Case No. 1 PEOPLE V.

MARTI
G.R. No. 81561 JANUARY 18, 1991
Digested by: Acacio, Marc

FACTS:

ANDREI MARTI AND HIS COMMON-LAW WIFE, SHIRLEY REYES, WENT TO THE BOOTH OF
MANILA PACKING AND EXPORT FORWARDERS CARRYING FOUR GIFT WRAPPED PACKAGES TO
BE SENT TO ZURICH. ANITA REYES, THE PROPRIETESS, ASKED MARTI IF SHE COULD EXAMINE
AND INSPECT THE PACKAGES. MARTI, HOWEVER, REFUSED. BEFORE THE DELIVERY OF THE
BOX TO THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS AND/OR BUREAU OF POST, MR. JOB REYES, FOLLOWING
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE, OPENED THE BOXES FOR FINAL INSPECTION. HE FELT
DRIED LEAVES INSIDE. HE REPORTED IT TO THE NBI AND UPON EXAMINATION, THE DRIED
LEAVES WERE CONFIRMED AS MARIJUANA LEAVES.

MARTI WAS CHARGED FOR VIOLATION OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT. ON HIS
APPEAL, HE CONTENDS THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND SHOULD BE HELD INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
ISSUES:

I. WHETHER THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED SHALL BECOME INADMISSIBLE IN

EVIDENCE DUE TO THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONBLE SEACH AND SEIZURE.

II. WHETHER HIS RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION WERE OBSERVED.

HELD:

I. NO. THE EVIDENCE WAS PRIMARILY DISCOVERED AND OBTAINED BY A PRIVATE

PERSON, ACTING IN A PRIVATE CAPACITY AND WITHOUT THE INTERVENTION
AND PARTICIPATION OF THE STATE AUTHORITIES. IN THE ABSENCE OF
GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERENCE, THE LIBERTIES GUARANTEED BY THE
CONSTITUTION CANNOT BE INVOKED AGAINST THE STATE. THE EVIDENCE
OBTAINED WAS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

II. THE COURT FOUND NOTHING TO INDICATE, AS AN UNDISPUTED FACT, THAT

THE APPELLANT WAS NOT INFORMED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OR
THAT HE GAVE STATEMENTS WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF A COUNSEL. IT IS
PRESUMED THAT LAW ENFORCERS HAVE REGULARLY PERFORMED THEIR
DUTIES AND THEIR TESTIMONIES SHOULD BE GIVEN FULL FAITH AND
CREDENCE, THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.
Case No. 2 VELASQUEZ-RODRIGUEZ v. HONDURAS
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Digested by: Palatan, Roselyn

FACTS: Manfredo Velásquez, a student at the National Autonomous University of Honduras, was
violently detained without a warrant for his arrest by members of the National Office of Investigations
(DNI) and G-2 of the Armed Forces of Honduras. The detention took place in Tegucigalpa. According to
the petitioners, several eyewitnesses reported that Manfredo Velásquez and others were detained and
taken to the cells of Public Security Forces Station No. 2 located in the Barrio El Manchén of Tegucigalpa,
where he was accused of alleged political crimes and subjected to harsh interrogation and cruel torture.
On September 17, 1981, Manfredo Velásquez was moved to the First Infantry Battalion where the
interrogation continued but that the police and security forces denied that he had been detained.

After transmitting the relevant parts of the petition to the Government, the Commission, on various
occasions, requested information on the matter. Since the Commission received no reply, it applied
Article 42 (formerly 39) of its Regulations and presumed "as true the allegations contained in the
communication of October 7, 1981 concerning the detention and possible disappearance of Angel
Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez in the Republic of Honduras" and pointed out to the Government "that
such acts are most serious violations of the right to life (Art. 4) and the right to personal liberty (Art. 7) of
the American Convention".

ISSUE: WON THE STATE OF HONDURAS HAD VIOLATED ARTICLES 4 (RIGHT TO LIFE), 5 (RIGHT
TO HUMANE TREATMENT) AND 7 (RIGHT TO PERSONAL LIBERTY) OF THE CONVENTION IN THE
CASE OF ANGEL MANFREDO VELÁSQUEZ RODRÍGUEZ (ALSO KNOWN AS MANFREDO
VELÁSQUEZ).

RULING: THE COURT RULED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. The Court concluded that the facts found in the
proceeding show that the State of Honduras is responsible for the involuntary disappearance of Angel
Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez. Thus, Honduras has violated Articles 7, 5 and 4 of the Convention. As a
result of the disappearance, Manfredo Velásquez was the victim of an arbitrary detention, which deprived
him of his physical liberty without legal cause and without a determination of the lawfulness of his
detention by a judge or competent tribunal. Those acts directly violate the right to personal liberty
recognized by Article 7 of the Convention and are a violation imputable to Honduras of the duties to
respect and ensure that right under Article 1 (1).

The disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez violates the right to personal integrity recognized by Article 5
of the Convention. First, the mere subjection of an individual to prolonged isolation and deprivation of
communication is in itself cruel and inhuman treatment which harms the psychological and moral integrity
of the person, and violates the right of every detainee under Article 5 (1) and 5 (2) to treatment respectful
of his dignity. Second, although it has not been directly shown that Manfredo Velásquez was physically
tortured, his kidnapping and imprisonment by governmental authorities, who have been shown to subject
detainees to indignities, cruelty and torture, constitute a failure of Honduras to fulfill the duty imposed by
Article 1 (1) to ensure the rights under Article 5 (1) and 5 (2) of the Convention. The guarantee of physical
integrity and the right of detainees to treatment respectful of their human dignity require States Parties to
take reasonable steps to prevent situations which are truly harmful to the rights protected.

The above reasoning is applicable to the right to life recognized by Article 4 of the Convention. The
context in which the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez occurred and the lack of knowledge seven
years later about his fate create a reasonable presumption that he was killed. Even if there is a minimal
margin of doubt in this respect, it must be presumed that his fate was decided by authorities who
systematically executed detainees without trial and concealed their bodies in order to avoid punishment.
This, together with the failure to investigate, is a violation by Honduras of a legal duty under Article 1 (1)
of the Convention to ensure the rights recognized by Article 4 (1). That duty is to ensure every person
subject to its jurisdiction the inviolability of the right to life and the right not to have one's life taken
arbitrarily. These rights imply an obligation on the part of States Parties to take reasonable steps to
prevent situations that could result in the violation of that right.
Case No. 3 The Republic Of Nicaragua V. The United States Of America
Digested by: Dadhwal, Raamah

FACTS OF THE CASE:

The dispute between Nicaragua and the United States concerns events in Nicaragua subsequent
to the fall of the Government of President Anastacio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua in July 1979, and
activites of the US Government in relation to Nicaragua since that time. Then, a Junta of National
Reconstruction and an 18-member government were installed by the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion
Nacional (FSLN). The latter had initially an extensive share in the new government. Certain opponents of
the new government, primarily supporters of the former Somoza government, formed themselves into
irregular military forces.

The United States was initially supportive of the new government; however, this had changed due
to the involvement of the Government of Nicaragua in logistical support for guerrillas in El Salvador.

The armed opposition to the new government was conducted mainly by Fuerza Democratica
Nicaraguense (FDN) and Alianza Revolucionaria Democratica (ARDE), these groups, called “contras”,
were fighting against the new government. The US had been giving support to these Groups and that the
US Congress made specific provision for funds to be used by the US intelligence agencies for supporting
directly or indirectly military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.

Submissions of the Nicaragua:

a. That the United States, in recruiting, training, arming, equipping, financing, supplying and
otherwise encouraging, supporting, aiding, and directing military and paramilitary actions in
and against Nicaragua, had violated its treaty obligations to Nicaragua under:
 Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter;
 Articles 18 and 20 of the Charter of the Organization of American States;
 Article 8 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of States;
 Article I, Third, of the Convention concerning the Duties and Rights of States in the Event
of Civil Strife.

b. That the United States had breached international law by:

 violating the sovereignty of Nicaragua by:
- armed attacks against Nicaragua by air, land and sea;
- incursions into Nicaraguan territorial waters;
- aerial trespass into Nicaraguan airspace;
 efforts by direct and indirect means to coerce and intimidate the Government of
Nicaragua.
 using force and the threat of force against Nicaragua.
 intervening in the internal affairs of Nicaragua.
 infringing upon the freedom of the high seas and interrupting peaceful maritime
commerce.
 killing, wounding and kidnapping citizens of Nicaragua.

c. Nicaragua demanded that all such actions cease and that the United States had an obligation
to pay reparations to the government for damage to their people, property, and economy.

Submissions of the United State:

 that its actions were "primarily for the benefit of El Salvador, and to help it to respond to an
alleged armed attack by Nicaragua, that the United States claims to be exercising a right of
collective self-defense, which it regards as a justification of its own conduct towards
Nicaragua. El Salvador joined the U.S. in their Declaration of Intervention which it submitted
on 15 August 1984, where it alleged itself the victim of an armed attack by Nicaragua, and
that it had asked the United States to exercise for its benefit the right of collective self-
defence."

 The CIA claimed that the purpose of the Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare
manual was to "moderate" the existing Contra activities.

 The United States argued that the Court did not have jurisdiction, with U.S. ambassador to
the United NationsJeane Kirkpatrick dismissing the Court as a "semi-legal, semi-juridical,
semi-political body, which nations sometimes accept and sometimes don't."
 It is noteworthy that the United States, the defaulting party, was the only member that put
forward arguments against the validity of the judgment of the court, arguing that it passed a
decision that it 'had neither the jurisdiction nor the competence to render'. Members that
sided with the United States in opposing Nicaragua's claims did not challenge the court's
jurisdiction, its findings, nor the substantive merits of the case.

ISSUES:

 Whether the prohibition of the use of force and collective self-defence are issues regulated both
by customary international law and by treaties, in particular the United Nations Charter.
 What are the rules of customary international law applicable to the case?
 Whether the recognition of the States of certain rules is sufficient to consider as being part of
customary international law, and as applicable as such to States.
 Whether the practice of State must be in “absolute conformity” with the purported customary rule.
What makes State practice an international rule?

THE RULING OF THE COURT:

First Issue

 The Court then considered the rules of customary law applicable to the present dispute. For
this purpose it considered whether a customary rule exists in the opinio juris of States,and
satisfy itself that it is confirmed by practice.

 The Court ruled that there can be no doubt that the issues of the use of force and collective
self-defence are regulated both by customary international law and by treaties, in particular
the United Nations Charter.

 The Court concluded that both Parties accept a treaty-law obligation to refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations. The Court has however to be satisfied that there exists in customary law an
opinio juris as to the binding character of such abstention. It considers that this opinio juris
may be deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties and of States towards certain
General Assembly resolutions, and particularly resolution 2625 (XXV) entitled "Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations". Consent to such resolutions is one of
the forms of expression of an opinio juris with regard to the principle of non-use of force,
regarded as a principle of customary international law, independently of the provisions,
especially those of an institutional kind, to which it is subject on the treaty-law plane of the
Charter.

Second Issue

 The court, for this case, directed its attention to the practice and opinio juris of States: as the
Court observed, “It is of course axiomatic that the material of customary international law is to
be looked for primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of States, even though
multilateral conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining rules
deriving from custom, or indeed in developing them”.

 In the separate opinion of Judge Nagendra Singh. - The Charter provisions as well as the
Latin American Treaty System have not only developed the concept but strengthened it to the
extent that it would stand on its own, even if the Charter and the Treaty basis were held
inapplicable in this case. The obvious explanation is that the original customary aspect which
has evolved with the treaty law development has come now to stay and survive as the
existing modern concept of international law, whether customary, because of its origins, or "a
general principle of international law recognized by civilized nations". The contribution of the
Court has been to emphasize the principle of non-use of force as one belonging to the realm
of jus cogens and hence as the very cornerstone of the human effort to promote peace in a
world torn by strife.

Third Issue
  The Court ruled that the mere fact that States declare their recognition of certain rules in not
sufficient for the Court to consider these as being part of customary international law, and as
applicable to those States. Bound as it is by Article 38 of its Stature to apply, inter alia,
international custom “as evidence of general practice accepted as law”, the Court may not
disregard the essential role played by general practice. Where two States agree to
incorporate a particular rule in a treaty, their agreement suffices to make that rule a legal one,
binding upon them; but in the field of customary international law, the shared view of the
Parties as to the content of what they regard as the rule is not enough. The Court must satisfy
itself that the existence of the rule in the opinio juris of State is confirmed by practice.

 In the present disputes, the Court, while exercising its jurisdiction only in respect of the
application of the customary rules of non-use of force and non-intervention, cannot disregard
the fact that the Parties are bound by these rules as a matter of treaty law and of customary
international law. Furthermore, in the present case, apart from the treaty commitments
binding the Parties to the rules in question, there are various instances of their having
expressed recognition of the validity thereof as customary international law in other ways. It
is therefore in the light of this “subject element” - expression used by the Court in its 1969
Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases) – that the Court has to appraise the
relevant practice.

Fourth Issue

 The court said that in order to deduce the existence of customary rules, the Court deems it
sufficient that the conduct of the States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and
that instances of State conduct inconsistent with the given rule should generally have been
treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.
 The Court emphasized, as was observed in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, for a new
customary rule to be formed, not only must the acts concerned “ amount to a settled
practice”, but they must accompanied by the opinio juris sive necessitates. Either the States
taking such action or other States in a position to react to it, must have behaved so that their
conduct is “evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belef, i.e., the existence of a subjective elements,
is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitates.”
Case No. 4 Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
Digested by: Go, Shahanie

FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted
that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain
from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the
said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction
vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of
the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can
be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise
by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In
short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
Case No. 5 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1
(February 4, 1946)
Digested by: Aragon, Celine

FACTS:

Petitioner was the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial Japanese
Army in the Philippine Islands. On September 3, 1945, he surrendered to the United States Army and
became a prisoner of war. Respondent was the Commanding General of the United States Army Forces,
Western Pacific, whose command embraced the Philippine Islands. Respondent appointed a military
commission to try the petitioner on a charge of violation of the law of war. The charge was because of the
failure of the petitioner in his duty as an army commander to control the operations of his troops,
"permitting them to commit" specified cruelties against the civilian population and prisoners of war.
Petitioner was found guilty and was sentenced to death.

ISSUES:

a) WON the guilt or innocence of the accused must be considered in the application for habeas
corpus
b) WON the trial of the petitioner by the military commission was lawful, although hostilities had
ceased
c) WON the detention of the petitioner for trial and upon his conviction were lawful

RULINGS:

a) No. The Court ruled that on application for habeas corpus, it is not concerned with the guilt or
innocence of the petitioners. It only considers the lawful power of the commission to try the
petitioner for the offense charged.
In the present case, it must be recognized throughout that the military tribunals which Congress
has sanctioned by the Articles of War are not courts whose rulings and judgments are made
subject to review by the Court. They are tribunals whose determinations are reviewable by the
military authorities either as provided in the military orders constituting such tribunals or as
provided by the Articles of War. Congress conferred on the courts no power to review their
determinations save only as it has granted judicial power "to grant writs of habeas corpus for the
purpose of an inquiry into the cause of the restraint of liberty.

b) Yes. A violation of the law of war, committed before the cessation of hostilities, may lawfully be
tried by a military commission after hostilities have ceased, at least until peace has been officially
recognized by treaty or proclamation by the political branch of the Government. Trial of the
petitioner by the military commission was authorized by the political branch of the Government,
by military command, by international law and usage, and by the terms of the surrender of the
Japanese government.

c) Yes. It appeared that petitioner was charged with violation of the law of war, and that the
commission had authority to proceed with the trial, thus, it did not violate any military, statutory, or
constitutional command. The Court therefore conclude that the detention of petitioner for trial and
his detention upon his conviction, subject to the prescribed review by the military authorities, were
lawful.
Case No. 6 North Sea Continental Shelf vs Netherlands
Digested by: Aguedan, Jaz

Facts:

Netherlands and Denmark had drawn partial boundary lines based on the equidistance principle (A-B and
C-D). An agreement on further prolongation of the boundary proved difficult because Denmark and
Netherlands wanted this prolongation to take place based on the equidistance principle (B-E and D-E)
where as Germany was of the view that, together, these two boundaries would produce an inequitable
result for her. Germany stated that due to its concave coastline, such a line would result in her loosing out
on her share of the continental shelf based on proportionality to the length of its North Sea coastline. The
Court had to decide the principles and rules of international law applicable to this delimitation. In doing so,
the Court had to decide if the principles espoused by the parties were binding on the parties either
through treaty law or customary international law.

Issue:

Is Germany under a legal obligation to accept the equidistance-special circumstances principle, contained
in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf of 1958, either as a customary
international law rule or on the basis of the Geneva Convention?

The Court’s Decision:

The use of the equidistance method had not crystallised into customary law and the method was not
obligatory for the delimitation of the areas in the North Sea related to the present proceedings.

Relevant Findings of the Court:

1. Nature of the treaty obligation: Is the 1958 Geneva Convention, and in particular Article 6, binding on
Germany?

1. Article 6 of the Geneva Convention stated that unless the parties had already agreed on a method for
delimitation or unless special circumstances exist, the equidistance method would apply. Germany had
signed, but not ratified, the Geneva Convention, while Netherlands and Denmark were parties to the
Convention. The latter two States argued that while Germany is not a party to the Convention (not having
ratified it), she was still bound by Article 6 of the Convention because:

“…(1) by conduct, by public statements and proclamations, and in other ways, the Republic has
unilaterally assumed the obligations of the Convention; or has manifested its acceptance of the
conventional regime; or has recognized it as being generally applicable to the delimitation of continental
shelf areas…

(2) the Federal Republic had held itself out as so assuming, accepting or recognizing, in such a manner
as to cause other States, and in particular Denmark and the Netherlands, to rely on the attitude thus
taken up” (the latter is called the principle of estoppel).

2. The Court rejected the first argument. It said that only a ‘very definite very consistent course of conduct
on the part of a State would allow the Court to presume that the State had somehow become bound by a
treaty (by a means other than in the formal manner: i.e. ratification) when the State was ‘at all times fully
able and entitled to…’ accept the treaty commitments in a formal manner. The Court held that Germany
had not unilaterally assumed obligations under the Convention. The court also took notice of the fact that
even if Germany ratified the treaty, she had the option of entering into a reservation on Article 6, following
which that particular article would no longer be applicable to Germany (in other words, even if one were to
assume that Germany had intended to become a party to the Convention, it does not presuppose that it
would have also undertaken those obligations contained in Article 6).

3. Note: The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT), which came into force in 1980,
discusses in more detail treaty obligations of third States (those States who are not parties to the treaty).
It clearly stipulates that obligations arise for third States from a provision of a treaty only if (1) the actual
parties to the treaty intended the provision to create obligations for third States; and (2) third State
expressly accept those obligations in writing (Article 35 of the VCLT). The VCLT was not in force when
the Court deliberated on this case. However, as seen above, the Court’s position is consistent the VCLT.
(See the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).

4. The Court held that the existence of a situation of estoppel would have allowed Article 6 to become
binding on Germany – but held that Germany’s action did not support an argument for estoppel. The
Court also held that the mere fact that Germany may not have specifically objected to the equidistance
principle as contained in Article 6, is not sufficient to state that the principle is now binding upon it.
5. In conclusion, the Court held that Germany had not acted in any manner so as to incur obligations
contained in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention. The equidistance–special circumstances rule was not
binding on Germany by way of treaty law.

2. Nature of the customary international law obligation: Is Germany bound by the provisions of Article 6 of
the Geneva Convention in so far as they reflect customary international law?

6. Netherlands and Denmark argued that Article 6 also reflected ‘the accepted rule of general
international law on the subject of continental shelf delimitation’ and that it existed independently of the
Convention. Therefore, they argued, Germany is bound by the subject matter of Article 6 by way of
customary international law.

7. To decide if the equidistance principle bound Germany by way of customary international law, the
Court examined (1) the status of the principle contained in Article 6 as it stood when the Convention was
being drawn up; and (2) its status after the Convention came into force.

(a) What was the customary law status of Article 6 at the time of drafting the Convention?

8. The Court held that the principle of equidistance, as contained in Article 6 did not form a part of existing
or emerging customary international law at the time of drafting the Convention. The Court supported this
finding based on (1) the hesitation expressed by the drafters of the Convention, the International Law
Commission, on the inclusion of Article 6 into the Convention and (2) the fact that reservations to Article
6 was permissible under the Convention. The Court held:

“… Article 6 is one of those in respect of which, under the reservations article of the Convention (Article
12) reservations may be made by any State on signing, ratifying or acceding, – for speaking generally, it
is a characteristic of purely conventional rules and obligations that, in regard to them, some faculty of
making unilateral reservations may, within certain limits, be admitted; whereas this cannot be so in the
case of general or customary law rules and obligations which, by their very nature, must have equal force
for all members of the international community, and cannot therefore be the subject of any right of
unilateral exclusion exercisable at will by any one of them in its own favor…. The normal inference would
therefore be that any articles that do not figure among those excluded from the faculty of reservation
under Article 12, were not regarded as declaratory of previously existing or emergent rules of law …” (see
para 65 for a counter argument and the Court’s careful differentiation)

(b) Did the provisions in Article 6 on the equidistance principle attain the customary law status after the
Convention came into force?

9. The Court then examined whether the rule contained in Article 6 had become customary international
law after the Convention entered into force – either due the Convention itself (i.e., if enough States had
ratified the Convention in a manner so as to fulfil the criteria specified below), or because of subsequent
State practice (i.e. even if an adequate number of States had not ratified the Convention, one could find
sufficient State practice to meet the criteria below). The Court held that Article 6 of the Convention had
not attained a customary law status. (Compare the 1958 Geneva Convention with the four Geneva
Conventions on 1949 relating to international humanitarian law in terms of the latter’s authority as a
pronouncement of customary international law).

10. For a customary rule to emerge the Court held that it needed: (1) very widespread and representative
participation in the Convention, including States whose interests were specially affected (in this case, they
were coastal States) (i.e. generality); and (2) virtually uniform practice (i.e. consistent and uniform usage)
undertaken in a manner that demonstrates (3) a general recognition of the rule of law or legal obligation
(i.e. opinio juries). In the North Sea Continental Shelf cases the court held that the passage of a
considerable period of time was unnecessary (i.e. duration) for the formation of a customary law.

Widespread and representative participation

11. The Court held that the first criteria was not met. The number of ratifications and accessions to the
Convention (39 States) were not adequately representative or widespread.

Duration

12. The Court held that the duration taken for a customary law rule to emerge is not as important as
widespread and representative participation, uniform usage, and the existence of an opinio juris. It held
that:

“Although the passage of only a short period of time (in this case, 3 – 5 years) is not necessarily, or of
itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what was
originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that within the period in
question, short though it might be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially
affected, should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked and
should moreover have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal
obligation is involved.”

Opinio juris

13. Opinio juris is reflected in acts of States (Nicaragua Case) or in omissions (Lotus case), in so far as
those acts or omissions were done following a belief that the said State is obligated by law to act or
refrain from acting in a particular way. (For more on opinio juris click here).

14. The Court examined 15 cases where States had delimited their boundaries using the equidistance
method, after the Convention came into force (paras. 75 -77). The Court concluded that even if there
were some State practice in favour of the equidistance principle, the Court could not deduct the
necessary opinio juris from this State practice. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases confirmed that
both State practice (the objective element) and opinio juris (the subjective element) are essential pre-
requisites for the formation of a customary law rule. This is consistent with Article 38 (1) (b) of the Statute
of the ICJ. The Court explained the concept of opinio juris and the difference between customs (i.e.
habits) and customary law:

“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried
out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of
a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e, the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in
the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation. The frequency, or even habitual character of the acts is
not in itself enough. There are many international acts, e.g., in the field of ceremonial and protocol, which
are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of courtesy, convenience
or tradition, and not by any sense of legal duty.” (Para 77).

15. The Court concluded that the equidistance principle was not binding on Germany by way of treaty or
customary international law. In the case of the latter, the principle had not attained a customary
international law status at the time of the entry into force of the Geneva Convention or thereafter. As such,
the Court held that the use of the equidistance method is not obligatory for the delimitation of the areas
concerned in the present proceedings.
Case No. 7 BARCELONA TRACTION, LIGHT and POWER COMPANY vs. SPAIN
Digested by: Llanto, Karl Gay

FACTS: Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company was incorporated in 1911 in Toronto, Canada for
the purpose of creating and developing an electric power production and distribution system in Spain.
According to the Belgian gov’t, some years after WWI Barcelona Traction’s share capital came to be very
largely held by Belgian nationals, but the Spanish government contends that the Belgian nationality of the
shareholders was not proven. After WWI, the company was declared bankrupt by the Spanish court due
to its failure to pay the interest of the bonds and its assets were seized. After the Canadian interposition
ceased, Belgium brought an action for damages against Spain for what it termed expropriation of the
assets of the Barcelona Traction company on the ground that a large majority of the stock of the company
was owned by Belgian nationals. Spain raised the preliminary objection that Belgium lacked standing to
bring suit for the damages to a Canadian company.

ISSUE: Does the state of the shareholders of a company have a right of diplomatic protection if the state
whose responsibility is invoked is not the national state of the company?

RULING: No. In order for a state to bring a claim in respect of the breach of an obligation owed to it, it
must first establish its right to do so. This right is predicated on a showing that the defendant state has
broken an obligation toward the national state in respect of its nationals. In the present case it is therefore
essential to establish whether the losses allegedly suffered by Belgian shareholders in Barcelona Traction
were the consequence of the violation of obligations of which they are beneficiaries. In the present state
of the law, the protection of shareholders requires that recourse be had to treaty stipulations or special
agreements directly concluded between the private investor and the state in which the investment is
placed. Barring such agreements, the obligation owed is to the corporation, and only the state of
incorporation has standing to bring an action for violations of such an obligation. Nonetheless, for reasons
of equity a theory has been developed to the effect that the state of the shareholders has a right of
diplomatic protection when the state whose responsibility is invoked is the national state of the company.
This theory, however, is not applicable to the present case, since Spain is not the national state of
Barcelona Traction. Barcelona Traction could have approached its national state, Canada, to ask for its
diplomatic protection. For the above reasons, the Court is of the opinion that Belgium lacks standing to
bring this action.
Case No. 8 Kuroda v. Jalandoni
Digested by: Pallay, Realyn

Facts:

Shigenori Kuroda, the former Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines,
was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes for having unlawfully disregarded
and failed “to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and
other high crimes against non-combatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial Japanese Forces in
violation of the laws and customs of war”. He questioned the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 68
which created the National War Crimes Office and prescribed the rules on the trial of accused war
criminals. He asserted that the Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Welfare. Thus, he cannot be charged of said crimes based on national and
international laws.

Issue:

Whether the Military Commission has jurisdiction to try Kuroda for acts committed in violation of The
Hague Convention and The Geneva Convention even if the Philippines is not a signatory to both.

Ruling:

Yes. The Philippine Supreme Court held that the Military Commission created by the President which
tried General Kuroda for the war crimes committed in the country during the World War II was valid and
constitutional by virtue of the incorporation clause embodied in Article II of the Philippine Constitution
although the Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague and Geneva Conventions.

Section 2, Article II of the Philippine Constitution reads:

“The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.”

Therefore, the Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over
the crimes charged fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68 and having Kuroda in its custody,
the Supreme Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military Commission.
CASE NO. 9 Pretty v UK
(Application no. 2346/02)
Jurisdiction: European Court of Human Rights
Date of Decision: 29 April 2002
Digested by: Malsi, Sarah

Facts:
The applicant suffers from motor neurone disease (MND). This is a progressive neuro-degenerative
disease of motor cells within the central nervous system. The disease is associated with progressive
muscle weakness affecting the voluntary muscles of the body. As a result of the progression of the
disease, severe weakness of the arms and legs and the muscles involved in the control of breathing are
affected. Death usually occurs as a result of weakness of the breathing muscles, in association with
weakness of the muscles controlling speaking and swallowing, leading to respiratory failure and
pneumonia. No treatment can prevent the progression of the disease.
As she is frightened and distressed at the suffering and indignity that she will endure if the disease
runs its course, she very strongly wishes to be able to control how and when she dies and thereby be
spared that suffering and indignity.
Applicant, a U.K. national, alleged that English law violated her rights under Articles 2 (right to life), 3
(freedom from torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), 8 (right to respect for his
private and family life) and 9 (right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion) of the European
Convention on Human Rights (Convention), when she was physically unable to legally commit suicide
and the English law prevented her from exercising this right with assistance.
While committing suicide is lawful under English law, it is a crime to assist another to commit suicide
under section 2 § 1 of the Suicide Act 1961. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) refused
applicant’s request to guarantee her husband freedom from prosecution if he helped her. Her appeals
against that decision have been unsuccessful, and she turned to the European Court of Human Rights.

Issue:
Whether or not the Applicant violated Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture and degrading
treatment), Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion) and Article 14 (non-discrimination).

Ruling:
NO.
The Court unanimously found no violations of Articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the Convention. It ruled that a
right to die, whether at the hands of a third person or with the assistance of a public authority, cannot be
derived from Article 2. Still, the Court found that the Applicant's case fell within the scope of Article 8 of
the Convention. The applicant's plea of violation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 was centered
around her claim that "she was prevented from exercising a right enjoyed by others who could end their
lives without assistance because they were not prevented by any disability from doing so." The
government's blanket ban on all assisted suicide was allegedly the source of this discrimination, and it
could not be justified in this case since the applicant was not one of the class of vulnerable people the law
was designed to protect. In this case, the Court found it reasonable not to create different regimes for
those able and those unable to commit suicide, as the "borderline between the two categories will often
be a very fine one and to seek to build into the law an exemption for those judged to be incapable of
committing suicide would seriously undermine the protection of life which the 1961 Act was intended to
safeguard and greatly increase the risk of abuse."
Case No. 10 People vs. Cayat
G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939
Digested by: Dumucloy, Jesa

FACTS:
On January 25, 1937, Cayat, a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of
A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of
such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639. The trial
court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or suffer
subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.
Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian
tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in
his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than
the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall
be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal
or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found unlawfully in the
possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.

SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment
for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds: (1) That it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws; (2) That it is violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution: and. (3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.
ISSUE/S: 1. WON Act No. 1639 denies equal protection of the laws
2. WON ActNo. 1639 is violative of the due process clause
3. WON Act No. 1639 is an improper exercise of the police power of the State.
HELD:
1. NO. Act No. 1639 satisfies the requirements of valid classification.

It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is
not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not
based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of
civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the
geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization,
usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." This distinction is unquestionably
reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.
The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural
equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus
established.

That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his
possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the
so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves
to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and
among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the
lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the nonChristian tribes have often
resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their
standard of life and civilization.

The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to
apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant
asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the
contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in
hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it
may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of
culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

2. NO.
To constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true
where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular
cases. Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the
general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its
operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4)
that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. Thus, a person's property
may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in
violation of law may be confiscated or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case.

3. Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the
police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly
described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity.
Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or
to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is a
legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere
with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld. Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to
promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and
intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their
Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a
greater Philippines.
Case No. 11 BELTRAN VS SECRETARY OF HEALTH
Digested by: Apostol, Corine

DOCTRINE: The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be
nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS: This case involves a law ( RA 7719) seeking to promote voluntary donation of blood and to
phase out commercial blood banks within 2 years from its effectivity. The purpose of the law is to prevent
blood transfusion transmissible diseases which were proven in studies to be more prone in blood
transfusions w/c come from the commercial blood banks as compared to those coming from the Phil.
National Red Cross. According to the petitioners, the act was incomplete when it was passed by the
Legislature. They also contend that the 2 year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of
Health for the phasing out the commercial blood banks pursuant to Sec 7 of the Act constrained the
Secretary to legislate, thus constituting undue delegation of legislative powers.

ISSUE: WON RA 7719 (National Blood Services Act) constitutes undue delegation of power.

RULING:

No, R.A. No. 7719 does not constitute undue delegation of legislative power. In testing whether a statute
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it left

the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative body or any
other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. RA 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is
complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to
safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. One of
these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a
definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the
promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood
donation. By its provisions, it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
CASE NO 12: Carino vs. CHR
Digested by: Heart

Facts: 800 public school teachers undertook what they described as “mass concerted actions”. The
teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education (Hon.
Isidro Cariño) to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS
officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements but the mass action still continued.

For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were
administratively charged. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to
Section 41 of P.D. 807" (the Civil Service Decree) and temporarily replaced. After MPSTA’s petition on
the RTC and SC were denied, respondent teachers thereafter submitted sworn statements to the
Commission on Human Rights to complain their dismissal.

The Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary
Cariño requiring his attendance therein. Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the
basis of complainants' evidence.

ISSUE: where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other
government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudication, may the Commission on Human
Rights take cognizance of the same subjectmatter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

Held: NO. The CHR may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed
human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot
be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function the
Commission does not have.

Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not
"try and resolve on the merits" the matters involved. These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the
original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers
granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.

-Red pogi
Case No: 13 MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS
Digested by: Galamgam, Ruchelle

FACTS: The petitioner, former president Ferdinand Marcos, was deposed. Near to death, he wished to
return to the Philippines. The new president, Corazon Aquino, refused. The petitioner argued that it was
unconstitutional to forbid him from returning under the guarantees of due process, the liberty of abode,
and the right to travel. He also argued that his right to return to the Philippines was guaranteed under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The
gov’t argued that the right of the State to national security trumped individual rights as the return of
Marcos may cause distress to the country.

ISSUE: Whether the act of Corazon Aquino in forbidding Marcos to return to the Philippines a violation of
the right to travel and abode guaranteed under the constitution?

RULING: NO. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally
connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under
international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration
of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state" Art. 13(l) separately from the "right to leave
any country, including his own, and to return to his country." Art. 13(2). On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" Art. 12(l) and the right
to "be free to leave any country, including his own." Art. 12(2) which rights may be restricted by such laws
as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter his own
country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." Art. 12(4). It would therefore be inappropriate to
construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to
the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
Case No. 14. MALCAMPO-SIN v. SIN
Digested by: Guittu, Mark Stephen

FACTS: Florence and respondent Philipp, a Portugese citizen, are married in the Philippines. On
September 20, 1994, Florence filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 158, Pasig City, a complaint for
"declaration of nullity of marriage" against Philipp due to psychological incapacity. The trial court
dismissed Florence's petition due to insufficient evidence. Florence filed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals but it was dismissed. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
WON THE LACK OF PARTICIPATION OF THE STATE WAS CURED SINCE THE LOWER COURT
DISMISSED THE PETITION.

RULING:
THE SUPREME COURT ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE. The task of protecting marriage as an
inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance.
The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine
union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. In Republic of the Philippines v. Erlinda Matias Dagdag,
while we upheld the validity of the marriage, we nevertheless characterized the decision of the trial court
as "prematurely rendered" since the investigating prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence before the judgment was rendered. This stresses the importance of the
participation of the State.
A declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code requires the application of
procedural and substantive guidelines. While compliance with these requirements mostly devolves upon
petitioner, the State is likewise mandated to actively intervene in the procedure. Should there be non-
compliance by the State with its statutory duty, there is a need to remand the case to the lower court for
proper trial.

FACTS:
This is a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage due to psychological incapacity.
Florence Macalampo is married to Philipp Sin, a Portuguese citizen. Several years after their marriage,
Florence filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. Trial ensued and the parties presented
their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. Throughout the trial, the State did not participate
in the proceedings. While the fiscal filed his manifestation stating that he found no collusion between the
parties, he did not actively participate therein. Nothing more was heard of him other than his appearance
at certain hearings. The Trial Court dismissed the petition so she elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
WHETHER THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF SIN WAS ADEQUATELY PROVEN AND THE
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BE DECLARED EVEN WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION
OF THE STATE IN THE PROCEEDING.

RULING:
The Court found that the records were bereft of evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of
the case, thus, the case is remanded for proper trial.
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage, the
Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take
steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to ensure that evidence is not fabricated nor
suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-
General to appear as counsel for the State. Furthermore, no decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor-General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the
petition.
Case No. 15: American Bible Society vs City of Manila
Digested by: Bangayan, Cristy

Facts:

American biblie society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered
and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November,
1898, with its principal office at 636 Isaac Peral in said City. City of Manila is a corporation with powers
that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila.

In the course of its ministry, plaintiff's Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles and/or
gospel portions. the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the
business of general merchandise. In violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos.
2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and
license fees.

The society paid such under protest and filed suit questioning the legality of the ordinances under which
the fees are being collected.

Issue:

Whether or not said ordinances are inapplicable, invalid or unconstitutional if applied to the alleged
business of distribution and sale of bibles to the people of the Philippines by a religious corporation like
the American Bible Society

Held:

It is constitutional, however, ordinance is inapplicable to said plaintiff. It may be true that in the case at bar
the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than
the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or
occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the provisions of City
of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair
its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, which requires the obtention the Mayor's permit before
any person can engage in any of the businesses, trades or occupations enumerated therein, We do not
find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the
exercise of religious practices. In the case of Coleman vs. City of Griffin, 189 S.E. 427, this point was
elucidated as follows:

An ordinance by the City of Griffin, declaring that the practice of distributing either by hand or otherwise,
circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind, whether said articles are being delivered free,
or whether same are being sold within the city limits of the City of Griffin, without first obtaining written
permission from the city manager of the City of Griffin, shall be deemed a nuisance and punishable as an
offense against the City of Griffin, does not deprive defendant of his constitutional right of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, even though it prohibits him from introducing
and carrying out a scheme or purpose which he sees fit to claim as a part of his religious system.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, even if applied
to plaintiff Society. But as Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is not applicable to
plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellee is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society
involved herein for, as stated before, it would impair plaintiff's right to the free exercise and enjoyment of
its religious profession and worship, as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs, We find that
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended is also inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff.
Case No. 16 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
G.R. No. 115455; October 30, 1995
Mendoza, J.:
Digested by: Balubal, Joy

FACTS:
The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several petitioners. The case involves
motions seeking reconsideration of the Court’s decision dismissing the petitions for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law. The
Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI) contends that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT
while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders Associations, Invc., (CREBA), on the other hand, asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1)
impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable
basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall evolve
a progressive system of taxation. The Cooperative Union of the Philippines (CUP) argues that legislature
was to adopt a definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution
embodies provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would, therefore, be to infringe
a constitutional policy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not, based on the grounds of the petitioners, the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law should be
declared unconstitutional.

RULING:
No.
With respect to the first contention, it would enough to say that since the law granted the press a privilege,
the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by
granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. Indeed, in
withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to which other
businesses have long ago been subject. The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does
not discriminate against the press because “even non-discriminatory taxation on constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.” The Court was speaking in the case of Murdock v. Pennsylvania
of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for regulation. Its imposition on the press is
unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right. The VAT is, however, different.
It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is
imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services
and the lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to
burden the exercise of its right any more than to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general
regulation is not to violate its freedom under the Constitution.

Anent the first contention of CREBA, it has been held in an early case that even though such taxation
may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of
another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of another, still the
tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of
any existing contract in its true legal sense. It is next pointed out that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 7716
exempts such transactions as the sale of agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and
veterinary services, it grants no exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale
of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods and services
was already exempt under Section 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of R.A. No.
7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these transactions while
subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Finally, it is contended that R.A. No. 7716 also
violates Art. VI, Section 28(1) which provides that “The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation”. Nevertheless, equality and uniformity of
taxation mean that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class be taxed at the same rate.
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of
taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or ordinance applies equally to all
persons, firms, and corporations placed in similar situation. Furthermore, the Constitution does not really
prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are regressive. What it simply provides is that
Congress shall “evolve a progressive system of taxation. The constitutional provision has been
interpreted to mean simply that “direct taxes are to be preferred and as much as possible, indirect taxes
should be minimized. The mandate to Congress is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax
system.
CASE NO 17. SAHIN Vs TURKEY
Digested by: Manuel, Jessa Joy

Facts. Sahin had a traditional background of family practicing Muslims and considered it her religious duty
to wear the Islamic headscarf. When she was in her 5th year at the faculty of medicine of the University of
Istanbul in 1998, the Vice-Chancellor of the University issued a circular which stipulated that students with
beards and wearing the Islamic headscarf would be refused admission to lectures, courses and tutorials.
Sahin was denied access to a written exam and the University authorities refused to enroll her in a course
and to admit her to various lectures and other written exams because of the Islamic headscarf she was
putting on. She later left the University to further her studies in Vienna and had lived in Vienna since then.
Before leaving Istanbul, Sahin filed an application against the Republic of Turkey (P) with the European
Commission of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms alleging that her rights and freedom under the
Convention had been violated. A judgment was rendered by the European Court after it heard the case.

Issue. WON students’ rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms violated when a secular country places a ban on the wearing of religious clothing
in institutions of higher learning

Held. No. Student’s rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms are not violated when a secular country places a ban on wearing religious
clothing in institutions of higher education. Constitutionally, Turkey is a secular state founded on the
principles of equality without regard to distinctions based on sex, religion or denomination. In 1989,
Turkey’s Constitutional Court decided that granting legal recognition to a religious symbol such as the
Islamic headscarf was not compatible with the principle that the state education must be neutral and
might generate conflicts between students of different religions. The Vice Chancellor explained the
banning of the headscarf at the University School of Medicine in a memorandum which was circulated
that the ban was not intended to infringe on students freedom of conscience or religion, but to comply with
the laws and regulations in force and that such compliance would be sensitive to patients’ rights. Hence,
the ban did not prohibit Muslim students from manifesting their religion in accordance with habitual forms
of Muslim observance and it was not directed only at Muslim attire. So the view of the Court should not be
interchanged for that of the University who are better placed to evaluate local needs. The right to behave
in a manner governed by a religion belief is not guaranteed by Article 9 and it also does not confer on
people who do so the right to disregard rules that have proved to be justified. By giving due regard to
Turkey’s margin of appreciation, the interference here was justified in principle and proportionate to aim
pursued. Hence, Article 9 was not contravened.
CASE NO. 18 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire
315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766 (1942)
Digested by: Luyun, Nicole

FACTS:
Appellant was convicted by the lower court under a New Hampshire statute for using offensive language
towards another person in public. Appellant contended that the statute was invalid under the Constitution
because it placed an unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech and because it was vague and
indefinite. Appellant sought review from a judgment of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirming
appellant's conviction under a state law, which prohibited the use of offensive or annoying words when
addressing another individual in a public place. The court affirmed appellant's conviction.

ISSUE:
WON the contested statute place an unreasonable restraint on freedom of speech, freedom of the press,
and freedom of worship, and because it was vague and indefinite.

HELD:
No. The court noted that there were certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which had never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem, such as
"fighting" words. The challenged statute, on its face and as applied, did not contravene the Fourteenth
Amendment, as it did no more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the
peace by the addressee. The lower court declared that the statute's purpose was to preserve public
peace, and in appellant's case, the forbidden words were those that had a direct tendency to cause acts
of violence. Furthermore, the word "offensive" was not defined in terms of what a particular addressee
thought, it was defined as what reasonable men of common intelligence understood as words likely to
cause an average addressee to fight. The court held that the statute was narrowly drawn and limited to
define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of the state power.
CASE NO. 19 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DORIQUEZ

Digested by: Serrano, Justin Gay

Facts:
Accused Doriquez was charged with the offense of Grave Oral Defamation before the Court of First
Instance (CFI, now RTC) of Ilolo. Six days later, accused Doriquez was indicted before the same court for
discharge of firearm. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged.
Subsequently, he moved to dismiss both informations. One of his contentions is that the institution of
criminal action for discharge of firearm places him in double jeopardy for he had already been in jeopardy
once in the Municipal Court of Iloilo which was dismissed , without his consent, the information charging
him with the offense of alarm and scandal based on the same facts. The court denied the motion to
dismiss. The Motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Issue:
WON accused Doriquez was placed in Double Jeopardy by charging him the offense of
discharged of firearm?

Ruling:
No, for Double Jeopardy to attach in his favor the accused must prove, among other
things, that there is”identity of offenses.” It is altogether evident, however, that the offense of discharge of
firearms not the crime of alarm and scandal, nor it is an attempt or a frustration of the later felony. Neither
may it be asserted that every crime discharged of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal. Nor
could the reverse situation be true, for less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or
subsume the offense of alarm and scandal which is a light felony.
Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under Article 155 of the Revised Penal Code and the
information for discharge of firearm instituted under Art. 258 of the RPC are close related, in fact they are
definitely different and diverse in law. Initially, the two crimes do not describe the same felony — alarm
and scandal is an offense against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons.
Secondly, the indispensable element of the former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause
alarm or danger to the public, while the the latter crime is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain
person, without the intent to kill.
Therefore, the plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded with merit.
CASE NO. 20 ROMUALDEZ vs. COMELEC
Digested by: Bunagan, Kristel

Facts: Imelda Romualdez-Marcos files her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of
First District of Leyte on March 8, 1995. On March 23, 1995 Cirilo Montejo, on the other hand, the
incumbent Representative and a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification alleging that Marcos lacked the Constitution’s one year requirement for candidates for the
House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made be her in Voter Registration Record and
in her certificate of candidacy. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood". On the same day, the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that her petition was filed out of time. In view of this, she
filed with the Central Office of COMELEC the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy alleging that
the word “seven” in her original certificate of candidacy was the result of an honest mistake as she though
that what was asked was her “actual and physical” presence in Tolosa and not resident of origin or
domicile in the First Legislative District to which she could have responded “since childhood” to which she
now sough to rectify. She further asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa. The Comelec Second Division
found the petition to disqualify meritorious. The Comelec en banc denied her motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON Imelda Marcos was a resident for election purposes of the Frist District of Leyte for a period of one
year

HELD:
YES. In fact, the Court upheld Romualdez’s claim that she has been a resident of Tacloban City, Leyte
“since childhood.” The entries in her Certificate of Candidacy where she put seven months when asked
the period of stay in her residence is, as the Court upheld, an honest misinterpretation or mistake
because all she thought was, what was being asked is her length of stay in Tolosa and not in Tacloban.
The Court supported this by stating that in election laws, residence and domicile are often used
interchangeably as they mean similarly. However, in interpreting “residence” as used in election laws,
jurisprudence and the framers of the constitution dictates that it does actually mean “domicile”. Domicile,
as used in many respects, includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence, in its
ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical
presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence
and domicile is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. The Supreme Court held that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos could not have
effectively abandoned her place of domicile, Tacloban City because she merely established residence in
various places with the intent of returning in the former place.
Case No. 21 AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI,
MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
Digested by: Ignacio, Grachel

FACTS:

On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City.

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under
Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.

Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held and petitioner garnered the highest number of votes as
against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco who placed second.

On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation.

On June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution declaring Respondent Agapito A. Aquino
ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.
Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent should he obtain the winning
number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made permanent.

ISSUES:

1. WON COMELEC still has jurisdiction over the question of petitioner’s qualifications to run for member
of the House of Representatives.

2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence in the district he
was running in.

3. WON the COMELEC erred in issuing its Order instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to
proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes.

HELD:

1. YES. Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House
of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does
not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution contemplates that the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative
to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the
latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not
been proclaimed  and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the House of
Representatives subject to Section 17 of the Constitution.

2. NO. We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice. 

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be
a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections.  Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,"  where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law.

3. YES. To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified
candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process
and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The result suggested
by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two
cases of Labo vs. Comelec  but also to a massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who
cast their vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had
petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would have been different. The
votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to
second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To simplistically
assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment
for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.

By: Ignacio, Grachel S.

CASE NO. 22 PIANDIONG ET AL V. THE PHILIPPINES

CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999 19 October 2000

Digested by: Angeles, Ceslhee

FACTS:

Piandiong and Morallos were arrested on 27 February 1994, on suspicion of having participated,
on 21 February 1994, in the robbery of passengers of a jeepney in Caloocan City, during which one of the
passengers, a policeman, was killed. After arriving in the police station, Piandiong and Morallos were hit
in the stomach in order to make them confess, but they refused. During a line up, the eyewitnesses failed
to recognize them as the robbers. The police then placed them in a room by themselves, and directed the
eyewitnesses to point them out. No counsel was present to assist the accused. During the trial,
Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan testified under oath, but the judge chose to disregard their testimony,
because of lack of independent corroboration.

Counsel further complains that the death sentence was wrongly imposed, because the judge
considered that an aggravating circumstance existed, as the crime was committed by more than three
armed persons. However, this was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, counsel states that
the judge should have taken into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, since they
came with the police without resisting. Counsel further states that the testimonies of the eyewitnesses
deserved no credence, because the eyewitnesses were close friends of the deceased and their
description of the perpetrators did not coincide with the way they actually looked. Counsel also states that
the judge erred when he did not give credence to the alibi defence. Finally, counsel complains that the
death penalty was unconstitutional and should not have been imposed for anything but the most heinous
crime.

On 7 November 1994, Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were convicted of robbery with homicide
and sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. The Supreme Court denied the
appeal, and confirmed both conviction and sentence by judgement of 19 February 1997. Further motions
for reconsideration were denied on 3 March 1998. After the execution had been scheduled, the Office of
the President granted a three-month reprieve of execution. No clemency was however granted and
counsel presented a communication to the Committee under the Optional Protocol. The Committee
transmitted the communication to the State party with a request to provide information and observations
in respect of both admissibility and merits of the claims. The State party was also requested not to carry
out the death sentence against Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan, while their case was under consideration
by the Committee. The Committee was informed by counsel that a warrant for execution had been issued.
After having contacted the State party’s representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva, the
Committee was informed that the executions would go ahead as scheduled, despite the Committee’s
request, since the State party was of the opinion that the Authors received a fair trial. Counsel for the
Authors filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking an injunction, which was refused by the Court.
However, Messrs. Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan were executed by lethal injection. Counsel argues that
Authors considered resort to the President as a domestic remedy necessary for them to exhaust before
presenting their communication to the Human Rights Committee. They argue therefore that it was not
improper for them to wait until it became clear that clemency was not going to be granted. With respect to
the State party’s argument that clemency could not be granted because the crime could not be
considered as poverty driven, counsel notes that Messrs. Piandiong, Morallos and Bulan disputed the
very finding of their supposed authorship of the crime.

With regard to the State party’s argument that the Supreme Court has ruled the death penalty
and method of execution constitutional, counsel argues that the Supreme Court’s judgement deserves to
be reconsidered.

ISSUE/S:

1. The Human Rights Committee must decide whether or not it is admissible under the Optional Protocol
to the Covenant.
2. Whether or not the accused were identified in Court by the eyewitnesses and that this identification was
sufficient.
3. Whether or not the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee, shall evaluate facts and
evidence in a particular case, and shall interpret the relevant domestic legislation.
4. Whether or not the crime for which they were convicted was a most serious crime as stipulated by
article 6(2), and whether the re-introduction of the death penalty in the Philippines is in compliance with
the State party’s obligations under article 6(1) (2) and (6) of the Covenant.

RULING:
1. The Committee notes that the State party has not raised any objections to the admissibility of the
communication. The Committee is not aware of any obstacles to the admissibility of the communication
and accordingly declares the communication admissible and proceeds without delay with the
consideration of the merits
2. Counsel has claimed that the identification of Messrs. Piandiong and Morallos by eyewitnesses during
the police line-up was irregular, since the first time around none of the eyewitnesses recognized them,
upon which they were put aside in a room and policemen directed the eyewitnesses to point them out.
The Court rejected their claim in this respect, as it was uncorroborated by any disinterested and reliable
witness.
3. The Committee reiterates that it is for the courts of States parties, and not for the Committee, to
evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, and to interpret the relevant domestic legislation. There
is no information before the Committee to show that the decisions by the courts were arbitrary or that they
amounted to denial of justice. In the circumstances, the Committee finds that the facts before it do not
reveal a violation of the Covenant in this respect.
4. The Committee is not in a position to address these issues, since neither counsel nor the State party
has made submissions in this respect.

The Human Rights Committee of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, is of the view that it cannot make a finding of a violation of any of the articles of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In the circumstances, the Committee finds that the
facts before it does not reveal a violation of the Covenant in this respect. The Committee reiterates its
conclusion that the State committed a grave breach of its obligations under the Protocol by putting the
alleged victims to death before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the communication.
Case No: 23 Sanchez vs. People
G.R. No. 179090, June 5, 2009
Digested by: Garcellano, Honey Grace

FACTS:
Appellant was charged with the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse in an Information[6] dated August 29,
2001 which reads:

The undersigned, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, hereby accuses Leonilo Sanchez alias Nilo of
Lajog, Clarin, Bohol of the crime of Other Acts of Child Abuse, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of September, 2000 in the municipality of Clarin, province of Bohol,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, acting as a Family Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to abuse, exploit and/or to inflict other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously abuse physically one [VVV],[7] a
sixteen (16) year old minor, by hitting her thrice in the upper part of her legs, and which acts are
prejudicial to the child-victim's development which acts are not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, but the same are covered by Art. 59, par. 8 of P.D. No. 603 as amended; to the damage and
prejudice of the offended party in the amount to be proved during the trial.

The appellant argues that the injuries inflicted by him were minor in nature that it is not prejudicial to the
child-victim’s development and therefore P.D. No. 603 is not applicable and he should be charged under
the Revised Penal Code for slight physical injuries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. 603 as amended is applicable to the case at hand.

HELD:
In this case, the applicable laws are Article 59 of P.D. No. 603 and Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 provides:

SECTION 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to
the Child's Development. —
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article
59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.

As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 603, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and
Regulations of the questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty and
exploitation just to show that these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial
to the child’s development. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be
convicted under Section 10(a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts
therein. The prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation
have resulted in the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is
different from the former acts.

Moreover, it is a rule in statutory construction that the word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying dissociation
and independence of one thing from other things enumerated. It should, as a rule, be construed in the
sense which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of “or” in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610 before
the phrase “be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development” supposes that there
are four punishable acts therein. First, the act of child abuse; second, child cruelty; third, child
exploitation; and fourth, being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The fourth
penalized act cannot be interpreted, as petitioner suggests, as a qualifying condition for the three other
acts, because an analysis of the entire context of the questioned provision does not warrant such
construal.

Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be considered as child abuse but merely as slight
physical injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant
conveniently forgets that when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to the protection extended
by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by the Constitution. As defined in the law, child abuse includes physical
abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this
definition. We, therefore, cannot accept appellant's contention.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 10(a) in relation to Sections 3(a) and 3(b) No. 1 of
Rep. Act No. 7610 and Sec. 59(8) of PD 603, amended.
CASE NO. 24 ARANETA VS. PEOPLE
Digested By: Pamttan, Lawrence Gay

FACTS:
ON APRIL 10, 1998 AT ABOUT 8O’CLOCK IN THE MORNING AT NEGROS ORIENTAL GONZALO
ARANETA WITH AN INTENT TO HARASS, ABUSE AND DEGRADE A 17 YEAR OLD OFFENDED
PARTY AAA, AND GRATIFY THE SEXUAL DESIRE OF SAID ACCUSED, THE LATTER DID THEN AND
THERE WILLFULLY, UNLAWFULLY AND FELONIOUSLY, BY MEANS OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION
HOLD AND EMBRACE SAID AAA, AFTER TRESPASSING WITH VIOLENCE INTO THE ROOM OF THE
DWELLING OCCUPIED BY SAID OFFENDED PARTY ALL AGAINST THE LATTER’S CONSENT AND
WILL. THAT WHILE AAA AND HER SIBLINGS WERE WAITING AT THE BENCH THE ACCUSED
EXPRESS HER FEELINGS TO AAA, THAT THE ACCUSED LOVE HER. SHE AND HER TWO SISTERS
DASHED TO THE BOARDING HOUSE CLOSE THE DOOR OF THE HOUSE AND THE ACCUSED
FORCED HIMSELF INSIDE. THE ACCUSED THEN EMBRACED AAA AND THE LATTER SHOUTED
FOR HELP. THE ACCUSED THREATENED TO KILL HER IF SHE WILL NOT ACCEPT ACCUSED’S
LOVE. ANDREW TABILAG CAME TO RESCUE AND REPORTED THE INCIDENT TO THE POLICE
STATION.

THE RTC RENDERED A DECISION TOTALLY DISREGARDING PETITIONER’S BARE DENIALS

VIOLATING SECTION 10(A) OF RA 7610. THE CA AFFIRME IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE RTC.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED

RULING:
YES. THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION PROVE THAT THE PETITIONER DESPITE VICTIM’S
PROTESTATIONS, RELENTLESSLY FOLLOWED THE LATTER FROM THE WAITING SHED TO HER
BOARDING HOUSE HUGGED HER AND THREATENED TO KILL HER IS INDEED SUCH DEVIOUS
ACT MUST HAVE SHATTERED HER SELF-ESTEEM AND WOMANHOOD AND VIRTUALLY DEBASED,
DEGRADED OR DEMEANED HER INTRINSIC WORTH AND DIGNITY. UNDOUBTEDLY, SUCH ACT OF
PETITIONER ACCORDING TO SUPREME COURT CONSTITUTES CHILD ABUSE. THEREFORE, THE
ACCUSED IS FOUND GUILTY OF VIOLATING SECTION 10(A) ARTICLE VI OF RA 7610 AND
AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE RTC AND CA.
CASE NO. 25 KURT v. TURKEY
Digested By: Angge Tolentino

FACTS:

This is a case filed by a mother against the respondent state for her son’s disappearance.

On November 23, 1993, security forces went to the village of Agill acting on an intelligence report that
three terrorists will visit the village. Several encounters happened. On Nov. 24, the soldiers gathered all
the villagers for evacuation considering that some houses have been burned down. Allegedly, it was at
this day when Complainant’s son, Uzeyir, was taken by the soldiers and allegedly spent the next two
nights together with them.

On the 25th, complainant received a message from a kid that her son wanted some cigarettes. When she
went to bring him some, her son told her that he is cold, so she went back with some jacket and socks.
Allegedly, this is the last time she saw her son.

On the 30th, she went to the prosecutor’s office to know about the whereabouts of her son. But she was
referred to the head of the gendamerie (head of the security forces) and she was told that her son has
been kidnapped by the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) and that they never took her son into custody.

Complainant then went to the National Security Court but the reply given to her was that her son was not
in their custody records. She then again contacted the prosecutor’s office but for the second time, she
was only referred to the head of the security forces.

On the 24th of December, she went to the Diyarbakir Human Rights Association for help. On March 21,
1994, the prosecutor’s office dismissed the case on the ground of jurisdiction because according to them,
the crime was committed by the PKK.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Uzeyir is a victim of breaches of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedom (Convention) by the Respondent State.

HELD:

Yes. The Court held that there has been a particularly grave violation of the right to liberty and security of
person guaranteed under Art. 5 of the Convention raising serious concerns about his welfare.

Authorities failed to offer any credible and substantiated explanation for the whereabouts or fate of Uzeyir
after he was detained in the village and that no meaningful investigation was conducted into
Complainant’s insistence that he was in detention and that she was concerned for his life. They have
failed to discharge their responsibility to account for him and it must be accepted that he has been held in
unacknowledged detention in the complete absence of the safeguards contained in Article 5.

The detention was not logged and there exists no official trace of his subsequent whereabouts or facts.
That fact in itself must be considered a most serious failing since it enables those responsible for the act
of deprivation of liberty to conceal their involvement in a crime, to cover their tracks and to escape
accountability for the fate of the detainee. The absence of holding data recoding such matters, as the
date, time and location of detention, the name of the detainee as well as the reasons for the detention and
the name of the person affecting it must be seen as incompatible with the very purpose of Art. 5 of the
Convention.

Unacknowledged detention of an individual is a complete negation of the guaranteed and a most grave
violation of Art. 5. Having assumed control over the individual, it is incumbent on the authorities to
account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Art. 5 must be seen as requiring the authorities to
take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct prompt effective
investigation into an arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not been seen
since.
The Court notes at the outset the fundamental importance of the guarantees contained in Art. 5 for
securing the right of individuals in a democracy to be free from arbitrary detention at the hands of the
authorities. It is precisely for this reason that the Court has repeatedly stressed in its case-law that any
deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in conformity with the substantive and procedural
rules of national law but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Art. 5 namely to protect the
individual from arbitrariness.
Case No. 26 The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema
ICTR-96-13-T-January 27, 2000
Digest by: Bassig, Marge

COURT: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (Trial Chamber I), Tanzania

FACTS:

The Accused, Alfred Musema, was director of the Gisovu Tea Factory in Kibuye Prefecture during the
1994 genocide in Rwanda. The Prosecutor alleged that Musema committed the following acts: under
Count 1, the Prosecutor charged Musema with genocide alternatively, under Count for complicity in
genocide. These Counts relate to the Accused's role in the rape and death of Annunciata (a Tutsi
woman), and the death of her son, as well as in the attack against Tutsi refugees at Gitwa Hill, at
Rwiarambo Hill, at Muyira Hill and the rape of Nyiramusugi, a young Tutsi woman, during this attack, at
Mumataba Hill and at Nyakavumu cave. Under Count 3, the Accused was charged with conspiracy to
commit genocide for the same acts alleged under Counts 1 and 2. Under Count 5, the Accused was
charged with extermination as a crime against humanity for his participation in the attacks against Tutsis
at Muyira Hill, at Mumataba Hill, in the Nyakavumu cave, at Gitwa Hill and in Rwirambo.Count 4 of the
Indictment charged the Accused with murder as a crime against humanity for the acts that also formed
the basis for Count 5 (extermination).

The Prosecution further charged him with other inhumane acts (Count 6) and rape (Count 7) as crimes
against humanity.

ISSUE:

WON the accused was guilty of the crimes charged against him

RULING:

The Trial Chamber was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Accused was guilty of genocide
pursuant to Article 6(1) and (3) of the Statute. For any of the acts charged to constitute genocide, the said
acts must have been committed against one or more persons because such person or persons were
members of a specific group, and specifically, because of their membership in this group. The acts were
committed by Musema with the specific intent to destroy the Tutsi group, and that the Tutsi group is one
of the groups legally protected from the crime of genocide.

The Chamber dismissed count 3 on the grounds that the Prosecution had not clearly alleged or adduced
evidence that the Accused had conspired to commit genocide. On the basis of the same acts, the
Prosecutor presented evidence of Musema’s participation in the commission of genocide, the substantive
offence in relation to conspiracy.

The Chamber found the Accused guilty of extermination as a crime against humanity, pursuant to Articles
6(1) and 6(3) of the Statute. Statute of the International Criminal Court defines a crime against humanity
as any of the enumerated acts committed, as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against
any civilian population, with the Perpetrator having knowledge of the said attack. Pursuant to Article 3 (c)
of the Statute, extermination constitutes a crime against humanity. Extermination differs from murder in
that it requires an element of mass destruction, which is not a prerequisite for murder. Therefore, the
Chamber dismissed count 4, since the killings at Gitwa Hill, Muyira Hill, Rwirambo Hill, Mumataba Hill and
at the Nyakavumu cave were killings of collective groups of individuals, thus constituting extermination
and not murder.

The Trial Chamber found the Accused guilty of rape as a crime against humanity under Article 6(1) but
not Article 6(3) of the Statute.
Case No. 27 The Prosecutor vs. Dusko Tadic
Case No: IT-94-1
July 15, 1999
Digest by: Lucena, Gerard

FACTS: Dusko Tadic, a former Bosnian Serb politician and former member of the paramilitary forces, He
faced 12 counts of crimes against humanity, 12 counts of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions,
and 10 counts of violations of the customs of war. This was for his actions in the Prijedor region, including
the Omarska, Trnopolje and Keraterm detention camps. On May 7, 1997, the International Criminal
Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found him guilty of 9 counts and partially guilty on 2 counts.
Tadic and the Prosecutor appealed separate aspects of the judgment of the Trial Chamber. Tadic also
appealed against the Sentencing Judgment.

ESSENTIAL ISSUES:
Whether the Trial Chamber erred when it decided:
a.) that the victims of the acts ascribed to Tadic did not enjoy the protection of the grave breaches regime
of the Geneva Conventions as recognized the Statute of the International Tribunal Article 2.
b.) it could not be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Tadic had played any in part in the killing of any
of the five men from the village of Jaskici
c.) it held that in order to be found guilty of a crime against humanity, the Prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused not only formed the intent to commit the offense but also knew of the
context of a widespread or systematic attack on the civilian population and that the act was not taken for
purely personal reasons unrelated to the armed conflict.
d.) it held that discriminatory intent is an element of all crimes against humanity
e.) it denied a Prosecution motion for production of defense witness statements.

HELD:
A. Yes. The grave breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions applied because there was an
international armed conflict. The victims were protected persons under the Geneva Convention on the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. Thus, Tadic is guilty on Counts 8, 9, 12, 15, 21 and 32 of
the Indictment on which he was earlier acquitted
B. YES. The Trial Chamber also misapplied the doctrine of common purpose which imputes criminal
liability to the participants in a criminal enterprise for all that results from that enterprise. He is thus guilty
on Counts 29, 30 and 31.
C. Yes. An act carried out for purely personal motives can constitute a crime against humanity within the
meaning of Article 5 of the Tribunal’s Statute relating to such crimes.
D. Discriminatory intent is not required for all crimes against humanity, but only for such crimes relating to
persecution. Such intent is not an indispensable legal ingredient of the offence only with regard to those
crimes for which it is expressly required, that is, for the types of persecution crimes mentioned in Article
5(h) of the Tribunal’s Statute.
E. Yes. The Trial Chamber may order, depending on the circumstances of the case before it, the
disclosure of a defense witness statement after examination-in-chief of the witness.
The Trial Chamber also saw no prejudice of his right to a fair trial. He was sentenced to 20-years
imprisonment.
Case No. 28: Delalic, it-965-21-a, Feb 20, 2001
Digested by: Agatep, Ron Gay

Facts: In 1992, during conflict in the Balkans, Bosnian and Croat forces took over villages in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, detaining prisoners in the village of Celebici, where the forces subjected them to torture and
cruel treatment. In response to these mass atrocities, the United Nations Security Council created the first
international criminal tribunal, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In
1993, four members of the Bosnian and Croat forces involved in the abuses at Celebici (defendants) were
brought to trial before the ICTY. The Trial Chamber determined that three out of the four defendants were
guilty of various breaches of the Geneva Conventions for acts of killing, torture, and sexual abuse of the
Celebici detainees. The Trial Chamber also made numerous findings, including that a Military
Investigative Commission was established to review detentions, but that it did not meet the requirements
of the Geneva Convention, and that the detained civilians did not possess weapons or participate in
political activity. The Trial Chamber concluded that the confinement of civilians during armed conflict may
be authorized in limited circumstances, but is unlawful if the detaining power is not in compliance with
Article 42 of Geneva Convention IV. The four defendants, along with the prosecution, appealed the
decision, as well as the conclusion that some of the civilians were illegally detained.

Issue: During armed conflicts, is confinement of civilians lawful when: (1) it is not absolutely necessary for
the security of the detaining nation and (2) procedural rights as prescribed in the Geneva Convention IV
are not afforded to the detainees?

Ruling: No. Article 42 of Geneva Convention IV (the Convention) states that the involuntary confinement
of a civilian during an armed conflict will be unlawful unless the security of the detaining power makes
such detention absolutely necessary. Even if a detainment is initially lawful, it may still become unlawful if
the detaining power does not comply with Article 43 of the Convention, which mandates that appropriate
courts be established to review the determination of whether a detainee is, in fact, dangerous. Simply
because citizens are nationals of an opposing power during times of conflict does not mean that they can
automatically be regarded as a threat to a detaining power’s authority without an individual assessment of
dangerousness. The Convention does not allow for such blanket authority to detain entire civilian
populations of enemy countries. While it is true that detaining powers are granted a reasonable time to
determine if the detainees are dangerous, this time is limited and is not to be solely determined by the
detaining power itself. Even though the detaining power identified these civilians as disloyal to Bosnia and
Herzegovina because they were members of the population of the opposing power, this is not enough to
prove that their detainment was absolutely necessary to security. In fact, several of the detained civilians
could not reasonably have been considered to pose any threat serious enough to justify their detention,
as it was proven they did not bear arms or participate in any political activity. While a commission was
established to review determinations involving detainees, it did not meet the requirements of Article 43,
and the time taken to make determinations was outside reasonable boundaries. The Trial Chamber’s
decision is affirmed.