DECLARATION PAGE

I Mitesh Kumar student of B.A.L.L.B. (First year) in Chanakya National Law University
declare that the research project entitled “PERSON AGANIST WHOM CONTRACT MAY
BE SPECIFICALLY ENFORCED (SECTION 15-19)” submitted by me for the fulfilment of
LAW OF CONRACT course is my own work. This project has not been submitted for any
other Degree / Certificate / Course in any Institution / University.

Name of the candidate

MITESH KUMAR

B.A.L.L.B (1st Year) Signature of Candidate

ROLL NO. 1344

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT PAGE

I am highly elated to have worked on my research topic “PERSON AGANIST WHOM

CONTRACT MAY BE SPECIFICALLY ENFORCED (SECTION 15-19)” under the
guidelines of DR. SHUSHMITA SINGH, (FACULTY OF LAW ). I am very grateful to
her for his proper guidance.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my profound gratitude and deep regard to her
for his exemplary guidance, valuable feedback and constant encouragement throughout the
duration of the project.

Her valuable suggestions were of immense help throughout my project work.

Her perceptive criticism kept me working to make this project in a much better way. Working
under her was an extremely knowledgeable experience for me.

I would also like to thank all my friends and my seniors. Apart from all these I would like to
give special regard to the librarian of my university who made a relevant effort regarding to
provide the materials to my topic and also assisting me.

Finally I would like to thank my parents and brother for their immense support and presence
during this whole project work.

MITESH KUMAR

CONTENTS

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NAME OF CHAPTERS PAGE NUMBER.

DECLARATION …………….…………………………………… 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT………………………………………… 2

INTRODUCTION………………………………………………… 4-5

AIMS AND OBJECTIVE……………………………………,,,,,.... 6

HYPOTHESIS……………………………………………………… 6

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY……….…………………………… 6

REVIEW OF EXISTING LITRATURE…………………………… 6

RESEARCH METHEDLOGY ........................................ 6

SOURCES OF DATA……………………………………………… 6

2.SECTION-15…………………………………………………… 7-9

3.SECTION-16 ............................................ 10-12

4.SECTION-17................................. 13

5.SECTION-18........ 14

6.SECTION-19……………………………………… 15-16

7. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………… 17

BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………… 18

CHAPTER I

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 INTRODUCTION

The 'Specific Relief Act 1963' is an Act of the Parliament of India large number of remedial
aspects of law. It came in the replacement of the earlier Act of 1877. Protection of life and
property cannot be assured by a simple declaration of rights and duties. The enumeration of
rights and duties must be supplemented by legal devices which help the individual to enforce
his rights. Social redress must be provided to every person who is injured in the social
process. Basically, the mission of the Specific Act is to assure that whenever there is a wrong
there must be a remedy.

Remedies are generally provided by the branch of substantive law which defines its rights
and duties for its own purposes. The law of contract provides the remedy of damages for
breach of contract. Similarly the law of tort provides for recovery in cases of tortuous
wrongs. However, substantive laws can never afford to be exhaustive in terms of their
remedies and reliefs. Scope of the Act remains specific to provide a network of relief. The
Act does not confer any Rights on itself. Specific relief is only provided for the violation of a
legal right. The network of reliefs allowed by this Act falls under the following outlines:

Recovery of possession of property

Though the Specific Relief Act is concerned only with the enforcement of civil rights and not
penal laws, even civil law has to take care of certain rights, the violation of which is capable
of creating serious violent clashes, and these are rights to possession of property. The very
first chapter provides relief to those who have been dispossessed of their property.—Nair
Services Society Vs. K C Alexander [All India Reporter] AIR Year of Judgment-1968 SC
[Supreme Court of India] Page No.1165—No suit for dispossession against the government is
maintainable under Specific Relief Act.

Specific performance of contracts

The base of almost all economic relations are made of contracts. Every profession is contract
bound. Property, whether owned by businesses or individuals are locked up under contracts.
For example, money in banks and other forms of investment are contractually bound. As a
result, contracts constitute modern wealth. They are sacred per se. Moreover a particular
contract is not an isolated transaction. Often it is a link in the chain of several contracts. A
failure at one place could cause serious dislocation to economic and social life. Contracts,
thus must be enforced. But awarding compensation to an injured person is the only way that
the law of contract can enforce a contract. However, in many cases compensation fails to

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serve the economic purpose of a contract. For example, a hospital is interested in the
fulfillment of its requirements and not in receiving compensation from a failed supplier. Thus
there was a need for a remedy which would compel a defaulting contractor to actually
perform his contract.

Rectification and cancellation of instruments and rescission of contracts

By law, many transactions are required to be in writing. Because of expediency, many more
transactions are put into writing. A written transaction is called aninstrument. An instrument
is a result of negotiations. Sometimes, an instrument may fail to express the intention of the
involved parties. Rectification of such an instrument may become necessary. Help towards
parties who want to have their documents (which are mistakenly executed) rectified, is
provided in Chapter III of the Specific Relief Act. Closely related with documents mistakenly
executed, is the category of documents which are at a later point found to be void or which
become void. These documents ought to be cancelled. Chapter V provides relief from such
kinds of documents. Also, there is a category of contracts which, for some reason or the other
(e.g. lack of free consent) can be deemed voidable by the party which consent was not free.
This party has the right to have the contract rescinded. Relief by way of rescission is provided
by Chapter IV of the Specific Relief Act.

Preventive relief

c.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVE OF THE PROJECT

The researcher’s aim for making this project is to study the:-\

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(i) section 15-19 of specific relief act

HYPOTHESIS
The researcher presume that the agreement, provision for marriage express on maintenance
under a family arrangement.

(B).REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE

For the purpose of research the researcher had visited CNLU library and review
various sources available secondary nature.

SOURCES OF DATA

Primary Sources – case laws, Bare act

Secondary Sources – Books on law of contract, websites, journals, articles, magazines etc.

CHAPTER II

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 SECTION-15 OF SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT

Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 Provides that:

1. Abatement of:
It was a suit for dissolution of partnership. One of the respondent’s sharers died during the
pendency of the appeal. His legal representatives were not brought on record. While holding
that the appeal abated as a whole their Lordships observed in para 16 as follows:

“Under Rule 4 (3) read with Rule 11 of Order XXII, C.P.C. the appeal abates as against the
deceased respondent where within the time limited by law no application is made to bring his
heirs or legal representatives on record. As pointed out by this Court in the State of Punjab v.
Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89, it is not correct to say that the appeal abates against the other
respondents. Under certain circumstances the appeal may not be proceeded with and is liable
to be dismissed. But that is so, not because of the procedural defect but because as Mulla has
pointed out it is a part of the substantive law.”

It is, therefore, the substantive law which has to be looked into to find out whether a lis is
constituted properly or remains to be constituted with all the necessary parties on record. So
that it may be disposed off by the Court. It is, therefore, that when a co-plaintiff being a party
to a joint and indivisible contract dies and his legal representatives are not brought on record
within the prescribed time the suit does not remain properly constituted and becomes liable to
be dismissed as a whole as abated in it’s entirety.

2. Agreement of repurchase:
When a condition of repurchase is embodied in the document which effects or purports to
effect a sale, it is always a matter for construction whether a sale was meant or a mortgage. In
such a case, the presumption is that it is a mortgage. That presumption can be displaced by
clear and express words. If the conditions of Section 58 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act
are fulfilled, the deed should be construed as a mortgage. In such a case, the real question is
not what the parties intended or meant, but what the legal effect of the words used by them is.
Surrounding circumstances can be looked to in case of ambiguity.

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3. Agreement of sale:
A dispute was pending between the appellant and one Chikkanarayanappa in the High Court.
The Central Bank of India obtained a decree for a sum of Rs. 42.000/ – against the appellant.
As per the agreement for sale, the respondent was to pay the said amount on behalf of the
appellant and get the loan discharged. The appellant was to get only such amount from the
respondent which might have been remaining after discharge of the loan taken by him from
the Central Bank of India.

The sale deed was to be executed within a period of four months. However, if the dispute
between the appellant and the said Chikkanarayanappa was not disposed off within the said
period, the appellant was required to have permission from the State.

It is now accepted that no permission at the relevant point of time was required to be obtained
from the State, for sale of the land. It is furthermore not in dispute that the litigation pending
between the appellant and the said

Chikanarayanappa had not been disposed off within a period of four months. Even if the said
dispute, in terms of the stipulation contained in the agreement for sale, was not to come to an
end, the sale deed was to be executed and the balance sale consideration was to be left with
the appellant after deducting the advance amount so as to enable the respondent to pay the
same to the Bank till the said dispute comes to an end wherefore a separate agreement was to
be entered into.

The notice dated 24.4.1984 must be construed having regard to the aforementioned backdrop
of facts. From a perusal of the said notice, it appears that prior thereto, the appellant had
received notice from the Court of the Civil Judge, Bangalore, in connection with the said
loan. From 1982 to 1984, the respondent did not take any steps to make any inquiry as regard
the disposal of the said litigation before the High Court. He did not pay any amount to the
Bank.

The appellant, therefore, had good reasons to serve the aforementioned notice calling upon
the respondent to deposit the entire amount to the Bank. There is nothing on record to show

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that despite receipt of the said notice dated 24.4.1984, the respondent took any step to deposit
the said amount. He was, thus, not ready and willing to perform his part of contract. He has,
deposited a sum of Rs. 10,000/- only in the year 1985, i.e. after more than one year thereafter.

Evidently, he was not interested in payment of the loan amount to the Bank on behalf of the
appellant as he was appropriating the usufructs from the land as he was in possession thereof.

Thus, even though the time for performance was not fixed in the agreement for sale, on
receipt of the notice, the respondent had notice that the performance was being refused, if he
failed to fulfil his obligation under the contract within 15 days of receipt of the notice.

This suit was, therefore, in terms of the requirement of Article 54 of the Limitation Act,
should have been filed within a period of three years from the date of expiry of fifteen days
from the date of receipt of the said notice.

4. Agreement to repurchase:
Without words or expressions in the documents indicating prohibition on assignment or
transfer of right of repurchase and in the face of clear provisions of Section 15 (b) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963, an implied prohibition cannot be read into the terms of the
documents. Merely because in the documents, there is mention of ‘heirs’ of the contracting
parties but not their ‘assignees’ or ‘transferees’, the legal right of assignment available to the
benefit of original contracting party under Section 15 (b) of the Act cannot be denied to it.

SECTION-16 OF SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT

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Section 16 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 Provides that:

1. Agreement for sale:

A Court may not grant to a plaintiff who has failed to aver and to prove that he has performed
or has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement the specific
performance whereof he seeks. In the circumstances, it becomes necessary to remand the suit
to the Trial Court to consider whether or not it has been established that the original plaintiff
and her legal representatives had proved that they had performed or were always ready and
willing to perform the terms of the agreement for sale.

2. Agreement of sale:
The respondent and his sister had each half share in the suit properties. Hence a mere failure
to mention in the agreement that they had such share in the property would not entitle one to
come to the conclusion that they did not have that share. When the property is owned jointly,
unless it is shown to contrary, it has to be held that each one of the joint owners owns a
moiety of the property. In the present case, there is neither a pleading nor a contention that
the respondent and his sister did not own the property in equal shares. Secondly, the agree-
ment of sale clearly mentions that respondent was entering into the agreement both on behalf
of himself and his sister, and that he was, under the agreement, selling the whole of his share
and also the whole of the share of his sister in the property. Further in the agreement itself he
had stated that he was responsible to get the sale-deed executed by his sister and that he
would persuade her to do so. This being the case, the properties agreed to be sold were
clearly distinguishable by the shares of the respective vendors. In the circumstances when the
absentee vendor, for some reason or the other, refused to accept the agreement should not be
enforced against the vendor who had signed it and whose property is identifiable by his
specific share.

This is not a case which is covered by Section 12 of the Act. It is clear from Section 12 that it
related to the specific performance of a part of a contract. The present is not a case of the
performance of a part of the contract but of the whole of the contract so far as to contracting
party, namely, the respondent is concerned. Under the agreement, he had contracted to sale
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whole of his property. The two contracts, viz. for the sale of his share and of his sister’s share
were separate and were incorporated in one agreement.

In the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not the essence of the
contract unless specifically provided to that effect.

3. Agreement to sale:
Where purchaser was not willing to pay part consideration unless some conditions foreign to
the agreement are fulfilled it was held that he could not ask for the specific performance.

4. Agreement to sell:
Everybody concerned in the matter proceeded on the assumption that there were two houses,
one occupied by defendants and another in the occupation of the tenants. The agreement
mentions the house in which the defendants were living as the subject matter of the
agreement. The words ‘entire house’ cannot in any way militate against this fact.

It will only be the entire house in which the defendants were living. As we stated earlier, the
plaintiff was aware of the fact that there was a portion of the premises which was referred to
and understood as a separate house by all those concerned and which was in the occupation
of the tenants. If the agreement was to include that portion also it was his duty to have it
specifically mentioned in the agreement, riot having done so he has got to fail in his claim
regarding that portion of the house.

5. Allowability of:
Where the amendment does not constitute addition of a new cause of action, or does not raise
a new case, but amounts to no more than addition to the facts already on the records, the
amendment could be allowed even after the statutory period of limitation.

6. Amendment:
Question of delay is one of the considerations and not the sole consideration for accepting or
refusing amendment. Delay itself is per se no ground for refusing prayer for amendment
unless the same was mala Fide and intended at delaying disposal of the proceeding. Where in
a plaint for specific performance of a contract, the legal requirement of an averment of

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continuous readiness and willingness is substantially complied with there can be no objection
to amend the plaint, to add the language of the statute to this averment.

CHAPTER IV

SECTION-17 OF SPECIFIC RELEF ACT

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Section 17 in The Specific Relief Act, 1963

17. Contract to sell or let property by one who has no title, not specifically enforceable.—
(1) A contract to sell or let any immovable property cannot be specifically enforced in favour
of a vendor or lessor—
(a) who, knowing not to have any title to the property, has contracted to sell or let the
property;
(b) who, though he entered into the contract believing that he had a good title to the property,
cannot at the time fixed by the parties or by the court for the completion of the sale or letting,
give the purchaser or lessee a title free from reasonable doubt.
(2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall also apply, as far as may be, to contracts for the
sale or hire of movable property.

CHAPTER V

SECTION-18 OF SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT

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Section 18 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 Provides that:

1. Applicability and Scope:

When the defendant sets up a variation then the plaintiff may have the contract specifically
performed subject to the variation so set up only in cases of fraud, mistake of fact or
misrepresentation or where the contract has failed to produce a certain legal result which the
contract was intended to do or where the parties have subsequent to the execution of the
contract varied its terms. Obviously, the instant case is not covered by any of the situations
contemplated by Section 18 of Specific Relief Act.
2. Variation:
When the defendant sets up a variation then the plaintiff may have the contract specifically
performed subject to the variation so set up only in cases of fraud, mistake of fact or
misrepresentation or where the contract has failed to produce a certain legal result which the
contract was intended to do or where the parties have subsequent to the execution of the
contract varied its terms.

CHAPTER VI

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 SECTION-19 OF SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT

Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 Provides that:

1. Action:
When an action is brought for specific performance, the subsequent transferee would be a
necessary party to the suit as the only decree that is required to be passed in such a suit (for
specific performance) is against the original vendor. The subsequent transferees are required
to be directed to join in the sale which is directed by a decree for specific performance of
contract.

It has been held that the proper form of decree is to direct specific performance of the
contract between the vendor and the prior transferee and direct the subsequent transferee to
join in the conveyance so as to pass on the title which resides in him, to the prior transferee.
He does not join in any special covenants made between the prior transferee and his vendor,
all that he does not is to pass on his title to the prior transferee.

2. Agreement of sale:
Where the subsequent purchasers were bona fide purchasers for value without notice of
earlier agreement between parties but the Court recorded no finding as to whether earlier
agreement of sale was forged or not the case remanded for decision a fresh.

3. Applicability of:
Under Section 19 (b) a specific performance of a contract can be enforced not only against
either party thereto against any other person claiming under him by a title arising
subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value who has paid his money in good
faith and without notice of original contract.

4. Bona fide purchaser:

When subsequent purchaser already was aware of plaintiff being in possession of suit
property as tenant and he did not make any inquiry at the time of purchase, then subsequent

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purchaser could not be aid to bona fide purchaser for value without notice of prior agreement
in favour of plaintiff.

Section 19(b) protects the bona fide purchaser in good faith for value without notice of the
original contract. Which is in the nature of exception to the general rule. Hence the onus of
proof of good faith is on the purchaser who takes the plea that he is an innocent purchaser.
Good faith is a question of fact to be considered and decided on the facts of each case.
Section 52 of the Penal Code emphasized due care and attention in relation to good faith.

Hence with reference to subsequent purchaser it is essential that he should make an inquiry as
to the title or interest of the person in actual possession as on the date when the sale
transaction was made in his favour. The actual possession of a person itself is deemed or
constructive notice of the title if any, of a person who is for the time being in actual
possession thereof. A subsequent purchaser has to make inquiry as to further interest, nature
of possession and title under which the person was continuing in possession on the date of
purchase of the property.

5. Burden of proof:
The onus of proof of good faith is on the purchaser who takes the plea that he is an innocent
purchaser. It is his duty to inquire from persons in possession as to the precise character at the
time when subsequent sale transaction was entered into.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION

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The 'Specific Relief Act 1963' is an Act of the Parliament of India large number of remedial
aspects of law. It came in the replacement of the earlier Act of 1877.
Remedies are generally provided by the branch of substantive law which defines its rights
and duties for its own purposes. The law of contract provides the remedy of damages for
breach of contract. Similarly the law of tort provides for recovery in cases of tortuous
wrongs. However, substantive laws can never afford to be exhaustive in terms of their
remedies and reliefs. Scope of the Act remains specific to provide a network of relief. The
Act does not confer any Rights on itself. Specific relief is only provided for the violation of a
legal right.

There can be cases where the nature of the contract do not allow damages to likely serve any
purpose nor admit to specific performance. In such cases, the court may have to restrain the
party who threatens the breach, to the possible extent. For example, a person undertakes a
contract to sing at a particular place and also undertakes not to sing anywhere else during the
same period. In case the singer threatens breach, the court cannot force him to sing. The
positive side of the bargain is not specifically enforceable. But the negative undertaking i.e.
not to sing elsewhere, can be enforced by restraining him from singing elsewhere. When he is
prevented from resorting to other openings, it may exert some pressure upon his mind and he
may be persuaded to go ahead with the performance of his contract. This type of remedy is
known as preventive relief. This is granted by issuing an order known as
injunction. Injunction is an order issued upon the party concerned directing him/them to omit
the performance of a particular duty or act. This is also known as a mandatory injunction.
Such relief is granted under the provisions of Part III of the Act

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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BOOKS

(I) Dr. Bangia R.K, Contract-I, Allahabad ; Allahabad law agency, sixth ed.,
2009
(II) Singh Avatar, contract and Specific Relief act; Eastern book company,
eleventh edition, 2013

WEBSITES

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1818467/

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