump (refer to Fig. 1.)
b. Breakage of the lift adjustment screw and cap nut of the spill valve push-rod of the FO pump, as
well as bending of the push-rod (refer to Fig. 2,3,4.)

4. Causes

a. When unbroken push-rods were replaced and inspected, as there were some with cracks forming at
the base of the guide bushing screw, those with broken guide bushing, and those with bent and stick-
ing push-rods without breakage, it was determined that the guide bushing had broken and that secon-
dary damage occurred to the push-rod in the form of fracture.
b. At the maker factory, from an investigation of the broken push-rod among others, it was surmised
that the guide bushing nut had been tightened too hard during fuel pump assembly and that a precur-
sory crack had formed on the outer periphery of the radius corner of the nut base. Due to the mutual
effect of corrosion and impact force during valve opening, the crack progressed and resulted in break-
age.

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5. Countermeasures

a. As the possibility of breakage was high for the other FO pump spill valve push-rods which had yet
to be replaced, the remaining push-rods were also replaced.
b. At time of fuel pump assembly, caution should be given to avoid over-tightening of the guide bush-
ing nuts. As the tightening torque has not been determined in particular, tightening to a standard of 90
degrees from surface contact should be observed.

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