Civil Law 1 Case List

Civil Law I (COMPILATION)Page |1
Civil Law 1 Case List 32 Montanez v. Cipriano G.R. No. 181089 684 SCRA 315
1 Baksh v. CA G.R. No. 97336 219 SCRA 115
2 Geluz v. CA G.R. No. L-16439 2 SCRA 801
3 Continental Steel G.R. No. 182836 603 SCRA 621
Manufacturing Corporation v.
Montao
4 Yuchengco v. The Manila G.R. No. 182836 661 SCRA 392
Chronicle Publishing Corp.
5 California Clothing Inc. v G.R. No. 175822 708 SCRA 420
Quinones
6 Gutierrez v. HRCJ G.R. No. 193459 643 SCRA 498
7 Nikko Hotel Garden Manila G.R. No. 154259 452 SCRA 532
8 Quisumbing v. Manila Electric G.R. No. 142943 380 SCRA 195
Company
9 Joaquin v. Navarro G.R. No. L-5426 93 PHIL 257
10 Republic v. Dayot G.R. No. 175581 550 SCRA 435
11 Bellis v. Bellis G.R. No. L-23678 20 SCRA 358
12 Navarro v. Domagtoy A.M. NO. MTJ-96- 259 SCRA 129
1088
13 Lavadia v. Heirs of Juan G.R. No. 171914 730 SCRA 376
Luces Luna
14 Ando v. DFA G.R. No. 195432 733 SCRA 691
15 Tenebro v. CA G.R. No. 150758 423 SCRA 272
16 RP v. Melgar G.R. No. 139676 486 SCRA 177
17 Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas G.R. No. 186571 628 SCRA 266
18 Fujiki v. Marinay G.R. No. 196049 700 SCRA 69
19 Corpuz, Jr v. People G.R. No. 212656 810 SCRA 345
20 Abbas v. Abbas G.R. No. 183896 689 SCRA 646
21 Ronulo v. People G.R. No. 182438 728 SCRA 675
22 Alcantara v. Alcantara G.R. No. 167746 531 SCRA 446
23 Castillo v. Republic G.R. No. 214064 816 SCRA 595
24 Republic v. Tobora-Tionglico G.R. No. 218630 851 SCRA 107
25 Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz G.R. No. 201988 842 SCRA 401
26 Matudan v. Republic G.R. No. 203284 808 SCRA 480
27 Vinas v. Parel-Vinas G.R. No. 208790 747 SCRA 508
28 Del Rosario v. Del Rosario G.R. No. 222541 818 SCRA 83
29 Yu v. Yu G.R. No. 200072 794 SCRA 45
30 Quiao v. Quiao G.R. No. 176556 675 SCRA 642
31 Almelor v. RTC of Las Pinas G.R. No. 179620 563 SCRA 447
City
Same; Same; Same; Damages pursuant to Article 21 may be awarded not

G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993.* because of promise to marry but because of fraud and deceit behind it—ln
the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion,
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents. cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
Civil Procedure; Appeals; Evidence; It is the rule in this jurisdiction that herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
of witnesses.—As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her
petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to
fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
closely their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had policy.
plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might
affect the result of the case. APPEAL by certiorari to review and set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Same; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Only questions of law may be raised
in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.— The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
recognized exceptions to this rule.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Civil Law; Damages; The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry
per se is not an actionable wrong.—The existing rule is that a breach of This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately review and set aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of
have made it so. Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil
Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
Same; Same; Same; Article. 21 of the Civil Code designed to expand the recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction grants adequate legal Civil Code of the Philippines.
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.— The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel,
granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
in the statute books. alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single,
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed
exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern upon, to wit:
Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they 1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic)
school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to
the private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure the present;
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner
forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before 2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern,
she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper;
petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained 3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette ,
injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a
of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their (sic) high school graduate;
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private 4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the
damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and
granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil
The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503. Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest
of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered
form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he
never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private 1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her
to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him 2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of
by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand
with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he
was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and 3. All other claims are denied.6
has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an
award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a)
damages. petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not
a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to
sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his
persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him
parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as
by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her
and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors
culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the
temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation forthcoming wedding. 8
to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he
of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
by the respondent Court as follows: factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that
she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision
days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining
and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, analysis:
Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of
their relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
"A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose
family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate
told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by
during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern
thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house "herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive
and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the
plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for
1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school, otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live- the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's
in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the
medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic)
could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a
That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay
thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when
he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26
(pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of
involved in the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship
between them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had
defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the
proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988). Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise
to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the
Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good
for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his
Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the
In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on
that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted
promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that
to satisfy his lust on her. 11 even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the
private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not
and then concluded: be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable. 14
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-
appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to
marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's
palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which
and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the
coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's
our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly
damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the
him to do in its decision in this case. 12 result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason
trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed
the result of the case. Civil Code, from which We quote:
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led
Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions: to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many
of the American states. . . . 19
xxx xxx xxx
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by
surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish
Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the statute books. 20
(Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica
v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless
contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to
court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents the latter for the damage.
(Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the
record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]). nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither
above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore,
the trial and appellate courts must be respected. though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl
and family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents
And now to the legal issue. cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her
parents would have such a right of action.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an
actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's
which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
statutes. 21 plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to
live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus: promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by
quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could
not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was
willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common
law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in
not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting recovery of damages to the woman because:
the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions,
are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than
these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a
Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found
become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed
torts. 23 by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the
opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle case:
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
customs or public policy.
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595). complaint. 27
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that — In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras,
who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other recovered:
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was
56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960;
and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et
submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123). al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to
marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there
And in American Jurisprudence we find: was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery. together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses
for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual
desire of curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized
that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists,
the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662) example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction,
not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But
xxx xxx xxx when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been action lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the
relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an
did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.
under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged,
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private
effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal
injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35 At
doing, 33 for: most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a transgression has been brought about by the imposition of undue influence
mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or
in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, fraud. 36
pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a
proposition that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34 In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule,
respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could Phil. 209).
not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and
promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents
and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their
which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's higher values of morality and dignity.
concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have
for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.
directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance SO ORDERED.
of his obligations.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and
traditions. Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.
C i v i l L a w I ( C O M P I L A T I O N ) P a g e | 10
disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as to exemplary

damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, New Civil
Code).
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of First Instance

of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.
A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband
of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages
from physician who caused the same.
No. L-16439. July 20, 1961. The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by
respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs. THE HON.COURT OF APPEALS and Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the
OSCAR LAZO,respondents. evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo
Criminal Law; Abortion; Consent of woman or husband does not excuse and against defendant Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as
criminal act.—Abortion, without medical necessity to warrant it, is a criminal damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court
act, and neither the consent of the woman nor that of the husband would of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority
excuse it. vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting
opinion.
Damages; Unborn foetus without personality; Award for death of a person
does not cover unborn foetus.—The minimum award for the death of a The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with
personality and incapable of having rights and obligations. Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time
in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by
Same; Same; Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf. her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal
—Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she
death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff,
derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission
on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
Same; Same; Nature of damages recoverable by parents of unborn child.— aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later,
The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her
the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the
three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two- This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at
month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine all. But such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either
gave his consent, to the abortion. help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be
limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and
action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
granted certiorari. expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us,
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an
the sum of P3,000.06 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the
2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly
said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of
with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the
nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have
Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations. taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern
for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's
accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was
behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, clearly exaggerated.
since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels
same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands
condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his
born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was
case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to
mother's womb. personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative
or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his wife,
generally held that recovery can not had for the death of an unborn child would be the beneficiaries.
(Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs.
Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of
note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639). appellee's wife, without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and
morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the
consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the
immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already
under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis. has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered
dismissed. Without costs. Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs);
Bereavement Leave and Death Benefits; The unborn child can be considered
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the a dependent under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the
Board of Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and parties in the instant case.—The unborn child can be considered a dependent
action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant. under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who
relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., the power or aid of someone else.” Under said general definition, even an
concur. unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have
Concepcion, J., took no part. reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its
De Leon, J., took no part. mother, Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA
provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or
child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single
employee. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent,
such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil
personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child
shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn
fetus in the mother’s womb.
G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009.* Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate Children; A legitimate
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, petitioner, child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.—
vs. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation
MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya, 469 SCRA 363 (2005) we have
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz.: A legitimate child is a product
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), respondents. of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element
of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents
Civil Law; Civil Personality; Death of a Party; Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the
Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death; While the Civil Code matter: “Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it legitimate.”
does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical
personality could die—one need not acquire civil personality first before Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The legitimacy or
he/she could die.—Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception.—It is apparent that
all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides according to the Family Code and the aforecited jurisprudence, the
that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the
state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. And present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly
third, death has been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence,
with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before making said child legitimate upon her conception.
he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Being for the benefit of the Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing
employee, Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) provisions on Corporation (Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang
bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
give life to the intentions thereof; It cannot be said that the parents’ grief Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006,
and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident
case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement
less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.— (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted
to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be xxxx
said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the
died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and
alive but died subsequently. Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA sisters) based on the following:
provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be 2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the 2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days
Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the xxxx
interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS
interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions xxxx
should be interpreted in favor of labor. Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant
death and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court manner:
of Appeals. xxxx
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. 4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00)
in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse,
A. Gerardo B. Collado for petitioner. and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the
legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to
DECISION be presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos
wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of
Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated 27 February 2008 and the Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to
Resolution[2] dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]
101697, affirming the Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of respondent
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave
bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits,
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child. consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims
for bereavement and other death benefits, the Union resorted to the
grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences
held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to
file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of
(NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), National the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without
Capital Region (NCR).[9] In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement
the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent,
issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel, relying on
death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2 Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with
and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it
Atty. Montao, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11] never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of
thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent
dispute, the parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A
[12] Replies,[13] and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao. fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it
never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and
other death benefits pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and
X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically unambiguous. Since neither of the parties qualified the terms used in the
state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically
acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be accepted by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child
covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein included in the definition of dependent, as used in the CBA the death of
employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and
Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar other death benefits bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the
situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar latter term.
provisions of their CBAs.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an of its sister companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union,
employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that
paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the the grant of bereavement leave and other death benefits to the parent-
CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.[15] Dugans child was employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted company practice.
only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos
child who was already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor. On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling that Hortillano was entitled to
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.
located in the same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives
of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
employees unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel
who signed the existing CBA with the Union. This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement
leave with pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X,
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be
all doubts in labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor present: (1) there is death; (2) such death must be of employees dependent;
of the safety of and decent living for the laborer. and (3) such dependent must be legitimate.
since what was contemplated by the CBA was the death of a legal person,
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality.
insurance as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact
parties CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is that the term death was qualified by the phrase legitimate dependent. It
death; (b) such death must be of employees dependent; (c) such dependent asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said childs
must be legitimate; and (d) proper legal document to be presented.[18] birth, otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine
qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to bereavement leave and other death
Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an benefits under the CBA were lacking.
employees legitimate dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be
supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty.
fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or Montaos Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court
sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, interpreted death to mean as follows:
specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent,
although he/she died during the labor or delivery. There was also no [Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal sense in which
question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making their the term death is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is
dependent, unborn child, legitimate. irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement
leave and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no
In the end, Atty. Montao decreed: arguing with [Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a
child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be
ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano contemplated as a death as to be covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly
the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the
representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a
Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total narrow and technical significance to the term death of a legitimate
amount of P16,489.00 dependent as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits
under the CBA. Following [Continental Steels] theory, there can be no
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack experience of death to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this
of merit. view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than loss of
human life, especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit. leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the latters
immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein conferring legal status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental
dispositions. Steels] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes
only sadly misses this crucial point.[20]
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Review on Certiorari,[19] under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697. Appeals reads:
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED
claims for bereavement leave with pay and other death benefits because no for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of
death of an employees dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby AFFIRMED
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA and UPHELD.
37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].[21] personality, which reads:
In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration[23] of Continental Steel. Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal
relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired
CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death and may be lost.
should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead
fetus never acquired a juridical personality. We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since
his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is
We are not persuaded. not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or
incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or
As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article assumed by the childs parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other
X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and unborn child upon the latters death.
(3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for
death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a
are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that
parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state
sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the proper legal that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.
document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
that the provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No
argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,
death benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms [25] that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
death and dependent as used in the CBA. If the provisions of the CBA are unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the being delivered, qualifies as death.
interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself
admitted that neither management nor the Union sought to define the Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As
pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is one who relies on another for
negotiation of the CBA. support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of
someone else. Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is a
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39
for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos
conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a
personality is extinguished by death. married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The
CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
42 of the Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born
mothers womb. alive but died subsequently.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave
to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to give life to the
a legitimate child, viz: intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating
that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.[29] In the same way, the
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper
legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,[30] we pronounced:
cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate. (Emphasis ours.) Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the
assailed decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of
as follows: labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of
the Labor Code shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is
The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between
been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the
children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice
rights of legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.
outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them
legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.) In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited (1990)], we categorically stated that:
jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the
wife were validly married and that their child was conceived during said scales of social justice, the heavier influence of the latter should be counter-
marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception. balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the
fourth element entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA
i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child. 265 (1991)], we declared:
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
death benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have pursuant to the social justice policy.
been granted by Continental Steel.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited
employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P.
said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death benefits in the amounts of
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and Eleven
Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on
the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Civil Law; Abuse of Rights; The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in
Manufacturing Corporation. Article 19 of the Civil Code sets standards which must be observed in the
exercise of one’s rights as well as in the performance of its duties; to wit: to
SO ORDERED. act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
—The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code
provides: “Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. This provision of law sets standards which
must be observed in the exercise of one’s rights as well as in the
performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due;
and observe honesty and good faith.
Same; Same; Damages; Article 20 speaks of general sanctions of all other

provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction—thus,
if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code is proper.—
Article 20 provides that “every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the
same.” It speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which
do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said
provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the
provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
Same; Damages; Moral Damages; The trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly awarded moral damages to petitioner; such damages may be
awarded when the transgression is the cause of petitioner’s anguish.—The
trial court and the CA correctly awarded moral damages to petitioner. Such
damages may be awarded when the transgression is the cause of petitioner’s
anguish. Further, converse to Coyiuto, Jr.’s argument, although petitioner is
claiming damages for violation of Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, still
such violations directly resulted in the publication of the libelous articles in
G.R. No. 184315. November 28, 2011.* the newspaper, which, by analogy, is one of the ground for the recovery of
moral damages under (7) of Article 2219.
ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, petitioner, vs. THE MANILA CHRONICLE
PUBLISHING CORPORATION, NOEL CABRERA, GERRY ZARAGOZA, Same; Same; Same; While there is no hard-and-fast rule in determining
DONNA GATDULA, RODNEY P. DIOLA, RAUL VALINO, THELMA SAN what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, the same
JUAN and ROBERT COYIUTO, JR., respondents. should not be palpably and scandalously excessive.—While there is no hard-
and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of
moral damages, the same should not be palpably and scandalously
excessive. Moral damages are not intended to impose a penalty to the by a preponderance of evidence.—The case against respondent was one for
wrongdoer, neither to enrich the claimant at the expense of the defendant. damages based on the publication of libelous articles against petitioner;
hence, only civil in nature. The rule is that a party who has the burden of
Same; Same; Same; Moral Damages; Moral damages should be reasonably proof in a civil case must establish his cause of action by a preponderance of
approximate to the extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong evidence. Thus, respondents’ liability was proven only on the basis of
done.—Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the preponderance of evidence, which is quite different from a criminal case for
defendant’s grief and suffering. Moral damages should be reasonably libel where proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established.
approximate to the extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong
done. The Court, therefore, finds the award of moral damages in the first VELASCO, JR., J., Concurring Opinion:
and second cause of action in the amount of P2,000,000.00 and
P25,000,000.00, respectively, to be too excessive and holds that an award of Civil Law; Damages; There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of
P1,000,000.00 and P10,000,000.00, respectively, as moral damages are what would be a fair amount of damages since each case must be governed
more reasonable. by its own peculiar facts.—There is no hard-and-fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of damages since each case
Same; Same; Exemplary Damages; As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Much weight is placed on the
provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or social standing of the aggrieved party in the calibration of the fair and
correction for the public good.—As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 reasonable amount of the award of moral damages.
provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed Same; Same; Jurisprudence, even in other jurisdictions, is clear that the
not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent character and social standing of the defendant, as well of the plaintiff, may
against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious actions. On this be considered in estimating the amount of damages.—Jurisprudence, even in
basis, the award of exemplary damages in the first and second cause of other jurisdictions, is clear that the character and social standing of the
action in the amount of P500,000.00 and P10,000,000.00, respectively, is defendant, as well as of the plaintiff, may be considered in estimating the
reduced to P200,000.00 and P1,000,000.00, respectively. amount of damages. Evidence may be adduced as to the social and financial
status of the parties as basis for the grant of damages.
Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; On the matter of attorney’s fees and costs of
suit, Article 2208 of the same Code provides, among others, that attorney’s Same; Abuse-of-Rights; Damages; Respondent clearly abused his right when
fees and expenses of the litigation may be recovered in cases when he took undue advantage of his position as owner and Chairman of the
exemplary damages are awarded and where the court deems it just and Board of Chronicle Publishing and used the The Manila Chronicle to launch
equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. his personal vendetta against the petitioner who was his rival in the
—On the matter of attorney’s fees and costs of suit, Article 2208 of the same insurance business—respondent is, therefore, liable for the prejudice
Code provides, among others, that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation suffered by petitioner under the abuse-of-rights doctrine for having caused
may be recovered in cases when exemplary damages are awarded and the publication of the subject articles in the newspaper which he owns and
where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and controls.—Respondent Coyiuto clearly abused his right when he took undue
expenses of litigation should be recovered. In any event, however, such advantage of his position as owner and Chairman of the Board of Chronicle
award must be reasonable, just and equitable. Thus, the award of attorney’s Publishing and used The Manila Chronicle to launch a personal vendetta
fees and costs is reduced from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. against the petitioner who was his rival in the insurance business. As this
Court ruled in its November 25, 2009 Decision, Coyiuto did not only cause
Same; Actions; Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; Damages; The case the publication of articles that would paint petitioner in a bad light, worse,
against respondent was one for damages based on the publication of libelous Coyiuto was even portrayed as the underdog and petitioner the greedy
articles against petitioner; hence, only civil in nature—the rule is that a party capitalist: As earlier explained, as correctly found by the trial court, even the
who has the burden of proof in a civil case must establish his cause of action timing of the publication of these subject articles is highly suspicious
inasmuch as the subject libelous articles came out in the Manila Chronicle, a Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City in Civil Case No. 94-
newspaper owned and under the control of [respondent] Coyiuto, around 1114 dated 8 November 2002 finding herein respondents liable for damages.
November to December of 1993, a couple of months prior to the January
stockholders meeting of Oriental Corporation. From this, it is logical to The facts of the case, as summarized by the RTC, are as follows:
conclude that the publication of the subject defamatory articles defaming the
good name and reputation of [petitioner] is but a part of [a] grand scheme In his Complaint, plaintiff Alfonso T. Yuchengco alleges that in the last
to create a negative image of [petitioner] so as to negatively affect quarter of 1994, Chronicle Publishing Corporation
[petitioner’s] credibility to the public, more particularly, to the then Chronicle Publishing for brevity) published in the Manila Chronicle a series of
stockholders of Oriental Corporation. Worth noting also is the fact that the defamatory articles against him. In two of the subject articles (November 10
subject articles did not only portray [petitioner] in a bad light. Curiously, in and 12, 1993 issues), he was imputed to be a Marcos crony or a Marcos-
these articles, [respondent] Coyiuto, a known rival of [petitioner], was Romualdez crony, which term according to him is commonly used and
portrayed as the underdog, the “David” and [petitioner] as the “Goliath” in understood in Philippine media to describe an individual who was a recipient
their battle for control over Oriental Corporation. This does not escape the of special and underserving favors from former President Ferdinand E.
Court’s attention.” (Decision dated November 25, 2009, pp. 24-25) Coyiuto Marcos and/or his brother-in-law Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez due to special
is, therefore, liable for the prejudice suffered by petitioner under the abuse- and extra-ordinary closeness to either or both, and which favors allowed an
of-rights doctrine for having caused the publication of the subject articles in individual to engage in illegal and dishonorable business activities.
the newspaper which he owns and controls.
The plaintiff claims that the said articles further branded him as a mere front
MOTION for RECONSIDERATION and SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR or dummy for the Marcos and Romualdez clans in Benguet Corporation,
RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court. which company sought to take-over the management of Oriental Petroleum
Mineral Corporation (Oriental for brevity). He contends that such an
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court. imputation is untrue since his holdings in Benguet Corporation were legally
acquired by him.
Belo, Gozon, Elma, Parel, Asuncion & Lucila for petitioner.
Also, he was likewise accused of unsound and immoral business practices by
Lapuz-Ureta, Ramos, Arches, Cruz & Manlangit collaborating counsel for insinuating that he wanted to take control of Oriental in order to divert its
petitioner. resources to rescue the debt-ridden Benguet Corporation. He claims that the
accusation is untrue since he was merely interested in being represented in
Ethelwoldo E. Fernandez for respondents Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp, the board thereof so as to protect his and his companies interest therein as
Cabrera, San Juan, Zaragosa, Gatdula, Valino, Diola and Coyuito, Jr. shareholders.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: The subject articles insinuated that he personally and intentionally caused
the failure of Benguet Corporation and that if even if he ever assumed
When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles control of Oriental, it would suffer the same fate as the former. According to
are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly him, at the time he assumed chairmanship of Benguet Corporation, it was
privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from already experiencing financial downturns caused by plummeting world prices
attaching in a defamatory imputation. of gold and unprofitable investments it ventured into.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Amended Decision[1] Moreover, one of the articles portrayed him as being an unfair and uncaring
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 dated 28 August 2008. The employer when the employees of Grepalife Corporation, of which he is the
Amended Decision reversed on Motion for Reconsideration the 18 March Chairman, staged a strike, when the truth being that he had nothing to do
2008 Decision[2] of the same court, which in turn affirmed in toto the
with it. And that if his group takes over Oriental, it will experience the same
labor problems as in Grepalife. PLAINTIFFS EVIDENCE
During the trial, the plaintiff himself, ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO, testified that
Furthermore, the subject articles accused him of inducing Rizal Commercial prior to his appointment as Ambassador to Japan, he was the chairman of
Banking Corporation (RCBC for brevity) to violate the provisions of the various business organizations notably: Benguet Corporation (Benguet),
General Banking Act on DOSRI loans. He denies the imputations believing Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Rizal Commercial Banking
that there is nothing irregular in the RCBC-Piedras transaction for the Corporation (RCBC), Bank of America Savings Bank, House of Investments,
acquisition of shares of Oriental. Inc., Dole Philippines and Philippine Fuji Xerox Corporation. He was also the
President of the Philippine Ambassadors; chairman or vice president of
Also, the plaintiff claims that the subject articles insinuated that he induced Bantayog ng Bayan; and chairman of AY Foundation, Inc. He was appointed
others to disobey lawful orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission Philippine Ambassador to Peoples Republic of China after the EDSA
(SEC for brevity) when the truth is that the officials of RCBC and Alcorn Revolution.
never defied any SEC order, and that if ever they did, he never induced them
to do so. As regards the article referring to the November 10, 1993 issue of the Manila
Chronicle (Exh. A), he stated that he had never been a Marcos crony nor had
Finally, the plaintiff asserts that the subject articles imputed to him the been a business partner of the Romualdezes or had personal dealings with
derogatory tag of corporate raider, implying that he was seeking to profit for them; that during the shareholders meeting, the two (2) sons of Benjamin
something he did not work for. He denies the imputation since he acquired Kokoy Romualdez were elected as directors of Benguet Corporation pursuant
his stake in Oriental for adequate and valuable consideration at the time to a Court order; that he had no personal dealings with them; that he had no
when no one was willing to bailout the government from its difficult and intention of taking over Oriental and that Benguet Corporation did not lose
losing position thereto. the amount as stated in the article; that Benguet Corporation experienced
liquidity problems, and that before he joined the corporation, it had already
In their Answer, the defendants deny liability claiming that the subject diversified into many other financial ventures; that he denied having any
articles were not defamatory since they were composed and published in business partnership with the Romualdezes at that time.
good faith and only after having ascertained their contents. In any event,
they claim that these articles are privileged and/or constitute reasonable and Regarding the November 12, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. B), he
balance[d] comments on matters of legitimate public interest which cannot denied having any partnership with the Marcos family; that he denied
serve as basis for the finding of libel against them. They likewise alleged that responsibility for the losses incurred by Benguet Corporation, as the losses
they were acting within the bounds of constitutionally guaranteed freedom of were due to the drop of the commodity market, and for having diversified
speech and of the press. into other non-profitable ventures; that he had no intention whatsoever of
taking over Oriental; that although the Yuchengco family owns a substantial
Furthermore, they contend that since plaintiff is a public figure, and block of shares of RCBC, Sanwa Bank actually owns twenty-five percent
assuming that the articles were indeed defamatory, they cannot be held (25%) thereof; that RCBC did not finance his fund but it extended a loan to
liable for damages since they were not impelled by actual malice in the Piedras Petroleum, a subsidiary of the Presidential Commission of Good
composition thereof. They did not compose and/or publish said articles with Government (PCGG for brevity); admitted that Traders Royal Bank also
the knowledge that they contained falsehoods, or with reckless disregard on granted a loan to PCGG but such was an independent transaction of RCBC.
whether or not they contained falsehood.
About the November 15, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. C), he
As to defendant Coyiuto, he claims that he had no participation in the denied any knowledge of what transpired at the Trust Department of RCBC
publication of the subject articles nor consented or approved their because as Chairman he was not involved in many of the banks transactions.
publication.
Referring to November 16, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. D), he On cross-examination, Mr. Zaragoza testified that he volunteered to testify in
considered the attacks against him to be malicious considering that he does the instant case because he was the most knowledgeable about the Piedras
not see any connection between the labor strike at Grepalife with the case of deal; that plaintiff Yuchengco was aggrieved upon reading the subject
Alcorn and RCBC; that the article would like to show that he was the reason articles; that under the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between RCBC
for the huge losses incurred by Benguet Corporation. and Piedras, should the latter fail to comply with its obligations under the
MOA, it will pay interest at the prevailing market interest rate from the date
As regards the November 22, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. E), he of advance until full payment; and that there was a complaint filed with the
denied giving any interest free loan, the fact that they gave a loan to PCGG Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas against RCBC by Mr. Felipe Remollo questioning
does not mean that they gave a loan to Benedicto since the latter had the Piedras deal. [TSN 28 February 1997; 26 June 1997; 27 June 1997; 04
already turned over the shares of Piedras to PCGG at that time. July 1997]
Regarding the November 23, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. F), he JOSE REVILLA testified that he and Amb. Yuchengco were long time friends,
denied extending an interest free loan considering that he is not the only where he (Revilla) worked for him (Yuchengco) for thirty-two (32) years in
owner of RCBC; that these series of attacks against him and RCBC were his (Yuchengco) credit card company Industrial Finance Corporation Credit
intended to cause a bank run; that the article imputes that he was Cards; that knowing Amb. Yuchengco for a considerable period of time, he
responsible for giving an interest free loan. does not believe the truth of the contents of the subject articles; that plaintiff
Yuchengco appeared distressed when he joked about the subject articles;
About the December 5, 1993 issue of the Manila Chronicle (Exh. G), he said that other people approached him to ask whether the subject articles are
the article was intended to humiliate and embarrass him since he really had true [TSN 25 August 1997].
no intention of taking over Oriental; that the reason for the attack against his
person was because he and defendant Coyiuto, Jr. were both rivals in the xxxx
insurance business and that the latter has always been envious of his
position for having owned Malayan Insurance Company. DEFENDANTS EVIDENCE
On the other hand, defendants Zaragoza, Gatdula, Cabrera and Valino
On cross-examination, plaintiff Yuchengco testified that he does not consider substantially testified on the following matters:
himself a public figure; and that he felt maligned by the references to him as
a Marcos crony. [TSN, 07 February 1997; 10 February 1997; 12 February GERRY ZARAGOZA testified that he was the Managing Editor of Manila
1997] Chronicle in charge of the national and political news; that defendant San
Juan was the other Managing Editor in charge of the lifestyle section; that a
ROSAURO ZARAGOZA testified that he is the Executive Vice-President of story conference is conducted everyday where the articles, including the
RCBC; that the statement in Exhibits D, E and F with regard to the interest pages where they will appear, are discussed; that the editor-in-chief
free loan allegedly granted to Piedras Petroleum Company, Inc. (Piedras) are (defendant Cruz), executive editor (defendant Tolentino) and deputy editor
false because the Piedras deal was a trust transaction which involved an (defendant Cabrera) were the ones responsible for the decisions of the story
advance in exchange for shares of stock; that plaintiff Yuchengco did not conference relative to the printing of the newspaper; that he was not
have a personal interest in the Piedras deal; that Piedras or Oriental involved in the writing and editing of the subject articles; that Exhibits A to D
Petroleum Mineral Corporation (Oriental Petroleum) shares were not are classified as business news; that columns, specifically Exhibits E and F
transferred to plaintiff Yuchengcos name by virtue of the transaction; and are not discussed during story conferences; and that Exhibit G, which
that the defendants did not approach him or RCBC to check the veracity of appeared in the Money Section did not pass thru him.
the subject articles. The affidavit of Mr. Zaragoza (Exhibit H) was adopted as
part of his testimony. On cross-examination, defendant Zaragoza testified that except for the
columns, Exhibits A to D and Exhibit G are considered hard news; that he
handled the hard news, while defendant San Juan handled the soft news;
and that defendant Valino was the business editor in charge of the business having consulted several dictionaries as to the meaning of the word crony,
section (TSN 22 July 1998; 23 September 1998] he did not come across a definition describing the word to mean someone
who is a recipient of any undeserving or special favor from anyone, that it
DONNABELLE GATDULA claimed that she was a correspondent for Manila merely refers to someone who is a friend or a special friend; there was no
Chronicle assigned to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) beat; mention whatsoever in the subject article that Amb. Yuchengco was being
that she had no participation in the writing or publication of Exhibits A to C accused of fronting for the late President Marcos (referring to par. 2.3.2 of
and G to E; that she attended the hearing conducted by the SEC and the complaint); that nowhere in the said paragraph was Amb. Yuchengco
interviewed the two lawyers of RCBC and SEC Chairman Rosario Lopez accused of having acted as a front to facilitate the acquisition of a prohibited
regarding the Oriental Petroleum case; that her name appears as a tag line interest in a private corporation by a public official while occupying a public
in Exhibit D, because she only wrote part of the story; and that she did not office; that nowhere in the article was Amb. Yuchengco accused of being
write the entire article (Exhibit D) as some of the statements therein were directly or indirectly involved in unsound business practices (referring to par.
added by the editor/s; and that she did not discuss Exhibit D with any of the 2.4 of the complaint); that whatever imputation of ill-will in par. 2.4.1 of the
editors. complaint was only in plaintiffs mind; and as regards par. 2.6 of the
complaint, that he was merely reporting on what transpired at the picket line
On cross-examination, defendant Gatdula testified that she does not have a and what the striking employees answered to him; and that he did not state
copy of the original article which she wrote; that she read Exhibit D after it in his columns (Exhibits E and F) that plaintiff Yuchengco violated banking
was published; that she did not compare her original story with Exhibit D nor laws. [TSN 23 February 2000][3]
question the authority of the editor to edit her story; and that she agreed to
put her name on Exhibit D. (TSN 23 September 1998; 05 October 1998). On 8 November 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of herein
petitioner Alfonso T. Yuchengco, disposing of the case as follows:
NOEL CABRERA contended that after having gone through the subject
articles, he believes that the news stories and commentaries were fair and WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as
that those who wrote the same followed the proper standards; that as follows:
regard the contents of Exhibits E and F, the opinion of Mr. Raul Valino, as
written in the said articles, were valid and based on documentary facts; as to 1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing,
Exhibit D, pertaining to the article of Ms. Donnabelle Gatdula, she based her Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry
article on documents pertaining to the Oriental transaction, other documents, Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola to pay plaintiff
as well as interviews; that at the time the subject articles were written, Amb. Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
Yuchengco was a public figure, being a very prominent businessman with a. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as moral damages;
vast interest in banks and other businesses; that during the year 1993, the and
word crony was more or less accepted to mean as a big businessman or b. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as exemplary
close associate of the late President Marcos, and its use in the column was damages;
meant only to supply the perspective as to the figure or subject involved in 2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Roberto Coyiuto, Jr.
the news story, and there is thus no malice or derogatory intent when the and Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally:
same was use a. the amount of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) as moral damages;
On cross-examination, defendant Cabrera testified that defendant Coyiuto is and
one of the owners of Manila Chronicle; and that he only saw the records of
Exhibits 8 to 10 and 16 to 20 after the publication of Exhibits A to G (TSN 21 b. the amount of Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) as exemplary
April 1999; 28 April 1999 05 May 1999; 10 May 1999). damages;
RAUL VALINO stated that he was the Acting Business Manager and later
Managing Editor and Business Editor-in-Chief of Manila Chronicle; that after
3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff

Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of One Million Pesos Libel is defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides:
(P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fee and legal costs.[4]
Art. 353. Definition of Libel. A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a
The respondents, namely the Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, Neal crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino, Rodney P. Diola, and Roberto Coyiuto, Jr. contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV who is dead.
No. 76995 and was raffled to the Fifth Division.
Based on this definition, this Court has held that four elements constitute the
On 18 March 2008, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming crime of libel, namely (a) defamatory imputation tending to cause dishonor,
the RTC Decision: discredit or contempt; (b) malice, either in law or in fact; (c) publication; and
(d) identifiability of the person defamed.[7]
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING the appeals of defendants-appellants and AFFIRMING Despite being defined in the Revised Penal Code, libel can also be instituted,
the decision dated November 8, 2002 of the trial court IN TOTO.[5] like in the case at bar, as a purely civil action, the cause of action for which
is provided by Article 33 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. On 28 August 2008, the
Court of Appeals reversed itself in an Amended Decision: Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action
for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of this Court dated brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
March 18, 2008 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the court the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
a quo dated November 8, 2002 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Amended The above elements of libel were adopted as well in a purely civil action for
Complaint for Damages against the defendants-appellants is DISMISSED. No damages. As held by this Court in GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos[8]:
pronouncement as to costs.
An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, where petitioner puts forth the act amounting to defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes
following Assignments of Error: malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a
discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE contempt of a natural or juridical person. Liability for libel attaches present
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE CASE OF ARTURO BORJAL, ET the following elements: (a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act
AL. V. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL. CITED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c)
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WARRANTED THE REVERSAL OF THE CA identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
DECISION DATED MARCH 18, 2008. Of these four elements, the most apparent in the case at bar would be the
publication of the alleged imputation. Libel is published not only when it is
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE SUBJECT ARTICLES IN THE or notice of another person other than its author and the offended party.[9]
COMPLAINT FALL WITHIN THE CONCEPT OF PRIVILEGED The circulation of an allegedly libelous matter in a newspaper is certainly
COMMUNICATION. sufficient publication. We are thus left with the determination of the
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE existence of the three remaining elements of libel, namely: (1) the
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL defamatory imputation; (2) the identity of the person defamed; and (3) the
OR PUBLIC FIGURE.[6] existence of malice.
Defamatory Imputation C, C-1 to C-3

Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a
person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious 16 November 1993
statements. It is that which tends to injure reputation or to diminish esteem,
respect, goodwill or confidence in the plaintiff, or to excite derogatory (Donna Gatdula)
feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything that is
injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him Alcorn, RCBC execs own guilt
into disrepute.[10] In determining whether certain utterances are
defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and taken D, D-1 to D-4
in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning, as they would naturally be
understood by persons hearing (or reading, as in libel) them, unless it 22 November 1993
appears that they were used and understood in another sense.[11]
(Raul Valino)
In order to fully appreciate whether the subject articles are, in fact,
defamatory, an analysis thereof is in order. The following are what have Bank runs and RCBC free loans
been referred to as the subject articles:
Manila Chronicle Issue Date (Author) E, E-1 to E-2
Title
Exhibit 23 November 1993
10 November 1993 (Raul Valino)
(no by-line) RCBC case bugs Bangko Sentral
Yuchengko joins forces with Kokoy F, F-1 to F-3
A, A-1 to A-5 5 December 1993
12 November 1993 (Rodney P. Diola)

The Battle for Oriental
(no by-line)
G, G-1 to G-4
RCBC probed for violating CB rules In two of the subject articles, respondents allegedly accused and labeled
Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who took advantage of his relationship with
B, B-1 to B-2 the former President to gain unwarranted benefits:
15 November 1993 Yuchengco joins forces with Kokoy[12]
(no by-line) Alfonso Yuchengco, a Marcos crony who wants to takeover the ownership
and management of the highly profitable Oriental Petroleum Minerals Corp.
RCBC called to SEC; subtitled Yuchengco Bank defies government order (OMPC), has tied up with Marcos brother-in-law Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez
through two of his sons, records at the securities and Exchange Commission to enrich their owners and enable them to acquire shares of stock from other
(SEC) showed yesterday. companies?
Kokoys two sons, Benjamin Philip Gomez Romualdez, 32, and Ferdinand The interest-free loan controversy also involves Traders Royal Bank (TRB), a
Martin G. Romualdez, 29, are now members of the board of the debt-ridden sequestered bank, owned by Roberto Benedicto, a Marcos crony.
and heavily losing Benguet Corp., a company taken over by Marcos during
his dictatorship, but which was sequestered at the start of President Aquinos xxxx
term.
The deal could be from one crony to another since Yuchengco is very much
xxxx associated with the Marcoses and the Romualdezes, a source opined.
Observers said they believed the elections of the Romualdez sons officially Yuchengco owns Benguet Corp., which is heavily losing since he joined the
confirmed suspicions that the Marcos and Romualdez clans really owned Company as Chairman in 1989.
Benguet.
xxxx
Benguets former president, Jaime Ongpin, employed by the company for 10
years before he was named finance secretary by then President Aquino, Since Benguet is encountering all kinds of financial problems, losses and
committed suicide after being accused of being a Marcos-Romualdez crony. overdue debts, observers say they fear that Oriental may also suffer the
Yuchengco Bank under CB probe[13] same fate when and should Yuchengco and his partners assume
xxxx management of OMPC.
The official said the case was recently brought to Bangko Sentrals attention
by an RCBC creditor who felt he was being cheated by the bank through Already, it was noted the Oriental shares sold on the stock market are
interest-free loans granted to related interests. weakening, and stock observers say this could be attributed to the planned
entry into the company of Yuchengco, Leonardo Siguion-Reyna and their
Under the interest-free loan scheme, Yuchengco was able to own OMPC minority partners.
shares of Piedras since they were the same shares RCBC financed and which
were turned over to the bank as payment for the loan. In another of the subject articles, respondents allegedly insinuated that
Yuchengco induced others to disobey the lawful orders of the Securities and
The Central Bank official said that Bangko Sentral is now determining Exchange Commission (SEC):
whether RCBC violated the rule on loans to directors, officers, stockholders
and related interests (DOSRI). Alcorn, RCBC execs own guilt[14]
Two officials of Alcorn Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (AMPC) and Rizal
Yuchengco is both a director (chairman) officer, stockholder, and a related Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) admitted before the Securities and
interest of RCBC. Exchange Commission (SEC) yesterday that they ignored the SEC order
xxxx commanding them to process all Alcorn shares in the name of R. Coyiuto
Violating the DOSRI rule is a criminal offense. The Bangko Sentral official Securities Inc. and its investor clients such as Oriental Petroleum and
stressed. I believe that that is tantamount, not only to cheating the Minerals Corporation (OMPC).
depositor, but also robbing the bank of its clients money. xxxx
RCBC is owned by Alfonso Yuchengco, chairman of the debt-ridden and
If Bangko Sentral does not act decisively on this matter, the official asked heavily-losing Benguet Corp. He also owns Great Pacific Life Insurance Co.,
what will prevent the other banks from resorting to this kind of transactions whose employees are on strike because of the companys refusal to grant
them better salaries and benefits.
xxxx What would happen if all the other banks resort to this kind of lending
SEC insiders said that while Monreal and Ricalde should be punished for activity, giving away loans without interest? The entire banking system would
disobeying a lawful order from the SEC, people who masterminded the APMC certainly be compromised.
order should also be penalized once proven guilt
xxxx The owners or RCBC, therefore, should not be too liberal with their
Some observers said the APMC order to RCBC could be a ploy to prevent depositors money. They should also consider what fatal effects such a
Robert Coyiuto, Jr., chairman and president of OPMC, from retaining his practice could inflict on the very system where RCBC operates. The country,
majority control of Oriental, and a scheme to put on the board members of at this time, cannot afford another series of bank runs, nor a run at RCBC.
the Yuchengco company.
RCBC case bugs Bangko Sentral[16]
In fact, when Yuchengco created his own OPMC board of directors, he xxxx
appointed Ricalde as corporate secretary, OPMC officials pointed out.
The P101 million interest-free loan to Piedras is of national interest for not
In our opinion, observers following the OPMC developments stated, this is a just one reason alone.
clear and simple case of criminal conspiracy whose perpetrators must be
meted the harshest punishment to prevent corporate thieves from making a First, the money involved came from the depositors, and not from the
mockery of the law and from illegally taking over corporations which they do pockets of Yuchengco.
not own in the first place.
Second, banking rules dictate that a bank must be prudent in lending out its
Yuchengco further presented the following articles which allegedly accused clients money, so that its financial viability must never be put in question.
him of inducing Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) to violate the
provisions of the General Banking Act on Directors, Officers, stockholders, Third, the money lent to a borrower must never end up in the pocket of the
and Related Interest (DOSRI) loans: owner of the bank.
Bank runs and RCBC free loans[15] Fourth, such a practice could lead to a bank run, which the economy cannot
afford at this time, even if the run is confined to just one bank.
The Bank runs that devastated the economy in the recent past were, first
and foremost, instigated by rumors that bank owners were, themselves, Yuchengco further claims that the following article, in labeling him as a
using the publics money to promote their own businesses and interests in corporate raider, implies that he is seeking to profit from something he did
violation of Central Bank rules and regulations. not work for:
xxxx
The Battle for Oriental[17]
Now here comes Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) being Ledesma says Coyiuto will not wilt from Yuchengcos fabled financial power.
charged with engaging in unsound banking by lending an interest-free loan Robert has a lot of friends that will help him fend off a raider like Yuchengco,
of P101 million to one company, Piedras Petroleum Corporation, which says Ledesma.
Marcos crony Roberto Benedicto had surrendered to the Presidential xxxx
Commission on Good Government (PCGG). Ledesma of OPMC says that even if Coyiuto loses in the bid, hell still remain
a very significant player in OPMC given his substantial personal holdings and
xxxx proxies in the company. Coyiutos investment in OPMC is now valued at more
than a billion pesos compared to the Yuchengco block which, the Coyiuto
group points out, has only minimal investments.
Thats our moral ascendancy over their group. Coyiuto virtually made Oriental [F]or the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to
what it is today unlike Yuchengco who is just getting into the act now be libelous that construction must be adopted which will give to the matter
because Oriental has become an attractive cash cow says Ledesma. such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in
which the public would naturally understand what was uttered. The
War of Families published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole. In
The fight for control of Oriental Petroleum gains particular poignancy given applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will
the long history of feuding between the families of Yuchengco and Coyiuto. disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation offered by the publisher on
Their families were bitter rivals in the insurance business way back in the being called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication
seventies. The Yuchengcos own the Malayan Group of Insurance Companies had upon the minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the
while the Coyiutos used to control Pioneer Insurance. That rivalry seems to offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late to have the effect
have come full circle with their battle in Oriental Petroleum. of removing the sting, if any there be, from the word used in the publication.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Pomento says the best arrangement would have been a modus vivendi
between the two groups to stop their quarrel and work instead for the In finding that the phrase Marcos crony is derogatory, the trial court took
interest of the company. But given the bad blood that exists between the judicial notice of the fact that the said phrase, as understood in Philippine
two families, that might be a difficult proposition, he says. context, refers to an individual who was the recipient of special and/or
undeserved favors from the late President Marcos due to a special closeness
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are in agreement that the above to the latter. This finding, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals in its
articles contain defamatory imputations. Even the Amended Decision of the original Decision and was not tackled in the Amended Decision, is even
Court of Appeals, wherein the appellate court reversed itself and held that supported by one of the subject articles. In particular, the 10 November
respondents were not liable for damages, did not modify its earlier ruling 1993 article marked as Exhibit A mentioned that Benguets former president,
affirming the defamatory character of the imputations in the above articles. Jaime Ongpin, committed suicide after being accused of being a Marcos-
The Court of Appeals merely reversed itself on account of the allegedly Romualdez crony.[20] This statement highlights the disgrace respondents
privileged nature of the articles, which goes into the element of malice. wanted to associate with the term crony, which was used to describe
Malice, as an element of libel, and the defenses affecting the existence of the Yuchengco in the very same article.
same shall be discussed later.
In arguing that the subject articles are not really derogatory, respondent Even a cursory reading of the subject articles would show the intention of
Cabrera explains that the word crony was more or less accepted to describe the writers to injure the reputation, credit and virtue of Yuchengco and
a big businessman or close associate of the late President Marcos, and its expose him to public hatred, discredit, contempt and ridicule. The indirect
use in the column was meant only to supply the perspective as to the figure manner in which the articles attributed the insults to Yuchengco (e.g., the
or subject involved in the news story. Respondent Valino further claimed that money involved came from depositors, and not from Yuchengco) does not
after consulting several dictionaries as to the meaning of the word crony, he lessen the culpability of the writers and publishers thereof, but instead
did not come across a definition describing the word to mean someone who makes the defamatory imputations even more effective. Words calculated to
is a recipient of any undeserving or special favor from anyone. induce suspicion are sometimes more effective to destroy reputation than
false charges directly made. Ironical and metaphorical language is a favored
We are not swayed by the explanations of respondents Cabrera and Valino. vehicle for slander.[21]
In determining the defamatory character of words used, the explanation of
the respondent should not prevail over what the utterances (or writing) In sum, this Court upholds the ruling of the trial court and the Court of
convey to an ordinary listener (or reader).[18] Furthermore, as held by this Appeals that the subject articles contain defamatory imputations. All of the
Court in United States v. Sotto[19]: following imputations: (1) the labeling of Yuchengco as a Marcos crony, who
took advantage of his relationship with the former President to gain
unwarranted benefits; (2) the insinuations that Yuchengco induced others to
disobey the lawful orders of SEC; (3) the portrayal of Yuchengco as an unfair Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but
and uncaring employer due to the strike staged by the employees of merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an
Grepalife; (4) the accusation that he induced RCBC to violate the provisions intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.[28] It is present when it is
of the General shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks with
Banking Act on DOSRI loans; and (5) the tagging of Yuchengco as a knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or
corporate raider seeking to profit from something he did not work for, all falsity thereof.[29]
exposed Yuchengco to public contempt and ridicule, for they imputed to him
a condition that was dishonorable. Malice, however, does not necessarily have to be proven. There are two
types of malice malice in law and malice in fact.[30] Malice in law is a
Identification presumption of law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words that
raise the presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as
Defamatory words must refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person, and constructive malice, legal malice, or implied malice.[31] On the other hand,
that person must be the plaintiff. Statements are not libelous unless they malice in fact is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may
refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person.[22] However, the obnoxious denote that the defendant was actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also
writing need not mention the libeled party by name. It is sufficient if it is called express malice, actual malice, real malice, true malice, or particular
shown that the offended party is the person meant or alluded to.[23] malice.[32]
In the case at bar, all but one of the subject articles explicitly mention the
name of petitioner Yuchengco. The lone article, which does not mention
Yuchengco at all, Bank runs & RCBC free loans,[24] nevertheless chided the In this jurisdiction, malice in law is provided in Article 354 of the Revised
owners of RCBC: Penal Code, which also enumerates exceptions thereto:
The owners or RCBC, therefore, should not be too liberal with their Art. 354. Requirement of publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is
depositors money. They should also consider what fatal effects such a presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
practice could inflict on the very system where RCBC operates. The country, justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
at this time, cannot afford another series of bank runs, nor a run at RCBC.
[25] 1. A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and
Identifying Yuchengco in said article by name was, however, not necessary, 2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or
since the other subject articles, published a few days before and after this remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not
one, had already referred to Yuchengco as the owner of RCBC, sometimes of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said
explicitly (Benguet started to bleed in 1989, the year Yuchengco, who owns proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise
Rizal Commercial Banking Corp. [RCBC], took over as chairman of the of their functions.
company[26]), and sometimes implicitly (the money involved came from
depositors, and not from Yuchengco). While the defamation of a large group There is, thus, a presumption of malice in the case of every defamatory
does not give rise to a cause of action on the part of an individual, this is imputation, where there is no showing of a good intention or justifiable
subject to exception when it can be shown that he is the target of the motive for making such imputation.
defamatory matter.[27] This Court therefore finds that Yuchengco was
clearly identified as the libeled party in the subject defamatory imputations. The exceptions provided in Article 354 are also known as qualifiedly
privileged communications. The enumeration under said article is, however,
Malice not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged.[33] They
are known as qualifiedly privileged communications, since they are merely show that they had any good intention and justifiable motive for composing
exceptions to the general rule requiring proof of actual malice in order that a and publishing the vicious and malicious accusations against [petitioner].
defamatory imputation may be held actionable. In other words, defamatory
imputations written or uttered during any of the three classes of qualifiedly Moreover, [respondents] published or caused the publication of the subject
privileged communications enumerated above (1) a private communication defamatory articles with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.
made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or As previously stated, there is no proof that the contents of the subject
social duty; (2) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any articles are true or that the respondents exercised a reasonable degree of
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings care before publishing the same. [Respondents] failed to present evidence
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech showing that they verified the truth of any of the subject articles, especially
delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public in light of the categorical denial by [petitioner] of the accusations made
officers in the exercise of their functions; and (3) fair commentaries on against him.
matters of public interest may still be considered actionable if actual malice is
proven. This is in contrast with absolutely privileged communications, [Respondents] did not exercise reasonable degree of care or good faith
wherein the imputations are not actionable, even if attended by actual efforts to arrive at the truth before publishing the subject defamatory
malice: articles. [Respondents] did not present any competent evidence to establish
the truth of their allegations against [petitioner]. There was no showing that
A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, [respondents] made any attempt to talk to [petitioner] to verify the
even if its author has acted in bad faith. This class includes statements made statements contained in the defamatory articles, especially considering the
by members of Congress in the discharge of their functions as such, official gravity of the accusations made against [petitioner]. At the very least,
communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, [respondents] should have exercised efforts to talk to [petitioner] to clarify
and allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in their the issues and get his side. [Respondents] failure to verify the truth of the
pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as information from [petitioner] himself is in itself an evidence of their lack of
the answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them, in bona fide efforts to verify the accuracy of her information.
the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements
are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the The incessant publication of the defamatory articles attacking the honor and
questions propounded to said witnesses. Upon the other hand, conditionally reputation of [petitioner] is also proof of [respondents] malicious scheme to
or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although malign and defame the name, honor and reputation of [petitioner]. As earlier
containing defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made pointed out, in a span of one (1) month, [respondents] wrote and published
with malice or bad faith.[34] and/or caused the publication of seven (7) libelous articles against
[petitioner] attacking his honor and reputation as a distinguished
In the case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that businessman, philanthropist, his political inclination, and as an employer in
the publication of the subject articles was attended by actual malice his insurance company. In fact, the presence of malice is made more evident
by [respondents] baseless and uncalled for attack on the person of
In the instant case, there is preponderance of evidence showing that there [petitioner] as an employer. As aptly noted by the trial court in the assailed
exists malice in fact in the writing and publication of the subject libelous Decision:
articles.
Also in one of the articles, herein plaintiff was portrayed as an unfair and
As correctly found by the trial court, [petitioner] was able to show that uncaring employer due to the strike staged by the employees of Grepalife
[respondents] were animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his suggesting that it was the [petitioner] who was the cause, and of insinuating
reputation as shown by the timing and frequency of the publication of the that if [petitioners] group takes over control of Oriental, it would experience
defamatory articles. Further, as previously stated, [respondents] failed to the same labor problem as in Grepalife. The Court finds that [respondents]
failed to render an unbiased and fair report as to the real cause of the strike
except to lay the blame to [petitioner], without stating, much less describing, liability is absolute, regardless of the existence of actual malice, as
his participation thereon, knowing fully well that Grepalife is an entity distinct contrasted with the freedom in the latter, where it is conditioned on the want
from the plaintiff. In other words, the labor policies implemented by or absence of actual malice. Conditionally or qualifiedly privileged
Grepalife as regards its employees are obviously not that of Yuchengco. communications are actionable when made with actual malice.[36]
Such baseless and malicious accusation of [respondents] on [petitioner] only When malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles
proves the intention of the [respondents] in publishing the defamatory are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since being qualifiedly
articles was not to present an unbiased report on current issues but to privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from
launch a personal attack on the very person of [petitioner]. attaching to a defamatory imputation.
As earlier explained, as correctly found by the trial court, even the timing of Neither is there any reason for this Court to reverse the findings of the trial
the publication of these subject articles is highly suspicious inasmuch as the court and the Court of Appeals that there was actual malice on the part of
subject libelous articles came out in the Manila Chronicle, a newspaper the respondents. As held by the courts a quo, Yuchengco was able to show
owned and under the control of [respondent] Coyiuto, around November to by the attendant circumstances that respondents were animated by a desire
December of 1993, a couple of months prior to the January stockholders to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, as shown by the timing and
meeting of Oriental Corporation. From this, it is logical to conclude that the frequency of the publication of the defamatory articles. The portrayal of then
publication of the subject defamatory articles defaming the good name and Chronicle Publishing Chairman Coyiuto as an underdog and his rival
reputation of [petitioner] is but a part of [a] grand scheme to create a Yuchengco as the greedy Goliath in their battle for control over Oriental
negative image of [petitioner] so as to negatively affect [petitioners] Corporation, taken with the timing of the publication of these subject articles
credibility to the public, more particularly, to the then stockholders of a couple of months prior to the January stockholders meeting of Oriental
Oriental Corporation. Worth noting also is the fact that the subject articles Corporation, clearly indicate that the articles constituted an orchestrated
did not only portray [petitioner] in a bad light. Curiously, in these articles, attack to undermine the reputation of Yuchengco. Furthermore, respondents
[respondent] Coyiuto, a known rival of [petitioner], was portrayed as the were shown to have acted with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity of
underdog, the David and [petitioner] as the Goliath in their battle for control the articles they published, when they were unable to rebut the categorical
over Oriental Corporation. This does not escape the Courts attention. denial by Yuchengco of the accusations made against him, and his allegation
that he was not approached by respondents for his side of the stories before
These circumstances clearly indicate the presence of actual malice on the the publication thereof. Respondents failure to present evidence showing
part of [respondents] in the publication of the subject libelous articles.[35] that they verified the truth of any of the subject articles is fatal to their
(Emphases supplied.) cause. In In re: Emil P. Jurado,[37] this Court ruled that categorical denials
of the truth of allegations in a publication place the burden upon the party
When the Court of Appeals granted the Motion for Reconsideration, it did publishing it, either of proving the truth of the imputations or of showing that
not touch upon its earlier finding of actual malice on the part of respondents the same was an honest mistake or error committed despite good efforts to
in publishing the subject articles. Instead, the Court of Appeals merely held arrive at the truth. There is actual malice when there is either (1) knowledge
that the subject articles were fair commentaries on matters of public interest, of the publications falsity; or (2) reckless disregard of whether the contents
and thus fell within the scope of the third type of qualifiedly privileged of the publication were false or not.[38] Failure to even get the side of
communications. Yuchengco in the published articles clearly constituted reckless disregard of
the truth or falsity of said articles.
This was a glaring error on the part of the Court of Appeals. As discussed
above, whereas there is an absolute bar to an action in the case of Finally, even if we assume for the sake of argument that actual malice was
absolutely privileged communication, the same is not true with respect to not proven in the case at bar, we nevertheless cannot adhere to the finding
qualifiedly privileged communication, wherein the law merely raises a prima of the Court of Appeals in the Amended Decision that the subject articles
facie presumption in favor of the occasion. In the former, the freedom from
were fair commentaries on matters of public interest, and thus fell within the that the person involved is a public officer, unless the said topic or story
scope of the third type of qualifiedly privileged communications. relates to his functions as such. Assuming a public office is not tantamount
to completely abdicating ones right to privacy. Therefore, for the purpose of
In Philippine Journalists, Inc. (Peoples Journal) v. Theonen,[39] this Court determining whether or not a topic is a matter of public interest, Yuchengco
adopted the pronouncement in the United States Decision in Gertz v. Robert cannot be considered a public officer.
Welsch, Inc.[40] that, in order to be considered as fair commentaries on
matters of public interest, the individual to whom the defamatory articles Neither is Yuchengco a public figure. The above case Philippine Journalists
were imputed should either be a public officer or a public figure: continues to cite the US case Gertz in describing who is a public figure:
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, we stated that the enumeration under Art. 354 More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to
is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the
commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. We resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and
stated that the doctrine of fair commentaries means that while in general comment. Third, this would impose an additional difficulty on trial court
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every judges to decide which publications address issues of general interest and
man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false which do not. Even if the foregoing generalities do not obtain in every
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable instance, the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption
imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such
public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or assumption is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not
a comment based on a false supposition. accepted public office or assumed an influential role in ordering society.
Again, this argument is unavailing to the petitioners. As we said, the (Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S., at 164) He has relinquished no part
respondent is a private individual, and not a public official or public figure. of his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently he
We are persuaded by the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in has a more compelling call on the courts for redress of injury inflicted by
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., [418 U. S. 323 (1974)] that a newspaper or defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are not only more vulnerable
broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving
neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional of recovery.[43] (Emphasis supplied.)
privilege against liability, for injury inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a
discussion of public interest. (Emphasis supplied.) The records in the case at bar do not disclose any instance wherein
Yuchengco had voluntarily thrust himself to the forefront of particular public
Thus, in trying to prove that the subject articles delved on matters controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. He
concerning public interest, the Court of Appeals insisted that Yuchengco was cannot, therefore, be considered a public figure. Since Yuchengco, the
a public official or public figure, who must not be too thin-skinned with person defamed in the subject articles, is neither as public officer nor a
reference to comment upon his official acts.[41] The Court of Appeals then public figure, said articles cannot be considered as qualifiedly privileged
noted that Yuchengco was, at the time of the Amended Decision, appointed communications even if they deal with matters of public concern.
as a Presidential Adviser on Foreign Affairs with Cabinet rank, and proceeded
to enumerate[42] the public positions held by Yuchengco through the years. In view of the foregoing, this Court is constrained to grant the instant
Petition and reinstate the Decision of the trial court, as previously affirmed
However, an examination of the subject articles reveals that the allegations by the Court of Appeals in its original Decision. This Court, however, finds
therein pertain to Yuchengcos private business endeavors and do not refer to the award of damages in the total amount of One Hundred Million Pesos by
his duties, functions and responsibilities as a Philippine Ambassador to China the trial court to be rather excessive given the circumstances. This Court,
and Japan, or to any of the other public positions he occupied. A topic or thus, further resolves to reduce the award of damages, as follows:
story should not be considered a matter of public interest by the mere fact
1. The damages for which Chronicle Publishing, Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto 3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff
Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Yuchengco, jointly and severally, the amount of One Million Pesos
Raul Valino and Rodney Diola shall be jointly and severally liable under the (P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fee and legal costs.
first cause of action shall be reduced as follows:
Costs against respondents.
a. The amount of moral damages shall be reduced from Ten Million Pesos
(P10,000,000.00) to Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00); and SO ORDERED.
b. The amount of exemplary damages shall be reduced from Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);
2. The damages for which Roberto Coyuito, Jr. and Chronicle Publishing shall
be jointly and severally liable under the second cause of action shall be
reduced as follows:
a. The amount of moral damages shall be reduced from Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00) to Twenty-Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00); and
b. The amount of exemplary damages shall be reduced from Thirty Million
Pesos (P30,000,000.00) Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). G.R. No. 175822. October 23, 2013.*
WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Amended Decision of CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAÑEZ,
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76995 dated 28 August 2008, which petitioners, vs. SHIRLEY G. QUIÑONES, respondent.
reversed on Motion for Reconsideration the 18 March 2008 Decision of the
same Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Civil Law; Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; Any abuse in the exercise of
Regional Trial Court of Makati City in Civil Case No. 94-1114 dated 8 such right and in the performance of duty causing damage or injury to
November 2002 finding herein respondents liable for damages, is hereby another is actionable under the Civil Code.—Respondent’s complaint against
REINSTATED, but shall be MODIFIED to read as follows: petitioners stemmed from the prin-ciple of abuse of rights provided for in the
Civil Code on the chapter of human relations. Respondent cried foul when
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as petitioners allegedly embarrassed her when they insisted that she did not
follows: pay for the black jeans she purchased from their shop despite the evidence
of payment which is the official receipt issued by the shop. The issu-ance of
1. On the First Cause of Action, ordering defendants Chronicle Publishing, the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners had the right to verify from
Neil H. Cruz, Ernesto Tolentino, Noel Cabrera, Thelma San Juan, Gerry respondent whether she indeed made payment if they had reason to believe
Zaragoza, Donna Gatdula, Raul Valino and Rodney Diola to pay plaintiff that she did not. However, the exercise of such right is not without
Yuchengco, jointly and severally: limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in the performance of
a. the amount of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) as moral damages; and duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable under the Civil Code.
b. the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as exemplary
damages; Same; Same; Same; Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of
the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in
2. On the Second Cause of Action, ordering defendants Roberto Coyuito, Jr. good faith.—Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the
and Chronicle Publishing to pay plaintiff Yuchengco, jointly and severally: Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good
a. the amount of Twenty-Five Million Pesos (P25,000,000.00) as moral faith. He would be liable if he in-stead acted in bad faith, with intent to
damages; and prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested
b. the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain
from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.
Malice or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and in-tentional Geraldez, Suico-Le, Chanco, Peque, Caracut-Arnibal Law Offices for
design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. respondent.
Same; Same; Same; A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.—To malign DECISION
respondent without substantial evidence and despite the latter’s possession
of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A person should PERALTA, J.:
not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise,
he opens himself to liability. The exercise of a right must be in accordance Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the ; Rules
with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or of Court are the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated August 3, 2006 and
unduly harsh. In this case, petitioners obviously abused their rights. Resolution2 dated November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309. The
assailed decision reversed and set aside the June 20, 2003 Decision3 of the
Same; Damages; Moral Damages; Moral damages may be awarded Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC), Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-
whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of 26984; while the assailed resolution denied the motion for reconsideration
the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, filed by petitioner Michelle Ybañez (Ybañez).
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation
and similar injury in the cases speci-fied or analogous to those provided in The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:
Article 2219 of the Civil Code.—In view of the foregoing, respondent is
entitled to an award of moral damages and attorney’s fees. Moral damages On July 25, 2001, respondent Shirley G. Quiñones, a Reservation Ticketing
may be awarded whenever the defendant’s wrongful act or omission is the Agent of Cebu Pacific Air in Lapu Lapu City, went inside the Guess USA
proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, Boutique at the second floor of Robinson’s Department Store (Robinson’s) in
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, Cebu City. She fitted four items: two jeans, a blouse and a shorts, then
social humiliation and similar injury in the cases specified or analogous to decided to purchase the black jeans worth ₱2,098.00.4 Respondent allegedly
those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Moral damages are not a paid to the cashier evidenced by a receipt5 issued by the store.6
bonanza. They are given to ease the defendant’s grief and suffering. They
should, thus, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the While she was walking through the skywalk connecting Robinson’s and
gravity of the wrong done. They are awarded not to enrich the complainant Mercury Drug Store (Mercury) where she was heading next, a Guess
but to enable the latter to obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will employee approached and informed her that she failed to pay the item she
serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone. We find that the got. She, however, insisted that she paid and showed the employee the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable receipt issued in her favor.7 She then suggested that they talk about it at the
under the circumstances. Considering that respondent was com-pelled to Cebu Pacific Office located at the basement of the mall. She first went to
litigate to protect her interest, attorney’s fees in the amount of P20,000.00 is Mercury then met the Guess employees as agreed upon.8
likewise just and proper.
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the Guess employees allegedly
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolu-tion of the Court subjected her to humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and
of Appeals. repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans.9 They supposedly even
searched her wallet to check how much money she had, followed by another
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. argument. Respondent, thereafter, went home.10
Rainero C. Roiles for petitioners. On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly gave a letter to the
Director of Cebu Pacific Air narrating the incident, but the latter refused to
receive it as it did not concern the office and the same took place while
respondent was off duty.11 Another letter was allegedly prepared and was RTC likewise did not find it damaging for respondent when the confrontation
supposed to be sent to the Cebu Pacific Office in Robinson’s, but the latter took place in front of Cebu Pacific clients, because it was respondent herself
again refused to receive it.12 Respondent also claimed that the Human who put herself in that situation by choosing the venue for discussion. As to
Resource Department (HRD) of Robinson’s was furnished said letter and the the letter sent to Cebu Pacific Air, the trial court also did not take it against
latter in fact conducted an investigation for purposes of canceling the Guess employees, because they merely asked for assistance and not to
respondent’s Robinson’s credit card. Respondent further claimed that she embarrass or humiliate respondent. In other words, the RTC found no
was not given a copy of said damaging letter.13 With the above experience, evidence to prove bad faith on the part of the Guess employees to warrant
respondent claimed to have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, the award of damages.23
mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched reputation, moral
shock and social humiliation.14 She thus filed the Complaint for Damages15 On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision, the dispositive
before the RTC against petitioners California Clothing, Inc. (California portion of which reads:
Clothing), Excelsis Villagonzalo (Villagonzalo), Imelda Hawayon (Hawayon)
and Ybañez. She demanded the payment of moral, nominal, and exemplary WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The decision of the Regional
damages, plus attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.16 Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 58, in Civil Case No. CEB-26984 (for:
Damages) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants Michelle Ybañez
In their Answer,17 petitioners and the other defendants admitted the and California Clothing, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant
issuance of the receipt of payment. They claimed, however, that instead of Shirley G. Quiñones jointly and solidarily moral damages in the amount of
the cashier (Hawayon) issuing the official receipt, it was the invoicer Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) and attorney’s fees in the amount of
(Villagonzalo) who did it manually. They explained that there was Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00).
miscommunication between the employees at that time because prior to the
issuance of the receipt, Villagonzalo asked Hawayon " Ok na ?," and the SO ORDERED.24
latter replied " Ok na ," which the former believed to mean that the item has
already been paid.18 Realizing the mistake, Villagonzalo rushed outside to While agreeing with the trial court that the Guess employees were in good
look for respondent and when he saw the latter, he invited her to go back to faith when they confronted respondent inside the Cebu Pacific Office about
the shop to make clarifications as to whether or not payment was indeed the alleged non-payment, the CA, however, found preponderance of
made. Instead, however, of going back to the shop, respondent suggested evidence showing that they acted in bad faith in sending the demand letter
that they meet at the Cebu Pacific Office. Villagonzalo, Hawayon and Ybañez to respondent’s employer. It found respondent’s possession of both the
thus went to the agreed venue where they talked to respondent.19 They official receipt and the subject black jeans as evidence of payment.25
pointed out that it appeared in their conversation that respondent could not Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the CA opined that the letter addressed
recall whom she gave the payment.20 They emphasized that they were to Cebu Pacific’s director was sent to respondent’s employer not merely to
gentle and polite in talking to respondent and it was the latter who was ask for assistance for the collection of the disputed payment but to subject
arrogant in answering their questions.21 As counterclaim, petitioners and the her to ridicule, humiliation and similar injury such that she would be
other defendants sought the payment of moral and exemplary damages, plus pressured to pay.26 Considering that Guess already started its investigation
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.22 on the incident, there was a taint of bad faith and malice when it dragged
respondent’s employer who was not privy to the transaction. This is
On June 20, 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing both the especially true in this case since the purported letter contained not only a
complaint and counterclaim of the parties. From the evidence presented, the narrative of the incident but accusations as to the alleged acts of respondent
trial court concluded that the petitioners and the other defendants believed in trying to evade payment.27 The appellate court thus held that petitioners
in good faith that respondent failed to make payment. Considering that no are guilty of abuse of right entitling respondent to collect moral damages and
motive to fabricate a lie could be attributed to the Guess employees, the attorney’s fees. Petitioner California Clothing Inc. was made liable for its
court held that when they demanded payment from respondent, they merely failure to exercise extraordinary diligence in the hiring and selection of its
exercised a right under the honest belief that no payment was made. The employees; while Ybañez’s liability stemmed from her act of signing the
demand letter sent to respondent’s employer. In view of Hawayon and principle commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the Civil
Villagonzalo’s good faith, however, they were exonerated from liability.28 Code. It provides that " Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
Ybañez moved for the reconsideration29 of the aforesaid decision, but the observe honesty and good faith."x x x32 The elements of abuse of rights are
same was denied in the assailed November 14, 2006 CA Resolution. as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.33
Petitioners now come before the Court in this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court based on the following grounds: In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a miscommunication between
the cashier and the invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the receipt
I. to respondent. When they realized the mistake, they made a cash count and
discovered that the amount which is equivalent to the price of the black
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that it was respondent who failed
LETTER SENT TO THE CEBU PACIFIC OFFICE WAS MADE TO SUBJECT to make such payment. It was, therefore, within their right to verify from
HEREIN RESPONDENT TO RIDICULE, HUMILIATION AND SIMILAR INJURY. respondent whether she indeed paid or not and collect from her if she did
not. However, the question now is whether such right was exercised in good
II. faith or they went overboard giving respondent a cause of action against
them.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING MORAL
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES.30 Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a
person must, in the exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He
The petition is without merit. would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to prejudice
another.34 Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the
Respondent’s complaint against petitioners stemmed from the principle of acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from
abuse of rights provided for in the Civil Code on the chapter of human taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another.35 Malice
relations. Respondent cried foul when petitioners allegedly embarrassed her or bad faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and intentional design to
when they insisted that she did not pay for the black jeans she purchased do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.36
from their shop despite the evidence of payment which is the official receipt
issued by the shop. The issuance of the receipt notwithstanding, petitioners Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners asking respondent
had the right to verify from respondent whether she indeed made payment if whether she paid or not. The Guess employees were able to talk to
they had reason to believe that she did not. However, the exercise of such respondent at the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started well, but it
right is not without limitations. Any abuse in the exercise of such right and in eventually turned sour when voices were raised by both parties. As aptly
the performance of duty causing damage or injury to another is actionable held by both the RTC and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two
under the Civil Code. The Court’s pronouncement in Carpio v. Valmonte31 is parties with conflicting views insisting on their respective beliefs.
noteworthy: Considering, however, that respondent was in possession of the item
purchased from the shop, together with the official receipt of payment issued
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a wrongful act or by petitioners, the latter cannot insist that no such payment was made on
omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left without any the basis of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been proven by
remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he sustained. substantial evidence in the proper forum.
Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but also
universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms that It is evident from the circumstances of the case that petitioners went
spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve overboard and tried to force respondent to pay the amount they were
as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the demanding. In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even sent a
demand letter to respondent’s employer not only informing it of the incident The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it
but obviously imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.1âwphi1 was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh.39 In this case,
Petitioners claimed that after receiving the receipt of payment and the item petitioners obviously abused their rights.
purchased, respondent "was noted to hurriedly left (sic) the store." They also
accused respondent that she was not completely being honest when she was Complementing the principle of abuse of rights are the provisions of Articles
asked about the circumstances of payment, thus: 20 and 2 of the Civil Code which read:40
x x x After receiving the OR and the item, Ms. Gutierrez was noted to Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
hurriedly left (sic) the store. x x x damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
When I asked her about to whom she gave the money, she gave out a blank Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
expression and told me, "I can’t remember." Then I asked her how much manner that is contrary to morals or good customs, or public policy shall
money she gave, she answered, "₱2,100; 2 pcs 1,000 and 1 pc 100 bill." compensate the latter for the damage.
Then I told her that that would (sic) impossible since we have no such
denomination in our cash fund at that moment. Finally, I asked her if how In view of the foregoing, respondent is entitled to an award of moral
much change and if she received change from the cashier, she then damages and attorney s fees. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the
answered, "I don’t remember." After asking these simple questions, I am defendant s wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
very certain that she is not completely being honest about this. In fact, we physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
invited her to come to our boutique to clear these matters but she reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar
vehemently refused saying that she’s in a hurry and very busy.37 injury in the cases specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code.41 Moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease
Clearly, these statements are outrightly accusatory. Petitioners accused the defendant s grief and suffering. They should, thus, reasonably
respondent that not only did she fail to pay for the jeans she purchased but approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done.42
that she deliberately took the same without paying for it and later hurriedly They are awarded not to enrich the complainant but to enable the latter to
left the shop to evade payment. These accusations were made despite the obtain means, diversions, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
issuance of the receipt of payment and the release of the item purchased. moral suffering he has undergone.43 We find that the amount of ₱50,000.00
There was, likewise, no showing that respondent had the intention to evade as moral damages awarded by the CA is reasonable under the
payment. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, respondent was not in a rush in circumstances. Considering that respondent was compelled to litigate to
leaving the shop or the mall. This is evidenced by the fact that the Guess protect her interest, attorney s fees in the amount of of₱20,000.00 is
employees did not have a hard time looking for her when they realized the likewise just and proper.
supposed non-payment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending the demand letter to The Court of Appeals Decision dated August 3, 2006 and Resolution dated
respondent’s employer, petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in November 14, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 80309, are AFFIRMED.
collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish respondent’s reputation in the
eyes of her employer. To malign respondent without substantial evidence SO ORDERED.
and despite the latter’s possession of enough evidence in her favor, is clearly
impermissible. A person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself to liability.38
G.R. No. 193459. February 15, 2011.*
MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, RISA HONTIVEROS-
BARAQUEL, DANILO D. LIM, FELIPE PESTAÑO, EVELYN PESTAÑO,
RENATO M. REYES, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL OF BAGONG ALYAN-
SANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN); MOTHER MARY JOHN MANANZAN,
CO-CHAIRPERSON OF PAGBABAGO; DANILO RAMOS, SECRETARY-
GENERAL OF KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP); ATTY.
EDRE OLALIA, ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
UNION OF PEOPLE’S LAWYERS (NUPL); FERDINAND R. GAITE,
CHAIRPERSON, CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE); and
JAMES TERRY RIDON OF THE LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
(LFS), respondents. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent-
intervenor.
Impeachment; Judicial Review; Certiorari; Jurisdiction; The Court finds it

well-within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted
its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that
jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court.— only one impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the impeachable officer within a period of one year.
expanded certiorari jurisdiction of this Court reflects, includes the power to
“determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion Same; Due Process; Bias and Partiality; Mere suspicion of partiality does not
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or suffice to prove bias; The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be
instrumentality of the Government.” In the present case, petitioner invokes considered as that of the entire body itself.—The Court finds petitioner’s
the Court’s expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of merit, there being hardly any
certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well- indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality does not suffice. The act of
within its power to determine whether public respondent committed a the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the entire body
violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils., 271 SCRA 790
its functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of (1997), teaches: First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body
jurisdiction, which would require corrective measures from the Court. requiring a majority vote out of the three members of the commission in
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in order to validly decide a case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote
this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the alone of the chairman of the commission, as in this case, the vote of
repository of the sovereign will. Commissioner Kintanar, absent the required concurring vote coming from the
rest of the membership of the commission to at least arrive at a majority
Same; Same; Same; An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is decision, is not sufficient to legally render an NTC order, resolution or
the requisite of ripeness; There is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the decision. Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National
validity of the simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need Telecommunications Commission. He alone does not speak and in behalf of
to publish as a mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in the NTC. The NTC acts through a three-man body x x x. In the present case,
Impeachment Proceedings of the House (Impeachment Rules) present Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact, vote and merely
constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation; The unusual presided over the proceedings when it decided on the sufficiency of form and
act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment substance of the complaints.
complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power.—Respondents
do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial Same; Same; Same; An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is
review, as they only assert that the petition is premature and not yet ripe for not per se an indication of bias.—Petitioner contends that the “indecent and
adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain, speedy and precipitate haste” of public respondent in finding the two complaints
adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public respondent. sufficient in form and substance is a clear indication of bias, she pointing out
Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present petition on that it only took public respondent five minutes to arrive thereat. An
September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the determination of the abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication of
sufficiency of form and substance of the two complaints. An aspect of the bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice, 543 SCRA 70
“case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of ripeness. The question (2008), holds: Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-
of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct, adverse effect on an judicial officer cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious
individual by the challenged conduct. In the present petition, there is no performance of functions. For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue
doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the simultaneous referral of haste. The orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and
the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of promulgating constant consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar
the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House to each case. The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s
(Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for official actuations in all phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it
immediate interpretation. The unusual act of simultaneously referring to was incumbent upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than
public respondent two impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to a mere tallying of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to
discharge. The swift completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task impeachment complaint is vital “to effectively carry out” the impeachment
cannot be relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
regular performance of not just one but five state prosecutors. (italics in the
original; emphasis and underscoring supplied) Same; Same; Publication; Words and Phrases; While “promulgation” would
seem synonymous to “publication,” there is a statutory difference in their
Same; Same; The respondent’s initial participation in the impeachment usage.—Black’s Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as To publish; to
proceedings—the opportunity to file an Answer—starts after the Committee announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. The formal act
on Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance.—Rule III(A) of announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative order that is given
of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the impeachment to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or obligatory.
procedure at the Committee-level, particularly Section 5 which denotes that (emphasis supplied) While “promulgation” would seem synonymous to
petitioner’s initial participation in the impeachment proceedings—the “publication,” there is a statutory difference in their usage. The Constitution
opportunity to file an Answer—starts after the Committee on Justice finds the notably uses the word “promulgate” 12 times. A number of those instances
complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee refused to involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating
accept petitioner’s motion for reconsideration from its finding of sufficiency from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other
of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite, conformably with the constitutional offices. To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of
Impeachment Rules. the terms “promulgate” and “publish,” the case of the Judiciary is in point. In
promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
Same; Same; The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the Court
impeachment complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As
rule-making powers of the House of Representatives which committed such far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, promulgation
determinative function to public Committee on Justice.—The determination means “the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and
of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment complaint is an publication.” Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar
exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making powers of the provision directing Congress to “promulgate its rules for the canvassing of
House of Representatives which committed suchm, determinative function to the certificates” in the presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably,
public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the exercise of its when Congress approved its canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national
discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards as to the form elections on May 25, 2010, it did not require the publication thereof for its
and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential considerations effectivity. Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its
behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of its duty to adoption. In the case of administrative agencies, “promulgation” and
effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any contravention of “publication” likewise take on different meanings as they are part of a multi-
the minimum constitutional guidelines. Contrary to petitioner’s position that stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case, the publication
the Impeachment Rules do not provide for comprehensible standards in of implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption.
determining the sufficiency of form and substance, the Impeachment Rules
are clear in echoing the constitutional requirements and providing that there Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Promulgation must be used in
must be a “verified complaint or resolution,” and that the substance the context in which it is generally understood—that is, to make known;
requirement is met if there is “a recital of facts constituting the offense Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict “promulgation” to
charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.” Notatu “publication,” the former should be understood to have been used in its
dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a general sense; It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific
complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the method of promulgation.—Promulgation must thus be used in the context in
organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely which it is generally understood—that is, to make known. Generalia verba
requires a “hearing.” In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House sunt generaliter inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally
deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an understood. Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a
word, the general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power of the House to
restricted sense was to be used. Since the Constitutional Commission did not promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the avowed
restrict “promulgation” to “publication,” the former should be understood to purpose.—Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it
have been used in its general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the
determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing
way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment
decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods
publication. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government under Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even
how to promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific lapse while awaiting the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior
method of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would
promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution. already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment
complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement. Given
Same; Same; Same; Official Gazette; Publication in the Official Gazette or a that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on
newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for Congress to make impeachment is aimed at “effectively carry[ing] out the purpose” of
known its rules; Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion
Rules published, it could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on
of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries; Other than “promulgate,” Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation
there is no other single formal term in the English language to appropriately of early filing and in keeping with the “effective” implementation of the
refer to an issuance without need of it being published.—Publication in the “purpose” of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional
Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but one avenue for adoption of the previous Congress’ Impeachment Rules is within the power
Congress to make known its rules. Jurisprudence emphatically teaches that x of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, the avowed purpose.
this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the
acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic Same; Same; Same; The rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the
concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal framers of the Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects
affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct of impeachment, and, being procedural in nature, they may be given
Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, retroactive application to pending actions.—Moreover, the rules on
this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, merely
standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural
effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement in nature, they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. “It is
them, before the courts may intervene. (italics in the original; emphasis and axiomatic that the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate
underscoring supplied; citations omitted) Had the Constitution intended to any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
have the Impeachment Rules published, it could have stated so as constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule,
categorically as it did in the case of the rules of procedure in legislative no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.” In the
inquiries, per Neri. Other than “promulgate,” there is no other single formal present case, petitioner fails to allege any impairment of vested rights. It
term in the English language to appropriately refer to an issuance without bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where
need of it being published. the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the
protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the
Same; Same; Same; Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, offender.
lack of it does not nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the
Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing Same; One-Year Bar Rule; Words and Phrases; The initiation starts with the
provisions of the Constitution; The provisional adoption of the previous filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the
complaint moving, i.e., Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint which House” precedes the bringing of an impeachment case to the Senate. In fact,
is its referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.—Contrary to petitioner concedes that the initiation of impeachment proceedings is within
petitioner’s asseveration, Francisco states that the term “initiate” means to the sole and absolute control of the House of Representatives. Conscious of
file the complaint and take initial action on it. The initiation starts with the the legal import of each step, the House, in taking charge of its own
filing of the complaint which must be accompanied with an action to set the proceedings, must deliberately decide to initiate an impeachment
complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint proceeding, subject to the time frame and other limitations imposed by the
coupled with Congress’ taking initial action of said complaint. Constitution. This chamber of Congress alone, not its officers or members or
any private individual, should own up to its processes. The Constitution did
The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of the not place the power of the “final say” on the lips of the House Secretary
complaint to the Committee on Justice. General who would otherwise be calling the shots in forwarding or freezing
any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint to the proper
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The petitioner’s reliance on the committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either, which explains
singular tense of the word “complaint” to denote the limit prescribed by the why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of the House. It is
Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word the House of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power
covers its enlarged and plural sense.—Contrary to petitioner’s emphasis on to set its own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to
impeachment complaint, what the Constitution mentions is impeachment otherwise guard against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding
“proceedings.” Her reliance on the singular tense of the word “complaint” to by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.
denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution goes against the basic rule of
statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged and plural sense. The Same; Same; It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended
Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment limitation refers to the element of time, and not the number of complaints—
complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment the impeachable officer should defend himself in only one impeachment
proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a proceeding, so that he will not be precluded from performing his official
matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the functions and duties, while, similarly, Congress should run only one
candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it with little time to attend to its
Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment main work of law-making.—The Court does not lose sight of the salutary
proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more reason of confining only one impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner
than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is concededly cites Justice Adolfo Azcuna’s separate opinion that concurred
important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, with the Francisco ruling. Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-
such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no year bar is two-fold: “to prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2)
longer rekindle the candle. to allow the legislature to do its principal task [of] legislation,” with main
reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission, that reads: MR.
Same; Same; The question as to who should administer or pronounce that ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to protect
an impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body that public officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from
administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial; It is the House harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is
of Representatives, in public plenary session, which has the power to set its lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow
own chamber into special operation by referring the complaint or to multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the
otherwise guard against the initiation of a second impeachment proceeding legislature will do nothing else but that. (underscoring supplied) It becomes
by rejecting a patently unconstitutional complaint.—The question as to who clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers to the
should administer or pronounce that an impeachment proceeding has been element of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer
initiated rests also on the body that administers the proceedings prior to the should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that he will
impeachment trial. As gathered from Commissioner Bernas’ disquisition in not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. Similarly,
Francisco, a proceeding which “takes place not in the Senate but in the Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not to leave it
with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The doctrine laid each charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set
down in Francisco that initiation means filing and referral remains congruent known as the “Articles of Impeachment.” It, therefore, follows that an
to the rationale of the constitutional provision. impeachment complaint need not allege only one impeachable offense.
Same; Same; What the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not CARPIO MORALES, J.:
freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself; In considering the side of The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via
the impeachable officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7,
smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave 2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public
issues—the measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the respondent).
impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made
to traverse it just once; Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the
as a vehicle, it should do so just once.—Petitioner’s claim is based on the fourth Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the
premise that the exertion of time, energy and other resources runs directly Constitution) or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-
proportional to the number of complaints filed. This is non sequitur. What Baraquel, Danilo Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn Pestao (Baraquel
the Constitution assures an impeachable officer is not freedom from arduous group) filed an impeachment complaint[1] against petitioner, upon the
effort to defend oneself, which depends on the qualitative assessment of the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-ao and Walden Bello.
charges and evidence and not on the quantitative aspect of complaints or [2]
offenses. In considering the side of the impeachable officers, the Constitution
does not promise an absolutely smooth ride for them, especially if the A day after the opening of the 15th Congress or on July 27, 2010, Atty.
charges entail genuine and grave issues. The framers of the Constitution did Marilyn Barua-Yap, Secretary General of the House of Representatives,
not concern themselves with the media tolerance level or internal disposition transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano
of an impeachable officer when they deliberated on the impairment of Belmonte, Jr.[3] who, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, directed the
performance of official functions. The measure of protection afforded by the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.[4]
Constitution is that if the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride,
he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary
called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry
no repeat ride for one full year. This is the whole import of the constitutional Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint[5] against
safeguard of one-year bar rule. petitioner with a resolution of endorsement by Party-List Representatives
Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan,
Same; Criminal Procedure; The Constitution allows the indictment for Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.[6] On even date, the House of
multiple impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of Procedure in
impeachment, assembled in one set known as the “Articles of Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still of even date,
Impeachment”—it, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need [7] the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker
not allege only one impeachable offense.—Without going into the Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010,[8] also directed the
effectiveness of the suppletory application of the Rules on Criminal Procedure Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
in carrying out the relevant constitutional provisions, which prerogative the
Constitution vests on Congress, and without delving into the practicability of On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as
the application of the one offense per complaint rule, the initial chairperson of the Committee on Rules,[9] instructed Atty. Artemio Adasa,
determination of which must be made by the House which has yet to pass Jr., Deputy Secretary General for Operations, through Atty. Cesar Pareja,
upon the question, the Court finds that petitioner’s invocation of that Executive Director of the Plenary Affairs Department, to include the two
particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not lie. Suffice it to state that the complaints in the Order of Business,[10] which was complied with by their
Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day, August 11, 2010.
Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4,

On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of 2010 which the Court granted by Resolution of October 5, 2010.
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public
respondent.[11] Under an Advisory[15] issued by the Court, oral arguments were conducted
on October 5 and 12, 2010, followed by petitioners filing of a Consolidated
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found Reply of October 15, 2010 and the filing by the parties of Memoranda within
both complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have the given 15-day period.
been referred to it at exactly the same time.
The petition is harangued by procedural objections which the Court shall first
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th resolve.
Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the prohibition. They argue that public respondent was not exercising any
September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two
refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised impeachment complaints as it was exercising a political act that is
petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to the complaints, discretionary in nature,[16] and that its function is inquisitorial that is akin to
drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55 members a preliminary investigation.[17]
of public respondent.
These same arguments were raised in Francisco, Jr. v. House of
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found Representatives.[18] The argument that impeachment proceedings are
the two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution beyond the reach of judicial review was debunked in this wise:
and betrayal of public trust,[12] sufficient in substance. The determination of
the sufficiency of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
assumed hypothetically the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
whether valid judgment to impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
was served also on September 7, 2010 a notice directing her to file an discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
answer to the complaints within 10 days.[13] lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a
power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include the
Six days following her receipt of the notice to file answer or on September power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application government branch or instrumentality.
for injunctive reliefs. The following day or on September 14, 2010, the Court
En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo ante order[14] and There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days. The Court Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
subsequently, by Resolution of September 21, 2010, directed the Office of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution
the Solicitor General (OSG) to file in 10 days its Comment on the petition bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of Representatives without
limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representatives
The Baraquel group which filed the first complaint, the Reyes group which the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several
filed the second complaint, and public respondent (through the OSG and limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3),
private counsel) filed their respective Comments on September 27, 29 and (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing,
30, 2010. required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one
and the same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments

undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts between Congress Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court to exercise judicial exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
statesmanship on the principle that "whenever possible, the Court should system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted
defer to the judgment of the people expressed legislatively, recognizing full as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are
well the perils of judicial willfulness and pride." integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the above- powers assigned to it by the Constitution.[19] (citations omitted; italics in the
mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the Constitution original; underscoring supplied)
did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or in the Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the
language of Baker v. Carr, "judicially discoverable standards" for determining expanded certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects, includes the power
the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicial to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
review. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
xxxx instrumentality of the Government.[21]
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power
of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, In the present case, petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari
Jr., this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the jurisdiction, using the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition as
Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of procedural vehicles. The Court finds it well-within its power to determine
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions whether public respondent committed a violation of the Constitution or
and prerogatives. In Taada v. Angara, in seeking to nullify an act of the gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of its functions and prerogatives
Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which would require
that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of corrective measures from the Court.
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution,
it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in
dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, this Court declared null and void a resolution of this instance, but simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the
the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding repository of the sovereign will.[22]
the election, of a congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal
for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Respondents do not seriously contest all the essential requisites for the
Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in the exercise of judicial review, as they only assert that the petition is premature
Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of and not yet ripe for adjudication since petitioner has at her disposal a plain,
the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is speedy and adequate remedy in the course of the proceedings before public
subject to judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the respondent. Public respondent argues that when petitioner filed the present
House of Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on petition[23] on September 13, 2010, it had not gone beyond the
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Taada v. Cuenco, it held that determination of the sufficiency of form and substance of the two
although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in complaints.
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon
the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, An aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness.
it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any [24] The question of ripeness is especially relevant in light of the direct,
member, irrespective of whether his election is contested, is not essential adverse effect on an individual by the challenged conduct.[25] In the present
before such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges petition, there is no doubt that questions on, inter alia, the validity of the
of a member of the National Assembly. simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a
mode of promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings commission to at least arrive at a majority decision, is not sufficient to legally
of the House (Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call render an NTC order, resolution or decision.
for immediate interpretation.
Simply put, Commissioner Kintanar is not the National Telecommunications
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two Commission. He alone does not speak and in behalf of the NTC. The NTC
impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. acts through a three-man body x x x. [28]
Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she
took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment In the present case, Rep. Tupas, public respondent informs, did not, in fact,
proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period vote and merely presided over the proceedings when it decided on the
of one year. sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints.[29]
And so the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issue ─ whether public Even petitioners counsel conceded during the oral arguments that there are
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess no grounds to compel the inhibition of Rep. Tupas.
of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions. Petitioner basically
anchors her claim on alleged violation of the due process clause (Art. III, JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec 3, par. 5) of the Well, the Committee is headed by a gentleman who happened to be a
Constitution. respondent in the charges that the Ombudsman filed. In addition to that[,]
his father was likewise a respondent in another case. How can he be
Due process of law expected to act with impartiality, in fairness and in accordance with law
under that matter, he is only human we grant him that benefit.
Petitioner alleges that public respondents chairperson, Representative Niel
Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting, JUSTICE MORALES:
while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by Is he a one-man committee?
her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep. JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent He is not a one-man committee, Your Honor, but he decides.
in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the
finding of sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her. JUSTICE MORALES:
Do we presume good faith or we presume bad faith?
The Court finds petitioners allegations of bias and vindictiveness bereft of
merit, there being hardly any indication thereof. Mere suspicion of partiality JUSTICE CUEVAS:
does not suffice.[26] We presume that he is acting in good faith, Your Honor, but then
(interrupted)
The act of the head of a collegial body cannot be considered as that of the
entire body itself. So GMCR, Inc. v. Bell Telecommunications Phils.[27] JUSTICE MORALES:
teaches: So, that he was found liable for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, does that mean that your client will be deprived of due process
First. We hereby declare that the NTC is a collegial body requiring a majority of law?
vote out of the three members of the commission in order to validly decide a
case or any incident therein. Corollarily, the vote alone of the chairman of JUSTICE CUEVAS:
the commission, as in this case, the vote of Commissioner Kintanar, absent
the required concurring vote coming from the rest of the membership of the
No, what we are stating, Your Honor, is that expectation of a client goes with functions. For ones prompt dispatch may be anothers undue haste. The
the Ombudsman, which goes with the element of due process is the lack of orderly administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant
impartiality that may be expected of him. consideration, with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each
case.
JUSTICE MORALES:
But as you admitted the Committee is not a one-man committee? The presumption of regularity includes the public officers official actuations
in all phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent
JUSTICE CUEVAS: upon petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying
That is correct, Your Honor. of days or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The
swift completion of the Investigating Panels initial task cannot be relegated
JUSTICE MORALES: as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance
So, why do you say then that there is a lack of impartiality? of not just one but five state prosecutors.[32] (italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Because if anything before anything goes (sic) he is the presiding officer of Petitioner goes on to contend that her participation in the determination of
the committee as in this case there were objections relative to the existence sufficiency of form and substance was indispensable. As mandated by the
of the implementing rules not heard, there was objection made by Impeachment Rules, however, and as, in fact, conceded by petitioners
Congressman Golez to the effect that this may give rise to a constitutional counsel, the participation of the impeachable officer starts with the filing of
crisis. an answer.
JUSTICE MORALES: JUSTICE MORALES:

That called for a voluntary inhibition. Is there any law or rule you can cite Is it not that the Committee should first determine that there is sufficiency in
which makes it mandatory for the chair of the committee to inhibit given that form and substance before she is asked to file her answer (interrupted)
he had previously been found liable for violation of a law[?]
JUSTICE CUEVAS:
JUSTICE CUEVAS: That is correct, Your Honor.
There is nothing, Your Honor. In our jurisprudence which deals with the
situation whereby with that background as the material or pertinent JUSTICE MORALES:
antecedent that there could be no violation of the right of the petitioner to During which she can raise any defenses she can assail the regularity of the
due process. What is the effect of notice, hearing if the judgment cannot proceedings and related irregularities?
come from an impartial adjudicator.[30] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied) JUSTICE CUEVAS:
Petitioner contends that the indecent and precipitate haste of public
respondent in finding the two complaints sufficient in form and substance is Yes. We are in total conformity and in full accord with that statement, Your
a clear indication of bias, she pointing out that it only took public respondent Honor, because it is only after a determination that the complaint is sufficient
five minutes to arrive thereat. in form and substance that a complaint may be filed, Your Honor, without
that but it may be asked, how is not your action premature, Your Honor, our
An abbreviated pace in the conduct of proceedings is not per se an indication answer is- no, because of the other violations involved and that is
of bias, however. So Santos-Concio v. Department of Justice[31] holds: (interrupted).[33] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the
cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of impeachment procedure at the Committee-level, particularly Section 5[34]
which denotes that petitioners initial participation in the impeachment Petitioner urges the Court to look into the narration of facts constitutive of
proceedings the opportunity to file an Answer starts after the Committee on the offenses vis--vis her submissions disclaiming the allegations in the
Justice finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the complaints.
Committee refused to accept petitioners motion for reconsideration from its
finding of sufficiency of form of the impeachment complaints is apposite, This the Court cannot do.
conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
Francisco instructs that this issue would require the Court to make a
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has left to
standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.[35] the sound discretion of the legislature. Such an intent is clear from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. x x x x Clearly, the issue calls
The claim fails. upon this court to decide a non-justiciable political question which is beyond
the scope of its judicial power[.][39] Worse, petitioner urges the Court to
The determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment make a preliminary assessment of certain grounds raised, upon a
complaint is an exponent of the express constitutional grant of rule-making hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the complaints, which involve
powers of the House of Representatives which committed such determinative matters of defense.
function to public respondent. In the discharge of that power and in the
exercise of its discretion, the House has formulated determinable standards In another vein, petitioner, pursuing her claim of denial of due process,
as to the form and substance of an impeachment complaint. Prudential questions the lack of or, more accurately, delay in the publication of the
considerations behoove the Court to respect the compliance by the House of Impeachment Rules.
its duty to effectively carry out the constitutional purpose, absent any
contravention of the minimum constitutional guidelines. To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on
August 3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment
Contrary to petitioners position that the Impeachment Rules do not provide Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010
for comprehensible standards in determining the sufficiency of form and its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical with that of the
substance, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing the constitutional 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.[40]
requirements and providing that there must be a verified complaint or
resolution,[36] and that the substance requirement is met if there is a recital Citing Taada v. Tuvera,[41] petitioner contends that she was deprived of due
of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction process since the Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2,
of the committee.[37] 2010 a day after public respondent ruled on the sufficiency of form of the
complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on Section 3(8), Article XI of
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a the Constitution which directs that Congress shall promulgate its rules on
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section.
complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
organic law, as Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution basically merely Public respondent counters that promulgation in this case refers to the
requires a hearing.[38] In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the House publication of rules in any medium of information, not necessarily in the
deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation.[42]
impeachment complaint is vital to effectively carry out the impeachment
process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules. Differentiating Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations[43] which held that the Constitution categorically requires
publication of the rules of procedure in legislative inquiries, public
respondent explains that the Impeachment Rules is intended to merely
enable Congress to effectively carry out the purpose of Section 3(8), Art. XI general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense
of Constitution. was to be used.[49]
Blacks Law Dictionary broadly defines promulgate as Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict promulgation to
publication, the former should be understood to have been used in its
To publish; to announce officially; to make public as important or obligatory. general sense. It is within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to
The formal act of announcing a statute or rule of court. An administrative promulgate its Impeachment Rules, in much the same way that the Judiciary
order that is given to cause an agency law or regulation to become known or is permitted to determine that to promulgate a decision means to deliver the
obligatory.[44] (emphasis supplied) decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
While promulgation would seem synonymous to publication, there is a It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to
statutory difference in their usage. promulgate when the Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method
of promulgation. The Court is in no position to dictate a mode of
The Constitution notably uses the word promulgate 12 times.[45] A number promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
of those instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and
issuances emanating from Congress, this Court, the Office of the Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is but
Ombudsman as well as other constitutional offices. one avenue for Congress to make known its rules. Jurisprudence
emphatically teaches that
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms promulgate
and publish, the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules x x x in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules,
concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, this Court is devoid of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the
practice and procedure in all courts, the Court has invariably required the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
publication of these rules for their effectivity. As far as promulgation of concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal
judgments is concerned, however, promulgation means the delivery of the affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province of courts to direct
decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.[46] Congress how to do its work. In the words of Justice Florentino P. Feliciano,
this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution contains a similar provision directing standards are shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and
Congress to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates in the effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as well as to implement
presidential and vice presidential elections. Notably, when Congress them, before the courts may intervene.[50] (italics in the original; emphasis
approved its canvassing rules for the May 14, 2010 national elections on May and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
25, 2010,[47] it did not require the publication thereof for its effectivity.
Rather, Congress made the canvassing rules effective upon its adoption. Had the Constitution intended to have the Impeachment Rules published, it
could have stated so as categorically as it did in the case of the rules of
In the case of administrative agencies, promulgation and publication likewise procedure in legislative inquiries, per Neri. Other than promulgate, there is
take on different meanings as they are part of a multi-stage procedure in no other single formal term in the English language to appropriately refer to
quasi-legislation. As detailed in one case,[48] the publication of an issuance without need of it being published.
implementing rules occurs after their promulgation or adoption.
IN FINE, petitioner cannot take refuge in Neri since inquiries in aid of
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole instance
understoodthat is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set
inteligencia. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood. of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the
Between the restricted sense and the general meaning of a word, the issue of publication, the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitutions
directive, without any reliance on or reference to the 1986 case of Taada v. . . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing
Tuvera.[51] Taada naturally could neither have interpreted a forthcoming rather than non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended,
1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitutions intentions as the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a
expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or
sense of making known the issuances. whether, they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to
the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless
From the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, then Commissioner, by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute.[53] (emphasis
now retired Associate Justice Florenz Regalado intended Section 3(8), Article and underscoring supplied)
XI to be the vehicle for the House to fill the gaps in the impeachment
process. Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not
nullify the proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment
MR. REGALADO. Mr. Presiding Officer, I have decided to put in an additional Rules which faithfully comply with the relevant self-executing provisions of
section because, for instance, under Section 3 (2), there is mention of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where impeachment complaints are
indorsing a verified complaint for impeachment by any citizen alleging filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under Section 3,
ultimate facts constituting a ground or grounds for impeachment. In other Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting
words, it is just like a provision in the rules of court. Instead, I propose that the expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of
this procedural requirement, like indorsement of a complaint by a citizen to the Impeachment Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the
avoid harassment or crank complaints, could very well be taken up in a new Constitution for its inaction on the impeachment complaints pending the
section 4 which shall read as follows: THE CONGRESS SHALL PROMULGATE completion of the publication requirement.
ITS RULES ON IMPEACHMENT TO EFFECTIVELY CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES
THEREOF. I think all these other procedural requirements could be taken Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on
care of by the Rules of Congress.[52] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) impeachment is aimed at effectively carry[ing] out the purpose of
impeachment proceedings, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion
The discussion clearly rejects the notion that the impeachment provisions are when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the Rules on
not self-executing. Section 3(8) does not, in any circumstance, operate to Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation
suspend the entire impeachment mechanism which the Constitutional of early filing and in keeping with the effective implementation of the
Commission took pains in designing even its details. purpose of the impeachment provisions. In other words, the provisional
adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment Rules is within the power of
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect the avowed purpose.
extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a
manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the
constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of
body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary impeachment. Being procedural in nature, they may be given retroactive
to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive application
provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the he is adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the for this is that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise
mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the from, procedural laws.[54] In the present case, petitioner fails to allege any
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation Contrary to petitioners asseveration, Francisco[58] states that the term
where the rights of witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the initiate means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.[59] The
protection of the people as a body politic, and not for the punishment of the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be accompanied
offender.[55] with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said
Even Neri concedes that the unpublished rules of legislative inquiries were complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the
not considered null and void in its entirety. Rather, referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
x x x [o]nly those that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be Petitioner misreads the remark of Commissioner Joaquin Bernas, S.J. that no
considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is second verified impeachment may be accepted and referred to the
to protect the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Committee on Justice for action[60] which contemplates a situation where a
Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and proceedings are considered first impeachment complaint had already been referred. Bernas and
valid and effective.[56] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) Regalado, who both acted as amici curiae in Francisco, affirmed that the act
of initiating includes the act of taking initial action on the complaint.
Petitioner in fact does not deny that she was fully apprised of the proper
procedure. She even availed of and invoked certain provisions[57] of the From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae
Impeachment Rules when she, on September 7, 2010, filed the motion for briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that
reconsideration and later filed the present petition. The Court thus finds no the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
violation of the due process clause. coupled with Congress' taking initial action of said complaint.
The one-year bar rule Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third[61] of the
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the
than once within a period of one year. House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.[62]
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one
year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be The Court, in Francisco, thus found that the assailed provisions of the 12th
accepted and referred to public respondent. Congress Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings ─ Sections 16[63]
and 17[64] of Rule V thereof ─ clearly contravene Section 3(5) of Article XI
On the other hand, public respondent, respondent Reyes group and since they g[a]ve the term initiate a meaning different from filing and
respondent-intervenor submit that the initiation starts with the filing of the referral.[65]
impeachment complaint and ends with the referral to the Committee,
following Francisco, but venture to alternatively proffer that the initiation Petitioner highlights certain portions of Francisco which delve on the relevant
ends somewhere between the conclusion of the Committee Report and the records of the Constitutional Commission, particularly Commissioner
transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. Respondent Maambongs statements[66] that the initiation starts with the filing of the
Baraquel group, meanwhile, essentially maintains that under either the complaint.
prevailing doctrine or the parties interpretation, its impeachment complaint
could withstand constitutional scrutiny. Petitioner fails to consider the verb starts as the operative word.
Commissioner Maambong was all too keen to stress that the filing of the
complaint indeed starts the initiation and that the Houses action on the fifth of the members of the legislature, and that such overturning will not
committee report/resolution is not part of that initiation phase. amount to a refiling which is prohibited under Section 3 (4).
Commissioner Maambong saw the need to be very technical about this,[67] Another point, Madam President. x x x[68] (emphasis and underscoring
for certain exchanges in the Constitutional Commission deliberations loosely supplied)
used the term, as shown in the following exchanges.
An apparent effort to clarify the term initiate was made by Commissioner
MR. DAVIDE. That is for conviction, but not for initiation. Initiation of Teodulo Natividad:
impeachment proceedings still requires a vote of one-fifth of the membership
of the House under the 1935 Constitution. MR. NATIVIDAD. How many votes are needed to initiate?
MR. MONSOD. A two-thirds vote of the membership of the House is required MR. BENGZON. One-third.
to initiate proceedings.
MR. NATIVIDAD. To initiate is different from to impeach; to impeach is
MR. DAVIDE. No. for initiation of impeachment proceedings, only one-fifth different from to convict. To impeach means to file the case before the
vote of the membership of the House is required; for conviction, a two-thirds Senate.
vote of the membership is required.
MR. REGALADO. When we speak of initiative, we refer here to the Articles of
xxxx Impeachment.
MR. DAVIDE. However, if we allow one-fifth of the membership of the MR. NATIVIDAD. So, that is the impeachment itself, because when we
legislature to overturn a report of the committee, we have here Section 3 (4) impeach, we are charging him with the Articles of Impeachment. That is my
which reads: understanding.[69] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more Capping these above-quoted discussions was the explanation of
than once within a period of one year. Commissioner Maambong delivered on at least two occasions:
So, necessarily, under this particular subsection, we will, in effect, disallow [I]
one-fifth of the members of the National Assembly to revive an impeachment MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
move by an individual or an ordinary Member. reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking that we
MR. ROMULO. Yes. May I say that Section 3 (4) is there to look towards the do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment on the floor.
possibility of a very liberal impeachment proceeding. Second, we were The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that the initiation starts
ourselves struggling with that problem where we are faced with just a with the filing of the complaint. And what is actually done on the floor is that
verified complaint rather than the signatures of one-fifth, or whatever it is the committee resolution containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one
we decide, of the Members of the House. So whether to put a period for the approved by the body.
Committee to report, whether we should not allow the Committee to overrule
a mere verified complaint, are some of the questions we would like to be As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the Committee on
discussed. Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If we only have time, I
MR. DAVIDE. We can probably overrule a rejection by the Committee by could cite examples in the case of the impeachment proceedings of President
providing that it can be overturned by, say, one-half or a majority, or one- Richard Nixon wherein the Committee on the Judiciary submitted the
recommendation, the resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the
body, and it was the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body complaint must be accompanied by the referral to the Committee on Justice,
which initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on that which is the action that sets the complaint moving. Francisco cannot be any
score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging the words clearer in pointing out the material dates.
because we have to be very technical about this. I have been bringing with
me The Rules of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress. The Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings on the case of Richard Nixon are impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the
with me. I have submitted my proposal, but the Committee has already initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
decided. Nevertheless, I just want to indicate this on record. becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a
Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.[70] (italics in the original; emphasis and one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
underscoring supplied)
[II] In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint was filed by former
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of the President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with
approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect the seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the
substance, but it is only with keeping with the exact formulation of the Rules House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment
of the House of Representatives of the United States regarding complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William
impeachment. Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the
constitutional prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of its against the same impeachable officer within a one-year period.[72]
provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we delete the (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
words which read: to initiate impeachment proceedings and the comma (,)
and insert on line 19 after the word resolution the phrase WITH THE These clear pronouncements notwithstanding, petitioner posits that the date
ARTICLES, and then capitalize the letter i in impeachment and replace the of referral was considered irrelevant in Francisco. She submits that referral
word by with OF, so that the whole section will now read: A vote of at least could not be the reckoning point of initiation because something prior to that
one-third of all the Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm had already been done,[73] apparently citing Bernas discussion.
a resolution WITH THE ARTICLES of impeachment OF the committee or to
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be recorded. The Court cannot countenance any attempt at obscurantism.
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House What the cited discussion was rejecting was the view that the Houses action
of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the on the committee report initiates the impeachment proceedings. It did not
filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always carries state that to determine the initiating step, absolutely nothing prior to it must
with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words Articles of be done. Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the
Impeachment are mentioned on line 25 in the 0case of the direct filing of a complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to
verified complaint of one-third of all the Members of the House. I will the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the
substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of the Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the
House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the
singular tense of the word complaint[74] to denote the limit prescribed by
Thank you, Madam President.[71] (emphasis and underscoring supplied) the Constitution goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a
word covers its enlarged and plural sense.[75]
To the next logical question of what ends or completes the initiation,
Commissioners Bernas and Regalado lucidly explained that the filing of the
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment

complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment The question as to who should administer or pronounce that an
proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a impeachment proceeding has been initiated rests also on the body that
matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the administers the proceedings prior to the impeachment trial. As gathered from
candle, unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Commissioner Bernas disquisition[76] in Francisco, a proceeding which takes
Referring the complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment place not in the Senate but in the House[77] precedes the bringing of an
proceeding. With a simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more impeachment case to the Senate. In fact, petitioner concedes that the
than one lighted matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is initiation of impeachment proceedings is within the sole and absolute control
important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, of the House of Representatives.[78] Conscious of the legal import of each
such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no step, the House, in taking charge of its own proceedings, must deliberately
longer rekindle the candle. decide to initiate an impeachment proceeding, subject to the time frame and
other limitations imposed by the Constitution. This chamber of Congress
A restrictive interpretation renders the impeachment mechanism both alone, not its officers or members or any private individual, should own up to
illusive and illusory. its processes.
For one, it puts premium on senseless haste. Petitioners stance suggests that The Constitution did not place the power of the final say on the lips of the
whoever files the first impeachment complaint exclusively gets the attention House Secretary General who would otherwise be calling the shots in
of Congress which sets in motion an exceptional once-a-year mechanism forwarding or freezing any impeachment complaint. Referral of the complaint
wherein government resources are devoted. A prospective complainant, to the proper committee is not done by the House Speaker alone either,
regardless of ill motives or best intentions, can wittingly or unwittingly which explains why there is a need to include it in the Order of Business of
desecrate the entire process by the expediency of submitting a haphazard the House. It is the House of Representatives, in public plenary session,
complaint out of sheer hope to be the first in line. It also puts to naught the which has the power to set its own chamber into special operation by
effort of other prospective complainants who, after diligently gathering referring the complaint or to otherwise guard against the initiation of a
evidence first to buttress the case, would be barred days or even hours later second impeachment proceeding by rejecting a patently unconstitutional
from filing an impeachment complaint. complaint.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions
Moreover, the first-to-file scheme places undue strain on the part of the that shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made
actual complainants, injured party or principal witnesses who, by mere subject to the five-minute rule.[79] Moreover, it is common parliamentary
happenstance of an almost always unforeseeable filing of a first practice that a motion to refer a matter or question to a committee may be
impeachment complaint, would be brushed aside and restricted from directly debated upon, not as to the merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of
participating in the impeachment process. the referral.[80] With respect to complaints for impeachment, the House has
the discretion not to refer a subsequent impeachment complaint to the
Further, prospective complainants, along with their counsel and members of Committee on Justice where official records and further debate show that an
the House of Representatives who sign, endorse and file subsequent impeachment complaint filed against the same impeachable officer has
impeachment complaints against the same impeachable officer run the risk already been referred to the said committee and the one year period has not
of violating the Constitution since they would have already initiated a second yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a constitutionally
impeachment proceeding within the same year. Virtually anybody can initiate prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being mechanical,
a second or third impeachment proceeding by the mere filing of endorsed before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the House, as
impeachment complaints. Without any public notice that could charge them the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within
with knowledge, even members of the House of Representatives could not which to make the proper referral.
readily ascertain whether no other impeachment complaint has been filed at
the time of committing their endorsement.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an the impeachment proceeding against the then Chief Justice. To change the
impeachment proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that reckoning point of initiation on no other basis but to accommodate the socio-
[a] verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the political considerations of respondents does not sit well in a court of law.
House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement
by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business x x x We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
within ten session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three movere. This doctrine, which is really adherence to precedents," mandates
session days thereafter. that once a case has been decided one way, then another case involving
exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same manner. This
In the present case, petitioner failed to establish grave abuse of discretion doctrine is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
on the allegedly belated referral of the first impeachment complaint filed by stability of judicial decisions. As the renowned jurist Benjamin Cardozo stated
the Baraquel group. For while the said complaint was filed on July 22, 2010, in his treatise The Nature of the Judicial Process:
there was yet then no session in Congress. It was only four days later or on
July 26, 2010 that the 15th Congress opened from which date the 10-day It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of
session period started to run. When, by Memorandum of August 2, 2010, litigants and the opposite way between another. "If a group of cases involves
Speaker Belmonte directed the Committee on Rules to include the complaint the same point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross
in its Order of Business, it was well within the said 10-day session period. injustice to decide alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was
[81] decided against me yesterday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the
same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide differently would raise a
There is no evident point in rushing at closing the door the moment an feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement,
impeachment complaint is filed. Depriving the people (recall that material and moral, of my rights." Adherence to precedent must then be the
impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body politic) rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the even-
of reasonable access to the limited political vent simply prolongs the agony handed administration of justice in the courts.[85]
and frustrates the collective rage of an entire citizenry whose trust has been
betrayed by an impeachable officer. It shortchanges the promise of As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated
reasonable opportunity to remove an impeachable officer through the when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the
mechanism enshrined in the Constitution. Committee, because something prior to that has already been done. The
action of the House is already a further step in the proceeding, not its
But neither does the Court find merit in respondents alternative contention initiation or beginning. Rather, the proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
that the initiation of the impeachment proceedings, which sets into motion verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for
the one-year bar, should include or await, at the earliest, the Committee on action. This is the initiating step which triggers the series of steps that
Justice report. To public respondent, the reckoning point of initiation should follow.[86]
refer to the disposition of the complaint by the vote of at least one-third
(1/3) of all the members of the House.[82] To the Reyes group, initiation Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of
means the act of transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate. referral allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having
[83] To respondent-intervenor, it should last until the Committee on Justices their own respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral.
recommendation to the House plenary.[84] Worse, the Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless
the disposition of one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a
The Court, in Francisco, rejected a parallel thesis in which a related resolution for impeachment or the overriding[87] of a contrary resolution (as
proposition was inputed in the therein assailed provisions of the espoused by public respondent), or the House transmits the Articles of
Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress. The present case involving an Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group),[88] or the Committee on
impeachment proceeding against the Ombudsman offers no cogent reason Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless of the
for the Court to deviate from what was settled in Francisco that dealt with recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these
scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally agenda standard operating procedure), the number of complaints may still
imposed one-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the be filtered or reduced to nil after the Committee decides once and for all on
series of steps operating in unison under one proceeding. the sufficiency of form and substance. Besides, if only to douse petitioners
fear, a complaint will not last the primary stage if it does not have the stated
The Court does not lose sight of the salutary reason of confining only one preliminary requisites.
impeachment proceeding in a year. Petitioner concededly cites Justice Adolfo
Azcunas separate opinion that concurred with the Francisco ruling.[89] To petitioner, disturbance of her performance of official duties and the
Justice Azcuna stated that the purpose of the one-year bar is two-fold: to deleterious effects of bad publicity are enough oppression.
prevent undue or too frequent harassment; and 2) to allow the legislature to Petitioners claim is based on the premise that the exertion of time, energy
do its principal task [of] legislation, with main reference to the records of the and other resources runs directly proportional to the number of complaints
Constitutional Commission, that reads: filed. This is non sequitur. What the Constitution assures an impeachable
officer is not freedom from arduous effort to defend oneself, which depends
MR. ROMULO. Yes, the intention here really is to limit. This is not only to on the qualitative assessment of the charges and evidence and not on the
protect public officials who, in this case, are of the highest category from quantitative aspect of complaints or offenses. In considering the side of the
harassment but also to allow the legislative body to do its work which is impeachable officers, the Constitution does not promise an absolutely
lawmaking. Impeachment proceedings take a lot of time. And if we allow smooth ride for them, especially if the charges entail genuine and grave
multiple impeachment charges on the same individual to take place, the issues. The framers of the Constitution did not concern themselves with the
legislature will do nothing else but that.[90] (underscoring supplied) media tolerance level or internal disposition of an impeachable officer when
they deliberated on the impairment of performance of official functions. The
It becomes clear that the consideration behind the intended limitation refers measure of protection afforded by the Constitution is that if the impeachable
to the element of time, and not the number of complaints. The impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it
officer should defend himself in only one impeachment proceeding, so that just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it
he will not be precluded from performing his official functions and duties. should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year. This is the
Similarly, Congress should run only one impeachment proceeding so as not whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule.
to leave it with little time to attend to its main work of law-making. The
doctrine laid down in Francisco that initiation means filing and referral Applicability of the Rules
remains congruent to the rationale of the constitutional provision. on Criminal Procedure
Petitioner complains that an impeachable officer may be subjected to On another plane, petitioner posits that public respondent gravely abused its
harassment by the filing of multiple impeachment complaints during the discretion when it disregarded its own Impeachment Rules, the same rules
intervening period of a maximum of 13 session days between the date of the she earlier chastised.
filing of the first impeachment complaint to the date of referral. In the exercise of the power to promulgate rules to effectively carry out the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution, the House promulgated
As pointed out during the oral arguments[91] by the counsel for respondent- the Impeachment Rules, Section 16 of which provides that the Rules of
intervenor, the framework of privilege and layers of protection for an Criminal Procedure under the Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply
impeachable officer abound. The requirements or restrictions of a one-year to impeachment proceedings before the House.
bar, a single proceeding, verification of complaint, endorsement by a House
member, and a finding of sufficiency of form and substance all these must be Finding that the Constitution, by express grant, permits the application of
met before bothering a respondent to answer already weigh heavily in favor additional adjective rules that Congress may consider in effectively carrying
of an impeachable officer. out its mandate, petitioner either asserts or rejects two procedural devices.
First is on the one offense, one complaint rule. By way of reference to
Aside from the probability of an early referral and the improbability of Section 16 of the Impeachment Rules, petitioner invokes the application of
inclusion in the agenda of a complaint filed on the 11th hour (owing to pre- Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that [a]
complaint or information must charge only one offense, except when the law petitioners invocation of that particular rule of Criminal Procedure does not
prescribes a single punishment for various offenses. To petitioner, the two lie. Suffice it to state that the Constitution allows the indictment for multiple
impeachment complaints are insufficient in form and substance since each impeachment offenses, with each charge representing an article of
charges her with both culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the Articles of Impeachment.
public trust. She concludes that public respondent gravely abused its [94] It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege
discretion when it disregarded its own rules. only one impeachable offense.
The second procedural matter deals with the rule on consolidation. In
Petitioner adds that heaping two or more charges in one complaint will rejecting a consolidation, petitioner maintains that the Constitution allows
confuse her in preparing her defense; expose her to the grave dangers of only one impeachment complaint against her within one year.
the highly political nature of the impeachment process; constitute a
whimsical disregard of certain rules; impair her performance of official Records show that public respondent disavowed any immediate need to
functions as well as that of the House; and prevent public respondent from consolidate. Its chairperson Rep. Tupas stated that [c]onsolidation depends
completing its report within the deadline. on the Committee whether to consolidate[; c]onsolidation may come today
or may come later on after determination of the sufficiency in form and
Public respondent counters that there is no requirement in the Constitution substance, and that for purposes of consolidation, the Committee will decide
that an impeachment complaint must charge only one offense, and the when is the time to consolidate[, a]nd if, indeed, we need to consolidate.[95]
nature of impeachable offenses precludes the application of the above-said Petitioners petition, in fact, initially describes the consolidation as merely
Rule on Criminal Procedure since the broad terms cannot be defined with the contemplated.[96]
same precision required in defining crimes. It adds that the determination of
the grounds for impeachment is an exercise of political judgment, which Since public respondent, whether motu proprio or upon motion, did not yet
issue respondent-intervenor also considers as non-justiciable, and to which order a consolidation, the Court will not venture to make a determination on
the Baraquel group adds that impeachment is a political process and not a this matter, as it would be premature, conjectural or anticipatory.[97]
criminal prosecution, during which criminal prosecution stage the complaint Even if the Court assumes petitioners change of stance that the two
or information referred thereto and cited by petitioner, unlike an impeachment complaints were deemed consolidated,[98] her claim that
impeachment complaint, must already be in the name of the People of the consolidation is a legal anomaly fails. Petitioners theory obviously springs
Philippines. from her proceeding = complaint equation which the Court already brushed
The Baraquel group deems that there are provisions[92] outside the Rules aside.
on Criminal Procedure that are more relevant to the issue. Both the Baraquel
and Reyes groups point out that even if Sec. 13 of Rule 110 is made to WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of
apply, petitioners case falls under the exception since impeachment September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of public respondent, the House
prescribes a single punishment removal from office and disqualification to of Representatives Committee on Justice, are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
hold any public office even for various offenses. Both groups also observe The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on September 14, 2010 is
that petitioner concededly and admittedly was not keen on pursuing this LIFTED.
issue during the oral arguments.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners claim deserves scant consideration.
Without going into the effectiveness of the suppletory application of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure in carrying out the relevant constitutional
provisions, which prerogative the Constitution vests on Congress, and
without delving into the practicability of the application of the one offense
per complaint rule, the initial determination of which must be made by the
House[93] which has yet to pass upon the question, the Court finds that
and evidence of the case, the Supreme Court is left without choice but to use
its latent power to review such findings of facts.—The general rule is that we
are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising
errors of law. One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains
herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the
trial court. The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask
Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The
appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as
she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food
and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both
courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that
brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who
alleges proves.—Another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is
that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges
G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005.* proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story
up. All his witnesses—Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva—
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA,” respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Party Gatecrashers; A person who did not abuse her
Actions; Human Relations; Torts and Damages; Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit right in asking a person to leave a party to which he was not invited cannot
Injuria; The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is be made to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.—Ms.
not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to a self-inflicted injury or to the Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer,
negligent in doing so.—Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.
pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable
for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave Same; Same; Same; Principle of Abuse of Rights; Article 19 of the Civil Code,
(and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate- known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
crasher.” The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances, the object
not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent of the article being to set certain standards which must be observed not only
to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.—
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
negligent in doing so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Article 19 states: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat observe honesty and good faith. Elsewhere, we explained that when “a right
him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame. is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Where the trial court and the appellate court committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.” The object of this
reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity
duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his but respect of such dignity.” Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms.
due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct
act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) especially because she did inquire from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her
There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad
sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
Same; Same; Same; Same; A common theme runs through Articles 19 and of Appeals.
21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.—Article 20
pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
Article 21, on the other hand, states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for petitioners.
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Article Vicente D. Millora for respondent Amay Bisaya.
21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1)
There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good DECISION
custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila
complained of must be intentional. Garden (Hotel Nikko)[1] and Ruby Lim assail the Decision[2] of the Court of
Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision [3] of the Regional
Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution [4] of
Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied petitioners motion for
innuendos and conjectures.—As applied to herein case and as earlier reconsideration.
discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought
against him. These two people did not know each other personally before under the human relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat
the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen
explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that name Amay Bisaya, alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13
Ms. Lim, being “single at 44 years old,” had a “very strong bias and prejudice October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko, [5] he
against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then
hotel with foreign businessmen.” The lameness of this argument need not be approached him.[6] Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels
belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the hotels manager, Mr.
the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but Masakazu Tsuruoka.[7] Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which
innuendos and conjectures. she replied: of course.[8] Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart
carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters present for the celebrant.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad judgment which, if done with good [9]
At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after
intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.—The manner by which Ms. Lim which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. [10]After a couple of hours,
asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but,
circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner
court’s declaration that Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive
(without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave Secretary thereof.[11] In a loud voice and within the presence and hearing of
rise to a cause of action “predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim
told him to leave the party ( huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming and making a big
bumaba ka na lang).[12] Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.[33]
Filart.[13] Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower
ignored him thus adding to his shame and humiliation. [14] Not long after, court, also gave her version of the story to the effect that she never invited
while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a Makati Mr. Reyes to the party.[34] According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who
policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. [15] Like a volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was
common criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman. likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to Altitude 49.
[16]
Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual [35]
When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down
damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two as he was not properly dressed and was not invited. [36] All the while, she
Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.[17] thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the bar talking to Col. Batung.[37] Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr.
party but not under the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Reyes shouting.[38] She ignored Mr. Reyes.[39] She was embarrassed and did
Lim narrated that she was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past twenty not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.[40]
(20) years.[18] One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,
the hotels former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. [19] The year 1994 was no [41]
giving more credence to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in
different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive guest list asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that
and extended invitations accordingly. [20] The guest list was limited to Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was
approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel uninvited:
employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. [21] At the party, Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of
Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink. [22]Mindful Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to
of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages
Boy Miller, the captain waiter, to inquire as to the presence of Mr. Reyes who are pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some
was not invited.[23] Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against
Dr. Filart.[24] As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault
and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the
of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed him to join her and took
Reyes.[25] Ms. Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants
party as he was not invited. [26] Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms. Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.[42]
Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as
[27]
When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a it found more commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim
Captain Batung whom she later approached. [28] Believing that Captain Batung ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several
and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor guests:
from Ms. Fruto, i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he
as he was not invited.[29] Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. should not finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance
Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for
no other guests in the immediate vicinity. [30] However, as Mr. Reyes was which appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered
already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. [31] When Mr. Reyes by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The
went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: alam liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited,
ninyo, hindo ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng but contrary to morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of
pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity intentionally cause damage to
kayo.[32] She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs. [43]
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in BISAYA COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION, WERE IT NOT
approaching several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION
exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have III.
approached Dr. Filart first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
in private: REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should IV.
have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE
the celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND
Filart be the one to approach appellant because it was she who invited NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant V.
could not have suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE
liable. APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
... USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine
mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as
protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being
the Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a gate-crasher.
damages, especially if said acts were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports esteemed in law as injury[47]) refers to self-inflicted injury [48] or to the consent
a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a to injury[49] which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or interest or ill-will that knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603). negligent in doing so.[50] As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine
[44]
does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under
Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat
exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
(P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in
Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of Ten Thousand asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. Amay Bisaya, to leave the party where he was
Pesos (P10,000).[45] On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles
affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had been 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable,
amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered. whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily liable with her.
[46]
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts and evidence of the
that the Court of Appeals seriously erred in case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review
I. such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of
NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law.
INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A [51]
One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the
GATE-CRASHER findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.
II. [52]
The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr.
HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The
WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as
she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary
and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was
courts, however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that correct in observing that
brought Mr. Reyes to the party. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible? the latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have
lower courts findings of fact. been no intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was
First, let us put things in the proper perspective. plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel, [53] for- aware of what transpired between them. . .
invitation-only, thrown for the hotels former Manager, a Japanese national. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the
Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant) [54] and who police to take him out.[56]
could not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that
an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the party, Ms. it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves.
Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All
the celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants his witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved
instruction to keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party. [57]
gate-crasher in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party
glitch in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure to which he was not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages
of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily call attention to the under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its
follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and employee.[58]
some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not principle of abuse of rights,[59] is not a panacea for all human hurts and social
offer any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining grievances. Article 19 states:
a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross- Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss: observe honesty and good faith.
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which
while you were at the buffet table? How close was she when does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in
she approached you? damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other. wrongdoer must be responsible.[60] The object of this article, therefore, is to
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of
and she shouted? ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. [61] These standards
A: Yes. She said, wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
bumaba ka na lang. honesty and good faith.[62] Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice? faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
... right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.[55] prejudicing or injuring another. [63] When Article 19 is violated, an action for
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20
Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she pertains to damages arising from a violation of law [64] which does not obtain
would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave.
hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner correction for public good and to avert further commission of such acts,
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate exemplary damages should be imposed upon appellees.[73]
the latter for the damage. The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter
Article 21[65] refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following with the very facts of the case and the evidence on hand. It is not disputed
elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was an actor of long
morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the
with intent to injure.[66] Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, [67] and that is, the showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992 official candidate of
act complained of must be intentional.[68] the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not humanitarian organizations of the Philippines. [74] During his direct
shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income [75] and
did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of
thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged any information as to the social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby
abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court cannot
old, had a very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any
businessmen.[69] The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a
Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be
Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos his to bear alone.
and conjectures. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby
regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
that Ms. Lims act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of SO ORDERED.
action predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such
dignity.[70] Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lims act of by-
passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she
did inquire from Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not
invite Mr. Reyes.[71] If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if
done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can
petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made answerable for exemplary
damages[72] especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals held
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the
latters lowly station in life. This has to be limited somewhere. In a
democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by
the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and
propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34). And by way of example or
however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in order

to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and
attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).” (Italics supplied) Under the above
provision, the prima facie presumption that will authorize immediate
disconnection will arise only upon the satisfaction of certain requisites. One
of these is the personal witnessing and attestation by an officer of the law or
by an authorized ERB representative when the discovery was made.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; As a rule, the Supreme Court reviews
only questions of law, not of facts, but it may pass upon the evidence when
the factual findings of the trial court are different from those of the Court of
Appeals.—As a rule, this Court reviews only questions of law, not of facts.
However, it may pass upon the evidence when the factual findings of the
trial court are different from those of the Court of Appeals, as in this case. A
careful review of the evidence on record negates the appellate court’s
holding that “the actions of defendant-appellant’s service inspectors were all
in accord with the requirement of the law.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Embedded in

jurisprudence is the rule that courts may not construe a statute that is free
from doubt—where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the
mandate is obeyed.—Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that
petitioners’ secretary was present at the time the inspection was made. The
G.R. No. 142943. April 3, 2002.* law clearly states that for the prima facie evidence to apply, the discovery
“must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a
Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs. duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).” Had
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent. the law intended the presence of the owner or his/her representative to
suffice, then it should have said so. Embedded in our jurisprudence is the
Public Utilities; Electric Utility Firms; Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission rule that courts may not construe a statute that is free from doubt. Where
Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994 (R.A. 7832); Presumption of Illegal Use the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it
of Electricity; Under Section 4 of R.A. 7832, the prima facie presumption that says, and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed.
will authorize immediate disconnection will arise only upon the satisfaction of
certain requisites, one of which is the personal witnessing and attestation by Same; Same; Same; Same; That an ERB representative was allegedly
an officer of the law or by an authorized Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) present when the meter was examined in the Meralco laboratory will not
representative when the discovery was made.—We agree with petitioners. cure the defect that he was not around when the discovery of the illegal use
Section 4 of RA 7832 states: (a) The presence of any of the following of electricity.—The law says that before immediate disconnection may be
circumstances shall constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of allowed, the discovery of the illegal use of electricity must have been
electricity, as defined in this Act, by the person benefitted thereby, and shall personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or by an
be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the electric utility to authorized ERB representative. In this case, the disconnection was effected
such person after due notice, x x x x x x x x x x x x (viii) x x x Provided, immediately after the discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which was
witnessed only by Meralco’s employees. That the ERB representative was be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
allegedly present when the meter was examined in the Meralco laboratory competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.
will not cure the defect.
Same; Due Process; Moral Damages; Requisites; Moral damages may be
Same; Same; Same; Same; Due Process; Manila Electric Company; The recovered when the rights of individuals, including the right against
presence of government agents who may authorize immediate deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated.—Article
disconnections go into the essence of due process; Meralco is a monopoly 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages may be
that derives its power from the government, and clothing it with unilateral recovered. One such case is when the rights of individuals, including the
authority to disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize right against deprivation of property without due process of law, are violated.
its hapless customers.—As to respondent’s argument that the presence of an Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
authorized ERB representative had not been raised below, it is clear, anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
however, that the issue of due process was brought up by petitioners as a humiliation, and similar injury. Although incapable of pecuniary computation,
valid issue in the CA. The presence of government agents who may authorize such damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the
immediate disconnections go into the essence of due process. Indeed, we defendant’s wrongful act or omission. Case law establishes the following
cannot allow respondent to act virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing requisites for the award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury whether
the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. That would not physical, mental or psychological—clearly sustained by the claimant; (2)
sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that derives there is a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) the wrongful act
its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
disconnect would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the
customers. cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Where the Same; Electric Utility Firms; Although the Court sympathizes with Meralco’s
issues already raised also rest on other issues not specifically presented, as efforts to stamp out the illegal use of electricity, such action must be done
long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to the former and only with strict observance of the rights of the people—there is a right way
as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the authority to to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason.—Observance of
include them in its discussion of the controversy as well as to pass upon the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We cannot allow such rights
them.—Even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled that to be trifled with or trivialized. Although the Court sympathizes with
“[w]here the issues already raised also rest on other issues not specifically respondent’s efforts to stamp out the illegal use of electricity, such action
presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to must be done only with strict observance of the rights of our people. As has
the former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has been succinctly said: “there is a right way to do the right thing at the right
the authority to include them in its discussion of the controversy as well as to time for the right reason.”
pass upon them.”
Same; Same; Exemplary damages are not given to enrich one party and
Damages; A party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
pecuniary loss as it has duly proven.—Actual damages are compensation for incentive to socially deleterious actions.—Exemplary damages, on the other
an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it was before it hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in
was injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. It is not
sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by given to enrich one party and impoverish another, but to serve as a
stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such deterrent against or as a negative incentive to socially deleterious actions. In
pecuniary loss as it has duly proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual this case, to serve an example—that before a disconnection of electrical
damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also supply can be effected by a public utility like Meralco, the requisites of law
must be faithfully complied with—we award the amount of P50,000 to Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49022. The
petitioners. decretal portion of the said Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision in Civil Case No. Q-95-23219 is
Same; Same; Despite the basis for the award of damages—the lack of due hereby SET ASIDE and the complaint against defendant-appellant MERALCO
process in immediately disconnecting a party’s electrical supply—Meralco’s is hereby DISMISSED. Plaintiffs-appellees are hereby ORDERED to pay
counterclaim for the billing differential is still proper.—This Court holds that defendant-appellant MERALCO the differential billing of P193,332.00
despite the basis for the award of damages—the lack of due process in representing the value of used but unregistered electrical consumption. [3]
immediately disconnecting petitioners’ electrical supply—respondent’s The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
counterclaim for the billing differential is still proper. We agree with the CA The Facts
that respondent should be given what it rightfully deserves. The evidence it The facts of the case are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this
presented, both documentary and testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount wise:
of the differential. Not only did respondent show how the meter examination Defendant-appellant Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a private
had been conducted by its experts, but it also established the amount of corporation, authorized by law to charge all persons, including the
P193,332.96 that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure through which government, for the consumption of electric power at rates duly authorized
this amount was arrived at was testified to by Meralco’s senior billing and approved by the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board).
computer, Enrique Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by Plaintiffs-appellees Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing are owners of a
documentary evidence showing the account’s billing history and the house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City, which
corresponding computations. Neither do we doubt the documents of they bought on April 7, 1994 from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. They alleged
inspections and examinations presented by respondent to prove that, indeed, to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of furnitures under the
there had been meter tampering that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid business name Loran Industries and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and
electrical consumption. 1994 Golden Shell Award.Mrs. Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel
Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club, Chairman of
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture.
of Appeals. On March 3, 1995 at around 9:00 a.m., defendant-appellants inspectors
headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. spot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue. House
no. 94 of Block 8, Lot 19 Greenmeadows Avenue owned by plaintiffs-
MR Reyes and Associates for petitioners. appellees was inspected after observing a standard operating procedure of
asking permission from plaintiffs-appellees, through their secretary which
Gil S. San Diego, Alfonso Y. Lacap and Jose Ronald V. Valles for respondent. was granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection,
defendant-appellants inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the
DECISION meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of
PANGANIBAN, J.: the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the meter base
Under the law, the Manila Electric Company (Meralco) plate. Defendant-appellants inspectors relayed the matter to plaintiffs-
may immediately disconnect electric service on the ground of alleged meter appellees secretary, who in turn relayed the same to plaintiff-appellee, Lorna
tampering, but only if the discovery of the cause is personally witnessed and Quisumbing, who was outraged of the result of the inspection and denied
attested to by an officer of the law or by a duly authorized representative of liability as to the tampering of the meter. Plaintiffs-appellees were advised by
the Energy Regulatory Board. defendant-appellants inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring
The Case it to their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, event the meter turned out to be tampered, defendant-appellant had to
assailing the February 1, 2000 Decision[1] and the April 10, 2000 temporarily disconnect the electric services of plaintiffs-appellees. The
laboratory testing conducted on the meter has the following findings to wit:
1. Terminal seal was missing. It held that respondent had acted summarily and without procedural
2. Lead cover seals (90 ERB 1-Meralco 21) were tampered by due process in immediately disconnecting the electric service of
forcibly pulling out from the sealing wire. petitioners. Respondents action, ruled the RTC, constituted a quasi delict.
3. The 1000th, 100th and 10th dial pointers of the register Ruling of the Court of Appeals
were found out of alignment and with circular scratches at The Court of Appeals overturned the trial courts ruling and dismissed
the face of the register which indicates that the meter had the Complaint. It held that respondents representatives had acted in good
been opened to manipulate the said dial pointers and set faith when they disconnected petitioners electric service. Citing testimonial
manually to the desired reading. In addition to this, the and documentary evidence, it ruled that the disconnection was made only
meter terminal blades were found full of scratches. after observing due process. Further, it noted that petitioners had not been
After an hour, defendant-appellants head inspector, E. Orlina returned to the able to prove their claim for damages. The appellate court likewise upheld
residence of plaintiffs-appellees and informed them that the meter had been respondents counterclaim for the billing differential in the amount
tampered and unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the of P193,332[5] representing the value of petitioners used but unregistered
differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina electrical consumption, which had been established without being
informed plaintiffs-appellees that they were just following their standard controverted.
operating procedure. Plaintiffs-appellees were further advised that questions Hence, this Petition.[6]
relative to the results of the inspection as well as the disconnection of her The Issues
electrical services for Violation of Contract (VOC) may be settled with Mr. M. In their Memorandum,[7] petitioners submit the following issues for our
Manuson of the Special Accounts, Legal Service Department. However, on consideration:
the same day at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon defendant-appellants 4.1 Whether a prima facie presumption of tampering of electrical meter
officer through a two-way radio instructed its service inspector headed by enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric
Mr. Orlino to reconnect plaintiffs-appellees electric service which the latter Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994) may be had despite the
faithfully complied. absence of an ERB representative or an officer of the law?
On March 6, 1995, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint for damages with 4.2 Whether the enumeration of instances to establish a prima facie
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, despite presumption of tampering of electrical meter enumerated under Sec. 4 (a) iv
the immediate reconnection, to order defendant-appellant to furnish of RA 7832 (Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials
electricity to the plaintiffs-appellees alleging that defendant-appellant acted Pilferage Act of 1994) is exclusive?
with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting 4.3 What constitutes notice prior to disconnection of electricity service?
their power supply which was done without due process, and without due Corollarily, whether the definition of notice under Meralco v. Court of Appeals
regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business (157 SCRA 243) applies to the case at bar?
reputation. 4.4 Whether a prima facie presumption may contradict logic?
In its Answer, defendant-appellant admitted disconnecting the electric 4.5 Whether documentary proof is pre-requisite for award of damages? [8]
service at the plaintiffs-appellees house but denied liability citing the Terms In sum, this Petition raises three (3) main issues which this Court will
and Conditions of Service, and Republic Act No. 7832 otherwise known as address: (1) whether respondent observed the requisites of law when it
Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of disconnected the electrical supply of petitioners, (2) whether such
1994. disconnection entitled petitioners to damages, and (3) whether petitioners
After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment, ruling in favor are liable for the billing differential computed by respondent.
of plaintiffs-appellees.[4] (Citations omitted) The Courts Ruling
Ruling of the Trial Court The Petition is partly meritorious.
The trial court held that Meralco (herein respondent) should have given First Issue:
the Quisumbing spouses (herein petitioners) ample opportunity to dispute Compliance with Requisites of Law
the alleged meter tampering. Petitioners contend that the immediate disconnection of electrical
service was not validly effected because of respondents noncompliance with
the relevant provisions of RA 7832, the Anti-Electricity and Electric Q When you were conducting this inspection, and you discovered
Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage Act of 1994. They insist that the these findings you testified earlier, who was present?
immediate disconnection of electrical supply may only be validly effected only A The secretary, sir.[12]
when there is prima facie evidence of its illegal use. To constitute prima facie ATTY. REYES - Who else were the members of your team that
evidence, the discovery of the illegal use must be personally witnessed and conducted this inspection at Greenmeadows Avenue on that
attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the day, March 3, 1995?
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). A The composition of the team, sir?
Respondent, on the other hand, points out that the issue raised by Q Yes.
petitioners is a question of fact which this Court cannot pass upon. It argues A Including me, we are about four (4) inspectors, sir.
further that this issue, which was not raised in the court below, can no Q You were four (4)?
longer be taken up for the first time on appeal. Assuming arguendo that the A Yes, sir.
issue was raised below, it also contends that petitioners were not able to Q Who is the head of this team?
specifically prove the absence of an officer of the law or a duly authorized A I was the head of the team, sir.[13]
representative of the ERB when the discovery was made. Further, Catalino A. Macaraig, the area head of the Orlino team, stated
Prima facie Evidence of Illegal Use of Electricity that only Meralco personnel had been present during the inspection:
We agree with petitioners. Section 4 of RA 7832 states: Q By the way you were not there at Green Meadows on that day,
(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall right?
constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as A Yes, sir.
defined in this Act, by the person benefited thereby, and shall Q Only Mr. Orlino and who else were there?
be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the electric A Two or three of his men.
utility to such person after due notice, x x x Q All members of the inspection team?
x x x x x x x x x A Yes, sir.[14]
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing These testimonies clearly show that at the time the alleged meter
circumstances, in order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be tampering was discovered, only the Meralco inspection team and petitioners
personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly secretary were present. Plainly, there was no officer of the law or ERB
authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).[9] (Italics representative at that time. Because of the absence of government
supplied) representatives, the prima facie authority to disconnect, granted to Meralco
Under the above provision, the prima facie presumption that will by RA 7832, cannot apply.
authorize immediate disconnection will arise only upon the satisfaction of Neither can respondent find solace in the fact that petitioners secretary
certain requisites. One of these requisites is the personal witnessing and was present at the time the inspection was made. The law clearly states that
attestation by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB representative for the prima facie evidence to apply, the discovery must be personally
when the discovery was made. witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or a duly authorized
As a rule, this Court reviews only questions of law, not of representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB). [15] Had the law
facts. However, it may pass upon the evidence when the factual findings of intended the presence of the owner or his/her representative to suffice, then
the trial court are different from those of the Court of Appeals, as in this it should have said so. Embedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that courts
case.[10] may not construe a statute that is free from doubt. [16] Where the law is clear
A careful review of the evidence on record negates the appellate courts and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts
holding that the actions of defendant-appellants service inspectors were all in have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. [17]
accord with the requirement of the law.[11] In fact, during the Senate deliberations on RA 7832, Senator John H.
Respondents own witnesses provided the evidence on who were Osmea, its author, stressed the need for the presence of government officers
actually present when the inspection was made. Emmanuel C. Orlino, the during inspections of electric meters.He said:
head of the Meralco team, testified:
Mr. President, if a utility like MERALCO finds certain circumstances or As to respondents argument that the presence of an authorized ERB
situations which are listed in Section 2 of this bill to be prima representative had not been raised below, it is clear, however, that the issue
facie evidence, I think they should be prudent enough to bring in competent of due process was brought up by petitioners as a valid issue in the CA. The
authority, either the police or the NBI, to verify or substantiate their presence of government agents who may authorize immediate
finding. If they were to summarily proceed to disconnect on the basis of disconnections go into the essence of due process. Indeed, we cannot allow
their findings and later on there would be a court case and the customer or respondent to act virtually as prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty
the user would deny the existence of what is listed in Section 2, then they of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. That would not sit well in a
could be in a lot of trouble.[18] (Italics supplied) democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly that derives its power
Neither can we accept respondents argument that when the alleged from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect
tampered meter was brought to Meralcos laboratory for testing, there was would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.
already an ERB representative present. Besides, even if not specifically raised, this Court has already ruled that
The law says that before immediate disconnection may be allowed, the [w]here the issues already raised also rest on other issues not specifically
discovery of the illegal use of electricity must have been personally witnessed presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to
and attested to by an officer of the law or by an authorized ERB the former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has
representative. In this case, the disconnection was effected immediately the authority to include them in its discussion of the controversy as well as to
after the discovery of the alleged meter tampering, which was witnessed pass upon them.[21]
only by Meralcos employees. That the ERB representative was allegedly Contractual Right to Disconnect
present when the meter was examined in the Meralco laboratory will not Electrical Service
cure the defect. Neither may respondent rely on its alleged contractual right to
It is undisputed that after members of the Meralco team conducted their disconnect electrical service based on Exhibits 10 [22] and 11,[23] or on
inspection and found alleged meter tampering, they immediately Decisions of the Board of Energy (now the Energy Regulatory Board). The
disconnected petitioners electrical supply.Again, this verity is culled from the relevant portion of these documents concerns discontinuance of service. It
testimony of Meralcos Orlina: provides:
A When she went inside then she came out together with Mrs. The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer
Lourdes Quis[u]mbing at that time. We did tell our findings is in arrears in the payment of bills or for failure to pay the adjusted bills in
regarding the meter and the consequence with it. And she those cases where the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount
was very angry with me. of energy consumed, or for failure to comply with any of these terms and
Q When you say consequence of your findings, what exactly did conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company. Before
you tell Mrs. Quisumbing? disconnection is made in case of or to prevent fraud, the Company may
A We told her that the service will be temporarily disconnected and adjust the bill of said Customer accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not
that we are referring to our Legal Department so could know paid, the Company may disconnect the same. In case of disconnection, the
the violation, sir.[19] provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former Public Service Commission
A Yes, sir. At that time, I referred her to Mr. Macaraig, sir. (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any such suspension of service
Q What is the first name of this supervisor? shall not terminate the contract between the Company and the Customer. [24]
A Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, sir. Petitioners situation can fall under disconnection only in case of or to
Q Then after talking to Mr. Catalino Macara[i]g, this is over the prevent fraud upon the Company. However, this too has requisites before a
telephone, what happened? disconnection may be made. An adjusted bill shall be prepared, and only
A The supervisor advised her that the service will be temporarily upon failure to pay it may the company discontinue service. This is also true
disconnected and she has to go to our Legal Department in regard to the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the former Public
where she could settle the VOC, sir. Service Commission, which requires a 48-hour written notice before a
Q You are talking of VOC, what is this all about Mr. Orlino? disconnection may be justified. In the instant case, these requisites were
A VOC is violation of contract, sir.[20] obviously not complied with.
Second Issue Q Whereat?

Damages A At our residence, we were supposed to have a dinner at our
Having ruled that the immediate disconnection effected by Meralco lacks residence.
legal, factual or contractual basis, we will now pass upon on the right of Q What happened to this occasion?
petitioners to recover damages for the improper disconnection. A So when they disconnected our electric power we had to get in
Petitioners are asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, which touch with them and change the venue.
awarded them actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys Q Which venue did you transfer your dinner for your buyers?
fees. All these were overturned by the CA. A We brought them in a restaurant in Makati at Seasons
As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof is Restaurant. But it was very embar[r]assing for us because we
necessary before our award may be made. The appellate court ruled as faxed them ahead of time before they came to Manila.
follows: Q Now as a result of this change of your schedule because of the
Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be disconnection of the electric power on that day, Friday, what
recovered, the best evidence obtainable by the injured party must be damage did you suffer?
presented. Actual and compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must A I cancelled the catering service and that is so much of a h[a]ssle
be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree and certainty. A court it was so embarras[s]ing for us.
cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the fact and Q Can you tell us how much amount?
amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have A Approximately P50,000.00.[30]
been suffered and on evidence of actual amount thereof. If the proof is No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare
flimsy and unsubstantial, no damages will be awarded. [25] statements. She has not shown how she arrived at the amount of P50,000; it
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured is, at best, speculative. Her self-serving testimonial evidence, if it may be
party in the position where it was before it was injured. [26] They pertain to called such, is insufficient to support alleged actual damages.
such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of While respondent does not rebut this testimony on the expenses
measurement.[27] Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is incurred by the spouses in moving the dinner out of their residence due to
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has the disconnection, no receipts covering such expenditures have been
duly proven.[28] adduced in evidence. Neither is the testimony corroborated. To reiterate,
Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. It is dependent upon
reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best competent proof of damages that petitioners have suffered and of the actual
evidence obtainable.[29] amount thereof.[31] The award must be based on the evidence presented, not
Petitioners claim for actual damages was premised only upon Lorna on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote,
Quisumbings bare testimony as follows: speculative and unsubstantial proof. [32] Consequently, we uphold the CA
A Actually that da[y] I was really scheduled to go to that furniture ruling denying the grant of actual damages.
exhibit. That furniture exhibit is only once a year. Having said that, we agree with the trial court, however, that petitioners
Q What is this furniture exhibit? are entitled to moral damages, albeit in a reduced amount.
A The SITEM, that is a government agency that takes care of The RTC opined as follows:
exporters and exclusive marketing of our products around the This Court agrees with the defendant regarding [its] right by law and equity
world. We always have that once a year and thats the time to protect itself from any fraud. However, such right should not be exercised
when all our buyers are here for us to show what we had that arbitrarily but with great caution and with due regard to the rights of the
was exhibited to go around. So, my husband had to [fly] from consumers. Meralco having a virtual monopoly of the supply of electric power
Cebu to Manila just for this occasion. So we have an should refrain from taking drastic actions against the consumers without
appointment with our people and our buyers with SITEM and observing due process. Even assuming that the subject meter has had
also that evening we will have to treat them [to] dinner. history of meter tampering, defendant cannot simply assume that the
present occupants are the ones responsible for such tampering. Neither does x x x One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO,
it serve as a license to deprive the plaintiffs of their right to due having a monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and
process. Defendant should have given the plaintiffs simple opportunity to some nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such
dispute the electric charges brought about by the alleged meter-tampering, areas. Electricity has become a necessity to most people in these areas,
which were not included in the bill rendered them. Procedural due process justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the business
requires reasonable notice to pay the bill and reasonable notice to of supplying electrical service to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is
discontinue supply. Absent due process the defendant may be held liable for engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of
damages. While this Court is aware of the practice of unscrupulous the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions
individuals of stealing electric curre[n]t which causes thousands if not under which and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may
millions of pesos in lost revenue to electric companies, this does not give the effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a
defendant the right to trample upon the rights of the consumers by denying prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of the
them due process.[33] service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort.[41]
Article 2219 of the Civil Code lists the instances when moral damages Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We
may be recovered. One such case[34] is when the rights of individuals, cannot allow such rights to be trifled with or trivialized. Although the Court
including the right against deprivation of property without due process of sympathizes with respondents efforts to stamp out the illegal use of
law, are violated.[35] electricity, such action must be done only with strict observance of the rights
Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, of our people. As has been we succinctly said: there is a right way to do the
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, right thing at the right time for the right reason.[42]
social humiliation, and similar injury. [36]Although incapable of pecuniary However, the amount of moral damages, which is left largely to the
computation, such damages may be recovered if they are the proximate sound discretion of the courts, should be granted in reasonable amounts,
results of the defendants wrongful act or omission.[37] considering the attendant facts and circumstances. [43] Moral damages,
Case law establishes the following requisites for the award of moral though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the
damages: (1) there is an injury -- whether physical, mental or psychological claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty. [44] Moral
-- clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or omission damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the
factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the defendant.[45] They are awarded only to obtain a means, a diversion or an
proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering the injured party
of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 of the has undergone by reason of the defendants culpable action. [46] They must be
Civil Code.[38] proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[47]
To reiterate, respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect It is clear from the records that respondent was able to restore the
petitioners electrical supply without observing the requisites of law which, in electrical supply of petitioners on the same day. Verily, the inconvenience
turn, are akin to due process. Had respondent been more circumspect and and anxiety they suffered as a result of the disconnection was thereafter
prudent, petitioners could have been given the opportunity to controvert the corrected. Thus, we reduce the RTCs grant of moral damages to the more
initial finding of alleged meter tampering. Said the RTC: equitable amount of P100,000.
More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of
electric service constitutes a breach of public policy. For public utilities, broad example or correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate,
as their powers are, have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor liquidated or compensatory damages.[48] It is not given to enrich one party
transgress the rights of the consumers. Any act on their part that militates and impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction incentive to socially deleterious actions. [49] In this case, to serve an example
that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar.[39] -- that before a disconnection of electrical supply can be effected by a public
Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled in Meralco v. CA[40] that utility like Meralco, the requisites of law must be faithfully complied with --
respondent is required to give notice of disconnection to an alleged we award the amount of P50,000 to petitioners.
delinquent customer. The Court said:
Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorneys

fees is likewise granted.[50] It is readily apparent that petitioners needed the Ramon Joaquin, petitioner, vs. Auromo C. Navarro,respondent.
services of a lawyer to argue their cause, even to the extent of elevating the
matter to this Court;[51] thus, an award of P50,000 is considered sufficient. 1.Survivorship; Evidence; Where Facts are Clear Presumptions Cannot Lie.—
Final Issue: On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging,
Billing Differential the spouses of JN, Sr. and AJ, together with their three daughters, P, C, and
Finally, this Court holds that despite the basis for the award of damages N, and their son JN, Jr. and the latter's wife, AC, sought refuge in the ground
-- the lack of due process in immediately disconnecting petitioners electrical floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San
supply -- respondents counterclaim for the billing differential is still Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building
proper. We agree with the CA that respondent should be given what it was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was
rightfully deserves. The evidence it presented, both documentary and set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people
testimonial, sufficiently proved the amount of the differential. inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three
Not only did respondent show how the meter examination had been daughters were hit and fell on the ground near the entrance; and JN. Sr. and
conducted by its experts, but it also established the amount of P193,332.96 his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer haven. They could
that petitioners owed respondent. The procedure through which this amount not convince AJ, who refused to join them and so JN, Sr., his son JN, Jr., and
was arrived at was testified to by Meralcos Senior Billing Computer Enrique the latter's wife, AC and a friend and former neighbor FL, dashed out of the
Katipunan. His testimony was corroborated by documentary evidence burning edifice. As they came out JN, Jr. was shot in the head by a Japanese
showing the accounts billing history and the corresponding computations. soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front
Neither do we doubt the documents of inspections and examinations of the Club premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club,
presented by respondent to prove that, indeed there had been meter already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people inside, presumably including
tampering that resulted in unrecorded and unpaid electrical consumption. AJ: JN, Sr., Mrs., JN, Jr. and FL managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby,
The mere presentation by petitioners of a Contract to Sell with and stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1945, when they were
Assumption of Mortgage [52] does not necessarily mean that they are no forced to leave the shelter because the shelling tore it open. They fled
longer liable for the billing differential. There was no sufficient evidence to toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately
show that they had not been actually residing in the house before the date met Japanese patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing JN, Sr. and his
of the said document. Lorna Quisumbing herself admitted[53] that they did not daughter-in-law. At the time of the massacre, JN, Sr. was at the age of 70;
have any contract for electrical service in their own name. Hence, petitioners his wife was about 67 years old; JN, Jr. about 30;. P was two or three years
effectively assumed the bills of the former occupants of the premises. older than her brother ; while the other sisters C and N were between 23
Finally, the CA was correct in ruling that the convincing documentary and 25. With this, three proceedings were instituted, which were jointly
and testimonial evidence presented by respondent, was not controverted by heard, for the summary settlement of the estates of the deceased, by the
petitioners. petitioner, an acknowledged natural child of AJ and adopted child of the
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed deceased spouses, and by the respondent son of JN, Sr. by first marriage.
CA Decision is MODIFIED as follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay The controversy relative to succession is focused on the question whether
respondent the billing differential of P193,332.96; while respondent is the mother, AJ, died before her son JN, Jr. or vice versa. The trial court
ordered to pay petitioners P100,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as found the mother to have survived her son but the appellate court found
exemplary damages, and P50,000 as attorneys fees. No pronouncement as otherwise. Held: The facts are quite adequate to solve the problem of
to costs. survivorship between AJ and JN, Jr., and keep the statutory presumption out
SO ORDERED. of the case. It is believed that in the light of the conditions painted by FL, a
Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur. fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely : that JN, Jr., died
Vitug, J., abroad on official business. before his mother. The presumption that AJ died before her son is based
purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation
[No. L-5426-28. May 29, 1953] in the evidence. The opposite theory—that the mother outlived her son is
deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience,

engender the inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference
ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the rediculous, where in an action on the
game laws it was suggested that the gun with which the defendant fired was Agrava, Peralta .& Agrava for petitioner,
charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of
fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.) Leonardo Abola for respondent Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil., 257, No. L-
5426-28 May 29, 1953
2.Id.; Evidence of Survivorship.—The evidence of survivorship need not be
direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial or inferential. Where there are facts, TUASON, J.:
known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila
presumption does not step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence in the summary settlement of states of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela
controls. Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of
them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single
3.Id.; Id.; Particular Circumstances Required.—Section 68 (ii) of Rule 123 decision which was appealed to the Court of Appeals, whose decision,
does not require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn was elevated to the
therein provided be certain. It is the "particular circumstances from which it Supreme Court for review.
(survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by The main question represented in the first two courts related to the
the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife, and their children,
doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but it may be plain enough to justify all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in
a finding of fact." (In re Bhenko's Estate, 4 N. Y. S. 2d. 427, citing Tortera Manila in February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to
vs. State of New York, 269 N. Y. 199 N. E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River' Bridge have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion
Co., 80 N. W. 622.) and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro,
and 4th, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial
4.Evidence; Testimony ; Undesputed Evidence Contradicted Evidence court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin de Navarro and Joaquin
Distinguished.—Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.
another. An incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is not It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being
impeached or contradicted,. But when the evidence is purely documentary, contested by the petitioner. The importance of the question whether Angela
the authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the
construction to be placed thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an fact that it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the
agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment and the present petitioner who was an acknowledged natural child of Angela Joaquin
issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro,
one of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. (1 Moran Comm. respondent, son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.
on the Rules of Court, 3rd Ed. 855, 857.) The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision
of the Court of Appeals as follows:
5.Id ; Intermiddling with court Decisions; Substantial Evidence.—The "On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was
prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Angela Joaquin, together with
refers to decisions supported by substantial evidence. But substantial their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son
evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the
men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, ground floor of the building known as the German Club, at the corner of San
or conjectures come within the exception to the general rules. Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building
was packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the German
set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese started shooting at the people Club; but she could have died almost immediately after, from a variety of
inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like her daughters, killed
daughters were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin by falling beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally
Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the premises to seek a safer struck by splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No
heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; evidence is available on the point. All we can decide is that no one saw her
and son Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's alive after her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died.
wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former neighbor, Francisco Lopez, Clearly, this circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter
dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. than her son, and we are thus compelled to fall back upon the statutory
was shot in the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The presumption. In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption
others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club premises to avoid the of survivorship would be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like
bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be deemed to have
many people inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin. survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of
"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez age (Rule 123, sec. 69, subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).
managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby, the stayed there about three "The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of
days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter the question whether she and her deceased children perished in the same
because the shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa calamity. There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the
Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met Japanese Patrols, occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the
who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in- liberation of Manila. A second reason is that the law, in declaring that those
law. fallen in the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same
"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife calamity, could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can ( and
Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old; Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar usually do) operate in the source of combats. During the same battle, some
Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while the other may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that
sisters, Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and the law disregards episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause
25." of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.
The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco "We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the
Lopez, who miraculously survived the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is as follows: first, the three daughters
Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no doubt), the
insufficient" and the statutory presumption must be applied. The appellate father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."
Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated: Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37)
"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be of Act No. 129, now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has
established by proof of the death of only one of the parties; but that there repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the New Civil
must be adequate proof that one was alive when the other had already died. Code. It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the
Now in this case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the assumption that there is total lack of evidence, as the Court of Appeals said,
effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died shortly after the living the then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be
German Club in the company of his father and the witness, and that the held to have died at the same time.
burning edified entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting of the son; but The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the
there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which we consideration when obsolute necessity there for arises. We say irrelevant
may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the
appreciable interval from the instant his son turned his back to her, to dash reasons to be presently set forth.
out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from the evidence is that Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of
or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who died first, and there are the foregoing decision that the evidence of the survivorship need not be
no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are
survivorship is presumed from the probabilities resulting from the facts, known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the
strength and ages of the sexes, according to the following rules: presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance of evidence
xxx xxx xxx controls.
Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor: Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable
Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two inference of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and her son can be
or more persons who would inherent one from the other, the drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this
persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the purpose? For a better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and
allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that necessary to detail the testimony, which was described by the trial court as
they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from one "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to
to the other shall take place. credence."
Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a Lopez testified:
substitute for lacks and so are not to be available when there are facts. With Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German
particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it Club with Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the latter's
present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By wife?- A. Yes, sir.
hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it Q. Did you fall? — A. I fell down.
is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts are Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes,
unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate sir.
to the different legal situation that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? — A. We were
ed., 483.) out 15 meters away from the building but I could see what was
In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the going on.
applied with the respect to the deaths of the Navarro girls, pointing out that xxx xxx xxx
"our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California Code Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the
of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said: two events, that is the shooting of Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and the
When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it collapse of the German Club? — A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly,
can be inferred" that one died before the other it means that there Occasions like that, you know, you are confused.
are circumstances from which the fact of death by one before the Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen
other may be inferred as a relation conclusion from the facts proven. minutes? — A. Possible, but not probable.
The statue does not mean circumstances which would shown, or Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? — A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.
which would tend to show, probably that one died before the other. xxx xxx xxx
Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96 Pac. 22. When Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? — A. Yes, sir.
by circumstantial evidence alone, a party seeks to prove a Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? —
survivorship contrary to the statutory presumption, the A. Well, a few minutes after we have dashed out, the German Club,
circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must which was burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin
be such as are competent and sufficient when tested by the general Navarro, Sr.
rules of evidence in civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot xxx xxx xxx
rest upon mere surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said in Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give
Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to probably, then positive evidence to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad
the statue of the presumption." Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the same
positive evidence to the fact that Angela Joaquin also died? — A.
Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her actually die, but when of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and
the building collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and I did not so died within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building.
see her come out of that building so I presumed she died there. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and wife started to flee from
xxx xxx xxx the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the
Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Navarro father and son tried hard to have her come along. She could have
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr. and the latter's perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the probabilities
wife? — A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and they that she did seem very remote. True, people in the building were also killed
were shooting people outside, so we thought of running away rather but these, according to Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip
than be roasted. away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very likely that
xxx xxx xxx Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic
Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club efforts to dissuade her husband and son from leaving the place and exposing
all the Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, were already themselves to gun fire.
wounded? — A. to my knowledge, yes. This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well
Q. They were wounded? — A. Yes, sir. give an idea, at the same time, of a condition of relative safety in the
Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? — A. On the ground near clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It
the entrance, because most of the people who were shot by the strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of
Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far as I can death from staying were not so imminent. And it lends credence to Mr.
remember they were among those killed. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40
xxx xxx xxx minutes after Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped
Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela Navarro. The Court
few minutes before you left the place? — A. That is what I think, of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the
because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people inside breaking down of the edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer
especially those trying to escape. than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that Mrs. Angela
xxx xxx xxx Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired
Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the
mean? A — . There were many people shot because they were trying building, by which Mrs. Navarro could have been killed. All these are
to escape. speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against
xxx xxx xxx them. Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal
Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the to follow the only remaining living members of her family, she could not have
building, can you explain that? — A. They were trying to escape kept away form protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire
probably. trap the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was
It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate their ammunition except upon those who tried to leave the premises. Nor
to solve the problem of survivorship between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the
Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was
believed that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause instantaneous death; certainly not
reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. within the brief space of five seconds between her son's departure and his
died before his mother. death.
While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive.
out, it must be noted that this possibility is entirely speculative and must Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not require that the inference necessary to
yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular
way around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required
running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the German Club. Still in the prime to be certain as tested by the rules of evidence. In speaking of inference the
rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may contradicted. But when the evidence is purely documentary, the authenticity
be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. of which is not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed
2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where
Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California courts all the facts are stated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of
have said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be
the survivorship must be such as are competent and sufficient when tested reviewed by the Supreme Court."
by the general rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory
Estate, supra.) "Juries must often reason," says one author, "according presumption is to be invoked is a question of law.
to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in issue existed from The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of
collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its evidence refers to decisions supported by substantial evidence. By
existence. The vital question in such cases is the cogency of the proof substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about which
afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to experience, is the reasonable men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations,
existence of the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on surmises, or conjectures come within the exception to the general rule.
Facts, Sec. 596.) The same author tells us of a case where "a jury was We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the
justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught firing a distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the
shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon
about an hour before at the same animal also trespassing." That conclusion the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical
was not airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without
leave greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at costs.
hand. Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and
In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Labrador, JJ., concur.
her son is based purely on surmises, speculations, or conjectures without
any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory — that the mother
outlived her son — is deduced from established facts which, weighed by
common experience, engender the inference as a very strong probability.
Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases
are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an
instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous,
where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with
which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird might
have died in consequence of the fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing
Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)
It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant
impugns, and which has been discussed, involves findings of fact which can
not be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well considered. The
particular circumstances from which the parties and the Court of Appeals
drew conclusions are, as above seen, undisputed, and this being the case,
the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of
law, not of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As
was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857,
"Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An
incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or
Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting

parties, after the proper government official has inquired into their capacity
to contract marriage.—Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not
those under Article 75. Article 80(3) of the Civil Code makes it clear that a
marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this
being nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact
that the license is the essence of the marriage contract. This is in stark
contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license
did not make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character
of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted
by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official
has inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.
Same; Same; Ratification of Marital Cohabitation; The reason for the law on
ratification of marital cohabitation, whereby no marriage license is required,
is that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such
persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.
—The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under
Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 76. No marriage license
shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by
law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the
ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no
legal impediment to the marriage. The reason for the law, as espoused by
G.R. No. 175581. March 28, 2008.* the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from
respondent. legalizing their status.
G.R. No. 179474. March 28, 2008.*
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, petitioner, vs. JOSE A. DAYOT, respondent. Same; Same; Same; The falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where
the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement,
Marriages; Marriage License; A marriage performed without the effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the —It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
of the marriage contract, in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law, whereby affidavit declaring that “they have attained the age of maturity; that being
the absence of a marriage license did not make the marriage void; The unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.” One
of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short impediment to the marriage.
of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage void
ab initio for lack of a marriage license. We answer in the affirmative. Same; Same; Same; The question as to whether they satisfied the minimum
five-year requisite is factual in nature.—It is noteworthy that the question as
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Marriages of exceptional to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature.
character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or
the formal requisite of a marriage license, and under the rules of statutory falsehood of the alleged facts. Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily
construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably not subject to this Court’s review. It is already well-settled that: The general
construed.—Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a Court. A recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and
marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make contradictory
general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed. They extend only findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the
so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in Court of Appeals and the trial court or administrative body disagree. The
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Where a general factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if
rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.
former or add to the latter by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to
apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have Same; Same; Same; The rule that persons dwelling together in apparent
attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
together as husband and wife for at least five years. evidence special to the case, to be in fact married does not apply to a case
which does not involve an apparent marriage.—Anent petitioners’ reliance on
Same; Same; Same; Same; A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no
of the Civil Code leaves the Court with no other expediency but to read the applicability to the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption
law as it is plainly written—the exception of a marriage license under Article of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man
76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
least five years and desire to marry each other.—A strict but reasonable lawful contract of marriage. Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
law as it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.
76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at The present case does not involve an apparent marriage to which the
least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose and
ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986,
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage Petitions.
celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be
dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but Same; Same; Same; The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is
as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the
Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall prerequisite for a valid marriage.—The declaration of the Civil Code that
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will
not salvage the parties’ marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a
violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil
without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the declaration of
requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The nullity of the parties’ marriage is without prejudice to their criminal liability.
solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud Same; Declaration of Nullity; Prescription; An action for nullity of marriage is
against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law imprescriptible.—The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error
sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for
marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived
the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Jose’s subsequent marriage to
as well. To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before
to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in. This is
fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and
that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws. Felisa’s marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No other
conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the
Same; Same; Same; The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any
relating to the period of the parties’ cohabitation, which would have qualified time.
their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license,
cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the Same; Same; Common-Law Cohabitation Period; To settle all doubts,
law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
oath—if the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect.—We are not impressed by the from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.—To settle all doubts,
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law
marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is flagrant. from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal
The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and union had it not been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years
not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage license at all. immediately preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity
Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the —meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years—and
period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their continuity that is unbroken.
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot
be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the amended decision of the Court of
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. Appeals.
If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere
scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
affidavit at all.
Public Attorney’s Office for Felisa Tecson-Dayot.
Same; Same; Same; Equity; Equity finds no room for application where there
is a law.—In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the Urbano C. Victorio, Sr. for Jose A. Dayot.
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he
perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. DECISION
This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room
for application where there is a law. There is a law on the ratification of CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage
Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581 and G.R. in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage
No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed with him on account of their age difference. [5] In her pre-trial brief, Felisa
by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter
respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision [1] of the Court of contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August
Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against
the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio. Jose. Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of
were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. [6] The Ombudsman found
Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted
sworn affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year without
had attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived emolument.[7]
together as husband and wife for at least five years.
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision [8] dismissing the
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint [4] for Annulment and/or Complaint. It disposed:
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian,
Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis
as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds
not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a
husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case
marriage was secured through fraud. is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his
filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented,
1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24 November 1986 was
the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized
to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so she could claim a that:
package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall,
upon a pre-arranged signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of Any person in his right frame of mind would easily
paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet
so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do of paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something
so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get a
of them killed by her brother who had learned about their package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the pieces of paper for the release of the said
the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered package. Another indirect suggestion that could have put
that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission,
of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he [Felisa] told him that her brother would kill them if he will
perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three
with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance. months to discover that the pieces of paper that he signed
was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and seem to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be
defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]

[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to
marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005, the Court of
Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the
notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on appellate courts Decision reads:
May 12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage
contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]
again, in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the
person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between
does not believe that the only reason why her name was Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family
written in his company I.D. was because he was residing Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud
there then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he as a ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86 [14] of the Civil Code
really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would did not exist in the marriage between the parties.Further, it ruled that the
have written instead the name of his sister. action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond
the prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, Joses appeal in the following manner:
under oath, she testified that she signed her name
voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the marriage Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation
certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the marriage,
further testified that the signature appearing over the name the action for the annulment thereof had already
of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code provides
voluntarily affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that
T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was the consent of a party was obtained by fraud, force or
asked by the Honorable Court if indeed she believed that intimidation must be commenced by said party within four
Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and within four (4)
answered yes.The testimony of his sister all the more belied years from the time the force or intimidation
his claim that his consent was procured through fraud. [10] ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered by
Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February,
1991 within which to file an action for annulment of
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose
had prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New Civil Code which requires filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to Felisa.[15]
that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the
injured party within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his
That granting even for the sake of argument that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license. It ruled
consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76 [16] of the Civil Code as one
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or of exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage
declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible between man and woman who have lived together as husband and wife for
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the
and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any action affidavit to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and
to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12] wife for the period required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the
marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements
contained therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the at least five (5) years and that they desired to marry each
good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:
affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said
affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated x x x In other words, the five-year common-law
that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union
the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year
was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V. Atienza period should be the years immediately before the day of
belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56 [17] of the Civil Code the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
did not require that either one of the contracting parties to the marriage characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was
must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is
prescription was established only in Article 7 [18] of the Family Code which unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation
does not govern the parties marriage. is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites for the immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article 76 relationships and placing them on the same footing with
of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a
Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the woman must have been special relationship must be respected as such and its
living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption
marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
executed by him and Felisa was false. and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements
of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed not comply with every single requirement and later use the
itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7 November same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to
2006, the fallo of which reads: nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted
2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered that a license is required in order to notify the public that
declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that
Tecson void ab initio. anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil
of Pasay City.[19] registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and reasoned that: marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from the
beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to Felisa is not covered by the exception to the requirement of
a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of
basis of their affidavit that they had attained the age of the absence of a marriage license.[21]
majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for
avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no would exonerate Jose from any liability.
avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution [22] dated 10 May 2007,
denying Felisas motion. For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and
Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly tackle the
Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and
Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this Court in G.R. Felisa.
No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances
marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared valid and subsisting. Felisa give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists between Jose and
filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be
assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling
Court resolved to consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. [26] To buttress its assertion, the Republic
the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution. [23] points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986,
attesting that they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics
for the allowance of its Petition, to wit: position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the
validity of the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied
I with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to
whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was
OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE TO FELISA. wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by the fact that
the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they
II cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years. In addition, the
Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their marriage
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature
HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM of the parties and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary
HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT. evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
III dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2)
Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman 192, Zone
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together
LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF MARRIAGE as husband and wife in said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card,
LICEN[S]E.[24] dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil Code. A survey of
misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at bar from Nial by reasoning the prevailing rules is in order.
that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance
which does not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
that Jose only sought the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family
for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to
Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man
Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract: and a woman who have attained the age of majority and
who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The
requisites are complied with: contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an
affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the
parties; marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to
ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting
(2) Their consent, freely given; parties and that he found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage;
and
The reason for the law, [35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of that the publicity attending a marriage license may discourage such persons
exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.) who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status. [36]

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they executed an
without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry each other.
Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code makes it clear that a marriage [37]
One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being of an affidavit of marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen
nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders the marriage
license is the essence of the marriage contract. [30] This is in stark contrast to void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license did not
make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a We answer in the affirmative.
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.[32] the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage
license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general
Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered rule, should be strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so
by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
are: (1) marriages inarticulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. [40] Where a general
war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages, [33] (3) rule is established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the
ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious ratification of a civil former or add to the latter by implication. [41] For the exception in Article 76 to
marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34] apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have
attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation together as husband and wife for at least five years.
under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no findings are supported by the record or based on substantial
other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The exception of evidence.[48]
a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each
other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986,
requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of a
had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of marriage license, is beyond question.
five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of
cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage,
requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The
to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the
state the requisite facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal
to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain legal requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as
the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
no legal impediment to the marriage. requirement of a marriage license.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at bar. Essentially,
contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
celebration of their marriage. [43] The Court of Appeals also noted Felisas as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.
testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, [49]
Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent
sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. [44] The matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or
appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June 1986 evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. [50] The present case does
when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45] not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be
applied. There is no question that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A question of institute a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the which spawned the instant consolidated Petitions.
alleged facts.[46] Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to
this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that: In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code [51] that every
intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage will not
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a
Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized exception to violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into
this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the stringent
in this case the administrative body, make contradictory requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The
findings. However, the exception does not apply in every solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court or law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud
administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law
Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this Court if such sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a valid
marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not the right to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised
just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid any time.
one as well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage
license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that
protect the fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article 76 means a five-
deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws. year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and
refers to a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding the day of the
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved
license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a at any time within the five years - and continuity that is unbroken. [58]
fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of
irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here, the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759,
there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio,
in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it SO ORDERED.
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed
and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force
and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because he
perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that equity
finds no room for application where there is a law. [54] There is a law on the
ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article
76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities are consistent that the
declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.[55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose
is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack of a
marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from
1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual
on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven years before he sought the
declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
[56]
Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a marriage license. No
other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case,
Wills; Succession; Conflict of laws; Renvoi doctrine.—The doctrine of renvoi

is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country and is
domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent was a
citizen of Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that,
even assuming that Texas has a conflicts rule providing that the domiciliary
law should govern successional rights, the same would not result in a
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex rei sitae,
which calls for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties involved are found in
the Philippines.
Same; Foreign laws.—In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of

Texas, it would be presumed to be the same as our local conflicts rule.
Same; Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to succeed—The

decedent's national law governs the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and
capacity to succeed.
Same; Third paragraph of article 17 of New Civil Code does not modify article
16.—The third paragraph of article 17 of the New Civil Code is not an
exception to the second paragraph of article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted
the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article," when it incorporated article 11 of the old Civil Code as article 17,
while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of article
10 of the old Civil Code, as article 16. The legislative intent must have been
to make the second paragraph of article 176 a specific provision in itself
which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As a further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under
article 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is governed by the
decedent's national law,
Same; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general provisions.—Whatever public

policy and good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
No. L-23678. June 6, 1967.
Congres has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign
nationals. It has specifically chosen the decedent's national law to govern,
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK & inter alia, the amount of successional rights. Specific provisions must prevail
TRUST COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM over general ones.
PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants, vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET
AL., heirs-appellees.
Same; Testamentary provision that successional right to decedent's estate On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which
would be governed by law other than his national law is void.—A provision in he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration
a foreigner's will that his properties should be distributed in accordance with are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
Philippine law and not in accordance with his national law is void, being following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E.
contrary to article 16 of the New Civil Code. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,
Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
Same; System of legitimes does not apply to estate of a citizen of Texas.— the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his
Where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there are seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
no forced heirs, the system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
the succession to the decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. 1äwphï1.ñët
provisions of the decedent's will and the amount of successional rights are to Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San
be determined under Texas law. Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the
bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares
of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts
totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositorsappellants. total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the
lower court approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al. the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective
legacies.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al. On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor
submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company. and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman. legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting
to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and
BENGZON, J.P., J.: Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor — pursuant to the
the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided the
project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089 residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's
therein.1äwphï1.ñët seven legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
The facts of the case are as follows: On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they
United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-deceased compulsory heirs of the deceased.
him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27,
children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he 1964 by the executor.1
had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
Miriam Palma Bellis. pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the
oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and
administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and
Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas those which have for their object public order, public policy and good
law, which did not provide for legitimes. customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise foreign country.
the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or Philippine law. prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding
doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L- the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they incorporated
16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while
decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of
present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to
Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death. 2 So that even make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which
assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the domiciliary must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of
system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039,
reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei of the decedent.
sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the
in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen to
rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing
paragraph of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code. from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate
national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v.
regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with
(d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that — his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
law of the country where it is situated. states said national law should govern.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. Amos G. Bellis.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
of the decedent. costs against appellants. So ordered.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez
Code, stating that — and Castro, JJ., concur.

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Even if the spouse present has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
contract a subsequent marriage.—There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to
comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the
spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to
discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous
marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
Same; Same; Same; Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error

on the part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit
submitted by the groom.—In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife’s
presumptive death. Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to
Ida Peñaranda. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the
part of respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by
the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous,
and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, “The
following marriage shall be void from the beginning; (4) Those bigamous x x
x marriages not falling under Article 41.”
Same; Same; Same; Instances where a marriage can be held outside of the
judge’s chambers or courtroom.—As the aforequoted provision states, a
marriage can be held outside of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in
the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in
accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a
sworn statement to this effect.
Same; Same; Same; Article 8 which is a directory provision, refers only to

the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer.—Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing officer.” Under
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996.* Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.” Article 8, which is a
(Formerly A.M. No. OCA I.P.I. 95-61-MTJ) directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the
DOMAGTOY, respondent. marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of
court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in
down in Article 3 which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial
may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.—A priest who is Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross
commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place allowed by
his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the
the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.Respondent judge holds office and has
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Judges; By citing Article 8 and the in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area
exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority, of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
principles of civil law.—Inasmuch as respondent judge’s jurisdiction covers
the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator,
authority to solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of
Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private
lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law. person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-
MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court finds respondent to have acted Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge
in gross ignorance of the law.—Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in
the cases brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks
prompting us to conclude that respondent’s failure to apply them is due to a exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar
lack of comprehension of the law. Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by
stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first
wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. [1] With respect to the
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Gross Misconduct and second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between
Inefficiency. Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the
Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that
Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
DECISION
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
ROMERO, J.: pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. [2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has
upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary
suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to
malfeasance. contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been
precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary
Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. [3] The proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent
affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether
but merely acknowledged before him.In their affidavit, the affiants stated wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent
that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such
Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore
having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage
Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not
almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is falling under Article 41."
already dead.
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family
affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample Code, thus:
reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous jurisdiction;
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of writing in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or
the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."
spouse." (Emphasis added.)
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the
justifications for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's the law.
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of
death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying
remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles
respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. [4] like the ones involved in instant case. [6] It is not too much to expect them to
know and apply the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by
the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal those not learned in the law.While magistrates may at times make mistakes
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
marriage. Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum
the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of
place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that
Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the
with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of
solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant the law.
irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may
not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C.
administrative liability.[5] Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of with more severely.
Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a
marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 SO ORDERED.
and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross

ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to
our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,

represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-
LUNA, respondents.
Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; Nationality Rule; The Civil Code continued to
follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living abroad.—The
first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the
time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the
nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow the nationality rule, to the
effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of
the Philippines, although living abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and Eugenio
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Divorce; The nonrecognition of absolute divorce

between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if either
or both of the spouses are residing abroad.—From the time of the
celebration of the first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the present,
absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The nonrecognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has
remained even under the Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses
are residing abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions
under our laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The nonrecognition of absolute divorce in the

Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the marital
union especially among Filipino citizens.—It is true that on January 12, 1976,
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic
issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and
Eugenia. Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if
voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty.
FIRST DIVISION Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12,
1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
G.R. No. 171914. July 23, 2014.* marriage as an inviolable social institution, and regards it as a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for the
establishment of a conjugal and family life. The nonrecognition of absolute being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the
the marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the Civil Code.—Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
either spouse, or upon a ground expressly provided by law. For as long as acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-
this public policy on marriage between Filipinos exists, no divorce decree ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz.: Article 144.
dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or judicial When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are
recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction. not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their
Same; Same; Same; Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership of Gains; wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. (n) In
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof
settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of to confirm such fact. To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the
relations.—Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor.
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their
property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the
spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly so
provides, to wit: Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage Arnulfo F. Dumadag for petitioner.
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon
complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence Renato G. De la Cruz Law Office for respondents.
of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall DECISION
govern the property relations between husband and wife.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Same; Same; Same; Marriages; In the Philippines, marriages that are
bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void.—In the Philippines, Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule
marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the
of the Civil Code clearly states: Article 71. All marriages performed outside parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks competent judicial approval, and
they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband who contracts a
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as subsequent marriage.
determined by Philippine law. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has The Case
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals
proceedings. A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio. the adverse decision promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision rendered on
Same; Same; Property Relations; Co-Ownership; Due to the second marriage August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati
between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the
husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full payment, the Deed
acquired during the second marriage. of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983,
and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered
Antecedents bearing the following names:
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows: "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E.
ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R.
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ
prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100
Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife, herein intervenor- share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the
appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT
civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:
September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-
Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E.
marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON,
L. Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna.
After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was
eventually agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966 and agreed partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered in common
to separation of property, to which end, they entered into a written under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA
agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND PROPERTY over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter
SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live established and headed another law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand
separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law
property. firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including
with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over
Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z.
Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit belonging
LUNA contracted another marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm
ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
husband and wife until 1987.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, as the law books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the
Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of
managing partner. Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No.
99-1644. The complaint alleged that the subject properties were acquired
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD
Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became
Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent
consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on of ¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus
installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978. Said condominium her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her
in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA Both parties appealed to the CA.6
through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD from her share in the subject
properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD be declared the owner of On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be partitioned; that an
accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM
SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN
administer the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be LUCES LUNA;
ordered to pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
Ruling of the RTC PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly: III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO
PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows: ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT
IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA
adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND
industry; LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND
LUNA;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over
the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO
Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT
the civil status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna"; VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE
TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, APPEAR IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG
Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM
Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium unit and UNIT;
defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as
appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport and storage. VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE
148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE
No pronouncement as to costs. OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE;
SO ORDERED.5 VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE
OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED
Decision of the CA BY PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first
THE INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
PAY FILING FEE.7
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry
to wit: in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of
Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L.
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner
PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the
LAW OFFICE; and condominium unit.
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING No pronouncement as to costs.
PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT
TO RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES SO ORDERED.11
AND ESTOPPEL.8
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified reconsideration.13
decision,9 holding and ruling:
Issues
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the
latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate his prior marriage
with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10 Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna
and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal
xxxx partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the
the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows: Dominican Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner
SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of acquisition of purchase of the subjectcondominium unit; and
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is
hereby adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having been not entitled to the subject law books.14
acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan Luces Luna
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, which subsisted up
should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding conforms to the
and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports). institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between
a man and a woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life. 20 The
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the non-recognition of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of
law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna the respect for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino
and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be
marriage; and, secondly, whether the second marriage entered into by the grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any rights in property. provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Ruling of the Court Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can
ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement in this
We affirm the modified decision of the CA. jurisdiction.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia 2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
subsisted up to the time of his death was void for lack of court approval
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered
time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI
nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow the nationality rule, to the of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and liquidate their
effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the conjugal partnership was enforceable against Eugenia. Hence, the CA
status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens of committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
the Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule,
Philippine laws governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
having remained Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997
terminated their marriage. Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage
settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed their property
until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the
recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce time of their marriage, did not specify the property regime of the spouses in
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, 16 even if either the event that they had not entered into any marriage settlement before or
or both of the spouses are residing abroad. 17 Indeed, the only two types of at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides,
defective marital unions under our laws have beenthe void and the voidable to wit:
marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective marriages have
been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon
of the marriage. absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete separation of
property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. or when the same are void, the system of relative community or conjugal
Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the partnership of gains as established in this Code, shall govern the property
first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality relations between husband and wife.
rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily obtained abroad, did not
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe
thusly: hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for
dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and may protect the creditors and other third persons.
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of
indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in
causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz: the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal
partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by
Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution of
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in the action for
divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable under
(3) When the marriage is annulled; Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law,
the approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191. under Philippine law. Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty.
Luna and Eugenia subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per
sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of 3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
the Agreement by a competent court was still required under Article 190 and was void; properties acquired during their marriage
Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows: were governed by the rules on co-ownership
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the Atty. Luna and Soledad?
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the
and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the
sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted. Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
xxxx The Court concurs with the CA.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall
be notified of any petition for judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must
the laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with more vigor where, as
incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law. in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex
parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or for. The law gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff
subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff
of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of
considered void ab initio.24 proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual
void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate
the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz: ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from Premex
Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30; 27 and that such aggregate
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of
but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to
property acquired by eitheror both of them through their work or industry or ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.(n) further asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her personal
funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a "thank you" note; 29 that
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and
proof to confirm such fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the
became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief in her favor. As Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved assertions on her actual contributions through the following findings and
the issue of co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous conclusions, namely:
marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own
co-ownership of the petitioners therein who were parties to the bigamous independent funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law
and adulterousunion is without basis because they failed to substantiate their books subject matter in contentionin this case – proof that was required for
allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed Article 144 of the New Civil Code and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply
properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that – as to cases where properties were acquired by a man and a woman living
the controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an together as husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-
of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property. ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many
situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without impediment to
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-ownership where
there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute community between SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is
the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-
Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the trial
the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole industry
industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to their respective of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares were prima
faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of "The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was
actual contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to in the name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The
apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the parties name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty.
was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The
to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank and Trust Company
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was not validly married to were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have
another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on forfeiture applied even if both
parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception while conjugal The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the
partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that
social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and
was held by the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration
No. L-19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus: does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. The phrase
"married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil
xxxx status of ATTY. LUNA.
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for
the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had anything to contribute
presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA and that she actually purchased or paid for the law office amortization and
in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained in the Decision of the trial for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who
court, viz.: bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings from his
practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita for use of the law firm that he headed.30
Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months
before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both
check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was because they were substantiated by the records and because we have not
payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as
the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to the party claiming the co-ownership, did not discharge her burden of proof.
PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being evidence,31 did not
The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage
None of the foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired
payees were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The the properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should
connection was simply not established. x x x" then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their
conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death. Consequently, the
sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the
condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the respondents as the G.R. No. 195432. August 27, 2014.*
lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
EDELINA T. ANDO, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, AFFAIRS, respondent.
2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
Administrative Law; Passports; Documentary Requirements Before a Married
SO ORDERED. Woman May Obtain a Passport Under the Name of Her Spouse.—Under the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was adopted
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN on 25 February 1997, the following are the additional documentary
Associate Justice requirements before a married woman may obtain a passport under the
name of her spouse: SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married,
WE CONCUR: divorced or widowed women shall be made in accordance with the following
provisions: a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt
the surname of her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386,
she must present the original or certified true copy of her marriage contract,
and one photocopy thereof. In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts
marriage in the Philippines to a foreigner, shall be required to present a
Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counselling Seminar conducted
by the CFO when applying for a passport for the first time. b) In case of
annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true copy of
her annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the Court
Order effecting the annulment. c) In case of a woman who was divorced by
her alien husband, she must present a certified true copy of the Divorce
Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post which
has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the
concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines. When
the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of
the Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from
the Shari’ah Court or the OCRG. d) In the event that marriage is dissolved by
the death of the husband, the applicant must present the original or certified
true copy of the Death Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of
Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shari’ah Court, in which case the applicant
may choose to continue to use her husband’s surname or resume the use of
her maiden surname.
Same; Same; She should have filed an appeal with the Secretary of the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in the event of the denial of her
application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of
Republic Act (RA) No. 8239.—In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that
she would not be issued a Philippine passport under her second husband’s
name. Should her application for a passport be denied, the remedies
available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal.—Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the The Department of Foreign Affairs for respondent.
application of this Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued by
the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign DECISION
Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due
course. The IRR further provides in detail: ARTICLE 10. Appeal. In the event SERENO, CJ:
that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one cancelled or
restricted, the applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to appeal in This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the
writing to the Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial, nullification of the Orders dated 14 January and 8 February 2011 issued by
cancellation or restriction. Clearly, she should have filed an appeal with the the Regional Trial Court (R TC), Third Judicial Region, Branch 45,1 City of San
Secretary of the DFA in the event of the denial of her application for a Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which dismissed the Petition for
passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioner’s Declaratory Relief filed therein.
argument that her application “cannot be said to have been either denied,
cancelled or restricted by [the DFA], so as to make her an aggrieved party STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE
entitled to appeal,” as instead she “was merely told” that her passport
cannot be issued, does not persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:
petitioner in the event of the denial of her application.
3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a
Civil Law; Husband and Wife; Divorce; Because our courts do not take Japanese National, in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba,
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached
that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be as Annex 'A' and made an integral part hereof.
alleged and proven and like any other fact.—With respect to her prayer for
the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, 4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and
instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her was validly granted under Japaneselaws, a divorce in respect of his
first husband. In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), we ruled that a marriage with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly
divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, issued by the Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by
provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is heretoas Annex ‘B’ and
The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce made an integral part hereof. 5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. A copy of
divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is hereto attached as Annex
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the ‘C’ and made an integral part hereof.
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven
and like any other fact. 6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to
remarry and that by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner
PETITION for review on certiorari of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding
San Fernando City, Pampanga, Br. 45. celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of
Marriage is hereto attached as Annex ‘D’ and made an integral part
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. hereof.
Gerome N. Tubig for petitioner. 7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27
December 2005. A copy of the JapaneseFamily Registry Record of
Kobayashi showing the divorce he obtained and his remarriage with
Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by the Consulate-General of Japan
and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is hereto attached as On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause
Annex ‘E’ and made an integral part hereof. and action, as well as jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:
8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioner’s marriage to
passport to indicate her surname withher husband Masatomi Y. Ando Masatomi Y. Ando, herein petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a
but she was told at the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on September 16, 2001, and that
cannot be issued to her until she can prove bycompetent court though a divorce was obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to the
decision that her marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando their (sic) marriage, there is no showing that petitioner herein complied with
is valid until otherwise declared. the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is obtaining a
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.
xxxx
It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein
12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner’s marriage with her petitioner does not have any causeof action and/or is entitled to the reliefs
said husband Masatomi Y. Ando musttherefore be honored, prayed for under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In the same vein, though
considered and declared valid, until otherwise declared by a there is other adequate remedy available to the petitioner, such remedy is
competent court. Consequently, and until then, petitioner therefore however beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court to act upon and
is and must be declared entitled to the issuance of a Philippine grant, as it isonly the family court which is vested with such authority and
passport under the name ‘Edelina Ando y Tungol.’ Hence, this jurisdiction.4
petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. 2
On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory of the Order dated 15 November 2010. In anOrder dated 14 December 2010,
Relief, which was later raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded the the RTC granted the motion in this wise:
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as respondent and prayed for the
following reliefs before the lower court: WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the
petitioner in her petition and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that within the jurisdiction of the Special Family Court of this jurisdiction and for
after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows: the interest ofsubstantial justice, the Order of the Court dated November 15,
2010 is hereby reconsidered.
(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner
Edelina T. Ando and her husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the
declared by a competent court; Clerk of Court for proper endorsement to the Family Court of this jurisdiction
for appropriateaction and/or disposition.5 Thereafter, the case was raffled to
(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the trial court dismissed the
Passport under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol"; and Petition anew on the ground that petitioner had no cause of action. The
Order reads thus:
(c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor petitioner’s
marriage to her husband Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as
Passport to petitioner under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol". valid is already her second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article
35(4) of the Family Codeconsidering that the first one, though allegedly
Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs. 3 terminated by virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never
recognized by a Philippine court, hence, petitioner is considered as still
married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the second marriage with Ando cannot be With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for
honored and considered asvalid at this time. Reconsideration to the OSG and the DFA, petitioner avers that at the time of
the filing, the RTC had yet to issue a summons to respondent; thus, it had
Petitioner’s allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. yet to acquire jurisdiction over them.
The fact that no judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ando was
rendered does not make the same valid because such declaration under Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The
Article 40 ofthe Family Code is applicable onlyin case of re-marriage. More latter raised the following arguments: (1) the Petition was improperly
importantly, the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is not verified, as the juratin the Verification thereof only stated that the affiant had
even a requisite to make a marriage valid. exhibited "her currentand valid proof of identity," which proof was not
properly indicated, however; (2) prior judicial recognition by a Philippine
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative. 6 court of a divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is required before a
Filipino spouse can remarry and be entitled to the legal effects of
On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show that she had first exhausted all
the Order dated 14 January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in available administrative remedies, such as appealing to the Secretary of the
open court on 8 February2011, considering that neither the Office of the DFA under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine Passport Act of
Solicitor General (OSG) nor respondent was furnished with copies of the 1996, before resorting to the special civil action of declaratory relief; and (4)
motion. petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap of
paper and did not toll the running of the period to appeal. Hence, the RTC
On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the Order dated 14 January 2011 is now final.
sole issue of whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of
action. On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment,
addressing the issues raised therein.
Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable THE COURT’S RULING
Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
not even allowed to filea direct petition for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a void marriage,with even more reason can it not collaterally attack First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport,
the validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief. Further, petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She
petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage – even one that is void or should have first appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her
voidable – shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial ultimate entreaty was toquestion the DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her
proceeding. under her second husband’s name.
Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which
decree of divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family Code, was adopted on 25 February 1997, the following are the additional
noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage documentary requirements before a married woman may obtain a passport
license. Any irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, such as with under the name of her spouse:
respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect the legality of the marriage.
Petitioner further claims that all the requisites for a petition for declaratory SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed
relief have been complied with. women shall be made inaccordance with the following provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the
surname of her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. application of this Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued by
386, she must present the original or certifiedtrue copy of her the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of Foreign
marriage contract, and one photocopy thereof. Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due
course.
In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the
Philippines to a foreigner, shall be required to present a Certificate of The IRR further provides in detail:
Attendance in a Guidance and Counselling Seminar conducted by the
CFO when applying for a passport for the first time. ARTICLE 10
Appeal
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a
certified true copy of her annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one
of Registration and the Court Order effecting the annulment. cancelled or restricted, the applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to
appeal in writing to the Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she denial, cancellation or restriction.
must present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly
authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post which has Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the
jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the event of the denial of her application for a passport, after having complied
concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines. with the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioner’s argument that her application
"cannot be said to havebeen either denied, cancelled or restricted by [the
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved party entitled to appeal", 7 as instead
copy of the Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of she "was merely told"8 that her passport cannot be issued, does not
Divorce from the Shari’ah Court or the OCRG. d) In the event that marriage persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event of
is dissolved by the death of the husband, the applicant must present the the denial of her application.
original or certified true copy of the Death Certificate of the husband or the
Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shari’ah Court, in which case Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second
the applicant may choose to continue to use her husband’s surname or marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the
resume the use of her maiden surname. From the above provisions, it is judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.
clear that for petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married
name, all she needed to present were the following: (1) the original or In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may
certified true copyof her marriage contract and one photocopy thereof; (2) a be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to
Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce
applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal
authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because
over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law
diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines. on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact. 10
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a
Philippine passport under her second husband’s name. 1âwphi1 Should her While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed
application for a passport be denied, the remedies available to her are before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,11 we
provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus: are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there
appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the
national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.*
divorce decree under that national law.12 Hence, any declaration as to the
validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien APPEALS, respondent.
spouse, in an action instituted in the proper forum.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Evidence; The certified copy of the
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, is admissible
recourse to the proper remedies available. as the best evidence of its contents.–This being the case, the certified copy
of the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, was
SO ORDERED. admissible as the best evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly
indicates that a marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO on November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence
Chief Justice, Chairperson given to public documents.
WE CONCUR: Same; Same; Same; Same; There is absolutely no requirement in the law
that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a
condition precedent for the validity of a marriage; The mere fact that no
record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all the
requisites for its validity are present.–The marriage contract presented by
the prosecution serves as positive evidence as to the existence of the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes, which should be given greater
credence than documents testifying merely as to absence of any record of
the marriage, especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement
in the law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil
registrar as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere
fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no evidence
presented by the defense that would indicate that the marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for validity, apart from the self-
serving testimony of the accused himself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A declaration of the nullity of the second

marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.–Petitioner makes
much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code.
What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no
moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bigamy; A marriage contracted during the

subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal however of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally
liability for bigamy; Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the mere inexistent, can outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy.–Void
act of contracting a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is
of a valid marriage.–As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during required to establish their nullity. As early as the case of
the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of People vs. Aragon, this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be
this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code contemplated otherwise, said the Court, “an express provision to that effect
criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation” of penal statutes. In
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled
rendered in the proper proceedings.” A plain reading of the law, therefore, (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage
would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a were contracted prior to the decree of annulment), the complete nullity,
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally
inexistent, can outrightly be a defense in an indictment for bigamy.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The requisites for the validity of a
marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential (legal capacity of Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A civil case questioning the validity of the
the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the presence of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a
solemnizing officer) and formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, civil case assailing a prior “voidable” marriage (being valid until annulled)
marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense
declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the for bigamy.–Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the
presence of at least two witnesses).–Moreover, the declaration of the nullity fact that a “void” marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for all
of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially declared
indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or
for validity. The requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus,
Family Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be a
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and formal prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior
(authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage “voidable” marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial
ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their agreement to marry question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy.
before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).
Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male or female of the age of Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; For a person to be held guilty of bigamy,
eighteen years or upwards not under any of the impediments mentioned in it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has
Articles 37 and 38 may contract marriage. all the essential elements of a valid marriage were it not for the subsisting
first union.–In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other
VITUG, J., Separate Opinion: than the existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line of
cases that no crime of bigamy is committed. The Court has explained that for
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages: Evidence; Bigamy; The Revised Penal a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be
Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid
judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is
by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy; The complete nullity established that the second marriage has been contracted without the
necessary license and thus void, or that the accused is merely forced to marriage. Article 35 of the Family Code enumerates the marriages that are
enter into the second (voidable) marriage, no criminal liability for the crime “void from the beginning.” The succeeding article, Article 36, declares that a
of bigamy can attach. marriage contracted by one psychologically incapacitated “shall likewise be
void.” Article 1409 of the Civil Code declares “inexistent and void from the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The judicial declaration of nullity of a beginning” contracts “expressly x x x declared void by law.” Thus, a marriage
bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies contracted by one psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage is
the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of legally inexistent and void from the beginning. Such void marriage cannot
the bigamous marriage.–Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, constitute a second marriage to sustain a conviction for bigamy under Article
does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
contracting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the
bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 349 speaks of a “second or
inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of subsequent marriage” which, as commonly understood and applied
nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity consistently by the Court, means a valid second marriage were it not for the
merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of existence of the first marriage.–Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code does
perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity not state that it is immaterial whether the second marriage is valid or void ab
dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite initio. This Article does not also state that the mere act of celebration of the
conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no second marriage, while the first marriage subsists, constitutes the crime of
defense on the part of the offender who has entered into it. bigamy. Article 349 speaks of a “second or subsequent marriage” which, as
commonly understood and applied consistently by the Court, means a valid
CARPIO, J., Dissenting Opinion: second marriage were it not for the existence of the first marriage.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Evidence; Bigamy; Court has consistently CALLEJO, SR., J., Separate Dissenting Opinion:
ruled that if the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence
of the first marriage, there is no crime of bigamy.–For more than 75 years Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Evidence; Bigamy; Since the second
now, this Court has consistently ruled that if the second marriage is void on marriage is null and void ab initio, such marriage in contemplation of criminal
grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, there is no crime of law never existed and for that reason, one of the essential elements of
bigamy. bigamy has disappeared.–The prosecution was burdened to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the corpus delicti, namely, all the elements of the crime. In
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Decisions of the Court declaring there is this case, the prosecution adduced evidence that the petitioner contracted
no crime of bigamy if the second marriage is void on grounds other than the marriage with Hilda and during the subsistence of said marriage, he
existence of the first marriage merely apply the clear language and intent of contracted a second marriage with the private respondent. However, the
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.–These decisions of the Court petitioner adduced in evidence the decision of the Regional Trial Court in
declaring there is no crime of bigamy if the second marriage is void on Civil Case No. AU-885 before the court a quo rendered judgment convicting
grounds other than the existence of the first marriage merely apply the clear the petitioner of bigamy declaring null and void ab initio the petitioner’s
language and intent of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. marriage with the private respondent on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. Since the second marriage is null and void ab initio,
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A marriage contracted by one such marriage in contemplation of criminal law never existed and for that
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the marriage is legally inexistent reason, one of the essential elements of bigamy has disappeared.
and void from the beginning; Such void marriage cannot constitute a second
marriage to sustain a conviction for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code.–If the second marriage is void ab initio on grounds other than
the existence of the first marriage, then legally there exists no second PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,
Urbano, Palamos & Fabros for petitioner. having been previously united in lawful marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and
without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there
The Solicitor General for respondent. willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA
ANCAJAS, which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the
DECISION essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first marriage.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: CONTRARY TO LAW.
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty". 6
judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage, on the
ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal liability for During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from
bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not retroact to the and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that no marriage
date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws ceremony took place to solemnize their union.7 He alleged that he signed a
are concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is criminally liable for connection with his work as a seaman.8 He further testified that he requested
bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said
marriage.9
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were wed by Judge On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, Branch
Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and
part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. maximum.10 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal court. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit
with Villareyes.1 Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of errors:
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED, AND
with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS APPEAL – WHEN IT
Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15.2 When Ancajas learned of this third AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT A
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY,
to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,3 Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, DESPITE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband. INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. 4 The II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR (sic)
Information,5 which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L, reads: THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR PROOF THAT THE
MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
HAD BEEN DECLARED NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1) a
LEGAL FORCE AND EFFECT.11 certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7,
1995;17 and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of Manila,
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent reason to dated February 3, 1997.18 Both these documents attest that the respective
disturb the assailed judgment. issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated between Veronico B.
Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the crime of
Bigamy are: To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot adequately
assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already have been
(1) that the offender has been legally married; sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes.
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case
his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents, and
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are applicable to
all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and Court reads as follows:
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. –
requisites for validity.12 When the original of a document is in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in which he issued by the public officer in custody thereof (Emphasis ours).
(1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and (2) argues
that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued by a
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best evidence of its
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was
which the second marriage was celebrated. 13 Hence, petitioner argues that celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on November 10, 1986, and it
all four of the elements of the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents.
acquittal.14
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued by the
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts. National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by the City Civil
Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly show that neither
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both documentary and document attests as a positive fact that there was no marriage celebrated
oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage between petitioner and between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented was in the form of: (1) a copy Rather, the documents merely attest that the respective issuing offices have
of a marriage contract between Tenebro and Villareyes, dated November 10, no record of such a marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a
1986, which, as seen on the document, was solemnized at the Manila City record is quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a
Hall before Rev. Julieto Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of the
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila;15 and (2) a handwritten letter from marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
Villareyes to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes
and Tenebro were legally married.16 The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive
evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents testifying
merely as to absence of any record of the marriage, especially considering As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of
that there is absolutely no requirement in the law that a marriage contract petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas
needs to be submitted to the civil registrar as a condition precedent for the would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s
validity of a marriage. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does psychological capacity or incapacity.22 Since a marriage contracted during the
not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this
present.19 There is no evidence presented by the defense that would indicate second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
that the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself. criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’ testimony that before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent
petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first marriage, and spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to indicate that the first rendered in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore,
marriage had all the requisites for validity. would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the non-
existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his brother to Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10,
validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to note that the 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy
certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and the City Civil had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no cogent reason for
Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and February 3, 1997, distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely
respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated after the accused’s because it is a second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage
marriage to his second wife, private respondent in this case. that is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at least
insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented by the protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct
prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime of bigamy. character of this special contract between spouses, and punish an
individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
subsequent judicial declaration20 of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to the marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The requisites
date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he argues that, for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family Code into essential
since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared void ab initio, the (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent freely given in the
crime of bigamy was not committed.21 presence of the solemnizing officer)23 and formal (authority of the
solemnizing officer, marriage license, and marriage ceremony wherein the
This argument is not impressed with merit. parties personally declare their agreement to marry before the solemnizing
officer in the presence of at least two witnesses).24 Under Article 5 of the
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second Family Code, any male or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the not under any of the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 25 and 3826 may
Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a declaration of the nullity contract marriage.27
of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of
absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage
were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of
age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the required
license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for review is
City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy and
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two
psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
significant to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among
these effects is that children conceived or born before the judgment of SO ORDERED.
absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. 28 There is
therefore a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these Azcuna, JJ., concur.
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug.
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia.
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion.
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
with the promise of futurity and commitment. Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of bigamy Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent.
are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner

contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to Villareyes and
Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is irrelevant in the
determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of this particular case, the
act of the accused displays a deliberate disregard for the sanctity of
marriage, and the State does not look kindly on such activities. Marriage is a
special contract, the key characteristic of which is its permanence. When an
individual manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the
State’s basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for
the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the same shall be imposed in its medium period.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a
minimum term, to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e.,
prision correccional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision
of the trial court which sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139676. March 31, 2006.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NORMA CUISON-

MELGAR and EULOGIO A. MELGAR, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Family Code; Marriages; It is the policy of our

Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.—It bears
stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage
is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric
and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family
members.
Family Code; Marriages; Only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor
or the OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and
protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.—In this case, the State did not actively participate
in the prosecution of the case at the trial level. Other than the Public
Prosecutor’s Manifestation that no collusion existed between the contending
parties and the brief cross-examination which had barely scratched the
surface, no pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the Public
Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the opportunity to
present controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. Truly,
only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure
that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.
Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240

SCRA 20 (1995), the Supreme Court declared that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability—it should refer to “no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.—In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical Filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is a petition for review
antecedence, and (c) incurability. It should refer to “no less than a mental, on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 11,
not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, which affirmed in toto the decision of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City (RTC) nullifying the marriage
by the parties to the marriage.” The intendment of the law has been to of respondents Norma Cuison-Melgar (Norma) and Eulogio A.
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases Melgar2 (Eulogio) pursuant to Article 363 of the Family Code.
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. The factual background of the case is as follows:
Same; Same; Same; In Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000) the On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the Catholic
Supreme Court clarified that there is no requirement that the Church in Dagupan City. Their union begot five children, namely, Arneldo,
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician Fermin, Norman, Marion Joy, and Eulogio III. On August 19, 1996, Norma
or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage on the ground of Eulogio’s
marriage based on psychological incapacity.—The Court clarified in Marcos v. psychological incapacity to comply with his essential marital
Marcos that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse obligations.4 According to Norma, the manifestations of Eulogio’s
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable
sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his
incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by family since December 27, 1985.
the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served by personal
Same; Same; Same; There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity service on Eulogio on October 21, 1996 by the sheriff.5 Eulogio failed to file
where there is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period.
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.—In order that the
allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor to conduct an
fabrication, evidence other than Norma’s lone testimony should have been investigation on the case to determine whether or not there exists collusion
adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is between the contending parties.6 On December 18, 1996, Public Prosecutor
not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert Joven M. Maramba submitted his Manifestation to the effect that no collusion
witness would have strengthened Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s alleged existed between the contending parties.7 On December 19, 1996, the RTC
psychological incapacity. Norma’s omission to present one is fatal to her set the reception of evidence on January 8, 1997.8
position. There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there
is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at the On January 8, 1997, upon motion of Norma’s counsel, the RTC allowed the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court. 9 Norma testified that
since the birth of their firstborn, Eulogio has been a habitual alcoholic; when
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. he is drunk he (a) sometimes sleeps on the streets, (b) every so often, he
goes to her office, utters unwholesome remarks against her and drags her
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. home, (c) he usually lays a hand on her, (d) he often scolds their children
without justifiable reason; his liquor drinking habit has brought shame and
The Solicitor General for petitioner. embarrassment on their family; when she would refuse to give him money
for his compulsive drinking habit, he would beat her up and threaten her; he
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: has not been employed since he was dismissed from work and he refuses to
look for a job; she has been the one supporting the family, providing for the
education and the basic needs of their children out of her salary as a
government employee; on December 27, 1985, because of unbearable responsibilities as a good and responsible husband to his wife and a loving
jealousy to her male officemates, Eulogio went to her office, dragged her father to his children x x x.13
home and then beat her up; her brothers saw this, came to her rescue and
then told Eulogio to get out of the house; and since then, Eulogio has not Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an
visited or communicated with his family such that reconciliation is very appeal with the CA, contending that the evidence presented are not
unlikely.10 The Public Prosecutor thereafter conducted a brief cross- sufficient to declare the marriage void under Article 36 of the Family Code. 14
examination of Norma.11
On August 11, 1999, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the decision of
Twelve days later, or on January 20, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision the RTC.15 The CA, quoting extensively Norma’s testimony, ratiocinated:
nullifying the marriage of Norma and Eulogio. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads: [I]t has been adequately established that the decree of annulment is proper
not simply because of defendant’s habitual alcoholism but likewise because
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant petition for being of other causes amounting to psychological incapacity as a result of which
impressed with merit. As such, pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code of the defendant has failed to perform his obligations under Articles 68-72, 220,
Philippines, the marriage between Norma L. Cuison-Melgar and Eulogio A. 221 and 225 of the Family Code x x x.
Melgar, Jr. is declared an ABSOLUTE NULLITY.
Contrary to the submission of the appellant Republic, the grant of annulment
The Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City is therefore ordered to cancel the is not based merely on defendant’s habitual alcoholism but also because of
Marriage Contract of the parties bearing Registry No. 180 in the Marriage his inability to cope with his other essential marital obligations foremost of
Registry of said Office after payment of the required fees. which is his obligation to live together with his wife, observe mutual love,
respect, fidelity and render mutual help and support.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the following offices: The City
Prosecution Office, Dagupan City, the Solicitor General, and the Local Civil For the whole duration of their marriage, that is, the period when they
Registrar of Dagupan City. actually lived together as husband and wide and even thereafter, defendant
has miserably failed to perform his obligations for which reason the plaintiff
SO ORDERED.12 should not be made to suffer any longer. The contention of the Republic that
plaintiff never showed that she exerted effort to seek medical help for her
The RTC reasoned that: husband is stretching the obligations of the plaintiff beyond its limits. To our
mind, it is equivalent to saying that plaintiff deserves to be punished for all
With the testimony of the petitioner, the Court is convinced that defendant the inabilities of defendant to perform his concomitant duties as a husband
has been incorrigible in his vices such as habitual alcoholism, subjecting his and a father all of which inabilities in the first place are in no way
family to physical maltreatment and many times caused them to be attributable to the herein plaintiff.16
scandalized, his being indolent by not at least trying to look for a job so that
he could also help his wife in supporting his family, and also his uncalled for Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
display of his jealousy. These are clear manifestation of his psychological
incapacity to perform his marital obligation to his wife such as showing In its Petition,17 the OSG poses a sole issue for resolution:
respect, understanding and love to her. Defendant also became indifferent to
the needs of his own children who really longed for a father who is willing to WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
make the sacrifice in looking for a job so as to support them. Without any RESPONDENT IS IN THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE
communication to his family since 1985, certaining [sic] reconciliation and FAMILY CODE.18
love would be improbable. The attendant circumstances in this case really
point to the fact that defendant was unprepared to comply with his
The OSG contends that the law does not contemplate mere inability to In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be
perform the essential marital obligations as equivalent to or evidence of based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment. (Emphasis
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that such supplied)
inability must be due to causes that are psychological in nature; that no
psychiatrist or psychologist testified during the trial that a psychological Similarly, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court, 23 the rule then
disorder is the cause of Eulogio's inability to look for a job, his resulting applicable, provides:
drunkenness, unbearable jealousy and other disagreeable behavior; and that
the decision failed to state the nature, gravity or seriousness, and incurability Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
of Eulogio’s alleged psychological incapacity. separation. - If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for
legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting
In her Comment,19 Norma maintains that her testimony pointing to the facts attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists,
and circumstances of Eulogio’s immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it
jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness and indolence are more than that the evidence submitted is not fabricated. (Emphasis supplied)
enough proof of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his
essential marital obligations, which justifies the dissolution of their marriage. In Republic v. Molina,24 the Court emphasized the role of the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal, and the OSG to appear as counsel for the State in
In its Reply,20 the OSG submits that Norma’s comments are irrelevant and proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages:
not responsive to the arguments in the petition. Nonetheless, the OSG
reiterates that Norma’s evidence fell short of the requirements of the law (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
since no competent evidence was presented during the trial to prove that Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
Eulogio’s inability to look for a job, his resulting drunkenness, jealousy and handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
other disagreeable behavior are manifestations of psychological incapacity quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
under Article 36 of the Family Code. or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General,
along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge
marriage as the foundation of the family.21 Our family law is based on the the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which 1095.25 (Emphasis supplied)
the state is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of the
and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of case at the trial level. Other than the Public Prosecutor’s Manifestation 26 that
the family members.22 no collusion existed between the contending parties and the brief cross-
examination27 which had barely scratched the surface, no pleading, motion,
In this regard, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates: or position paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State
should have been given the opportunity to present controverting evidence
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of before the judgment was rendered.28 Truly, only the active participation of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is
it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of
the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the
suppressed. fabrication or suppression of evidence.29
Be that as it may, the totality of evidence presented by Norma is completely under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA
insufficient to sustain a finding that Eulogio is psychologically incapacitated. 100, 108), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court declared that psychological Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, psychologists.
and (c) incurability.31 It should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
parties to the marriage."32 The intendment of the law has been to confine illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The
the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 33 thereto.
Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
Molina34 the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
the Family Code, to wit: relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees obligation of marriage.
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of
"protected" by the state. the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity obligations essential to marriage.
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
to such an extent that the person could not have known the wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 46
x x.35 (Emphasis supplied)
All told, in order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not be
Later, the Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos36 that there is no requirement considered a mere fabrication, evidence other than Norma’s lone testimony
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a should have been adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of psychological examination is not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological psychological incapacity,47 an expert witness would have strengthened
incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s alleged psychological incapacity. Norma’s omission
presented during the trial.37 to present one is fatal to her position. There can be no conclusion of
psychological incapacity where there is absolutely no showing that the
In the present case, Norma alone testified in support of her complaint for "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
declaration of nullity of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. are incurable.48
She failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, Eulogio
was already suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him The Court commiserates with Norma’s marital predicament, but as a court,
of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant even as the highest one, it can only apply the letter and the spirit of the law;
responsibilities. In fact, Norma admitted in her testimony that her marital it cannot reinvent or modify it. Unfortunately, law and jurisprudence are
woes and Eulogio’s disagreeable behavior started only after the birth of their ranged against Norma’s stance. The Court has no choice but to apply them
firstborn and when Eulogio lost his job.38 accordingly, if it must be true to its mission under the rule of law. The
Court’s first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it
Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was not may be.
cognizant of the basic marital obligations as outlined in Articles 68 to
72,39 220,40 221,41 and 22542 of the Family Code. It was not sufficiently WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the
proved that Eulogio was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some Court of Appeals dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, affirming
incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical.lawphil.net the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City in Civil
Case No. CV-96-01061-D, dated January 20, 1997, is REVERSED and SET
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of ASIDE. The complaint of Norma Cuison-Melgar in Civil Case No. CV-96-
Eulogio’s immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, 01061-D is DISMISSED.
maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family. These
circumstances by themselves cannot be equated with psychological SO ORDERED.
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown
that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Eulogio completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the Associate Justice
marital state.43
WE CONCUR:
At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal
separation under Article 5544 of the Family Code. As the Court ruled in
Republic of the Philippines v. Molina,45 it is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person, it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some
psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a natal or
G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.*
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS

and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Marriages; Family Code; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Divorce;

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void and
voidable marriages—and in both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration
of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time
of the marriage; Divorce contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
cause arising after the marriage.—The Family Code recognizes only two
types of defective marriages—void and voidable marriages. In both cases,
the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the
marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other
hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after
the marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Through the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Executive Order No. (EO) 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653
(1989).—Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise
of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted Executive
Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
wording, as follows: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” Through the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139
(1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989). In both cases, the
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights
after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essentially, the second paragraph the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.—As the RTC correctly stated, the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Recognition of
provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the Foreign Judgments; The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip such aliens of legal
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The legislative intent is interest to petition the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the recognition of his
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, foreign divorce decree—direct involvement or being the subject of the
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered judgment.—We qualify our above conclusion—i.e., that the second
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the aliens—with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the Regional Trial Court
that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no (RTC). In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
a mode of severing the marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert,
serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. effect of foreign judgments. * * * To our mind, direct involvement or being
the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action based on the second requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less,
the foreign divorce decree—if the court finds that the decree capacitated the that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.—An action based on the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The starting point in
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws—the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our
in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.—The starting point
and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law. in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that
our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Only the Filipino spouse can Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within
invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code—the alien its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This
spouse can claim no right under this provision.—Given the rationale and means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as
intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of facts under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for
the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as by its terms.—More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice
an integral aspect of his claim or defense. of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis
Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; In the instant case for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound
where the foreigner seeking recognition of the foreign divorce decree by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the
attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph
certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the foreign of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
law on divorce, the Court deems it more appropriate to remand the case to
the trial court to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Same; Same; Civil Registry; While the law requires the entry of the divorce
foreign divorce law, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
Filipina wife’s obvious conformity with the petition.—In Gerbert’s case, since themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration—there must
both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing first be a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a res judicata effect; The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) effect.—But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the
records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity, but failed of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited National Statistics
Regional Trial Court (RTC) to determine whether the divorce decree is Office (NSO) Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice
consistent with the Canadian divorce law. We deem it more appropriate to Opinion No. 181, series of 1982—both of which required a final order from a
take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage,
served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the
oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, void and cannot produce any legal effect.
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a Same; Same; Same; Cancellation of Entries; The recognition that the
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have Regional Trial Court (RTC) may extend to a foreign divorce decree does not,
the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry—a
39 of the Rules of Court. petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
Same; Same; More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice civil registry; The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected—Rule 108 of the
for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements
that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.—Another point we wish
to draw attention to is that the recognition that the Regional Trial Court Gilbert U. Medrano for petitioner.
(RTC) may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for Michael P. Mejia for private respondent.
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding,
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the BRION, J.:
civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that “no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order.” The Rules of Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be review on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail petition).
the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.
[3]
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas,
corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other professional commitments,
who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to
and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked
general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for
the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted
Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took
Same; Same; Same; Same; The recognition of the foreign divorce decree effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.[5]
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact.—We hasten to Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in
point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage
civil registry—one for recognition of the foreign decree and another certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the
specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between
The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. [6]
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve
as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the
infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
law or fact. submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She
offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
Laoag City, Br. 11.
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in- only to the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for
RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,
remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, [8] in [14]
both support Gerberts position.
order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. [9] Article 26
of the Family Code reads: Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the foreign divorce decree.
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under THE COURTS RULING
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
The alien spouse can
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen claim no right under the
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is second paragraph of
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien Article 26 of the Family
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Code as the substantive
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to right it establishes is in
remarry under Philippine law. favor of the Filipino
spouse
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent
behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and
Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; [10] the intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
no longer married to the Filipino spouse.[11] void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
THE PETITION exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13] marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens.[18]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for
declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise
Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, [19] enacted
of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly present wording, as follows:
stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
such, shall also be valid in this country, except those significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and a mode of severing the marital bond; [25] Article 17 of the Civil Code provides
38. that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
remarry under Philippine law. Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar
Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the
to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, national law.[26]
recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond
between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that: Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can
x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be claim no right under this provisions
obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity,
and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should The foreign divorce
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to decree is presumptive
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated evidence of a right that
against in her own country if the ends of justice are clothes the party with
to be served.[22] legal interest to petition
for its recognition in this
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to jurisdiction
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of
Filipino spouse.[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. [24] Without the second recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself,
after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
Section states national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce,
purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1)
orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
render the judgment or final order is as follows: the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
(a) In case of a judgment or final order stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
upon a specific thing, the judgment or final authenticated by the seal of his office.
order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the
divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,
(b) In case of a judgment or final [30]
but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. [31] Under this
order against a person, the judgment situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
or final order is presumptive evidence supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the
of a right as between the parties and case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with
their successors in interest by a the Canadian divorce law.
subsequent title.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action,
In either case, the judgment or final order may be given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and
overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure
before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign
situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata[32] between
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. [33]
according to his or her national law.[27]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations,
the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the
judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not
of another country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
with the aliens applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on
the alien himself or herself. [29] The recognition may be made in an action
Considerations beyond (g) adoptions;

the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree (h) acknowledgment of natural children;
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that (i) naturalization; and

the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce
decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the (j) changes of name.
mere presentation of the decree. [34] We consider the recording to be
legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar
to what had been done.
xxxx
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall
register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in
that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and which they shall, respectively make the proper entries
status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or concerning the civil status of persons:
less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as
his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35] (1) Birth and death register;
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,

affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, (2) Marriage register, in which shall be
Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the entered not only the marriages solemnized but
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry: also divorces and dissolved marriages.

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
for recording the civil status of persons, in which change of name and naturalization register.
shall be entered:

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,
(a) births; the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation
(b) deaths; with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before
it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no
(c) marriages; judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the
Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority
(d) annulments of marriages; of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
(e) divorces; presented by Gerbert.
(f) legitimations; Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 [37] both serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding [41] by which the applicability
of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being mistake of law or fact.
contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision
contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court SO ORDERED.
supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be ARTURO D. BRION
judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail
the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with Associate Justice
before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the
verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located; [38] that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in
a newspaper of general circulation. [40] As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a
Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that
in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right
of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.*
MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY,

SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY,
and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; For

Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
Rules of Court.—For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1)
an official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who
has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment relating to the status of a

marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws.—A foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that “[l]aws to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal obtained a divorce decree abroad.—Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though Gee, 43 Phil. 43 (1922), Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
living abroad.” This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully
Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, proven under the rules of evidence. Divorce involves the dissolution of a
recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve
over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
and legal capacity of such citizen. trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
Same; Same; Same; Same; A petition to recognize a foreign judgment paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.—A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage Same; Same; Same; Same; Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only
void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under
cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.”—Since the recognition of a
jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence. made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven Rules of Court provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a
in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” Rule 108
i.e., “want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the
clear mistake of law or fact.”—Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of
provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which the State has an
“presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
in interest by a subsequent title.” Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court Tomas, 628 SCRA 266 (2010), this Court declared that “[t]he recognition of
states that “the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
mistake of law or fact.” Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a fact.”
foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a
Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., Civil Law; Marriages; Parties; When Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for
“want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
mistake of law or fact.” The rule on limited review embodies the policy of husband or the wife” — it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
efficiency and the protection of party expectations, as well as respecting the marriage; The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one
jurisdiction of other states. who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.—Section 2(a) of
Same; Same; Same; Same; Civil Law; Divorce; While the Philippines does not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to
have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On
divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that “[a] petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the be filed in the Regional Trial Court “where the corresponding civil registry is
wife” — it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. located.” In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
No. 02-11-10-SC. marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under
R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Parties; Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a criminal action decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous
more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither
subsisting marriage.—Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Foreign
Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an Judgments; Divorce; Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on
interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone can file a Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino
criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband the marriage.—Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine
or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the
interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage. marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides
that “[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries; A petition for celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” In Republic v. Orbecido, 472 SCRA
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage 114 (2005), this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.—To be paragraph of Article 26 which is “to avoid the absurd situation where the
sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse” under the laws of his or
necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case
the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the for divorce.
properties of the spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of Same; Same; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Divorce; Foreign
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Judgments; The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy; If the foreign
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part
cannot remarry.—The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states
marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign that the foreign judgment is already “presumptive evidence of a right
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino between the parties.” Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction
of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in the civil
country. If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of
Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the foreign spouse can remarry while the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the
the Filipino spouse cannot remarry. Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully Criminal Law; Bigamy; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; The recognition
consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for
Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.—Under the second extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered Code.—The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of
foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical the Revised Penal Code, “[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy]
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago.”
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the
nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as PETITION for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial Court of
expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Quezon City, Br. 107.
Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have
jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Lorenzo U. Padilla for petitioner.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Conflict of Law; Philippine courts will
only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an DECISION
overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party
is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want CARPIO, J.:
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake
of law or fact.—Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign The Case
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines;
and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails
the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of (a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file
the petition. xxxx
The Facts Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, petitioner. x x x
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they
lost contact with each other. The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought immediate dismissal of the petition." 8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3 file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family 10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A
void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which
the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and
the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that
to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO). 6 of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by
Philippine courts.12
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of
Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC): bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be permitted
to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x
the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would x."24
be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage." 14 Fujiki had material
interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage. The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based
on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x
Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the
the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized." 17 Section 2 of Rule 108 correction of entry] x x x."27
provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments
of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of
the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a
RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. 28 Moreover, the verification
Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not
authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence,
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same
court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on provision.
improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of
venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General
allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-
empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of
that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO,
under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a
with the provision. comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion. 31
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity 11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court
of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the
No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M.
by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this
recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of Court explained:
impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4
(Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken [t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she
had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was
bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that
parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki. 46
would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage
void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be The Issues
given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter
is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but
most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The (1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-
and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the SC) is applicable.
Constitution.34
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage
Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign bigamy.
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is (3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in
fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the
parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen. The Ruling of the Court
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the We grant the petition.
procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one
capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v.
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding. husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
"does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy." 48
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity
in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De I.
Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void
marriage may be collaterally attacked."41 For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the
directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official
publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has
custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment
country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper or final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as
diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title."
authenticated by the seal of office.50 Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed
follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court
explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have
merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action, recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation." 59 they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves
the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law,
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree
laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family abroad.65
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the
is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
State may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning
such citizen. under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24
not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was II.
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and
legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
fact according to the rules of evidence. correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a
particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish,
which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the
party or a particular fact."67 ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a]
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the
wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code,
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action
under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a
Family Court. subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property
relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void.
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
preserving the property regime of the marriage. 71 nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such
judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational registry.
rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband
III. country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental ,
this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without
the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage. 82 The RTC relied on Braza in The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that
dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara. celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26
a citizen of the foreign country. which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine
action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11- Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on
10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.
of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, 85 and the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do
the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. 86 A direct not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The
action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the
prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located." 87 In rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry. spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served."91
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a
civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle
R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the
a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11- judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the
courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of
the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under
a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy]
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial
by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02- Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the
11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the
courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET
They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of
whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a SO ORDERED. Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a concur.
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to
the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of
the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is
neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive
evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign
judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the
basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The
recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a
subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact 92 that needs
to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency
G.R. Nos. 212656-57. November 23, 2016.*
MAYOR AMADO CORPUZ, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
Presumption of Innocence; The Constitution presumes a person innocent

until proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt.—At the outset, the
Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven guilty by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the defense’s evidence for it has the onus probandi in
establishing the guilt of the accused — ei incumbit probatio qui elicit, non
que negat — he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that

quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince
and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.—The burden of such
proof rests with the prosecution, which must rely on the strength of its case
rather than on the weakness of the case for the defense. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral
certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in
judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence.
Criminal Law; In every criminal conviction, the prosecution is required to

prove two (2) things beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the
commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of the
offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the
crime.—Worthy to mention that in every criminal conviction, the prosecution
is required to prove two things beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of
the commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of
the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of
the crime.
Same; Falsification of Public Documents; The elements of Article 171 are: (1)
the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) he takes
advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei
committing any of the ways it is done.—It bears emphasis that what is incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who
punished in falsification of a public document is the violation of the public asserts, not he who denies, must prove.—By way of reiteration, it is a
faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly proclaimed in it. Generally, fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the State carries the onus
the elements of Article 171 are: (1) the offender is a public officer, probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt,
employee, or notary public; (2) he takes advantage of his official position; as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat,
and (3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of the ways it is which means that he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, and as a
done. means of respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or
woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of
Same; Same; In falsification of public document, the offender is considered proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2)
to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the
make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; accused.
or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.—In
addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public Same; That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential
officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity
falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the
have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish
make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; innocence.—That the defense the accused puts up may be weak is
or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the
onus of his identity and culpability.
Sandiganbayan; Factual findings; Exceptions to the rule that factual findings
of Sandiganbayan (SB) are conclusive to the Supreme Court (SC).—We are The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the prosecution to
not unaware that settled is the rule that factual findings of the SB are demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence.
conclusive upon this Court. However, there are exceptions to said rule, to Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof
wit: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise on his or her shoulders.
and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on
a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based Same; Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2)
on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the
of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record; and (6) said innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for
they are based. conviction.—Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Not only that, where
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
Presumption of Innocence; In order to overcome the presumption of explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
innocence, the prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence
than proof beyond reasonable doubt.—In order to overcome the does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction.
presumption of innocence, the prosecution is required to adduce against him Accordingly, the prosecution failed to establish the elements of falsification of
nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to public documents.
discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be
freed, it becomes the Court’s constitutional duty to acquit him. PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Sandiganbayan.
Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; It is a fundamental rule in criminal
procedure that the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Napoleon Uy Galit and Associates for petitioner. Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, acting in relation to his office and taking
advantage of his official position, did there and then deliberately, willfully
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. and feloniously, falsify the Certificate of Marriage of Alex Pascual and
Esperanza Arizabal by certifying therein that it was he who solemnized their
DECISION marriage when in truth and in fact, he was not the one who solemnized the
same but rather Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., Local Civil Registrar (of) Cuyapo,
PEREZ, J.: Nueva Ecija, to the damage and prejudice of the said couple and of public
interest.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) in Criminal As petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges, trial ensued with the
Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0171 and SB-12-CRM-0172 dated 27 February 2014 prosecution presenting five (5) witnesses, and the defense presenting three
and 23 May 2014, respectively, finding petitioner Mayor Amado. Corpuz, Jr. (3) witnesses, inclusive of documentary evidence admitted therein, in order
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Falsification of Public to resolve the jointly proposed issue of "who among the parties the
Document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). complainant on the one hand, [and] the married couples and the sponsors
who attest to the fact that it was the accused who solemnized the said
The Facts marriage is telling the truth?"
At the trial, the prosecution presented complainant Arsenio Flores, a retired

Petitioner, in his official capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva government employee who testified that being one of the wedding sponsors
Ecija, was indicted for two (2) counts of the abovementioned criminal of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal, he attended and witnessed the
offense. The accusatory portions of the two (2) separate Informations filed actual ceremony of their wedding which was solemnized by Thelmo Corpuz,
against him before the SB are as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Sr., the Municipal Registrar, and not petitioner, at the Municipal Registrar's
Office where it was held; that with the knowledge that said Municipal
CRIM. CASE NO. SB-12-CRM-0171 Registrar was not authorized to solemnize marriage, he did not sign as a
witness their marriage certificate, and thereafter searched for documents,
That on 28 October 2009 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in including pictures and invitation cards, in order to establish such illegal acts;
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable that based on the documents he gathered, it was made to appear that
Court, the above-named [petitioner], a public officer, being the Municipal petitioner was the one who solemnized said marriages because of his
Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, acting in relation to his office and taking signature appearing on the corresponding marriage certificates; and that he
advantage of his official position, did there and then deliberately, willfully could not explain why the subject marriage certificate was already signed by
and feloniously, falsify the Certificate of Marriage of Manny Asuncion and petitioner when in fact he was not around during the ceremony, and was
Dina Lumanlan by certifying therein that it was he who solemnized their immediately given to them on the same day.4 His testimony was
marriage when in truth and in fact, he was not the one who solemnized the corroborated by Honorato M. Tolentino, the brother-in-law of Alex Pascual,
same but rather Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., Local Civil Registrar (of) Cuyapo, who testified that he rendered his services for free as a photographer during
Nueva Ecija, to the damage and prejudice of the said couple and of public said wedding, and witnessed the actual ceremony, with the observation that
interest. it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr. who solemnized the same. 5chanrobleslaw
CRIM. CASE NO. SB-12-CRM-0172 As to the marriage ceremony of Manny Asuncion and Dina Lumanlan, Jorge
N. Lazaro, a freelance photographer and pilot, testified that the latter and
That on 18 December 2009 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in her mother engaged his services as a photographer, and even requested his
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable live-in partner, Tessie Atayde, to stand as one of the principal sponsors; that
Court, the above-named [petitioner], a public officer, being the Municipal while taking photos for the event, he naturally witnessed the actual
ceremony which was held at the Senior Citizen Building (now called Multi- testified that petitioner was indeed the one who solemnized their respective
Purpose Building); and that it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal marriage; that their respective marriage is valid and legal; that both
Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, who actually solemnized said ceremonies were held at the mayor's office; and that, as reflected in the
marriage.6chanrobleslaw pictures shown by the prosecution, they appeared before Thelmo O. Corpuz,
Sr. only to receive marriage counseling and to be taught on how to act
Lastly, the prosecution presented as rebuttal witness, Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., during the actual ceremony, before they went to the mayor's office for the
who testified that complainant Arsenio Flores filed a case for usurpation of actual solemnization by petitioner.9chanrobleslaw
official functions against him before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in
connection with the marriages of the couples, which he allegedly solemnized; From the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, including the
that he changed his plea of NOT GUILTY to that of GUILTY, in order to have stipulations between the parties, the facts, as taken and appreciated by the
a peace of mind and to reveal the truth that it was actually him who SB, are presented as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
solemnized said marriages; that it was actually him who was standing in
front of both couples as shown by the pictures presented as evidence; that At the time material to the Informations, the [petitioner] was the incumbent
after pleading guilty, he immediately filed a Petition for Probation before the Mayor of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, while Thelmo O. Corpuz,
same court; that he did not execute any affidavit of desistance to that effect; Sr. was the Municipal Civil Registrar until his retirement from the service in
and that his son Thelmo Corpuz III was already separated from the 2011.
government service, and that in the recent local elections, the latter sided
with the political rival of petitioner.7 The above narration was corroborated As set forth on the invitation for the Asuncion-Lumanlan Nuptials, the couple
and attested to by witness Felicisima D. Almonte, Clerk of Court of the MTC, was united in matrimony on October 28, 2009 at around 9:30 in the morning
with the stipulation of the parties on the authenticity and due execution of its at Cuyapo Town Hall, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. Jorge N. Lazaro attended the
15 July 2013 Decision. On cross-examination, she affirmed that as part of the occasion along with his live-in partner Tessie Atayde, who was one of the
records of the case, that there was a counter�-affidavit attached therewith principal sponsors. Lazaro was hired as photographer for the event and was
by Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., but without an affidavit of recantation against his able to capture the actual ceremony. A marriage certificate was then issued
previous counter-affidavit denying such accusations against him; and that to Spouses Asuncion, duly signed by the [petitioner] as the solemnizing
during the last local election, both Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., and his son, officer.
Thelmo Corpuz, Jr., persuaded her to vote for petitioner's
opponent.8chanrobleslaw Another wedding which took place at the Municipal Hall of Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija on December 18, 2009 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning was that
In his defense, petitioner himself testified. He insisted that he actually of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal. Among those present was Arsenio
solemnized at his office the marriage of spouses Pascual and that of spouses Flores who stood as one of the principal sponsors. The ceremony was
Asuncion; that spouses Asuncion executed a joint affidavit of cohabitation similarly witnessed by Honorato M. Tolentino, a brother-in-law of the groom
based on Article 34 of the Family Code making them exempted from securing who was also hired as photographer for the said wedding. As proof of the
a marriage license as appearing in their marriage contract; that complainant wedding, a marriage certificate bearing the signature of the [petitioner] as
Arsenio Flores was not present at the mayor's office when the wedding of solemnizing officer was thereafter issued to spouses Pascual.
spouses Pascual took place; that in the subject weddings, all signatures
appearing on the marriage certificates were actually signed in his presence; Displeased with what transpired during the wedding ceremony of Alez and
that as a mayor for eighteen ( 18) years, he knew that the power to Esperanza, Arsenio Flores came up with a complaint-affidavit, dated February
solemnize marriage cannot be delegated; and that he is aware that a case 8, 2010, setting forth the violations committed by the [petitioner] and that of
for usurpation of official function was filed against Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the former as mere signatory of the marriage
but has no knowledge about his change of plea. The above testimonies were certificates, and the latter acting as the solemnizing officer on behalf of the
further bolstered by no other than the parties themselves of said marriage mayor. Flores' declaration with respect to the Pascual-Arizabal nuptial was
ceremonies. Both Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion appeared and corroborated by the affidavit, dated March 22, 2010, of Honorato M.
Tolentino, Sr., who covered the said wedding. Flores included in his affidavit The Ruling of the Sandiganhayan
other nuptials specifically that of Manny and Dina which was held on October
28, 2009 and which was also solemnized by Thelma Corpuz, Sr. His
statement was supported by Jorge Lazaro's affidavit, dated March 22, 2010, In the assailed Decision dated 27 February 2014, the SB found petitioner
inclusive of snapshots he personally took on that day. In view of Thelma O. guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the said crimes, the dispositive portion of
Corpuz's entry of plea of guilty for two (2) counts of usurpation of official which is stated hereunder for ready reference, to
functions filed against him before the Municipal Trial Court of Cuyapo, Nueva wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Ecija, the court, in its Decision dated July 15, 2013, duly considered his plea
of guilty as a mitigating circumstance, and imposed on him the straight WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court finds
penalty of one (1) year imprisonment for each case. [petitioner] Amado R. Corpuz, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for
two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Document, defined and penalized
DISCUSSION under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code and, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
four (4) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
In his memorandum, the [petitioner] maintains his innocence as he (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count, and to pay a fine of
questions the trustworthiness and reliability of the prosecution's witnesses. P5,000.00 for each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
According to him, the presumption of authenticity of public documents, the insolvency.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
marriage certificates in these cases, should prevail over the inconsistent
testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution that it was not him who It ruled that with the prosecution's pieces of evidence taken together, all the
officiated these ceremonies. According to him also, the couples themselves elements of the crime of falsification of public documents, by making
through Alex and Manny, who are definitely in the best position to attest that untruthful statements in a narration of facts, were adequately established.
it was the [petitioner] himself who solemnized their marriage, did so in open The SB further explained that being a local chief executive and duly
court and expressed such fact in their Joint Affidavits. Further, the rebuttal authorized officer to solemnize marriage, petitioner was duty-bound to
evidence of the prosecution sans the affidavit of recantation of Thelmo O. observe his solemn affirmation on the marriage certificates. More so, by
Corpuz, Sr., did not alter his previous declaration that he did not solemnize taking advantage of his official position, petitioner certified the particulars of
the subject weddings but the herein [petitioner] who rightfully certified his an event, the subject marriages, despite full knowledge that he did not
deed in the marriage certificates. With these, the defense avers that the personally solemnize the exchange of marital vows of spouses Pascual and
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the [petitioner] beyond reasonable spouses Asuncion. In other words, what he certified was absolutely false and
doubt and, therefore, the [petitioner] should be acquitted. for such reason, petitioner's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.
By way of conclusion, the court stressed that in falsification of public or
On the other hand, in its memorandum, the prosecution asserts that from official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain
the pieces of evidence presented and the testimonies of its witnesses, it has or intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of public
proven all the elements of the offense charged based on the quantum of document, what is being punished is the violation of the public faith and the
evidence required by law. The accused clearly committed falsification of destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. 12chanrobleslaw
public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts
when, by taking advantage of his official function, he certified in the Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof and his supplemental thereto
marriage certificates of spouses Asuncion and spouses Pascual that as the were likewise denied for lack of merit in the 23 May 2014 Resolution.
Municipal Mayor, he personally solemnized their marriage when it was
Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Civil Registrar, who did so on his Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter through a petition for review
behalf. Thus, for this false declaration, the [petitioner] should be held on certiorari before this Court asserting the following errors, grounds or
criminally liable.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary arguments:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (RESPONDENT COURT FOR BREVITY) COMMITTED WHICH CORRECT PRONOUNCEMENT AND ACCURATE OBSERVATION, WAS
SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN FACT, MADE BY ONE OF THE HONORABLE JUSTICES, THE HONORABLE
IN ACCORD WITH JURISPRUDENCE WHEN WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION RODOLFO PONFERRADA, IN OPEN COURT NOT THE ACCUSED WHICH
IT ADMITTED MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, I.E., (1) OBSERVATION WE NOT ONLY SUPPORT BUT TREASURE SO MUCH.
INVITATION CARDS AND (2) PICTURES OVER THE OBJECTION OF THE
DEFENSE - 4. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF
LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE
WHEN IT AGAIN MADE ANOTHER PRONOUNCEMENT DECLARING THAT
1.1 WORSENED BY THE ALLOWANCE OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE (AS A "ACCUSED ONLY RELIED ON DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF
NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE IN ITS ADMISSION) WITHOUT REGULARITY WITHOUT PRESENTING ANY OTHER EVIDENCE NOT TO
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RUDIMENTS ON SECONDARY EVIDENCE; DOUBT HIS PERSONAL APPEARANCE ON THOSE DATES AND THAT HE
AND SIGNED THESE DOCUMENTS AFTER ACTUALLY SOLEMNIZING THE SAID
MARRIAGES."
1.2 SERIOUS MISAPPRECIATJON OF FACT UPON ITS FAlLURE AND/OR 5. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
OMISSION TO CONSIDER GLARING DISPARITIES BETWEEN AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS - WHEN IT DECLARED TIIE PRESENCE
PROSECUTION'S VERY OWN EVIDENCE, I.E., (SAID) INVITATION OF ALL THE ELEMENTS OF FALSIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 171 [OF THE]
CARDS AND ITS OWN WITNESSES' STATEMENT AS TO THE PLACE REVISED PENAL CODE, AGORAVATED BY THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE
OR VENUE OF SOLEMNIZATION WHICH ON MATTERS OF DICTUM IN ITS CITED GALEOS VS. PEOPLE.
CREDIBILITY MORE SO, BY THE SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES
IN HERE, TOUCHES ON THE VERY ISSUE OF COMPETENCY OF THE 6. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF LAW AND
WITNESS AND THE STRICT RULE ON ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS WHICH ARE MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT
AGAINST THE STATE AND'LIBERAL FOR THE ACCUSED. THIS RULE IN ACCORD WITH CASE LAW ADOPTING TWO (2) STANDARDS OF
WAS SADLY IGNORED. WE TAKE THIS TO NOTE AS NO TRIVIAL APPLICATION OF LAW OVER TWO (2) OPPOSSING DOCUMENTS, I.E., (1)
ASPECT AS THE RESPONDENT COURT PUT IT. THE TWO SETS OF MARRIAGE CERTIFICATES ON ONE HAND, AND (2) THE
ADMITTEDLY FALSIFIED THREE (3) AFFIDAVITS OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES, HONORATO TOLENTINO, JORGE LAZARO AND THELMO
CORPUZ, THEREBY GROSSLY MISAPPLIED ART. 171 [OF THE] REVISED
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW AND PENAL CODE AS CITED IN GALEOS VS. PEOPLE, WHEN IT TURNED DOWN
MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH CASE LAW WHEN IT THE TWO (2) CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGES IGNORING THE DECIDENDI IN
CONSIDERED FACTS NOT OFFERED IN EVIDENCE AND TOTALLY OUT OF THE CITED CASE - WHILE CASUALLY DOWNPLAYED THE FALSIFIED 3
THE RECORDS - HOLDING DEFENSE TWO (2) WITNESSES, THE SPOUSES WITNESSES AFFIDAVITS, ITS LEGAL AND NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES.
HUSBANDS, ALEX PASCUAL, AND MANNY ASUNCION, WERE ALLEGEDLY
INDEBTED OF GRATITUDE TO THE ACCUSED FOR BEING ALLEGEDLY 7. OVER ALL CONSIDERATIONS, THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED
EMPLOYED BY THE LATTER; HENCE, DEBUNKING CREDIBILITY OF THEIR THE MOST SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION
TESTIMONIES. OF FACTS IN CLINGING TO ITS JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION INSTEAD OF
ACQUITTAL ON THE BASIS OF THE OPPOSING EVIDENCE RESPECTIVELY
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION ON ONE HAND - AND - THE DEFENSE
LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS ON MATTERS AND SUBSTANCE SO ON THE OTHER HEREAFTER PRESENTED IN GRAPHIC
MATERIAL POINTING TO THE DEFENSE AS ALLEGEDLY THE ONE WHO SAID FORM.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
THAT THE BEST PERSONS WHO COULD ATTEST WHO THE SOLEMNIZER
WAS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE WEDDINGS WERE THE COUPLES TliEMSELVES
It is the contention of petitioner that none of the five (5) witnesses

presented by the prosecution was competent to testify on accused's actual In other words, the burden of such proof rests with the prosecution, which
solemnization of and presence during the subject marriages. Neither did any must rely on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness of the case
of the documentary evidence submitted by the prosecution establish beyond for the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
reasonable doubt that petitioner was not the one who solemnized the same. sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
Thus, in his defense, petitioner believes that he is innocent considering that conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
he was able to present the husbands of the subject marriages, who constitutional presumption of innocence.16chanrobleslaw
appeared before him during the actual solemnizations, and both testified in
his favor, supported by various documentary evidence, such as the subject Worthy to mention that in every criminal onviction, the prosecution is
marriage certificates, including the joint affidavit of cohabitation and joint required to prove two thinss beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of the
affidavit of confirmation issued by the couples, and also the counter-affidavit commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the elements of the
issued by Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the person alleged to have actually offense; and second, the fact that the accused was the perpetrator of the
conducted the said solemnization of the subject marriages; who initially crime.17chanrobleslaw
denied being the one who acted as a solemnizing officer to any marriage
ceremony. In the instant case, petitioner was charged with violation of Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the RPC, which provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Respondents, through its Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed on 28 April
2015 its Comment14 to the instant petition, and counters that the SB acted in ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or ecclesiastical
accord with law and jurisprudence on the basis of the evidence on record minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos
when it found petitioner guilty of the felonies charged; that petitioner raised shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
questions of fact contrary to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; that the equipoise advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any
doctrine is inapplicable in the case of petitioner; that petitioner was correctly of the following acts:
convicted of the crimes of falsification of public document since all the
elements to establish the same were proven beyond reasonable doubt; and chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
that the other issues and arguments raised by petitioner do not constitute
reversible error on the part of the SB. 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; x x x
The Issue It bears emphasis that what is punished in falsification of a public document
is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as solemnly
proclaimed in it.18 Generally, the elements of Article 171 are: (1) the offender
Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (2) he takes advantage of his
falsification of public documents. official position; and (3) that he falsifies a document by committing any of
the ways it is done.19chanrobleslaw
The Ruling of the Court
Specifically, paragraph 4 of the said Article requires that: (a) the offender
makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b)
At the outset, the Constitution presumes a person innocent until proven the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated
guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution cannot be allowed by him; and (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
to draw strength from the weakness ofthe defense's evidence for it has false.20chanrobleslaw
the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused - ei incumbit
probatio qui elicit, non que negat - he who asserts, not he who denies, must In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public
prove.15chanrobleslaw officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to From the above-quoted statement, petitioner categorically expresses that, in
have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to both marriages, all parties (referring to spouses Pascual and spouses
make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; Asuncion), personally appeared before him, as their solemnizing officer, in
or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he the presence of other witnesses.
falsifies.21chanrobleslaw
In ruling that petitioner was not the one who solemnized the subject
In the case at bench, and as correctly found by the SB, it is undisputed that marriages, the SB relied heavily on the testimonial evidence of the
petitioner was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva prosecution's witnesses, particularly on the common fact that they all
Ecija, duly authorized by law to solemnize marriages, at the time such witnessed an alleged ceremony conducted on said dates wherein Thelmo O.
alleged criminal offense was committed. Likewise, in issuing marriage Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, was the one who acted as the
certificates, being a public document issued by the Municipality of Cuyapo, solemnizing officer, and not petitioner. It further considered the photos and
Nueva Ecija, petitioner had the legal duty to prepare said document, and not photocopies of the invitations presented and offered as additional proofs to
only to attest to the truth of what he had given account of but more establish the aforesaid incidents which show spouses Pascual and spouses
importantly, to warrant the truth of the facts narrated by him Asuncion standing in front of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. Moreover, the testimony
thereon.22 Undoubtedly, these factual circumstances were clearly established of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., being a rebuttal evidence to the claims of Alex Y.
since petitioner himself admits the same. Accordingly; we are now left with Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion that it was petitioner who solemnized their
one final matter to determine, i.e. whether or not the facts narrated by respective marriages, was vastly recognized as acceptable and damaging to
petitioner on the subject marriage certificates were absolutely false. If petitioner's defense since the principle of res inter alios acta (the rights of a
answered in the affirmative, then petitioner is indeed guilty beyond party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or mission of another)
reasonable doubt of falsification of public documents. Otherwise, he shall be does not apply in this case.
exonerated.
We are not unaware that settled is the rule that factual findings of the SB are
Relevant thereto, the initial query to be resolved is whose evidence between conclusive upon this Court. However, there are exceptions to said rule, to
the prosecution and defense is credible in order to determine the guilt of the wit: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise
accused in a criminal action. and conjecture; (2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on
a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
For ready reference, we find the necessity of reproducing hereunder the on misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are premised on a want
actual pertinent portion declared by petitioner in his official capacity as a of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on record; and (6) said
solemnizing officer, common to the subject marriage certificates, which findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary they are based.24chanrobleslaw
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT BEFORE ME, on the date and place above A perusal of the offered and admitted evidence, testimonial and
written, personally appeared the above-mentioned parties, with their mutual documentary, reveals some misappreciation of facts of which if considered�
consent, lawfully joined together in marriage which was solemnized by me in may result in a different conclusion. In other words, there were findings
the presence of the witnesses named below, all of legal age. grounded entirely on speculation and/or premised on want of evidence that
are needed to be resolved in the case before us. Hence, we rule to reverse
xxxx the SB's ruling of conviction against petitioner.
(Signed) First, none of the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by the
HON. AMADOR. CORPUS, JR. prosecution was able to dispute the presumption of regularity of an official
MUNICIPAL MAYOR function and authenticity and due execution of the public instruments issued
CUYAPO, NUEVA ECIJA23 by petitioner as the Municipal Mayor, which may only be overcome by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. As can be gleaned from the petitioner who solemnized their marriages on said date and at said office.
narration of facts provided by the trial court, there is no showing that an
actual appearance by the concerned parties (spouses Pascual and spouses Fourth, the burden of proof in estabiishing that petitioner made an untruthful
Asuncion) before petitioner as their solemnizing officer did not occur or statement in the marriage certificate in order to be convicted of the crime of
happen. Looking into the evidence presented, the only patent conclusion that falsification of public instrument solely lies on the prosecution.
can be derived from the prosecution's evidence, as admitted by the
witnesses for the defense, is that both couples appeared before. Thelmo O. If only to stress the merit of this petition, we repeat the axioms that the Bill
Corpuz, Sr., for the sole purpose of recetvmg marriage counseling and/or of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed innocent until
marriage rehearsals, nothing more. the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the presumption of innocence,
the prosecution is required to adduce against him nothing less than proof
Second, as mentioned in the assailed Decision, the SB expressed that the beyond reasonable doubt. If the prosecution fails to discharge its heavy
testimonies of the defense's witnesses appear biased considering that they burden, then it is not only the right of the accused to be freed, it becomes
"owe their current employment with the accused as these narrations rang no the Court's constitutional duty to acquit him.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
truth and sounded to have been well-coached;" hence, they found the
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses more credible. Unfortunately, we Lastly, considering that the subject public instrument in this case refers to
find this declaration quite odd considering that there was no iota of evidence the marriage certificate, we find it apropos to point out that the validity of
to show that both Alex Y. Pascual and. Manny M. Asuncion owe debts of marriage cannot be collaterally attacked since under existing laws and
gratitude to petitioner. Indeed even it is taken as true that the defense jurisprudence, the same may be questioned only in a direct action. A direct
witnesses who are the husbands in the questioned marriages owe their action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
employment to the accused such fact can rightfully be construed as itself the procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-
reason why these witnesses would truly want their respective�marriages 10-SC and other related laws. In declaring that the one who solemnized the
officiated by the accused. As a matter of fact, it was the prosecution's subject marriages had no authority to do so would indirectly result in the
witnesses who have manifested some tainted credibility in their testimonies declaration that said marriages are void. This is what our jurisdiction intends
when it was declared, among others, that: (a) all the judicial affidavits were to prevent.26chanrobleslaw
prepared by the complainant Arsenio A. Flores and were given to them for
their signatures; (b) Thelma Corpuz III, the son of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., By way of reiteration, it is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the
was separated from the government service, and that in the recent local State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused
election, he sided with petitioner's political rival; and (c) Thelmo O. Corpuz, beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei incumbit
Sr. and his son, Thelmo Corpuz, Jr., persuaded Felicisima D. Almonte to vote probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who asserts, not he
for the petitioner's opponent during the local election. Clearly therefore, if who denies, must prove,27 and as a means of respecting the presumption of
there were any doubts as to the credibility of the witnesses in this case, it is innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime.
those of the prosecution who should be considered guilty of potential political Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof to show: (1) the correct
motivations. identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the actuality of the
commission of the offense with the participation of the accused. All these
Third, as to the testimony of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., we do not find the same facts must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength
damaging on the part of petitioner considering that his admission of of its evidence and without solace from the weakness of the defense. That
conducting his own ceremony in the capacity of a solemnizing officer simply the defense the accused puts up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the
confirms his criminal liability in the case of usurpation of authority as his first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity and
conviction was already pronounced by the MTC. Such testimony does not culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the�
necessarily result in the falsity of petitioner's declaration that he nonetheless prosecution to demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish
conducted his own solemnization of the subject marriages. The fact remains innocence.28 Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries no
that, as testified to by Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion, it was burden of proof on his or her shoulders.
Furthermore, it has been consistently ruled that "[c]ourts must judge the
guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013.*
conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions."29 It is iniquitous to base
petitioner's guilt on the presumptions of the prosecution's witnesses for the SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS,
Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts and respondent.
circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which
being consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other or others Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Formal Requisites of Marriage.―As the
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law.
thus insufficient to support a conviction.30chanrobleslaw The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles
3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of
In sum, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution in this case marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage
failed to pass the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant petitioner's license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A
conviction. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. 31Not only that, where marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting
the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they
explanations or interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two
of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence witnesses of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal
does not meet or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
conviction.32 Accordingly, the prosecution failed to establish the elements of 35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
falsification of public documents. With the prosecution having failed to voidable as provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites
discharge its burden of establishing petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
doubt, this Court is constrained, as is its bounden duty when reasonable responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively
doubt persists, to acquit him. liable. Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x (3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the preceding Chapter.
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0171 and SB-12-CRM-0172
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Amado Corpuz, Jr. is Remedial Law; Evidence; Disputable Presumptions; Presumption of
hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond Regularity; Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
reasonable doubt. presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary; The presumption of
SO ORDERED.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.―Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur. Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been
Peralta, J., on wellness leave. regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary.
We held, “The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the
presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having
been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and
submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not
correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office. Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision 2 in
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Marriage License; Evidence; The Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24,
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.―In 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it was held that
the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas
The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM,
the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage
alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No.
required marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for
that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.
marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of the In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s the resolution of this case.
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a
Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992
that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. 4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of
except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at
Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.―All the evidence cited by the CA to his mother-in-law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila,
show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told
signed does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for
Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said ceremony.
essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he
as stated in Article 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later.
a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003,
2, Title I of the same Code. he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on
their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. 5 The
of Appeals. Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a certification on
July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the
number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and
DECISION Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
VELASCO, JR., J.: 11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the solemnization of the
office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev.
GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with
that office.17
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR
ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993. Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding
of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo. 18 He
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for
purpose or intents it may serve.7 the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to
him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases the marriage license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on
against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and
a marriage license on advice of his counsel.8 the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held
of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of
brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9 that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to
their house with the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license
and that the numbers are issued chronologically. 10 He testified that the before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra license was obtained from Carmona. 25 She also testified that a bigamy case
Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending
person.11 before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 26
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated
Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola. that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed
Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony
Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the
marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the
on January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother
Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked
been solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said
that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days 2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
returned with an application for marriage license for them to sign, which she petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired
and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the during their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of
license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. the parties.
Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28 3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed
1993.29 Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in
Manila.
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had
married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the SO ORDERED.34
previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30 Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the
RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 the Court of Appeals.
in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated
under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was The Ruling of the CA
Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese.31
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
The Ruling of the RTC
I
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID
been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that
neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage II
License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE
void ab initio. WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE
THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows: THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and
against the respondent declaring as follows: III
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar

Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF II

ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was MARRIAGE.42
conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and The Ruling of this Court
documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and
that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37 The petition is meritorious.
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993,
marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the
themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular
after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy. 38 case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Chapter 2 of this Title; and
Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains valid and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of
subsisting. No costs. the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
SO ORDERED.39 in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render
same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41 the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
Hence, this petition. A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable
as provided in Article 45.
Grounds in Support of Petition
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
I marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO
THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE. xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar
preceding Chapter. enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative
to the issuance of a marriage license.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family
Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license
officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect
that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the
Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo
hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License
couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and
held that there was a valid marriage license. indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance. In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification,
stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy
thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search"
witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such in the certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage
license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted
of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that and thus the certification could not be given probative value.
he requested certification that no such license was issued. In the case of
Republic v. Court of Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads: Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking,
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically
of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a
evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry. categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court to apply.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of
Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held: Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption
despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was
As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court.
relevant data.44 The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria
and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary,
thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was that appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally
resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their
the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in the
license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and
license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one other members of appellant’s family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as
of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing
The task of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who the Marriage Contract.
could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the testimony of xxxx
her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of
the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value. The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic]
one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family
Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted
been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January
inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage
valid marriage license issued for her and Syed. with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to
reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and
that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no perfidy.50
record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license. The case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the
of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear
and that the required marriage license had been secured. 49 Gloria has failed when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be reached is that render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article
no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a
simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license
the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is
failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage license. void ab initio.1âwphi1
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may
that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA: well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy
suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight G.R. No. 182438. July 2, 2014.*
of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license
cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the RENE RONULO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, respondent.
is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
Criminal Law; Performing Illegal Marriage Ceremony; Article 352 of the
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing
assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony.—Article
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer
SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements
dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2)
of petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence,
No costs. the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged “blessing” by the
petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an “illegal marriage
SO ORDERED. ceremony” which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Same; Same; While Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
Associate Justice amended, does not specifically define a “marriage ceremony” and what
constitutes its “illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code
are clear on these matters.—While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does
not specifically define a “marriage ceremony” and what constitutes its
“illegal” performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on
these matters. These provisions were taken from Article 55 of the New Civil
Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law with no
substantial amendments. Article 6 of the Family Code provides that “[n]o
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is
required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to
appear personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence
of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; A judge may

examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory
questions to test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth.—The
petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions
to Florida fails to persuade us. A judge may examine or cross-examine a
witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the
witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and
material testimony though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the
position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if
the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths that Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by petitioner Fr.
tend to destroy the theory of one party. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; No prescribed form or religious rite for the The Factual Antecedents
solemnization of marriage is required.—We also do not agree with the
petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen
State from qualifying the church “blessing” into a marriage ceremony. were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been duly preserved Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of
by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or the wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to
religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required. This solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a
pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong
conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
the core requirements of law be observed. sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino
Christians, also known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the
Constitutional Law; Marriages; Article 15 of the Constitution recognizes petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter
marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no
on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in marriage certificate.
which the State is vitally interested.—We emphasize at this point that Article
15 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the
and that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of
State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies their invited guests.4
and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its
power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC, as An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the as amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court
disintegration and mockery of marriage. (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage
ceremony.5
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. arraignment.
Reynaldo A. Corpuz for petitioner. The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the
incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride
walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings,
DECISION kiss each other, and sign a document.6She heard the petitioner instructing
the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to
BRION, J.: the reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She
also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although
declare during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage,
wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage
of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was ceremony has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear
given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the couple. 9 personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that
they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that witnesses of legal age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved
his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is
marriage as contemplated by law.10 not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15
The MTC Judgment The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code. 16
amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act
No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the
marriage ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations
cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.
performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the
petitioner violated Article 352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided The Petition
under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the
Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First,
that is not specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what
shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage
imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil
court. Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the verbal
declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty marriage certificate containing the declaration in writing which is duly signed
for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer. 17 The
penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12 petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband
The RTC Ruling and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the
State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the "blessing" into a
surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably "marriage ceremony."19
show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the
positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in
than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple. 20
basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage
Law. Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article
350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the present case
The CA Decision against him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the
The present case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as
petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated husband and wife.
thereafter.22
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared
THE COURT’S RULING: before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second
requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the
We find the petition unmeritorious. prosecution has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the
contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as and wife.
amended, were proven by the prosecution
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-
officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the
elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out
and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to support
case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken
Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal
petitioner is tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party. 28
ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking
"marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles any irregularity.
3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions
were taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the
from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support
Article 625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple
rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, that they take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey
however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and that the prosecution witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to
wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and testify against the petitioner.
particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing"
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this
principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of
amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the
solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the freedom or latitude in conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to
CA, the law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of
marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section
on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
which the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister
of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the Director of the
such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to
of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage. exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so by the parties or
parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations
was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were and practices whereof require banns or publications previous to the
complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized
presence of the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony the immediate solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared
qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in violation of
Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor
more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
this marriage ceremony was illegal.
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of
marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act
the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the
license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their relationship. proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred
pesos or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law
were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is that
good faith. covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the
certificate negates his criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not
determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC,
certificate is not included in the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the as amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this
Family Code, as discussed above. provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352
falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate provides for the penalty for any violation of the regulations to be
criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
not make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper which was enacted after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00
amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of G.R. No. 167746. August 28, 2007.*
Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA, petitioner, vs. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA
SO ORDERED. and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
ARTURO D. BRION Civil Law; Marriages; Marriage License; A valid marriage license is a requisite
Associate Justice of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58
of the same Code.—The marriage involved herein having been solemnized
on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the
applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in
effect at the time of its celebration. A valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article 58 of
the same Code.
Same; Same; Same; To be considered void on the ground of ab-sence of a

marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract or at the very least, supported by
a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties.—From these cases, it can be deduced that to be
considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law
requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the
local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In
this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent
reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also
issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification
moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the
marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario,
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
herein.
Same; Same; Same; Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of

Carmona, Cavite enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular
conduct of official business.—This certification enjoys the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage
license was done in the regular conduct of official business.The presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails
until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the Same; Same; Presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.
contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. —Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of
Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward
and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful, the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, presumption is of great weight.
issued in Carmona, Cavite.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality,
not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion
of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that Leonardo C. Aguilar, Jr. for petitioner.
do not affect the validity of the marriage; An irregularity in any of the formal Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.
requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively DECISION
liable.— Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the
marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident of CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to
annul petitioner and respondent’s marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in
a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by
and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners
irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in appeal and affirming the decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February
party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
administratively liable.
The antecedent facts are:
Same; Same; The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have
performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any A petition for annulment of marriage [3] was filed by petitioner against
showing to the contrary.—The issue raised by petitioner—that they appeared respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and
before a “fixer” who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to
ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could
the CDCC BR Chapel—will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged
officer or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. Moreover, the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. [4] They got married on the same day, 8
solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage
marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties
been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to
apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned
October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.[13]
1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after
due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for
the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract [5] and its resolution:
entry on file.[6]
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment
the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence
issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry on record that there was no marriage license at the
of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation, respondent gave precise moment of the solemnization of the
birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and marriage.
to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.
[7]
Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. [8]Petitioner only b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible
filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage. error when it gave weight to the Marriage License
[9]
Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner No. 7054133 despite the fact that the same was not
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60. identified and offered as evidence during the trial,
[10]
Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied and was not the Marriage license number appearing
for lack of merit. on the face of the marriage contract.

On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible
Decision disposing as follows: error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by
this Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows: Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA
550]).
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty error when it failed to relax the observance of
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for their procedural rules to protect and promote the
two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]

3. To pay the costs.[11] We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and
petitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in a respondent just went to the ManilaCity Hall and dealt with a fixer who
resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12] arranged everything for them.[15] The wedding took place at the stairs
in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev.Aquilino Navarro
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is who solemnized the marriage belongs. [16] He and respondent did not go
presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage
evidence to overcome the presumption.Moreover, the parties marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the Court held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or
certification states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar
favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their marriage of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number. to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is absence of a
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine
its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner
celebration. Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The
records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil
Code, the absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such
Article 80(3)[18] in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.[19] marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil
registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
Article 53 of the Civil Code [20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license
marriage of the parties states: and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these void ab initio.
requisites are complied with:
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15
November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the
(2) Their consent, freely given; marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional rendered the marriage void.
character.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage
maintenance of which the general public is interested. [21] contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the
of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification moreover is
clear-cut. precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage
license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals ,[22] the Local Civil Registrar validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
issued a certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry to
the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such
of Carmona, Cavite, reads: that the marriage license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It
therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,
in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss [32]
petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to the
Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982. marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite
marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. because he initiated it.[33] Petitioner is an educated person.He is a mechanical
Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City
may serve.[26] Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage
ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to extricate
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no
performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the regular longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance
conduct of official business.[27] The presumption of regularity of official acts such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform betrays his bad faith.[34]
a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less
than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There is no
intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under
as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a
of its lawfulness.[28]Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, whimper on the part of the petitioner.
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed during
license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed
of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis in petitioners testimony as follows
to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license
in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting WITNESS
parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication
or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the
mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. [30] An necessary document prior to the wedding.
irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its
validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, COURT
criminally and administratively liable.[31]
What particular document did the church asked you to
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license produce? I am referring to the San Jose
number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that de Manuguit church.
the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage
contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number WITNESS
7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to
assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of I dont remember your honor.
-- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman

COURT shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the
absence of any showing to the contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing officer
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been
License? duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing
officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
WITNESS official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said
official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have fulfilled the requirements of law.[38]
already a Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is
good enough for the marriage and they accepted it Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of
your honor. the validity of the marriage. [39] Every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
COURT presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary,
the presumption is of great weight.
In other words, you represented to the San Jose
de Manuguit church that you have with you already WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack
a Marriage Contract? of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September
2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143
WITNESS of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
Yes your honor.
SO ORDERED.
COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
same marriage License in the Marriage Contract
issued which Marriage License is Number 7054033. Associate Justice

WITNESS

Yes your honor.[35]

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing
participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church
ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing
whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.[36]

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer
who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony before a
certain Rev. AquilinoNavarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel
G.R. No. 214064. February 6, 2017.*
MIRASOL CASTILLO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

and FELIPE IMPAS, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological

Incapacity; Psychological incapacity has been intended by law to be confined
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.—Time and again, it was held that “psychological incapacity” has
been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means
of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The existence or absence of the

psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts of each case and
not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.—The existence
or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based strictly on the facts
of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694 (2009): By the
very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties in order to
determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of
the psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable,
are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriage. At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but not
indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical or psychological examination of
the person concerned need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the
other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely essential obligations of marriage.—Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity
on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings. The presentation of any by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36,
form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or unwillingness to
incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would have automatically assume the essential obligations of marriage. In order for sexual infidelity to
ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must
bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely
always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by preventing the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor
proceedings. that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be
faithful to his spouse. It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link,
Remedial Law; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; The probative force medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity
of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory and the psychological disorder itself.
or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in
showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons Remedial Law; Evidence; Testimonial Evidence; Aside from the psychologist,
upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.—The presentation of petitioner did not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on
expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on Felipe’s infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their
psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment relatives saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value.—Basic is the rule that bare
grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. The allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e.,
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere mere allegations are not evidence. Based on the records, this Court finds
statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can that there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude that Felipe’s
render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated with psychological
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded. incapacity as contemplated by law. We reiterate that there was no other
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present
antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe’s personality disorder, it was, other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe’s infidelity
however, admitted that she evaluated respondent’s psychological condition notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their relatives saw him with
indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and her witness. other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving and had
Felipe’s dysfunctional family portrait which brought about his personality no serious evidentiary value.
disorder as painted in the evaluation was based solely on the assumed
truthful knowledge of petitioner. There was no independent witness DECISION
knowledgeable of respondent’s upbringing interviewed by the psychologist or
presented before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple’s common PERALTA, J.:
friend, agreed with petitioner’s claims in the interview with the psychologist,
confirmed the information given by petitioner, and alleged that she knew
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Mirasol
Felipe as “chick boy” or “playboy.” She did not testify before the court a quo.
Castillo (Mirasol) challenging the Decision1and Resolution,2 dated March 10,
2014 and August 28, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological ruled against the dissolution and nullity of her marriage under Article 36 of
Incapacity; Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, the Family Code.
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same
The facts of the case follow: respondent's flawed personality pattern can be in childhood milieu.
Respondent's familial constellation, unreliable parenting style from significant
As their parents were good friends and business partners, Mirasol and Felipe figures around him, and unfavorable childhood experiences have greatly
started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their affected his perceptions of himself and his environment in general. The
courtship, Mirasol discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former respondent did not grow up mature enough to cope with his obligations and
girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation. responsibilities as married man and father.
With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got married in
Bani, Pangasinan on April 22, 1984 and were blessed with two (2) children It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the normative and
born in 1992 and in 2001.3 ordinary duties of marriage and family, shouldered by any married man,
existing in ordinary circumstances. He just cannot perform his duties and
On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint4 for declaration of nullity of obligations as a husband, as he entered into marriage for his own self-
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmariñas, Cavite, satisfaction and gratification, manipulate and denigrate the petitioner for his
Branch 90. own pleasures and satisfaction. In the process, respondent was unable to
assume his marital duties and responsibilities to his wife. He failed to render
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was harmonious prompting mutual help and support (Article 68, FC).
her to believe that the same was made in heaven. However, after thirteen
(13) years of marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Their relatives and Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has no psychological
friends saw him with different women. One time, she has just arrived from a insight that he has a character problem. He would not acknowledge the pain
trip and returned home to surprise her family. But to her consternation, she he caused to people around him. People suffering from this personality
caught him in a compromising act with another woman. He did not bother to disorder are unmotivated to treatment and impervious to recovery. There are
explain or apologize. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the conjugal no medications and laboratory examinations to be taken for maladaptive
dwelling and stopped any communication with him.5Felipe's irresponsible acts behavior such as the NPD (Narcissistic Personality Disorder).
like cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with her, and not
supporting their children for a period of not less than ten (10) years without Otherwise stated, his personality disorder is chronic and pervasive affecting
any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.6 many aspects of his life, such as social functioning and close
relationships.1âwphi1 Apparently, he has failed to develop appropriate
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical psychologist Sheila Marie adjustment methods. He lacks the intrapersonal and interpersonal integration
Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in her Psychological Evaluation that caused him the failure to understand the very nature of that sharing of
Report,7 concluded that Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the life that is directed toward the solidarity and formation of family.
essential marital obligations. A portion of the report reads:
x x x x8
x x xx
In a Decision9 dated January 20, 2012, the RTC in Civil Case No. 4853-11
The personality disorder speaks of antecedence as it has an early onset, with declared the marriage between Mirasol and Felipe null and void. The
an enduring pattern and behavior that deviates markedly from the dispositive portion of the decision states:
expectations of the individual's culture. His poor parental and family molding
(particularly lack of parental parenting) caused him to have a defective WHEREFORE, premises considered, Court hereby declares the marriage
superego and he proved to be selfish, immature and negligent person and contract by the petitioner MIRASOL CASTILLO to the respondent FELIPE
followed a pattern of gross irresponsibility and gross disregard of the feelings IMPAS on April 22, 1984 in Bani, Pangasinan to be NULL AND VOID AB
of his partner/wife disregarding the marriage contract and the commitment INITIO.
he agreed on during the wedding. In other words, the root cause of
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, the spousal obligations. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that
Clerk of Court is directed to enter this judgment upon its finality in the Book petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that
of Entry of Judgment and to issue the corresponding Entry of Judgment. the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality
Thereupon, the Office of the Civil Registrars in Bani, Pangasinan and Imus, which make him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
Cavite, are also mandated to cause the registration of the said ENTRY OF marriage. Since that situation does not obtain in the case, Mirasol's claim of
JUDGMENT in their respective Book of Marriages. psychological incapacity must fail. Psychological incapacity must be more
than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the counsel of the petitioner, the marital obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party was
respondent, the Solicitor General, 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness existing at the time
R. Jarlos and the Civil Registrar General with copies hereof. of the celebration of the marriage.
Upon compliance, the Court shall forthwith issue the DECREE OF NULLITY In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the psychological
OF MARRIAGE. incapacity of Felipe, We cannot but rule in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
SO ORDERED.10
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 20, 2012
On February 22, 2012, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC
denied in an Order11 dated April 3, 2012. SO ORDERED.13
On appeal, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed and set aside the Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol elevated the case
decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to present sufficient evidence before this Court raising the issue, thus:
to prove that Felipe was suffering from psychological incapacity, thus,
incapable of performing marital obligations due to some psychological illness [Petitioner] was able to establish that respondent is suffering from grave
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. 12 A pertinent portion psychological condition that rendered him incognitive of his marital
of the decision reads: covenants under Article 36 of the Family Code.
x x xx Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the totality
of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of
Based on the records, it appears more likely that Felipe became unfaithful as nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter's
a result of unknown factors that happened during the marriage and not psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
because of his family background. His tendency to womanize was not shown
to be due to causes of a psychological nature that are grave, permanent and This Court rules in the negative.
incurable. In fact, it was only after thirteen (13) years of marriage that he
started to engage in extra-marital affairs. In the complaint filed by Mirasol, Mirasol alleges that she has sufficiently established that Felipe is
she said that after they got married, their relationship as husband and wife psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
went smoothly and that she was of the belief that she had a marriage made marriage. The conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of the
in heaven. witnesses are entitled to great respect because of its opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses. Since the court a quo accepted the veracity
In short, Felipe's marital infidelity does not appear to be symptomatic of a of the petitioner's premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of
grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his Felipe's psychological incapacity drawn from the expert witness. She claims
that Montefalcon was correct in interviewing her for it was submitted that it (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
was only her who knew best whether her husband was complying with his celebration" of the marriage. x x x
marital obligations. Moreover, the OSG admits that personal examination of
the respondent by the clinical psychologist is not an indispensable requisite (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
for a finding of psychological incapacity. permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative
only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against
On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to establish from the everyone of the same sex. x x x
totality of evidence the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of
Felipe's alleged Narcissistic Personality Disorder. The conclusions of the (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
clinical psychologist that he was psychologically incapacitated and that such party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. x x x In other words,
incapacity was present at the inception of the marriage were not supported there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
by evidence. At most, the psychologist merely proved his refusal to perform integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
his marital obligations.14 Moreover, she has no personal knowledge of the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
facts from which she based her findings and was working on pure essential to marriage.
assumptions and secondhand information related to her by one side. 15
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity" has been up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give children. x x x
meaning and significance to the marriage.16 Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history should be given great respect by our courts. x x x
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x
of the party involved.17
xxx19
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,18 this Court laid down
the more definitive guidelines in the disposition of psychological incapacity
cases, viz.: The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity shall be based
strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations.20
x x xx
As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. x x x By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical
and understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by
psychologists regarding the psychological temperament of parties
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. x x x
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting Answer: From the interviews I had with the petitioner and also from my
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat interview of the couple's common friend who validated all information given
such opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in to me by the petitioner.
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, Question: You mean to say you were not able to interview the respondent?
then actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case Answer: No sir. But I sent him an invitation to undergo the same
presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the psychological evaluation I administered with the petitioner but he did not
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of respond to my invitation.
evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.22
Question: [W]hat relevant information were you able to gather from your
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show interview of the friend of the couple?
the psychological incapacity, however, did not mean that the same would
have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for declaration of
Answer: She validated every piece of information relayed to me by the
nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other
petitioner during the interview.
cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert
opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in
the course of their proceedings.23 x x xx
Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal of the records, Question: Madam witness, were you able to determine at what point in time
this Court rules that the totality of the evidence presented failed to establish in the life of the respondent did he acquire this disorder that you mentioned?
Felipe's psychological incapacity.
Answer: The disorder of the respondent already existed even at the time of
Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that respondent is encumbered with celebration of their marriage, although the incapacity became manifest only
a personality disorder classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder deeply after their marriage. His disorder seemed to have started during the
ingrained in his personality structure that rendered him incapacitated to early years of his life.
perform his marital duties and obligations. In her direct testimony, she
stated: Question: In your expert opinion, what would be the likely source of the
disorder of the respondent?
ATTY. BAYAUA:
Answer: The disorder of the respondent seemed to have developed
Question: Were you able to interview and conduct examination on the during the early years of his life due to his poor parental and family
respondent? [molding] particularly lack of parental guidance. [His] parents
separated when he was still young and when [his] mother had another affair
and lived with her common-law husband. Respondent's familial constellation
Answer: No, sir.
and [unfavorable] childhood experiences have greatly affected his
perceptions of himself and his environment. Respondent did not grow up
Question: [W]here did you base your conclusion that supported your findings mature enough to cope with his obligations and responsibilities as a married
that the husband of Mirasol is psychologically incapacitated to comply with man and father.
the essential obligations of marriage?
x x x24
The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological evidence.28 We cannot take the conclusion that Felipe harbors a personality
evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal of the RTC's decision would reveal that disorder existing prior to his marriage which purportedly incapacitated him
there was no assessment of the veracity of such allegations, the credibility of with the essential marital obligations as credible proof of juridical
the witnesses, and the weight of the pieces of evidence presented. Also, antecedence. The manner by which such conclusion was reached leaves
there were no factual findings which can serve as bases for its conclusion of much to be desired in terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in
Felipe's psychological incapacity. determining psychological incapacity. The lack of corroborative witness and
evidence regarding Felipe's upbringing and family history renders
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of Montefalcon's opinion on the root cause of his psychological incapacity
marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an conjectural or speculative.
in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at issue are considered
psychological incapacity.25 The probative force of the testimony of an since the judge had found them to be credible enough, this Court cannot
expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather lower the evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on Felipe's pre-
in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the marital history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this case
facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon because we only have petitioner's words to rely on. To make conclusions and
which the logic of her conclusion is founded.26 generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, it was, truthfulness of the content of such evidence.29
however, admitted that she evaluated respondent's psychological condition
indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and her witness. Anent Felipe's sexual infidelity, Mirasol alleged in her judicial affidavit, to wit:
Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which brought about his personality
disorder as painted in the evaluation was based solely on the assumed x x xx
truthful knowledge of petitioner. There was no independent witness
knowledgeable of respondent's upbringing interviewed by the psychologist or Question: You said Madam Witness that after several months you and
presented before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's common respondent became sweethearts, what happened next Madam Witness?
friend, agreed with petitioner's claims in the interview with the psychologist,
confirmed the information given by petitioner, and alleged that she knew
Answer: Sir, while we were already sweethearts, I got dismayed when
Felipe as "chick boy" or ''playboy."27 She did not testify before the court a
respondent was also maintaining another woman who was his former
quo.
girlfriend.
As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to establish Felipe's

Question: What was the reaction of the respondent when you told him about
psychological condition and its associations in his early life. Montefalcon's
his relation with his former girlfriend?
testimony and psychological evaluation report do not provide evidentiary
support to cure the doubtful veracity of Mirasol's one-sided assertion. The
said report falls short of the required proof for the Court to rely on the same Answer: Respondent was shocked and became moody Sir. This turned our
as basis to declare petitioner's marriage to respondent as void. relationship sour and it led to being stormy.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to declare him Question: You said Madam Witness that you and respondent's relationship
psychologically incapacitated is not required, the root cause thereof must still became sour and stormy, what happened next, if any?
be "medically or clinically identified," and adequately established by
Answer: Sir, my relationship with respondent should have been ended had it of marriage.33 In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological
not been with the timely intervention of our parents. Respondent and I incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness must be established as a
reconciled. manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing
the respondent from discharging the essential obligations of the
x x xx marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation
Question: Madam Witness as you said you finally got married with the to be faithful to his spouse.34 It is indispensable that the evidence must show
respondent as evidenced in fact by a Marriage Certificate. What happened a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
next after the marriage? incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.35
Answer: After our wedding, our relationship as husband and wife went on As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did not emanate
smoothly. I was of the belief that my marriage was made in heaven and that from a personal interview with the subject himself. Apart from the
respondent had already reformed his ways and had completely deviated from psychologist's opinion and petitioner's allegations, no other reliable evidence
his relationship with his ex-girlfriend; was cited to prove that Felipe's sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his
alleged personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable.
We are not persuaded that the natal or supervening disabling factor which
x x x30
effectively incapacitated him from complying with his obligation to be faithful
to his wife was medically or clinically established.
Question: After giving birth to your first child did respondent change or
become responsible considering that he is already a father?
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.36 Based on the
Answer: No, Sir. I thought that having our first child would already change records, this Court finds that there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
the ways of respondent. The birth of our first child did not actually help conclude that Felipe's sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be equated
improve respondent's ways because respondent is really a man who is not with psychological incapacity as contemplated by law. We reiterate that there
contented with one woman even before we got married; was no other evidence adduced. Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did
not present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's
xxx31 infidelity notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their relatives saw
him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is considered self-serving
Question: After you gave birth to you[r] second child what happened next and had no serious evidentiary value.
Madam Witness?
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the CA
Answer: Sir, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, respondent is back to his against the dissolution and nullity of the parties' marriage due to
old habit where he has been seen having relationship with a different insufficiency of the evidence presented. The policy of the State is to protect
woman. This was also seen by our relatives and friends of respondent. and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the
foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
x xx32 validity of the marriage.37
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari filed by herein
immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a petitioner Mirasol Castillo. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the assailed Decision
finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be and Resolution, dated March 10, 2014 and August 28, 2014, respectively, of
due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
G.R. No. 218630. January 11, 2018.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. KATRINA S.

TOBORA-TIONGLICO,** respondent.

Incapacity; Time and again, it has been held that “psychological incapacity”
has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage.—Time and again, it has
been held that “psychological incapacity” has been intended by law to be
confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage,
(b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage, and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The case of Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), has set out the guidelines that has
been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of nullity of marriage
on the basis of psychological incapacity cases.—The case of Republic of the
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), has set out the
guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of
nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We
have decided: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. x x x (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently
proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. x x x (3) The
incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of
the marriage. x x x (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. x x x (5) Such illness must
be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
essential obligations of marriage. x x x (6) The essential marital obligations
must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x (7) Interpretations The Solicitor General for petitioner.
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
Francis A. Africa for respondent
respect by our courts. x x x (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.
No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a DECISION
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his TIJAM, J.:
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 dated May 27, 2015
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the
immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological May 8, 2012 Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus
illness.—Their frequent fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
night-outs can hardly be said to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our on the ground of Article 36 of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of
view, do not rise to the level of the “psychological incapacity” that the law Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio.
requires, and should be distinguished from the “difficulty,” if not outright
“refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations that Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a petition for
characterize some marriages. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed declaration of nullity of her marriage with Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence)
to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological Code.
illness. The psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of
the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a group of mutual
party of his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the friends. After a brief courtship, they entered into a relationship. When she
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume. got pregnant, the two panicked as both their parents were very strict and
conservative. Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was worried how
Remedial Law; Evidence; Allegations; Basic is the rule that bare allegations, it would affect his image and how his parents would take the
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere situation.3 Nevertheless, they got married on July 22, 2000.4
allegations are not evidence.—Although We commiserate with Katrina’s
predicament, We are hard-pressed to affirm the RTC and CA when the Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred by bickering and
totality of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they were fighting so much that they
conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina’s marriage is void ab initio. No other went their separate ways most of the time and Katrina found herself
evidence or witnesses were presented by Katrina to prove Lawrence’s alleged wandering the streets of Hong Kong alone.5
psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare allegations,
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's parents until the
allegations are not evidence. Here, we reiterate that apart from the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30,
psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate her 2000.6 Lawrence was distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying he
allegations on Lawrence’s psychological incapacity. Her testimony, therefore, knew nothing about children and how to run a family.7 Lawrence spent
is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value. almost every night out for late dinners, parties and drinking sprees. 8 Katrina
noticed that Lawrence was alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered visitation rights accorded to respondent, preferably Saturday and Sunday, or
from a very high degree of immaturity.9 Lawrence would repeatedly taunt as the parties may agree among themselves.
Katrina to fight with him and they lost all intimacy between them as he
Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-General, the
insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom every night to see to the
National Statistics Office and the Local Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in
needs of Lanz.10
turn, shall endorse a copy of the same to the Local Civil Registrar of
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of Katrina's Mandaluyong City, ·Metro Manila, so that the appropriate amendment and/or
decisions-from the manner by which she took care of Lanz, to the way she cancellation of the parties' marriage can be effected in its registry. Furnish,
treated the household help. Most fights ended up in full blown arguments, likewise, the parties and counsel.
often in front of Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and missed her
SO ORDERED.16
youngest brother who was then committed in a substance rehabilitation
center, Lawrence told her to stop crying or sleep in the rehabilitation center The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
if she will not stop.11
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked Katrina to leave his Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, in Civil Case No. 4903-
parents' home and never to come back. They have been separated in fact 11dated8 May 2012 is hereby AFFIRMED.17
since then.12
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr. Arellano), who
confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a
based on the narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the
Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened sense of self- information coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of
importance and grandiose feelings that he is unique in some way. 13 marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case,
the psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is permanent, psychologically incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.
incurable, and deeply integrated within his psyche;14 and that it was present
but repressed at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the onset The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that there has been a
was in early adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors myriad of cases declaring that psychological assessment based solely on the
interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity, respect, mutual information coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity of
help, and support to his wife.15 marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident that in this case,
the psychiatrist obtained his data, in concluding that Lawrence is
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of Katrina and psychologically incapacitated, exclusively from Katrina.
Lawrence as void ab initio. It disposed, thus:
Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding circumstances of each
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Katrina and every case for the nullity is different from the other and must be
S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a appreciated for its distinctiveness. She points out that the psychological
necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using report of Dr. Arellano clearly outlined well-accepted scientific and reliable
the surname of her husband having lost the right over the same and so as to tests18 to come up with his findings. In any case, the decision must be based
avoid the misconception that she is still the legal wifo of respondent. Custody not solely on the expert opinions but on the totality of evidence adduced in
over the couple's· minor child is awarded to petitioner, with reasonable the course of the proceedings, which the RTC and the CA have found to have
been sufficient in proving Lawrence's psychological incapacity.
The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of evidence presented by (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
Katrina supports the findings of both the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations, Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina. children. xxx
Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule in the negative. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
Time and again, it has been held that "psychological incapacity" has been should be given great respect by our courts. xxx
intended by law to be confined to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
marriage, (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. xxx21
Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to sufficiently prove that
Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of
a husband.
of the party involved.19
Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in all the other
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals20has set out the
cases they try, must always base their judgments not solely on the expert
guidelines that has been the core of discussion of practically all declaration of
opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in
nullity of marriage on the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We
the course of their proceedings.22 Here, We find the totality of evidence
have decided:
clearly wanting.
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
were based solely on Katrina's statements.1âwphi1 It bears to stress that
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. xxx
Lawrence, despite notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or was he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the Philippines and Marilyn B.
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. xxx
Matudan23is instructive on the matter:
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of
celebration" of the marriage. xxx
the clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied upon to substantiate the
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological incapacity of his wife.
permanent or incurable. xxx
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. xxx was based mainly on the information supplied by her husband, the
petitioner, and to some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy,
however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at the time the
respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as
Also, Maricel would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'
case because she could not have been there when the spouses were married
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the
and could not have been expected to know what was happening between
psychological condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to
her parents until long after her birth. On the other hand, as the petitioning
warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented
spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased,
Marilyn from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said
and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can
report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from. Narcissistic
hardly be considered as credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v. Angelita
Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives
Suazo, el al., is illuminating on this score:
as manifestations of the same. The report neither explained the
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the
evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some
report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. (Emphasis Ours)
psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests conducted by
manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming from
Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive of the psychological disposition
Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the
of Katrina, but cannot be said to be indicative of the psychological condition
source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon,
of Lawrence. There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude
the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care
that Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential
and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards
marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-serving statements. To make
outlined above i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment
conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
on the information fed by only one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
xxxx truthfulness of the content of such evidence.24
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of Lawrence hardly
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured depicts the picture of a psychologically incapacitated husband. Their frequent
a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an fights, his insensitivity, immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the to be a psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's of the "psychological incapacity" that the law requires, and should be
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness performance of some marital obligations that characterize some
of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a marriages.25 It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness. The
exists. psychological illness that must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage
should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of his or
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he
similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the
or she was then about to assume.26
respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only
Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We are hardpressed

to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality of evidence is clearly lacking to
support the factual and legal conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's
marriage is void ab initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by
Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological incapacity. Basic is the rule
that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.27 Here, we reiterate that apart
G.R. No. 201988. October 11, 2017.*
from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not present other witnesses to substantiate
her allegations on Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony, MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-CRUZ, petitioner, vs. NILO
therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary value. 28 SANTOS CRUZ, respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological
hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals Incapacity; “Psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity
in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012 Decision (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
the Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio, is hereby REVERSED and SET marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
ASIDE. The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved).”—We
Case No. 4903-11 is hereby DISMISSED. sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA. Article 36 of the Family
Code states: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
SO ORDERED.
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
Associate Justice incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. We have laid down
guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision. In Republic v. De
Gracia, 716 SCRA 8 (2014), we reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), “that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
emerge only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be
of the party involved).” Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 685 SCRA 33
(2012), we reiterated the well-settled guidelines in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, as embodied in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Mere showing of ‘irreconcilable

differences’ and ‘conflicting personalities’ [as in the present case,] in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.” “Nor does failure of the parties to meet The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
their responsibilities and duties as married persons” amount to psychological
Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr. and Abrenica, Ardiente, Abrenica & Partners for
incapacity.—Notably, “mere showing of ‘irreconcilable differences’ and
petitioner.
‘conflicting personalities’ [as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.” “Nor does failure of the parties to meet their DECISION
responsibilities and duties as married persons” amount to psychological
incapacity. We further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic, 640 SCRA 355 DEL CASTILLO, J.:
(2011), that the psychological condition should render the subject totally
The most challenging part of being in a difficult marriage is to thrive in one.
unaware or incognitive of the basic marital obligations: Article 36
In the case of petitioner Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz (Marivi) and
contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
respondent Nilo Santos Cruz (Nilo), their marriage withered as this was beset
basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
with problems such as the lack of quality time, recriminations,
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of the
disillusionment, loss of passion, and infidelity. The estranged spouses
following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage;
considered their union as non-functional, attributing the failure of their
(b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of
marriage to their respective personality disorders that repelled each other.
marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of
mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the inability This Petition for Review on Certiorari1challenges the November 22, 2011
must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not enough to Decision2 and May 29, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married G.R. CV No. 93736 that affirmed the Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due (RTC), Branch 207, Muntinlupa City in Civil Case No. 05-095 which refused to
to some psychological illness. declare the marriage void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; For a personality disorder to be declared Factual Antecedents
clinically or medically incurable or permanent is one thing; for a spouse to
refuse or to be reluctant to perform his/her marital duties is another.—With Twenty-two-year-old Marivi met 28-year old Nilo sometime in March 1986.
specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both parties did They became steady in August of the same year. Nilo, whose job was then in
suffer from personality disorders as evaluated by the expert witnesses, we Hong Kong, prodded Marivi to marry him so she could join him there
find that the conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do not soonest. Marivi agreed. The couple married in a civil ceremony 5 on October
irresistibly point to the fact that the personality disorders which plague the 21, 1986 followed by a church wedding6on February 8, 1987. The marriage
spouses antedated the marriage; that these personality disorders are indeed produced two sons: Antonio Manuel, born on April 25, 1988, and Jose Nilo,
grave or serious; or that these personality disorders are incurable or born on September 9, 1992.
permanent as to render the parties psychologically incapacitated to carry out On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa City a petition for
and carry on their marital duties. What can be inferred from the totality of declaration of nullity of marriage7 based on psychological incapacity. She
evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility. For a personality disorder to averred that it had been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from
be declared clinically or medically incurable or permanent is one thing; for a "inadequate personality disorder related to masculine strivings associated
spouse to refuse or to be reluctant to perform his/her marital duties is with unresolved oedipal complex,"8 while she herself was found to be
another. suffering from a "personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic,
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court [n]arcissistic with immaturity x x x."9
of Appeals.
To show that Nilo failed to provide her with the necessary emotional, dissolution of the properties. Trial on the issue of the nullity of marriage on
psychological, and physical support, Marivi cited the following: the ground of psychological incapacity ensued.
1. His infidelity and his non-commitment to the marriage as he continued to Marivi's Version
act like a bachelor;
Marivi narrated that when they were still going steady, Nilo would only spend
2. The lack of 'oneness' in the marriage as Nilo would make decisions (on Saturdays and Sundays with her and devote the weekdays to partying with
financial matters) without consulting or considering her suggestions; treating his friends; that even after their engagement, Nilo would still meet other
her as a housemate or a "mayordoma;" keeping from her his whereabouts, women and accept invitations to beauty pageants and cocktails; 15 that Nilo
when he would come home or how much his income was; was not the type who would kiss passionately; that Nilo would not engage in
foreplay during sex, but wished only to satisfy himself; that Nilo would
3. The lack of sexual contact for more than a decade as Nilo made excuses;
engage in anal sex and would only stop when she complained that it was
4. Putting up a facade that he is a caring, concerned, and loving husband, painful; that Nilo would thereafter sleep, leaving her feeling "used," and that
especially to his bosses; and Nilo was impulsive, daring, and adventurous.16
5. Preference towards the company of his peers/friends. 10 She also claimed that Nilo would habitually come home late; that Friday
nights were Nilo's boys' night out; that unless she would ask him to take her
In his Answer,11 Nilo claimed that he was madly in love with Marivi; that at out on a date, Nilo would not do so; and that Nilo would call her a "nagger"
the start of their relationship, both he and Mari vi would exhibit negative even if she was merely asking him to come home early.17
personality traits which they overlooked; that he believed that both he and
Marivi were suffering from psychological incapacity; and that he was not Marivi further narrated that Nilo would engage in extramarital affairs; that a
singularly responsible for the breakdown of their marriage. He stressed that few months into their marriage, Nilo had an affair with an unmarried female
Marivi also contributed to the deterioration of their union, to wit: officemate;18 that Nilo ended the affair only after she (Mari vi) threatened to
tell his employer/supervisor;19 that Nilo had another affair a few weeks after
1. Marivi would demand that he behave in ways he was not accustomed to the birth of their second son; that when confronted with his womanizing and
or inconsistent with his career position; made to choose between her and the children or the other women, Nilo
replied that he was "confused,"20 which prompted her to leave and stay in
2. Marivi was jealous of his friends; and would often make hasty conclusions
Cebu with her parents; and that she heard from her friends that while she
that he was having an affair with other women;
was in Cebu, Nilo was living a bachelor's life.21
3. Marivi would exhibit volatile temperament if things did not go her way;
Marivi added that she eventually reconciled with Nilo but despite the
would not admit mistakes, and blame others instead;
reconciliation, Nilo never really changed, and that he remained indifferent,
4. Marivi would make decisions impulsively, such as changing an item she insensitive, and unappreciative. According to Marivi, she would instead call
gets tired of, or demanding that Nilo change a motor vehicle simply because up her parents and sisters to talk about their family problems;22 that while he
she did not like it; and (Nilo) told people that he was proud of her, he never gave her the
emotional, psychological, and physical support she needed.23 She felt like she
5. She lacked respect for Nilo, and would speak to him degradingly, and was no more than a mayordoma to him, and that they were just
even accuse him of being gay or a homosexual. 12 "housemates." Nilo would come home late on weekdays and preferred to go
On October 11, 2006, the trial court rendered a Partial Decision13 approving out with his friends. Their quarrels were frequent and their conversations
the parties' Compromise Agreement14pertaining to custody, support, and were superficial; Nilo would rather talk about himself, instead of asking
Marivi about her day or about their children. He was controlling and
domineering,24 and refused to consider her suggestions; he would not want conceit and her "prima donna" attitude embarrassed him. Marivi would order
his money mingled with her (Marivi's) money.25 Nilo would shell out money him to act in accordance with their stature in life, and would demand that he
when he wanted to buy things, but would make excuses when it came to instruct his office staff to accord her special treatment as Hewlett Packard's
Mari vi's suggestion for a family vacation.26 Marivi also claimed that Nilo had "first lady" during the time that he was Hewlett Packard's President. Marivi
no sense of companionship with their children; and that Nilo even told their would also instruct their housemaids to call him "sefiorito;" and she would
son that their brand new house was everything to him. 27 make a "big deal" out of her being a "mestiza," and would think of herself a
"trophy wife."34
Marivi was moreover bothered by Nilo's effeminate ways; he was vain and
would have weekly "beauty" treatments.28Furthermore, they no long had sex Nilo claimed that Marivi was "unappreciative" of him, had a misdirected
after the birth of their second son. While they tried to have sex twice, Nilo sense of self-entitlement, and would complain if she did not get her own
failed to have an erection. After that, Nilo would refuse to have sex with her way, as she was used to, she being her father's favorite daughter; Marivi did
which made her (Marivi) question his sexual orientation, so much so that Nilo not even care about discussing family finances with him as long as she got
physically hurt her when she questioned his virility. 29 what she wanted. She also had a violent temper and would hurl things at
him during their fights; that she would blame him for everything, and would
Marivi's father, Manuel, likewise stated that Marivi would call them up for
keep on reciting his past mistakes. Marivi did not understand the demands of
help because Nilo had hurt her during the couple's quarrel; that their his job, and unfairly compared his work to her father's job, the operation of
marriage was not harmonious due to Marivi's youth and her unfamiliarity
which was limited to a single area, a compound in a mine site in Cebu. He
with Nilo's personality and family values. He considered Nilo only as a explained that the multinational companies he then worked for required him
provider, not as a husband and a good father to his sons. 30
to work beyond the normal office hours because he has to meet "sales
Marivi's younger sister, Margarita Ledesma (Margarita), who lived for four quotas in millions of dollars," entertain people from different headquarters,
years with Nilo and Marivi, claimed to have witnessed how lonely Marivi was. and meet with different clients from areas far from his residence. 35
She alleged that Nilo was absent when Marivi gave birth to their second son; Worse, Nilo was turned off by Marivi's act of broadcasting to her whole clan
that Nilo was short-tempered when driving; and that the couple would often
his inadequacies during their intimate sexual relations, which began after he
fight because Nilo would always come home late or because Marivi witnessed Marivi giving birth to their first child. When he confided to Marivi
suspected Nilo of infidelity. Margarita believed that Nilo did not really want to
about this, she instead accused him of having another affair. Since then, he
save the marriage, although he told her that he loves Marivi and the did not feel any sexual excitement and attraction toward her when they were
children.31
together. Instead of discussing the problem with him candidly, she accused
Nilo's Version him of being gay. Nilo stated that the last time they had sex was in 1997 or
in 1998.36
Nilo acknowledged his contribution to the breakdown of the marriage
because his job required him to come home late, his inability to sexually The Clinical Findings
perform adequately, his failure to be the "ideal husband," 32 and because he
In support of her claim that she and Nilo were suffering from psychological
had had extramarital affairs in the years 1992, 2002, and 2006.33 At the incapacity, Marivi presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), a psychiatrist,
same time, Nilo insisted that Marivi also contributed to the collapse of their
and Dr. Ruben Encarnacion (Dr. Encarnacion), a clinical psychologist.
union.
Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nilo to have "inadequate personality disorder related
According to Nilo, Marivi would always want to know his companions and
to masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal complex," 37 while
whereabouts; would demand information about his female acquaintances; she diagnosed Marivi to have "personality disorder of the mixed type,
and would even call up his workplace to ask where he was. Moreover, her
[h]istrionic, [n]arcissistic, with immaturity x x x."38
In the March 21, 2005 Psychiatric Report,39 Dr. Villegas stated: Marivi, on the other hand, expected that her interactions with the world
would be like that of her own close-knit family, a perception attributable to
The root cause of the above clinical conditions, on the part of Marivi Cruz, her parents' prolonged gratification of her dependency needs. Her father was
were the overindulgence and over attention of her parents, in a prolonged
a dedicated, devoted, and responsible family man who regularly came home
manner, carried over to adult adjustments. On the part of Nilo Cruz, his to spend time with them, while her mother was a good housewife, who
negative identification and resentments towards his father and close
always found time to personally attend to their needs. Dr. Villegas described
attachments to his mother, continued by his long-time maid, to the point of Marivi’s one with strong mood fluctuations, emotionally immature, with low
an oedipal situation led to his inadequacy, along masculine strivings, with
self-esteem has difficulty neutralizing the outbreak of negativity in her
difficult assertions of his authority and power. behavior, is suggestible, egocentric, and impelled by a desire to "extort" from
The above clinical conditions existed prior [to] marriage but became manifest others. To Dr. Villegas, the couple's respective personality disorders were
only after the celebration due to marital stresses and demands. Both are mutually repelling, their brain waves not being in sync because what Marivi
considered as permanent in nature, because they started early in their expected from Nilo happened to be Nilo's weakest point. 45
developmental stage, and therefore became so deeply engrained into their Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas' diagnosis. On the basis of Nilo's five-
personality structures. Both are considered grave in degree, because they
to-six sessions and Marivi's eight bi-weekly psychotherapy sessions with him,
hampered, interfered and disrupted their normal functioning related to Dr. Encarnacion concluded that there was no chance of a successful
heterosexual adjustments.40
marriage in a dysfunctional union when there is double psychological
According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate each others' incapacity. He categorically stated that Nilo was incapable of being a good
weaknesses and that the incapacities of the parties are grave because they husband and a good father. Nilo lacked an individual coherent identity and
preferred to satisfy their own needs rather than to give in to the other's instead went by the standards of general society, which is driven by the
needs.41 desire to gain material wealth, power, and control. Nilo did not like close
relationships and was incapable of forming some; his social anxiety,
She claimed that Nilo's lack of a father figure weakened his masculinity. He associated with paranoid fears, was manifested by excessive vanity. Nilo
cross-identified himself with his mother because his father, a disciplinarian projected an image of a wealthy, successful, handsome man surrounded by
and the thrifty one, was often absent because of his military service. While women, in none of whom, however, he was interested in a long-term sexual
he was still a teenager, his mother migrated to Canada and their long-time relationship; he saw himself as a performer-provider and was disinterested in
maid acted as his surrogate mother. Nilo sought from his wife his mother's spending quality time with his family, in carrying on conversations with
nurturing qualities, but he felt hostility when Marivi failed to meet his ego members of his family, insensitive, intolerant, and demanding. 46
ideal. His aggression was in the form of passivity, punishing his wife by not
sexually performing.42 Dr. Encarnacion attributed respondent's psychological disorder to his
childhood, in which he did not have fond memories of tender moments and
Dr. Villegas noted that Nilo would put on a facade, a compensatory vacation times with his family. Nilo grew up very close to his mother who
mechanism according to social norms. While he was not exactly a always listened to his complaints and with whom he sympathized, hence his
homosexual, he covered up his weak masculine traits by being a "playboy." unresolved oedipal issues; even as he patterned his masculinity strivings
Nilo could only comply with the financial obligation of marital life, but not the after his stingy father, the family provider, but whom he nonetheless
psychological and emotional parts of it.43 Nilo likewise was an inadequate described as "unappreciative, undemonstrative, and quite materialistic." At
father figure to his own two sons, especially the younger, who has already the age of 18, when his parents migrated to Canada and left him in the
manifested strong feminine traits.44 Philippines, he then lost his role models, incapacitating him from creating his
own identity. Thus, when he began working at the age of 21, he imbibed the
values of his workplace, where feelings and emotional discussions were
absent, factors that nonetheless somehow worked to his advantage in his In its November 22, 2011 Decision,51 the CA united with the RTC in rejecting
job.47 Dr. Encarnacion opined that Nilo's incapacity was his "rigidity," which the alleged existence of psychological incapacity pointed out by Dr. Villegas
drove him into imposing his family upbringing on his mvn family, instead of and by Dr. Encarnacion.
adjusting to the modem family setup, i.e., that the modem father should
The CA found that Dr. Villegas and Dr. Encarnacion failed to paint a clear
take on new roles and be part of family activities where his family needs him
picture of the supposed gravity or seriousness of Nilo's psychological
to be, e.g. taking the children to the pediatrician or to the park, camping
incapacity, and that it was unconvinced of the doctors' conclusion that Nilo
with the family, or being with them in church, instead of strictly confining
had a deep propensity to cover up for his serious inadequacies.
himself to being a provider.48
It ruled that Marivi failed to prove that Nilo's failure to comply with his sexual
As for Marivi, Dr. Encarnacion found that she exhibited "Histrionic Personality
obligation was due to some psychological condition or makeup, as this could
Behaviors and Features" as manifested by her impressionistic speech, her
very well be explained by the stress brought about by Marivi's negative
exaggerated expression of emotions, and her suggestibility. He stated that
attitude toward Nilo, who was turned off by her act of revealing to her clan
Marivi's "inflexibility" consisted in her expecting a high standard of
their bedroom secrets instead of privately resolving the problem with him.
faithfulness from all men as exemplified by her dad, who was also very
Moreover, the CA said it is a non sequitur, that just because he could not
devoted to her mother. However, because dissatisfied and frustrated by her
sexually perform according to Marivi's standard, he should thus be labelled a
actual marital situation, she sought attention, externalized blame, displayed
gay or homosexual. It appears that Nilo has "selective" impotency, for while
anger, mistrust, resentment, and self-indulgence.49
he could not have an erection for Marivi, he nevertheless had had
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court extramarital affairs. Neither did the CA see anything wrong with Nilo's "put-
on fa9ade" of a happy marriage to protect the family's privacy.
In its October 13, 2008 Decision,50 the RTC denied the Petition.
The CA did not even consider Marivi's alleged histrionic traits as reflected in
The RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses' attribution of a double
her behavior, e.g., her persistent demand as to Nilo's whereabouts, her
psychological incapacity to Marivi's nature of being a "father figure woman," constant naggings, her attention-seeking acts, grave or serious enough to
and to Nilo's "oedipal complex." The court noted that Marivi already
qualify as psychological incapacity. The CA ruled that it was the couple's
disengaged herself from her father as her standard of an ideal husband irreconcilable differences that marred their marriage; that the negative acts
when she married Nilo, despite the latter's limitations and his then being
or actions of one spouse were neutralized or offset by the other's negative
already very focused on his job. Marivi's need for assurance that she is acts or actions, and that these are "mere character flaws or bad habits that
loved, vis-a-vis her looking up to her father as her standard, was not by itself
the spouses developed over the years [which] can be modified or changed
sufficient to declare her psychologically incapacitated. depending on the desire of either spouse to do so." 52 The CA thereafter
As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of "oedipal complex;" the disposed of the appeal, thus:
RTC held that prioritizing his work over the emotional needs of his family was WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court
not reflective of his psychological incapacity because what he did was still for
in CV No. 05-095 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
his family's benefit. Neither was Nilo's lack of sexual interest in Marivi a case between appellant Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz and appellee Nilo
of psychological incapacity, for this was a result of his being turned off by
Santos Cruz for insufficiency of evidence is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
Marivi's unabated naggings and her revelations to her family of his sexual
inadequacies. SO ORDERED."53
From the RTC's verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA. Marivi moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in the CA's May 29,
2012 Resolution.54
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Issue (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
celebration' of the marriage.x x x.
At issue before us is whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall
under Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the declaration of nullity of xxxx
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically
Our Ruling permanent or incurable. x x x.
We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA. xxxx
Article 36 of the Family Code states: (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
outbursts' cannot be accepted as root causes.x x x.
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization. xxxx
We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying this provision. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
In Republic v. De Gracia, 55 we reiterated the doctrine in Santos v. Court of up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
Appeals, 56 "that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a) Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage); (b) petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if
should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved)." Also, in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 57 we reiterated the well- xxxx
settled guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
as embodied in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 58 viz.: (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. x x x.
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and Notably, "mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.x x x. personalities' [as in the present case,] in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity."59 "Nor does failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities
xxxx and duties as married persons" amount to psychological incapacity. 60 We
further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic61that the psychological condition
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
should render the subject totally unaware or incognitive of the basic marital
obligations:
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. x x x. assume basic marital obligations and not merely difficulty,
xxxx refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will. This
incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to With regard to his failure to sexually perform "adequately," the same
the essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to appeared to be a case of "selective impotency," as he was turned off by
the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life Marivi's disclosure of their bed secrets to her family. Furthermore, Nilo
and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education of testified that the sexual problem with Marivi did not crop up until the birth of
offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological their second son, and that he felt that the blame was invariably and unfairly
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his laid on upon him, thus:
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be
THE COURT:
shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.62
The Court has just some questions with regard to the main issue. During
In Marcos v. Marcos, 63 the actual medical examination of the one claimed to
your direct testimony; Mr. Witness, you mentioned some of your faults which
have psychological incapacity is not a condition sine qua non, for what
[may be] the reason why the instant case was filed. x x x one of those faults
matters is the totality of evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological
is no sex. When did that happen? x x x
incapacity. While it behooves this Court to weigh the clinical findings of
psychology experts as part of the evidence, the court's hands are A. If I recall it right, Your Honor; I [had] some challenge[s] immediately after
nonetheless free to make its own independent factual findings. "It bears the first birth of my eldest son which I x x x shared with the psychologist or
repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always psychiatrist who [had] examined me.
base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the
parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the THE COURT:
proceedings."64
But when you got married with your wife that was not a problem until the
With specific reference to the case before us, even granting that both parties birth of your last son?
did suffer from personality disorders as evaluated by the expert witnesses,
A. Yes, your Honor.
we find that the conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do not
irresistibly point to the fact that the personality disorders which plague the x x x x66
spouses antedated the marriage; that these personality disorders are indeed
grave or serious; or that these personality disorders are incurable or ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
permanent as to render the parties psychologically incapacitated to carry out Q. So it is attributable to the petitioner though you claim that it is your fault,
and carry on their marital duties. What can be inferred from the totality of is that correct?
evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility. For a personality disorder to
be declared clinically or medically incurable or permanent is one thing; for a A. Because, your Honor, that kind of situation, I always get blamed, so for
spouse to refuse or to be reluctant to perform his/her marital duties is the purpose of settling all these questions, when you make that mistake,
another.65 you'll always be the one to be blamed although as per the psychologist and
the psychiatrist, there's also a reason why I am not able to perform sex to
Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and the CA. More my wife because in those ten (10) years that we were together, after the
than that, too, the evidence on record do not square with the existence of first one, [didn't] have any other affairs but I kept being blamed that I [had]
psychological incapacity as contemplated by law and jurisprudence. In the just because I [was] not able to perform sex to her. The whole family, her
case of Nilo, what brought about the breakdown of his relationship with family knows that in that premise because I got, one time, in one of our
Marivi was not necessarily attributable to his so-called "psychological quarrels x x x told me, ''maybe you're not making love with my daughter
disorder" but can be imputed to his work and marital stress, and his ordinary because you are having an affair with another woman." So, I know 1 made a
human failings.
mistake in the past but if I'm x x x kept [being] reminded of it, it's a Q. You also referred to a headquarters. What do you mean by headquarters?
punishment, your Honor.
A. Headquarters, if you work in a multinational company like companies I
xxxx worked for, they have headquarters in Hong Kong, they have headquarters
in Singapore, they have headquarters in the U.S.
Q. What you initially said was your fault was ... as you're now talking before
this Honorable Court, is really the fault of 1he petitioner; is that what you are Q. So you had to entertain principals coming from [these] headquarters?
saying?
A. As a part of the job as required by the principals who [visit] us.
A. There [were] times, your Honor, I would say it was my fault. There [were]
Q. How often were you required to stay out late because of your job?
times it was caused by her faults as well. H's not one plus one It was hers
and one plus one it was mine, it depends on the situation. We've been A. Ma'am, it is unpredictable. Sometimes, we were required to stay for
dealing with cases before so not all the time it's the fault of Mrs. Cruz. And dinner and entertainment thereafter. Sometimes, we can go home early also.
not all the time it's the fault of Mr. Cruz. It's a relationship, there are times
it's hers, there are times, it's mine but we're able to fix it until this annulment Q. Could you not refuse the invitations of going out and just go home and
situation came. spend time with your family?
x x x x67 A. Sometimes I can refuse, sometimes I cannot. Because it becomes a

condition of sale of the clients x x x.
Nor can it be said that Nilo's failure to provide quality time for the family was
caused by his "inadequate personality disorder" or "unresolved oedipal xxxx
complex." Nilo explained that he has a taxing and demanding job, and that
Q. So x x x what's the latest time of the night that you usually come home?
unfortunately, with his working hours eating up his home life, while he was
able to provide his family with an adequate standard of living, the lack of A. My objective as a husband and as a father is to really come as early as I
quality time for his wife became attenuated and resulted in severing his bond can which I have explained on and on, your Honor. But to meet my million
with Mari vi, who failed to understand the nature of his job. They were a dollar targets of the country, I have to do things beyond 5 o'clock. In several
happy couple during the period of courtship, and even during the early years occasions when I tried to go home early, to my disappointment, my kids are
of their marriage. Nilo testified: not at home because they were borrowed by my in-laws to have merienda.
That's why I complained to my wife that time that "please tell me if they are
ATTY. REVILLA:
going with my in-laws because I don't want to deprive them also of the few
Q. x x x What was the reason why you had to stay up late? times I'm able to go home early."
A. Ma'am, I'm .. .in those I.T. companies that I worked for whether manager Q. So, you are saying that you only have few times of coming home early?
or managing director, my companies are ... the companies are involved in
A. Well, yes, but not very few.
sales and marketing and support so it entails entertainment of clients,
entertainment of principals coming from headquarters and entertainment of Q. Okay. Have you tried to make an effort to remedy the situation?
customers with my staff and other company.
A. Well, if I have my way to be able to direct my appointments in the South,
Q. When you say LT., what does it stand for? my meetings in Amkor Anam, Mamplasan, in Sta. Rosa then that will allow
me to be home at least 5-6 o'clock. But most of my meetings in Makati,
A. Information Technology.
Quezon City, Manila especially with government clients [do] allow me to go THE COURT:
home early, your Honor.
So you mean to say that this problem of staying late only happened lately?
x x x x68
xxxx
THE COURT:
A The definition, your Honor, of my family... late is when you don't make it
What about another fault you mentioned which is staying late, when did this at 7:00 o'clock or. .. [with] the family at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. So ifl
thing happen? don't make it at seven, I considered myself late.
A. When I came back from my assignment in Hong Kong in 1988 when I was THE COURT:
given a new job in sales and marketing.
What is the reason why you have been late?
xxxx
A Your Honor, my job is not a 9 to 5 job because we ... we call on
THE COURT: customers, we entertain customers, partners, principals, we also have
fellowship with our teams. So, we either have dinner or we have happy
So before the birth of your children, that is after your marriage with the
hours. We also see friends after. So but, physically I cannot do that
petitioner, this was not a problem? everyday, your Honor, because I also wake up automatically at 6:00
A. Because, your Honor, I was assigned in Hong Kong and I was only twelve everyday whether I have a drink, or have dinner, or I worked out in the
(12) minutes [away] by [foot] to our office x x x. evening or play[ed] basketball during that time, I always wake up at six. So
if I stayed up late like previously... like 2, 3, it's gonna be a burden for me
xxxx physically and [I would be] unable to perform my job well. So, like I
mentioned earlier in a hearing, your Honor, many times I tried to be home
And I was not in [sales] and marketing, I was the Administrative Assistant of
by 10 to be able to watch. Before 10 to be able to watch the 10:00 o'clock
the President of IBM in Southeast Asia so it's the ... purely management
news and be able to enjoy my ice cream while watching it.
administrative work as an administrative assistant so there's [not] much of
entertaining done in Hong Kong. THE COURT:
THE COURT: Well, one of those faults you mentioned is also working hard, why did you
say that it is your fault?
Okay, so in other words, at that time, that was not a problem. It was only a
problem when you were appointed to your position in ... A In our industry, your Honor, when you work out, you will definitely end up
late several couple of times, but not all the time.
A. IBM.
xxxx
THE COURT:
Your Honor, sometimes, I get all these complaints. But when they saw my
That was so many years after you got married with your wife
picture in the newspaper or in the TV having success stories and contract
A We got married, your Honor, in 1987 then we went back to the Philippines signing, they are proud of me.
in July 1988 [when] I was given a new marketing and [sales] role as a
THE COURT:
manager of general marketing which is ... which encompasses all industries
aside [from] the government. When you say "so proud of me," to whom are you referring x x x?
A. My family. They call me, they congratulate me, we have dinners together So only those times when you have a problem. Like what problems, Mr.
to celebrate but to get to that, is the working hard and staying away from Witness?
the family.
A. Our relationship, your Honor.
xxxx
THE COURT:
THE COURT:
But most of the time, you were able to patch up your problems?
How long did you court your wife?
A. Yes, your Honor.
A. Six (6) months, your Honor.
x x x x70
x x x x69
Interestingly, when asked if there was no more functional marital life
THE COURT: between him and Marivi, Nilo candidly highlighted his different perception
from his estranged wife:
Could you say that you were a perfect couple at that time?
ATTY. STA MARIA, JR.:
A. When we were starting, your Honor, we [were] happy, and during the
time that we were in Hong Kong. But when we went back to Manila, there Q. So, Mr. Witness, well in reality today, Mr. Witness, even the petitioner
are times (the witness is in tears) ... adjusting to work and family that is why believes that there is no more functional marital life in this relationship,
it affected my relationship to her family and combination of mistakes would you agree with that?
happened which I admitted.
A. If that's the way she thinks, I...I will have my own way of looking at
THE COURT: things because ...
How would you describe your wife during your first years of marriage? xxxx
A. [She was] a very good wife. Q. Even ... as I was saying since she was asking for nullity and you were
asking for nullity, it's a fact of life as of today, as you speak today that there
THE COURT:
is no more functional marital life between the two (2) of you?
Did she perform her duties as a wife and as a mother? A. You see, your Honor, that's why we're different. Her style is conclude and
A. Yes, your Honor. conclude. I have a different style because of my background. I will only stop
till death. I cannot share her legal counsel's statement with my own thinking,
THE COURT: your Honor.
And was she that independent from her parents or she was too dependent x x x x71
[on] her parents?
Even the psychiatrist Dr. Villegas pinpointed the differences of the estranged
A. On her performing her duties, with the ... as a wife and as a friend, she's couple which led to squabbles -
independent. When it comes to our problems, she would consult her family.
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
THE COURT:
Q. Doctor, from your examination of both respondent and petitioner the Q. So even without the respondent, Nilo Cruz, petitioner would still be
obligation of trust and respect for each other, how did it not manifest in this psychologically incapacitated?
relationship?
A. I beg to [differ]: from that because the needs were not fulfilled in this
A.The respondent [sees] the petitioner as one who's very negativistic on him particular marriage, it's like a tendency to have cancer, but if you take care
or who's very demanding and who is also trying to put him down because of yourself with the right environment, you will not catch cancer. Those were
according to him, the petitioner would always see his weak points rather previous positions, that's why I called them Histrionic Personality Traits
than his strong points. Behaviors and Features not a full blown Histrionic Personality Disorder, the
needs were badly unfulfilled in this marriage because she married a man
Q. Are you saying that this developed a non-trust just between them? who did not know the language of feeling of showing some attention
A None trust. They do not trust each other anymore.1âwphi1 On the part of towards his spouse, meaning, if she is put in a relationship with a man who
the petitioner, because of his womanizing activities and on the part of the is able to address these needs, she would be better, she would be better in a
respondent, that the petitioner is always looking at his weak points rather marriage.
than his strong points. Q. So this psychological incapacity of the petitioner is only dormant at
xxxx 72
the time that she was not yet married?
It is significant to note that Marivi failed to substantiate Nilo's penchant for A. Well, it's grave ...
womanizing as a manifestation of his psychological incapacity. Aside from
her bare allegations, which were chiefly based on what other people told her, Q. Was it grave already at the time ...
she never presented irrefutable proof to corroborate her claims of his sexual
A. Yes, it is, it's grave but. ..
proclivities, i.e., that these proclivities were already existing before the
marriage and during the first years of their marriage. Nilo, on the other Q. Even before the marriage?
hand, categorically admitted to having extramarital affairs in 1992, 2002, and
2006, the period when the marriage was already on the rocks. Neither is A. ... but not incurable, that is the only adjective, grave, pre-existing ...
there evidence of Nilo's alleged oedipal complex, the manifestations of which
Q. Pre-existing?
were not cited by the experts, that caused the couple to fall out of love.
A. Grave and pre-existing, yes, incurable, no, in the sense that if she married
Anent Marivi's case, based on her family history as reflected in the experts'
properly if her needs were addressed, it would not appear in that marriage.
clinical evaluation, she grew up in a well-functioning, supportive, and
emotionally healthy family environment. Even Nilo himself attested that she Q. But because of her marriage to the respondent, are you saying now that
was a good wife and a good mother to their children. Her demand for her psychological incapacity now…
attention, time, love, and fidelity is normal for a wife. The anger she felt
within her is also a legitimate reaction. A. Became an incapacity, yes
Yet the psychologist Dr. Encarnacion himself acknowledged that Marivi's so- Q. ... became incurable?
called psychological incapacity is in fact, curable. Thus: A. No.
ATTY. REVILLA: xxxx
Q. Okay. I am quite curious about the curability of the personality disorder of

the petitioner. Now, if her needs are satisfied with ... in case, assuming the
petitioner enters into another relationship and her needs are satisfied then
her incapacity is cured, is that what you're saying?
A. In effect, yes, in effect, yes.
Q. Would you say, what are these needs of the petitioner that [you're] ... not
satisfied of the respondent?
A. Need to be paid attention to, need to be valued, need to have an effect

on someone, it is a universal need. She was made to feel that she did not
have any effect on him and so are the children, x x x well, the father made
G.R. No. 203284. November 14, 2016.*
the children feel that they, wife and two sons did not have any effect on him,
ma'am. NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES and MARILYN** B. MATUDAN, respondents.
x x x x73
Family Law; Psychological Incapacity; Psychological incapacity under Article
Q. One last question. The needs of the petitioner, like you say, do you think
36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
she was able to convey, clearly convey her needs to the respondent,
antecedence, and (c) incurability.—The landmark case of Santos v. Court of
properly convey?
Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), taught us that psychological incapacity under
A. Very clearly, yes, and then when they were still not being heard, Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
well, iyon na nga eh, yung hostility niya and resentment would get the better juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
of her as a ano ... so it would become dysfunctional reaction upon reaction.
Same; Same; The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the
That's a good question.74
petitioner.—The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the
Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes that the petitioner, pursuant to Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198 (1997),
protagonists in this case are in reality simply unwilling to work out a solution or the Molina case.
for each other's personality differences, and have thus become overwhelmed
Same; Same; The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if
by feelings of disappointment or disillusionment toward one another. Sadly, a
any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. 75
celebration of the marriage.—Indeed, “[w]hat is important is the presence of
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition.”
“[T]he complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as
SO ORDERED. are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.” Petitioner’s judicial affidavit and testimony during trial, however,
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
fail to show gravity and juridical antecedence.
Associate Justice
LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion
Family Law; Psychological Incapacity; View that a psychological evaluation

should not be discounted if based on sources other than the patient.—A
psychological evaluation should not be discounted if based on sources other This Petition for Review on Certiorari1seeks to set aside the January 31, 2012
than the patient. In psychiatry, it is accepted practice to base a person’s Decision2 and August 23, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
psychiatric history on collateral information. Ideally, the psychiatric history denying the Petition in CA·G.R. CV No. 95392 and the Motion for
should “be based [on] the patient’s own words from his or her point on Reconsideration,4 thus affirming the December 18, 2009 Decision5 of the
view,” the psychiatric history being a “record of [a] patient’s life[.]” However, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-
if the patient is not available, as in this case, information from other sources 62827.
may be utilized.
Factual Antecedents
Same; Same; View that thirty-one (31) years of no contact with loved ones,
Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan
shows a grave and incurable illness, a psychological incapacity warranting
(Marilyn) were married in Laoang, Northern Samar on October 26, 1976.
the dissolution of marriage.—Dr. Tayag’s expert testimony is consistent with
They had four children.
the undisputed fact that Marilyn left the conjugal home and has not
contacted her family since 1985. Thirty-one years of no contact with loved In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the
ones, to my mind, shows a grave and incurable illness, a psychological children lost contact with her; she had not been seen nor heard from again.
incapacity warranting the dissolution of Marilyn’s marriage with Nicolas.
Twenty-three years later, or on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for
Same; Same; View that the choice to stay in or leave a marriage is not for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,6docketed as Civil Case No. Q-08-62827
the Court, or the State, to make.—The choice to stay in or leave a marriage with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94. Petitioner alleged that before,
is not for this Court, or the State, to make. The choice is given to the during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically
partners, with the Constitution providing that “[t]he right of spouses to found incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother; that she
a family in accordance with their religious convictions and demands of consistently neglected and failed to provide petitioner and her children with
responsible parenthood[.]” the necessary emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance, and
even so after leaving for work abroad; that based on expert evaluation
Same; Same; View that our country needs a law that recognizes the validity
conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), Marilyn's
of marriage at the time of its celebration but nonetheless allows parties to
psychological incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable; that petitioner's
dissociate without destroying the human dignity of their former partners by
consent to the marriage was obtained by Marilyn through misrepresentation
pathologizing them with a psychological disorder.—The Philippines remains
as she concealed her condition from him; and that Marilyn is "not ready for a
to be the only country in the world with no absolute divorce law available to
lasting and pennanent commitment like marriage"7 as she "never (gave) him
its citizens regardless of religion. Our country needs a law that recognizes
and their children financial and emotional support x x x and for being selfish
the validity of marriage at the time of its celebration but nonetheless allows
through their six (6) years of cohabitation;"8 that Marilyn became "so
parties to dissociate without destroying the human dignity of their former
despicably irresponsible as she has not shown love and care upon her
partners by pathologizing them with a psychological disorder.
husband, x x x and that she cannot properly and morally take on the
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court responsibility of a loving and caring wife x x x."9
of Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. General, opposed the Petition.
DECISION The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having determined that there
is no collusion between the parties, proceedings were conducted in due
DEL CASTILLO, J.: course. However, trial proceeded in Marilyn's absence.
Apart from the testimonies of the petitioner, his daughter Maricel B. Matudan children. Petitioner inquired from the relatives of the respondent but they did
(Maricel), and Dr. Tayag, the following documents were submitted in not tell him her whereabouts.
evidence:
In his Affidavit which was considered as his direct testimony, petitioner
1. Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit (Exhibit "A") which was adopted as his
10
claimed that respondent failed to perform her duties as a wife to him.
testimony on direct examination; Respondent never gave petitioner and their children financial and emotional
support, love and care during their cohabitation. She was irresponsible,
2. The Judicial Aftidavit11 of Maricel (Exhibit "D"), which was adopted as part immature and exhibited irrational behavior towards petitioner and their
of her testimony on direct examination;
children. She was self-centered, had no remorse and involved herself in
3. The Sworn Affidavit12 of Dr. Tayag (Exhibit "B"), which was considered activities defying social and moral ethics.
part of her testimony on direct examination;
On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he and the respondent had a
4. Dr. Tayag's evaluation report entitled "A Report on the Psychological happy married life and they never had a fight. The only reason why he filed
Condition of NICOLAS T. MATUDAN, the petitioner for Nullity of Marriage this case was because respondent abandoned him and their children.
against respondent MARILYN BORJA-MATUDAN''13(Exhibit "C"); and Maricel Matudan was only two (2) years old when respondent left them. She
5. Other relevant evidence, such as petitioner's marriage contract/certificate corroborated the testimony of the petitioner that since respondent left the
and respective birth certificates of his children, and a Letter/Notice, with conjugal dwelling she never provided financial support to the family and
Registry Return Receipt, sent by Dr. Tayag to Marilyn requesting never communicated with them.
evaluation/interview relative to petitioner's desire to file a petition for Nedy L. Tayag, Psychologist, testified on the 'Report on the Psychological
declaration of nullity of their marriage (Exhibits "E" to "G").
Condition of Nicolas Matudan' which she prepared (Exhibit "C''). She
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court subjected petitioner to psychological test and interview. She likewise
interviewed Maricel Matudan. She came up with the findings that petitioner is
On December 18, 2009, the RTC issued its Decision14 dismissing the Petition suffering from Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder and respondent has
in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits. The features of
to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity. It held, thus: petitioner's disorder are the following: negativistic attitude, passive
resistance, lacks the ability to assert his opinions and has great difficulty
Petitioner, his daughter Maricel Matudan and psychologist Nedy L. Tayag
expressing his feelings.
testified. Petitioner offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to ''G" which were
admitted by the Court. The root cause of his personality condition can be attributed to his being an
abandoned child. At a young age, his parents separated and he was left in
The State and the respondent did not present any evidence.
the custody of his paternal grandmother. He lacked a support system and
From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the petitioner, the Court felt rejected. He developed a strong need for nurturance, love and attention
gathered the following: and that he would do anything to attain such.
Petitioner and respondent were roamed on October 26, 1976 x x x. They As for respondent, the manifestation of her disorder are as follows:
begot four (4) children x x x. Petitioner and respondent lived together with Preoccupation with pursuing matters that would make her happy; has a high
their children. On June 25, 1985, petitioner asked respondent [sic] for sense of self-importance; wants to have her way and disregards her
permission to work and left the conjugal dwelling. Since then she was never husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a good life.
heard of [sic]. Respondent never communicated with the petitioner and her
Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial environment. duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.' x
She came from an impoverished family. Her parents were more pre-occupied x x.
with finding ways to make ends meet to such extent that they failed to give
In the case of Santos, it was also held that the intendment of the law has
adequate attention and emotional support to their children.
been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious
Ms. Tayag further testified that the psychological condition of the parties are cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
grave and characterized by juridical antecedence as the same already existed or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.'
before they got married, their disorders having been in existence since their
It must be emphasized that the cause of action of petitioner is the alleged
childhood years are permanent and severe.
psychological incapacity of the respondent. During the pre-trial, the sole
The sole issue to be resolved is whether x x x respondent is psychologically issue raised is whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
incapacitated to perform her marital obligations under Article 36 of the perform her marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
Family Code. alleged personality disorder of the petitioner is clearly not an issue in this
case.
Article 36 of the Family Code as amended, states:
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds that the totality of the
'A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration, was
evidence adduced by petitioner has not established the requisites of gravity,
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations juridical antecedence and incurability. Again, it must be emphasized that this
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapicity becomes manifest
petition was filed on the ground of the psychological incapacity of
only after its solemnization.' respondent and not the petitioner.
Article 68 of the same Code provides:
Respondent is said to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, antisocial traits. The salient features of her disorder were enumerated by
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.' Nedy Tayag in her report as follows: pre-occupation with pursuing matters
that would make her happy; has a high sense of self-importance; wants to
In the case of Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, January 4, 1995, G.R. No. have her way and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants
112019, the Honorable Supreme Court held: to have a good life. Her personality disorder is considered permanent, grave
and incurable. It has its root cause in her unhealthy familial environment
'Justice Alicia Sempio Dy, in her commentaries on the Family Code cites with
during her early developmental years.
approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila x x x, In petitions for declaration of marriage (sic), the testimony of the petitioner
who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) as to the physical manifestation of the psychological incapacity is of utmost
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be importance. Unfortunately, petitioner's testimony particularly his affidavit
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the which was considered as his direct examination contained only general
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the statements on the supposed manifestations of respondent's incapacity.
party antedating the marriage although the overt manifestations may Respondent was described therein as irresponsible, immature, self -centered,
emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or even if it were lacks remorse, got involved with activities defying social and moral ethics.
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. Petitioner however miserably failed to expound on these allegations. In fact
during his cross-examination, he even contradicted the allegations in his
For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the same must be
petition and affidavit. He clearly stated that he had a happy marital
serious, grave and 'so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
relationship with the respondent and never had a fight with her (TSN, Verily, instead or substantiating the alleged psychological incapacity his wife,
December 5, 2008, page 8). petitioner-appellant revealed during his cross examination that it was actually
his wife's act of abandoning the family that led him to seek the nullification
Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He even admitted that
of their marriage. In fact, during his cross-examination, he readily admitted
this the [sic] only reason why he wants their marriage dissolved (TSN, that they were happily married and that they never engaged in bickering
December 5, 2008, page 9). Abandonment of spouse however is not
with each other.
psychological incapacity. It is only a ground for legal separation.
xxxx
Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage are sui generis, the allegations
therein must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that would Q: But how would you describe your marital relations [sic]? Were there
warrant the dissolution of the marriage bond. Absent such proof, the Court moments that you were happy with your wife?
will uphold the validity of the marriage for 'the rule is settled that every
A: Yes, ma' am, that is why we begot four children.
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bond.' (Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, COURT
July 31, 2006).
And so, you so you [sic] had a happy married life then?
In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of the marriage is on the petitioner. FISCAL
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed for I would presume that you had a happy married life, how come your wife just
insufficiency of evidence. left you like that? Do you have any idea why your wife just left you like that?
SO ORDERED.15 A: She did not communicate with us to tell her whereabouts.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, 16 but in a May 12, 2010 Order,17 the RTC Q: Did you ever have a fight with your wife?
held its ground reiterating its pronouncement that petitioner failed to
A: None, ma'am.
demonstrate Marilyn's psychological incapacity, and that the petition is
anchored merely on Marilyn's abandonment of the marriage and family, xxxx
which by itself is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.
COURT
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
All right, you stated in this Affidavit that you are filing this case for the
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R CV No. 95392. declaration of nullity of marriage because of the psychological incapacity of
However, in its assailed January 31, 2012 Decision, the CA instead affirmed your wife, what do you mean by that?
the RTC judgment, declaring thus:
WITNESS
Petitioner-appellant asserts that the ETC should not have denied the petition
for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Marilyn x x x. He maintains that, 'Pinabayaan lang kmning pamilya niya, hindi naman niya sinasabi kung saan
contrary to the conclusion reached by the trial court, he was able to establish siya hahanapin.' She did not inform us of her whereabouts.
by the quantum of evidence required, the claimed psychological incapacity of COURT
his wife.
Is that the only reason why you want your marriage with her dissolved?
The argument of Nicolas R. Matudan fails to persuade Us.
WITNESS Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children.
Yes, your honor.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of
As correctly observed by the RTC, abandonment by a spouse, by itself,
however, does not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity within the should be given great respect by our courts.
contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that such abandonment
is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes the spouse (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
concerned completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
marital state. handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be
quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
Indeed, the term 'psychological incapacity' to be a ground for the nullity of
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements established in Santos v.
marriage. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less than a mental not Court of Appeals that psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a)
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. These requisites must
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by be strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nu1lity of marriage
the parties to the marriage. based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano Molina, the following or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
definitive guidelines were laid down in resolving petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code: Using the above standards, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's
evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent-appellee is psychologically
unfit to discharge the duties expected of her as a wife.
plaintiff: Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of
the clinical psychologist cannot be relied upon to substantiate the petitioner-
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or appellant's theory of the psychological incapacity of his wife.
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below.
The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-appellee's condition
(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the
was based mainly on the information supplied by her husband, the
celebration' of the marriage, petitioner, and to some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy,
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at the time the
permanent or incurable. respondent left and therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well.
Also, Maricel would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the case because she could not have been there when the spouses were married
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. and could not have been expected to know what was happening between
her parents until long after her birth. On the other hand; as the petitioning
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68
spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased,
up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as
and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can
hardly be considered as credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v.Angelita Personality Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives
Suazo, et al., is illuminating on this score: as manifestations of the same. The report neither explained the
incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion
respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some
evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the psychological evaluation incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.
report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the
psychologist evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an indirect xxxx
manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming from
Dr. Tayag's testimony during her cross-examination as well as her
Jocelyn whose bias for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the
statements in the Sworn Affidavit are no different.
source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon,
the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care When asked to explain the personality disorder of Marilyn, Dr. Tayag simply
and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of standards replied:
outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment
of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a Q: On her case you assessed her as, likewise, suffering from a personality
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable. disorder characterized by Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Anti-Social
Trait. Will you please tell to the Court what do you mean by that personality
xxxx disorder?
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager A: In layman's term, once you are being labeled as a narcissistic [sic], this is
information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a person whose preoccupation are all toward his own self satisfaction both
a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an materially or emotionally at the expense of somebody. They have what you
objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelita's psychological condition. While the called [sic] strong sense of entitlement thinking that she can get away
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's whatever [sic] she wants to in pursuit of her own satisfaction at the expense
psychological condition, this is not true for Angelito's. The methodology of somebody. And this is what happened to the respondent. She gave more
employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness consideration to her own satisfaction material wise at the expense of social
of examination required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a embarrassment of the children because of what happened to her.
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the
Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity On the other hand, in her Sworn Affidavit, Dr. Tayag stated:
exists.
7. Without a doubt, Marilyn is suffering from a form of personality disorder
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was that rooted [sic] the downfall of their marriage. As based on the DSM-IV,
similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's behavioral disposition fits with individuals with NARCISSISTIC
respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti-social traits, as characterized by her
one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay evidence as disregard for and violation of the rights of others as well as her failure to
proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.' conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by
repeatedly performing acts that are clearly immoral and socially despised.
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the Such is also depicted through his [sic] deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated
psychological condition of the respondent-appellee to be insufficient to lying and conning methods she used upon others in order to achieve
warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented personal profit or pleasure. In addition, her consistent irresponsibility, as
Marilyn from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. In said indicated by her repeated failure to sustain consistent work behavior or
report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from Narcissistic honor financial obligations and her lack of remorse, as indicated by being
indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another. permanent as to render her incapable of assuming her marriage obligations;
x x x. And such condition is considered to [sic] grave, severe, long lasting that the nullification of his marriage to Marilyn is not an affront to the
and incurable by any treatment available. institutions of marriage and family, but will actually protect the sanctity
thereof because in effect, it will discourage individuals with psychological
Accordingly, even if We assume that Marilyn is really afflicted with disorders that prevent them from assuming marital obligations from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits, in the absence of any
remaining in the sacred bond;21 that the issue of whether psychological
showing that the same actually incapacitated her from fulfilling her essential incapacity exists as a ground to nullify one's marriage is a legal question; and
marital obligations, such disorder cannot be a valid basis for declaring
that the totality of his evidence and Marilyn's failure to refute the same
Nicolas' marriage to Marilyn as null and void under Article 36 of the Family despite due notice demonstrate that he is entitled to a declaration of nullity
Code. To be sure, jurisprudence has declared that not every psychological
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the marriage a nullity
under Article 36. '[T]he meaning of 'psychological incapacity' [is confined] to Respondent's Arguments
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
In its Comment22 praying for denial, the Republic argues that the Petition
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
calls for an evaluation of facts, thus violating the rule that a petition for
marriage.'
review on certiorari should be confined to legal questions. Citing Perez-
All told, We find that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in Ferraris v. Ferraris,23which decrees as follows-
rendering its assailed Decision:
Tue issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827, the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the
is AFFIRMED. province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
SO ORDERED.18 (Citations omitted) determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 23, 2012 trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,
Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant Petition. save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of
the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the
In a November 19, 2014 Resolution,19 this Court resolved to give due course admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
to the Petition. which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when
there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case.
Issue
(Citations omitted)
Petitioner mainly questions the CA's appreciation of the case, insisting that
the State argues that the instant case should be dismissed instead.
he was able to prove Marilyn's psychological incapacity. 1âwphi1
The public respondent adds that allegations and proof of irresponsibility,
Petitioner's Arguments
immaturity, selfishness, indifference, and abandonment of the family do not
In his Petition and Reply,20 petitioner argues that contrary to the CA's automatically justify a conclusion of psychological incapacity under Article 36
findings, he was able to prove Marilyn's psychological incapacity which is of the Family Code; that the intent of the law is to confine the meaning of
rooted in Dr. Tayag's diagnosis that she was suffering from Narcissistic psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders -
Personality Disorder which existed even before their marriage, and continued existing at the time of the marriage - clearly demonstrating an utter
to subsist thereafter; that her illness is grave, serious, incurable, and insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and
depriving the spouse of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the The Court agrees.
marital bond he/she is about to assume; that petitioner failed to show how
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony;
each of Marilyn's claimed negative traits affected her ability to perform her
the judicial affidavits and testimonies of his daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag;
essential marital obligations; that the supposed psychological evaluation of
and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the psychological
Marilyn was in fact based on the one-sided, self-serving, and biased
condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed evaluation of Marilyn's
information supplied by petitioner and Maricel - which renders the same
psychological condition was based solely on petitioner's account, since
unreliable and without credibility; that petitioner's real reason for seeking
Marilyn did not participate in the proceedings.
nullification is Marilyn's abandonment of the family; and that all in all,
petitioner failed to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately
of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity. establish the party's psychological condition."28 "[T]he complete facts should
allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
Our Ruling
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage." 29 Petitioner's
The Court denies the Petition. judicial affidavit and testimony during trial, however, fail to show gravity and
juridical antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of
The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals24taught us that
guilt and was involved in "activities defying social and moral ethics," 30 and
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be that she was, among others, irrational, irresponsible, immature, and self-
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently and particularly elaborate on
Thus, the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the party would be these allegations, particularly the degree of Marilyn's claimed irresponsibility,
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be
immaturity, or selfishness. This is compounded by the fact that petitioner
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt contradicted his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily
manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or,
married and never had a fight, which is why they begot four children; and
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party the only reason for his filing Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 was Marilyn's
involved."25 In this connection, the burden of proving psychological
complete abandonment of the marriage and family when she left to work
incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant to Republic v. Court of Appeals,26or abroad.
the Molina case.
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental-- not merely
precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the psychological
physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
of the psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family
not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together,
incapacity should be established by the totality of evidence presented during
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is
trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
existence of the psychological incapacity. 27
meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. Q- disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
08-62827 on the ground that the totality of petitioner's evidence failed to meaning and significance to the marriage. 31
sufficiently prove that Marilyn was psychologically unfit to enter marriage - in
short, while petitioner professed psychological incapacity, he could not
establish its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very least. Anent Dr. Tayag's assessment of Mary Grace's condition, the Court finds the
At most, they fail to sufficiently establish the degree of Marilyn's claimed same as unfounded. Rumbaua provides some guidelines on how the courts
psychological incapacity. should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions
for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz.:
On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only two years
old when Marilyn left the family. Growing up, she may have seen the effects We' cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the
of Marilyn's abandonment - such as the lack of emotional and financial respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to
support; but she could not have any idea of her mother's claimed her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in favor of her cause
psychological incapacity, as well as the nature, history, and gravity thereof. cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions
Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's
deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the
psychological condition were not based on actual tests or interviews manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the
conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are based on the personal accounts of
respondent from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually
petitioner. This fact gave more significance and importance to petitioner's hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and
other pieces of evidence, which could have compensated for the deficiency in
responded to the doctor's probes.
the expert opinion which resulted from its being based solely on petitioner's
one-sided account. But since these other pieces of evidence could not be Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and
relied upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well. In one on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric,
decided case with a similar factual backdrop and involving the very same and unremorseful person who 'believes that the world revolves around him';
expert witness, this Court held: and who 'used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence
[petitioner] extended towards him.' x x x
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more
or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
that living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity
Grace's departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential
difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
her husband. respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at
the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr.
of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of
Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more convincing evidence to fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical,
prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former's
nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in
condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn's testimony is her Report --i.e., that the respondent suffered 'Narcissistic Personality
wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of
Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave
Glenn. Glenn's statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and and incurable' -is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from
Rodelito both referred to MaryGrace's traits and acts, which she exhibited
her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the
during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair
Mary Grace's alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement
they got married, they saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make
loving[,] caring and well[-] educated person" in Mary Grace.
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition
based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content

of such evidence.32
Finally, the identical rulings of the trial and appellate courts should be given
due respect and finality. This Court is not a trier of facts.
The issue of whether or not psychological inq1pacity exists in a given case

calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of G.R. No. 208790. January 21, 2015.*
the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the
province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze GLENN VIÑAS, petitioner, vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS,
or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual respondent.
determination. It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; The lack of
trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,
personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or
save for the most compelling and cogent reasons x x x.33
psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no need to resolve the other issues of marriage.—The lack of personal examination or assessment of the
raised. They have become irrelevant. respondent by a psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. “If the totality of evidence
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2012 Decision and presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
August 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95392 actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted
are AFFIRMED. to.”
SO ORDERED. Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; The Supreme Court
(SC) understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s
Associate Justice psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner
from complying with what the law requires.—The Court understands the
inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the statements of witnesses who
can attest to the antecedence of a person’s psychological incapacity, but
such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner from complying with what the
law requires. While the Court also commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes,
the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the
Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to
comply with her obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Angelito V. Maraña for petitioner.

RESOLUTION Before Glenn decided to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Mary Grace, he consulted the latter’s friends. They informed
REYES, J.: him that Mary Grace came from a broken family and was left to be cared for
For review is the Decision1 rendered on January 29, 2013 and by her aunts and nannies. The foregoing circumstance must have
Resolution2 issued on August 7, 2013 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- contributed to her sense of insecurity and difficulty in adjusting to married
G.R. CV No. 96448. The CA set aside the Decision3 dated January 29, 2010 life.8
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pablo City, Branch 30, in Civil Case To ease their marital problems, Glenn sought professional guidance and
No. SP-6564(09), which declared the marriage between Glenn Vifias (Glenn)
submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist Nedy
and Mary Grace Parel-Vifias (Mary Grace) as null and void. Tayag (Dr. Tayag). Dr. Tayag found him as "amply aware of his marital
Antecedents roles" and "capable of maintaining a mature and healthy heterosexual
relationship."9
On April 26, 1999, Glenn and Mary Grace, then 25 and 23 years old,
respectively, got married in civil rites held in Lipa City, Batangas. 4 Mary Grace On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the
was already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to data she had gathered from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito),
weakness and malnourishment. Glenn alleged that the infant’s death was who knew Mary Graceway back in college.
caused by Mary Grace’s heavy drinking and smoking during her pregnancy. Mary Grace is the eldest among four siblings. She is a college graduate. She
The couple lived together under one roof. Glenn worked as a bartender, belongs to a middle class family. Her father is an overseas contract worker,
while Mary Grace was a production engineer. while her mother is a housewife. At the time Dr. Tayag prepared her report,
Mary Grace was employed in Dubai and romantically involved with another
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with man.10
Glenn. Glenn subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai.
At the time the instant petition was filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet. According to Rodelito, Mary Grace verbally abused and physically harmed
Glenn during the couple’s fights. Mary Grace is also ill-tempered and
On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed a Petition 5 for the declaration of nullity of carefree, while Glenn is jolly, kind and family-oriented.11
his marriage with Mary Grace.He alleged that Mary Grace was insecure,
extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext Dr. Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic
to be able to leave the house. She thoroughly enjoyed the night life, and Personality Disorder with anti-social traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary
drank and smoked heavily even whenshe was pregnant. Further, Mary Grace Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual love, trust, respect,
refused to perform even the most essential household chores of cleaning and commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag recommended the
cooking. According to Glenn, Mary Grace had not exhibited the foregoing propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage. 12
traits and behavior during their whirlwind courtship. 6
In drawing her conclusions, Dr. Tayag explained that:
Glenn likewise alleged that Mary Grace was not remorseful about the death The said disorder [of Mary Grace] is considered to be severe, serious, grave,
of the infant whom she delivered. She lived as if she were single and was
permanent and chronic in proportion and is incurable by any form of clinical
unmindful of her husband’s needs. She was self-centered, selfish and intervention. It has already been deeply embedded within her system as it
immature. When Glenn confronted her about her behavior, she showed
was found to have started as early as her childhood years. Because of such,
indifference. She eventually left their home without informing Glenn. Glenn it has caused her to be inflexible, maladaptive and functionally[-]impaired
later found out that she left for an overseas employment in Dubai. 7
especially with regards to heterosexual dealings.
Such disorder of [Mary Grace]is mainly characterized by grandiosity, need for On February 18, 2009, Glenn filed before the RTC a Petition for the
admiration and lack of empathy[,] along with her pattern of disregard for Declaration of Nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. Substituted service of
and violation of the rights of others[,] which utterly distorted her perceptions summons was made upon Mary Grace through her aunt, Susana
and views especially in terms of a fitting marital relationship. Such disorder Rosita.14 Mary Grace filed no answer and did not attend any of the
manifested in [Mary Grace] through her unrelenting apathy, sense of proceedings before the RTC.
entitlement and arrogance. Throughout her union with [Glenn], she has
During the trial, the testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag and Rodelito were
exhibited a heightened sense of self as seen in her marked inability to show
offered as evidence. Glenn and Rodelito described Mary Grace as outgoing,
proper respect for her husband. x x x She is too headstrong that most of the
carefree, and irresponsible. She is the exact opposite of Glenn, who is
time[,] she would do things her own way and would not pay close attention
conservative and preoccupied with his work.15 On her part, Dr. Tayag
to what her husband needed. She had been a wife who constantly struggled
reiterated her findings in the psychological report dated December 29, 2008.
for power and dominance in their relationship and [Glenn], being too
considerate to her, was often subjected to her control.x x x She is into many Ruling of the RTC
vices and loved hanging out with her friends at night[,] and she even got
involved in an illicit relationship[,] which was still going on up to the present On January 29, 2010, the RTC rendered its Decision16 declaring the marriage
time. x x x. between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on account of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. The RTC cited the following as grounds:
The root cause of [Mary Grace’s]personality aberration can be said to have
emanated from the various forms of unfavorable factors in her milieu way The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn] warrants [the] grant of the
back as early as her childhood years[,] which is the crucial stage in the life of petition. Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil.
a person as thisis the time when the individual’s character and behavior are For the best interest of the parties, it is best that the legal bond between
shaped. [Mary Grace] came from a dysfunctional family with lenient and them be severed.
tolerating parents[,] who never impose any restrictions [upon] their children.
The testimonies of [Glenn] and his witness [Rodelito] portray the miserable
Considering such fact, she apparently failed to feel the love and affection of
life [Glenn] had with [Mary Grace] who is a Narcissistic Personality
the nurturing figures that she had[,] who were supposed to bethe first to
Disordered person with anti[-]social traits and who does not treat him as her
show concern [for] her. x x x She has acquired a domineering character as
husband. [Glenn] and [Mary Grace] are separated in fact since the year
she was not taught to have boundaries in her actions because of the laxity
2006. [Mary Grace] abandoned [Glenn] without telling the latter where to
she had from her caregivers and also because she grew up to be the eldest
go. x x x Had it not for the insistence of[Glenn] that he would not know the
in the brood. She sees to it that she is the one always followed with regards
whereabouts of his wife. The law provides that [a] husband and [a] wife are
to making decisions and always mandates people to submit to her wishes.
obliged to live together, [and] observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. x x x
She has not acquired the very essence of morality [and] has certainly
For all intents and purposes, however, [Mary Grace] was in a quandary on
learned set of unconstructive traits that further made her too futile to
what it really means. x x x.
assume mature roles. Morals and values were not instilled in her young mind
that as she went on with her life, she never learned to restrain herself from From the testimony of [Glenn], it was established that [Mary Grace] failed to
doing ill-advised things even if she isamply aware of the depravity of her comply with the basic marital obligations of mutual love, respect, mutual
actions. help and support. [Glenn] tried his best to have their marriage saved but
[Mary Grace] did not cooperate with him. [Mary Grace] is x x x, unmindful of
The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of a juridical antecedence as
her marital obligations.
it was already inher system even prior to the solemnization of her marriage
with [Glenn]. x x x.13 (Underlining ours) The Court has no reason to doubt the testimony of [Dr. Tayag], a clinical
psychologist with sufficient authority to speak on the subject of psychological
incapacity. She examined [Glenn], and was able to gather sufficient data and the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
information about [Mary Grace]. x x x This [Narcissistic] personality disorder utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
of[Mary Grace] is ingrained in her personality make-up, so grave and so marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
permanent, incurable and difficult to treat. It is conclusive that this personal celebrated. The psychological condition must be characterized by (a) gravity,
incapacity leading to psychological incapacity is already pre-existing before (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
the marriage and was only manifested after. It has become grave,
In the instant case, [Glenn] tried to prove that [Mary Grace] was carefree,
permanent and incurable.17 (Underlining ours and italics in the original)
outgoing, immature, and irresponsible which made her unable to perform the
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved for reconsideration but it essential obligations of marriage. He likewise alleged that she refused to
was denied by the RTC in its Order18dated December 1, 2010. communicate with him to save the marriage and eventually left him to work
abroad. To Our mind, the above actuations of [Mary Grace] do not make out
The Appeal of the OSG and the Ruling of the CA a case of psychological incapacity on her part.
On appeal before the CA, the OSG claimed that no competent evidence exist
While it is true that [Glenn’s] testimony was corroborated by [Dr. Tayag], a
proving that Mary Grace indeed suffers from a Narcissistic Personality psychologist who conducted a psychological examination on [Glenn],
Disorder, which prevents her from fulfilling her marital obligations.
however, said examination was conducted only on him and no evidence was
Specifically, the RTC decision failed to cite the root cause of Mary Grace’s shown that the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] was characterized
disorder. Further, the RTC did not state its own findings and merely relied on
by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
Dr. Tayag’s statements anent the gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s
condition. The RTC resorted to mere generalizations and conclusions Certainly, the opinion of a psychologist would be of persuasive value in
sansdetails. Besides, what psychological incapacity contemplates is determining the psychological incapacity of a person as she would be in the
downright incapacity to assume marital obligations. In the instant case, best position to assess and evaluate the psychological condition of the
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity and couple, she being an expert in this field of study of behavior. Although the
irresponsibility were shown, but these do not warrant the grant of Glenn’s psychologist stated that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic
petition. Mary Grace may be unwilling to assume her marital duties, but this Personality Disorder, she did not fully explain the root cause of the disorder
does not translate into a psychological illness.19 nor did she makea conclusion as to its gravity or permanence. Moreover, she
admitted that she was not able to examine the respondent[,] hence, the
Glenn, on the other hand, sought the dismissal of the OSG’s appeal. information provided to her may be subjective and self-serving. Essential in
On January 29, 2013, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing this petition is the allegation of the root causeof the spouse’s psychological
the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently
valid and subsisting. The CA stated the reasons below: proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must
be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriageand
In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "psychological shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be
incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such non-complied marital obligations
marriage which, asso expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity explained in the decision.
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment
of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to
Unfortunately for [Glenn], the expert testimony of his witness did not Verily, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to
establish the root cause of the psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] nor [Glenn]. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
was such ground alleged in the complaint. We reiterate the ruling of the continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
Supreme Court on this score, to wit: the root cause of the psychological rooted from the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the
incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified; b) alleged in the validity of marriage and unity of the family.20 (Citations omitted, underlining
complaint; c) sufficiently proven by experts; and d) clearly explained in the ours and emphasis and italics in the original)
decision.
The CA, through the herein assailed Resolution21 dated August 7, 2013,
Discoursing on this issue, the Supreme Court, in Republic of the Philippines denied the Motion for Reconsideration22filed by Glenn.
vs. Court of Appeals and Molina, has this to say:
Issue
"Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
Unperturbed, Glenn now raises before this Court the issue of whether or not
psychological– not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
sufficient evidence exist justifying the RTC’s declaration of nullity of his
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or
marriage with Mary Grace.
one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, In support thereof, Glenn points out that each petition for the declaration of
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such nullity of marriage should be judged according to its own set of facts, and
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the not on the basis of assumptions, predilections or generalizations. The RTC
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis x x x[,] nevertheless[,] judge should pains takingly examine the factual milieu, while the CA must
suchroot cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its refrain from substituting its own judgment for that of the trial
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by court.23 Further, Glenn argues that in Marcos v. Marcos,24 the Court ruled
qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists." that it is not a sine qua non requirement for the respondent spouse to be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist before a marriage could
The Supreme Court further went on to proclaim, that"Article 36 of the Family
be declared as a nullity.25 However, if the opinion of an expert is sought, his
Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
or her testimony should be considered as decisive evidence.26 Besides, the
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves". It refers to a serious
findings of the trial court regarding the credibility of the witnesses should be
psychological illness afflicting a party evenbefore the celebration of the
respected.27
marriage. It is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is In seeking the denial of the instant petition, the OSG emphasizes that the
about to assume." Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a arguments Glenn raise for our consideration are mere reiterations of the
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of matters already resolved by the CA.28
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. Ruling of the Court
From the foregoing, We cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage of the The instant petition lacks merit.
parties for the obvious failure of [Glenn] to show that the alleged
The lack of personal examination orassessment of the respondent by a
psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is characterized by gravity, juridical
psychologist or psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the
antecedence and incurability; and for his failure to observe the guidelines
declaration of nullity of marriage. "If the totality of evidence presented is
outlined in the afore-cited cases.
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." 29
In the instant petition, however, the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person’s refusal or
Tayag and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to
sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity and incurability of Mary Grace’s some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. 31 (Citations
condition. The evidence merely shows that Mary Grace is outgoing, strong- omitted, underlining ours and emphasis in the original)
willed and not inclined to perform household chores. Further, she is
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more
employed in Dubai and is romantically-involved with another man. She has
or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing established fact shows
not been maintaining lines of communication with Glenn at the time the
that living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary
latter filed the petition before the RTC. Glenn, on the other hand, is
Grace’s departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal or mere
conservative, family-oriented and is the exact opposite of Mary Grace. While
difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with
Glenn and Mary Grace possess incompatible personalities, the latter’s acts
her husband.
and traits do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity. Rumbaua v.
Rumbaua30 is emphatic that: Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr.
Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more convincing evidence to
In Bier v. Bier, we ruled that it was not enough that respondent, alleged to
prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former’s
be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn’s testimony is
obligations, or was unwilling toperform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of
supervening disabling factor – an adverse integral element in the
Glenn. Glenn’s statements are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and
respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from
Rodelito both referred to Mary Grace’s traits and acts, which she exhibited
complying with his essential marital obligations – had to be shown and was
during the marriage. Hence, there isnary a proof on the antecedence of Mary
not shown in this cited case.
Grace’s alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months before they
In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn refusal to cohabit with the got married, they saw each other almost everyday.32 Glenn saw "a loving[,]
petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be rooted caring and well[-]educated person"33 in Mary Grace.
in some psychological illness. x x x Likewise, the respondent’s act of living
Anent Dr. Tayag’s assessment of Mary Grace’s condition, the Court finds the
with another woman four years into the marriage cannot automatically be
same as unfounded.1âwphi1 Rumbaua34provides some guidelines on how the
equated with a psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence
courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in
was shown that promiscuity was a trait already existing at the inception of
petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz:
marriage. In fact, petitioner herself admitted that respondent was caring and
faithful when they were going steady and for a time after their marriage; We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the respondent’s
their problems only came in later. psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only
one side – the petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be
x x x To use the words of Navales v. Navales:
doubted. While this circumstance alone does notdisqualify the psychologist
Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the
ofand to assume basic marital obligations. Mere "difficulty," "refusal" or application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards in the manner we
"neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent
the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating from the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and
psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the the doctor’s probes.
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner’s narrations, and particulars, most notably on how the respondent can besaid to be suffering
on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-centered, egocentric, from narcissistic personality disorder; why and to what extent the disorder is
and unremorseful person who "believes that the world revolves around him"; grave and incurable; how and why it was already present at the time of the
and who "used love as a…deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence marriage; and the effects of the disorder on the respondent’s awareness of
[petitioner] extended towards him." x x x. and his capability to undertake the duties and responsibilities of marriage. All
these are critical to the success of the petitioner’s case.
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity Second, her testimony was short on factual basis for her diagnosis because it
existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential was wholly based on what the petitioner related toher. x x x If a
obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason
respondent’s narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No
the inception of the marriage. Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature such independent evidence, however, appears on record to have been
of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of gathered in this case, particularly about the respondent’s early life and
fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, associations, and about events on orabout the time of the marriage and
nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag’s conclusion in immediately thereafter. Thus, the testimony and report appearto us to be no
her Report – i.e., that the respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality more than a diagnosis that revolves around the one-sided and meagre facts
Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave that the petitioner related, and were all slanted to support the conclusion
and incurable" – is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from that a ground exists to justify the nullification of the marriage. We say this
her previous characterization and portrayal of the respondent. While the because only the baser qualities of the respondent’s life were examined and
various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair given focus; none of these qualities were weighed and balanced with the
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement better qualities, such as his focus on having a job, his determination to
cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. To make improve himself through studies, his care and attention in the first six
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological condition months of the marriage, among others. The evidence fails to mention also
based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different what character and qualities the petitioner brought into her marriage, for
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content example, why the respondent’s family opposed the marriage and what
of such evidence. events led the respondent to blame the petitioner for the death of his
mother, if this allegation is at all correct. To be sure, these are important
xxxx because not a few marriages have failed, not because of psychological
A careful reading of Dr. Tayag’s testimony reveals that she failed to establish incapacity of either or both of the spouses, but because of basic
the fact that at the time the parties were married, respondent was already incompatibilities and marital developments that do not amount to
suffering from a psychological defect that deprived him of the ability to psychological incapacity. x x x.35 (Citations omitted and underlining ours)
assume the essential duties and responsibilities of marriage. Neither did she In the case at bar, Dr. Tayag made general references to Mary Grace’s status
adequately explain howshe came to the conclusion that respondent’s
as the eldest among her siblings,36her father’s being an overseas contract
condition was grave and incurable. x x x worker and her very tolerant mother, a housewife.37 These, however, are not
xxxx sufficient to establish and explain the supposed psychological incapacity of
Mary Grace warranting the declaration of the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
First, what she medically described was not related or linked to the
respondent’s exact condition except in a very general way. In short, her The Court understands the inherent difficulty attendant to obtaining the
testimony and report were rich in generalities but disastrously short on statements of witnesses who can attest to the antecedence of a person’s
psychological incapacity, but such difficulty does not exempt a petitioner

from complying with what the law requires. While the Court also
commiserates with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence
presented provides inadequate basis for the Court to conclude that Mary
Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her obligations
as Glenn’s spouse.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 29,
2013 and Resolution dated August 7, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 96448 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice G.R. No. 222541. February 15, 2017.*
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and

COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Incapacity; Psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.—The policy of
the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social
institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. Because of this, the
Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this regard, psychological incapacity
as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental — not
merely physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under Article
68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. In
other words, it must be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Expert Opinions; An expert opinion is not that Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts
absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under Article the marital bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; a
36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be Thus, absent sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within
duly established.—An expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be the context of Article 36, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility
dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the marital tie.
of the evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. The evidence
of Appeals.
need not necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can
come from persons intimately related to the spouses, i.e., relatives and close The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
friends, who could clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse’s
condition at or about the time of the marriage. In other words, the Republic Brandy L. Marzan for petitioner.
v. Molina, 268 SCRA 198 (1997), guidelines continue to apply but its
Public Attorney’s Office for private respondent.
application calls for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity. To be DECISION
clear, however, the totality of the evidence must still establish the
characteristics that Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), laid down: gravity, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
incurability, and juridical antecedence. Before the Court is this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological incapacity must be more Decision2 dated May 29, 2015 and the Resolution3 dated December 1, 2015
than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of the of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745, which reversed the
marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other failed Decision4 dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person.—In sum, Dr. Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891 declaring the marriage of Jose O.
Tayag’s assessment, even when taken together with the various testimonies, Del Rosario (Jose) and Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of
failed to show that Jose’s immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the Family Code, as
level of psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the amended.6
parties’ marriage. To reiterate and emphasize, psychological incapacity must The Facts
be more than just a “difficulty,” “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of
the marital obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen (17) years old,
failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married person. There must be sometime in December 1983 at a party in Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person — an adverse Vizcaya.7 Very soon, they became romantically involved. 8
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a domestic helper.
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations
During this period, Rachel allegedly provided for Jose's tuition fees for his
essential to marriage — which must be linked with the manifestations of the
college education. Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on
psychological incapacity.
December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Jose City, Nueva
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named Wesley, on December 1, 1993.
Family Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at On February 19, 1995, they renewed their vows in a church ceremony held
the time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves; a marriage, no matter in the Philippine Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya. 9
how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage.—It is well to reiterate
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered only to his own
helper/caregiver and has been working there ever since, only returning to fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness marked by his lack of depth when it
the Philippines every year for a vacation. Through her efforts, she was able comes to his marital commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his
to acquire a house and lot in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva shortcomings.19
Ecija.10
For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition. Jose maintained
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition 11 for declaration of nullity of that: (a) he had dutifully performed all of his marital and parental duties and
marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11-891, alleging that obligations to his family; (b) he had provided for his family's financial and
Jose was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital emotional needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and maintenance of
obligations. In support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their their conjugal home. He claimed that although they occasionally had
marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his duties as husband misunderstandings, they nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out
and father. According to Rachel, Jose was hot tempered and violent; he that their first major argument was when Rachel decided to go to Hongkong
punched her in the shoulder a few days before their church wedding, causing to work; that they continued to communicate through mail during her stay
it to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation expenses of his overseas; and that he remained supportive of Rachel and would advise her
parents; he hit his own father with a pipe, causing the latter to fall to give her family the financial aid that they need so long as she would not
unconscious, which forced them to leave Jose's parents' house where they sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-marital affair and
were then staying; and he even locked her out of their house in the middle having laid hand on Rachel and their son.20 Jose presented as well the
of the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her relatives testimony of Faustino Rigos to support his allegations. 21
from the bus terminal, which he refused to perform. Rachel added that Jose
The RTC Ruling
would represent himself as single, would flirt openly, and had an extra-
marital affair which she discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the marriage between
message to her sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating: "love, kung ayaw Jose and Rachel void on the ground of psychological incapacity. It relied on
mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang dito." 12 Another text the findings and testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that Jose's APD interferes
message read: "Dumating lang ang asawa mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext with his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties, as he in fact
at tumawag sa 'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and even refused to take responsibility for his actions, notwithstanding the
Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman with their child inside their overwhelming evidence against him.23
conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose would refuse any chance of
sexual intimacy between them as they slowly drifted apart. 13 Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to seek
employment, squandering of their money on vices, violent nature, and
Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran smoothly during its infidelity are not the serious, grave, and permanent psychological condition
early years, and it was only later in their marriage that Jose started that incapacitates him to perform his marital obligations required by Article
frequenting bars and engaging in drinking sessions. 14 36 of the Family Code, as amended. At most, they are personality
defects, i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness, which may be
Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley15 and her sisters, Beverly
considered as grounds for legal separation under Article 55 25 of the same
and Jocelyn Cabusora,16 which corroborated her allegations, as well as the
code.26
testimony17 of Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who prepared the
Psychological Report18 (Report) on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr. The CA Ruling
Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on her interview with Rachel and
Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the ruling of the
characterized by: (a) his lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his RTC,28 holding that the totality of the evidence Rachel presented was not
enough to sustain a finding that Jose is psychologically incapacitated to provided under Article 6837 of the Family Code, among others,38 include their
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.29 Particularly, the CA mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and
declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek employment, his act render help and support.39 In other words, it must be a malady that is so
of squandering their money on his vices, and his temper and alleged grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
propensity for violence were not so grave and permanent as to deprive him responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.40
of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological incapacity under
sufficient to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code; at best,
Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it
they showed that Jose was irresponsible, insensitive, or emotionally
must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of
immature which nonetheless do not amount to the downright incapacity that
carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical
the law requires. Additionally, the CA pointed out that the root cause of the
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature, and the incapacity
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
itself were not sufficiently explained as Dr. Tayag's Report failed to show the
marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise the
relation between Jose's "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition," on
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. 42 The Court laid
one hand, and grave and permanent psychological malady, on the other.
down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's testimony was detailed, it only
Article 36 in Republic v. Molina43 (Molina) whose salient points are footnoted
offered a general evaluation on the supposed root cause of Jose's personality
below,44 that incorporated the basic requirements the Court established
disorder.30
in Santos.
Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which was, however, denied by the CA
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that an expert opinion
in a Resolution32 dated December 1, 2015; hence, this petition.
is not absolutely necessary and may be dispensed with in a petition under
The Issue Before the Court Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of the evidence shows that
psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred
incurability can be duly established.45 The evidence need not necessarily
in reversing the RTC's finding of psychological incapacity. come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse, but can come from persons
The Court's Ruling intimately related to the spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could
clearly testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or about
The petition lacks merit. the time of the marriage.46 In other words, the Molina guidelines continue to
apply but its application calls for a more flexible approach in considering
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
basic social institution,33 and marriage as the foundation of the
incapacity.47 To be clear, however, the totality of the evidence must still
family.34 Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as legally
establish the characteristics that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and
inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this
juridical antecedence.
regard, psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage under
Article 3635 of the Family Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein respondent's
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could not be equated with
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 36 It should refer psychological incapacity as it was not shown that these acts are
to no less than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a manifestations of a disordered personality which make her completely unable
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity. 49 In Taring v. Taring,50 the
Court emphasized that "irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's conception.
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by Neither did the Report specify the reasons why and to what extent Jose's
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as [these] may only APD is serious and grave, and how it incapacitated him to understand and
be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or neglect to undertake the comply with his marital obligations. 1awp++i1 Lastly, the Report hastily
obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor home condition"
Article 36 of the Family Code addresses."51 The Court equally did not that automatically resulted in his APD equivalent to psychological incapacity
consider as tantamount to psychological incapacity the emotional immaturity, without, however, specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition
irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity, and other behavioral disorders invoked by antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits during his
the petitioning spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,52 Republic v. Encelan,53 Republic v. adolescent years that could explain his behavior during the marriage.
De Gracia,54 and Republic v. Romero,55 to name a few, and thus dismissed
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview Jose to
their petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.
determine, at the very least, his background that could have given her a
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus, denies the petition. more accurate basis for concluding that his APD is rooted in his childhood or
Based on the totality of the evidence presented, there exists insufficient was already existing at the inception of the marriage. To be sure, established
factual or legal basis to conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or parameters do not require that the expert witness personally examine the
infidelity amount to psychological incapacity. party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity provided
corroborating evidence are presented sufficiently establishing the required
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely showed that Jose: legal parameters.57 Considering that her Report was based solely on Rachel's
(1) would often indulge in drinking sprees; (2) tends to become violent when
side whose bias cannot be doubted, the Report and her testimony deserved
he gets drunk; (2) avoids discharging his duties as a father to Wesley and as the application of a more rigid and stringent standards which the RTC failed
a husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts openly and
to apply.
represented himself as single; and (4) engaged in an extra-marital affair with
a bar girl who he brought to the conjugal dwelling on several occasions. In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together with the various
Significantly, Rachel admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early testimonies, failed to show that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, and
years. Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply summarized Rachel infidelity rise to the level of psychological incapacity that would justify the
and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with APD and proceeded to nullification of the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize,
conclude that Jose's "personality flaw is deemed to be severe, grave, and psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or
have become deeply embedded within his adaptive systems since early "neglect" in the performance of the marital obligations; it is not enough that
childhood years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent component of his a party prove that the other failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a
life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair despite any form of married person.58 There must be proof of a natal or supervening disabling
intervention."56 factor in the person - an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not explain in detail complying with the obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked
how Jose's APD could be characterized as grave, deeply rooted in his
with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity. 59
childhood, and incurable within the jurisprudential parameters for
establishing psychological incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family Code, as
the concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its classification, amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and to what extent Jose exhibited grounds for divorce manifest themselves;60 a marriage, no matter how
this disorder or how and to what extent his alleged actions and behavior unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient
correlate with his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's condition has
evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the context of Article

36, the Court is compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 29, 2015
and the Resolution dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 102745 are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family Code, as
amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 200072. June 20, 2016.*
PHILIP YU, petitioner, vs. VIVECA LIM YU, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgments; Section 2, Rule 47

of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that judgments may be
annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction or denial
of due process.—Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character,
allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other
adequate remedy. Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. The objective of the remedy
of annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment
or final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to
prosecute his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is
lack of jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to
the original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final
order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may
on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new
trial had been granted therein.
Same; Same; Same; Extrinsic Fraud; Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a
fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside of the trial of the
case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing
party.—Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by
the prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Fraud is extrinsic where
the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by
means of fraud or deception, as by keeping him away from court, or by a summons and order of the court by registered mail to the defendant’s last
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had known address, also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or judge may consider sufficient.
where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a
party and connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that Same; Same; Annulment of Judgments; Extrinsic Fraud; Due Process; When
there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are defendants are deprived of such opportunity to duly participate in, and even
reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the be informed of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful scheme employed by the
former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. Ultimately, prevailing litigant, there exists a violation of their due process rights.—
the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing Indeed, due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. be notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests. When
defendants are deprived of such opportunity to duly participate in, and even
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case be informed of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful scheme employed by the
against a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines prevailing litigant, as in this case, there exists a violation of their due process
because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless rights. Any judgment issued in violation thereof necessarily suffers a fatal
he voluntarily appears in court.—Summons is a writ by which the defendant infirmity for courts, as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected
is notified of the action brought against him. Through its service, the court to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be
acquires jurisdiction over his person. As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try considered as acting within their jurisdiction. This Court, therefore, deems as
any case against a defendant who does not reside and is not found in the proper the annulment of the Batangas court’s judgment issued without
Philippines because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his proper service of summons.
person unless he voluntarily appears in court. Section 15, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court, however, enumerates the actions in rem or quasi in rem PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
when Philippine courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of Appeals.
they have jurisdiction over the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the
nonresident defendant is not essential. The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Same; Same; Summons; Extraterritorial Service of Summons; Extraterritorial Aguirre, Abaño, Pamfilo, Paras, Pineda & Agustin Law Offices for petitioner.
service of summons may be effected under any of three (3) modes: (1) by
personal service out of the country, with leave of court; (2) by publication Zamora, Poblador, Vasquez & Bretaña for respondent.
and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by registered
mail to the defendant’s last known address, also with leave of court; or (3) DECISION
by any other means the judge may consider sufficient.—Under Section 15 of PERALTA, J.:
Rule 14, a defendant who is a nonresident and is not found in the country Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
may be served with summons by extraterritorial service in four instances: (1) Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated
when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the September 30, 2011 and Resolution2 dated January 5, 2012 of the Court of
action relates to, or the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111414 which granted the petition for the
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest, actual or contingent; (3) annulment of the Decision3 dated August 20, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
when the relief demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the (RTC), Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 10, Balayan, Batangas.
defendant from any interest in property located in the Philippines; or (4)
when the property of the defendant has been attached within the The factual antecedents are as follows.
Philippines. In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be
effected under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Lim Yu were married on
country, with leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the November 18, 1984. They had four children and maintained their conjugal
home at Room 1603 Horizon Condominium, Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Yu, pursuant to the Decision of Branch 10, RTC of Balayan,
Manila. In 1993, however, Viveca left the conjugal home with their four Batangas, which attained its finality on October 13, 2008. Since the
children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against Philip before the marriage of the parties was declared a nullity there is, therefore, no legal
RTC of Pasig City, Branch 261, for repeated physical violence, grossly basis to issue a decree of legal separation to the spouses whose marriage
abusive conduct against her and the children, sexual infidelity, and attempt has already been declared of no force and effect.
on her life. She prayed for permanent custody over the children, support,
and the dissolution and distribution of their conjugal partnership valued at WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition should be, as it is hereby
approximately P5,000,000.00.4chanrobleslaw DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
Philip denied the accusations against him claiming that it was Viveca who SO ORDERED.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
actually attacked him a few times. He narrated that his marriage to Viveca Claiming to be completely unaware of the proceedings before the RTC of
was arranged according to the Chinese tradition and that it was much later Balayan, Batangas, nullifying her marriage with Philip on the ground of her
when he discovered Viveca's excessively jealous, cynical, and insecure psychological incapacity, Viveca filed a Petition for Annulment of
behaviour. He countered that since she abandoned the family home, taking Judgment9 before the CA seeking to annul the Decision dated August 20,
their four children away, she was not entitled to support. She was, likewise, 2008 of said court. According to Viveca, jurisdiction over her person did not
unqualified to become the administrator of their conjugal funds, which had properly vest since she was not duly served with Summons. She alleged that
outstanding obligations. Thus, Philip prayed in his Counterclaim for the she was deprived of her right to due process when Philip fraudulently
declaration of nullity of their marriage due to Viveca's psychological declared that her address upon which she may be duly summoned was still
incapacity, rendering her incapable of complying with her marital at their conjugal home, when he clearly knew that she had long left said
obligations.5chanrobleslaw address for the United States of America. Viveca likewise maintained that
had Philip complied with the legal requirements for an effective service of
On April 24, 2007, however, Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw Counterclaim summons by publication, she would have been able to rightly participate in
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage revealing that he no longer had the the proceedings before the Batangas court.
desire to have his marriage declared void. Despite Viveca's fervent
opposition, the Pasig RTC granted the motion.6chanrobleslaw On September 30, 2011, the CA granted Viveca's petition ruling as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On July 1, 2009, the RTC of Pasig City rendered a Decision 7 dismissing the The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage affecting the personal
Petition for Legal Separation in the following wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary status of private respondent is in the nature of an action in rem. This is so
because the term "personal status" includes family relations, particularly the
From the facts obtaining in this case, the Court finds that the relations between husband and wife.
parties are in pari delicto warranting a denial of this
petition. Respondent's illicit relationship with Linda Daet and his repeated With this premise in mind, it is beyond cavil that the court a quo was
verbal and physical abuses towards petitioner come within the purview of justified in resorting to Summons by publication. Petitioner is a nonresident
pars. 8 and 1 of Art. 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines whereas defendant who left the Philippines with her children way back in 1997 and
petitioner's unjustifiable abandonment bringing with her their children has now been living in the United States of America. The court a quo validly
without the knowledge and consent of respondent and her assaulting acquired jurisdiction to hear and decide the case given that as adumbrated,
respondent with a 10-inch knife are those contemplated in pars. 10 and 9 of in a proceeding in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a
the same code. prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res.
Notwithstanding the foregoing Court's findings, the same becomes
moot with the declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties, Still and all, there is more to this case than meets the eye. Private
on the ground of the psychological incapacity of petitioner, Viveca
respondent knew that petitioner left the conjugal home on account II.
of their marital difficulties. She temporarily resided at her parent's house
in Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. But during the pendency of THE PUBLICATION OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO, SUMMONS, THE
the Legal Separation case, she lived in Quezon City. This much was COMPLAINT AS WELL AS THE DECISION RENDERED THEREIN IS NOTICE
revealed by private respondent himself in the Amended Answer TO THE WHOLE WORLD INCLUDING RESPONDENT. RESPONDENT WAS
with Counterclaim filed in the Legal Separation suit- THEREFORE CONSTRUCTIVELY NOTIFIED OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND WAS
"10. After abandoning the conjugal abode on 24 August 1993, NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS HAVING BEEN DULY NOTIFIED BY
petitioner resided at her parent's house in Richbelt Condominium, PUBLICATION.
Annapolis Street, Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, until she
moved to her present address in October 1993. x x x x
This knowledge notwithstanding, private respondent declared
before the court a quo that the "last known address" of petitioner III.
was still her conjugal abode at Unit 1603 Horizon Condominium,
Mcralco Avenue, Ortigas, Pasig City. While private respondent knew RESPONDENT HAS BEEN DOMICILED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
that it was well-nigh impossible for petitioner to FOR MORE THAN TEN (10) YEARS AND WHOSE ADDRESS IS UNKNOWN TO
receive Summons and other court notices at their former conjugal PETITIONER. AS FAR AS PETITIONER IS CONCERNED, UNIT 1603 HORIZON
home, still, he supplied the aforesaid address. CONDOMINIUM, MERALCO AVENUE, PASIG CITY IS THE LAST KNOWN
ADDRESS OF RESPONDENT, BEING THE CONJUGAL HOME.
We cannot turn a blind eye to the fact that private respondent
moved for the dismissal of his counterclaim for nullity of marriage
in the Legal Separation case in 2007 as he had by then had the IV.
sinister motive of filing the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage before the court a quo. Private respondent knew that if he PETITIONER IS CURRENTLY NOT A RESIDENT OF THE CONJUGAL HOME.
breathed a word on the filing and pendency of the latter Petition,
petitioner would vigorously resist it as revealed by her tenacious
opposition in the proceedings before the RTC-Pasig.
V.
The deceitful scheme employed by private respondent deprived
petitioner of her constitutional right to due process which ensued in THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND/OR THE OFFICE OF THE
her failure to participate in the proceedings before the court a quo. CITY PROSECUTOR OF BALAYAN, BATANGAS, APPEARED AS COUNSEL FOR
To Our mind, this compelling justification warrants the annulment THE STATE AND FULLY PROTECTED THE INTEREST OF THE STATE
of judgement.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary INCLUDING THE INTEREST OF RESPONDENT.
In its Resolution dated January 5, 2012, the CA denied Philip's Motion for
Reconsideration finding no cogent and persuasive reason to revise or reverse
its Decision. Hence, this petition invoking the following VI.
grounds:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I. PETITIONER CANNOT BE FAULTED FOR MOVING FOR THE WITHDRAWAL
OF HIS COUNTER-CLAIM FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE,
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE FINAL AND WHICH IS ALLOWED BY SECTION 2, RULE 17 OF THE NEW RULES OF
EXECUTORY DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO DESPITE ITS ACCURATE COURT AS AMENDED, AND SAID WITHDRAWAL WAS EVEN APPROVED BY
FINDINGS THAT THE COURT A QUO PROPERLY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION THE RTC OF PASIG.
OVER THE ACTION IN REM THROUGH SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION.
VII. because they involve substituted service of summons whereas the mode of
service in this case is by publication. Philip further asserts that said
THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF DECISION FILED BEFORE THE COURT jurisprudential doctrines even teach us that in proceedings in rem or quasi in
OF APPEALS WAS DEFECTIVE AND NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 47 OF rem, such as the case at hand, jurisdiction over the defendant is not a
THE NEW RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED, FOR HAVING FAILED TO STATE prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court for as long as the court
AND ALLEGE THE DEFENSES THAT RESPONDENT HAS AGAINST acquires jurisdiction over the res. Thus, summons must be served upon the
PETITIONER. defendant not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but
merely for satisfying the due process requirements, which in this case was
duly complied with when Viveca, who is a non-resident, not found in the
Philippines, was served with summons by publication. 15chanrobleslaw
VIII.
Hence, Philip faults the CA in finding that due to his bad faith in maliciously
supplying the Batangas court with an erroneous address wherein Viveca may
supposedly be summoned, she was deprived of her constitutional right to
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE DEFENSES THAT ARE AVAILABLE due process, warranting the annulment of the subject judgment. According
TO RESPONDENT ARE THOSE THAT WERE PRESENTED IN THE LEGAL to him, as far as he was concerned, Viveca's last known address was their
SEPARATION CASE THAT WAS DISMISSED BY THE RTC OF PASIG CITY, conjugal home. This is because the addresses supplied in the proceedings of
SAID GROUNDS ONLY BOLSTER THE FACT THAT THE DECISION DATED the Legal Separation case before the RTC of Pasig City were merely
AUGUST 20, 2008 OF THE RTC OF BALAYAN, BATANGAS, CORRECTLY temporary in nature.16 Philip recalled that when Viveca left their conjugal
NULLIFIED THE MARRIAGE DUE TO RESPONDENT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL abode on August 24, 1993, she temporarily stayed at her parents' house in
INCAPACITY. Greenhills, Mandaluyong, for less than two months then, thereafter, stayed
at her temporary residence at Domingo Street, Cubao, Quezon City, in
October 1993. Considering that said addresses were merely temporary, Philip
claims that he should not be faulted for using their conjugal abode as
IX. Viveca's "last known address." According to him, what is mandated by the
THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT OBSERVE AND FOLLOW SECTIONS 6 rules as the defendant's "last known address" is his or her last
AND 7 OF RULE 47 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AS AMENDED. known permanent address, and certainly not one of temporary
In essence, Philip questions the appellate court's judgment of setting aside nature.17chanrobleslaw
the decision of the Batangas RTC despite its own finding that said court
validly acquired jurisdiction when Summons was duly served on Viveca by The petition is bereft of merit.
publication. He maintains that since service of summons was properly
accomplished by publication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation as Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in
well as its personal service on Viveca at her last known address, it logically exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy.
follows that any and all resolutions rendered by the trial court are valid and Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
binding on the parties. Thus, the decision of the Batangas court which judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
acquired jurisdiction over the res should be immutable as it is already final jurisdiction or denial of due process.18 The objective of the remedy of
and executory.11chanrobleslaw annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or
final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute
Philip also questions the appellate court's choice of supporting jurisprudence his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of
alleging them to be inapplicable to the instant case. He asserts that the jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the
teachings in Spouses Belen v. Judge Chavez,12Biaco v. Philippine Countryside original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final order
Rural Bank,13 and Ancheta v. Judge Ancheta14 fail to be instructive simply or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may on
motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order,
had been granted therein.19chanrobleslaw in which case a copy of the summons and order of the court shall be
sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant,
Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the or in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Any order
prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party granting such leave shall specify a reasonable time, which shall not be less
was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or than sixty (60) days after notice, within which the defendant must answer.
deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. 20 Fraud is extrinsic where (17a)
the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by Thus, under Section 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a non-resident and is
means of fraud or deception, as by keeping him away from court, or by a not found in the country may be served with summons by extraterritorial
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had service in four instances: (1) when the action affects the personal status of
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or
party and connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded consists, wholly
there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located in
reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the the Philippines; or (4) when the property of the defendant has been attached
former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. Ultimately, within the Philippines.24chanrobleslaw
the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court. 21chanrobleslaw In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons may be effected
under any of three modes: (1) by personal service out of the country, with
In the present case, We find that Viveca was completely prevented from leave of court; (2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons and
participating in the Declaration of Nullity case because of the fraudulent order of the court by registered mail to the defendant's last known address ,
scheme employed by Philip insofar as the service of summons is concerned. also with leave of court; or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient.25cralawredchanrobleslaw
Summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him. Through its service, the court acquires jurisdiction over his In the present case, it is undisputed that when Philip filed the Petition for
person.22 As a rule, Philippine courts cannot try any case against a defendant Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, an action which affects his personal status,
who does not reside and is not found in the Philippines because of the Viveca was already residing in the United States of America. Thus,
impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his person unless he voluntarily extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of
appears in court. Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, however, Court is the proper mode by which summons may be served on Viveca, a
enumerates the actions in rem or quasi in rem when Philippine courts have non-resident defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In compliance
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because they have jurisdiction over therewith, Philip claims that Viveca was duly served summons because: (1)
the res, and jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not copies of the summons, complaint, and order of the Batangas court were
essential.23 Said section provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary published in Tempo, a newspaper of general circulation on March 27, 2008
Section 15. Extraterritorial service. — When the defendant does not and April 3, 2008;26 and (2) the sheriff served copies of the summons,
reside and is not found in the Philippines, and the action affects the complaint, and order of the Batangas court on Viveca at their conjugal home
personal status of the plaintiffor relates to, or the subject of which is, in Pasig City, her last known address.27 Thus, he contends that the second
property within the Philippines, in which the defendant has or claims a lien or mode of extraterritorial service of summons mentioned above - by
interest, actual or contingent, or in which the relief demanded consists, publication and sending a copy of the summons and order of the court by
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest therein, or the registered mail to the defendant's last known address - was sufficiently
property of the defendant has been attached within the Philippines, service complied with. The Court finds, however, that such service of summons on
may, by leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines by personal service their conjugal home address cannot be deemed compliant with the
as under section 6; or by publication in a newspaper of general requirements of the rules and is even tantamount to deception warranting
the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment. apparent, direct contravention of this so-called "desire," he filed an identical
action which sought the same nullity of his marriage with Viveca. Thus, while
Philip fervently asserts the propriety of their conjugal home address as there may be no outright admission on Philip's part as to a sinister motive,
Viveca's "last known address," well within the true meaning and intent of the his inconsistent actions effectively negate his claims of good faith.
rules. But as borne by the records of the instant case, not only is he
mistaken, factual considerations herein belie his claims of good faith. First It is interesting to note, moreover, that as pointed out by Viveca, Philip does
and foremost, it is undisputed that the parties herein are also parties in a not even reside in Batangas, the city of the court wherein he filed his Petition
Legal Separation case, previously filed by Viveca way back in 1994. There for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In a Certification 31issued by Ricardo V.
was, in said case, a disclosure of their basic personal information, which Bautista, Barangay Chairman of Poblacion 1, Calatagan, Batangas, it was
customarily includes their respective local addresses, wherein they may be categorically stated that "the name Philip Yu is not a resident of Barangay
served with court papers. In fact, as pointed out by the appellate court, Poblacion 1, Calatagan, Batangas." Section 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,
Philip knew that Viveca had already left their conjugal home and moved to a otherwise known as the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
different local address for purposes of the pendency of the Legal Separation Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March
case, as shown by his stipulation in his Amended Answer with Counterclaim 15, 2003, provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
that "after abandoning the conjugal abode on 24 August 1993, petitioner Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court of
resided at her parent's house in Richbelt Condominium, Annapolis Street, the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
Greenhills, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, until she moved to her present been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in
address in October 1993." Thus, Philip cannot be allowed to feign ignorance the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
to the fact that Viveca had already intentionally abandoned their conjugal Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. 32chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
abode and that of all the addresses that Viveca resided at, their conjugal It is, therefore, evident that not only did Philip contradict his previous Motion
home in Horizon Condominium is her least recent address. In fact, it may to Withdraw his Counterclaim for the Declaration of Nullity of marriage, he
very well be considered as the address she is least likely to be found even violated a basic mandate of law so as to be able to file the same action
considering the circumstances in which she left the same. Note that from the before a different court in a city he was not even a resident of.
very beginning of the Legal Separation case in 1994, all the way up until the
promulgation by the Pasig RTC of its decision thereon in 2009, there is no Thus, while individually and in isolation, the aforementioned doubtful
showing that Viveca had ever received any document in relation to said case, circumstances may not instantly amount to extrinsic fraud, these
nor is there any proof that Philip had ever sent any pertinent file to Viveca, circumstances, when viewed in conjunction with each other, paint a deceitful
at the conjugal address. There is, therefore, no reason for Philip to assume, picture which resulted in a violation of Viveca's constitutional right to due
in good faith, that said address is in truth and in fact Viveca's "last known process. True, the service of summons in this case is not for the purpose of
address" at which she may receive summons. His contention that the rules vesting the court with jurisdiction, but for the purpose of complying with the
require the defendant's "last known address" to be of a permanent, and not requirements of fair play or due process. But because of Philip's employment
of a temporary nature, has no basis in law or jurisprudence. of deceptive means in the service of summons on Viveca, said purpose of
satisfying the due process requirements was never accomplished. To this
In addition, the Court is curious as to why Philip filed the instant Petition for Court, when Philip declared before the Batangas court that Viveca's last
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage28 before the RTC of Batangas City on known address was still their conjugal home with full and undisputed
February 15, 2008 when less than a year before filing the same, he had knowledge that she had already intentionally abandoned the same and had
motioned the RTC of Pasig City on April 24, 2007 to withdraw his even established a more recent, local residence herein evinces a clear lack of
counterclaim for the same declaration of nullity of marriage. 29 In his petition good faith. As a result, Viveca never had knowledge of the filing of the
before the Court, Philip explained that he withdrew his counterclaim in the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage suit, only finding out about the same when
Legal Separation case in his "desire to explore the possibility of having a so- the Pasig City RTC had promulgated its decision on the Legal Separation
called 'universal settlement' of all the pending cases with respondent and her case. It is clear, therefore, that because of the service of summons at the
relatives for the sake of his love for his four (4) children."30 Yet, in an erroneous address, Viveca was effectively prevented from participating in the
proceedings thereon. Civil Procedure; Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; To standardize the appeal
periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal
In Acance v. Court of Appeals,33 where the extraterritorial service of their cases, we held that “it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15
summons on the non-resident, US citizen, defendants therein were held to days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court
be defective due to the absence of proof that the summons, complaint, and (RTC), counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial
order of the court were duly served at their last known correct address, the or motion for reconsideration.”—In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA
Court ruled that the failure to strictly comply correctly with the requirements 633 (2005), we clarified that to standardize the appeal periods provided in
of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, we
for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons. 34Citing Dulap, held that “it would be practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.,35 it elucidated as which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.” In
It is the duty of the court to require the fullest compliance with all the Neypes, we explained that the “fresh period rule” shall also apply to Rule 40
requirements of the statute permitting service by publication. Where service governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Rule 42 on
is obtained by publication, the entire proceeding should be closely scrutinized petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); Rule 43 on
by the courts and a strict compliance with every condition of law should be appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45 governing
exacted. Otherwise great abuses may occur, and the rights of persons and appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, “The new rule aims
property may be made to depend upon the elastic conscience of interested to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt
parties rather than the enlightened judgment of the court or of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
judge.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.” In other words, a
Indeed, due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15-day period from
be notified and given an opportunity to defend those interests.37 When his receipt of the trial court’s decision or final order denying his motion for
defendants are deprived of such opportunity to duly participate in, and even new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the fresh 15-day
be informed of, the proceedings, due to a deceitful scheme employed by the period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes the decision
prevailing litigant, as in this case, there exists a violation of their due process or final order in question final and executory.
rights. Any judgment issued in violation thereof necessarily suffers a fatal
infirmity for courts, as guardians of constitutional rights cannot be expected Same; Finality of Judgments; A judgment becomes final and executory when
to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within
considered as acting within their jurisdiction. 38 This Court, therefore, deems such period.—A judgment becomes final and executory when the
as proper the annulment of the Batangas court's judgment issued without reglementary period to appeal lapses and no appeal is perfected within such
proper service of summons. period. Consequently, no court, not even this Court, can arrogate unto itself
appellate jurisdiction to review a case or modify a judgment that became
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The final.
assailed Decision dated September 30, 2011 and Resolution dated January 5,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 111414 are AFFIRMED. Same; Void Judgments; A judgment is null and void when the court which
rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the
SO ORDERED subject matter or over the parties or both.—“A judgment is null and void
when the court which rendered it had no power to grant the relief or no
G.R. No. 176556. July 4, 2012.* jurisdiction over the subject matter or over the parties or both.” In other
BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, petitioner, vs. RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. words, a court, which does not have the power to decide a case or that has
QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C. QUIAO, represented by their no jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, will issue a void
mother RITA QUIAO, respondents. judgment or a coram non judice.
Civil Law; Family Courts; Regional Trial Courts; Republic Act No. 8369; The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of the
Republic Act No. 8369 confers upon an Regional Trial Court (RTC), Family Code “[t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
designated as the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
hear and decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital Code or other law.”
status and property relations of the husband and wife or those living
together.—Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as Vested Rights; While one may not be deprived of his “vested right,” he may
the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and lose the same if there is due process and such deprivation is founded in law
decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and and jurisprudence.—In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for
property relations of the husband and wife or those living together. The Rule ABAKADA Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon.
on Legal Separation provides that “the petition [for legal separation] shall be Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, we also explained: The concept of
filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the “vested right” is a consequence of the constitutional guaranty of due process
respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of that expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural
filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only legal or
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.” equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also exemptions from
new obligations created after the right has become vested. Rights are
Same; Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership; Since at the time of the considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present interest,
exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of the absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and irrefutable. (Emphasis and
Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage underscoring supplied) From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not
settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the respondent be deprived of his “vested right,” he may lose the same if there is due
is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.—Since process and such deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
at the time of the exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil
Code of the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a Family Code; Property Relations; Absolute Community; When a couple enters
marriage settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes
respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of joint owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each
gains. Article 119 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 119. The future spouses spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage
may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or relative community (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the
of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any other common mass of the couple’s properties.—When a couple enters into a
regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife becomes joint
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse
established in this Code, shall govern the property relations between brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except
husband and wife. those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass
of the couple’s properties. And when the couple’s marriage or community is
Family Code; Property Relations; Since at the time of the dissolution of the dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their
petitioner and the respondent’s marriage the operative law is already the respective heirs, equally or in the proportion the parties have established,
Family Code, the same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.
so far as the liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is
concerned is Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Same; Same; Same; Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution
Family Code.—Since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the of marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of
respondent’s marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the the absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the and obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is community’s assets and if the community’s properties are insufficient, the
Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance.—Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of

marriage, an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the PETITION for review on certiorari of an order of the Regional Trial Court of
absolute community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and Butuan City, Br. 1.
obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute
community’s assets and if the community’s properties are insufficient, the The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the
unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered Reserva, Filoteo Law Office for petitioner.
to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net
assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for Noreen Salise-Gonzaga for respondents.
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall
DECISION
be the increase in value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value
at the time of its dissolution.
REYES, J.:
Civil Law; Property Relations; Conjugal Partnership; When a couple enters
into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil
The family is the basic and the most important institution of
Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their
separate property and income from their work or industry, and divide society. It is in the family where children are born and molded either to
equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net become useful citizens of the country or troublemakers in the
gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.”—When a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of community. Thus, we are saddened when parents have to separate and fight
gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in over properties, without regard to the message they send to their
common fund the fruits of their separate property and income from their
work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or children.Notwithstanding this, we must not shirk from our obligation to rule
of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by on this case involving legal separation escalating to questions on dissolution
either spouse during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of
the couple has his and her own property and debts. The law does not intend and partition of properties.
to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between the The Case
spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.

Family Code; Conjugal Partnership; Property Relations; Since the trial court This case comes before us via Petition for Review
found the petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the
conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner seeks that
[1]
Article 63(2) of the Family Code.—Ordinarily, what remains in the above- we vacate and set aside the Order [2]dated January 8, 2007 of the Regional
listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the guilty Trial Court (RTC), Branch 1, Butuan City. In lieu of the said order, we are
party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in asked to issue a Resolution defining the net profits subject of the forfeiture
favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.
Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing as a result of the decree of legal separation in accordance with the provision
will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, of Article 102(4) of the Family Code, or alternatively, in accordance with the
because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the
guilty party’s favor. provisions of Article 176 of the Civil Code.
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square

meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
Antecedent Facts 8. Bashier Bon Factory located in
Tungao, Butuan City;

On October 26, 2000, herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and
[petitioner] subject to the respective legitimes of the
complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner Brigido B. Quiao
children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of
(Brigido).[3] Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Decision [4] dated October 10, [P]45,740.00.

2005, the dispositive portion of which provides:
[Petitioners] share, however, of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of
WHEREFORE, viewed from the foregoing the common children.
considerations, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
legal separation of plaintiff Rita C. Quiao and defendant- He is further ordered to reimburse [respondents] the
respondent Brigido B. Quiao pursuant to Article 55. sum of [P]19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses of [P]5,000.00[.]
As such, the herein parties shall be entitled to live
separately from each other, but the marriage bond shall not SO ORDERED.[5]
be severed.

Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the
three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and Petchie, all
surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the period provided for under Section 17(a) and (b) of the Rule on Legal
plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Separation.[6]

Further, except for the personal and real properties
already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining properties,
On December 12, 2005, the respondents filed a motion for
namely:
execution[7] which the trial court granted in its Order dated December 16,
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan
2005, the dispositive portion of which reads:
del Norte;
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del
Norte; Wherefore, finding the motion to be well taken, the
3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del same is hereby granted. Let a writ of execution be issued for
Norte; the immediate enforcement of the Judgment.
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square SO ORDERED.[8]
meters located in Tungao, Butuan City;
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5
hectares located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, the RTC issued a Writ of

Execution[9] which reads as follows: To resolve the petitioner's Motion for Clarification, the RTC issued an
Order dated August 31, 2006, which held that the phrase NET PROFIT
[13]
NOW THEREFORE, that of the goods and chattels of

EARNED denotes the remainder of the properties of the parties after
the [petitioner] BRIGIDO B. QUIAO you cause to be made
the sums stated in the afore-quoted DECISION [sic], deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.
together with your lawful fees in the service of this Writ, all [14]
The Order further held that after determining the remainder of the
in the Philippine Currency.
properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children because the

offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits
But if sufficient personal property cannot be found
whereof to satisfy this execution and your lawful fees, then earned, pursuant to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.
we command you that of the lands and buildings of the said [15]
The dispositive portion of the Order states:
[petitioner], you make the said sums in the manner required
by law. You are enjoined to strictly observed Section 9, Rule
39, Rule [sic] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. WHEREFORE, there is no blatant disparity when the
sheriff intends to forfeit all the remaining properties after
You are hereby ordered to make a return of the said deducting the payments of the debts for only separate
proceedings immediately after the judgment has been properties of the defendant-respondent shall be delivered to
satisfied in part or in full in consonance with Section 14, Rule him which he has none.
39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.[10]
The Sheriff is herein directed to proceed with the
execution of the Decision.

On July 6, 2006, the writ was partially executed with the petitioner IT IS SO ORDERED.[16]
paying the respondents the amount of P46,870.00, representing the

following payments:
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed a Motion

for Reconsideration[17] on September 8, 2006. Consequently, the RTC issued
(a) P22,870.00 as petitioner's share of the payment of the conjugal
another Order[18]dated November 8, 2006, holding that although the Decision
share;
dated October 10, 2005 has become final and executory, it may still consider
(b) P19,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
the Motion for Clarification because the petitioner simply wanted to clarify
(c) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses.[11]
the meaning of net profit earned.[19] Furthermore, the same Order held:

On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the
ALL TOLD, the Court Order dated August 31, 2006
promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for is hereby ordered set aside. NET PROFIT EARNED, which is
subject of forfeiture in favor of [the] parties' common
Clarification,[12] asking the RTC to define the term Net Profits Earned.
children, is ordered to be computed in accordance [with] WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE PROPERTY RELATIONS
par. 4 of Article 102 of the Family Code.[20] BETWEEN THE HUSBAND AND WIFE WHO GOT MARRIED IN
1977? CAN THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES BE
GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING THE NET PROFITS SUBJECT OF FORFEITURE
On November 21, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for
AS A RESULT OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION
Reconsideration,[21] praying for the correction and reversal of the Order dated WITHOUT IMPAIRING VESTED RIGHTS ALREADY ACQUIRED
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE?
November 8, 2006. Thereafter, on January 8, 2007,[22] the trial court had

changed its ruling again and granted the respondents' Motion for IV

Reconsideration whereby the Order dated November 8, 2006 was set aside
WHAT PROPERTIES SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THE
to reinstate the Order dated August 31, 2006. FORFEITURE OF THE SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE IN
THE NET CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE

ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL SEPARATION?[23]
Not satisfied with the trial court's Order, the petitioner filed on
February 27, 2007 this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, raising the following: Our Ruling

Issues While the petitioner has raised a number of issues on the
applicability of certain laws, we are well-aware that the respondents have

I called our attention to the fact that the Decision dated October 10, 2005 has

attained finality when the Motion for Clarification was filed. [24] Thus, we are
IS THE DISSOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENT
LIQUIDATION OF THE COMMON PROPERTIES OF THE constrained to resolve first the issue of the finality of the Decision dated
HUSBAND AND WIFE BY VIRTUE OF THE DECREE OF LEGAL
October 10, 2005 and subsequently discuss the matters that we can clarify.
SEPARATION GOVERNED BY ARTICLE 125 (SIC) OF THE
FAMILY CODE?
The Decision dated
II October 10, 2005 has
become final and
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE NET PROFITS EARNED BY executory at the time
THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP FOR PURPOSES OF the Motion for
EFFECTING THE FORFEITURE AUTHORIZED UNDER Clarification was filed on
ARTICLE 63 OF THE FAMILY CODE? July 7, 2006.

III

Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:
fresh 15-day period from the denial of the motion for reconsideration makes
Section 3. Period of ordinary appeal. - The appeal
the decision or final order in question final and executory.
shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal
In the case at bar, the trial court rendered its Decision on October
and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of
the judgment or final order. 10, 2005. The petitioner neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor a
notice of appeal. On December 16, 2005, or after 67 days had lapsed, the
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion
for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of trial court issued an order granting the respondent's motion for execution;
time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be and on February 10, 2006, or after 123 days had lapsed, the trial court
allowed.
issued a writ of execution. Finally, when the writ had already been partially
executed, the petitioner, on July 7, 2006 or after 270 days had lapsed, filed
In Neypes v. Court of Appeals ,[25] we clarified that to standardize the his Motion for Clarification on the definition of the net profits earned. From
appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to the foregoing, the petitioner had clearly slept on his right to question the
appeal their cases, we held that it would be practical to allow a fresh period RTCs Decision dated October 10, 2005. For 270 days, the petitioner never
of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from raised a single issue until the decision had already been partially
receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for executed. Thus at the time the petitioner filed his motion for clarification, the
reconsideration. [26]
trial courts decision has become final and executory. A judgment becomes
final and executory when the reglementary period to appeal lapses and no
In Neypes, we explained that the "fresh period rule" shall also apply appeal is perfected within such period. Consequently, no court, not even this
to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the RTCs; Court, can arrogate unto itself appellate jurisdiction to review a case or
Rule 42 on petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA); modify a judgment that became final.[28]
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the CA and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. We also said, The new The petitioner argues that the decision he is questioning is a void
rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from judgment. Being such, the petitioner's thesis is that it can still be disturbed
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for even after 270 days had lapsed from the issuance of the decision to the filing
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution. [27] In of the motion for clarification. He said that a void judgment is no judgment
other words, a party litigant may file his notice of appeal within a fresh 15- at all. It never attains finality and cannot be a source of any right nor any
day period from his receipt of the trial court's decision or final order denying obligation.[29] But what precisely is a void judgment in our jurisdiction? When
his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Failure to avail of the does a judgment becomes void?
From the aforecited facts, the questioned October 10, 2005

A judgment is null and void when the court which rendered it had no judgment of the trial court is clearly not void ab initio, since it was rendered
power to grant the relief or no jurisdiction over the subject matter or over within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Being such, the same cannot
the parties or both.[30] In other words, a court, which does not have the anymore be disturbed, even if the modification is meant to correct what may
power to decide a case or that has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or be considered an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. [36]In fact, we have
the parties, will issue a void judgment or a coram non judice.[31] ruled that for [as] long as the public respondent acted with jurisdiction, any
error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing
The questioned judgment does not fall within the purview of a void more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by
judgment. For sure, the trial court has jurisdiction over a case involving legal appeal.[37] Granting without admitting that the RTC's judgment dated October
separation. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8369 confers upon an RTC, designated as 10, 2005 was erroneous, the petitioner's remedy should be an appeal filed
the Family Court of a city, the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and within the reglementary period. Unfortunately, the petitioner failed to do
decide, among others, complaints or petitions relating to marital status and this. He has already lost the chance to question the trial court's decision,
property relations of the husband and wife or those living together. [32]
The which has become immutable and unalterable. What we can only do is to
Rule on Legal Separation[33] provides that the petition [for legal separation] clarify the very question raised below and nothing more.
shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner
or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date For our convenience, the following matters cannot anymore be
of filing or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found disturbed since the October 10, 2005 judgment has already become
in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. [34] In the instant case, immutable and unalterable, to wit:
herein respondent Rita is found to reside in Tungao, Butuan City for more
than six months prior to the date of filing of the petition; thus, the RTC, (a) The finding that the petitioner is the offending spouse since he
clearly has jurisdiction over the respondent's petition below.Furthermore, the cohabited with a woman who is not his wife;[38]
RTC also acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties, considering
that summons and a copy of the complaint with its annexes were served (b) The trial court's grant of the petition for legal separation of
upon the herein petitioner on December 14, 2000 and that the herein respondent Rita;[39]
petitioner filed his Answer to the Complaint on January 9, 2001. [35] Thus,
without doubt, the RTC, which has rendered the questioned judgment, has (c) The dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership; [40]
jurisdiction over the complaint and the persons of the parties.

(d) The forfeiture of the petitioner's right to any share of the net (l) The holding that the conjugal partnership shall be liable to
profits earned by the conjugal partnership;[41] matters included under Article 121 of the Family Code and the conjugal
liabilities totaling P503,862.10 shall be charged to the income generated by
(e) The award to the innocent spouse of the minor children's these properties;[49]
custody;[42]
(m) The fact that the trial court had no way of knowing whether the
(f) The disqualification of the offending spouse from inheriting from petitioner had separate properties which can satisfy his share for the support
the innocent spouse by intestate succession;[43] of the family;[50]

(g) The revocation of provisions in favor of the offending spouse (n) The holding that the applicable law in this case is Article 129(7);
made in the will of the innocent spouse; [44] [51]

(h) The holding that the property relation of the parties is conjugal (o) The ruling that the remaining properties not subject to any
partnership of gains and pursuant to Article 116 of the Family Code, all encumbrance shall therefore be divided equally between the petitioner and
properties acquired during the marriage, whether acquired by one or both the respondent without prejudice to the children's legitime; [52]
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved; [45]
(p) The holding that the petitioner's share of the net profits earned
(i) The finding that the spouses acquired their real and personal by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children;
properties while they were living together; [46] [53]
and

(j) The list of properties which Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (q) The order to the petitioner to reimburse the respondents the sum
(RCBC) foreclosed;[47] of P19,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses of P5,000.00.[54]

(k) The list of the remaining properties of the couple which must be After discussing lengthily the immutability of the Decision dated
dissolved and liquidated and the fact that respondent Rita was the one who October 10, 2005, we will discuss the following issues for the enlightenment
took charge of the administration of these properties;[48] of the parties and the public at large.

Article 129 of the Family when the same are void, the system of relative community
Code applies to the or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
present case since the shall govern the property relations between husband and
parties' property relation wife.
is governed by
the system of relative
community or conjugal
Thus, from the foregoing facts and law, it is clear that what governs
partnership of gains.
the property relations of the petitioner and of the respondent is conjugal

partnership of gains. And under this property relation, the husband and the
The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied
wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property and the
Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 102. He confusingly argues
income from their work or industry.[56] The husband and wife also own in
that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the Family
common all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains.[57]
Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal

separation.
Second, since at the time of the dissolution of the petitioner and the

respondent's marriage the operative law is already the Family Code, the
Offhand, the trial court's Decision dated October 10, 2005 held that
same applies in the instant case and the applicable law in so far as the
Article 129(7) of the Family Code applies in this case. We agree with the trial
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is
court's holding.
Article 129 of the Family Code in relation to Article 63(2) of the Family

Code. The latter provision is applicable because according to Article 256 of
First, let us determine what governs the couple's property
the Family Code [t]his Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does
relation. From the record, we can deduce that the petitioner and the
not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
respondent tied the marital knot on January 6, 1977. Since at the time of the
Code or other law.[58]
exchange of marital vows, the operative law was the Civil Code of

the Philippines (R.A. No. 386) and since they did not agree on a marriage
Now, the petitioner asks: Was his vested right over half of the
settlement, the property relations between the petitioner and the respondent
common properties of the conjugal partnership violated when the trial court
is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains.
forfeited them in favor of his children pursuant to Articles 63(2) and 129 of
[55]
Article 119 of the Civil Code provides:
the Family Code?

Art. 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of We respond in the negative.
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon

any other regime.In the absence of marriage settlements, or
right reason and natural justice, should be protected against

Indeed, the petitioner claims that his vested rights have been
arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative
impaired, arguing: As earlier adverted to, the petitioner acquired vested right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent
and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny.
rights over half of the conjugal properties, the same being owned in common

by the spouses. If the provisions of the Family Code are to be given To be vested, a right must have become a titlelegal
or equitableto the present or future enjoyment of property.
retroactive application to the point of authorizing the forfeiture of the [62]
(Citations omitted)
petitioner's share in the net remainder of the conjugal partnership properties,

the same impairs his rights acquired prior to the effectivity of the Family
In our en banc Resolution dated October 18, 2005 for ABAKADA
Code.[59] In other words, the petitioner is saying that since the property
relations between the spouses is governed by the regime of Conjugal Guro Party List Officer Samson S. Alcantara, et al. v. The Hon. Executive
Partnership of Gains under the Civil Code, the petitioner acquired vested Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita,[63] we also explained:

rights over half of the properties of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains, The concept of vested right is a consequence of
pursuant to Article 143 of the Civil Code, which provides: All property of the the constitutional guaranty of due process that
expresses a present fixed interest which in right reason and
conjugal partnership of gains is owned in common by the husband and wife. natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action; it
[60]
Thus, since he is one of the owners of the properties covered by the includes not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement
of a demand but also exemptions from new obligations
conjugal partnership of gains, he has a vested right over half of the said created after the right has become vested.Rights are
properties, even after the promulgation of the Family Code; and he insisted considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a present
interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed and
that no provision under the Family Code may deprive him of this vested right irrefutable.[64] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
by virtue of Article 256 of the Family Code which prohibits retroactive

application of the Family Code when it will prejudice a person's vested right.
From the foregoing, it is clear that while one may not be deprived of

his vested right, he may lose the same if there is due process and such
However, the petitioner's claim of vested right is not one which is
deprivation is founded in law and jurisprudence.
written on stone. In Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals ,[61] we define and explained

vested right in the following manner:
In the present case, the petitioner was accorded his right to due

A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity process. First, he was well-aware that the respondent prayed in her
and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will of complaint that all of the conjugal properties be awarded to her. [65] In fact, in
the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists,
and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not his Answer, the petitioner prayed that the trial court divide the community
dependent upon a contingency. The term vested right assets between the petitioner and the respondent as circumstances and
expresses the concept of present fixed interest which, in
evidence warrant after the accounting and inventory of all the community be set aside under the Civil Code since the trial court found him the guilty
properties of the parties.[66] Second, when the Decision dated October 10, party.
2005 was promulgated, the petitioner never questioned the trial court's
ruling forfeiting what the trial court termed as net profits, pursuant to Article More, in Abalos v. Dr. Macatangay, Jr.,[68] we reiterated our long-
129(7) of the Family Code.[67] Thus, the petitioner cannot claim being standing ruling that:
deprived of his right to due process.
[P]rior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the

interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets is inchoate, a
Furthermore, we take note that the alleged deprivation of the mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears
petitioner's vested right is one founded, not only in the provisions of the
that there are assets in the community as a result of the
Family Code, but in Article 176 of the Civil Code. This provision is like Articles liquidation and settlement. The interest of each spouse is
limited to the net remainder or remanente liquido (haber
63 and 129 of the Family Code on the forfeiture of the guilty spouse's share
ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of the affairs of the
in the conjugal partnership profits. The said provision says: partnership after its dissolution. Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not

vest until the
Art. 176. In case of legal separation, the guilty
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or
spouse shall forfeit his or her share of the conjugal
after dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally
partnership profits, which shall be awarded to the children of
determined that, after settlement of conjugal obligations,
both, and the children of the guilty spouse had by a prior
there are net assets left which can be divided between the
marriage. However, if the conjugal partnership property
spouses or their respective heirs.[69] (Citations omitted)
came mostly or entirely from the work or industry, or from

the wages and salaries, or from the fruits of the separate

property of the guilty spouse, this forfeiture shall not apply.
Finally, as earlier discussed, the trial court has already decided in its
In case there are no children, the innocent spouse
Decision dated October 10, 2005 that the applicable law in this case is Article
shall be entitled to all the net profits.
129(7) of the Family Code.[70] The petitioner did not file a motion for

reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. Thus, the petitioner is now precluded
From the foregoing, the petitioner's claim of a vested right has no
from questioning the trial court's decision since it has become final and
basis considering that even under Article 176 of the Civil Code, his share of
executory. The doctrine of immutability and unalterability of a final judgment
the conjugal partnership profits may be forfeited if he is the guilty party in a
prevents us from disturbing the Decision dated October 10, 2005 because
legal separation case. Thus, after trial and after the petitioner was given the
final and executory decisions can no longer be reviewed nor reversed by this
chance to present his evidence, the petitioner's vested right claim may in fact
Court.[71]

From the above discussions, Article 129 of the Family Code clearly computation and the succession of events will follow the provisions under
applies to the present case since the parties' property relation is governed by Article 129 of the said Code. Moreover, as to the definition of net profits, we
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains and since cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly
the trial court's Decision has attained finality and immutability. provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture
under Article 43, No. (2) and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In
The net profits of the
this provision, net profits shall be the increase in value between the market
conjugal partnership of
gains are all the fruits of value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the
the separate properties
marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution. [72] Thus, without
of the spouses and the
products of their labor any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to both the dissolution of the
and industry.
absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the

dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of net profits earned by Code. Where lies the difference? As earlier shown, the difference lies in the
the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized processes used under the dissolution of the absolute community regime
under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no other under Article 102 of the Family Code, and in the processes used under the
provision under the Family Code, which defines net profits earned subject of dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family
forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article 102 of the Family Code Code.
applies.
Let us now discuss the difference in the processes between the
What does Article 102 of the Family Code say? Is the computation of absolute community regime and the conjugal partnership regime.
net profits earned in the conjugal partnership of gains the same with the
computation of net profits earned in the absolute community? On Absolute Community Regime:

Now, we clarify. When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the
husband and the wife becomes joint owners of all the properties of the
First and foremost, we must distinguish between the applicable law marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and
as to the property relations between the parties and the applicable law as to those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92
the definition of net profits. As earlier discussed, Article 129 of the Family of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties. And
Code applies as to the property relations of the parties. In other words, the when the couple's marriage or community is dissolved, that common mass is
divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the

proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one (a) According to the trial court's finding of facts, both husband and
may have originally owned. [73]
wife have no separate properties, thus, the remaining properties in the list
above are all part of the absolute community. And its market value at the
Under Article 102 of the Family Code, upon dissolution of marriage, time of the dissolution of the absolute community constitutes the market
an inventory is prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute value at dissolution.
community and the exclusive properties of each; then the debts and
obligations of the absolute community are paid out of the absolute (b) Thus, when the petitioner and the respondent finally were legally
community's assets and if the community's properties are insufficient, the separated, all the properties which remained will be liable for the debts and
separate properties of each of the couple will be solidarily liable for the obligations of the community. Such debts and obligations will be subtracted
unpaid balance. Whatever is left of the separate properties will be delivered from the market value at dissolution.
to each of them. The net remainder of the absolute community is its net
assets, which shall be divided between the husband and the wife; and for (c) What remains after the debts and obligations have been paid
purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture, said profits shall from the total assets of the absolute community constitutes the net
be the increase in value between the market value of the community remainder or net asset. And from such net asset/remainder of the petitioner
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value and respondent's remaining properties, the market value at the time of
at the time of its dissolution. [74]
marriage will be subtracted and the resulting totality constitutes the net
profits.
Applying Article 102 of the Family Code, the net profits requires that
we first find the market value of the properties at the time of the (d) Since both husband and wife have no separate
community's dissolution. From the totality of the market value of all the properties, and nothing would be returned to each of them, what will be
properties, we subtract the debts and obligations of the absolute community divided equally between them is simply the net profits. However, in the
and this result to the net assets or net remainder of the properties of the Decision dated October 10, 2005, the trial court forfeited the half-share of
absolute community, from which we deduct the market value of the the petitioner in favor of his children. Thus, if we use Article 102 in the
properties at the time of marriage, which then results to the net profits. [75]
instant case (which should not be the case), nothing is left to the petitioner
since both parties entered into their marriage without bringing with them any
Granting without admitting that Article 102 applies to the instant property.
case, let us see what will happen if we apply Article 102:

On Conjugal Partnership Regime:
(2) Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership
Before we go into our disquisition on the Conjugal Partnership in payment of personal debts and obligations of either
spouse shall be credited to the conjugal partnership as an
Regime, we make it clear that Article 102(4) of the Family Code applies in
asset thereof.
the instant case for purposes only of defining net profit. As earlier
(3) Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of
explained, the definition of net profits in Article 102(4) of the Family Code
his or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property or for
applies to both the absolute community regime and conjugal partnership the value of his or her exclusive property, the ownership of
which has been vested by law in the conjugal partnership.
regime as provided for under Article 63, No. (2) of the Family Code, relative

to the provisions on Legal Separation. (4) The debts and obligations of the conjugal
Now, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets. In case
of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
partnership of gains under Article 142 of the Civil Code, the husband and liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties,
the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate property and in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (2) of Article
121.
income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution (5) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of
of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.

indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage. [76] From the foregoing
provision, each of the couple has his and her own property and debts. The (6) Unless the owner had been indemnified from
whatever source, the loss or deterioration of movables used
law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or for the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse,
properties between the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said spouse
from the conjugal funds, if any.
of capitals.[77]
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership
properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be divided
Considering that the couple's marriage has been dissolved under the equally between husband and wife, unless a different
Family Code, Article 129 of the same Code applies in the liquidation of the proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements or unless there has been a voluntary waiver or
couple's properties in the event that the conjugal partnership of gains is forfeiture of such share as provided in this Code.
dissolved, to wit:
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common
children shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal with Article 51.
partnership regime, the following procedure shall apply:
(9) In the partition of the properties, the conjugal
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall, unless
all the properties of the conjugal partnership and the otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be adjudicated to the
exclusive properties of each spouse. spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are

(b) Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has
decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the partnership during the marriage is returned in equal amount to the assets of
court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
the conjugal partnership;[81]and if the community is enriched at the expense
interests of said children.
of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such

properties to their respective owners shall be made. [82]
In the normal course of events, the following are the steps in the

liquidation of the properties of the spouses:
(c) Subsequently, the couple's conjugal partnership shall pay the

debts of the conjugal partnership; while the debts and obligation of each of
(a) An inventory of all the actual properties shall be made,
the spouses shall be paid from their respective separate properties. But if the
separately listing the couple's conjugal properties and their separate
conjugal partnership is not sufficient to pay all its debts and obligations, the
properties.[78] In the instant case, the trial court found that the couple
spouses with their separate properties shall be solidarily liable. [83]
has no separate properties when they married. [79] Rather, the trial

court identified the following conjugal properties, to wit:
(d) Now, what remains of the separate or exclusive properties of the

husband and of the wife shall be returned to each of them. [84] In the instant
1. coffee mill in Balongagan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte;
case, since it was already established by the trial court that the
2. coffee mill in Durian, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; spouses have no separate properties,[85] there is nothing to return to

3. corn mill in Casiklan, Las Nieves, Agusan del Norte; any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of the
conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed
4. coffee mill in Esperanza, Agusan del Sur;
properties should be divided equally between the spouses and/or their
5. a parcel of land with an area of 1,200 square meters respective heirs.[86] However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
located in Tungao, Butuan City;
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is
6. a parcel of agricultural land with an area of 5 hectares forfeited in favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the
located in Manila de Bugabos, Butuan City;
Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in the absolute community
7. a parcel of land with an area of 84 square meters located regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal
in Tungao, Butuan City;
partnership regime, because there is no separate property which may
8. Bashier Bon Factory located in Tungao, Butuan City.[80] be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.

In the discussions above, we have seen that in both instances, the

petitioner is not entitled to any property at all. Thus, we cannot but uphold
the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the trial court. However, we must
clarify, as we already did above, the Order dated January 8, 2007.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 10, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 1 of Butuan City is AFFIRMED. Acting on the Motion for
Clarification dated July 7, 2006 in the Regional Trial Court, the Order dated
January 8, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court is hereby CLARIFIED in
accordance with the above discussions.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

G.R. No. 179620. August 26, 2008.*
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, petitioner, vs. THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254, and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondent.
Remedial Law; Appeals; For reasons of justice and equity, the Court has
allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals.—For reasons of
justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules
governing appeals. It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for
technicality.
Same; Same; Dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned Same; Same; Same; Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of
upon.—In Salazar v. Court of Appeals, 376 SCRA 459 (2002) citing Labad v. marriage.—This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and
University of Southeastern Philippines, 362 SCRA 510 (2001), this Court strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
reiterated: x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is marriage as the foundation of the family. The State and the public have vital
frowned upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, interest in the maintenance and preservation of these social institutions
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should against desecration by fabricated evidence. Thus, any doubt should be
proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
technicalities. Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse
a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
attain the ends of justice.
Christine Q. Dugenio for petitioner.
Same; Same; Recognized exceptions to the rule that the negligence of
counsel binds the client.—It was the negligence and incompetence of
Cayton, Peñalosa, Manzano & Morante for respondent.
Manuel’s counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty.
Christine Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the
denial of her notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new DECISION
trial at the first instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment
of judgment rather than pursue an ordinary appeal. These manifest errors REYES, R.T., J.:
were clearly indicative of counsel’s incompetence. These gravely worked to
the detriment of Manuel’s appeal. True it is that the negligence of counsel MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses' right to the community of
binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain exceptions: (1) where their whole lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities. 1
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of
law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client’s This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision2 of the Court of
liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice so require. Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of judgment and
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Piñas,
Civil Law; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; A marriage may be annulled Branch 254. The CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the
when the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, such as wrong remedy.
concealment of homosexuality; It is the concealment of homosexuality, and
not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party.— The Facts
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower
court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad
The law is clear—a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila Cathedral. 3 Their
party was obtained by fraud, such as concealment of homosexuality. union bore three children: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born on October 20,
Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3) Manuel Homer,
that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an
deliberately hid such fact to his wife. It is the concealment of homosexuality, anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.5
and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates the consent of the innocent party.
Such concealment presupposes bad faith and intent to defraud the other After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with the RTC in
party in giving consent to the marriage. Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case, relationship was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by
docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254. Leonida came as a surprise to him.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida's hostility against him was
San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks. At that their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the
time, she regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well memorandum15 released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum
with other people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they ordered him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or
got married.6 secondary hospital.16 Leonida's family owns Christ the King Hospital which is
situated in the same subdivision as Manuel's clinic and residence. 17 In other
Leonida averred that Manuel's kind and gentle demeanor did not last long. In words, he and her family have competing or rival hospitals in the same
the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and father. This vicinity.
was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel as a
harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel's Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father to their children. He
unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the necessary discipline
their frequent fights as a couple.7 Leonida complained that this was in stark on the children.
contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuel's
deep attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was
were incomprehensible to Leonida.8 nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection of the person who
reared and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his homosexuality. his mother is in her twilight years.18 Manuel pointed out that Leonida found
Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuel's peculiar fault in this otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous and
closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an possessive nature.19
indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male
caller.9 She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid the
possession.10 Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any further
another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she misunderstanding with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her about his sexual preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic
children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving materials found in his possession to cast doubt on his masculinity. 20
support to their children.12
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G. Almelor. Jesus
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to narrated that he usually stayed at Manuel's house during his weekly trips to
prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted Manila from Iriga City. He was a witness to the generally harmonious
evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True,
had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. they had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there
Paulina Corrinne (the eldest child).13 She concluded that Manuel is was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.21
psychologically incapacitated.14 Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it
existed even before the marriage and appeared to be incurable. Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida
allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such an incident
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty occurred. On that particular date,22 he and Manuel went straight home from
arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their marital a trip to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except
their driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcia's findings by x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding
presenting his own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented. circumstances of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence
presented in support thereof (sic) reveals that in this case (sic) there
RTC Disposition is more than meets the eyes (sic).
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed,
annulment, with the following disposition: generally incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason
enough that in this jurisdiction (sic) the law recognizes marriage as a
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby special contract exclusively only between a man and a woman x x x
rendered: and thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the
same law provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article
45(3) in relation to Article 46(4) or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code].
1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January
This is of course in recognition of the biological fact that no matter
1989 and all its effects under the law null and void from the
how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces
beginning;
himself to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a
time when his true sexual preference as a homosexual shall prevail
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the solidity, honor, and
parties with forfeiture of defendant's share thereon in favor of the welfare of his own family.25
same parties' children whose legal custody is awarded to plaintiff
with visitorial right afforded to defendant;
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due course.
Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA. 26
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the
children; and
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the
lower court's jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC: community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this CA Disposition

Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment
and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto;
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
and
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is

b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Piñas City and
hereby DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated
Manila City to cause the registration of the said Entry of
November 25, 2005) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las
Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Piñas City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs. 27
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the
extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said the
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis supplied) appellate court:
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the
Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated: decision rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming
there was a mistake is not a Petition for Annulment of Judgment but I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the
an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be reversed or demands of substantial justice and in the Court's exercise of equity
corrected only by appeal. jurisdiction.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the
jurisdiction, which is properly the subject of an ordinary appeal. wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.30This is to prevent the party
from benefiting from one's neglect and mistakes. However, like most
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he rules, it carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all
claims excess in the exercise thereof. "Excess" assuming there was is rules of procedures is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The possible.31
Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise thereof.28
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be
Issues resorted to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer available
through no fault of petitioner.32 However, in Buenaflor v. Court of
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the CA Appeals,33 this Court clarified the proper appreciation for technical rules of
the following errors: procedure, in this wise:
I Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat,

substantial justice and, therefore, they should not be applied
in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING
while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with
THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION
respect to the rules on the manner and periods for
FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES
perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an exception to
INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on
equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court
II has given due course to an appeal perfected out of time where a
stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but only
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER the exercise of equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.34 (Emphasis
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND and underscoring supplied)
OF PETITIONER'S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the
III stringent rules governing appeals.35 It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice
justice for technicality.36
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the
FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF THE indulgence of this Court to consider his petition before the CA instead as a
CONJUGAL ASSETS.29 petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Our Ruling A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of
discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on account of his
alleged homosexuality. This is not the first time that this Court is faced with Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G. Tan
a similar situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,37 petitioner Delia R. availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead
Nerves elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this
suspending her for six (6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school Court considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under
teacher, is deemed to have already served her six-month suspension during Rule 65.
the pendency of the case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without
back wages. On appeal, Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia: This Court found that based on Tan's allegations, the trial court prima facie
committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in
Section 7 of the Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of this wise:
the Rules of Court.
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the
(Revised Circular No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of
with this Honorable Court instead of the Supreme substantial justice.43 (Underscoring supplied)
Court.38 (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving
The CA dismissed Nerves' petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy due course to the present petition and treating petitioner's CA petition as one
or the inappropriate mode of appeal.39 The CA opined that "under the for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity
Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from or non-validity of a marriage.
judgments or final orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review." 40
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,44 citing Labad v. University of Southeastern
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially Philippines, this Court reiterated:
complied with the Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule upon. While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
65 of the Rules of Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts
the appeal. x x x should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right
to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause,
with merit. Hence, the Court of Appeals should have overlooked the free from the constraints of technicalities.45
insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in order to do justice to the
parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical
procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in order to lapse and afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the
promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, ends of justice.46
and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. As it
has been said, where the rigid application of the rules would Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuel's counsel
frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine Dugenio,
grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her notice of
from the operation of the rules.41(Underscoring supplied) appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first
instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment The client was likewise spared from counsel's negligence in Government
rather than pursue an ordinary appeal. Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings,
Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in Bengson:
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsel's incompetence.
These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuel's appeal. True it is that the But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its
negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized certain proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and
exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto
client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has
deprivation of the client's liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule
justice so require.47 whenever the purposes of justice require it.53
The negligence of Manuel's counsel falls under the exceptions. Ultimately, II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a
the reckless or gross negligence of petitioner's former counsel led to the loss marriage, not homosexuality per se.
of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for his counsel's
grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand that he be Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his
allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court. marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of
incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,48 this Court explained thus:
The trial court declared that Leonida's petition for nullity had "no basis at all
It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is because the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case
based on the rule that any act performed by a counsel within the under Article 36 of the Family Code." It went further by citing Republic
scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his v. Molina:54
client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance,
negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the client's Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable
being held liable for damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived differences, incessant quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood
of his day in court and the judgment may be set aside on such swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment, and difficulty, neglect, or
ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not suffice
demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their to establish psychological incapacity. 55
defense. Petitioners may not be made to suffer for the lawyer's
mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant relief to If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not
parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to
downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the demonstrate were Manuel's homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts
consequence of depriving their clients, of their day in generally predominant among homosexual individuals.56 She wanted to prove
court.49(Emphasis supplied) that the perceived homosexuality rendered Manuel incapable of fulfilling the
essential marital obligations.
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require it. With more But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage
conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of
institution of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of one's action. 50
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity at the
there is smoke surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole. 57
defendant, there is preponderant evidence enough to establish with
certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is the fact that Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations
can be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the
herein parties. time of their marriage. The lower court considered the public perception of
Manuel's sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around took cognizance of Manuel's peculiarities and interpreted it against his
him even including his own close friends doubtedhis true sexual sexuality.
preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15
December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings, plaintiff told Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower
defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida.
anything to prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all The law is clear - a marriage may be annulled when the consent of either
his denials. Defendant threatened to sue those people but nothing party was obtained by fraud,58 such as concealment of
happened after that. There may have been more important matters homosexuality.59 Nowhere in the said decision was it proven by
to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against and be preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a homosexual at the onset of
effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to his wife. 60 It is the
defendant's denials, plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se, that vitiates
upon reasons may be advanced to either exculpate or nail to the the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad faith
cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality to and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain - even during his
marriage with plaintiff, the smoke of doubt about his real preference Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be
continued and even got thicker, reason why obviously defendant freely given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven
failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff by preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an
and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims. exclusive list of circumstances 61 constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is
not among those cited, but its concealment.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he
is meticulous over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the
folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man is more authoritative in knowing deliberations62 of the Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN, 15
December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in
light of evidence presented apparently showing that he had extra
the provision on the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit,
fondness of his male friends (sic) to the extent that twice on
however, pointed out that in Article 46, they are talking only of
separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was
"concealment," while in the article on legal separation, there is
allegedly seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the
actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground
homosexual magazines and tapes likewise allegedly discovered
existed after the marriage, while in Article 46, the ground existed at
underneath his bed (Exhibits "L" and "M"), the doubt as to his real
the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested that, for clarity,
sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus
they add the phrase "existing at the time of the marriage" at the end
thereof of defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but
of subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.63
the simple reason of professional rivalry advanced by the defendant
is certainly not enough to justify and obscure the question why
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on
its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a the ground that he did not freely consent to be married to the
marriage.64 Concealment in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one appellee. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a
that is constitutive of fraud. It is this fundamental element that respondent reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger
failed to prove. to his life and safety. x x x
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for The Court is not convinced that appellant's apprehension of danger
divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to
of the basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at
between the spouses.65 In Crutcher v. Crutcher,66 the Court held: the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant worked as a
security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous the very least, the proper way to keep himself out of harm's way. x x
indignity to the wife, and which would make the marriage relation so x
revolting to her that it would become impossible for her to discharge
the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of the Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made
relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause mental to believe by appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child
suffering to the extent of affecting her health. 67 when they were married. Appellant's excuse that he could not have
impregnated the appellee because he did not have an erection
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines, during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The
the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the complaint is bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with
country. Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy the appellee. x x x
heterosexual life are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond
in our jurisdiction. At most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and xxxx
board.
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union result of the perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the
for more than eleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children. The marriage, such as lack of parental consent, insanity, fraud,
burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed to
she failed to discharge this onus. justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these
grounds, the validity of his marriage must be upheld.69
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated
marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.68 In Villanueva, Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by
instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless solely taking into account petitioner's homosexuality per se and not its
portrayals of his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court: concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen
with those of the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
binding on this Court. We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals foundation of the family.70 The State and the public have vital interest in the
that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private respondent and maintenance and preservation of these social institutions against desecration
that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to by fabricated evidence.71 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
do so, thus - validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer SO ORDERED.
and enjoy their community or conjugal property.
RUBEN T. REYES
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community property, Associate Justice
provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community

property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to

participate in the administration of the common properties, the other
spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do
not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance without the
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the
court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 12472 prescribes joint administration and G.R. No. 181089. October 22, 2012.*
enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both MERLINDA CIPRIONA MONTAÑEZ, respondent, vs. LOURDES
spouses exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, complainant.
jointly.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements of; It is essential in the prosecution for
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
Manuel's share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is marriage.―The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has
upheld valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuel's share been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
in the property regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
of the community property. presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed Decision
celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petition in the trial court to annul
the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the
the marriage is DISMISSED.
essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter
first marriage. from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Pedro,
Same; Same; The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first Laguna, a Complaint7 for Bigamy against respondent, which was docketed
marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the complaint was an Affidavit8
during the subsistence of the first marriage.―At the time respondent (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated August 23, 2004, thumb-marked
contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was still subsisting as it and signed by Silverio,9 which alleged, among others, that respondent failed
had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled in the above-mentioned to reveal to Silverio that she was still married to Socrates. On November 17,
jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first 2004, an Information10 for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the
marriage would not change the fact that she contracted the second marriage RTC of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal
during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense
charged were sufficiently alleged. That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
PETITION for review on certiorari of the order and resolution of the Regional Court, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Br. 31. feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with one SILVERIO
CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with SOCRATES FLORES has not
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. been judicially dissolved by proper judicial authorities.11
Jose Marlon P. Pabiton for petitioner. On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through counsel,
filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the Criminal
Robert Sison for respondent. Complaint)12 alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been
declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of
PERALTA, J.: prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983; that the basic element
of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is therefore wanting. She
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul also claimed that since the second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of
the Order1 dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of bigamy had already prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment13 arguing
San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL which that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent
dismissed the Information for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes filed her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of
Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC Resolution2 dated January 2, contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the first
2008 denying the motion for reconsideration. marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void by
the court.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in Lezo,
Aklan.3 On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said marriage, In its Order14 dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It found
respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San Pedro, Laguna.4 In respondent’s argument that with the declaration of nullity of her first
2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, a Petition for marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus the element
the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been laid to rest by
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of the Family Code, our ruling in Mercado v. Tan15 where we held:
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204. On July 18, 2003, the RTC of
Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an Amended Decision5 declaring the In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there
marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void. Said decision became was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he
final and executory on October 13, 2003.6 instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after
complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. For
contracting a second marriage while the first is still subsisting, he committed accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with the
the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City in 2003.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the prosecution, but
marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated January 2, 2008, the RTC
consummated by then. x x x16 denied the same ruling, among others, that the judicial declaration of nullity
of respondent’s marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation
As to respondent’s claim that the action had already prescribed, the RTC that said marriage never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in
found that while the second marriage indeed took place in 1983, or more contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy, the commission
of the crime was only discovered on November 17, 2004, which should be Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising the
the reckoning period, hence, prescription has not yet set in. following issues:
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 claiming that the Mercado I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of
ruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her first marriage in the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy on the
1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for annulment was ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a charge of bigamy
granted and became final before the criminal complaint for bigamy was filed; for entering into a second marriage prior to the enactment of the Family
and, that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy?
because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a
declaration of nullity of a completely void prior marriage. II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior to
the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,18 the dispositive Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of nullity of the
portion of which reads: first marriage before entering a second marriage ambivalent, such that a
person was allowed to enter a subsequent marriage without the annulment
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside. Let a of the first without incurring criminal liability.19
new one be entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let the instant
case be DISMISSED. Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC’s dismissal of
the Information for bigamy was filed by private complainant and not by the
SO ORDERED. Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which should represent the government
in all judicial proceedings filed before us.20 Notwithstanding, we will give
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted a due course to this petition as we had done in the past. In Antone v.
second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of the Beronilla,21 the offended party (private complainant) questioned before the
Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration of Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC’s dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed
absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent against her husband, and the CA dismissed the petition on the ground,
marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was ambivalent on the among others, that the petition should have been filed in behalf of the
issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of absolute nullity of the first People of the Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all
marriage. The RTC found that both marriages of respondent took place appealed criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had
before the effectivity of the Family Code, thus, considering the unsettled given due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests
state of jurisprudence on the need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and said:
of marriage before commencing a second marriage and the principle that
laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the following
the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is aggrieved by The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally
any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the OSG, and not the married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or
prosecutor, must be the one to question the order or ruling before us. x x x her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the State or marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss the petition on requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the
this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to comment on the second marriage or subsequent marriage.23 It is essential in the prosecution
petition, as we had done before in some cases. In light of its Comment, we for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as the Government and its requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
officers in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, and all other courts or marriage.24
tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government
or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second marriage
with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates celebrated in 1976 was
As an exception to this rule, the Solicitor General is allowed to: still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a
competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the
(8) Deputize legal officers of government departments, bureaus, agencies Information. In her Motion to Quash the Information, she alleged, among
and offices to assist the Solicitor General and appear or represent the others, that:
Government in cases involving their respective offices, brought before the
courts and exercise supervision and control over such legal officers with xxxx
respect to such cases.
2. The records of this case would bear out that accused’s marriage with
21 G.R. No. 183824, December 8, 2010, 637 SCRA 615. said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio on 14 April 2003 by Branch
256 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. The said decision was
its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis never appealed, and became final and executory shortly thereafter.
supplied)22
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this case, her
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the petition, marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared void from the beginning.
which it did, praying that the petition be granted in effect, such Comment
had ratified the petition filed with us. 4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983 to speak of.
In other words, there was only one marriage.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not the
RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against respondent. 5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid marriages, is
therefore wanting.25
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy as
follow: Clearly, the annulment of respondent’s first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now is
Art. 349. Bigamy.―The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon whether the declaration of nullity of respondent’s first marriage justifies the
any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the We rule in the negative.
proper proceedings.
In Mercado v. Tan,26 we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration of the respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential
nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the declaration elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. And by
contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, the accused Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the
committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing of the
Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered before
In Abunado v. People,27 we held that what is required for the charge of the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally
bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
second marriage is contracted.28 Even if the accused eventually obtained a during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the
first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
annulled.29 nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
In Tenebro v. CA,30 we declared that although the judicial declaration of the void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to marriage exists.34 Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not being prosecuted for bigamy.35
without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born
before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered Anent respondent’s contention in her Comment that since her two marriages
legitimate. There is, therefore, a recognition written into the law itself that were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, Article 40 of the
such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect because this will impair her
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability right to remarry without need of securing a judicial declaration of nullity of a
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on completely void marriage.
bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that
each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the We are not persuaded.
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of
hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment.31 In Jarillo v. People,36 where the accused, in her motion for reconsideration,
argued that since her marriages were entered into before the effectivity of
the Family Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law
And in Jarillo v. People,32 applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we affirmed (Act 3613),37 instead of Article 40 of the Family Code, which requires a final
the accused’s conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment the accused judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may contract
contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been a subsequent marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already
consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the
the accused’s first marriage which had not yet been declared null and void by declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied
a court of competent jurisdiction was deemed valid and subsisting. retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said
“Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first vested or acquired rights.” The Court went on to explain, thus:
marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. As ruled
in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent judicial declaration of The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights
nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The
the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. ――o0o――
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing
the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial

declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very
same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his
cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and
escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and
that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage
aware of the absence of a requisite―usually the marriage license―and
thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of
nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such
scenario would render nugatory the provision on bigamy.38
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Order

dated September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 2, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal
Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is
ordered REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,** Abad and Mendoza, JJ.,

concur.
Petition granted, order and resolution set aside.
Notes.―Under the Family Code a subsequent judicial declaration of the

nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then,
the crime had already been consummated. (Antone vs. Beronilla, 637 SCRA
615 [2010])
The elements of bigamy are as follows: 1. That the offender has been legally
married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his
or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity. (Teves vs. People, 656 SCRA 307 [2011])

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Civil Law I (COMPILATION)Page |1

Same; Same; Same; Damages pursuant to Article 21 may be awarded not

disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as to exemplary

PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of First Instance

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Same; Same; Damages; Article 20 speaks of general sanctions of all other

3. On the Third Cause of Action, ordering all defendants to pay plaintiff

Defamatory Imputation C, C-1 to C-3

10 November 1993 (Raul Valino)

(no by-line) RCBC case bugs Bangko Sentral

Yuchengko joins forces with Kokoy F, F-1 to F-3

A, A-1 to A-5 5 December 1993

12 November 1993 (Rodney P. Diola)

15 November 1993 Yuchengco joins forces with Kokoy[12]

G.R. No. 193459. February 15, 2011.*

MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, petitioner, vs. THE HOUSE OF

Impeachment; Judicial Review; Certiorari; Jurisdiction; The Court finds it

Speaker Belmonte filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene dated October 4,

Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of impeachments

JUSTICE MORALES: JUSTICE MORALES:

The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment

however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in order

Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Embedded in

Second Issue Q Whereat?

Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorneys

deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience,

Code is that it is the authority granted by the State to the contracting

avoid liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage

Wills; Succession; Conflict of laws; Renvoi doctrine.—The doctrine of renvoi

Same; Foreign laws.—In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of

Same; Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to succeed—The

Same; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general provisions.—Whatever public

Same; Same; Same; Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error

Same; Same; Same; Article 8 which is a directory provision, refers only to

Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross

SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA,

Same; Same; Same; Divorce; The nonrecognition of absolute divorce

Same; Same; Same; Same; The nonrecognition of absolute divorce in the

xxxx The Court concurs with the CA.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A declaration of the nullity of the second

Same; Same; Same; Same; Bigamy; A marriage contracted during the

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: CONTRARY TO LAW.

As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record, petitioner

G.R. No. 139676. March 31, 2006.*

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NORMA CUISON-

Constitutional Law; Family Code; Marriages; It is the policy of our

Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240

G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.*

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS

Marriages; Family Code; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Divorce;

Considerations beyond (g) adoptions;

As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that (i) naturalization; and

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one,

G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013.*

MINORU FUJIKI, petitioner, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY,

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Foreign Judgments; Conflict of Law; For

Same; Same; Same; Same; A foreign judgment relating to the status of a

G.R. Nos. 212656-57. November 23, 2016.*

MAYOR AMADO CORPUZ, JR., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE