REPUBLIC ACT No. 8249 February 5, 1997
The second paragraph of Section 3 of the same decree is
AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. The first paragraph of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1606, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 1. Sandiganbayan; Composition, Qualifications; Tenure;
Removal and Compensation. - A special court, of the same level as
the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a
court ofjustice, to be known as the Sandiganbayan is hereby created
composed of a presiding justice and fourteen associate justices who
shall be appointed by the President."
Section 2. Section 2 of the same decree is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
"SECTION 2. Official Station; Place of Holding Sessions. - The
Sandiganbayan shall have its principal office in the Metro Manila area
and shall hold sessions thereat for the trial and determination of cases
filed with it: Provided, however, That cases originating from the
principal geographical regions of the country, that is, from Luzon,
Visayas or Mindanao, shall be heard in their respective regions of
origin except only when the greater convenience of the accused and
of the witnesses, or other compelling considerations require the
contrary, in which instance a case originating from one geographical
region may be heard in another geographical region: Provided,
further, That for this purpose the presiding justice shall authorize any
divisions of the court to hold sessions at any time and place outside
Metro Manila and, where the interest of justice so requires, outside
the territorial boundaries of the Philippines. The Sandiganbayan may
require the services of the personnel and the use of facilities of the
courts or other government offices where any of the divisions is
holding sessions and the personnel of such courts or offices shall be
subject to the orders of the Sandiganbayan."
Section 3.
hereby deleted.
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city
department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as
Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
"b. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and
municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.
"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction orof their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in
cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14
and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these
petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the
implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may
hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the
Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed
with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan
and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices
or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those
employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall
be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper
courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action
for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal
action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately
from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That
where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment
therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action
shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as
the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed
abandoned."
Section 5. Section 7 of the same decree is hereby further amended to
read as follows:
'SECTION 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. - All
decisions and final orders determining the merits of a case or finally
disposing of the action or proceedings of the Sandijanbayan shall
contain complete findings of the facts and the law on which they are Section 8. Separability of Provisions. - If for any reason any
based, on all issues properly raised before it and necessary in provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, such parts
deciding the case. or portions not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect.
"A petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All acts, decrees, general orders and
filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final circulars, or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
order on judgment, and such motion for reconsideration shall be are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
decided within thirty (30) days from submission thereon.
Section 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days
"Decisions and final orders ofthe Sandiganbyan shall be appealable to after its complete publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general
the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure circulation.
questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Whenever, in any case decided by the Sandiganbayan, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death is imposed, the
decision shall be appealable to the Supreme Court in the manner
prescribed in the Rules of Court.
"Judgments and orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be executed and
enforced in the manner provided by law.
"Decisions and final orders of other courts in cases cognizable by said
courts under this decree as well as those rendered by them in the
exercise of their appellate jurisdiction shall be appealable to, or be
reviewable by, the Sandiganbayan in the manner provided by Rule
122 of the Rules of the Court.
"In case, however, the imposed penalty by the Sandiganbayan or the
regional trial court in the proper exercise of their respective
jurisdictions, is death, review by the Supreme Court shall be
automatic, whether or not accused files an appeal."
Section 6. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to carry out the
initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the current
fiscal year appropriations of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, such
sums as may be needed for its continued implementation shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases
pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015
DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF
THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules)
with prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the August 18, 2009
Resolution1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of respondent
Sandiganbayan Second Division in Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM-
0080, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
la9k of jurisdiction.
The facts are plain and undisputed.
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the
Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary
Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.3 On
March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of
the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of
Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713,5 allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused DANILODUNCANO y ACIDO, a high
ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region
No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is
under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath
of his assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business
interests, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business
interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus
Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof,
and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of
his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets,
to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With
Prayer to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest7before respondent
Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged, he admitted
that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v.
Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,9 he asserted
that under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,10 the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an official of the
executive branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but
with a compensation that is classified as below Salary Grade 27.
In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1)
(a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly show that the qualification as
to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive
branch other than the Regional Director and those specifically
enumerated. This is so since the term "Regional Director" and
"higher" are separated by the conjunction "and," which signifies that
these two positions are different, apart and distinct, words but are
conjoined together "relating one to the other" to give effect to the
purpose of the law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was
specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade
signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such
position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed,
was already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP contended that the
filing of the motion to dismiss is premature considering that the
Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.
Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v.
Sandiganbayan12 and Organo v. Sandiganbayan13 in his rejoinder.
On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division
promulgated its Resolution, disposing: WHEREFORE, in the light of
the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant Motion to Dismiss
for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore issued
against the accused.
SO ORDERED.14
The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is
one of those exceptions where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was opined that
Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that
respondent court has jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch
of the government occupying the position of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A.
No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (g). In support of the ruling, this Court’s
pronouncements in Indingand Binay v. Sandiganbayan15 were cited.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was
denied;16 Hence, this petition.
Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction, the Court required respondents to file a comment on the
petition without necessarily giving due course thereto.17 Upon
compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a Reply) was filed by
petitioner.
At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether,
according to P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A
No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher,
as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not included among the
public officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of
the law and heavily relying as well on Cuyco, petitioner insists that
respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional
Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains
that a Regional Director, irrespective of salary grade, falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We find merit in
the petition.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.18 By virtue of the powers vested
in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081,
dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was later amended by P.D. No.
1606,20Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No.
1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was
retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof.24 Aside from
Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A. 7080,27 which
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was
further modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this
year, R.A. No. 10660.30
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul
and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the
position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade
‘27’ and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and
higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
x x x"
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials of the executive
branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary
grades.31 While the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of
the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not
be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of
law placed under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.32
That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher"
qualifies "regional director and higher" is apparent from the
Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos.
1353and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249,
respectively:
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise
original jurisdiction over the cases assigned to it only in instances
where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher by the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the
time of the commission of the offense. The jurisdiction, therefore,
refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the
Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was
enacted for that Court to concentrate on the "larger fish" and leave the
"small fry" to the lower courts. This law became effective on May 6,
1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the
dockets of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials
whose salary grades were at Grade "26" or lower, devolving thereby
these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades were at
Grade "27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding
important positions in government regardless of salary grade; x x
x34 (Emphasis supplied)
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time
and expertise to big-time cases involving the so-called "big fishes" in
the government rather than those accused who are of limited means
who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in
turn, helps the court decongest its dockets.35
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still
fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they
hold the positions enumerated by the law.36 In this category, it is the
position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.37 The specific inclusion constitutes an
exception to the general qualification relating to "officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."38 As ruled in
Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides
that if the accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the
proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as
applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included
in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise,
except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to
(g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under
the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts "where none of the principal
accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher."
By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal
rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words,
clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction
that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut
magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which
gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word.39
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod,40 a department manager of the Philippine Health
Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),41 a student regent of the
University of the Philippines,42 and a Head of the Legal Department
and Chief of the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-
Presidents and Assistant Vice-President of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS)43 fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher.
Neither does he hold any position particularly enumerated in Section 4
(A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case is, in fact, on all
fours with Cuyco.1avvphi1Therein, the accused was the Regional
Director of the Land Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga
City, but at the time of the commission of the crime in 1992, his
position was classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26.44It was
opined: Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the
offense in 1992, he was occupying the position of Director II, Salary
Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls with the Regional
Trial Court.
We sustain petitioner's contention.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a)
and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by
public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director
and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in
relation to their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly
occupied the position of Director II with Salary Grade "26" under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction,
and acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in suspending petitioner from office, entitling petitioner to
the reliefs prayed for.45
In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief,
Personnel Division of the BIR shows that, although petitioner is a
Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified as Director II
with Salary Grade 26.46
There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was
prematurely filed on the ground that respondent court has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records disclose
that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on
September 17, 2009.Also, he was arraigned on April 14, 2010,prior to
the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for
certiorari is GRANTED. The August 18, 2009 Resolution and
February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second Division, which
denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
BATAS PAMBANSA Blg. 129
AN ACT REORGANIZING THE JUDICIARY, APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
PRELIMINARY CHAPTER
Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as "The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980."
Section 2. Scope. – The reorganization herein provided shall include
the Court of Appeals, the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal
Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of
Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the
Municipal Circuit Courts.
CHAPTER I
COURT OF APPEALS
Section 3. Organization. – There is hereby created a Court of
Appeals which consists of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate
Justice who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment, and
the Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the dates of
their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or
more of them shall bear the same date, according to the order in
which their appointments were issued by the President. Any member
who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other
position in the government shall retain the precedence to which he
was entitled under his original appointment, and his service in the
Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as continuous
and uninterrupted. (as amended by Exec. Order No. 33,, July 28,
1986.)
Section 4. Exercise of powers and functions. – The Court Appeals
shall exercise its powers, functions, and duties, through seventeen
(17) divisions, each composed of three (3) members. The Court may
sit en banc only for the purpose of exercising administrative,
ceremonial, or other non-adjudicatory functions. (as amended
by Exec. Order No. 33,.)
Section 5. Succession to Office of Presiding Justice. – In case of a
vacancy in the absence of inability to perform the powers, functions,
and duties of his office, the associate Justice who is first in
precedence shall perform his powers, functions, and duties until such
disability is removed, or another Presiding Justice is appointed and
has qualified.
Section 6. Who presides over session of a division. – If the Presiding
Justice is present in any session of a division of the Court, he shall
preside. In his absence, the Associate Justice attending such session
who has precedence shall preside.
Section 7. Qualifications. – The Presiding Justice and the Associate
Justice shall have the same qualifications as those provided in
Constitution for Justice of the Supreme Court.
Section 8. Grouping of Divisions. – (Expressly repealed by Section 4,
Exec. Order No. 33, July 28, 1986.)
Section 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Appeals shall Exercise:
1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs
of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto,and auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction;
2. Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
judgements of Regional Trial Courts; and
3. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgements,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission, including
the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security
Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, Except those falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution,
the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442,
as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the
third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of the fourth paragraph od
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to
resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within
three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice. (as amended
by R.A. No. 7902.)
Section 10. Place of holding sessions. – The Court of Appeals shall
have its permanent station in the City of Manila. Whenever demanded
by public interest, the Supreme Court, upon its own initiative or upon
recommendation of the Presiding Justice, may authorize a division of
the Court to hold sessions outside Manila, periodically, or for such
periods and at such places as the Supreme Court may determine, for
the purpose of hearing and deciding cases.
Section 11. Quorum – A majority of the actual members of the Court
shall constitute a quorum for its session en banc. Three members
shall constitute a quorum for the session of a division. The unanimous
vote of the three members of a division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a decision of final resolution, which shall be
reached in consultation before the writing of the opinion by any
members of the division. In the event that the three members do not
reach a unanimous vote, the Presiding Justice shall request the Raffle
Committee of the Court for the designation of two additional Justice to
sit temporarily with them, forming a special division of five members
and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary
for the pronouncement of a decision or final resolution. The
designation of such additional Justice shall be made strictly by raffle.
A month for reconsideration of its decision or final resolution shall be
resolved by the Court within ninety (90) days from the time it is
submitted for resolution, and no second motion for reconsideration
from the same party shall be entertainment. (as amended by Exec.
Order No. 33, July 28, 1986.)
Section 12. Internal Rules. – The court en banc is authorized to
promulgate rules or orders governing the constitution of the divisions
and the assignment of Appellate Justices thereto, the distribution of
cases, and other matters pertaining to the operations of the Court of
its divisions. Copies of such rules and orders shall be furnished by the
Supreme Court, which rules and orders shall be effective fifteen (15)
days after receipt thereof, unless directed otherwise by the Supreme
Court.
CHAPTER II
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby
created thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, one for each of the
following judicial regions:
The First Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Abra,
Benguet, Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, La Union, Mountain Province, and
Pangasinan, and cities of Baguio, Dagupan, Laog and San Carlos;
The Second Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Batanes,
Cagayan, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao, Nueva Viscaya, and Quirino;
The Third Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Bataan,
Bulacan (except the municipality of valenzuela), Nueva Ecija,
Pampanga, Tarlac, and Zambales, and the cities of Angeles,
Cabanatuan, Olongapo, Palayan and San Jose;
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila,
Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong, and the municipalities
of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig,
Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela;
The Fourth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Batangas,
Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque, Mindoro Occidental, Mindoro Oriental,
Palawan, Quezon, Rizal (except the cities and municipalities
embraced within the National Capital Judicial Region0, Romblon, and
Aurora, and the cities of Batangas, Cavite, Lipa, Lucena, Puerto
Princessa, San Pablo, Tagaytay, and Trece Martires;
The Fifth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Albay,
Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte, Catanduanes, Masbate, and
Sorsogon, and the cities of Legaspi, Naga and Iriga;
The Sixth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Aklan,
Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, La Calota, Roxas, San Carlos, and Silay, and
the subprovince of Guimaras;
The Seventh Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Bohol,
Cebu, Negros Oriental, and Siquijor, and the cities of Bais, Canlaon,
Cebu, Danao, Dumaguete, Lapu-lapu, Mandaue, Tagbilaran, and
Toledo,
The Eighth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces or Eastern
Samar, Leyte, Northern, Samar, Southern Leyte, Ormoc, and
Tacloban:
The Ninth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Basilan,
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur, and the cities of Dapitan,
Dipolog, Pagadian, and Zamboanga;
The Tenth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del
Norte, Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Occidental,
Misamis Oriental, and Surigao del Norte, and the cities of Butuan,
Cagayan de Oro, Gingoog, Ozamis, Oroquieta, Surigao, and Tangub;
The Eleventh Judicial Region, consistingnof the provinces of Davao
del Norte, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and
Surigao del Sur, and the cities of Davao, and General Santos; and
The Twelfth Judicial Region, consisting of the provinces of Lanao del
Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, North Cotabato, and Sultan
Kudarat, and the cities of Cotabato, Iligan, and Marawi.
In case of transfer or redistribution of the provinces, subprovinces,
cities or municipalities comprising the regions established by law of
purposes of the administrative field organization of the various
departments and agencies of the government, the composition of the
judicial regions herein constituted shall be deemed modified
accordingly.
Section 14. Regional Trial Courts.
(a) Fifty-seven Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
First Judicial Region. There shall be.
Two branches (Branches III ans II) for the province of Abra, with seats
at Bangued;
Eight branches (Branches III to X) for the province of Benguet and the
city of Baguio, Branches III to VII with seats at Baguio City, and
Branches VIII to X at La Trinidad;
Nine branches (Branches XI to XIX) for the province of Ilocos Norte
and the city of Laoag, Branches XI to XVI with seats at Laoag City,
Branches XVII and XVIII at Batac, and Branch XIX at Bangui;
Six branches (Braches XX to XXV) for the province of Ilocos Sur,
Branches XX and XXI with seats at Vigan, Branch XXII at Narvacan,
Branch XXIII at Candon, Branch XXIV at Cabugao, and Branch XXV
at Tagudin;
Nine branches (Branches XXVI to XXXIV) for the province of La
Union, Branches XXVI to XXX with seats at San Fernando, Branches
XXXI and XXXII at Agoo, Branch XXXIII at Bauang, and Branch
XXXIV at Balaoan;
Two branches (Branches XXXV and XXXVI) for the province of
Mountain province, with seats at Bontoc; and
Twenty-one branches (Branches XXXVII to LVII) for the province of
Pangasinan and the citie sof dagupan and san Carlos, Branches
XXXVII to XXXIX with seats at Lingayen, Branches XL to XLIV at
dagupan, Branches XLV to XLIX at Urdaneta, Branch L at Villasis,
Branches LI and LII at Tayug, Branch LIII at Rosalaes, Branches LIV
and LV at Alaminos, and Branch LVI and LVII at san Carlos.
(b) Thirty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Second Judicial region. There shall be:
Twelve branches (Branches I to XII) for the province of Cagayan,
Branches I to V with seats at Tuguegarao, Branches VI to X at Aparri,
Branch XI at Tuao, and Branch XII at Sanchez Mira;
One branch (Branch XIII) for the province of Batanes, with seat at
Basco;
Two branches (Branches XIV and XV) for the province of Ifugao,
Branch XIV with seat at Lagawe, and Branch XV at Potia;
Nine branches (Branches XVI to XXIV) for the province of Isabela,
Branches XVI to XVIII with seats at Ilagan, Branches XIX and XX at
cauayan, Branch XXI at Santiago, Branch XXII at Cabagan, Branch
XXIII at Roxas, and Branch XXIV at Echague;
Two branches (Branches XXV and XXVI) for the province of kalinga-
Apayao, Branch XXV with seat at Tabuk, and Branch XXVI at Luna;
Four branches (Branches XXVII to XXX) for the province of Nueva
Vizcaya, Branches XXVII to XXIX with seats at Bayombong, and
Branch XXX at Bambang;
Two branches (Branches XXXI and XXXII) for the province of Quirino,
with seats at Cabarroguis.
(c) Seventy-five Regional Trial judges shall be commissioned for the
Third Judicial Region. There shall be:
Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Bataan, Branches
I to III with seats at Balanga, Branch IV at Mariveles, and Branch V at
Dinalupihan;
Seventeen branches (Branches VI to XXII) for the province of Bulacan
(except the municipality of Valuenzuela), with seats at Malolos;
Eighteen branches (Branches XXIII to XL) for the province of Nueva
Ecija and the cities of Cabanatuan, San Jose and Palayan, Branches
XXIII to XXX with seats at Cabanatuan City, Branches XXXI to XXXIII
at Guimba, Branches XXXIV to XXXVI at Gapan, Branch XXXVII at
Sto. Domingo, Branches XXXVIII and XXXIX at San Jose, and Branch
XL at Palayan.
Twenty-two branches (Branches XLI to LXII) for the province of
Pampanga and the city of Angeles, Branches XLI to XLVIII with seats
at San Fernando, Branches XLIX to LIII at Guagua, Branches LIV and
LV at Macabebe, and Branches LVI to LXII at Angeles City;
Six branches (Branches LXIII to LXVIII) for the province of Tarlac,
Branches LXVI at Capas, Branch LXVII at Paniqui, and Branch LXVIII
at Camiling; and
Seven branches (Branches LXIX to LXXV) for the province of
Zambales and the city of Olongapo, Branches LXIX to LXXI with seats
at Iba and Branches LXXII to LXXV at Olongapo City
(d) One hundred seventy-two (172) Regional Trial Judges shall be
commissioned for the National Capital Judicial Region. There shall be:
Fifty-five branches (Branches 1 to 55) for the City of Manila, wit seats
thereat;
Thirty-two branches (Branches 76 to 107) for Quezon City, with seats
thereat;
Twelve branches (Branches 108 to 119) for Pasay City, with seats
thereat;
Twelve branches (Branches 120 to 131) for Caloocan City, with seats
thereat;
Fifty-eight branches (Branches 56 to 74 and 132 to 170) for the
Municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Madaluyong, Makati,
Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las Piñas, and
Muntinlupa; Branches 67 to 71 and 151 to 168 at Pasig; and
Branches 72 to 74, 169 and 170 at Malabon; and
Three branches (Branches 75, 171 and 172) for the municipality of
Valenzuela, with seats thereat. (As amended by EO No. 33, July 30,
1986.)
(e) Eihty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Fourth Judicial Region. There shall be:
Fourteen branches (Branches I to XIV) for the province of Batangas
and the cities of Lipa and Batangas, Branches I to VI with seats at
Batangas City, Branch V at Lemery, Branches VI to VIII at Tanuan,
Branches IX to XI at Balayan, Branches XII and XIII at Lipa, and
Branch XIV at Nasugbu;
Nine branches (Branches XV to XXIII) for the province of Cavite and
the cities of Cavite, Tagaytay and Trece Matires, Branch XV with seat
at Naic, Branches XVII at Cavite City, Branch XVIII at Tagayatay City,
Branch XIX at Bacoor, Branches XX to XXII at Imus, and Branch XXIII
at Trece Martires;
Fourteen branches (Branches XXIV to XXXVII) for the province of
Laguna and the city of San Pablo, Branches XXVIII at Sta. Cruz,
Branches XXIX to XXXII at San Pable City, Branch XXXIII at Siniloan,
and Branches XXXIV to XXXVI at Calamba;
One branch (Branch XXXVIII) for the province of Marinduque, with
seat at Boac;
Five branches (Branches XXXIX to XLIII) for the province of Mindoro
Oriental, Branches XXXIX to XL with seats at Calapan, Branches XLI
and XLII at Pinamalayan, and Branch XLII at Roxas;
Three branches (Branches XLVII to XLVI) for the province of Mindoro
Occidental, Branch XLIV with seat at Mamburao, and Branches XLV
and XLVI at San Jose;
Six branches (Branches XLVII to LII) for the province of Palawan and
the city of Puerto Princesa, with seats at Puerto Princesa City;
Thirteen branches (Branches LIII to LXV) for the province of Quezon
and the city of Lucena, Branches LIII to LX with seats at Lucena City,
Branches LXI and LXII at Gumaca, Branch LXIII at Calauag, Branch
LXIV at Mauban, and Branch LXV at Infanta;
One branchj(Branch LXVI) for the province of Aurora, with seat at
Baler;
Fourteen branches (Branches LXVII to LXXX) for the province of Rizal
except the cities and municipalities embraced within the National
Capital Judicial Region, Branches LXVII to LXX with seats at
Binangonan, Branches LXXI to LXXIV at Antipolo, Branches LXXV to
LXXVII at San Mateo, and Branches LXXVIII to LXXX at Morong; and
Two branches (Branches LXXXI and LXXXII) for the province of
Romblon, Branch LXXXI with seat at Romblon, and Branch LXXXII at
Odiongan.
(f) Fifty-five Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the Fifth
Judicial Region. There shall be:
Eighteen branches (Branches I to XVIII) for the province of Albay and
the city of Legaspi, Branches I to X with seats at Legaspi City,
Branches XI to XIV at Ligao, and Branches XV to XVIII at Tabaco;
Nineteen branches (Branches XIX to XXXVII) for the province of
Camarines Sur and the cities of Naga and Iriga, Branches XIX to
XXVIII with seats at Naga City, Branch XXIX at Libmanan, Branch
XXX at Tigaon, Braches XXXI to XXXIII at Pili, and Branches XXXIV
to XXXVII at Iriga City;
Four branches (Branches XXXVIII to XLII) for the province of
Camarines Norte, with seat at Daet;
Two branches (Branches XLII and XLII) for the province of
Catanduanes, with seats at Virac;
Seven branches (Branches XLIV to L) for the province of Masbate,
Branches XLIV to XLVIII with seats at Masbate, Branch XLIX at
Cataingan, and Branch L at San Jacinto; and
Five branches (Branches LI to LV) for the province of Sorsogon,
Branches LI to LIII with seats at Sorsogon, Branch LVI at Gubat, and
Branch LV at Irosin.
(g) Sixty-three Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Sixth Judicial Region. There shall be:
Nine branches (Branches I to IX) for the province of Aklan, with seats
at Kalibo;
Four branches (Branches X to XIII) for the province of Antique,
Branches X to XII with seats at San Jose, and Branch XIII and Culasi;
Eighr branches (Branches XIV to XXI) for the province of Capiz and
the city of Roxas, Branches XIV to XIX with seats at Roxas City and
Branches XX and XXI at Mambusao;
Eighteen branches (Branches XXII to XXXIX) for the province of Iloilo,
the subprovince of Guimaras, and the city of Iloilo, with seats at Iloilo
City; and
Twenty-four branches (Branches XL to LXIII) for the province of
Negros Occidental, and the cities of Bacolod,Bago, Cadiz, La Carlota,
San Carlos and Silay, Branch XL with seat at Silay City, Branches XLI
to LIV at Bacolod City, Branches LV and LVI at Himamaylan,
Branches LVII to LIX at Kabankalan, Branch LXII at Bago City, and
Branch LXII at La Carlota City.
(h) Forty-six Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Seventh Judicial Region. There shall be:
Four branches (Branches I to IV) for the province of Bohol and the city
of Tagbilaran, with seats at Tagbilaran City;
Twenty-five branches (Branches V to XXIX) for the province of Cebu
and the cities of Cebu, Danao, Lapu-Lapu, Mandaue and Toledo,
Branches V to XXIV with seats at Cebu City, Branch XXV at Danao
City, Branch XXVI at Argao, Branch XXVII at Lapu-Lapu City, Branch
XXVIII at Mandaue City, and Branch XXIX at Toledo City;
Sixteen branches (Branches XXX to XLV) for the province of Negros
Oriental and the cities of Dumaguete, Bais and Canlaon, Branches
XXX to XLIV with seats at Dumaguete City, and Branch XLV at Bais
City; and
One branch (Branch XLVI) for the province of Siquijor, with seat at
Larena.
(i) Thirty-three Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Eighth Judicial Region. There shall be:
Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Eastern Samar,
Branches I and II with seats at Borongan, Branch III at Guiuan,
Branch IV at Dolores, and Branch V at Oras;
Thirteen branches (Branches VI to XVIII) for the province of Leyte, the
sub-province of Biliran, and the cities of Ormoc and Tacloban,
Branches VI and IX with seats at Tacloban City, Branch X at Abuyog,
Branch XI at Calubian, Branch XII at Ormoc City, Branch XIII at
Carigara, Branch XIV at Baybay, Branch XV at Burauen, Branch XVI
at Naval, Branch XVII at Palompon, and Branch XVIII at Hilongos;
Five branches (Branches XIX to XXIII) for the province of Northern
Samar, Branches XIX and XX with seats at Catarman, Branches XXI
and XXII at Laoang, and Branch XXIII at Allen;
Three branches (Branches XXIV to XXVI) for the province of Southern
Leyte, Branches XXIV and XXV with seats at Maasin, and Branch
XXVI at San Juan; and
Seven branches (Branches XXVII to XXXIII) for the province of Samar
and the city of Calbayog, Branches XXVII to XXIX with seats at
Catbalogan, Branch XXX at Basey, Branches XXXI and XXXII at
Calbayog City, and Branch XXXIII at Calbiga.
(j) Twenty-four Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Ninth Judicial Region. There shall be:
Two branches (Branches I and II) for the province of Basilan, with
seats at Isabela;
Two branches (Branches III and IV) for the province of Sulu, Branch
III with seat at Jolo, and Branch IV at Parang;
One branch (Branch V) for the province of Tawi-Tawi, with seat at
Bongao;
Six branches (Branches VI to XI) for the province of Zamboanga del
Norte, and the cities of Dipolog and Dapitan, Branches VI to X seats
at Dipolog City, and Branch XI at Sindangan; and
Thirteen branches (Branches XII to XXIV) for the province of
Zamboanga del Sur and the cities of Pagadian and Zamboanga
Branches XII to XVII with seats at Zamboanga City, Branches, XVIII to
XXII at Pagadian City, Branch XXIII at Molave, and Branch XXIV at
Ipil.
(k) Thirty-two Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Tenth Judicial Region. There shall be:
Five branches (Branches I to V) for the province of Agusan del Norte
and the city of Butuan, with seats at Butuan City;
Two branches (Branches VI and VII) for the province of Agusan del
Sur, Branches VI with seat at Prosperidad and Branch VII with seat at
Bayugan;
Four branches (Branches VIII to XI) for the province of Bukidnon,
Branches VIII to X with seats at Malaybalay and Branch XI at Manalo
Fortich;
Five branches (Branches XII to XI) for the province of Misamis
Occidental and the cities of Oroquieta, Ozamis, and Tangub,
Branches XII to XIV with seats at Oroquieta City, Branch XV at
Ozamis City, and Branch XVI at Tangub City;
Eleven branches (Branches XVII to XXVII) for the province of Misamis
Oriental and the cities of Cagayan de Oro and Gingoog, Branches
XVII to XXV with seats at Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXVI at
Medina, and Branch XXVII at Gingoog City;
One branch (Branch XXVIII) for the province of Camiguin, with seat at
Mambajao; and
Four branches (Branches XXIX to XXXII) for the province of Surigao
del Norte and the City of Surigao, Branches XXIX and XXX with seats
at Surigao City, Branch XXXI at Dapa, and Branch XXXII at Dinagat,
Dinagat Island.
(l) Twenty-nine Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Eleventh Judicial Region. There shall be
Four branches (Branches I to IV) for the province of Davao del Norte,
Branches I and II with seats at Tagum, Branch III at Nabunturan, and
Branch IV at Panabo;
Three branches (Branches V to VII) for the province of Davao
Oriental, Branches V and VI with seats at Mati and Branch VII at
Banganga;
Fourteen branches (Branches VIII to XXI) for the province of Davao
del Sur and the city of Davao, Branches VIII to XVII with seats at
Davao City, Branches XVIII and XIX at Digos, Branch XX at Malinta,
and Branch XXI a Bansalan;
Five Branches (Branches XXII to XXVI) for the province of South
Cotabato and the city of General Santos, Branches XXII and XXIII
with seats at General Santos City, Branches XXIV and XXV at
Koronadal, and Branch XXVI at Surallah; and
Three branches (Branches XXVII to XXIX) for the province of Surigao
del Sur, Branch XXVII with seat at Tandag, Branch XXVIII at Lianga,
and Branch XXIX at Bislig.
(m) Twenty Regional Trial Judges shall be commissioned for the
Twelfth Judicial Region. There shall be:
Seven branches (Branches I to VII) for the province of Lanao del
Norte and the city of Iligan, Branches I to VI with seats at Iligan City,
and Branch VII at Tubod;
Five branches (Branches VIII to XII) for the province of Lanao del Sur
and the city of Marawi, Branches VIII to X with seats at Marawi City,
and Branches XI and XII at Malabang;
Three branches (Branches XIII to XV) for the province of
Maguindanao and the city of Cotabato, Branches XIII and XIV with
seats at Cotabato City, and Branch XV at Maganoy;
Three branches (Branches XVI to XVIII) for the province of North
Cotabato, Branch XVI with seat at Kabacan, Branch XVII at
Kidapawan, and Branch XVIII at Missayap; and
Two branches (Branches XIX and XX) for the province of Sultan
Kudarat, Branch XIX, with seat at Isulan, and Branch XX at Tacurong.
Section 15. Qualifications. – No persons shall be appointed Regional
Trial Judge unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at
least thirty-five years of age, and for at least ten years, has been
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a public
office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as
an indispensable requisite.
Section 16. Time and duration of sessions. – The time and duration
of daily sessions of the Regional Trial Courts shall be determined by
the Supreme Court: Provided, however, That all motions, except
those requiring immediate action, shall be heard in the afternoon of
every Friday, unless it falls on a holiday, in which case, the hearing
shall be held on the afternoon of the next succeeding business
day: Provided, further, That the Supreme Court may, for good
reasons, fix a different motion day in specified areas
Section 17. Appointment and assignment of Regional Trial Judges. –
Every Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall
be his permanent station, and his appointment shall state the branch
of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be originally
assigned. However, the Supreme Court may assign temporarily a
Regional Trial Judge to another region as public interest may require,
provided that such temporary assignment shall not last longer than six
(6) months without the consent of the Regional Trial Judge
concerned.
A Regional Trial Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any
branch or city or municipality within the same region as public interest
may require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an
assignment to another station within the meaning of this section.
Section 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. –
The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which a branch of
the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus
defined shall be deemed to be the territorial area of the branch
concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all suits,
proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal, as well as
determining the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts over the said branch may exercise
appellate jurisdiction. The power herein granted shall be exercised
with a view to making the courts readily accessible to the people of
the different parts of the region and making the attendance of litigants
and witnesses as inexpensive as possible.
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such the value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such
gross value exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00);
(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court and of the Courts of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law;
and
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (100,000.00) or, in such other
abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(200,000.00). (as amended by R.A. No. 7691*)
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. – Regional Trial Courts
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except
those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance
of by the latter.
Section 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases. – Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforced in any
part of their respective regions; and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and
consuls.
Section 22. Appellate jurisdiction. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be decided
on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the
parties or required by the Regional Trial Courts. The decision of the
Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be appealable by petition for
review to the
Court of Appeals which may give it due course only when the petition
shows prima facie that the lower court has committed an error of fact
or law that will warrant a reversal or modification of the decision or
judgment sought to be reviewed.
Section 23. Special jurisdiction to try special cases. – The Supreme
Court may designate certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to
handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile and domestic relations
cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases which do not fall
under the jurisdiction of quasi-judicial bodies and agencies, and/or
such other special cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the
interest of a speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Section 24. Special Rules of Procedure. – Whenever a Regional Trial
Court takes cognizance of juvenile and domestic relation cases and/or
agrarian cases, the special rules of procedure applicable under
present laws to such cases shall continue to be applied, unless
subsequently amended by law or by rules of court promulgated by the
Supreme Court.
CHAPTER III
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS
Section 25. Establishment of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. – There shall be
created a Metropolitan Trial Court in each metropolitan area
established by law, a Municipal Trial Court in each of the other cities
or municipalities, and a Municipal Circuit Trial Court in each circuit
comprising such cities and/or municipalities as are grouped together
pursuant to law.
Section 26. Qualifications. – No person shall be appointed judge of a
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit
Trial Court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at
least 30 years of age, and, for at least five years, has been engaged
in the practice of law in the Philippines, or has held a public office in
the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite.
Section 27. Metropolitan Trial Courts of the National Capital
Region. – There shall be a Metropolitan Trial Court in the National
Capital Region, to be known as the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro
Manila, which shall be composed of eighty-two (82) branches. There
shall be:
Thirty branches (Branches I to XXX) for the city of Manila with seats
thereat;
Thirteen branches (Branches XXXI to XLIII) for Quezon City with
seats thereat;
Five branches (Branches XLIV to XLVIII) for Pasay City with seats
thereat;
Five branches (Branches XLIX to LIII) for Caloocan City with seats
thereat;
One branch (Branch LIV) for Navotas with seat thereat;
Two branches (Branches LV and LVI) for Malabon with seats thereat;
Two branches (Branches LVII and LVIII) for San Juan with seats
thereat;
Two branches (Branches LIX and LX) for Mandaluyong with seats
thereat;
Seven branches (Branches LXI and LXVII) for Makati with seats
thereat;
Five branches (Branches LXVIII to LXXII) for Pasig with seats thereat;
One branch (Branch LXXIII) for Pateros with seat thereat;
One branch (Branch LXXIV) for Taguig with seat thereat;
Two branches (Branches LXXV and LXXVI) for Marikina with seats
thereat;
Two branches (Branches LXXVII and LXXVIII) for Parañaque with Two branches for Batangas City;
seats thereat;
Two branches for Lucena City;
One branch (Branch LXXIX) for Las Piñas with seat thereat;
Three branches for Naga City;
One branch (Branch LXXX) for Muntinlupa with seat thereat;
Two branches for Iriga City;
Two branches (Branches LXXXI and LXXXII) for Valenzuela with
Three branches for Legaspi City;
seats thereat;
Two branches for Roxas City;
Section 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. – The Supreme Court
shall constitute Metropolitan Trial Courts in such other metropolitan Four branches for Iloilo City;
areas as may be established by law whose territorial jurisdiction shall
be co-extensive with the cities and municipalities comprising the Seven branches for Bacolod City;
metropolitan area. Two branches for Dumaguete City;
Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a metropolitan Two branches for Tacloban City;
area which shall be his permanent station and his appointment shall
state branch of the court and the seat thereof to which he shall be Eight branches for Cebu City;
originally assigned. A Metropolitan Trial Judge may be assigned by
Three branches for Mandaue City;
the Supreme Court to any branch within said metropolitan area as the
interest of justice may require, and such assignment shall not be Two branches for Tagbilaran City;
deemed an assignment to another station within the meaning of this
section. Two branches for Surigao City;

Section 29. Municipal Trial Courts in cities. – In every city which does Two branches for Butuan City;
not form part of a metropolitan area, there shall be a Municipal Trial Five branches for Cagayan de Oro City;
Court with one branch, except as hereunder provided:
Seven branches for Davao City;
Two branches for Laoag City;
Three branches for General Santos City;
Four branches for Baguio City;
Two branches for Oroquieta City;
Three branches for Dagupan City;
Three branches for Ozamis City;
Five branches for Olongapo City;
Two branches for Dipolog City;
Three branches for Cabanatuan City;
Four branches for Zamboanga City;
Two branches for San Jose City;
Two branches for Pagadian City; and
Three branches for Angeles City;
Two branches for Iligan City.
Two branches for Cavite City;
Section 30. Municipal Trial Courts. – In each of the municipalities that
are not comprised within a metropolitan area and a municipal circuit
there shall be a Municipal Trial Court which shall have one branch,
except as hereunder provided:
Two branches for San Fernando, La Union;
Four branches for Tuguegarao;
Three branches for Lallo, and two branches for Aparri, both of
Cagayan;
Two branches for Santiago, Isabela;
Two branches each for Malolos, Meycauayan and Bulacan, all of
Bulacan Province;
Four branches for San Fernando and two branches for Guagua, both
of Pampanga;
Two branches for Tarlac, Tarlac;
Two branches for San Pedro, Laguna; and
Two branches each for Antipolo and Binangonan, both in Rizal.
Section 31. Municipal Circuit Trial Court. – There shall be a Municipal
Circuit Trial Court in each area defined as a municipal circuit,
comprising one or more cities and/or one or more municipalities. The
municipalities comprising municipal circuits as organized under
Administrative Order No. 33, issued on June 13, 1978 by the
Supreme Court pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 537, are hereby
constituted as municipal circuits for purposes of the establishment of
the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the appointment thereto of
Municipal Circuit Trial Judges: Provided, however, That the Supreme
Court may, as the interests of justice may require, further reorganize
the said courts taking into account workload, geographical location,
and such other factors as will contribute to a rational allocation
thereof, pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 537
which shall be applicable insofar as they are not inconsistent with this
Act.
Every Municipal Circuit Trial Judge shall be appointed to a municipal
circuit which shall be his official station.
The Supreme Court shall determine the city or municipality where the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court shall hold sessions.
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. – Except
in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal
ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount
of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof. (as amended by R.A, No. 7691)
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. – Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property,
estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided,
That where there are several claims or causes of action between the
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose
out of the same or different transactions;
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession.
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of
such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the
adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691)
Section 34. Delegated jurisdiction in cadastral and land registration
cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court
to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering
lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots the
where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of
the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are
more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the
same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts. (as amended
by R.A. No. 7691)
Section 35. Special jurisdiction in certain cases. – In the absence of
all the Regional Trial Judges in a province or city, any Metropolitan
Trial Judge, Municipal Trial Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Judge may
hear and decide petitions for a writ of habeas corpus or applications
for bail in criminal cases in the province or city where the absent
Regional Trial Judges sit.
Section 36. Summary procedures in special cases. – In Metropolitan
Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts with at least two branches, the
Supreme Court may designate one or more branches thereof to try
exclusively forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, those involving
violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations, violations of the rental
law, and such other cases requiring summary disposition as the
Supreme Court may determine. The Supreme Court shall adopt
special rules or procedures applicable to such cases in order to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination thereof without
regard to technical rules. Such simplified procedures may provide that
affidavits and counter-affidavits may be admitted in lieu of oral
testimony and that the periods for filing pleadings shall be non-
extendible.
Section 37. Preliminary investigation. – Judges of Metropolitan Trial
Courts, except those in the National Capital Region, of Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall have authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of crimes alleged to have been
committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions which are
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courts.
The preliminary investigation shall be conducted in accordance with
the procedure prescribed in Section 1, paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and
(d), of Presidential Decree No. 911: Provided, however, That if after
the preliminary investigation the Judge finds a prima facie case, he
shall forward the records of the case to the Provincial/City Fiscal for
the filing of the corresponding information with the proper court.
No warrant of arrest shall be issued by the Judge in connection with
any criminal complaint filed with him for preliminary investigation,
unless after an examination in writing and under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and his witnesses, he finds that a probable cause
exists.
Any warrant of arrest issued in accordance herewith may be served
anywhere in the Philippines.
Section 38. Judgments and processes. –
(1) All judgments determining the merits of cases shall be in writing,
stating clearly the facts and the law on which they were based, signed
by the Judge and filed with the Clerk of Court. Such judgment shall be
appealable to the Regional Trial Courts in accordance with the
procedure now prescribed by law for appeals to the Court of First
Instance, by the provisions of this Act, and by such rules as the
Supreme Court may hereafter prescribe.
(2) All processes issued by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in cases falling within
their jurisdiction, may be served anywhere in the Philippines without
the necessity of certification by the Judge of the Regional Trial Court.
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases
shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order,
resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided
however, That in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be
forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from.
No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu
thereof, the entire record shall be transmitted with all the pages
prominently numbered consecutively, together with an index of the
contents thereof.
This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in
other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable
provisions of the Rules of Court.
Section 40. Form of decision in appealed cases. – Every decision of
final resolution of a court in appealed cases shall clearly and distinctly
state the findings of fact and the conclusions of law on which it is
based, which may be contained in the decision or final resolution
itself, or adopted by reference from those set forth in the decision,
order, or resolution appealed from.
Section 41. Salaries. – Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional
Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall receive such compensation and
allowances as may be authorized by the President along the
guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1597.
Section 42. Longevity pay. – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to
5% of the monthly basic pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges
of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous,
efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the
judiciary; Provided, That in no case shall the total salary of each
Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed
the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.
Section 43. Staffing pattern. – The Supreme Court shall submit to the
President, within thirty (30) days from the date of the effectivity of this
Act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant to this Act
which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the
President in accordance with the immediately succeeding section.
Section 44. Transitory provisions. – The provisions of this Act shall be
immediately carried out in accordance with an Executive Order to be
issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts of First
Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts,
the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall continue
to function as presently constituted and organized, until the
completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by
the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed
automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to
hold office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to
the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with
the pertinent functions, records, equipment, property and the
necessary personnel.
The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the
appropriate courts constituted pursuant to this Act, to be augmented
as may be necessary from the funds for organizational changes as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding shall thereafter be
included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 45. Shari'a Courts. – Shari'a Courts to be constituted as
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the
"Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines," shall be included
in the funding appropriations so provided in this Act.
Section 46. Gratuity of judges and personnel separated from office. –
All members of the judiciary and subordinate employees who shall be
separated from office by reason of the reorganization authorized
herein, shall be granted a gratuity at a rate equivalent to one month's
salary for every year of continuous service rendered in any branch of
the government or equivalent nearest fraction thereof favorable to
them on the basis of the highest salary received: Provided, That such
member of the judiciary or employee shall have the option to retire
under the Judiciary Retirement Law or general retirement law, if he
has met or satisfied the requirements therefor.
Section 47. Repealing clause. – The provisions of Republic Act No.
296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, of
Republic Act No. 5179 as amended, of the Rules of Court, and of all
other statutes, letters of instructions and general order or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or accordingly modified.
Section 48. Date of Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect
immediately.
Approved: August 14, 1981
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7691]
AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS,
AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA, BLG. 129, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE “JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1980”
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980”, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction.
“(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable
of pecuniary estimation;
“(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the
property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000,00) or,
for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which
is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
“(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the
demand or claim exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim
exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
“(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the
gross value of the estate exceeds One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in probate matters in Metro Manila, where such
gross value exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00);
“(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital
relations;
“(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction of any court, tribunal,
person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions;
“(7) In all civil actions and special proceedings falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court and of the Court of Agrarian Relations as now provided by law;
and
“(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in
Metro Manila, where the demand exclusive of the abovementioned
items exceeds Two Hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).”
SEC. 2. Section 32 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. – Except
in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional
Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall
exercise:
“(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal
ordinances committed within their respective territorial jurisdiction; and
“(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount
of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or
predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount
thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to
property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction thereof.”
SEC. 3. Section 33 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. –
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
“(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property,
estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such
personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and
costs, the amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided,
That interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation
expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing
fees: Provided, further, That where there are several claims or causes
of actions between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes
of action arose out of the same or different transactions;
“(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant
raises the questions of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine
the issue of possession; and
“(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed
Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases
of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.”
SEC 4. Section 34 of the same law is hereby amended to read as
follows:
“SEC. 34. Delegated Jurisdiction in Cadastral and Land Registration
Cases. – Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts may be assigned by the Supreme Court
to hear and determine cadastral or land registration cases covering
lots where there is no controversy or opposition, or contested lots
where the value of which does not exceed One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00), such value to be ascertained by the affidavit of
the claimant or by agreement of the respective claimants if there are
more than one, or from the corresponding tax declaration of the real
property. Their decisions in these cases shall be appealable in the
same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.”
SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the
jurisdictional amounts mentioned in Sec. 19(3), (4), and (8); and Sec.
33(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be
adjusted to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5)
years thereafter, such jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further
to Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however,
That in the case of Metro Manila, the abovementioned jurisdictional
amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years from the effectivity of
this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00).
SEC. 6. All laws, decrees, and orders inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act shall be considered amended or modified accordingly.
SEC. 7. The provisions of this Act shall apply to all civil cases that
have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. However, by agreement of all
the parties, civil cases cognizable by municipal and metropolitan
courts by the provisions of this Act may be transferred from the
Regional Trial Courts to the latter. The executive judge of the
appropriate Regional Trial Courts shall define the administrative
procedure of transferring the cases affected by the redefinition of
jurisdiction to the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
SEC. 8. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) national newspapers of
general circulation.
[G.R. No. 127022. June 28, 2000.]
FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., BOOMTOWN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Spouses CYNTHIA D. CHING and CHING TIONG
KENG, Spouses CARMEN SOCO and LORENZO ONG ENG
CHONG, Spouses SOLEDAD B. YU and YU SY CHIA and LETICIA
NOCOM CHAN, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, LORENZO
J. GANA, PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, ALICE E. SOTTO,
VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, LUCIA E.
LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN
DEVELOPMENT, INC., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI of
Rizal) and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, METRO
MANILA, Respondents.
ALEJANDRO B. REY, petitioner-intervenor.
[G.R. No. 127245. June 28, 2000.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR,
LAND MANAGEMENT BUREAU, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, LORENZO J. GANA, PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES,
ALICE E. SOTTO, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, EDGARDO C.
ESPINOSA, LUCIA A. LAPERAL, NORMA C. ESPINOSA,
TERESITA E. CASAL, PELTAN DEVELOPMENT INC., THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (formerly CFI) of RIZAL, and THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LAS PIÑAS, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PURISIMA, J.:
This resolves petitioners’ Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these
consolidated cases, which the Third Division decided on September 2,
1999. The motions for reconsideration seasonably filed by the
petitioners, Republic of the Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc.,
Et Al., are pending.
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as
amended by the Resolution of November 18, 1993:clubjuris
. . ., the following are considered en banc cases:clubjuris
1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death
penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service
Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit;
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge,
officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either
the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year
or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc
or in division may be modified or reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three
(3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are
acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en
banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.
The cases at bar involve a vast tract of land with an area of around
ninety-nine (99) hectares presumptively belonging to the Republic of
the Philippines, which land had been adjudicated to private individuals
by a court alleged to be without jurisdiction. Since the validity of the
said decision and the original certificate of title as well as transfer
certificates of title issued pursuant thereto hinges on the classification
of subject area at the time it was so adjudicated, determination of the
validity of the disposition thereof is in order.
The assailed decision does not indicate the classification of the land in
question, when the herein private respondents obtained their decree
of registration thereover.
In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court
conceded that it is not infallible. Should any error of judgment be
perceived, it does not blindly adhere to such error, and the parties
adversely affected thereby are not precluded from seeking relief
therefrom, by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this jurisdiction,
rectification of an error, more than anything else, is of paramount
importance.
Here, there was submitted to the Court en consulta, petitioners’
Motions to Refer to the Court En Banc these consolidated cases for
the consideration of the Court. A pleading, entitled "FOR THE
CONSIDERATION OF THE COURT EN BANC, EN CONSULTA,"
was presented but when the same was first brought to its attention on
March 7, 2000, the Court opined that since the Third Division had not
yet acted on subject motions to refer the cases to the Banc, it was
then premature for the Court to resolve the consulta. However, the
Court succinctly cautioned that the action of the Third Division on the
matter would just be tentative.
On March 8, 2000, the Third Division voted 4-1 to deny petitioners’
motion to transfer these cases to the Banc. Thus, on March 14, 2000,
the Court deliberated on the consulta and thereafter, voted 9-5 to
accept the cases for the Banc to pass upon in view of the finding that
the cases above entitled are of sufficient importance to merit its
attention. Evidently, the action of the Court under the premises is a
legitimate and valid exercise of its RESIDUAL POWER within the
contemplation of paragraph 9 of the Resolution En Banc of November
18, 1993, which reads: "All other cases as the court en banc by a
majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance
to merit its attention." (Emphasis supplied)
Untenable is the contention of Justice Panganiban that the Chief
Justice and the eight (8) Associate Justices who voted to treat these
consolidated cases as En Banc cases, have not given any cogent or
compelling reason for such action. Considering that paragraph 9 of
the Resolution of this Court dated November 18, 1993, has been cited
to support the majority opinion, it is decisively clear that these
consolidated cases have been found to be of sufficient importance to
merit the attention and disposition of the entire Court en banc and
therefore, the prayer of the Republic of the Philippines and the private
petitioners for the Court en banc to hear and resolve their pending
motions for reconsideration, is meritorious. The aforesaid finding by
the Court constitutes a reason cogent and compelling enough to
warrant the majority ruling that the Court En Banc has to act upon and
decide petitioners’ motions for reconsideration.
It bears stressing that where, as in the present cases, the Court En
Banc entertains a case for its resolution and disposition, it does so
without implying that the Division of origin is incapable of rendering
objective and fair justice. The action of the Court simply means that
the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and consideration.
Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage
of sheer voting strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied
finding and sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual
membership — that, indeed, subject cases are of sufficient
importance meriting the action and decision of the whole Court. It is,
of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court of
the land are always imbued with the noblest of intentions in
interpreting and applying the germane provisions of law,
jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court — to the end that
public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be observed.
Reliance by Justice Panganiban on the ruling of the Court in the
Sumilao case is misplaced. The said case is not on all fours with
these cases. In the Sumilao case, before it was brought to the Banc
en consulta, the motion for reconsideration of the decision therein
rendered had been voted upon by the Second Division with a vote of
2-2. The Court ruled that the stalemate resulting from the said voting
constituted a denial of the motion for reconsideration.clubjuris.com :
In the two consolidated cases under consideration, however, the
Motions for Reconsideration of the petitioners, Republic of the
Philippines and Firestone Ceramics, Inc., Et Al., are pending and
unresolved.
Taking into account the importance of these cases and the issues
raised, let alone the enormous value of the area in litigation, which is
claimed as government property, there is merit in the prayer of
petitioners that their pending motions for reconsideration should be
resolved by the Court En Banc.
WHEREFORE, these consolidated cases are considered and treated
as en banc cases; and petitioners’ motions for reconsideration are
hereby set for oral argument on July 18, 2000, at 11:00 a.m. Let
corresponding notices issue.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Buena, Ynares-
Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, J., joined the dissents and in lieu of the close vote, urge that this
action be not repeated and that it be reviewed again.
Vitug, J., joined the dissenting justices.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., dissenting:clubjuris
In the session last March 21, 2000, information was given that a
majority of the members of the Third Division intends to hear the
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic and then report its
result to the Court en banc. I sincerely believe that the result of the
said oral arguments will be a vital factor to consider before the court
en banc should finally decide to assume jurisdiction over the case at
bar. The issue for resolution in the said Motion for Reconsideration
concerns res judicata. This is an issue that does not strictly involve a
question of law for beyond doubt its resolution will rest on some
amorphous questions of fact. Until and unless these questions of fact
are sharpened and given shape in the intended oral arguments, I am
of the opinion and so vote that the Court en banc should defer its
action to assume jurisdiction over the case at bar.clubjuris virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
GONZAGA-REYES, J., dissenting:clubjuris
With due respect, I am constrained to dissent from the acceptance by
the Court en banc of the referral of the motions for reconsideration in
the cases at bar. The justification for the referral is stated
thus:ClubJuris
"These cases involve a vast tract of land around ninety-nine (99)
hectares presumptively belonging to the Republic of the Philippines,
which land had been adjudicated to private individuals under a
decision allegedly rendered by a court without jurisdiction. Since the
validity of the said decision and of the original certificate of title as well
as transfer certificates of title issued pursuant thereto is contingent on
the character or classification of subject area at the time it was so
adjudicated to private persons, the determination of the same is
essential. The decision sought to be reconsidered does not clearly
reflect or indicate the correct character of the land involved at the time
the private respondents obtained a degree of registration thereover.
Thus, should it be established that indeed the land in question was
still within the forest zone and inalienable at the time of its disposition
to private parties, reversal of this Court’s decision is in order.
In Lemketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 1 this Court has
acknowledged that it is not infallible and that, if upon examination an
error in judgment is perceived, the Court is not obliged to blindly
adhere to such decision and the parties are not precluded from
seeking relief by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this
jurisdiction, rectification of an error, more than anything else, is
paramount." clubjuris
The fact alone that the property involved covers an area of 99
hectares does not provide a cogent reason to elevate the cases to the
Court en banc. Nowhere in the extent guidelines for referral to the
Court en banc is the value of the property subject of the case relevant
to determine whether the division should refer a matter to the Court en
banc. Moreover, the validity of OCT No. 4216, which petitioner
Republic raised as a principal issue in the instant petition, had already
been long settled by final judgments of this Court in three (3) cases. 2
It was also submitted that the cases are of sufficient importance to be
"reexamined and reviewed" by the Court en banc pursuant to S. C.
Circular No. 2-89 dated February 7, 1989 as amended by the
Resolution of November 18, 1993, which considers the following,
among others, as en banc cases:clubjuris
x x x
"9. All other cases as the Court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention." clubjuris
It is believed that the acceptance by the court en banc of the referral
on the proposal of one member of the division is not called for on the
following grounds:clubjuris
(1) The motion for reconsideration from the decision unanimously
adopted by the 3rd Division on September 2, 1999 is still pending. If
there is any error to be rectified in the said decision, the matter should
be left to the sound judgment of the members of the division which
promulgated the decision unless there is a demonstrated incapacity or
disqualification on the part of its members to render a fair and just
resolution of the motion for reconsideration.
(2) The court en banc is not an appellate court to which a decision or
resolution may be appealed:clubjuris virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Article VIII, Section 4, of the 1987 Constitution provides:ClubJuris
"(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or, in its discretion, in
divisions of three, five or seven members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or
executive agreement, or law which shall be heard by the Supreme
Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving the
constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations,
shall be decided with the concurrence of majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon.
(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of majority of the Members who actually took
part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall
be decided en banc; Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc." clubjuris
It is implicit in the paragraph immediately preceding that decisions or
resolutions of a division of the court, when concurred in by a majority
of its members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues in a case and voted thereon is a decision or resolution of the
Supreme Court itself. The Supreme Court sitting en banc is not an
appellate court vis a vis its Divisions, and it exercises no appellate
jurisdiction over the latter. Each division of the Court is considered not
a body inferior to the Court en banc, and sits veritably as the Court en
banc itself. The only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law
laid down by the Court, either rendered en banc or in division, may be
overturned or reversed only by the Court sitting en banc.
(3) Circular No. 2-89 of the Court en banc laid down the following
Guidelines and Rules on the referral to the Court en banc of cases
assigned to a Division:ClubJuris
"1. The Supreme Court sits either en banc or in Divisions of three, five
or seven Members (Sec. 4[1]. Article VIII, 1987 Constitution). At
present the Court has three Divisions of five Members each.
2. A decision or resolution of a Division of the Court, when concurred
in by a majority of its Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in a case and voted thereon, and in no
case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members, is a
decision or resolution of the Supreme Court (Section 4[3]. Article VIII,
1987 Constitution).
3. The Court en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or
resolutions of a Division may be appealed.
4. At any time after a Division takes cognizance of a case and before
a judgment or resolution therein rendered becomes final and
executory, the Division may refer the case en consulta to the Court en
banc which, after consideration of the reasons of the Division for such
referral, may return the case to the Division or accept the case for
decision or resolution.
4a. Paragraph [f] of the Resolution of this Court of 23 February 1984
in Bar Matter No. 205 (formerly item 6, en banc Resolution dated 29
September 1977), enumerating the cases considered as en banc
cases, states:ClubJuris
"f. Cases assigned to a division including motions for reconsideration
which in the opinion of at least three (3) members merit the attention
of the Court en banc and are acceptable by a majority vote of the
actual members of the Court en banc." clubjuris
5. A resolution of the Division denying a party’s motion for referral to
the Court en banc of any Division case, shall be final and not
appealable to the Court en banc.
6. When a decision or resolution is referred by a Division to the Court
en banc, the latter may, in the absence of sufficiently important
reasons, decline to take cognizance of the same, in which case, the
decision or resolution shall be returned to the referring Division.
7. No motion for reconsideration of the action of the Court en banc
declining to take cognizance of a referral by a Division, shall be
entertained.
8. This Circular shall take effect on March 1, 1989." clubjuris virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
In the Resolution of the Court en banc dated November 18, 1993, the
following were enumerated as the cases to be considered as "en banc
cases" :ClubJuris
"1. Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question;
2. Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death
penalty;
3. Cases raising novel questions of law;
4. Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
5. Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service
Commission, Commission on Elections, and Commission on Audit;
6. Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge,
officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either
the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year
or a fine exceeding P10,000.00 or both;
7. Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc
or in division may be modified or reversed;
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three
(3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are
acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en
banc; and
9. All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention." clubjuris
Notably, the rule that "cases assigned to a division which is the
opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the
Court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual
membership of the Court en banc" has been reiterated.
However, a new paragraph was added in the 1993 Resolution, as
follows:ClubJuris
"9. All other cases as the Court en banc by a majority of its actual
membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention." clubjuris
The immediately foregoing paragraph may lend itself to an
interpretation that any case which the Court en banc by majority vote
of its members "may deem of sufficient importance to merit its
attention" is an en banc case.
This interpretation is of doubtful validity and soundness.
To begin with, Resolution dated November 18, 1993 is essentially an
amendment to Sections 15 and 16, Rule 136 of the Rules of Court
which deals with the form ("unglazed paper," margins, number of
copies, etc.) of unprinted and printed papers to be filed with this Court.
This Resolution was clearly not intended to lay down new guidelines
or rules for referral to the court en banc of cases assigned to a
Division. Thus, the principle that the court en banc is not an appellate
court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be appealed
could not have been intended to be abrogated. Article VIII, Section 4
of the Constitution, earlier quoted, expressly provides that "when the
required number (the concurrence of at least three members of the
division) is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc." The
obvious contemplation is that when the required vote of at least three
members is obtained, the banc’s participation is not called for.
(4) It is true that the Constitution itself recognizes the power of the
Supreme Court to require other cases to be heard en banc (Article
VIII, Sec. 4 (2)). As pointed out, the November 18, 1993 Resolution
quoted earlier, could not, by reading the issuance in proper context,
have been intended to expand the enumeration of en banc cases. A
reasonable interpretation is that paragraph 9 refers to cases accepted
by the banc pursuant to existing rules, foremost of which is that the
referral requires the concurrence of at least three of the members of
the division. If the provision "all other cases as the court en banc by a
majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance
to merit its attention" was intended to give the court en banc a general
residual power and prerogative to cause the elevation of any case
assigned to a division, without a consulta from the division itself, this
intent should be ineluctably expressed, having in mind the essential
and traditional role of a division of the court sitting veritably as the
court en banc itself.
The court en banc should be shielded from the importunings of
litigants who perceive themselves aggrieved by a decision of a
division of the court and resort to the convenience of an appeal to the
court en banc on the plea that its case is "of sufficient importance to
merit its attention." In the Sumilao case, the majority of the banc’s
members refused to take the case where there was a two-two tie vote
in the division for the elevation of the motion for reconsideration to the
court en banc. In an earlier precedent involving the conviction of
Imelda Marcos by the Sandiganbayan, the case was considered as
deserving of a full court treatment, despite the fact that the motion for
reconsideration did not garner a majority vote in the division. The
Court should establish a consistent policy on these referrals for the
stability of its policies and procedures.
The prerogative to take out a case from the division without the
concurrence of a majority of its members, should, if at all, be used
only for clearly compelling reasons; otherwise the decision of the
Court en banc to take cognizance of the matter itself would be
suspect of irregularity and the precedent would be difficult to justify
before litigants who may be similarly situated.
I vote to deny the motions to refer the motions for reconsideration to
the Court en banc.
Quisumbing and Pardo, JJ., concur.
PANGANIBAN, J., dissenting:clubjuris
With due respect, I dissent from the majority’s Resolution.
Very briefly, these are the relevant antecedents. On September 2,
1999, the Court through the Third Division unanimously promulgated
its Decision denying the Petitions in these cases. Thereafter, both the
government and private petitioners filed separate (1) Motions for
Reconsideration and (2) Motions to Refer the Cases to the Court en
Banc.clubjuris virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
By vote of 4-1, 1 the Third Division rejected the Motions to Refer the
Cases to the full Court because the movants had utterly failed to
adduce any legal reason for such referral. Subsequently, Justice Fidel
P. Purisima, the lone dissenter, asked the Court en banc to yank the
case out of and against the will of the said Division, and to empower
the banc to resolve the pending Motions for Reconsideration. By the
instant Resolution, the majority has agreed with Justice Purisima.
With due respect, I say that the majority has not given any cogent or
compelling reason for this unprecedented action. Its Resolution,
penned by Justice Purisima, simply pontificates that "these
consolidated cases are of sufficient importance to merit the attention
and disposition of the entire Court," without stating why. The majority
simply used its sheer voting strength to bulldoze the earlier 4-1 action
of the Third Division. If at all, the lame excuse given that the "subject
Decision [promulgated by the Third Division] does not clearly indicate
the classification of said land" is merely an argument why the pending
Motions for Reconsideration should be granted, not why the banc
should take over this case.
I fully agree with the well-reasoned Dissent of Justice Minerva P.
Gonzaga-Reyes, the ponente of the Third Division’s unanimous
Decision. I write, however, to stress one point. In the celebrated
Sumilao farmers’ case, 2 a similar motion to refer to the full Court was
turned down by the Second Division by a vote of 3-1. Arguing that the
Division’s earlier vote of 2-2 on the Motion for Reconsideration was
not decisive, Justice Jose A. R. Melo (who was then a member of the
Second Division) subsequently asked the banc to take over the case.
Justice Melo argued that under Article VIII, Section 4 (3) of the
Constitution," [c]ases or matters heard by a division shall be decided
or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and
voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least
three of such members." Since the Motion for Reconsideration did not
obtain the required three votes in the Division, he added that the banc
should thus take over and resolve the impasse. In other words,
Justice Melo presented a genuine "question of sufficient importance"
— which the Second Division was not in a position to resolve — to
justify a take-over by the banc. Yet, the full Court turned down his
proposal. Only Justice Vitug and I supported Justice Melo.
I therefore cannot understand why the banc is now taking over this
case against the wishes of the Third Division. It turned down the poor
farmers’ plea and the Melo proposal. Why then should the banc grant
the not-so-poor private petitioners’ prayer here? Why then should it
approve the groundless Purisima proposal? At the very least, if it
should take over this case, then it should likewise assume jurisdiction
over the farmer’s suit. After all, the vote in the Motion for
Reconsideration in that case was two in favor and two against, while
in the present case, the Third Division has not even voted on the plea
for reconsideration. In other words, there was sufficient reason for the
banc to take over the Sumilao problem because of the 2-2 vote of the
Division. Here, no cogent reason whatsoever — other than the
motherhood peroration that the case was "of sufficient importance" —
is given by the majority.
Parenthetically, I should add that the Third Division is not averse to
hearing the petitioners’ Motions for Reconsideration. As a matter of
fact, if the banc did not take over this case, it would have scheduled
the said Motions for oral argument. Simply stated, the Third Division is
not incapable of rendering objective and fair justice in this case and to
rule on the issue of "classification of said land." clubjuris
Having taken over this case, the banc — in the name of equal justice
— should also take over the Sumilao farmers’ Petition. But having
rejected their case, then it should also turn down this one. Sauce for
the poor goose should be the same sauce for the rich gander. That is
simple, equal justice for all.club
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE CHIEF OF
STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioners,
vs.
RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest
of the world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the
constitutional protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an
overarching sky that covers all in its protection. The case at bar
involves the rights to life, liberty and security in the first petition for a
writ of Amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court in relation to Section 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo,
seeking to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law,
the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. AMPARO No. 00001, entitled "Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo
Manalo, petitioners, versus The Secretary of National Defense, the
Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, respondents."
This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)2 filed before this Court by herein
respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein
petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein
petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all
other legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)3 of the
1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In
our Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary
of the Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the
AFP, their agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead,
including but not limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical
Unit (CAFGU) to submit their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from
causing the arrest of therein petitioners, or otherwise restricting,
curtailing, abridging, or depriving them of their right to life, liberty, and
other basic rights as guaranteed under Article III, Section 14 of the
1987 Constitution.5
While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein
petitioners filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing
Petition as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to
Grant Interim and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the
petition be considered a Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec.
266 of the Amparo Rule; (2) the Court issue the writ commanding
therein respondents to make a verified return within the period
provided by law and containing the specific matter required by law; (3)
they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by the Amparo Rule and all
other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not covered by
the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment as
required in Sec. 187 of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and
equitable reliefs.8
On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007
Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents
requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written
return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We
REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of
Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing
on the petition on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the
petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.9
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive
portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP
CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from
notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those
already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of
M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days
from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records
and charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and
medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of
medical and (sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to
them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days
from notice of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature
and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized
deputy, the latter's authority to be express and made apparent on the
face of the sworn compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.10
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as
alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks
before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and
members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of
their barangay in San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able
to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond
saw some of the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.11
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol
na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed
soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered
their house and roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his
mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The
armed soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the
stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his house,
and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip,
ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly brought near
the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped
her and told her to stay.12
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers
Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, "Puti" de la Cruz, and "Pula"
de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the
CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also
recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also
members of the CAFGU. While he was being forcibly taken, he also
saw outside of his house two barangaycouncilors, Pablo Cunanan
and Bernardo Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.13
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was
blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers
who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their
names. The one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie
Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The
leader of the team who entered his house and abducted him was
"Ganata." He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one of
his abductors was "George" who was tall, thin, white-skinned and
about 30 years old.14
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside
the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten
up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as
his brother Reynaldo's. The van stopped several times until they
finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought
to a different room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond
saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the
head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about
15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was brought to his (Raymond's)
room and it was his (Raymond's) turn to be beaten up in the other
room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of the New
People's Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt
of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how
many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was
helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.15 boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They
poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called "Mam" or "Madam"
In the next days, Raymond's interrogators appeared to be high
suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond before he
officials as the soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them
was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside
"sir," and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was detained.20
interrogated by the high officials, but he saw their faces when they
arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture.
uniform of the high officials was different from those of the other Their wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed,
soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents' guards got
and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and drunk.21
knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was
filed in connection with the respondents' abduction.16 While these
detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in
officials interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once
that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there,
they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got
including urinating, removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping.
drunk, they also manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond
was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.17 He counted that eighteen people22 had been detained in
that bartolina, including his brother Reynaldo and himself.23
On the third week of respondents' detention, two men arrived while
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in
Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine
Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and
and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his
a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was
forehead twice with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt
near the firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers
some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer
marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what
endure the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then
he only knew as the "DTU."24
subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room. Before their
torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked
next day and kill him.18 their body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them.
When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the
time urinating, their stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in
guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to
their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also
see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on
examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol,
him, he managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped
amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with them the results of
through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range
respondents' urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and
and stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his
take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more times.
chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near a river
Thereafter, medicines were sent through the "master" of the DTU,
and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were
"Master" Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept
doing the laundry, asked where he was and the road to Gapan. He
in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named
was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.19 He reached the highway,
Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take
but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The soldiers
care of them.25
chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They,
along with Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits,
went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan.
Respondents were detained for one or two weeks in a big two-storey
house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was
beaten up by Hilario's men.26
From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San
Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big
unfinished house inside the compound of "Kapitan" for about three
months. When they arrived in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them.
They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center
of the compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting,
seated. He was about two arms' length away from respondents. He
began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond
replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew him.
Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be
scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded
that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan
was an evil man.27
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his
affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, "Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di
ka ba natatakot sa akin?"
Sumagot akong, "Siyempre po, natatakot din..."
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: "Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon
na mabuhay, basta't sundin n'yo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko... sabihin
mo sa magulang mo - huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa
Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa
magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami
na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno."28
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt
they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario,
Efren and the former's men - the same group that abducted them -
brought them to their parents' house. Raymond was shown to his
parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not
walk. In the presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed
to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid,
Raymond's parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymond's parents
that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never
see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to
Sapang.29
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about
to leave. He was talking with the four "masters" who were there:
Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.30 When Gen. Palparan saw
Raymond, he called for him. He was in a big white vehicle. Raymond
stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his
strength and be healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and
Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each,
and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that
they are on the side of the military and warned that they would not be
given another chance.31 During his testimony, Raymond identified
Gen. Palparan by his picture.32
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine
left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named "Alive," was green and
yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this
medicine and instructed to take one capsule a day. Arman checked if
they were getting their dose of the medicine. The "Alive" made them
sleep each time they took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.33
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left
Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in
Sapang, he should introduce himself as "Oscar," a military trainee
from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw
again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and
got acquainted with other military men and civilians.34
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp
Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three
unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them.
Raymond was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold
was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the
barracks.35
The next day, Raymond's chains were removed and he was ordered
to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a
detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of
them were training. He was also ordered to clean inside the barracks.
In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna.
She told him that she was a student of the University of the
Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that
she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying
and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her
chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.36
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days
from his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeño and Manuel
Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with "Allan"
whose name they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called
"master" or "commander" by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion.
Raymond and Reynaldo were put in the adjoining room. At times,
Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten
up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on
at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their families
would all be killed.37
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told
the detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and
should continue along their "renewed life." Before the hearing of
November 6 or 8, 2006, respondents were brought to their parents to
instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had
already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp
Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September 2006 to November
2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name
"Oscar" and holding himself out as a military trainee. He got
acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names
and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.38
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and
Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in
Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in
that camp until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed
with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as
"Mar" and "Billy" beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their
guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp.
They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.39
Raymond recalled that when "Operation Lubog" was launched,
Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to
take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to
Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of
an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he
had a son who was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA
members in his house.40 Another time, in another "Operation Lubog,"
Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men
stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the house who was
sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before
Raymond's eyes.41
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were
transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and
some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in
charge of the house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to
do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9,
2007 until June 2007.42
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay.
Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to
detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed
and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami.
Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng
silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o
marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang
bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos
sa kanyang katawan at ito'y sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga
unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng
kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang
mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang
Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na
binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng
sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay
nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at
ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo.
Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga
bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong
sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya.
Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong
gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel
dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel,
wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo
ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko
ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig
at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena
mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami
nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong
kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na
raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil
magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo
ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa
gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.43
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to
Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas). Caigas
told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he
would take care of the food of their family. They were also told that
they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce.
They were no longer put in chains and were instructed to use the
names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent
themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.44
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the
highway from where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for
which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their
earnings. When they had saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a
neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange
text messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to
him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned some more
until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo
were housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three.
Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards.
Respondents' house did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There
was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13,
2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00
a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio. When none of the
guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded
towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping guards and
barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus
freed from captivity.45
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of
Raymond's affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed
together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house
on February 14, 2006, he saw the faces of his abductors before he
was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got
acquainted with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond
attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was severely
beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA
because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was
hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear
the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo
were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought
to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a
friend of Hilario, in a mountainous area. He was instructed to use the
name "Rodel" and to represent himself as a military trainee from
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in
his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in San Jose, del
Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was
buying. He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario delivered
boxes of "Alive" in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a
black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan,
but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one
of their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson
where Reynaldo saw the sign board, "Welcome to Camp Tecson."46
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic
medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an
organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly
cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to
conduct medical examinations on the respondents after their escape.
He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the
physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by
respondents were consistent with their account of physical injuries
inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15,
2007, two days after respondents' escape, and the results thereof
were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars.
He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the
examination.47
Petitioners dispute respondents' account of their alleged abduction
and torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the
Court, they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the
abduction but denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time
arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado,
disappeared or under the custody by the military. This is a settled
issue laid to rest in the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by
petitioners' parents before the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No.
94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the
24th Infantry Battalion; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of
the 7th Infantry Division in Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in
his capacity as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and
members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU),
namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula
dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza. The respondents
therein submitted a return of the writ... On July 4, 2006, the Court of
Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C.
Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine Army, and
on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then
Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed
at Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no
evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the
taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007..., it
exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence
establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of
the Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents
were illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to
release the latter.48
Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein
respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which
attested that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus
unaware of the Manalo brothers' alleged abduction. He also claimed
that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual
military directional operations, neither does he undertake command
directions of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage
the AFP operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of
National Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to
the Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces
of the Philippines;
8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable
Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to
institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of
the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance... Likewise,
in a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have
issued a policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the
AFP should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ
of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the
AFP:
(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;
(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or
disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may aid in
the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;
(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning
the death or disappearance;
(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance;
(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the
death or disappearance; and
(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.49
Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received
the above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National
Defense and that acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of
the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
petitioners.
3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the
result thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate
conduct of the investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s,
dispatching Radio Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the
Commanding General, Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG,
71D PA and CO 24 IB PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached
as ANNEX "3" of this Affidavit.
3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or
to be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of
the alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparohas been sought for as soon as the same has been
furnished Higher headquarters.
3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units
relative to another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994)
filed at the instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeño
pending before the Supreme Court.
3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert
earnest efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the
disappearances of the petitioners and to bring those responsible,
including any military personnel if shown to have participated or had
complicity in the commission of the complained acts, to the bar of
justice, when warranted by the findings and the competent evidence
that may be gathered in the process.50
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col.
Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994,
another Amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeño and
Merino, which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the
24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately
went to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no
untoward incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and Manuel Merino being held
captive;
11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in
the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan;
12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further
inquiries with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding
the alleged detentions or deaths and were informed that none was
reported to their good office;
13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to
inquire into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to
be a detention place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño and
Manuel Merino were detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such
beachhouse was used as a detention place found to have been used
by armed men to detain Cadapan, Empeño and Merino.51
It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient
time, the affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein
petitioners could not be secured in time for the submission of the
Return and would be subsequently submitted.52
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings,
Lt. Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija.
The territorial jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora,
Bataan, Bulacan, Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of
Pangasinan.53 The 24th Infantry Battalion is part of the 7th Infantry
Division.54
On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding
General of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito
Palaran,55 through his Assistant Chief of Staff,56 to investigate the
alleged abduction of the respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his
unit, namely: CAA Michael de la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka
Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-
CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and a civilian named Rudy
Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the veracity of the
abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged elements
of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of said
auxiliaries, if any.57 Jimenez testified that this particular investigation
was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but
because the Commanding General saw news about the abduction of
the Manalo brothers on the television, and he was concerned about
what was happening within his territorial jurisdiction.58
Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of
having them execute sworn statements and conducting an
investigation on May 29, 2006.59 The investigation started at 8:00 in
the morning and finished at 10:00 in the evening.60 The investigating
officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo Lingad, took the individual sworn
statements of all six persons on that day. There were no other sworn
statements taken, not even of the Manalo family, nor were there other
witnesses summoned and investigated61 as according to Jimenez, the
directive to him was only to investigate the six persons.62
Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the
statements.63 The six persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in
fact his first time to meet them.64 During the entire time that he was
beside Lingad, a subordinate of his in the Office of the Provost
Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single question to the six
persons.65
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006,
but Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next
day to sign their statements as the printing of their statements was
interrupted by a power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on
May 30, 2006, but the jurats of their statements indicated that they
were signed on May 29, 2006.66 When the Sworn Statements were
turned over to Jimenez, he personally wrote his investigation report.
He began writing it in the afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on
June 1, 2006.67 He then gave his report to the Office of the Chief of
Personnel.68
As petitioners largely rely on Jimenez's Investigation Report dated
June 1, 2006 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially
quoted:
III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and
REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective
homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14
February 2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly
disappeared. After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a
case for Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects:
Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela
Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the
Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29
May 2006 in (Exhibit "B") states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy.
Bohol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building
of a church located nearby his residence, together with some
neighbor thereat. He claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being
informed by Brgy. Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he
was one of the suspects, he claims that they only implicated him
because he was a CAFGU and that they claimed that those who
abducted the Manalo brothers are members of the Military and
CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or involvement
on the abduction of said victims.
b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd
29 May 2006 in (Exhibit "C") states that he is a resident of Sitio
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA
member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He
claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are
active members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows
their elder Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader
operating in their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of
the two (2) brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects,
he claims that on February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at
the concrete chapel being constructed nearby his residence. He
claims further that he just came only to know about the incident on
other day (15 Feb 06) when he was being informed by Kagawad
Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA vehemently denied any
participation about the incident and claimed that they only implicated
him because he is a member of the CAFGU.
c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit "O") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at
Biak na Bato Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much
aware about the background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo as active supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he
also knew their elder brother "KUMANDER BESTRE" TN: Rolando
Manalo. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February
2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate, San Miguel, Bulacan in the house
of his aunt and he learned only about the incident when he arrived
home in their place. He claims further that the only reason why they
implicated him was due to the fact that his mother has filed a criminal
charge against their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE who is
an NPA Commander who killed his father and for that reason they
implicated him in support of their brother. Subject CAA vehemently
denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo brothers.
d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006
in (Exhibit "E") states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat,
Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar
to him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew
them since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14
February 2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat,
Bulacan. He claims that he was being informed only about the
incident lately and he was not aware of any reason why the two (2)
brothers were being abducted by alleged members of the military and
CAFGU. The only reason he knows why they implicated him was
because there are those people who are angry with their family
particularly victims of summary execution (killing) done by their
brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo who is an NPA leader. He
claims further that it was their brother @ KA BESTRE who killed his
father and he was living witness to that incident. Subject civilian
vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of the Manalo
brothers.
e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006
in (Exhibit "F") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol
na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA
based at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond
and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He
claims further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that
their brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being
one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his
residence at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan. That he vehemently denied any participation of the alleged
abduction of the two (2) brothers and learned only about the incident
when rumors reached him by his barrio mates. He claims that his
implication is merely fabricated because of his relationship to Roman
and Maximo who are his brothers.
f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit "G") states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod
and a CAFGU member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San
Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that he knew very well the brothers
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in their barangay for having been the
Tanod Chief for twenty (20) years. He alleged further that they are
active supporters or sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and whose elder
brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader operating
within the area. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 Feb
2006 he was helping in the construction of their concrete chapel in
their place and he learned only about the incident which is the
abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy.
Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the
matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation
against him as being one of the abductors and he considers
everything fabricated in order to destroy his name that remains loyal
to his service to the government as a CAA member.
IV. DISCUSSION
5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular
case, the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and
disappearance of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on
14 February 2006 at Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, is unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement
theretofore to that incident is considered doubtful, hence, no basis to
indict them as charged in this investigation.
Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the
past to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by
@ KA BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish
a fact that they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of
revenge. As it was also stated in the testimony of other accused
claiming that the Manalos are active sympathizers/supporters of the
CPP/NPA, this would not also mean, however, that in the first place,
they were in connivance with the abductors. Being their neighbors and
as members of CAFGU's, they ought to be vigilant in protecting their
village from any intervention by the leftist group, hence inside their
village, they were fully aware of the activities of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the CPP/NPA is
concerned.
V. CONCLUSION
6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged
charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents
has not been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to
indict them for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability.
It is therefore concluded that they are innocent of the charge.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman
dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela
Cruz and Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.
8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.69
In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate court's
assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26,
2007 Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO
THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED, AND
OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND
MANALO.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS)
TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH
THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE
COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF
OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE
CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE
PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL
REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY
TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES
PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO
INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006
UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.70
The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.
The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition
in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National
Consultative Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced
Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The
Summit was "envisioned to provide a broad and fact-based
perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances,"71 hence "representatives from all sides of the
political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the
justice system"72 participated in mapping out ways to resolve the
crisis.
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in
light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced
disappearances."73 It was an exercise for the first time of the Court's
expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our people's
constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987
Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
regime.74 As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable
problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
threats thereof. "Extralegal killings" are "killings committed without due
process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings."75 On the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are
"attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or
private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of
the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or
whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection
of law."76
The writ of Amparo originated in Mexico. "Amparo" literally means
"protection" in Spanish.77 In 1837, de Tocqueville's Democracy in
America became available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its
description of the practice of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to
many Mexican jurists.78 One of them, Manuel Crescencio Rejón,
drafted a constitutional provision for his native state, Yucatan,79 which
granted judges the power to protect all persons in the enjoyment of
their constitutional and legal rights. This idea was incorporated into
the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the
exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this
Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by
the Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state
governments, limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific
case in litigation, making no general declaration concerning the
statute or regulation that motivated the violation.80
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican
constitutionalism.81 If, after hearing, the judge determines that a
constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the
official, or the official's superiors, to cease the violation and to take the
necessary measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of
the right in question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial
review derived from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power
characteristic of the civil law tradition which prevails in Mexico. It
enables courts to enforce the constitution by protecting individual
rights in particular cases, but prevents them from using this power to
make law for the entire nation.82
The writ of Amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere,
gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular
needs of each country.83 It became, in the words of a justice of the
Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexico's self-attributed
"task of conveying to the world's legal heritage that institution which,
as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history
conceived."84 What began as a protection against acts or omissions of
public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for
several purposes: (1) Amparo libertad for the protection of personal
freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) Amparo contra
leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes;
(3) Amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and
legality of a judicial decision; (4) Amparo administrativo for the judicial
review of administrative actions; and (5) Amparo agrario for the
protection of peasants' rights derived from the agrarian reform
process.85
In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of Amparo has
been constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses
especially committed in countries under military juntas. In general,
these countries adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole
gamut of constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.86 Other
countries like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have
chosen to limit the protection of the writ of Amparo only to some
constitutional guarantees or fundamental rights.87
In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly
provide for the writ of Amparo, several of the
above Amparo protections are guaranteed by our charter. The second
paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave
Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial power "to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." The Clause accords a similar general protection to
human rights extended by the Amparo contra leyes, Amparo
casacion, and Amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable
to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the
1987 Constitution.88 The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common
law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case
of Marbury v. Madison.89
While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse
Clause through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule
102,90 these remedies may not be adequate to address the pestering
problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. However,
with the swiftness required to resolve a petition for a writ
of Amparo through summary proceedings and the availability of
appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under the Amparo Rule, this
hybrid writ of the common law and civil law traditions - borne out of
the Latin American and Philippine experience of human rights abuses
- offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid
judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires
only substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to
the petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring
preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring
substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive
proceedings.91
The writ of Amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in
addressing the problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of
impunity in the commission of these offenses; it is curative in that it
facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators as it will
inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation and action. In the
long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles is to deter
the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.
In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for "Prohibition,
Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order"92 to stop petitioners
and/or their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of
their right to liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,93 prior
to the promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary
remedies including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of
Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and
equitable remedies under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. When
the Amparo Rule came into effect on October 24, 2007, they moved to
have their petition treated as an Amparo petition as it would be more
effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo brothers'
enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.
With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the petitioner.
Petitioners' first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and
giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated,
contradicted, and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving
affidavit/testimony of herein respondent Raymond Manalo.94
In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and
refine the ore of petitioners' cause of action, to determine whether the
evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof
required.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following
causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. - The petition for a writ of Amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof
required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. - The
parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 18. Judgment. - ... If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the
writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise,
the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.95
After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings
of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their
houses in Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso,
Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until
they escaped on August 13, 2007. The abduction, detention, torture,
and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent
Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing manner. His account is
dotted with countless candid details of respondents' harrowing
experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his
different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the
following: "Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong
sinisilaban si Manuel."96 "(N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na
galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o
ungol ni Manuel."97 "May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila
nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang
bakas."98 "Tumigil ako sa may palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang
bato para tanggalin ang mga kadena."99 "Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-
bahay kung paano ako makakakuha ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto
kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa malapit na lugar."100
We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on
respondent Raymond Manalo's affidavit and testimony, viz:
...the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently
identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military
personnel and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six
armed men who barged into his house through the rear door were
military men based on their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and
the CAFGU auxiliaries, namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la
Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU
and residents of Muzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers
Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also CAFGU members, served
as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond was sure that three of the
six military men were Ganata, who headed the abducting team,
Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent incidents of their
long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated their assertion
of the participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry Division,
Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.
We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the
suspicion that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of
the NPA, considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre,
who turned out to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.
The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the
abduction were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided
version of the CAFGU auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might
be due to the fact that the Provost Marshall could delve only into the
participation of military personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall
should have refrained from outrightly exculpating the CAFGU
auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated...
Gen. Palparan's participation in the abduction was also established.
At the very least, he was aware of the petitioners' captivity at the
hands of men in uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any
other officer tendered no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond
that he (Gen. Palparan) met them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan
and told them what he wanted them and their parents to do or not to
be doing. Gen. Palparan's direct and personal role in the abduction
might not have been shown but his knowledge of the dire situation of
the petitioners during their long captivity at the hands of military
personnel under his command bespoke of his indubitable command
policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely tolerated the
abduction of civilians without due process of law and without probable
cause.
In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special
Sixth Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr.,
member; and Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear
and convincing evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had
anything to do with the abduction or the detention. Hilario's
involvement could not, indeed, be then established after Evangeline
Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the van in which the
petitioners were boarded and ferried following the abduction, did not
testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings at rollo, p. 52)
However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white
L-300 van in which the petitioners were brought away from their
houses on February 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario
participated in subsequent incidents during the captivity of the
petitioners, one of which was when Hilario fetched them from Fort
Magsaysay on board a Revo and conveyed them to a detachment in
Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where they were detained for at least
a week in a house of strong materials (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and
then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them to Sapang, San Miguel,
Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house inside the
compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less three
months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners
came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought
the petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners'
parents, where only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay
the message from Gen. Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that
occasion, Hilario warned the parents that they would not again see
their sons should they join any rallies to denounce human rights
violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-206) Hilario was also among four
Master Sergeants (the others being Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with
whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the occasion when Gen. Palparan
required Raymond to take the medicines for his health. (Exhibit D,
rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the petitioners saw
that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.
It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction
and forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. The
participation of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse
and Caigas, among others, was similarly established.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally
involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of
their participation is overwhelming.101
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalo's
statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible
pieces of evidence.102 Raymond's affidavit and testimony were
corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The
testimony and medical reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr.
Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries
inflicted on respondents,103 also corroborate respondents' accounts of
the torture they endured while in detention. Respondent Raymond
Manalo's familiarity with the facilities in Fort Magsaysay such as the
"DTU," as shown in his testimony and confirmed by Lt. Col. Jimenez
to be the "Division Training Unit,"104 firms up respondents' story that
they were detained for some time in said military facility.
In Ortiz v. Guatemala,105 a case decided by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar
evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz
was abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government.
In this case, Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early
November 1989. The Commission's findings of fact were mostly
based on the consistent and credible statements, written and oral,
made by Sister Ortiz regarding her ordeal.106 These statements were
supported by her recognition of portions of the route they took when
she was being driven out of the military installation where she was
detained.107 She was also examined by a medical doctor whose
findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on her
back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of
cigarette burning and torture she suffered while in detention.108
With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture
perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much
of the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the
victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on
their credibility and candidness in their written and/or oral statements.
Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as
physical evidence left by the torture they suffered or landmarks they
can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful
military officers are implicated, the hesitation of witnesses to surface
and testify against them comes as no surprise.
We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the
writ of Amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance
of both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed
as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while
respondents admit that they are no longer in detention and are
physically free, they assert that they are not "free in every sense of
the word"109 as their "movements continue to be restricted for fear that
people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified
against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not been
held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position
to threaten respondents' rights to life, liberty and
security."110 (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are
under threat of being once again abducted, kept captive or even
killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of
person.111
Elaborating on the "right to security, in general," respondents point
out that this right is "often associated with liberty;" it is also seen as an
"expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel
and unusual punishment." Conceding that there is no right to security
expressly mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit
that their rights "to be kept free from torture and
from incommunicado detention and solitary detention places112 fall
under the general coverage of the right to security of person under the
writ of Amparo." They submit that the Court ought to give an
expansive recognition of the right to security of person in view of the
State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which enunciates
that, "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights." Finally, to justify a liberal
interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the
teaching in Moncupa v. Enrile113 that "the right to liberty may be
made more meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State
on the exercise of that liberty"114 such as a requirement to "report
under unreasonable restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of
liberty"115 or being put under "monitoring and surveillance."116
In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in
the threat to their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their
right to security.
Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it
has indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to
security or the right to security of person finds a textual hook in
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge...
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of one's person,
including the extensions of his/her person - houses, papers, and
effects - against government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the
state's power over a person's home and possessions, but more
importantly, protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself.117 The purpose of this provision was enunciated by the Court
in People v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, viz: 118
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in
person and property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home
by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and
to give remedy against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v.
New York, 192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The
right to privacy is an essential condition to the dignity and
happiness and to the peace and security of every individual,
whether it be of home or of persons and correspondence.
(Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, 139
[1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great fundamental right
against unreasonable searches and seizures must be deemed
absolute as nothing is closer to a man's soul than the serenity of
his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any
interference allowable can only be for the best causes and
reasons.119 (emphases supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1120 guarantees
essentially the right to be alive121 - upon which the enjoyment of all
other rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a
guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each
person has a right is not a life lived in fear that his person and
property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it
is a life lived with the assurance that the government he established
and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property.
The ideal of security in life and property... pervades the whole history
of man. It touches every aspect of man's existence."122 In a broad
sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person's legal
and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health,
and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to
enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a
deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the
enjoyment of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful
desires of the individual."123
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various
permutations of the exercise of this right.
First, the right to security of person is "freedom from fear." In its
"whereas" clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) enunciates that "a world in which human beings shall
enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want
has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common
people." (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that "freedom
from fear" is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an
individual international human right.124 It is the "right to security of
person" as the word "security" itself means "freedom from
fear."125 Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.126 (emphasis supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
also provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with
such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is
the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is
the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can
range from being baseless to well-founded as people react differently.
The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the
variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or
past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the Amparo context, it is
more correct to say that the "right to security" is actually the "freedom
from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation"
Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of
violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the
provision.127
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily
and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the
1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, one's body
cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant.128 Physical
injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the
body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and
painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases,
the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical
injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront
to the bodily integrity or security of a person.129
Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily
integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the
victim to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it
constitutes an invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as
the dignity of the human person includes the exercise of free will.
Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution more specifically
proscribes bodily and psychological invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate
the free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity -
nevertheless constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense
of "freedom from threat" as afore-discussed.
Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses
of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense.
Victims of enforced disappearances who are not even under such
investigation should all the more be protected from these
degradations.
An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a
right against torture was made by the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.130 In this
case, the claimant, who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state
authorities had physically abused him in prison, thereby violating his
right to security of person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights provides, viz: "Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the
following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by
law ..." (emphases supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides
that "(n)o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." Although the application failed on the facts
as the alleged ill-treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied
heavily on the concept of security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of
domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have
been expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and
to investigate the circumstances in question.
xxx xxx xxx
... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply
with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective
investigation into his allegations.131 (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily
integrity of women may also be related to the right to security and
liberty, viz:
...gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by
women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general
international law or under specific human rights conventions is
discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women). These
rights and freedoms include . . . the right to liberty and security of
person.132
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection
of one's rights by the government. In the context of the writ
of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life
and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and
the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and
guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III,
Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for
human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.133 As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of
the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of jurisdiction, just because that he or she is not arrested or
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case,134viz: otherwise detained. States parties are under an obligation to take
reasonable and appropriate measures to protect them. An
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner
interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to
and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An
ignore threats to the personal security of non-detained persons
investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State
within its jurisdiction would render totally ineffective the
as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that
guarantees of the Covenant.139(emphasis supplied)
depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon
their offer of proof, without an effective search for the truth by the The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v. Zambia,140 which
government.135 involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience who continued
to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements following
This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of
his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the
government protection has been interpreted by the United Nations'
Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial
Human Rights Committee136 in not a few cases involving Article 9137 of
Guinea,141 involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of
the ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in
opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v.
conjunction with the right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has
Zaire,142 involving the abduction of the complainant's husband who
ruled that the right to security of person can exist independently
was a supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v.
of the right to liberty. In other words, there need not necessarily be
Angola,143 involving the murder of the complainant's partner and
a deprivation of liberty for the right to security of person to be invoked.
the harassment he (complainant) suffered because of his
In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,138 a case involving death threats to a
investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v. Zambia,144 involving
religion teacher at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia, whose an assassination attempt on the chairman of an opposition alliance.
social views differed from those of the Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the
Committee held, viz: Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
interpreted the "right to security" not only as prohibiting the State from
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate
arbitrarily depriving liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to
paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the
afford protection of the right to liberty.145 The ECHR interpreted the
view that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and
"right to security of person" under Article 5(1) of the European
detention. The travaux préparatoires indicate that the discussions of
Convention of Human Rights in the leading case on disappearance of
the first sentence did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other
persons, Kurt v. Turkey.146 In this case, the claimant's son had been
provisions of article 9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
arrested by state authorities and had not been seen since. The
in article 3, refers to the right to life, the right to liberty and the
family's requests for information and investigation regarding his
right to security of the person. These elements have been dealt
whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a
with in separate clauses in the Covenant. Although in the
violation of her son's right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
Covenant the only reference to the right of security of person is
to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that it was intended ... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in
to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law
formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States parties but must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5,
have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the namely to protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed
Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States control over that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to
can ignore known threats to the life of persons under their account for his or her whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must
be seen as requiring the authorities to take effective measures to
safeguard against the risk of disappearance and to conduct a
prompt effective investigation into an arguable claim that a
person has been taken into custody and has not been seen
since.147 (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to the
case at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation
of respondents' right to security.
First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat
to respondents' life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they
escaped, their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymond's
narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was
caught the first time he attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A
call from a certain "Mam," who wanted to see him before he was
killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the
threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they
are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue
of a lawful order or voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be
recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007
when respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan,
respondents' captors even told them that they were still deciding
whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo
attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena
mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami
nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung
papatayin kami o hindi.148
The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye
while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat
to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and
implicated specific officers in the military not only in their own
abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to
have disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeño, and
Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under
concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat
to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as
they are forced to limit their movements or activities.149 Precisely
because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their
abduction, they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of
threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to their life,
liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents'
abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a
conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute
threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition
for a writ of Amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the
government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide
protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction,
detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an
effective investigation of respondents' abduction as revealed by the
testimony and investigation report of petitioners' own witness, Lt. Col.
Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited,
superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements
of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he
met in the investigation for the first time. He was present at the
investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn
statements, but he did not propound a single question to ascertain the
veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for
the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that
in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a
policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP
should adopt rules of action in the event the writ of Amparo is issued
by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should
essentially include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party;
recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification of
witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the
cause, manner, location and time of death or disappearance; (military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14,
identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in 2006 until August 12, 2007.
the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected offenders
With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that
before a competent court.150 Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also
the production order sought by respondents partakes of the
submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above
characteristics of a search warrant. Thus, they claim that the
directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting
requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be complied with
on this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the
prior to the grant of the production order, namely: (1) the application
units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of
must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the search warrant must
the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the
particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be
respondents, and undertook to provide results of the investigations to
seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense; and
respondents.151 To this day, however, almost a year after the policy
(4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge
directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of National Defense on
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of
witnesses he may produce.152 In the case at bar, however, petitioners
the investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a
point out that other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations
writ of Amparo.
made by respondent Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant and affidavit, the documents respondents seek to be produced are
the conclusion that there is a violation of respondents' right to security only mentioned generally by name, with no other supporting details.
as a guarantee of protection by the government. They also argue that the relevancy of the documents to be produced
must be apparent, but this is not true in the present case as the
In sum, we conclude that respondents' right to security as "freedom involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been shown.
from threat" is violated by the apparent threat to their life, liberty and
security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection Petitioners' arguments do not hold water. The production order under
by the government is likewise violated by the ineffective investigation the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for
and protection on the part of the military. law enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which
unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a protection of the
petitioners question.
government from the demand of the people such as respondents.
First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial
Instead, the Amparo production order may be likened to the
reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their
production of documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the
case, except those already in file with the court.
Rules of Civil Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.
official assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and
Donald Caigas. Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in
which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of
all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of any
the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of
treatment given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if
accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not
any, to the Manalo brothers, to include a list of medical personnel
privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and
control... security, these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. The writ of Amparo is a tool that gives
In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,153 the voice to preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.
respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena
duces tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The
books and papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is
questioned the issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it affirmed.
violated the search and seizure clause. The Court struck down the
SO ORDERED.
argument and held that the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure
that "cannot be identified or confused with unreasonable searches
prohibited by the Constitution..."
Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself
undertook "to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be
conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ
of Amparo has been sought for as soon as the same has been
furnished Higher headquarters."
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that
the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario
aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a
list of medical personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and
unnecessary in the resolution of the petition for a writ of Amparo. They
add that it will unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise
of official functions and duties of military officers and even unwittingly
and unnecessarily expose them to threat of personal injury or even
death.
On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of
M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom
respondents both directly implicated as perpetrators behind their
abduction and detention, is relevant in ensuring the safety of
respondents by avoiding their areas of territorial jurisdiction. Such
disclosure would also help ensure that these military officers can be
served with notices and court processes in relation to any
investigation and action for violation of the respondents' rights. The
list of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to
create the medical history of respondents and make appropriate
medical interventions, when applicable and necessary.
G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, J.:
For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1990
temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. It is the submission of
public respondents that:
1. The Decision in this case having become final and
executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of
authority of the executive authority. The issuance of the
TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of
executive authority;
2. The issuance of the temporary restraining order . . .
creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an
end to litigation because there is always a possibility
that Congress may repeal a law.
3. Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the
death penalty bill. To be certain, whatever question
may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before
the present Congress within the 6-month period given
by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully
debated upon . . .
4. Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex
praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks
at the past, . . . the Honorable Court in issuing the TRO
has transcended its power of judicial review.
5. At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening
events transpired to the effect that the repeal or
modification of the law imposing death penalty has
become nil, to wit:
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada
that he will veto any law imposing the death
penalty involving heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al.,
that they are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to
repeal the law only bears his signature and that
of Senator Pimentel.
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
public respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629
introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the
sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to review
Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death
penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive
Department of the position of the House of Representative on this
matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law
to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was
concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends: (1) the stay
order. . . is within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not
trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives; (2) the
exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable;
(3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction to address incidental matters
involved or arising from the petition; (4) public respondents are
estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5) there is no
certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or
modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various
resolutions and bills filed before it.
Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions
concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the
death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his
conviction by this Court. The instant motions were filed in this case,
G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8177 (Lethal
Injection Law) and its implementing rules and regulations was
assailed by petitioner. For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of
January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa
"Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance
of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal
standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the
interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.
We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public
respondents.
I Clerk of Court
First. We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public
respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar
and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner.
Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final
judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it
is just as important that there should be a place to end as there
should be a place to begin litigation." 1 To start with, the Court is not
changing even a comma of its final Decision. It is appropriate to
examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this
Court that became final. These metes and bounds are clearly spelled
out in the Entry of Judgment in this case, viz:
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
This is to certify that on October 12, 1998 a decision rendered in the
above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to
declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as
unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the
Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are
concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section
17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b) Section 19 fails to
provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the
Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential,
hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict
and counsel. Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and
implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17
and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No.
8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
and that the same has, on November 6, 1988 become final and
executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
Manila, Philippine.
By: (SGD) TERESITA G. DIMAISIP
Acting Chief
Judicial Records Office
The records will show that before the Entry of Judgment, the
Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this
Court on October 21, 1998 a Compliance where he submitted the
Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in
compliance with our Decision. On October 28, 1998, Secretary
Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has
caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as
required by the Administrative Code. It is crystalline that the Decision
of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated: (1) that
R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2) that sections 17 and 19 of
the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid,
and (3) R.A. No. 8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until
sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A.
No. 8177 are amended. It is also daylight clear that this Decision was
not altered a whit by this Court. Contrary to the submission of the
Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this
Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment.
Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established
jurisprudence on this issue as
follows: 2
xxx xxx xxx
the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its
powers nor the case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court
loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. Even after
the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to
execute and enforce it. 3 There is a difference between the jurisdiction
of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the
judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of
judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes
final. 4 . . . For after the judgment has become final facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or
impossible.5
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected
by this Court. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915,
this Court has unequivocably ruled in the case of Director of Prisons
v. Judge of First Instance, 6 viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions,
which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases,
after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening
the same cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has
terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been
returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has
been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper
order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions on the
part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the
judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the
Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any
event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while
the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to
provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which
is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a
hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There
can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature
thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be
postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render
impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has
once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of
the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after
the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of
ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a
circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an
imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a
postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the application
for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the
circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to
make the investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the subject of substantial
subtraction for our Constitution 7 vests the entirety of judicial power in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of decisions where supervening
events may change the circumstance of the parties and compel courts
to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness.
It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that
courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of
control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law
and justice. 8 For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that
"when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all
auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure
to be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically
pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit
of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the Court restrained
temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable
time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress
as alleged by petitioner. The Court, contrary to popular
misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by The said power of Congress, however, is not as absolute as it may
Congress.1âwphi1.nêt appear on its surface. In In re Cunanan 10Congress in the exercise of
its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission
The more disquieting dimension of the submission of the public
to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 11 which
respondents that this Court has no jurisdiction to restrain the
considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar
execution of petitioner is that it can diminish the independence of the
examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the
judiciary. Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts
1952 bar examinations. This Court struck down the law as
have been conceded the jurisdiction to enforce their final decisions. In
unconstitutional. In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that " . . .
accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment
rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure which, among
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar
others, spelled out the rules on execution of judgments. These rules
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke
are all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent,
these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain
necessary and incidental power to control and supervise the process
that only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department,
of execution of their decisions. Rule 39 governs execution,
that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these department would be
satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases. Rule 120 governs
a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in
judgments in criminal cases. It should be stressed that the power to
question." 12The venerable jurist further ruled: "It is obvious, therefore,
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was granted by
that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence, for in the
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the
words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity,
matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely
courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of
to fix the minimum conditions for the license." By its ruling, this Court
their vigor as champions of justice." 9 Hence, our Constitutions
qualified the absolutist tone of the power of Congress to "repeal, alter
continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its
or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure,
independence. Under the 1935 Constitution, the power of this Court to
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure was
granted but it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it The ruling of this Court in In re Cunanan was not changed by the
was subject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement. 1973 Constitution. For the 1973 Constitution reiterated the power of
Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides: this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, . . . which, however, may be repealed, altered
Sec.13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa . . . ." More completely,
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify xxx xxx xxx
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and
Sec.5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify xxx xxx xxx
the same. The Congress have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of
the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented
by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide a simplified and
inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights.
Well worth noting is that the 1973 Constitution further strengthened
the independence of the judiciary by giving to it the additional power
to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 13
The 1987 Constitution molded an even stronger and more
independent judiciary. Among others, it enhanced the rule making
power of this Court. Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the
first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was
also granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most
importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of Congress
to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more
so with the Executive. If the manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is
to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as
public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the
process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and
which it has exercised since time immemorial.
To be sure, it is too late in the day for public respondents to assail the
jurisdiction of this Court to control and supervise the implementation
of its decision in the case at bar. As aforestated, our Decision became
final and executory on November 6, 1998. The records reveal that
after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998, no less than the
Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Court by filing a
Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the
Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to
provide him ". . . a certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution
dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of
death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce
the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial
court to the public when requested." The relevant portions of the
Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justice
beseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:
xxx xxx xxx
5. Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation
however, herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation
and Motion (a) to stress, inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date
of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary
for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory
the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to
information of public concern, and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to
provide the appropriate relief.
6. The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein
respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his power
of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to
Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in
relation to Title III, Book IV of such Administrative Code, insofar as the
enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for
the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules
relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.
7. On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information
about the precise day of execution limits the exercise by the President
of executive clemency powers pursuant to Section 19, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution and Article
81 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides that the
death sentence shall be carried out "without prejudice to the exercise
by the President of his executive powers at all times." (Emphasis
supplied) For instance, the President cannot grant reprieve, i.e.,
postpone the execution of a sentence to a day certain (People v.
Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 110 [1937]) in the absence of a precise date to
reckon with. The exercise of such clemency power, at this time, might
even work to the prejudice of the convict and defeat the purpose of
the Constitution and the applicable statute as when the date at
execution set by the President would be earlier than that designated
by the court.
8. Moreover, the deliberate non-disclosure of information about the
date of execution to herein respondent and the public violates Section
7, Article III (Bill of Rights) and Section 28, Article II (Declaration of
Principles and State Policies) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
which read:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public
concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development shall, be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may beprovided by law.
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest.
9. The "right to information" provision is self-executing. It supplies "the
rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed
(Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations, 167 [1972]) by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to
sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein
recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the
Constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id.,
at p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must,
of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution,
Art. II, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever
limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty
under Art. III, Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue
of the adoption of the New Charter." (Decision of the Supreme
Court En Banc in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA
530, 534-535 [1987].
The same motion to compel Judge Ponferrada to reveal the date of
execution of petitioner Echegaray was filed by his counsel, Atty.
Theodore Te, on December 7, 1998. He invoked his client's right to
due process and the public's right to information. The Solicitor
General, as counsel for public respondents, did not oppose
petitioner's motion on the ground that this Court has no more
jurisdiction over the process of execution of Echegaray. This Court
granted the relief prayed for by the Secretary of Justice and by the
counsel of the petitioner in its Resolution of December 15, 1998.
There was not a whimper of protest from the public respondents and
they are now estopped from contending that this Court has lost its
jurisdiction to grant said relief. The jurisdiction of this Court does not
depend on the convenience of litigants.
II
Second. We likewise reject the public respondents' contention that the
"decision in this case having become final and executory, its
execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive
department . . .. By granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive function." 14 Public
respondents cite as their authority for this proposition, Section 19,
Article VII of the Constitution which reads:
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The text and tone of this provision will not yield to the interpretation
suggested by the public respondents. The provision is simply the
source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations,
and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. It also provides the authority for the President to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of the
Congress. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying
the power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after
their finality. In truth, an accused who has been convicted by final
judgment still possesses collateral rights and these rights can be
claimed in the appropriate courts. For instance, a death convict who
become insane after his final conviction cannot be executed while in a
state of insanity. 15 As observed by Antieau, "today, it is generally
assumed that due process of law will prevent the government from
executing the death sentence upon a person who is insane at the time
of execution." 16 The suspension of such a death sentence is
undisputably an exercise of judicial power. It is not a usurpation of the
presidential power of reprieve though its effects is the same — the
temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the
same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can at any time amend
R.A. No. 7659 by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment.
The effect of such an amendment is like that of commutation of
sentence. But by no stretch of the imagination can the exercise by
Congress of its plenary power to amend laws be considered as a
violation of the power of the President to commute final sentences of
conviction. The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude each other
for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
Indeed, in various States in the United States, laws have even been
enacted expressly granting courts the power to suspend execution of
convicts and their constitutionality has been upheld over arguments
that they infringe upon the power of the President to grant reprieves.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the
Executive can protect the right to life of an accused after his final
conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers
of the three branches of our government.
III
Third. The Court's resolution temporarily restraining the execution of
petitioner must be put in its proper perspective as it has been
grievously distorted especially by those who make a living by vilifying
courts. Petitioner filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on
December 28, 1998 at about 11:30 p.m. He invoked several
grounds, viz: (1) that his execution has been set on January 4, the
first working day of 1999; (b) that members of Congress had either
sought for his executive clemency and/or review or repeal of the law
authorizing capital punishment; (b.1) that Senator Aquilino Pimentel's
resolution asking that clemency be granted to the petitioner and that
capital punishment be reviewed has been concurred by thirteen (13)
other senators; (b.2) Senate President Marcelo Fernan and Senator
Miriam S. Defensor have publicly declared they would seek a review
of the death penalty law; (b.3) Senator Paul Roco has also sought the
repeal of capital punishment, and (b.4) Congressman Salacrib
Baterina, Jr., and thirty five (35) other congressmen are demanding
review of the same law.
When the Very Urgent Motion was filed, the Court was already in its
traditional recess and would only resume session on January 18,
1999. Even then, Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. called the Court to a
Special Session on January 4, 1991 17 at 10. a.m. to deliberate on
petitioner's Very Urgent Motion. The Court hardly had five (5) hours to
resolve petitioner's motion as he was due to be executed at 3 p.m.
Thus, the Court had the difficult problem of resolving whether
petitioner's allegations about the moves in Congress to repeal or
amend the Death Penalty Law are mere speculations or not. To the
Court's majority, there were good reasons why the Court should not
immediately dismiss petitioner's allegations as mere speculations and
surmises. They noted that petitioner's allegations were made in a
pleading under oath and were widely publicized in the print and
broadcast media. It was also of judicial notice that the 11th Congress
is a new Congress and has no less than one hundred thirty (130) new
members whose views on capital punishment are still unexpressed.
The present Congress is therefore different from the Congress that
enacted the Death Penalty Law (R.A. No. 7659) and the Lethal
Injection Law (R.A. No. 8177). In contrast, the Court's minority felt that
petitioner's allegations lacked clear factual bases. There was hardly a
time to verify petitioner's allegations as his execution was set at 3
p.m. And verification from Congress was impossible as Congress was
not in session. Given these constraints, the Court's majority did not
rush to judgment but took an extremely cautious stance by temporarily
restraining the execution of petitioner. The suspension was temporary
— "until June 15, 1999, coeval with the constitutional duration of the
present regular session of Congress, unless it sooner becomes
certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made."
The extreme caution taken by the Court was compelled, among
others, by the fear that any error of the Court in not stopping the
execution of the petitioner will preclude any further relief for all rights
stop at the graveyard. As life was at, stake, the Court refused to
constitutionalize haste and the hysteria of some partisans. The
Court's majority felt it needed the certainty that the legislature will not
petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It was believed that law and
equitable considerations demand no less before allowing the State to
take the life of one its citizens.
The temporary restraining order of this Court has produced its desired
result, i.e., the crystallization of the issue whether Congress is
disposed to review capital punishment. The public respondents, thru
the Solicitor General, cite posterior events that negate beyond doubt
the possibility that Congress will repeal or amend the death penalty
law. He names these supervening events as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
a. The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he
will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving
heinous crimes.
b. The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they
are against the repeal of the law;
c. The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the
law only bears his signature and that of Senator
Pimentel. 18
In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,
the Solicitor General cited House Resolution No. 629 introduced by
Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the
House of Representatives to reject any move to review R.A. No. 7659
which provided for the reimposition of death penalty, notifying the
Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of the position of
the House of Representative on this matter and urging the President
to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the
death penalty law." The Golez resolution was signed by 113
congressman as of January 11, 1999. In a marathon session
yesterday that extended up 3 o'clock in the morning, the House of
Representative with minor, the House of Representative with minor
amendments formally adopted the Golez resolution by an
overwhelming vote. House Resolution No. 25 expressed the
sentiment that the House ". . . does not desire at this time to review
Republic Act 7659." In addition, the President has stated that he will
not request Congress to ratify the Second Protocol in review of the
prevalence of heinous crimes in the country. In light of these
developments, the Court's TRO should now be lifted as it has served
its legal and humanitarian purpose.
A last note. In 1922, the famous Clarence Darrow predicted that ". . .
the question of capital punishment had been the subject of endless
discussion and will probably never be settled so long as men believe
in punishment." 19 In our clime and time when heinous crimes
continue to be unchecked, the debate on the legal and moral
predicates of capital punishment has been regrettably blurred by
emotionalism because of the unfaltering faith of the pro and anti-death
partisans on the right and righteousness of their postulates. To be
sure, any debate, even if it is no more than an exchange of epithets is
healthy in a democracy. But when the debate deteriorates to discord
due to the overuse of words that wound, when anger threatens to turn
the majority rule to tyranny, it is the especial duty of this Court to
assure that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to the minority fully
hold. As Justice Brennan reminds us ". . . it is the very purpose of the
Constitution — and particularly the Bill of Rights — to declare certain
values transcendent, beyond the reach of temporary political
majorities." 20 Man has yet to invent a better hatchery of justice than
the courts. It is a hatchery where justice will bloom only when we can
prevent the roots of reason to be blown away by the winds of rage.
The flame of the rule of law cannot be ignited by rage, especially the
rage of the mob which is the mother of unfairness. The business of
courts in rendering justice is to be fair and they can pass their litmus
test only when they can be fair to him who is momentarily the most
hated by society. 21
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court grants the public respondents' Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion to Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and lifts the Temporary Restraining Order
issued in its Resolution of January 4, 1999.
The Court also orders respondent trial court judge (Hon. Thelma A.
Ponferrada, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 104) to set
anew the date for execution of the convict/petitioner in accordance
with applicable provisions of law and the Rules of Court, without
further delay.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., Please see Separate Opinion.
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic
Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of
the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren
on the Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this
stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by
Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the
above-numbered petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO")
because, among other things, of what had been stated to be
indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It
was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the
government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded,
that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for
the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby
reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or recall the imposition
of the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes
final and executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its
compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no
end to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control
over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has
taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal
injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event,
jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final and
executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the
Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment
when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief
cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right
to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons
vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite,2 should be instructive. Thus —
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions,
which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases,
after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening
the same has elapsed, the court can not change or after its judgment,
as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according to
the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause
has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the
judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing
the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions
on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that
the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to
the executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are
certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in
any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority,
while the executive has no power over the person of the convict
except to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which
is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a
hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There
can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that,
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature
thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be
postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render
impossible the assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has
once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of
the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after
the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its
ministerial duty of ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and
its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay
the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its
final judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon,
commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or
modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not
essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible
and may each be exercised within their respective spheres and
confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not
prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning power or
Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the
adjudged offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted
even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the duration
of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes
certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made."
The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General states that as of the moment, "certain
circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that
the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has
become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance
for a timely3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law,
then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court
feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear
to undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of
the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have
a second look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the
Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People vs.
Masalihit,4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a
prompt re-examination of the death penalty law, I have said:
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the
initial instance, with the law-making authority, the Congress of the
Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself has
set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must
involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not
contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore alreadyprovided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone,
just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me
that there must first be a marked change in the milieu from that which
has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the
one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the statute
prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it
distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty.
Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the
'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as
to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in
the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from
exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of each
case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become
'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the
victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death
or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is callously
humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate
imposition of the death penalty could somehow constrain courts to
apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards
for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what might normally be
required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue
exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of
the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will
have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority
who continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659
to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental,
constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the
death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents
pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the
Court even as I, like everyone else, however, must respect and be
held bound by the ruling of the majority.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has
jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I
write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the
death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not
repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session which ends on
June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such
repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed
lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death
penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is
unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the capital
penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and
"compelling reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines.
* This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various
death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's
deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I
hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would
mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions
thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and
therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble
opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA
7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and
will abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177
are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be
implemented by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's
Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22,
1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for the
first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No.
7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the
Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous
counsel,3 this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was
not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's
sentence of death.4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced toreclusion
perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and
had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom
Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty
"unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress
provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed"
toreclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it
bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it
reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of
imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did
not merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact
completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic
commutation or reduction toreclusion perpetua of any death penalty
extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that,
while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death
as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution.
As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed,6 "(t)he majority voted for the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished
Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the
provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he
had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books
of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the
Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of
the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration
thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be
strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of
constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the
death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized
Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower
courts to reimpose it on condition that it (Congress)9 finds "compelling
reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution
is emphatic (even if "awkward"10): the authority of Congress to
"provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:
1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the
Constitution became effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or
characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of
determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining
what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making
prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I
emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on
certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual
offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said
crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA
7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain
provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new
article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes
stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the
penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the
preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the
reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the
offenses or individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by
which the death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987,
when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted
of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was
accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by
mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress
exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More
legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave
abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or
jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I
respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to
prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not
define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did
Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some
existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty.
It did not give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be
able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that
Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited power.
In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or
"whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an
insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It
simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous"
without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful,
workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of
heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious
and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition.
Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does
not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as
rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely
an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin
of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its
operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be
the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to
prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court
appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances. 16
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which
were already punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified
bribery,17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses
punished by death under said law were already to punishable by the
Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA
7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto
Maceda, wryly said: 19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President,
and from existing special laws which, before abolition of the death
penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes
which were already penalized with death prior to the charter's
effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive
constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely
to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it
would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law.
But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the
death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration
possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not
only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter
debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod.
In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and
Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder
of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not
just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal
murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather
scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when
deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not
have in mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with
death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:
1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the
elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or
level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of
until then; or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or
essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added
to show their utter perversity, odiousness or
malevolence; or
3. the means or method by which the crime, whether new
or old, is carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of
extreme violence, evil, cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as
to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of
circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner
that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to
murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the
Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons"
for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4
of the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this
requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It
should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution
is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed
aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the
characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must
shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter
because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and
that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons"
requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA
7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by
Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling
reasons: 23
MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr.
Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the
country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished
sponsor would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the justification
of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening
peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the
compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular "compelling
reason," may we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could
the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a
compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the
Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason
should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and
again that if one lives in an organized society governed by law, justice
demands that crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be
commensurate with the offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the
Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the
reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would
supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he
submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty
for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now,
under present conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses
being committed at this time, justice demands that the appropriate
penalty must be meted out for those who have committed heinous
crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of
"worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect I
submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the
revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these
"reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine
National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly
on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined
between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993,
the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the following
debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:
MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.
Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us
the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is
12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the
distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in
1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the
abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18
percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the
statistics supplied by the PC.
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution
abolished the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished
Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm
it.
MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was
40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the
death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery
cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with
me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined from
22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of
29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are
reading now from the same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870
or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a
crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the
same document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is
misreading the document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave
some figures on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-
related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.
In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was
abolished — the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062,
and the figure dropped to 2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this
report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to
2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased
again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the
drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a downward
trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the
death penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective
deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no
sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show
with any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of
the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-
commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and
on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that the real
deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and
conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk, expense and
inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be
argued indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the academics grow
weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the constitutionally-
imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and
"compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death
penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any
other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously
protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the
right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not
just crimes — but capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained
at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the
people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is
not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its
other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the
Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of
torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes
the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother
and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the
people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property
for people more than the state, and for life more than mere existence
augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against
the revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of
society against its perceived enemies.
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free
speech. assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most
important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights
cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching
fact that the death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless
and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts"
submitted by the Free Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad
fact:
1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186
persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of
1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end
of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven
(7) convicts per month; double the monthly average of
capital sentences imposed the prior year. From
January to June 1996, the number of death penalty
convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per
month, almost double the monthly average of capital
sentences imposed in 1995.
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice
percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers,
while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides,
between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4)
above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk) About
percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6)
percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP
percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative
earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four employee and executives comprise only three percent
percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent
5. None of the DRC's use English as their medium of
(13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two
communication. About forty four percent (44%), or
percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five
slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog;
percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately
twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak
nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in
a month. and understand Cebuano. The rest speak and
understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan,
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign
112 of them, earn below the government-mandated national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from
earn below the official poverty line set by government.
college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished
Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and
varying levels of elementary education with twenty
P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the
seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty
middle class; only one (1) earns P30.000.00 monthly.
five percent (35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished
Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a
varying levels of high school, with more than half of
percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do
them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts
not know or are unsure of their monthly income.
Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all. finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not
study at all.
4. In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic
percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in
situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against
animal husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-
the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the
fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are
legal services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive
in the transport and construction industry, with thirty
preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required.
one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields
The best example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this
(carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27)
very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully
are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic,
omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court
tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers.
until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the
Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex
and written in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still,
judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and
damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed
more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds
of the latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy
nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments,
and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense
prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic
profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in
any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or
the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the
disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and
written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial
proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate
penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the
whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems
to me that there will always be certain class or classes of people in
our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational
attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined
to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments,
amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves,
and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective,
the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their
lot substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law may even be said to
help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much
stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences
that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely
because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and
deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance from our laws
and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of
themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and
their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think,
simply that everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we
cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if we are
unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor
provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced
with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none
other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater majority of
cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly
permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This
law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional
firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
(1) The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our statute
books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its imposition.
(2) The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution right
against the death penalty, which is really a species of the right to life.
(3) Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused because such a
stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a basic right and
tends to deny equal justice to the underprivileged.
(4) Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should
never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
(5) Congressional power death is severely limited by two concurrent
requirements:
a. First, Congress must provide a set of attendant
circumstances which the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of
the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and
how these circumstances define or characterize the
crime as "heinous".
b. Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear
and specific reasons which arose after the effectivity of
the Constitution compelling the enactment of the law. It
bears repeating that these requirements are
inseparable. They must both be present in view of the
specific constitutional mandate — "for compelling
 reasons involving heinous crimes." The compelling
reason must flow from the heinous nature of the
offense.
(6) In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and
compelling reasons must be set out for each and every crime, and not
just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as
well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in
Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority
of our people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to
prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
"cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium
Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must be carefully evaluated
and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing
the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . .
(which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the
Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and
pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and
above even the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish
and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital
punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes"
just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute
necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare
and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in
enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of
proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death
against well-defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant
partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify
the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the
words "DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute
therefore reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., separate opinion;
Let me state at the outset that I have humbly maintained that Republic
Act No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, falls short of
the strict norm set forth by the Constitution. I and some of my brethren
on the Court, who hold similarly, have consistently expressed this
stand in the affirmance by the Court of death sentences imposed by
Regional Trial Courts.
In its resolution of 04 January 1999, the Court resolved to issue in the
above-numbered petition a temporary restraining order ("TRO")
because, among other things, of what had been stated to be
indications that Congress would re-examine the death penalty law. It
was principally out of respect and comity to a co-equal branch of the
government, i.e., to reasonably allow it that opportunity if truly minded,
that motivated the Court to grant, after deliberation, a limited time for
the purpose.
The Court, it must be stressed, did not, by issuing the TRO, thereby
reconsider its judgment convicting the accused or recall the imposition
of the death penalty.
The doctrine has almost invariably been that after a decision becomes
final and executory, nothing else is further done except to see to its
compliance since for the Court to adopt otherwise would be to put no
end to litigations The rule notwithstanding, the Court retains control
over the case until the full satisfaction of the final judgment
conformably with established legal processes. Hence, the Court has
taken cognizance of the petition assailing before it the use of lethal
injection by the State to carry out the death sentence. In any event,
jurisprudence teaches that the rule of immutability of final and
executory judgments admits of settled exceptions. Concededly, the
Court may, for instance, suspend the execution of a final judgment
when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when
supervening events warrant it.1 Certainly, this extraordinary relief
cannot be denied any man, whatever might be his station, whose right
to life is the issue at stake. The pronouncement in Director of Prisons
vs. Judge of First Instance of Cavite,2 should be instructive. Thus —
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions,
which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases,
after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening
the same has elapsed, the court can not change or after its judgment,
as its jurisdiction has terminated, functus est officio suo, according to
the classical phrase. When in cases of appeal or review the cause
has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the
judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing
the proper order. But it does not follow from this cessation of functions
on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that
the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to
the executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are
certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in
any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority,
while the executive has no power over the person of the convict
except to provide for carrying out the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which
is that of execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a
hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested. There
can be no dispute on this point. It is a well-known principle that,
notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature
thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be
postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this
postponement can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the
King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio) of the court; and (3) by mandate of the
law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render
impossible the assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has
once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to
investigate the facts that show the need for postponement. If one of
the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after
the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the
general rule that after the Court of First Instance has performed its
ministerial duty of ordering the execution, functus est officio suo, and
its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay
the execution, there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement . . ..
In fine, the authority of the Court to see to the proper execution of its
final judgment, the power of the President to grant pardon,
commutation or reprieve, and the prerogative of Congress to repeal or
modify the law that could benefit the convicted accused are not
essentially preclusive of one another nor constitutionally incompatible
and may each be exercised within their respective spheres and
confines. Thus, the stay of execution issued by the Court would not
prevent either the President from exercising his pardoning power or
Congress from enacting a measure that may be advantageous to the
adjudged offender.
The TRO of this Court has provided that it shall be lifted
even before its expiry date of 15 June 1999, "coeval with the duration
of the present regular session of Congress," if it "sooner becomes
certain that no repeal or modification of the law is going to be made."
The "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General states that as of the moment, "certain
circumstances/supervening events (have) transpired to the effect that
the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has
become nil . . .." If, indeed, it would be futile to yet expect any chance
for a timely3 re-examination by Congress of the death penalty law,
then I can appreciate why the majority of the Justices on the Court
feel rightly bound even now to lift the TRO.
I am hopeful, nevertheless, that Congress will in time find its way clear
to undertaking a most thorough and dispassionate re-examination of
the law not so much for its questioned wisdom as for the need to have
a second look at the conditions sine qua non prescribed by the
Constitution in the imposition of the death penalty. In People vs.
Masalihit,4 in urging, with all due respect, Congress to consider a
prompt re-examination of the death penalty law, I have said:
The determination of when to prescribe the death penalty lies, in the
initial instance, with the law-making authority, the Congress of the
Philippines, subject to the conditions that the Constitution itself has
set forth; viz: (1) That there must be compelling reasons to justify the
imposition of the death penalty; and (2) That the capital offense must
involve a heinous crime. It appears that the fundamental law did not
contemplate a simple 'reimposition' of the death penalty to offenses
theretofore alreadyprovided in the Revised Penal Code or, let alone,
just because of it. The term 'compelling reasons' would indicate to me
that there must first be a marked change in the milieu from that which
has prevailed at the time of adoption of the 1987 Constitution, on the
one hand, to that which exists at the enactment of the statute
prescribing the death penalty, upon the other hand, that would make it
distinctively inexorable to allow the re-imposition of the death penalty.
Most importantly, the circumstances that would characterize the
'heinous nature' of the crime and make it so exceptionally offensive as
to warrant the death penalty must be spelled out with great clarity in
the law, albeit without necessarily precluding the Court from
exercising its power of judicial review given the circumstances of each
case. To venture, in the case of murder, the crime would become
'heinous' within the Constitutional concept, when, to exemplify, the
victim is unnecessarily subjected to a painful and excruciating death
or, in the crime of rape, when the offended party is callously
humiliated or even brutally killed by the accused. The indiscriminate
imposition of the death penalty could somehow constrain courts to
apply, perhaps without consciously meaning to, stringent standards
for conviction, not too unlikely beyond what might normally be
required in criminal cases, that can, in fact, result in undue
exculpation of offenders to the great prejudice of victims and society.
Today, I reiterate the above view and until the exacting standards of
the Constitution are clearly met as so hereinabove expressed, I will
have to disagree, most respectfully, with my colleagues in the majority
who continue to hold the presently structured Republic Act No. 7659
to be in accord with the Constitution, an issue that is fundamental,
constant and inextricably linked to the imposition each time of the
death penalty and, like the instant petition, to the legal incidents
pertinent thereto.
Accordingly, I vote against the lifting of the restraining order of the
Court even as I, like everyone else, however, must respect and be
held bound by the ruling of the majority.
PANGANIBAN, J., separate opinion;
I agree with the Court's Resolution that, without doubt, this Court has
jurisdiction to issue the disputed Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
on January 4, 1999. I will not repeat its well-reasoned disquisition. I
write only to explain my vote in the context of the larger issue of the
death penalty.
Since the solicitor general has demonstrated that Congress will not
repeal or amend RA 7659 during its current session which ends on
June 15, 1999 and that, in any event, the President will veto any such
repeal or amendment, the TRO should by its own terms be deemed
lifted now. However, my objections to the imposition of the death
penalty transcend the TRO and permeate its juridical essence.
I maintain my view that RA 7659 (the Death Penalty Law) is
unconstitutional insofar as some parts thereof prescribing the capital
penalty fail to comply with the requirements of "heinousness" and
"compelling reasons" prescribed by the Constitution of the Philippines.
* This I have repeatedly stated in my Dissenting Opinion in various
death cases decided by the Court, as well as during the Court's
deliberation on this matter on January 4, 1999. For easy reference, I
hereby attach a copy of my Dissent promulgated on February 7, 1997.
Consequently, I cannot now vote to lift TRO, because to do so would
mean the upholding and enforcement of law (or the relevant portions
thereof) which, I submit with all due respect, is unconstitutional and
therefore legally nonexistent. I also reiterate that, in my humble
opinion, RA 8177 (the Lethal Injection Law) is likewise
unconstitutional since it merely prescribes the manner in which RA
7659 ( the Death Penalty Law) is to implemented.
Having said that, I stress, however, that I defer to the rule of law and
will abide by the ruling of the Court that both RA 7659 and RA 8177
are constitutional and that death penalty should, by majority vote, be
implemented by means of lethal injection.
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, I vote to deny the solicitor general's
Motion for Reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117472 February 7, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO.
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
SEPARATE OPINION
Death Penalty Law Unconstitutional
In his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 1 dated August 22,
1996 filed by his newly-retained counsel, 2 the accused raises for the
first time a very crucial ground for his defense: that Republic Act. No.
7659, the law reimposing the death penalty, is unconstitutional. In the
Brief and (original Motion for Reconsideration filed by his previous
counsel,3 this transcendental issue was nor brought up. Hence, it was
not passed upon by this Court in its Decision affirming the trial court's
sentence of death.4
The Constitution Abolished Death Penalty
Sec. 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless for compelling
reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced toreclusion
perpetua. (Emphasis supplied)
The second and third sentences of the above provision are new and
had not been written in the 1935, 1973 or even in the 1986 "Freedom
Constitution." They proscribe the imposition 5 of the death penalty
"unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, Congress
provides for it," and reduced "any death penalty already imposed"
toreclusion perpetua. The provision has both a prospective aspect (it
bars the future imposition of the penalty) and a retroactive one (it
reduces imposed capital sentences to the lesser penalty of
imprisonment).
This two-fold aspect is significant. It stresses that the Constitution did
not merely suspend the imposition of the death penalty, but in fact
completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic
commutation or reduction toreclusion perpetua of any death penalty
extant as of the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that,
while the conviction of an accused for a capital crime remains, death
as a penalty ceased to exist in our penal laws and thus may longer be
carried out. This is the clear intent of the framers of our Constitution.
As Comm. Bernas ex-claimed,6 "(t)he majority voted for the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty."
Citing this and other similar pronouncements of the distinguished
Concom delegate, Mme. Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
emphasized, 7 "It is thus clear that when Fr. Bernas sponsored the
provision regarding the non-imposition of the death penalty, what he
had in mind was the total abolition and removal from the statute books
of the death penalty. This became the intent of the frames of the
Constitution when they approved the provision and made it a part of
the Bill of Rights." With such abolition as a premise, restoration
thereof becomes an exception to a constitutional mandate. Being an
exception and thus in derogation of the Constitution, it must then be
strictly construed against the State and liberally in favor of the
people.8 In this light, RA 7659 enjoys no presumption of
constitutionality.
The Constitution Strictly Limits
Congressional Prerogative to Prescribe Death
To me, it is very clear that the Constitution (1) effectively removed the
death penalty from the then existing statutes but (2) authorized
Congress to restore it at some future time to enable or empower
courts to reimpose it on condition that it (Congress)9 finds "compelling
reasons, involving heinous crimes." The language of the Constitution
is emphatic (even if "awkward"10): the authority of Congress to
"provide for it" is not absolute. Rather, it is strictly limited:
1. by "compelling reasons" that may arise after the
Constitution became effective; and
2. to crimes which Congress should identify or define or
characterize as "heinous."
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of
determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining
what crimes are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making
prerogative to restore the death penalty. For clarity's sake, may I
emphasize that Congress, by law; prescribes the death penalty on
certain crimes; and courts, by their decisions, impose it on individual
offenders found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing said
crimes.
In the exercise of this fundamental mandate, Congress enacted RA
7659 11 to "provide for it" (the death penalty) (1) by amending certain
provisions of the Revised Penal Code; 12 (2) by incorporating a new
article therein; 13 and (3) by amending certain special laws. 14
But RA 7659 did not change the nature or the elements of the crimes
stated in the Penal Code and in the special laws. It merely made the
penalty more severe. Neither did its provisions (other than the
preamble, which was cast in general terms) discuss or justify the
reasons for the more sever sanction, either collectively for all the
offenses or individually for each of them.
Generally, it merely reinstated the concept of and the method by
which the death penalty had been imposed until February 2, 1987,
when the Constitution took effect as follows: (1) a person is convicted
of a capital offense; and (2) the commission of which was
accompanied by aggravating circumstances not outweighed by
mitigating circumstances.
The basic question then is: In enacting RA 7659, did Congress
exceed the limited authority granted it by the Constitution? More
legally put: It reviving the death penalty, did Congress act with grave
abuse of discretion or in excess of the very limited power or
jurisdiction conferred on it by Art. III, Sec. 19? The answer, I
respectfully submit, is YES.
Heinous Crimes
To repeal, while he Constitution limited the power of Congress to
prescribe the death penalty ONLY to "heinous" crimes, it did not
define or characterize the meaning of "heinous". Neither did
Congress. As already stated, RA 7659 itself merely selected some
existing crimes for which it prescribed death as an applicable penalty.
It did not give a standard or a characterization by which courts may be
able to appreciate the heinousness of a crime. I concede that
Congress was only too well aware of its constitutionally limited power.
In deference thereto, it included a paragraph in the preambular or
"whereas" clauses of RA 7659, as follows:
WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are
heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity
and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society.
In my humble view, however, the foregoing clause is clearly an
insufficient definition or characterization of what a heinous crime is. It
simply and gratuitously declared certain crimes to be "heinous"
without adequately justifying its bases therefor. It supplies no useful,
workable, clear and unambiguous standard by which the presence of
heinousness can be determined. Calling the crimes "grievous, odious
and hateful" is not a substitute for an objective juridical definition.
Neither is the description "inherent or manifest wickedness,
viciousness, atrocity and perversity." Describing blood as blue does
not detract from its being crimson in fact; and renaming gumamela as
rose will not arm it with thorns.
Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely
an introduction to show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin
of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its
operation, much less prevail over its text. 15 In this case, it cannot be
the authoritative source to show compliance with the Constitution.
As already alluded to, RA 7659 merely amended certain laws to
prescribe death as the maximum imposable penalty once the court
16
appreciates the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances.
In other words, it just reinstated capital punishment for crimes which
were already punishable with death prior to the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution. With the possible exception of plunder and qualified
bribery,17 no new crimes were introduced by RA 7659. The offenses
punished by death under said law were already to punishable by the
Revised Penal Code 18 and by special laws.
During the debate on Senate Bill No. 891 which later became RA
7659, Sen. Jose Lina, in answer to a question of Sen. Ernesto
Maceda, wryly said: 19
So we did not go that far from the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President,
and from existing special laws which, before abolition of the death
penalty, had already death as the maximum penalty.
By merely reimposing capital punishment on the very same crimes
which were already penalized with death prior to the charter's
effectivity, Congress I submit has not fulfilled its specific and positive
constitutional duty. If the Constitutional Commission intended merely
to allow Congress to prescribe death for these very same crimes, it
would not have written Sec. 19 of Article III into the fundamental law.
But the stubborn fact is it did. Verily, the intention to 1) delete the
death penalty from our criminal laws and 2) make its restoration
possible only under and subject to stringent conditions is evident not
only from the language of the Constitution but also from the charter
debates on this matter.
The critical phrase "unless for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes" was an amendment introduced by Comm. Christian Monsod.
In explaining what possible crimes could qualify as heinous, he and
Comm. Jose Suarez agreed on "organized murder" or "brutal murder
of a rape victim". 20 Note that the honorable commissioners did not
just say "murder" but organized murder; not just rape but brutal
murder of a rape victim. While the debates were admittedly rather
scanty, I believe that the available information shows that, when
deliberating on "heinousness", the Constitutional Commission did not
have in mind the offenses already existing and already penalized with
death. I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:
1. the crimes should be entirely new offenses, the
elements of which have an inherent quality, degree or
level of perversity, depravity or viciousness unheard of
until then; or
2. even existing crimes, provided some new element or
essential ingredient like "organized" or "brutal" is added
to show their utter perversity, odiousness or
malevolence; or
3) the means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is
carried out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil,
cruelty, atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. 21
For this purpose, Congress could enact an entirely new set of
circumstances to qualify the crime as "heinous", in the same manner
that the presence of treachery in a homicide aggravates the crime to
murder for which a heavier penalty is prescribed.
Compelling Reasons
Quite apart from requiring the attendant element of heinousness, the
Constitution also directs Congress to determine "compelling reasons"
for the revival of the capital penalty. It is true that paragraphs 3 and 4
of the preamble of RA 7659 22 made some attempt at meeting this
requirement. But such effort was at best feeble and inconsequential. It
should be remembered that every word or phrase in the Constitution
is sacred and should never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed
aside. Thus, I believe that the compelling reasons and the
characterization of heinousness cannot be done wholesale but must
shown for each and every crime, individually and separately.
The words "compelling reasons" were included in the Charter
because, in the words of Comm. Monsod, "in the future,
circumstances may arise which we should not preclude today . . . and
that the conditions and the situation (during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission) might change for very specific reasons"
requiring the return of the constitutionally-abhorred penalty.
In his sponsorship of House Bill No. 62 which later evolved into RA
7659, Congressman Pablo Garcia, in answer to questions raised by
Representative Edcel Lagman tried to explain these compelling
reasons: 23
MR. LAGMAN: So what are the compelling reasons now, Mr.
Speaker? . . .
MR. GARCIA (P.). The worsening peace and order condition in the
country, Mr. Speaker. That is one.
MR. LAGMAN. So the compelling reason which the distinguished
sponsor would like to justify or serve as an anchor for the justification
of the reimposition of the death penalty is the alleged worsening
peace and order situation. The Gentleman claims that is one the
compelling reasons. But before we dissent this particular "compelling
reason," may we know what are the other compelling reasons, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.) Justice, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Justice is a compelling reason, Mr. Speaker? Could
the Gentleman kindly elaborate on that answer? Why is justice a
compelling reason as if justice was not obtained at the time the
Constitution abolished the death penalty? Any compelling reason
should be a supervening circumstances after 1987.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Mr. Speaker, I have repeatedly said again and
again that if one lives in an organized society governed by law, justice
demands that crime be punished and that the penalty imposed be
commensurate with the offense committed.
MR. LAGMAN. The Gentleman would agree with me that when the
Constitution speaks of the compelling reasons to justify the
reimposition of death penalty, it refers to reasons which would
supervene or come after the approval of the 1987 Constitution. Is he
submitting that justice, in his own concept of a commensurate penalty
for the offense committed, was not obtained in 1987 when the
Constitution abolished the death penalty and the people ratified it?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is precisely why we are saying that now,
under present conditions, because of the seriousness of the offenses
being committed at this time, justice demands that the appropriate
penalty must be meted out for those who have committed heinous
crimes.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, Congressman Garcia invoked the preambular justifications of
"worsening peace and order" and "justice". With all due respect I
submit that these grounds are not "compelling" enough to justify the
revival of state-decreed deaths. In fact, I dare say that these
"reasons" were even non-existent. Statistics from the Philippine
National Police show that the crime volume and crime rate particularly
on those legislated capital offenses did not worsen but in fact declined
between 1987, the date when the Constitution took effect, and 1993,
the year when RA 7659 was enacted. Witness the following
debate 24 also between Representatives Garcia and Lagman:
MR. LAGMAN. Very good, Mr. Speaker.
Now, can we go to 1987. Could the Gentleman from Cebu inform us
the volume of the crime of murder in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The volume of the crime of murder in 1987 is
12,305.
MR. LAGMAN. So, the corresponding crime rate was 21 percent.
MR. GARCIA (P.). Yes, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. That was in 1987, Mr. Speaker, could the
distinguished chairman inform us the volume of murder in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 10,521, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Or it was a reduction from 12,305 in 1987 to 10,521 in
1988. Correspondingly, the crime rate in the very year after the
abolition of the death penalty was reduced from 21 percent to 18
percent. Is that correct, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). That is correct, Mr. Speaker. Those are the
statistics supplied by the PC.
MR. LAGMAN. Now can we go again to 1987 when the Constitution
abolished the death penalty? May we know from the distinguished
Gentleman the volume of robbery in 1987?
MR. GARCIA (P.). Will the Gentleman state the figure? I will confirm
it.
MR. LAGMAN. No, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the question.
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 22,942, Mr. Speaker, and the crime rate was
40 percent.
MR. LAGMAN. This was the year immediately after the abolition of the
death penalty. Could the Gentleman tell us the volume of robbery
cases in 1988?
MR. GARCIA (P.). It was 16,926, Mr. Speaker.
MR. LAGMAN. Obviously, the Gentleman would agree with
me. Mr. Speaker that the volume of robbery cases declined from
22,942 in 1987 or crime rate of 40 percent to 16,926 or a crime rate of
29 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr. Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). This is what the statistics say, I understand we are
reading now from the same document.
MR. LAGMAN. Now, going to homicide, the volume 1987 was 12,870
or a crime rate of 22 percent. The volume in 1988 was 11,132 or a
crime rate of 19 percent. Would the Gentleman confirm that, Mr.
Speaker?
MR. GARCIA (P.). As I Said, Mr. Speaker, we are reading from the
same document and I would not want to say that the Gentleman is
misreading the document that I have here.
MR. LAGMAN. But would the Gentleman confirm that?
MR. GARCIA (P.). The document speaks for itself.
When interpellated by Sen. Arturo Tolentino, Sen. Jose Lina gave
some figures on the number of persons arrested in regard to drug-
related offenses in the year 1987 as compared to 1991: 25
Let me cite this concrete statistics by the Dangerous Drug Board.
In 1987 — this was the year when the death penalty was abolished —
the persons arrested in drug-related cases were 3,062, and the figure
dropped to 2,686 in 1988.
By the way, I will furnish my Colleagues with a photocopy of this
report.
From 3,062 in 1987, it dropped to 2,686. Again, it increased a bit to
2,862 in 1989. It still decreased to 2,202 in 1990, and it increased
again to 2,862 in 1991.
But in 1987, when the death penalty was abolished, as far as the
drug-related cases are concerned, the figure continued a downward
trend, and there was no death penalty in this time from, 1988 to 1991.
In a further attempt to show compelling reasons, the proponents of the
death penalty argue that its reimposition "would pose as an effective
deterrent against heinous crimes." 26 However no statistical data, no
sufficient proof, empirical or otherwise, have been submitted to show
with any conclusiveness the relationship between the prescription of
the death penalty for certain offenses and the commission or non-
commission thereof. This is a theory that can be debated on and
on, 27 in the same manner that another proposition — that the real
deterrent to crime is the certainty of immediate arrest, prosecution and
conviction of the culprit without unnecessary risk, expense and
inconvenience to the victim, his heirs or his witnesses — can be
argued indefinitely. 28 This debate can last till the academics grow
weary of the spoken word, but it would not lessen the constitutionally-
imposed burden of Congress to act within the "heinousness" and
"compelling reasons" limits of its death-prescribing power.
Other Constitutional Rights
Militate Against RA 7659
It should be emphasized that the constitutional ban against the death
penalty is included in our Bill of Rights. As such, it should — like any
other guarantee in favor of the accused — be zealously
protected, 29 and any exception thereto meticulously screened. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the people, particularly where the
right pertains to persons accused of crimes. 30 Here the issue is not
just crimes — but capital crimes!
So too, all our previous Constitutions, including the first one ordained
at Malolos, guarantee that "(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of law." 31 This primary right of the
people to enjoy life — life at its fullest, life in dignity and honor — is
not only reiterated by the 1987 Charter but is in fact fortified by its
other pro-life and pro-human rights provisions. Hence, the
Constitution values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights, 32 expressly prohibits any form of
torture 33 which is arguably a lesser penalty than death, emphasizes
the individual right to life by giving protection to the life of the mother
and the unborn from the moment of conception 34 and establishes the
people's rights to health, a balanced ecology and education. 35
This Constitutional explosion of concern for man more than property percent (5%) earning variable income. Approximately
for people more than the state, and for life more than mere existence nine percent (9%) do not know how much they earn in
augurs well for the strict application of the constitutional limits against a month.
the revival of death penalty as the final and irreversible exaction of
3. Thus, approximately two-thirds of the convicts, about
society against its perceived enemies.
112 of them, earn below the government-mandated
Indeed, volumes have been written about individual rights to free minimum monthly wage of P4,290; ten (10) of these
speech. assembly and even religion. But the most basic and most earn below the official poverty line set by government.
important of these rights is the right to life. Without life, the other rights Twenty six (26) earn between P4,500.00 and
cease in their enjoyment, utility and expression. P11,0000.00 monthly, indicating they belong to the
middle class; only one (1) earns P30.000.00 monthly.
This opinion would not be complete without a word on the wrenching
Nine (9) convicts earn variable income or earn on a
fact that the death penalty militates against the poor, the powerless
percentage or allowance basis; fifteen (15) convicts do
and the marginalized. The "Profile of 165 Death Row Convicts"
not know or are unsure of their monthly income.
submitted by the Free Legal Assistance Group 36 highlights this sad
Twenty two (22) convicts earn nothing at all.
fact:
4. In terms of occupation, approximately twenty one
1. Since the reimposition of the death penalty, 186
percent (21%) are agricultural workers or workers in
persons 37 have been sentenced to death. At the end of
animal husbandry; of these thirty (30), or almost one-
1994, there were 24 death penalty convicts, at the end
fifth thereof, are farmers. Thirty five percent (35%) are
of 1995, the number rose to 90; an average of seven
in the transport and construction industry, with thirty
(7) convicts per month; double the monthly average of
one (31) construction workers or workers in allied fields
capital sentences imposed the prior year. From
(carpentry, painting, welding) while twenty seven (27)
January to June 1996, the number of death penalty
are transport workers (delivery, dispatcher, mechanic,
convicts reached 72, an average of 12 convicts per
tire man, truck helper) with sixteen (16) of them drivers.
month, almost double the monthly average of capital
Eighteen percent (18%) are in clerical, sales and
sentences imposed in 1995.
service industries, with fourteen (14) sales workers
2. Of the 165 convicts polled, approximately twenty one (engaged in buy and sell or fish, cigarette or rice
percent (21%) earn between P200 to P2,900 monthly; vendors), twelve (12) service workers (butchers,
while approximately twenty seven percent (27%) earn beauticians, security guards, shoemakers, tour guides,
between P3,000 to P3,999 monthly. Those earning computer programmers, radio technicians) and four (4)
above P4,000 monthly are exceedingly few: seven clerks (janitors, MERALCO employee and clerk) About
percent (7%) earn between P4,000 to P4,999, four four percent (4%) are government workers, with six (6)
percent (4%) earn between P5,000 to P5,999, seven persons belonging to the armed services (AFP, PNP
percent (7%) earn between P6,000 to P6,999, those and even CAFGU). Professionals, administrative
earning between P7,000 to P15,000 comprise only four employee and executives comprise only three percent
percent (4%), those earning P15,000 and above only (3%), nine percent (9%) are unemployed.
one percent (1%). Approximately thirteen percent
5. None of the DRC's use English as their medium of
(13%) earn nothing at all, while approximately two
communication. About forty four percent (44%), or
percent (2%) earn subsistence wages with another five
 slightly less than half speak and understand Tagalog;
twenty six percent (26%), or about one-fourth, speak
and understand Cebuano. The rest speak and
understand Bicolano, Ilocano, Ilonggo, Kapampangan,
Pangasinense and Waray. One (1) convict is a foreign
national and speaks and understand Niponggo.
6. Approximately twelve percent (12%) graduated from
college, about forty seven percent (47%) finished
varying levels of elementary education with twenty
seven (27) graduating from elementary. About thirty
five percent (35%), fifty eight (58) convicts, finished
varying levels of high school, with more than half of
them graduating from high school. Two (2) convicts
finished vocational education; nine (9) convicts did not
study at all.
The foregoing profile based on age, language and socio-economic
situations sufficiently demonstrates that RA 7659 has militated against
the poor and the powerless in society — those who cannot afford the
legal services necessary in capital crimes, where extensive
preparation, investigation, research and presentation are required.
The best example to shoe the sad plight of the underprivileged is this
very case where the crucial issue of constitutionality was woefully
omitted in the proceedings in the trial court and even before this Court
until the Free legal Assistance Group belatedly brought it up in the
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
To the poor and unlettered, it is bad enough that the law is complex
and written in a strange, incomprehensible language. Worse still,
judicial proceedings are themselves complicated, intimidating and
damning. The net effect of having a death penalty that is imposed
more often than not upon the impecunious is to engender in the minds
of the latter, a sense — unfounded, to be sure, but unhealthy
nevertheless — of the unequal balance of the scales of justice.
Most assuredly, it may be contended that the foregoing arguments,
and in particular, the statistics above-cited, are in a very real sense
prone to be misleading, and that regardless of the socio-economic
profile of the DRCs, the law reviving capital punishment does not in
any way single out or discriminate against the poor, the unlettered or
the underprivileged. To put it in another way, as far as the
disadvantaged are concerned, the law would still be complex and
written in a strange and incomprehensible language, and judicial
proceedings complicated and intimidating, whether the ultimate
penalty involved be life (sentence) or death. Another aspect of the
whole controversy is that, whatever the penalties set by law, it seems
to me that there will always be certain class or classes of people in
our society who, by reason of their poverty, lack of educational
attainment and employment opportunities, are consequently confined
to living, working and subsisting in less-than-ideal environments,
amidst less-than-genteel neighbors similarly situated as themselves,
and are therefore inherently more prone to be involved (as victims or
perpetrators) in vices, violence and crime. So from that perspective,
the law reviving the death penalty neither improves nor worsens their
lot substantially. Or, to be more precise, such law may even be said to
help improve their situation (at least in theory) by posing a much
stronger deterrent to the commission of heinous crimes.
However, such a viewpoint simply ignores the very basic differences
that exist in the situations of the poor and the non-poor. Precisely
because the underprivileged are what they are, they require and
deserve a greater degree of protection and assistance from our laws
and Constitution, and from the courts and the State, so that in spite of
themselves, they can be empowered to rise above themselves and
their situation. The basic postulates for such a position are, I think,
simply that everyone ultimately wants to better himself and that we
cannot better ourselves individually to any significant degree if we are
unable to advance as an entire people and nation. All the pro-poor
provisions of the Constitution point in this direction. Yet we are faced
with this law that effectively inflicts the ultimate punishment on none
other than the poor and disadvantaged in the greater majority of
cases, and which penalty, being so obviously final and so irreversibly
permanent, erases all hope of reform, of change for the better. This
law, I submit, has no place in our legal, judicial and constitutional
firmament.
Epilogue
In sum, I respectfully submit that:
 1. The 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty from our
statute books. It did not merely suspend or prohibit its
imposition.
2. The Charter effectively granted a new right: the constitution
right against the death penalty, which is really a species of the
right to life.
3. Any law reviving the capital penalty must be strictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused because
such a stature denigrates the Constitution, impinges on a
basic right and tends to deny equal justice to the
underprivileged.
4. Every word or phrase in the Constitution is sacred and should
never be ignored, cavalierly-treated or brushed aside.
5. Congressional power death is severely limited by two
concurrent requirements:
a. First, Congress must provide a set of attendant
circumstances which the prosecution must prove
beyond reasonable doubt, apart from the elements of
the crime and itself. Congress must explain why and
how these circumstances define or characterize the
crime as "heinous".
Second, Congress has also the duty of laying out clear and specific
reasons which arose after the effectivity of the Constitution compelling
the enactment of the law. It bears repeating that these requirements
are inseparable. They must both be present in view of the specific
constitutional mandate — "for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes." The compelling reason must flow from the heinous nature of
the offense.
1. In every law reviving the capital penalty, the heinousness and
compelling reasons must be set out for each and every crime,
and not just for all crimes generally and collectively.
"Thou shall not kill" is fundamental commandment to all Christians, as
well as to the rest of the "sovereign Filipino people" who believe in
Almighty God. 38 While the Catholic Church, to which the vast majority
of our people belong, acknowledges the power of public authorities to
prescribe the death penalty, it advisedly limits such prerogative only to
"cases of extreme
gravity." 39 To quote Pope John Paul II in his encyclical Evangelium
Vitae (A Hymn to Life), 40 "punishment must be carefully evaluated
and decided upon, and ought not to go to the extreme of executing
the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other
words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society . . .
(which is) very rare, if not practically non-existent."
Although not absolutely banning it, both the Constitution and the
Church indubitably abhor the death penalty. Both are pro-people and
pro-life. Both clearly recognize the primacy of human life over and
above even the state which man created precisely to protect, cherish
and defend him. The Constitution reluctantly allows capital
punishment only for "compelling reasons involving heinous crimes"
just as the Church grudgingly permits it only reasons of "absolute
necessity" involving crimes of "extreme gravity", which are very rare
and practically non-existent.
In the face of these evident truisms, I ask: Has the Congress, in
enacting RA 7659, amply discharged its constitutional burden of
proving the existence of "compelling reasons" to prescribe death
against well-defined "heinous" crimes?
I respectfully submit it has not.
WHEREFORE, the premises considered, I respectfully vote to grant
partially the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration and to modify
the dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court by deleting the
words "DEATH", as provided for under RA 7659," and substitute
therefore reclusion perpetua.
I further vote to declare RA 7659 unconstitutional insofar as it
prescribes the penalty of death for the crimes mentioned in its text.
354 Phil. 830
MARTINEZ, J.:
This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign judgment
rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in favor of the
petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION and against the
private respondent, PACIFIC CEMENT COMPANY,
INCORPORATED.
The petitioner is a foreign corporation owned and controlled by the
Government of India while the private respondent is a private
corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines. The present conflict between the petitioner and the
private respondent has its roots in a contract entered into by and
between both parties on February 26, 1983 whereby the private
respondent undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In
consideration therefor, the petitioner bound itself to pay the private
respondent the amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by
opening an irrevocable, divisible, and confirmed letter of credit in favor
of the latter. The oil well cement was loaded on board the ship MV
SURUTANA NAVA at the port of Surigao City, Philippines for delivery
at Bombay and Calcutta, India. However, due to a dispute between
the shipowner and the private respondent, the cargo was held up in
Bangkok and did not reach its point of destination. Notwithstanding
the fact that the private respondent had already received payment and
despite several demands made by the petitioner, the private
respondent failed to deliver the oil well cement. Thereafter,
negotiations ensued between the parties and they agreed that the
private respondent will replace the entire 4,300 metric tons of oil well
cement with Class "G" cement cost free at the petitioner's designated
port. However, upon inspection, the Class "G" cement did not conform
to the petitioner's specifications. The petitioner then informed the
private respondent that it was referring its claim to an arbitrator
pursuant to Clause 16 of their contract which stipulates:
"Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all
questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification
designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to
quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other
question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or
relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification,
instruction or these conditions or otherwise concerning the materials
or the execution or failure to execute the same during
stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment
thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the persons
appointed by Member of the Commission at the time of dispute. It will
be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so
appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with the
matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of
his duties as Commission's employee he had expressed views on all
or any of the matter in dispute or difference.
"The arbitrator to whom the matter is originally referred being
transferred or vacating his office or being unable to act for any reason
the Member of the Commission shall appoint another person to act as
arbitrator in acordance with the terms of the contract/supply order.
Such person shall be entitled to proceed with reference from the stage
at which it was left by his predecessor. Subject as aforesaid the
provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, or any Statutary modification or
re-enactment there of and the rules made there under and for the time
being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this
clause.
"The arbitrator may with the consent of parties enlarge the time, from
time to time, to make and publish the award.
"The venue for arbitration shall be at Dehra dun."[1]
On July 23, 1988, the chosen arbitrator, one Shri N.N. Malhotra,
resolved the dispute in petitioner's favor setting forth the arbitral
award as follows:
"NOW THEREFORE after considering all facts of the case, the "I determine the cost at Rs. 70,000/- equivalent to US $5,000 towards
evidence, oral and documentarys adduced by the claimant and the expenses on Arbitration, legal expenses, stamps duly incurred by
carefully examining the various written statements, submissions, the claimant. The cost will be shared by the parties in equal
letters, telexes, etc. sent by the respondent, and the oral arguments proportion.
addressed by the counsel for the claimants, I, N.N. Malhotra, Sole
Arbitrator, appointed under clause 16 of the supply order dated "Pronounced at Dehra Dun to-day, the 23rd of July 1988."[2]
26.2.1983, according to which the parties, i.e. M/S Oil and Natural
To enable the petitioner to execute the above award in its favor, it filed
Gas Commission and the Pacific Cement Co., Inc. can refer the
a Petition before the Court of the Civil Judge in Dehra Dun, India
dispute to the sole arbitration under the provision of the Arbitration
(hereinafter referred to as the foreign court for brevity), praying that
Act. 1940, do hereby award and direct as follows:-
the decision of the arbitrator be made "the Rule of Court" in India. The
foreign court issued notices to the private respondent for filing
"The Respondent will pay the following to the claimant :-
objections to the petition. The private respondent complied and sent
its objections dated January 16, 1989. Subsequently, the said court
1. Amount received by the Respondent
directed the private respondent to pay the filing fees in order that the
against the letter of credit No. 11/19
latter's objections could be given consideration. Instead of paying the
dated 28.2.1983 - - - US
required filing fees, the private respondent sent the following
$ 477,300.00
communication addressed to the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun:
2. Re-imbursement of expenditure incurred
by the claimant on the inspection team's
visit to Philippines in August 1985 --- "The Civil Judge
US$ 3,881.00 Dehra Dun (U.P.) India
Re: Misc. Case No. 5 of 1989
3. L. C. Establishment charges incurred M/S Pacific Cement Co.,
by the claimant - - - US Inc. vs. ONGC Case
$ 1,252.82 Sir:
1. We received your letter dated 28 April 1989 only last 18 May
4. Loss of interest suffered by claimant 1989.
from 21.6.83 to 23.7.88 - - - US 2. Please inform us how much is the court fee to be paid. Your
$ 417,169.95 letter did not mention the amount to be paid.
Total amount of award - - - US 3. Kindly give us 15 days from receipt of your letter advising us
$ 899,603.77 how much to pay to comply with the same.
Thank you for your kind consideration.
"In addition to the above, the respondent would also be liable to pay Pacific Cement Co., Inc.
to the claimant the interest at the rate of 6% on the above amount, By:
with effect from 24.7.1988 upto the actual date of payment by the Jose Cortes, Jr.
Respondent in full settlement of the claim as awarded or the date of President"[3]
the decree, whichever is earlier.
Without responding to the above communication, the foreign court
refused to admit the private respondent's objections for failure to pay
the required filing fees, and thereafter issued an Order on February 7,
1990, to wit:
"ORDER
Since objections filed by defendant have been rejected through Misc.
Suit No. 5 on 7.2.90, therefore, award should be made "Rule of the
Court.
"ORDER
Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On
the basis of conditions of award decree is passed. Award Paper No.
3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled
to get from defendant (US$ 899, 603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs ninety nine
thousand six hundred and three point seventy seven only) alongwith
9% interest per annum till the last date of realisation."[4]
Despite notice sent to the private respondent of the foregoing order
and several demands by the petitioner for compliance therewith, the
private respondent refused to pay the amount adjudged by the foreign
court as owing to the petitioner. Accordingly, the petitioner filed a
complaint with Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao
City for the enforcement of the aforementioned judgment of the
foreign court. The private respondent moved to dismiss the complaint
on the following grounds: (1) plaintiff's lack of legal capacity to sue; (2)
lack of cause of action; and (3) plaintiff's claim or demand has been
waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. The petitioner filed its
opposition to the said motion to dismiss, and the private respondent,
its rejoinder thereto. On January 3, 1992, the RTC issued an order
upholding the petitioner's legal capacity to sue, albeit dismissing the
complaint for lack of a valid cause of action. The RTC held that the
rule prohibiting foreign corporations transacting business in the
Philippines without a license from maintaining a suit in Philippine
courts admits of an exception, that is, when the foreign corporation is
suing on an isolated transaction as in this case.[5] Anent the issue of
the sufficiency of the petitioner's cause of action, however, the RTC
found the referral of the dispute between the parties to the arbitrator
under Clause 16 of their contract erroneous. According to the RTC,
"[a] perusal of the above-quoted clause (Clause 16) readily shows
that the matter covered by its terms is limited to "ALL QUESTIONS
AND DISPUTES, RELATING TO THE MEANING OF THE
SPECIFICATION, DESIGNS, DRAWINGS AND INSTRUCTIONS
HEREIN BEFORE MENTIONED and as to the QUALITY OF
WORKMANSHIP OF THE ITEMS ORDERED or as to any other
questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, but qualified to 'IN ANY
WAY ARISING OR RELATING TO THE SUPPLY
ORDER/CONTRACT, DESIGN, DRAWING, SPECIFICATION, etc.,'
repeating the enumeration in the opening sentence of the clause.
"The court is inclined to go along with the observation of the
defendant that the breach, consisting of the non-delivery of the
purchased materials, should have been properly litigated before a
court of law, pursuant to Clause No. 15 of the Contract/Supply Order,
herein quoted, to wit:
'JURISDICTION
All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in
connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT, within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction and the place from which this supply order is situated.'"[6]
The RTC characterized the erroneous submission of the dispute to
the arbitrator as a "mistake of law or fact amounting to want of
jurisdiction". Consequently, the proceedings had before the arbitrator
were null and void and the foreign court had therefore, adopted no
legal award which could be the source of an enforceable right.[7]
The petitioner then appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals
which affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. In its decision, the
appellate court concurred with the RTC's ruling that the arbitrator did
not have jurisdiction over the dispute between the parties, thus, the The threshold issue is whether or not the arbitrator had jurisdiction
foreign court could not validly adopt the arbitrator's award. In addition, over the dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent
the appellate court observed that the full text of the judgment of the under Clause 16 of the contract. To reiterate, Clause 16 provides as
foreign court contains the dispositive portion only and indicates no follows:
findings of fact and law as basis for the award. Hence, the said
judgment cannot be enforced by any Philippine court as it would
"Except where otherwise provided in the supply order/contract all
violate the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered
questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the specification
by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
designs, drawings and instructions herein before mentioned and as to
and the law on which it is based.[8] The appellate court ruled further
quality of workmanship of the items ordered or as to any other
that the dismissal of the private respondent's objections for non-
question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way arising out of or
payment of the required legal fees, without the foreign court first
relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing, specification,
replying to the private respondent's query as to the amount of legal
instruction or these conditions or otherwise concerning the materials
fees to be paid, constituted want of notice or violation of due process.
or the execution or failure to execute the same during
Lastly, it pointed out that the arbitration proceeding was defective
stipulated/extended period or after the completion/abandonment
because the arbitrator was appointed solely by the petitioner, and the
thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the persons
fact that the arbitrator was a former employee of the latter gives rise to
appointed by Member of the Commission at the time of dispute. It will
a presumed bias on his part in favor of the petitioner.[9]
be no objection to any such appointment that the arbitrator so
appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had to deal with the
A subsequent motion for reconsideration by the petitioner of the
matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in the course of
appellate court's decision was denied, thus, this petition for review on
his duties as Commission's employee he had expressed views on all
certiorari citing the following as grounds in support thereof:
or any of the matter in dispute or difference."[11]

The dispute between the parties had its origin in the non-delivery of
"RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement to the petitioner. The primary
AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL
question that may be posed, therefore, is whether or not the non-
SINCE:
delivery of the said cargo is a proper subject for arbitration under the
above-quoted Clause 16. The petitioner contends that the same was
A. THE NON-DELIVERY OF THE CARGO WAS A MATTER
a matter within the purview of Clause 16, particularly the phrase, "x x
PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BY THE PROVISIONS OF CLAUSE 16
x or as to any other questions, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any
OF THE CONTRACT;
way arising or relating to the supply order/contract, design, drawing,
specification, instruction x x x".[12] It is argued that the foregoing
B. THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIVIL COURT OF DEHRADUN, INDIA
phrase allows considerable latitude so as to include non-delivery of
WAS AN AFFIRMATION OF THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL FINDINGS
the cargo which was a "claim, right or thing relating to the supply
OF THE ARBITRATOR AND THEREFORE ENFORCEABLE IN THIS
order/contract". The contention is bereft of merit. First of all, the
JURISDICTION;
petitioner has misquoted the said phrase, shrewdly inserting a comma
between the words "supply order/contract" and "design" where none
C. EVIDENCE MUST BE RECEIVED TO REPEL THE EFFECT OF A
PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT UNDER A FOREIGN JUDGMENT."[10] actually exists. An accurate reproduction of the phrase reads, "x x x or
as to any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way
arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing,
specification, instruction or these conditions x x x". The absence of a
comma between the words "supply order/contract" and "design"
indicates that the former cannot be taken separately but should be
viewed in conjunction with the words "design, drawing, specification,
instruction or these conditions". It is thus clear that to fall within the
purview of this phrase, the "claim, right or thing whatsoever" must
arise out of or relate to the design, drawing, specification, or
instruction of the supply order/contract. The petitioner also insists that
the non-delivery of the cargo is not only covered by the foregoing
phrase but also by the phrase, "x x x or otherwise concerning the
materials or the execution or failure to execute the same during the
stipulated/extended period or after completion/abandonment thereof x
x x".
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, although a rule in the construction of
statutes, is equally applicable in the ascertainment of the meaning
and scope of vague contractual stipulations, such as the
aforementioned phrase. According to the maxim noscitur a sociis,
where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be
made clear and specific by considering the company of the words in
which it is found or with which it is associated, or stated differently, its
obscurity or doubt may be reviewed by reference to associated
words.[13] A close examination of Clause 16 reveals that it covers
three matters which may be submitted to arbitration namely,
(1) all questions and disputes, relating to the meaning of the
specification designs, drawings and instructions herein before
mentioned and as to quality of workmanship of the items ordered; or
(2) any other question, claim, right or thing whatsoever, in any way
arising out of or relating to the supply order/contract design, drawing,
specification, instruction or these conditions; or
(3) otherwise concerning the materials or the execution or failure to
execute the same during stipulated/extended period or after the
completion/abandonment thereof.
The first and second categories unmistakably refer to questions and
disputes relating to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or
quality of the materials of the supply/order contract. In the third
category, the clause, "execution or failure to execute the same", may
be read as "execution or failure to execute the supply order/contract".
But in accordance with the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, this reference
to the supply order/contract must be construed in the light of the
preceding words with which it is associated, meaning to say, as being
limited only to the design, drawing, instructions, specifications or
quality of the materials of the supply order/contract. The non-delivery
of the oil well cement is definitely not in the nature of a dispute arising
from the failure to execute the supply order/contract design, drawing,
instructions, specifications or quality of the materials. That Clause 16
should pertain only to matters involving the technical aspects of the
contract is but a logical inference considering that the underlying
purpose of a referral to arbitration is for such technical matters to be
deliberated upon by a person possessed with the required skill and
expertise which may be otherwise absent in the regular courts.
This Court agrees with the appellate court in its ruling that the non-
delivery of the oil well cement is a matter properly cognizable by the
regular courts as stipulated by the parties in Clause 15 of their
contract:
"All questions, disputes and differences, arising under out of or in
connection with this supply order, shall be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the court, within the local limits of whose jurisdiction and
the place from which this supply order is situated."[14]
The following fundamental principles in the interpretation of contracts
and other instruments served as our guide in arriving at the foregoing
conclusion:
"ART. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of
several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which
is most adequate to render it effectual."[15]
 argument, that the non-delivery of the oil well cement is not a proper
"ART. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted subject for arbitration, the failure of the replacement cement to
together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result conform to the specifications of the contract is a matter clearly falling
from all of them taken jointly".[16] within the ambit of Clause 16. In this contention, we find merit. When
the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement were not delivered to the
"Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In petitioner, an agreement was forged between the latter and the
the construction of an instrument, where there are several provisions private respondent that Class "G" cement would be delivered to the
or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will petitioner as replacement. Upon inspection, however, the replacement
give effect to all."[17] cement was rejected as it did not conform to the specifications of the
contract. Only after this latter circumstance was the matter brought
Thus, this Court has held that as in statutes, the provisions of a
before the arbitrator. Undoubtedly, what was referred to arbitration
contract should not be read in isolation from the rest of the instrument
was no longer the mere non-delivery of the cargo at the first instance
but, on the contrary, interpreted in the light of the other related
but also the failure of the replacement cargo to conform to the
provisions.[18] The whole and every part of a contract must be
specifications of the contract, a matter clearly within the coverage of
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to
Clause 16.
produce a harmonious whole. Equally applicable is the canon of
construction that in interpreting a statute (or a contract as in this
The private respondent posits that it was under no legal obligation to
case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on
make replacement and that it undertook the latter only "in the spirit of
the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a
liberality and to foster good business relationship".[20] Hence, the
hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. The rule is that a construction
undertaking to deliver the replacement cement and its subsequent
that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
failure to conform to specifications are not anymore subject of the
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
supply order/contract or any of the provisions thereof. We disagree.
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.[19]
As per Clause 7 of the supply order/contract, the private respondent
The petitioner's interpretation that Clause 16 is of such latitude as to
undertook to deliver the 4,300 metric tons of oil well cement at
contemplate even the non-delivery of the oil well cement would in
"BOMBAY (INDIA) 2181 MT and CALCUTTA 2119 MT".[21] The failure
effect render Clause 15 a mere superfluity. A perusal of Clause 16
of the private respondent to deliver the cargo to the designated places
shows that the parties did not intend arbitration to be the sole means
remains undisputed. Likewise, the fact that the petitioner had already
of settling disputes. This is manifest from Clause 16 itself which is
paid for the cost of the cement is not contested by the private
prefixed with the proviso, "Except where otherwise provided in the
respondent. The private respondent claims, however, that it never
supply order/contract x x x", thus indicating that the jurisdiction of the
benefited from the transaction as it was not able to recover the cargo
arbitrator is not all encompassing, and admits of exceptions as may
that was unloaded at the port of Bangkok.[22] First of all, whether or not
be provided elsewhere in the supply order/contract. We believe that
the private respondent was able to recover the cargo is immaterial to
the correct interpretation to give effect to both stipulations in the
its subsisting duty to make good its promise to deliver the cargo at the
contract is for Clause 16 to be confined to all claims or disputes
stipulated place of delivery. Secondly, we find it difficult to believe this
arising from or relating to the design, drawing, instructions,
representation. In its Memorandum filed before this Court, the private
specifications or quality of the materials of the supply order/contract,
respondent asserted that the Civil Court of Bangkok had already ruled
and for Clause 15 to cover all other claims or disputes.
that the non-delivery of the cargo was due solely to the fault of the
carrier.[23] It is, therefore, but logical to assume that the necessary
The petitioner then asseverates that granting, for the sake of
consequence of this finding is the eventual recovery by the private
respondent of the cargo or the value thereof. What inspires credulity is
not that the replacement was done in the spirit of liberality but that it
was undertaken precisely because of the private respondent's
recognition of its duty to do so under the supply order/contract, Clause
16 of which remains in force and effect until the full execution thereof.
We now go to the issue of whether or not the judgment of the foreign
court is enforceable in this jurisdiction in view of the private
respondent's allegation that it is bereft of any statement of facts and
law upon which the award in favor of the petitioner was based. The
pertinent portion of the judgment of the foreign court reads:
"ORDER
Award dated 23.7.88, Paper No. 3/B-1 is made Rule of the Court. On
the basis of conditions of award decree is passed. Award Paper No.
3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree. The plaintiff shall also be entitled
to get from defendant ( US$ 899, 603.77 (US$ Eight Lakhs ninety nine
thousand six hundred and three point seventy seven only) alongwith
9% interest per annum till the last date of realisation."[24]
As specified in the order of the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, "Award
Paper No. 3/B-1 shall be a part of the decree". This is a categorical
declaration that the foreign court adopted the findings of facts and law
of the arbitrator as contained in the latter's Award Paper. Award Paper
No. 3/B-1, contains an exhaustive discussion of the respective claims
and defenses of the parties, and the arbitrator's evaluation of the
same. Inasmuch as the foregoing is deemed to have been
incorporated into the foreign court's judgment the appellate court was
in error when it described the latter to be a "simplistic decision
containing literally, only the dispositive portion".[25]
The constitutional mandate that no decision shall be rendered by any
court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of
"memorandum decisions" which adopt by reference the findings of
fact and conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals. In Francisco v. Permskul,[26] this Court held that the
following memorandum decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
did not transgress the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution:
"MEMORANDUM DECISION
After a careful perusal, evaluation and study of the records of this
case, this Court hereby adopts by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila, Branch 63 and finds that there is no
cogent reason to disturb the same.
"WHEREFORE, judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in
toto."[27] (Underscoring supplied.)
This Court had occasion to make a similar pronouncement in the
earlier case of Romero v. Court of Appeals,[28] where the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals adopted the findings and disposition
of the Court of Agrarian Relations in this wise:
"We have, therefore, carefully reviewed the evidence and made a re-
assessment of the same, and We are persuaded, nay compelled, to
affirm the correctness of the trial court's factual findings and the
soundness of its conclusion. For judicial convenience and expediency,
therefore, We hereby adopt by way of reference, the findings of facts
and conclusions of the court a quo spread in its decision, as integral
part of this Our decision."[29] (Underscoring supplied)
Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed
if only to avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the
lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher
court.[30] This is particularly true when the decision sought to be
incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts and
conclusions arrived at, as in this case, where Award Paper No. 3/B-1
consists of eighteen (18) single spaced pages.
Furthermore, the recognition to be accorded a foreign judgment is not
necessarily affected by the fact that the procedure in the courts of the
country in which such judgment was rendered differs from that of the
courts of the country in which the judgment is relied on.[31]This Court
has held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by the
lex fori or the internal law of the forum.[32] Thus, if under the
procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid
judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator's findings, then
the same must be accorded respect. In the same vein, if the
procedure in the foreign court mandates that an Order of the Court
becomes final and executory upon failure to pay the necessary docket
fees, then the courts in this jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of
the foreign court simply because our rules provide otherwise.
The private respondent claims that its right to due process had been
blatantly violated, first by reason of the fact that the foreign court
never answered its queries as to the amount of docket fees to be paid
then refused to admit its objections for failure to pay the same, and
second, because of the presumed bias on the part of the arbitrator
who was a former employee of the petitioner.
Time and again this Court has held that the essence of due process is
to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one's defense[33] or stated
otherwise, what is repugnant to due process is the denial of
opportunity to be heard.[34] Thus, there is no violation of due process
even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a
chance to explain his side of the controversy and he waived his right
to do so.[35]
In the instant case, the private respondent does not deny the fact that
it was notified by the foreign court to file its objections to the petition,
and subsequently, to pay legal fees in order for its objections to be
given consideration. Instead of paying the legal fees, however, the
private respondent sent a communication to the foreign court inquiring
about the correct amount of fees to be paid. On the pretext that it was
yet awaiting the foreign court's reply, almost a year passed without
the private respondent paying the legal fees. Thus, on February 2,
1990, the foreign court rejected the objections of the private
respondent and proceeded to adjudicate upon the petitioner's claims.
We cannot subscribe to the private respondent's claim that the foreign
court violated its right to due process when it failed to reply to its
queries nor when the latter rejected its objections for a clearly
meritorious ground. The private respondent was afforded sufficient
opportunity to be heard. It was not incumbent upon the foreign court
to reply to the private respondent's written communication. On the
contrary, a genuine concern for its cause should have prompted the
private respondent to ascertain with all due diligence the correct
amount of legal fees to be paid. The private respondent did not act
with prudence and diligence thus its plea that they were not accorded
the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or
sympathy from this Court.[36]
The private respondent bewails the presumed bias on the part of the
arbitrator who was a former employee of the petitioner. This point
deserves scant consideration in view of the following stipulation in the
contract:
"x x x. It will be no objection to any such appointment that the
arbitrator so appointed is a Commission employer (sic) that he had to
deal with the matter to which the supply or contract relates and that in
the course of his duties as Commission's employee he had expressed
views on all or any of the matter in dispute or
difference."[37] (Underscoring supplied.)
Finally, we reiterate hereunder our pronouncement in the case of
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals[38] that:
"A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country
from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to
presume the regularity of the proceedings and the giving of due notice
therein.
"Under Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an
action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country having jurisdiction
to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The
judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact. Also, under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court,
whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it
was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly
performed its official duty."[39]
Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment, the private
respondent herein, had the burden of overcoming the presumption of
its validity which it failed to do in the instant case.
The foreign judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done
than to order its enforcement, despite the fact that the petitioner
merely prays for the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the validity and enforceability
of the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction, further proceedings in
the RTC for the reception of evidence to prove otherwise are no
longer necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining the trial court's dismissal
of the OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION's complaint in Civil
Case No. 4006 before Branch 30 of the RTC of Surigao City
is REVERSED, and another in its stead is hereby
rendered ORDERING private respondent PACIFIC CEMENT
COMPANY, INC. to pay to petitioner the amounts adjudged in the
foreign judgment subject of said case.
uestion whether the issue before us is political or not. In this
connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established
principle is considered that it is not within the province of the courts to
pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action.
Where, therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the
Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore,
concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and
extent of these discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive
departments are spoken of as the political departments of government
because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by
considerations of public or political policy. These considerations of
public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to
violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority
not granted him by the Constitution or by, statute, but, within these
limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to
recognize that a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists,
and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow
therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the
Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326; emphasis supplied.).
To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum,
from which we quote:.
"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with
such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provisions.
"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to
determine what matters, fall within its scope. It is frequently used to
designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial
questions, which under the constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also
Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio
St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72 App. D. C., 108;
emphasis supplied.).
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain
amendments to the Constitution are invalid for non-compliance with
the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be
settled by the Courts. 5 .
In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of
political question was considered carefully. The Court said:.
"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the
questions involved are political, and not judicial. If this is correct, the
court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing
board would then be final, regardless of the actual vote upon the
amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has
been so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the
Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.
xxx xxx x x x.
" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political,
and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is to be exercised by the
people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of
the government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs.
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155;
32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed. 852, 16, C.
C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683,
25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep. 220. Thus the Legislature may in its
discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial
control over such matters, not merely because they involve political
question, but because they are matters which the people have by the
Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The Governor may exercise
the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he
observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred.
His discretionary acts cannot be controllable, not primarily because
they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws
have placed the particular matter under his control. But every officer
under a constitutional government must act according to law and
subject him to the restraining and controlling power of the people,
acting through the courts, as well as through the executive or the
Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other,
and the judiciary is the department which is charged with the special
duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all
official action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in
Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that the
government may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster
said were the greatest contained in any written constitutional
document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what
it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present
case. Here, we are called upon to decide whether the election of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a
member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes
the constitutional mandate that said members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the
second largest number of votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and
void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with
"full discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to
constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature.
It is clearly within the legitimate prove of the judicial department to
pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with
law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department
has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular election has been in
conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute
has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional
or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied.).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but,
also, the duty, to consider and determine the principal issue raised by
the parties herein.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and lawful?.
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).
It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the
Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three (23) members of the
Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely,
Senator Tañada, who is, also, the president of said party. In the
session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido
moved that Senator Tañada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be
given the privilege to nominate .. three (3) members" of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp.
328-329), referring to those who, according to the provision above-
quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second largest
number of votes" in the Senate. Senator Tañada objected formally to
this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to nominate said
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the
Nacionalista Party of which Senator Sabido and the other Senators
are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second
largest number of votes in the Senate, so that, being devoid of
authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal,
the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party, which,
already, has such authority, pursuant to the Constitution; and (b) that
Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Tañada to nominate
three (3) Senators to said Tribunal, although as representative of the
minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two or
three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada
further stated that he reserved the right to determine how many he
would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in
support of his motion. After some discussion, in which Senators
Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the
Senate adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do,
pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).
Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator
Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition of Senator Tañada, but,
also, maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one"
member of the Senate, namely, himself, he being the only Senator
who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-
364, 369). Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who
does not belong to said party may be nominated by its spokesman,
Senator Tañada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and
Laurel, as well as the other Senators already mentioned, expressed
their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although
the deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning and
afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution of the question
before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the
meeting was suspended, on motion of Senator Laurel, with a view to
seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was
resumed at 8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above
referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators
Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Tañada stated:.
"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I
nominate the only Citizens Party member in this Body, and that is
Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada.".
Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House.
Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.
"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the
Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the Senate-and I am now
making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on
behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other
members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators
Delgado and Cuenco.".
What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from
the Congressional Record for the Senate.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. I would like to record my opposition to the
nominations of the last two named gentlemen, Senators Delgado and
Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be
appointed to the tribunal but because of my sincere and firm
conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by the
Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or
the party having the largest number of votes to nominate three.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few
moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to record my objection
to the last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the
Electoral Tribunal.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar?
(Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes con la nominacion
hecha por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los
Senadores Delgado y Cuenco para ser miembros del Tribunal
Electoral, digan, si. (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan,
no (Silencio.) Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis supplied.).
Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the Nacionalista Party-as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have
been made without power or color of authority, for, after the
nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators
Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other
Senators, who shall be members thereof, must necessarily be
nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in
the Senate, and such party is, admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which
Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents.
Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the
effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be compose of nine (9)
members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the
House of Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that
when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the majority party,
and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal-Senator Tañada nominated himself only, on behalf of the
minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;"
that, when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the Senate, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and
the Senate merely complied with the aforementioned provision of the
fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and
Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the appointment of
their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid and lawful.
At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a motion of Senator
Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon,
the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate
the three Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why
the movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained
that the present composition of the Senate had created a condition or
situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution;
that although Senator Tañada formed part of the Nacionalista Party
before the end of 1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party;
and that Senator Tañada "is the distinguished president of the
Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation desired by the
framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate
Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then Senator Lim intervened, stating:.
"At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only minority
or the one that has the second largest number of votes in the existing
Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a
matter of right, not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we
should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Tañada only as a
privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32;
emphasis supplied.).
Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada, as
Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a mere privilege to
nominate," adding that:.
".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main
largest number of votes, and it is clear in my mind that there is such a argument in support of the mandatory character of the constitutional
party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral
Quezon belongs. .. We have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator Tribunal is that the word "shall", therein used, is imperative in nature
Tañada was included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was and that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice
by virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and dated February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the
the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain that when Senator footnote. 6.
Tañada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the
Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen
Nacionalista Party, he did not thereby become a Nacionalista because
and public official, said opinion has little, if any, weight in the solution
that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party
of the question before this Court, for the practical construction of a
entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its personality as
Constitution is of little, if any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again,
a party separate and distinct from the, Nacionalista Party. And we
"as a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and
should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by
ambiguity that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical
Senator Tañada in the 1953 election was one to the effect that he
construction has any application". As a consequence, "where the
belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis supplied.).
meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or
The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to practical executive interpretation thereof is entitled to no weight, and
Senator Tañada:. will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural
meaning." The reason is that "the application of the doctrine of
"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first
contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the
place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the minority. And whether we
interpretation of constitutional provisions than when applied to
like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a
statutory provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the
Nacionalista now, that he is the head and the representative of the
Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department,
Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of
contemporary or practical construction is not necessarily binding upon
view of public opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches
the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the
what is within the spirit of that Constitution. .. and from the point of
court, such construction is erroneous and its further application is not
view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we
made imperative by any paramount considerations of public policy, it
grant the opportunity to Senator Tañada to help us in the organization may he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.
of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up
The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido
by a, "uniform" application of the view therein adopted, so essential to
withdrew his motion to grant Senator Tañada the "privilege" to
give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous
nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of
constructions. Moreover, said opinion tends to change the natural
the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body"-not only without
meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is clear.
any, objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senate-
What is more, there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the
leave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no room for doubt that
purpose and spirit of said provisions do not warrant said change and
the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party, represented by Senator
that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount
Tañada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in considerations of public policy. .
said House.
The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent
herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory nature of the word
"shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals,
it ignores the fact that the same term is used with respect to the
method prescribed for their election, and that both form part of a
single sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral
portions of one and the same thought. Indeed, respondents have not
even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be
deemed mandatory insofar as the number of members of each
Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the
procedure for their selection. More important still, the history of
section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the
Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the theory of
petitioners herein.
Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of providing for
the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M.
Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:.
"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the
organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the determination of the
elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not
altogether satisfactory. There were many complaints against the lack
of political justice in this determination; for in a great number of cases,
party interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay
in the dispatch of election contests for legislative seats, the
irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and
the very apparent injection of partisanship in the determination of a
great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the
people as well as by the organs of public opinion.
"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in
the performance of this function assigned to it in the organic laws was
by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in
the decisions that there was, gradually built up a camp of thought in
the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of
election contests, following the practice in some countries, like
England and Canada.
"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the
convention." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego,
Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).
This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in
its session of February 22, 1956, Senator Sumulong declared:.
".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests
involving its own members, that is virtually placing the majority party in
a position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because
each House will be composed of a majority and a minority, and when
you make each House the judge of every election protest involving
any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to
dominate and dictate the decision in the case and result was, there
were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by
the majority at the expense and to the prejudice of the minority
protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done
even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag,
when he almost became a victim of the majority when he had an
election case, and it was only through the intervention of President
Quezon that he was saved from becoming the victim of majority
injustices.
"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system,
but the record will show that those cases were few and they were the
rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests
decided under the old system was that the majority being then in a
position to dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to
commit as it did commit many abuses and injustices." (Congressional
Record for the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the
House of Representatives, said:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to
create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members: Three of
them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and
three from the party having the second largest number votes so that
these members may represent the party, and the members of said
party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when
it comes to a party, Mr. President, there ground to believe that
decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for
the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our
Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the
election, the returns and the qualifications of the members of the
legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time
when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative
department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the
members, of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that
body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns
and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also
expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the greatest
argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that
was, among other things, the system obtaining in the United States
under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no
reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body
should not be retained. But it was thought that would make the
determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as
has been observed in the past." (Congressional Record for the
Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate
contested the accuracy of the views thus expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional
provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.
"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon
the hope and belief that the abolition of Party line because of the
equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority
parties of the National Assembly and the intervention of some
members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed
constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would
insure greater political justice in the determination of election contests
for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power
had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate Francisco
summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral
Commission in the following words:.
"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the
hands of members not only of the majority party but also of the
minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would make
protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience
that many times in the many protests tried in the House or in the
Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in.
From the moment that it is required that not only the majority but also
the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already
enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the
majority.
`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me
most, and that is the intervention of three justices. So that with this
intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the
justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any
fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions
purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as those
of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the
protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a
check upon the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In the
last analysis, what is really applied in the determination of electoral
cases brought before the tribunals of justice or before the House of
Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than the law
and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be
greater skill in the application of the laws and in the application of
doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices
who will act impartially in these electoral questions.
`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact
that in electoral protests it is impossible to set aside party interests.
Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to
the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied rightfully or
incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme
Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall
have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three justices. And with the
formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as
well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty that they
will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from
this precept the intervention of the party of the minority and that of the
three justices, then we shall be placing protests exclusively in the
hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in
practice that has not given good results. Many have criticized, many
have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral
cases .. I repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions
will be judged not only by three members of the majority but also by
three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the
impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court." (The
Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263;
emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this
Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63 Phil., 139), he
asserted:.
"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our
fundamental law were in their majority-men mature in years and
experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history
and political development of other countries of the world. When,
therefore they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a
constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of
passing upon and determining the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so
not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the
experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of
the Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of
which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding
the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its
creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated, was approved by that body
by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the
approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission
is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate justice of the people'.
(Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).
"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident
that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It
was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt need of
determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations
which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the
Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral
Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both
the majority and minority parties are equally represented to off-set
partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further
endowed with judicial temper by including in its membership three
justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.
As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention,
Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir
informacion del Subcomite de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con
mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft., dando tres
miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte
Suprerma, no cree su Senoria que este equivale pricticamente a dejar
el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta
cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros de la mayoria como los
de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema
consideration la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que
el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese,
podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como los de la minoria
prescindieran del partidisrno?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el
triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra, pp. 168-169;
emphasis supplied.).
It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of
our Constitution in providing for the establishment, first, of an Electoral
Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of
Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the
disposition of election contests affecting members of the lawmaking
body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely:
(a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having
the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in
each House of Congress, were given the same number of
representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they
may realize that partisan considerations could not control the
adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater
impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the
same number of representatives as each one of said political parties,
so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said
Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision
under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabido-who had moved to grant
to Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of
party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees
with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.
"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the
Constitution precisely thought of creating this Electoral Tribunal so as
to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in
the Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330;
emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sabido replied:.
"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).
Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its
composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and
make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to
speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is
the ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p.
349; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .
"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three
from the minority become members of the Tribunal it is hoped that
they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the
protestants or the protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges
because to decide election cases is a judicial function. But the framers
of, the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience.
They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that we are
human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral
Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from partisan
influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three
from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as
Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act as
judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is the
guarantee that they will offset each other and the result will be that the
deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have
no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants.
In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the majority from
controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make
sure that the decisive vote will be wielded by the Congressmen or
Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the
Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan
motives to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my
understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when
they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.
xxx xxx x x x.
"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in
creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure impartially and
independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never
allowing the majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by
seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the
hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor
either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for the Senate,
Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).
So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political
parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several members of the Senate
questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate and, hence, of Senator Tañada, as representative
of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal any
Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and
Paredes maintained that the spirit of the Constitution would be
violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to
the parties respectively making the nominations. 10.
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine
whether the parties having the largest, and the second largest,
number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral
Tribunals, those members of Congress who do not belong to the party
nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most vital feature of
the Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties
therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices
of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of
the members of the present Senate, said feature reflects the "intent"
"purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the
Senate Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional Record
for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355, 358, 362-3, 364,
370, 376).
Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as
to the construction or interpretation of statutes is to discover the true
intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.
"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a
statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit
of statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while
that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is
not within the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of
pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).
"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory
provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from
those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this
question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the
prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent
must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the
determination does not depend on the form of the statute.
Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object,
and the consequences which would result from construing it one way
or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with
other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a
mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and,
when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made
effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable
operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such
construction should be given; .. On the other hand, the language of a
statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory
whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such
construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory
construction; but the construction of mandatory words as directory
should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a
new law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute
is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be
done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of
form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only
by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a
statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with
the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where
the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper,
orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as
directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a
statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on
it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the
legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that
prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a
provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to
matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a
statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way
shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision
to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same
antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the
exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers
can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp.
869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, pp. 463-467;
emphasis supplied.).
What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to,
and concomitant with, the adoption of section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the
majority party from controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the
structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the majority
and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme
Court, who are members of said Tribunals, holding the resulting
balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the
selection of members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they
are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said Tribunals.
Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts
performed in violation thereof are null and void. 11.
It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case at bar, to
seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the
present composition of the Senate was not foreseen by the framers of
our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp.
329, 342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law
prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted maintains the
spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be
decisive in a tribunal consisting of three (3) Justices of the Supreme
Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either
one (1) or two (2) members nominated by the party having the second
largest number of votes in the House concerned.
Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents'
contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the Citizens Party 12 has
only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he should
nominate, for the Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the
Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, vis-a-vis
the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Tañada did not
nominate other two Senators, because, otherwise, he would worsen
the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party.
Indeed, by the aforementioned nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the Nacionalista
Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
as against one (1) member of the Citizens Party and three members
of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by
the majority party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same
would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the political parties
therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating
role of the Justices of the Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in
lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the
predominance of political considerations in the determination of
election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely what
the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. 13.
This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned. As a matter of
fact, when Senator Tañada objected to their nomination, he explicitly
made of record that his opposition was based, not upon their
character, but upon the principle involved. When the election of
members of Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent
upon the nomination of the political parties above referred to, the
Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of
selection thus established, regardless of the individual qualities of
those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the
delegatesto the Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran
politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could not,
and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to
giving general patterns or norms of action. In connection, particularly,
with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that,
even the most well meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake
off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to
resist the demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is
bound to increase in proportion to the degree of predominance of the
party from which it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed by
distinguished members of the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34,
supra.).
In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to
the effect that when "there is no minority party represented in the
Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears",
the following observations of the petitioners herein are worthy of
notice:.
" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very
frauds or terrorism committed by a party would establish the legal
basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at
least. Let us suppose, for example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16
senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial
elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A
are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud and/or terrorism. (The
ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since
liberation attests to the reality of election frauds and terrorism in our
country.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the
minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the
minority parties? According to the contention of the respondents, it
would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme
Court Justices and 5 or 6 members of the same party A accused of
fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court
to reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution
the very instrument by which a corrupt and ruthless party could
entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy democracy in
the Philippines.
xxx xxx x x x.
".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or
when the only electoral protests filed are by candidates of the majority
against members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no
objection to the statement. But if electoral protests are filed by
candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a need for a
check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the
observation made in the above-quoted opinion, such a cheek is a
function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the
Supreme Court, for the obvious and simple reason that they could
easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the
Tribunal.
xxx xxx x x x.
"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in
1939, it, did not appear that there were minority party candidates who
were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and
who could have brought a test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.).
The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada
are untenable. Although "an individual may waive constitutional
provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the
protection of his property, and, sometimes, even those tending "to
secure his personal liberty", the power to waive does not exist when
"public policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The procedure
outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral
Tribunals was adopted in response to the demands of the common
weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public
policy, those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its
provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without
an intent to such effect, which Senator Tañada did not have. Again,
the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights does not justify the
exercise thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is
vested exclusively by the Constitution.
The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration,
act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a
particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a
litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted
to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar,
petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe that
Senator Primicias could nominate Senators Cuenco and Delgado. On
the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the
exclusive right to make the nomination. He, likewise, specifically
contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again,
the rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law, about the
truth of which the other party is ignorant (see Moran's Comments on
the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the
situation that confronted Senator Tañada and the other members of
the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66 Phil.,
615), cited by respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed
office by virtue of an appointment, the legality of which he later on
assailed. In the case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator
Tañada as member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate,
distinct and independent from the nomination and election of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those Senators who have
not been nominated by the political parties specified in the
Constitution; that the party having the largest number of votes in the
Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to
said Electoral Tribunal; that the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the
other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral
Tribunal; that neither these three (3) Senators, nor any of them, may
be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate or its representative
therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing
to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado by Senator Primicias, and the election of said
respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and
void ab initio.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel
Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared to hold, however,
that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by
Senators Cuenco and Delgado, who are not lawful members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman,
presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members
of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules thereof. At any rate, as held
in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is
an internal matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said
body, and there is every reason to believe that it will, hereafter take
appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents
abovementioned, conformably with the spirit of the Constitution and
of, the decision in the case at bar.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents
Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado have not
been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that
they are not entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they
are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties of
Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in
connection with Senate Electoral Case No. 4 thereof. With the
qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards
respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and
Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes,
J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.
Paras, C.J., dissenting:.
In 1939, Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution
provided that "There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of
three Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
and of six members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom
shall be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes,
and three by the party having the second largest number of votes
therein." As all the members of the National Assembly then belonged
to the Nacionalista Party and a belief arose that it was impossible to
comply with the constitutional requirement that three members of the
Electoral Commission should be nominated by the party having the
second largest number of votes, the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice was sought on the proper interpretation of the constitutional
provision involved. Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos accordingly
rendered the following opinion:.
"Sir:.
"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January
24, 1939, thru the office of His Excellency, the President, in which you
request my opinion as `to the proper interpretation of the following
provision of Section (4) of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution':.
`There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices
of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of six
members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three
by the party having the second largest number of votes therein.'.
"You state that `as all the members of the present National Assembly
belong to the Nacionalista Party, it is impossible to comply with the
last part of the provision which requires that three members shall be
nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in
the Assembly.'.
"The main features of the constitutional provision in question are: (1)
that there shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three
Justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, and of
six members chosen by the National Assembly; and that (2) of the six
members to be chosen by the National Assembly, three shall be
nominated by the party having the largest number of votes and three
by the party having the second largest number of votes.
"Examining the history of the constitutional provision, I find that in the
first two drafts it was provided that the Electoral Commission shall be
composed of `three members elected by the members of the party
having the largest number of vote three elected by the members of
the party having the second largest number of votes, and three
justices of the Supreme Court ..(Aruego, The Framing of the Phil.
Const., pp. 260-261). But as finally adopted by the Convention, the
Constitution explicitly states that there shall be `six members chosen
by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the
party having the largest number of votes, an and three by the party
having the second largest number of votes' (Aruego, The Framing of
the Phil. Const., pp. 271-272).
"From the foregoing changes in the phraseology of the provision, it is
evident that the intention of the framers of our Constitution was that
there should invariably be six members from the National Assembly. It
was also intended to create a non-partisan body to decide any
partisan contest that may be brought before the Commission. The
primary object was to avoid decision based chiefly if not exclusively
on partisan considerations.
"The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the
constitutional mandate that the Assembly is entitled to six members in
the Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation
in the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members
cannot be exercised, it logically follows that the only party the
Assembly may nominate three others, otherwise the explicit mandate
of the Constitution that there shall be six members from the National
Assembly would be nullified.
"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the
Commission were not and could not have been intended. We cannot
say that the Commission should have nine members during one
legislative term and six members during the next. Constitutional
provisions must always have a consistent application. The
membership of the Commission is intended to be fixed and not
variable and is not dependent upon the existence or non-existence of
one or more parties in the Assembly.
"`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should
receive a consistent and uniform interpretation, so they shall not be
taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another
time, even though the circumstances may have so changed as to
make a different rule after desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).
"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention
in giving representation to the minority party in the Electoral
Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to
protect their interests, especially when the election of any member of
the minority party is protested. The basic philosophy behind the
constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a
check on the majority in the Electoral Commission, with the members
of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as
there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity
for such a check by the minority party disappears. It is a function that
is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme
Court.
"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional
provision in question, the changes that it has undergone since it was
first introduced until finally adopted by the convertion, as well as, the
considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention
in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral
Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the
Supreme Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be
nominated by the party in power, there being no other party entitled to
such nomination.".
Pursuant to the foregoing opinion of February 1, 1939, the Electoral
Commission was formally organized, with six members of the National
Assembly all belonging to the same party and three Justices of the
Supreme Court. Constitutional amendments were introduced and duly
adopted in 1940, and the Electoral Commission was replaced by an
Electoral Tribunal for each house of Congress. It is now provided that
"Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each house, three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Article VI, Section 11, of the
Constitution.).
If there was any doubt on the matter, the same was removed by the
amendment of 1940 the framers of which may be assumed to have
been fully aware of the one-party composition of the former National
Assembly which gave rise to the abovequoted opinion of the
Secretary of Justice. When instead of wording the amendment in such
a form as to nullify said opinion, Section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution not only did not substantially depart from the original
constitutional provision but also positively and expressly ordains that
"Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members," the
intent has become clear and mandatory that at all times the Electoral
Tribunal shall have nine Members regardless of whether or not two
parties make up each house of Congress.
It is very significant that while the party having the second largest
number of votes is allowed to nominate three Members of the Senate
or of the House of Representatives, it is not required that the
nominees should belong to the same party. Considering further that
the six Members are chosen by each house, and not by the party or
parties, the conclusion is inescapable that party affiliation is neither
controlling nor necessary.
Under the theory of the petitioners, even if there were sufficient
Members belonging to the party having the second largest of votes,
the latter may nominate less than three or none at all; and the Chief
Justice may similarly designate less than three Justices. If not absurd,
would frustrate the purpose of having an ideal number in the
composition of the Electoral Tribunal and guarding against the
possibility of deadlocks. It would not be accurate to argue that the
Members of the Electoral Tribunal other than the Justices of the
Supreme Court would naturally vote along purely partisan lines,
checked or fiscalized only by the votes of the Justices; otherwise
membership in the Tribunal may well be limited to the Justices of the
Supreme Court and so others who are not Members of the Senate or
of the House of Representatives. Upon the other hand, he framers of
the Constitution-not insensitive to some such argument-still had
reposed their faith and confidence in the independence, integrity and
uprightness of the Members of each House who are to sit in the
Electoral Tribunals and thereby expected them, as does everybody, to
decide jointly with the Justices of the Supreme Court election contests
exclusively upon their merits.
In view of the failure or unwillingness of Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada
of the Citizens Party, the party having the second largest number of
votes in the Senate, to nominate two other Members of the Electoral
Tribunal, the Senate was justified, in obedience to the constitutional
mandate, to choose-as it did-said two Members.
I vote to dismiss the petition.
Endencia, J., concurs.
LABRADOR, J., dissenting:.
I dissent and herewith proceed to explain my reasons therefor.
The constitutional provision, in pursuance of which Senators Cuenco
and Delgado were elected by the Senate members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal is as follows:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party having the
largest number of votes and three of the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The Senior Justice in each Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Section II, Article VI of the
Constitution.).
I hold that the above provision, just as any other constitutional
provision, is mandatory in character and that this character is true not
only of the provision that nine members shall compose the tribunal but
also that which defines the manner in which the members shall be
chosen. Such a holding is in accord with well-settled rules of statutory
construction.
"As a general proposition, there is greater likelihood that constitutional
provisions will be given mandatory effect than is true of any other
class of organic law. Indeed, such a construction accords with the
generally acknowledged import of constitutional fiat; that its character
is such as to require absolute compliance in all cases without
exception. And the very principles of our institutions, involving as they
do concepts of constitutional supremacy, are such as to form
reasonable grounds for a presumption that the framers of a
constitution intended that just such efficacy be given to it .." (Sec.
5807, Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. 3, p.84.).
The majority helds that as Senator Tañada, the only member of the
Senate who does not belong to the Nacionalista Party, has refused to
exercise the constitutional privilege afforded him to nominate the two
other members the Senate may not elect said two other members.
And the reason given for this ruling is the presumed intention of the
constitutional provision to safeguard the interests of the minority. This
holding is subject to the following fundamental objections. In the first
Place, it renders nugatory the provision which fixes the membership of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal at nine, a provision which is admittedly a
mandatory provision. In the second place, it denies to the Senate the
power that the constitutional provision expressly grants it, i. e., that of
electing the members of the Electoral Tribunal so in effect this right or
prerogative is lodged, as a consequence of the refusal of the minority
member to nominate, in the hands of said member of the minority,
contrary to the constitutional provision. In the third place, it would
make the supposedly procedural provision, the process of nomination
lodged in the minority party in the Senate, superior to and paramount
over the power of election, which is in the whole Senate itself. So by
the ruling of the majority, a procedural provision overrides a
substantive one and renders nugatory the other more important
mandatory provision that the Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of
nine members. In the fourth place, the majority decision has by
interpretation inserted a provision in the Constitution, which the
Constitutional Convention alone had the power to introduce, namely,
a proviso to the effect that if the minority fails or refuses to exercise its
privilege to nominate all the three members, the membership of the
Electoral Tribunal shall thereby be correspondingly reduced. This
arrogation of power by us is not justified by any rule of law or reason.
I consider the opinion of the Senate that the refusal of Senator
Tañada to nominate the two other members must be construed as a
waiver of a mere privilege, more in consonance not only with the
constitutional provision as a whole, but with the dictates of reason.
The above principle (of waiver) furnishes the remedy by which two
parts of the constitutional provision, that which fixes membership at
nine and that which outlines the procedure in which said membership
of nine may be elected, can be reconciled. Well known is the legal
principle that provisions which in their application may nullify each
other should be reconciled to make them both effective, if the
reconciliation can be effected by the application of other legal
principles. The reconciliation is brought about in this case by the
principle of waiver.
While I agree with the majority that it is the duty of this Court to step
in, when a constitutional mandate is ignored, to enforce said mandate
even as against the other coordinate departments, this is not the
occasion for it to do so, for to say the least it does not clearly appear
that the form and manner in which the Senate exercised its expressly
recognized power to elect its members to the Senate Electoral
Tribunal has been clearly violative of the constitutional mandate.
_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.
1 Casanovas vs. Hord, 8 Phil., 125; Omo vs. Insular Gov't., 11 Phil.,
67; Weigall vs. Shuster, 11 Phil., 340; Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil.,
44; Hamilton vs. McGirr, 30 Phil., 563; Compania Gral. de Tabacos
vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 34 Phil., 136; Central Capiz
vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil 599;
McDaniel vs. Apacible, 42 Phil., 749; U. S. vs. Ang Tan Ho, 43 Phil.,
1; People vs. Pomar, 46 Phil., 440. Agcaoili vs. Saguitan, 48 Phil.,
676; Gov't. vs. Springer, 50 Phil., 259; Gov't. us. Agoncillo, 50 Phil.,
348; Gov't. vs. El Hogar Filipino, 50 Phil, 399; Manila Electric vs.
Pasay Transp., 57 Phil., 600; Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
supra; People vs. Vera, 65 Phil., 56; Vargas vs. Rilloraza, 45 Off.
Gaz., 3847; Endencia vs. David, 49 Off. Gaz., A822; Rutter vs.
Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz., 1807; Comm. investment vs. Garcia, 49 Off.
Gaz., 1801; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 137; Ex Parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333; Hepburn vs. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Knox vs. Lee, 12 Wall.
457; Civil Rights Cases [U. S. vs. M. Stanley; U. S. vs. M. Ryan, U. S.
vs. S. Nichols; U. S. vs. Singleton; Robinson vs. and Charleston
Railroad Co.], 109 U. S. 3 Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.
157 U. S. 429, 158 U. S. 601; Fairbanks vs. U. S., 181 U. S. 286.
2 Which, insofar as pertinent to the issues in the case at bar, is
substantially identical to each of the Electoral Tribunals under the
Constitution as amended.
3 Araneta vs. Dinglasan, Barredo vs. Commission on Elections, and
Rodriguez vs. Teasurer of the Philippines, 84 Phil., 368, 45 Off. Gaz.,
4411, 4457; Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil., 101, 47 Off.
Gaz., 2356; Lacson vs. Romero, 84 Phil., 740, 47 Off. Gaz., 1778; De
los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil., 289, 48 Off. Gaz., 1787; Lacson vs.
Roque, 92 Phil., 456, 49 Off. Gaz., 93; Jover Ledesma vs. Borra, 93
Phil., 506, 49 Off. Gaz., 2765; Ramos vs. Avelino, 97 Phil., 844, 51
Off. Gaz., 5607.
_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_ 4 "From
the very nature of the American system of government with
Constitutions prescribing the jurisdiction and powers of each of the
three branches of government, it has devolved on the judiciary to
determine whether the acts of the other two departments are in
harmony with the fundamental law. All the departments are of the
government are unquestionably entitled and compelled to judge of the
Constitution for themselves; but, in doing so, they act under the
obligations imposed in the instrument, and in the order of time pointed
out by it. When the, judiciary has once spoken, if the acts of the other
two departments are held to be unauthorized or despotic, in violation
of the Constitution or the vested rights of the citizen, they cease to be
operative or binding.
xxx xxx x x x.
"Since the Constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary
as well as the other departments of government and the judges are
sworn to support its provisions, the court are not at liberty to overlook
or disregard its commands. It is their duty in authorized proceedings
to give effect to the existing Constitution and to obey all constitutional
provisions irrespective of their opinion as to the wisdom of such
provisions.
"In accordance with principles which are basic, the rule is fixed that
the duty in a proper case to declare a law unconstitutional cannot be
declined and must be performed in accordance with the deliberate
judgment of the tribunal before which the validity of the enactment is
directly drawn into question. When it is clear that a statute
transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act
unconstitutional cause they cannot shrink from it without violating their
oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as
the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as
Chief Justice Marshal said, whenever a statute is in violation of the
fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect
to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of
the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a
statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of
jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political
agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals." (11
Am. Jur., pp. 712-713, 713-715; emphasis supplied).
5 Rich vs. Board of Canvassers, 59 N. W. 183; State vs. McBride, 29
Am. Dec. 636; Collier vs. Frierson, 24 Ala. 100; State vs. Swift, 69 Ind.
505; State vs. Timme, 11 N.W. 785; Prohibition and Amendment
Cases, 24 Kan. 700; Kadderly vs. Portland, 74 Pac. 710; Koehler vs.
Hill, 14 N. W. 738; State vs. Brockhart, 84 S. W. 1064; University vs.
Melver, 72 N. C. 76; Westinghausen vs. People, 6 N.W. 641; State vs.
Powell, 27 South, 927; Bott vs. Wurtz, 43 Atl. 744; Rice vs. Palmer, 96
S. W. 396; State vs. Tooker, 37 Pac. 840.
6 "The procedure or manner of nomination cannot possibly affect the,
constitutional mandate that the Assembly is entitled to six in the
Electoral Commission. When for lack of a minority representation in
the Assembly the power to nominate three minority members cannot
be exercised, it logically follows that the only party in the Assembly
may nominate three others, otherwise the explicit mandate of the
Constitution that there shall be six members from the National
Assembly would be nullified.
"In other words, fluctuations in the total membership of the
Commission were not and could have been intended; We cannot say
that the Commission should have nine members during one legislative
term and six members during the next. Constitutional provisions must
always have a consistent application. The membership of the
Commission is intended to be fixed and not variable and is not
dependent upon the existence or non-existence of one or more
parties in the Assembly.
`A cardinal rule in dealing with Constitutions is that they should
receive a consistent and uniform interpretation, so they shall not be
taken to mean one thing at one time and another thing at another
time, even though the circumstance may have so changed as to make
a different rule seem desirable (11 Am. Jur. 659).'.
"It is undisputed of course that the primary purpose of the Convention
in giving representation to the minority party in the Electoral
Commission was to safeguard the rights of the minority party and to
protect their interests, especially when the election of any member of
the minority party is protected. The basic philosophy behind the
constitutional provision was to enable the minority party to act as a
check on the majority of the Electoral Commission, with the members
of the Supreme Court as the balancing factor. Inasmuch, however, as
there is no minority party represented in the Assembly, the necessity
for such a check by the minority party disappears. It is a function that
is expected to be exercised by the three Justices of the Supreme
Court.
"To summarize, considering the plain terms of the constitutional
provision in question, the changes that it has undergone since it was
first introduced until finally adopted by the Convention, as well as the
considerations that must have inspired the Constitutional Convention
in adopting it as it is, I have come to the conclusion that the Electoral
Commission should be composed of nine members, three from the
Supreme Court and six chosen by the National Assembly to be
nominated by the party in power, there being no other party entitled to
such nomination." Annex A to the Answers pp. 2-3.
6a Since 1939, when said opinion was rendered, the question therein
raised has not been taken up or discussed, until the events leading to
the case at bar (in February 1956).
6b "Thus, in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra)-in which the
respondents maintained that the Electoral Commission formed part of
the National Assembly, citing in support thereof the principle of
contemporaneous and practical construction-this Court deemed it
unnecessary to refute the same in order to adopt the opposite view.
7 Senator Laurel reiterated this view on the floor of the Senate, on
February 22. 1956, in the following language:.
"And hence this provision that we find in the Constitution, three to
represent, in the manner prescribed in the Constitution, the party that
received the highest number of votes, meaning the majority party
which is the Nacionalista Party now, and three to represent the party
receiving the next highest number of votes therein, meaning the
minority party, the party receiving the next highest number of votes.
But there was a great deal of opinion that it would be better if this
political organization, so far as the legislative department is
concerned, could be tempered by a sort of a judicial reflection which
could be done by drafting three, as to each Electoral Tribunal, from
the Supreme Court. And that, I think, was the reason because a great
majority of the delegates to the constitutional convention accepted
that principle. That is why we have nine members in each electoral
tribunal, in the House and in the Senate. And one reason that I
remember then and I am speaking from memory, Mr. President, was
that it is likely that the three members representing a party would
naturally favor the protestants or protestees, and so on. So it would be
better that even on that hypothesis or on that supposition it would be
better, in case they annul each other because three votes in favor or
three votes against, depending on the party of the protestants or the
protestees, that the Supreme Court decide the case because then it
would be a judicial decision in reality. Another reason is founded on
the theory that the Justices of the Supreme Court are supposed to be
beyond influence, although that may not be true. But having reached
the highest judicial position of the land, these persons would likely act
impartially." (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, p. 376.).
8 When the legislative power was vested in a unicameral body, known
as the National Assembly.
9 Upon the substitution of the National Assembly by a bicameral
Congress, consisting of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
10 Senator Lim said:.
"But in the spirit, Your Honor can see very well that those three should
belong to the party having the second largest number of votes,
precisely, as Your Honor said, to maintain equilibrium because
partisan considerations naturally enter into the mind and heart of a
senator belonging to a particular party. Although grammatically, I
agree with Your Honor, Your Honor can see that the spirit of the
provision of the Constitution is clear that the three must come from the
party having the highest number of votes and the other three
nominated must belong to the party having the second highest
number of votes. Your Honor can see the point. If we allow Your
Honor to back up your argument that equilibrium should be
maintained, because partisan considerations enter when one is with
the majority party, and that no party should prevail, Your Honor should
also have to consider that the spirit of the Constitution is precisely to
obviate that to the extent that the only three can be nominated from
the party having the largest number of votes and three from the party
having the second largest number of votes." (Congressional Record
of the Senate, Vol. Ill, p, 337; emphasis supplied.).
_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä_.
The statement of Senator Sabido was:.
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its
composition is to maintain a balance between the two parties and
make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to
speak of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is
the ideal situation.".
xxx xxx x x x.
".. I said that the ideal composition in the contemplation of the framers
of the Constitution is that those participating in the electoral tribunal
shall belong to the members of the party who are before the electoral
tribunal either as protestants or protestees, in order to insure
impartiality in the proceeding and justice in the decision that may be
finally rendered." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp.
349, 352; emphasis supplied.).
_Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__Ä__
Ä_.
Senator Cea declared:.
".. the original purpose of the Constitution is to nominate only
members of the two major parties in the Senate in the Electoral
Tribunal." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 350;
emphasis supplied.).
The words of Senator Paredes were:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to
create a sort of collegiate court composed of nine members three of
them belonging to the party having largest number of votes, and three
from, the party having the second largest number of votes so that
these members my represent the party, and the members of said
party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when
it comes to a party, Mr. President, there is ground to believe that
decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for
the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; emphasis supplied.).
11 The need of adopting this view is demanded, not only by the
factors already adverted to, but, also, by the fact that constitutional
provisions, unlike statutory enactments, are presumed to be
mandatory, "unless the contrary is unmistakably manifest." The
pertinent rule of statutory construction is set forth in the American
Jurisprudence as follows:.
"In the interpretation of Constitutions, questions frequently arise as to
whether particular sections are mandatory or directory. The courts
usually hesitate to declare that a constitutional provision is directory
merely in view of the tendency of the legislature to disregard
provisions which are not said to be mandatory. Accordingly, it is the
general rule to regard constitutional provisions as mandatory, and not
to leave any direction to the will of a legislature to obey or to disregard
them. This presumption as to mandatory quality is usually followed
unless it is unmistakably manifest that the provisions are intended to
be merely directory. The analogous rules distinguishing mandatory
and directory statutes are of little value in this connection and are
rarely applied in passing upon the provisions of a Constitution.
"So strong is the inclination in favor of giving obligatory force to the
terms of the organic law that it has even been said that neither by the
courts nor by any other department of the government may any
provision of the Constitution be regarded as merely directory, but that
each and everyone of its provisions should be treated as imperative
and mandatory, without reference to the rules and distinguishing
between the directory and the mandatory statutes." (II Am. Jur. 686-
687; emphasis supplied.).
12 Which admittedly, has the second largest number of votes in the
Senate.
13 In Angara vs. Electoral Commission (supra, 169) Senator, then
Justice, Laurel, speaking for this Court, recalled that:.
"In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought
to amend the draft by reducing the representation of the minority party
and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members
each, so as to accord more representation to the majority party. The
Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of seventy-six (76)
against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of
the commission."(emphasis supplied.).
Needless to say, what the Constitutional Convention thus precluded
from being done by direct action or grant of authority in the Charter of
our Republic should not receive judicial sanction, when done by
resolution of one House of Congress, a mere creature of said charter.
14 Namely, the other two (2) Justices of the Supreme Court and
Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, or a total of six (6) members of
the Tribunal.
G.R. No. 203754 June 16, 2015
FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
COLON HERITAGE REALTY CORPORATION, operator of Oriente
Group Theaters, represented by ISIDORO A.
CANIZARES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF CEBU and SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no
act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of
their defined functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.1
The Case
Once again, We are called upon to resolve a clash between the
Inherent taxing power of the legislature and the constitutionally-
delegated power to tax of local governments in these consolidated
Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal of the Decision dated September 25, 2012 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 5 in Cebu City, in Civil Case No.
CEB-35601, entitled Colon Heritage Realty Corp., represented by
Isidoro Canizares v. Film Development Council of the' Philippines,
and Decision dated October 24, 2012 of the RTC, Branch 14 in Cebu
City, in Civil Case No. CEB-35529, entitled City of Cebu v. Film
Development Council of the Philippines, collectively declaring
Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9167 invalid and
unconstitutional.
The Facts
The facts are simple and undisputed.
Sometime in 1993, respondent City of Cebu, in its exercise of its
power to impose amusement taxes under Section 140 of the Local
Government Code2 (LGC) anchored on the constitutional policy on
local autonomy,3 passed City Ordinance No. LXIX otherwise known
as the "Revised Omnibus Tax Ordinance of the City of Cebu (tax
ordinance)." Central to the case at bar are Sections 42 and 43,
Chapter XI thereof which require proprietors, lessees or operators of
theatres, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement, to pay an amusement tax equivalent to thirty
percent (30%) of the gross receipts of admission fees to the Office of
the City Treasurer of Cebu City. Said provisions read:
CHAPTER XI - Amusement Tax
Section 42. Rate of Tax. - There shall be paid to the Office of the City proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted
Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, within thirty (30) days from the termination of the exhibition to the
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia and other places of Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the
amusement, an amusement tax at the rate of thirty percent (30%) of producers of the graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt
the gross receipts from admission fees.4 thereof.
Section 43. Manner of Payment. - In the case of theaters or cinemas, Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to
the tax shall first be deducted and withheld by their proprietors, remit the amusement tax proceeds within the prescribed period shall
lessees, or operators and paid to the city treasurer before the gross be liable to a surcharge equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount
receipts are divided between said proprietor, lessees, operators, and due for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to the Council.
the distributors of the cinematographic films. (emphasis added)
Almost a decade later, or on June 7, 2002, Congress passed RA According to petitioner, from the time RA 9167 took effect up to the
9167,5 creating the Film Development Council qf the Philippines present, all the cities and municipalities in Metro Manila, as well as
(FDCP) and abolishing the Film Development Foundation of the urbanized and independent component cities, with the sole exception
Philippines, Inc. and the Film Rating Board. Secs. 13 and 14 of RA of Cebu City, have complied with the mandate of said law.
9167 provided for the tax treatment of certain graded films as follows:
Accordingly, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. - Films which have obtained sent on January 2009 demand letters for unpaid amusement tax
an "A" or "B" grading from the Council pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 reward (with 5% surcharge for each month of delinquency) due to the
of this Act shall be entitled to the following privileges: producers of the Grade "A" or "B" films to the following cinema
proprietors and operators in Cebu City:
a. Amusement tax reward. - A grade "A" or "B" film shall entitle its
producer to an incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed Amusement
and collected on the graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro Tax Reward Number
Manila and other highly urbanized and independent component cities Cinema (with 5% of CEB
in the Philippines pursuant to Sections 140 to 151 of Republic Act No. Period Covered
Proprietor/Operator surcharge for Graded
7160 at the following rates: each moth of Films
1. For grade "A" films - 100% of the amusement tax collected on such delinquency)
film; and
SM Prime Holdings Inc. 76,836,807.08 89 Sept. 11, 2003 - Nov. 4, 20
2. For grade "B" films - 65% of the amusement tax collected on such
films. The remaining thirty-five (35%) shall accrue to the funds of theAyala Center Cinemas 43,435,718.23 70 May 14, 2003 - Nov. 4, 200
Council.
Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue Colon Heritage Realty 8,071,267.00 50 Aug. 11, 2004-Nov. 4, 2008
from the amusement tax on the graded film which may otherwise Corp.
accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and
highly urbanized and independent component cities in the PhilippinesEden Theater 428,938.25 4 May 5, 2005 - Sept. 2, 2008
pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during the period
the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the
nema Theater 3,100,354.80 22 Feb. 18, 2004-Oct. 7, 2008(a) Collecting amusement tax incentive award in the City of Cebu and
from imposing surcharges thereon;
saya Cineplex Corp. 17,582,521.89 86 June 25, 2005 - Oct. 21,
2008
ra Vistarama Cinema 68,821.60 2 July 2 - 22, 2008
bu Central Realty 9,853,559.69 48 Jan. 1, 2004 - Oct. 21, 2008amount; and
rp.
In said letters, the proprietors and cinema operators, including private
respondent Colon Heritage Realty Corp. (Colon Heritage), operator of
the Oriente theater, were given ten (10) days from receipt thereof to
pay the aforestated amounts to FDCP. The demand, however, fell on
deaf ears.
Meanwhile, on March 25, 2009, petitioner received a letter from Regal
Entertainment, Inc., inquiring on the status of its receivables for tax
rebates in Cebu cinemas for all their A and B rate films along with
those which it co-produced with GMA films. This was followed by a
letter from
Star Cinema ABS-CBN Film Productions, Inc., requesting the
immediate remittance of its amusement tax rewards for its graded
films for the years 2004-2008.
Because of the persistent refusal of the proprietors and cinema
operators to remit the said amounts as FDCP demanded, on one
hand, and Cebu City's assertion of a claim on the amounts in
question, the city finally filed on May 18, 2009 before the RTC, Branch
14 a petition for declaratory relief with application for a writ of
preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-35529 (City of
Cebu v. FDCP). In said petition, Cebu City sought the declaration of
Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.
Similarly, Colon Heritage filed before the RTC, Branch 5 Civil Case
No. CEB-35601 (Colon Heritage v. FDCP), seeking to declare Sec. 14
of RA 9167 as unconstitutional.
On May 25, 2010, the RTC, Branch 14 issued a temporary restraining
order (TRO) restraining and enjoining FDCP, et al. from, inter alia:
(b) Demanding from the owners, proprietors, and lessees of theaters
and cinemas located and operated within Cebu City, payment of said
amusement tax incentive award which should have been deducted,
withheld, and remitted to FDCP, etc. by the owners, etc., or being
operated within Cebu City and imposing surcharges on the unpaid
(c) Filing any suit due to or arising from the failure of the owners, etc.,
of theaters or cinemas within Cebu City, to deduct, withhold, and remit
the incentive to FDCP.
Meanwhile, on August 13, 2010, SM Prime Holdings, Inc. moved for
leave to file and admit attached comment-in-intervention and was later
granted.6
Rulings of the Trial Courts
In City of Cebu v. FDCP, the RTC, Branch 14 issued the challenged
Decision7 declaring Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 unconstitutional,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the disquisitions, judgment is rendered in
favor of petitioner City of Cebu against respondent Film Development
Council of the Philippines, as follows:
1. Declaring Sections 13 and 14 of the (sic) Republic Act No. 9167
otherwise known as an Act Creating the Film Development Council of
the Philippines, Defining its Powers and Functions, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for other purposes, as violative of Section 5
Article X of the 1997 (sic) Philippine Constitution; Consequently
2. Declaring that defendant Film Development Council of the
Philippines (FDCP) cannot collect under Sections 13 and 14 of R.A.
9167 as of the finality of the decision in G.R. Nos. 203754 and
204418;
3. Declaring that Intervenor SM Cinema Corporation has the
obligation to remit the amusement taxes, withheld on graded cinema
films to respondent FDCP under Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 for
taxes due prior to the finality of the decision in G.R. Nos. 203754 and
204418;
4. Declaring that after the finality of the decision in G.R. Nos. 203 754
and 204418, all amusement taxes withheld and those which may be
collected by Intervenor SM on graded films shown in SM Cinemas in
Cebu City shall be remitted to petitioner Cebu City pursuant to City
Ordinance LXIX, Chapter XI, Section 42.
As to the sum of PhP 76,836,807.08 remitted by the Intervenor SM to
petitioner City of Cebu, said amount shall be remitted by the City of
Cebu to petitioner FDCP within thirty (30) days from finality of this
decision in G.R. Nos. 203754 and 204418 without interests and
surcharges.
SO ORDERED.
According to the court, what RA 9167 seeks to accomplish is the
segregation of the amusement taxes raised and collected by Cebu
City and its subsequent transfer to FDCP. The court concluded that
this arrangement cannot be classified as a tax exemption but is a
confiscatory measure where the national government extracts money
from the local government's coffers and transfers it to FDCP, a private
agency, which in turn, will award the money to private persons, the
film producers, for having produced graded films.
The court further held that Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 are contrary to
the basic policy in local autonomy that all taxes, fees, and charges
imposed by the LGUs shall accrue exclusively to them, as articulated
in A1iicle X,. Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution. This edict, according to
the court, is a limitation upon the rule-making power of Congress
when it provides guidelines and limitations on the local government
unit's (LGU's) power of taxation. Therefore, when Congress passed
this "limitation," if went beyond its legislative authority, rendering the
questioned provisions unconstitutional.
By the same token, in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, the RTC, Branch 5, in
its Decision of September 25, 2012, also ruled against the
constitutionality of said Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 for the following
reasons: (a) while Congress, through the enactment of RA 9167, may
have amended Secs. 140(a)8 and 1519 of the LGC, in the exercise of
its plenary power to amend laws, such power must be exercised
within constitutional parameters; (b) the assailed provision violates the
constitutional directive that taxes should accrue exclusively to the
LGU concerned; (c) the Constitution, through its Art. X, Sec.
5,10 directly conferred LGUs with authority to levy taxes-the power is
no longer delegated by the legislature; (d) In CIR v. SM Prime
Holdings,11 the Court ruled that amusement tax on cinema/theater
operators or proprietors remain with the LGU, amusement tax, being,
by nature, a local tax. The fallo of the questioned judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of petitioner, as follows:
(1) Declaring Republic Act No. 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional;
(2) The obligation to remit amusement taxes for the graded films to
respondent is ordered extinguished;
(3) Directing respondent to refund all the amounts paid by petitioner,
by way of amusement tax, plus the legal rate of interest thereof, until
the whole amount is paid in full.
Notify parties and counsels of this order.
SO ORDERED.
The Issue
Undeterred by two defeats, petitioner has come directly to this Court,
presenting the singular issue: whether or not the RTC (Branches 5
and 14) gravely erred in declaring Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 invalid
for being unconstitutional.
Anent Sec. 13,12 FDCP concedes that the amusement taxes
assessed in RA 9167 are to be given to the producers of graded films
who are private persons. Nevertheless, according to FDCP, this
particular tax arrangement is not a violation of the rule on the use of
public funds for RA 9167 was enacted for a public purpose, that is, the
promotion and support of the "development and growth of the local
film industry as a medium for the upliftment of aesthetic, cultural, and
social values for the better understanding and appreciation of the
Filipino identity" as well as the "encouragement of the production of
quality films that will promote the growth and development' of the local
film industry."13 Moreover, FDCP suggests that "even if the resultant
effect would be a certain loss of revenue, [LGUs] do not feel deprived
nor bitter for they realize that the benefits for the film industry, the
fortification of our values system, and the cultural boost for the nation
as a whole, far outweigh the pecuniary cost they would shoulder by
backing this law."14 Finally, in support of its stance, FDCP invites
attention to the following words of former Associate Justice Isagani A.
Cruz: "[t]he mere fact that the tax will be directly enjoyed by a private
individual does not make it invalid so long as some link to the public
welfare is established."15
As regards Sec. 1416 of RA 9167, FDCP is of the position that Sec. 5,
Article X of the Constitution does not change the doctrine that
municipal corporations only possess delegated, not inherent, powers
of taxation and that the power to tax is still primarily vested in the
Congress. Thus, wielding its power to impose limitations on this
delegated power, Congress further restricted the LGU's power to
impose amusement taxes via Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167-an express
and real intention of Congress to further contain the LGU's delegated
taxing power. It, therefore, cannot be construed as an undue limitation
since it is well within the power of Congress to make such restriction.
Furthermore, the LGC is a mere statute which Congress can amend,
which it in fact did when it enacted RA 916417 and, later, the
questioned law, RA 9167.18
This, according to FDCP, evinces the overriding intent of Congress to
remove from the LGU' s delegated taxing power all revenues from
amusement taxes on grade "A" or "B" films which would otherwise
accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and
highly urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines
pursuant to Secs. 140 and 151 of the LGC.
In fine, it is petitioner's posture that the inclusion in RA 9167 of the
questioned provisions was a valid exercise of the legislature's power
to amend laws and an assertion of its constitutional authority to set
limitations on the LGU' s authority to tax.
The Court's Ruling
We find no reason to disturb the assailed rulings.
Local fiscal autonomy and the constitutionally-delegated power to tax
The power of taxation, being an essential and inherent attribute of
sovereignty, belongs, as a matter of right, to every independent
government, and needs no express conferment by the people before
it can be exercised. It is purely legislative and, thus, cannot be
delegated to the executive and judicial branches of government
without running afoul to the theory of separation of powers. It,
however, can be delegated to municipal corporations, consistent with
the principle that legislative powers may be delegated to local
governments in respect of matters of local concern.19 The authority of
provinces, cities, and municipalities to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes, therefore, is not inherent and may be
exercised only to the extent that such power might be delegated to
them either by the basic law or by statute.20 Under the regime of the
1935 Constitution, there was no constitutional provision on the
delegation of the power to tax to municipal corporations. They only
derived such under a limited statutory authority, outside of which, it
was deemed withheld.21 Local governments, thus, had very restricted
taxing powers which they derive from numerous tax laws. This highly-
centralized government structure was later seen to have arrested the
growth and efficient operations of LG Us, paving the way for the
adoption of a more decentralized system which granted LGUs local
autonomy, both administrative and fiscal autonomy.22
Material to the case at bar is the concept and scope of local fiscal
autonomy. In Pimentel v. Aguirre,23 fiscal autonomy was defined as
"the power [of LGUs] to create their own sources of revenue in
addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the
national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources
in accordance with their own priorities. It extends to the preparation of
their budgets, and local officials in tum have to work within the
constraints thereof."
With the adoption of the 1973 Constitution,24 and later the 1987
Constitution, municipal corporations were granted fiscal autonomy via
a general delegation of the power to tax.25 Section 5, Article XI of the
1973 Constitution gave LGUs the "power to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.'' This authority was further strengthened in the 1987
Constitution, through the inclusion in Section 5, Article X thereof of the
condition that " [s]uch taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to local governments."26
Accordingly, under the present Constitution, where there is neither a
grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power of municipal
corporations must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide
statutory limitations and guidelines.27 The basic rationale for the
current rule on local fiscal autonomy is the strengthening of LGUs and
the safeguarding of their viability and self-sufficiency through a direct
grant of general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental
law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and unconditional.
The legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-
burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b)
each LGU will have its fair share of available resources; ( c) the
resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and
( d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.28
In conformity to the dictate of the fundamental law for the legislature
to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more
responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization,"29 consistent with the basic
policy of local autonomy, Congress enacted the LGC, Book II of which
governs local taxation and fiscal matters and sets forth the guidelines
and limitations for the exercise of this power. In Pelizloy Realty
Corporation v. The Province of Benguet,30 the Court alluded to the
fundamental principles governing the taxing powers of LGUs as laid
out in Section 130 of the LGC, to wit:
1. Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU.
2. Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:
a. be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer's
ability to pay;
b. be levied and collected only for public purposes;
c. not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;
d. not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in
the restraint of trade.
3. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions
shall in no case be let to any private person.
4. The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall
inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the
LGU levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise
specifically provided by the LGC.
5. Each LGU shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system
of taxation.
It is in the application of the adverted fourth rule, that is-all revenue
collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall inure solely to
the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the LGU levying
the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically
provided by the LGC-upon which the present controversy grew.
RA 9167 violates local fiscal autonomy
It is beyond cavil that the City of Cebu had the authority to issue its
City Ordinance No. LXIX and impose an amusement tax on cinemas
pursuant to Sec. 140 in relation to Sec. 151 of the LGC. Sec. 140
states, among other things, that a "province may levy an amusement
tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of
theaters, cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other
places of amusement at a rate of not more than thirty percent (30%)
of the gross receipts from admission fees." By operation of said Sec.
151,31 extending to them the authority of provinces and municipalities
to levy certain taxes, fees, and charges, cities, such as respondent
city government, may therefore validly levy amusement taxes subject
to the parameters set forth under the law. Based on this authority, the
City of Cebu passed, in 1993, its Revised Omnibus Tax
Ordinance,32 Chapter XI, Secs. 42 and 43 of which reads:
CHAPTER XI - Amusement Tax
Section 42. Rate of Tax. - There shall be paid to the Office of the City
Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia and other places of
amusement, an amusement tax at the rate of thirty percent (30%) of
the gross receipts from admission fees.33
Section 43. Manner of Payment. - In the case of theaters or cinemas,
the tax shall first be deducted and withheld by their proprietors,
lessees, or operators and paid to the city treasurer before the gross
receipts are divided between said proprietor, lessees, operators, and
the distributors of the cinematographic films.
Then, after almost a decade of cities reaping benefits from this
imposition, Congress, through RA 9167, amending Section 140 of the
LGC,34 among others, transferred this income from the cities and
municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and highly urbanized and
independent component cities, such as respondent City of Cebu, to
petitioner FDCP, which proceeds will ultimately be rewarded to the
producers of graded films. We reproduce anew Secs. 13 and 14 of RA
9167, thus:
Section 13. Privileges of Graded Films. - Films which have obtained
an "A" or "B" grading from the Council pursuant to Sections 11 and 12
of this Act shall be entitled to the following privileges: a. Amusement
tax reward. - A grade "A" or "B" film shall entitle its producer to an
incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed and collected on
the graded films by cities and municipalities in Metro Manila and other
highly urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines
pursuant to Sections 140 to 151 of Republic Act No. 7160 at the
following rates:
1. For grade "A" films - 100% of the amusement tax collected on such
film; and
2. For grade "B" films - 65% of the amusement tax collected on such
films. The remaining thirty-five (35%) shall accrue to the funds of the
Council.
Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. -All revenue
from the amusement tax on the graded film which may otherwise
accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and
highly urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines
pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during the period
the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the
proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted
within thirty (30) days from the termination of the exhibition to the
Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the
producers of the graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
Proprietors, operators and lessees of theaters or cinemas who fail to
remit the amusement tax proceeds within the prescribed period shall
be liable to a surcharge equivalent to five percent (5%) of the amount
due for each month of delinquency which shall be paid to the Council.
Considering the amendment, the present rule is that ALL amusement
taxes levied by covered cities and municipalities shall be 2iven by
proprietors, operators or lessees of theatres and cinemas to FDCP,
which shall then reward said amount to the producers of graded films
in this wise:
1. For grade "A" films, ALL amusement taxes collected by ALL
covered LGUs on said films shall be given to the producer thereof.
The LGU, therefore, is entitled to NOTHING from its own imposition.
2. For grade "B" films, SIXTY FIVE PERCENT (65%) of ALL
amusement taxes derived by ALL covered LGUs on said film shall be
given to the producer thereof. In this case, however, the LGU is still
NOT entitled to any portion of the imposition, in view of Sec. 16 of RA
9167 which provides that the remaining 35% may be expended for the
Council's operational expenses. Thus: Section 16. Funding. - The
Executive Secretary shall immediately include in the Office of the
President's program the implementation of this Act, the funding of
which shall be included in the annual General Appropriations Act.
To augment the operational expenses of the Council, the Council
may:
a. Utilize the remaining thirty-five (35%) percent of the amusement tax
collected during the period of grade "B" film is exhibited, as provided
under Sections 13 and 14 hereof x x x.
For petitioner, the amendment is a valid legislative manifestation of
the intention to remove from the grasp of the taxing power of the
covered LGUs all revenues from amusement taxes on grade "A" or
"B" films which would otherwise accrue to them. An evaluation of the
provisions in question, however, compels Us to disagree.
RA 9167, Sec. 14 states:
Section 14. Amusement Tax Deduction and Remittance. - All revenue
from the amusement tax on the graded film which may otherwise
accrue to the cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila and
highly urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines
pursuant to Section 140 of Republic Act. No. 7160 during the period
the graded film is exhibited, shall be deducted and withheld by the
proprietors, operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted
within thirty (30) days from the termination of the exhibition to the
Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax to the
producers of the graded film within fifteen (15) days from receipt
thereof.
A reading of the challenged provision reveals that the power to
impose amusement taxes was NOT removed from the covered LGUs,
unlike what Congress did for the taxes enumerated in Sec. 133,
Article X of the LGC,35 which lays down the common limitations on the
taxing powers of LGUs. Thus:
Section 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local
Government Units. -Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of
the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial
institutions;
(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other
acquisitions mortis causa, except as otherwise provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on
wharves, tonnage dues, and all other kinds of customs fees, charges
and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by
the local government unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods
carried into or out of, or passing through, the territorial jurisdictions of
local government units in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls for
bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or charges in any form
whatsoever upon such goods or merchandise;
(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when
sold by marginal farmers or fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of
Investments as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period of six (6) and four
(4) years, respectively from the date of registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the national Internal
Revenue Code, as amended, and taxes, fees or charges on
petroleum products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or
exchanges or similar transactions on goods or services except as
otherwise provided herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and
persons engaged in the transportation of passengers or freight by hire
and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this
Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way or reinsurance or retrocession;
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for
the issuance of all kinds of licenses or permits for the driving thereof,
except tricycles;
(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually
exported, except as otherwise provided herein;
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business
Enterprises and cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6810
and Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No.
6938) otherwise known as the "Cooperative Code of the Philippines"
respectively; and
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government,
its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units.
(emphasis ours)
From the above, the difference between Sec. 133 and the questioned
amendment of Sec. 140 of the LGC by RA 9167 is readily revealed. In
Sec. · 133, what Congress did was to prohibit the levy by LGUs of the
enumerated taxes. For RA 9167, however, the covered LGUs were
deprived of the income which they will otherwise be collecting should
they impose amusement taxes, or, in petitioner's own words, "Section
14 of [RA 9167] can be viewed as an express and real intention on
the part of Congress to remove from the LGU's delegated taxing
power, all revenues from the amusement taxes on graded films which
would otherwise accrue to [them] pursuant to Section 140 of the
[LGC]."36
In other words, per RA 9167, covered LGUs still have the power to
levy amusement taxes, albeit at the end of the day, they will derive no
revenue therefrom. The same, however, cannot be said for FDCP and
the producers of graded films since the amounts thus levied by the
LGUs which should rightfully accrue to them, they being the taxing
authority-will be going to their coffers. As a matter of fact, it is only
through the exercise by the LGU of said power that the funds to be
used for the amusement tax reward can be raised. Without said
imposition, the producers of graded films will receive nothing from the
owners, proprietors and lessees of cinemas operating within the
territory of the covered LGU.
Taking the resulting scheme into consideration, it is apparent that
what Congress did in this instance was not to exclude the authority to
levy amusement taxes from the taxing power of the covered LGUs,
but to earmark, if not altogether confiscate, the income to be received
by the LGU from the taxpayers in favor of and for transmittal to FDCP,
instead of the taxing authority. This, to Our mind, is in clear
contravention of the constitutional command that taxes levied by
LGUs shall accrue exclusively to said LGU and is repugnant to the
power of LGUs to apportion their resources in line with their priorities.
It is a basic precept that the inherent legislative powers of Congress,
broad as they may be, are limited and confined within the four walls of
the Constitution.37 Accordingly, whenever the legislature exercises its
power to enact, amend, and repeal laws, it should do so without going
beyond the parameters wrought by the organic law.
In the case at bar, through the application and enforcement of Sec. 14
of RA 9167, the income from the amusement taxes levied by the
covered LGUs did not and will under no circumstance accrue to them,
not even partially, despite being the taxing authority therefor.
Congress, therefore, clearly overstepped its plenary legislative power,
the amendment being violative of the fundamental law's guarantee on
local autonomy, as echoed in Sec. 130(d) of the LGC, thus: Section
130. Fundamental Principles. - The following fundamental principles
shall govern the exercise of the taxing and other revenue-raising
powers of local government units:
xxxx
(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall
inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to the disposition by, the
local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition
unless otherwise specifically provided herein x x x.
Moreover, in Pimentel,38 the Court elucidated that local fiscal
autonomy includes the power of LGUs to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities. By earmarking the income on
amusement taxes imposed by the LGUs in favor of FDCP and the
producers of graded films, the legislature appropriated and distributed
the LGUs' funds-as though it were legally within its control-under the
guise of setting a limitation on the LGUs' exercise of their delegated
taxing power. This, undoubtedly, is a usurpation of the latter's
exclusive prerogative to apportion their funds, an impermissible
intrusion into the LGUs' constitutionally-protected domain which puts
to naught the guarantee of fiscal autonomy to municipal corporations
enshrined in our basic law.
Grant of amusement tax reward incentive:
not a tax exemption
It was argued that subject Sec. 13 is a grant by Congress of an
exemption from amusement taxes in favor of producers of graded
films. Without question, this Court has previously upheld the power of
Congress to grant exemptions over the power of LGUs to impose
taxes.39 This amusement tax reward, however, is not, as the lower
court posited, a tax exemption. Exempting a person or entity from tax
is to relieve or to excuse that person or entity from the burden of the
imposition. Here, however, it cannot be said that an exemption from
amusement taxes was granted by Congress to the producers of
graded films. Take note that the burden of paying the amusement tax
in question is on the proprietors, lessors, and operators of the theaters
and cinemas that showed the graded films. Thus, per City Ordinance
No. LXIX: CHAPTER XI - Amusement Tax
Section 42. Rate of Tax. - There shall be paid to the Office of the City
Treasurer by the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters,
cinemas, concert halls,, circuses, boxing stadia and other places of
amusement, an amusement tax at the rate of thirty percent (30%) of
the gross receipts from admission fees.
Section 43. Manner of Payment. - In the case of theaters or cinemas,
the tax shall first be deducted and withheld by their proprietors,
lessees, or operators and paid to the city treasurer before the gross
receipts are divided between said proprietor, lessees, operators, and
the distributors of the cinematographic films.
Similarly, the LGC provides as follows:
Section 140. Amusement Tax. –
(a) The province may levy an amusement tax to be collected from the
proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement at a rate of
not more than thirty percent (30%) of the gross receipts from
admission fees.
(b) In the case of theaters or cinemas, the tax shall first be deducted
and withheld by their proprietors, lessees, or operators and paid to the
provincial treasurer before the gross receipts are divided between
said proprietors, lessees, or operators and the distributors of the
cinematographic films.
Simply put, both the burden and incidence of the amusement tax are
borne by the proprietors, lessors, and operators, not by the producers
of the graded films. The transfer of the amount to the film producers is
actually a monetary reward given to them for having produced a
graded film, the funding for which was taken by the national
government from the coffers of the covered LGUs. Without a doubt,
this is not an exemption from payment of tax.
Declaration by the RTC, Branch 5 of the
entire RA 9167 as unconstitutional
Noticeably, the RTC, Branch 5, in its September 25, 2012 Decision in
Colon Heritage v. FDCP, ruled against the constitutionality of the
entire law, not just the assailed Sec. 14. The fallo of the judgment
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of petitioner, as follows:
(1) Declaring Republic Act No. 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional;
(2) The obligation to remit amusement taxes for the graded films to
respondent is ordered extinguished;
(3) Directing respondent to refund all the amounts paid by petitioner,
by way of amusement tax, plus the legal rate of interest thereof, until
the whole amount is paid in full.
In this regard, it is well to emphasize that if it appears that the rest of
the law is free from the taint of unconstitutionality, then it should
remain in force and effect if said law contains a separability clause. A
separability clause is a legislative expression of intent that the nullity
of one provision shall not invalidate the other provisions of the act.
Such a clause is not, however, controlling and the courts, in spite of it,
may invalidate the whole statute where what is left, after the void part,
is not complete and workable.40
In this case, not only does RA 9167 have a separability clause,
contained in Section 23 thereof which reads:
Section 23. Separability Clause. -If, for any reason, any provision of
this Act, or any part thereof, is declared invalid or unconstitutional, all
other sections or provisions not affected thereby shall remain in force
and effect.
it is also true that the constitutionality of the entire law was not put m
question in any of the said cases.
Moreover, a perusal of RA 9167 easily reveals that even with the
removal of Secs. 13 and 14 of the law, the remaining provisions can
survive as they mandate other matters like a cinema evaluation
system, an incentive and reward system, and local and international
film festivals and activities that "will promote the growth and
development of the local film industry and promote its participation in
both domestic and foreign markets," and to "enhance the skills and
expertise of Filipino talents."41
Where a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution,
while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand-and be enforced. The exception to this is when the
parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each
other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, in which case, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest.42
Here, the constitutionality of the rest of the provisions of RA 9167 was
never put in question. Too, nowhere in the assailed judgment of the
RTC was it explicated why the entire law was being declared as
unconstitutional.
It is a basic tenet that courts cannot go beyond the issues in a
case,43 which the RTC, Branch 5 did when it declared RA 9167
unconstitutional. This being the case, and in view of the elementary
rule that every statute is presumed valid,44 the declaration by the R
TC, Branch 5 of the entirety of RA 9167 as unconstitutional, is
improper.
Amounts paid by Colon Heritage
need not be returned
Having ruled that the questioned provisions are unconstitutional, the
RTC, Branch 5, in Colon Heritage v. FDCP, ordered the return of all
amounts paid by respondent Colon Heritage to FDCP by way of
amusement tax. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of petitioner, as follows:
(1) Declaring Republic Act No. 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional;
(2) The obligation to remit amusement taxes for the graded films to
respondent is ordered extinguished;
(3) Directing respondent to refund all the amounts paid by petitioner,
by way of amusement tax, plus the legal rate of interest thereof, until
the whole amount is paid in full.
As regards the refund, the Court cannot subscribe to this position.
It is a well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it .
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.
Applying this principle, the logical conclusion would be to order the
return of all the amounts remitted to FDCP and given to the producers
of graded films, by all of the covered cities, which actually amounts to
hundreds of millions, if not billions. In fact, just for Cebu City, the
aggregate deficiency claimed by FDCP is ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
NINE MILLION THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY-EIGHT PESOS AND FIFTY FOUR
CENTAVOS (₱159,377,988.54). Again, this amount represents the
unpaid amounts to FDCP by eight cinema operators or proprietors in
only one covered city.
An exception to the above rule, however, is the doctrine of operative
fact, which applies as a matter of equity and fair play. This doctrine
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law or an executive act by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences
that cannot always be ignored. It applies when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law.45
In Hacienda Luisita v. PARC, the Court elucidated the meaning and
scope of the operative fact doctrine, viz:
The "operative fact" doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of
Appeals, wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior to
its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must
be complied with, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
This doctrine was reiterated in the more recent case of City of Makati
v. Civil Service Commission, wherein we ruled that:
Moreover, we certainly cannot nullify the City Government's order of
suspension, as we have no reason to do so, much less retroactively
apply such nullification to deprive private respondent of a compelling
and valid reason for not filing the leave application. For as we have
held, a void act though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless
confers legitimacy upon past acts or omissions done in reliance
thereof. Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order
prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal
consequences are attached. It would indeed be ghastly unfair to
prevent private respondent from relying upon the order of suspension
in lieu of a formal leave application.
The applicability of the operative fact doctrine to executive acts was
further explicated by this Court in Rieta v. People, thus:
Petitioner contends that his arrest by virtue of Arrest . Search and
Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 4754 was invalid, as the law upon which it
was predicated-General Order No. 60, issued by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos - was subsequently declared by the Court, in
Tanada v. Tuvera, 33 to have no force and effect. Thus, he asserts,
any evidence obtained pursuant thereto is inadmissible in evidence.
We do not agree. In Tanada, the Court addressed the possible effects
of its declaration of the invalidity of various presidential
issuances.1a\^/phi1 Discussing therein how such a declaration might
affect acts done on a presumption of their validity, the Court said:
" ... In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic
and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs.
Baxter Bank to wit:
'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law;
that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. . . . It is quite
clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications.
The actual existence of a statute, prior to [the determination of its
invalidity], is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects – with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to
have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Similarly, the implementation/ enforcement of presidential decrees
prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is 'an operative fact
which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified."
The Chicot doctrine cited in Tanada advocates that, prior to the
nullification of a statute, there is an imperative necessity of taking into
account its actual existence as an operative fact negating the
acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity." Whatever
was done while the legislative or the executive act was in operation
should be duly recognized and presumed to be valid in all respects.
The ASSO that was issued in 1979 under General Order No. 60 - long
before our Deeision n Taiiada and the arrest of petitioner - is an
operative fact that can no longer be disturbed or simply ignored.
(citations omitted; emphasis in the original.)
Bearing in mind that PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2-an executive act-
was declared invalid in the instant case, the operative fact doctrine is
clearly applicable.46
Here, to order FDCP and the producers of graded films which may
have already received the amusement tax incentive reward pursuant
to the questioned provisions of RA 9167, to return the amounts
received to the respective taxing authorities would certainly impose a
heavy, and possibly crippling, financial burden upon them who merely,
and presumably in good faith, complied with the legislative fiat subject
of this case. For these reasons, We are of the considered view that
the application of the doctrine of operative facts in the case at bar is
proper so as not to penalize FDCP for having complied with the
legislative command in RA 9167, and the producers of graded films
who have already received their tax cut prior to this Decision for
having produced top-quality films.
With respect to the amounts retained by the cinema proprietors due to
petitioner FDCP, said proprietors are required under the law to remit
the same to petitioner. Obeisance to the rule of law must always be
protected and preserved at all times and the unjustified refusal of said
proprietors cannot be tolerated. The operative fact doctrine equally
applies to the non-remittance by said proprietors since the law
produced legal effects prior to the declaration of the nullity of Secs. 13
and 14 in these instant petitions. It can be surmised, however, that the
proprietors were at a loss whether or not to remit said amounts to
FDCP considering the position of the City of Cebu for them to remit
the amusement taxes directly to the local government. For this
reason, the proprietors shall not be liable for surcharges.
In view of the declaration of nullity of unconstitutionality of Secs. 13
and 14 of RA 9167, all amusement taxes remitted to petitioner FDCP
prior to the date of the finality of this decision shall remain legal and
valid under the operative fact doctrine. Amusement taxes due to
petitioner but unremitted up to the finality of this decision shall be
remitted to petitioner within thirty (30) days from date of finality.
Thereafter, amusement taxes previously covered by RA 9167 shall be
remitted to the local governments.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions are
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The questioned Decision of the RTC,
Branch 5 of Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-35601 dated September
25, 2012 and that of the R TC, Branch 14, Cebu City in Civil Case No.
CEB-35529 dated October 24, 2012, collectively declaring Sections
13 and 14 of Republic Act No. 9167 invalid and unconstitutional, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
As modified, the decisions of the lower courts shall read:
1. Civil Case No. CEB-35601 entitled Colon Heritage Realty Corp. v.
Film Development Council of the Philippines:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of Colon Heritage Realty Corp. and against the Film
Development council of the Philippines, as follows: 1. Declaring
Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act No. 9167 otherwise known as an
Act Creating the Film Development Council of the Philippines,
Defining its Powers and Functions, Appropriating Funds therefor arid
for other purposes, as invalid and unconstitutional;
2. Declaring that the Film Development Council of the Philippines
cannot collect under Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 as of the finality
of the decision in G.R. Nos. 203754 and 204418;
3. Declaring that Colon Heritage Realty Corp. has the obligation to
remit the amusement taxes withheld on graded cinema films to FDCP
under Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 for taxes due prior to the
finality of this Decision, without surcharges;
4. Declaring that upon the finality of this decision, all amusement
taxes withheld and those which may be collected by Colon Heritage
Realty Corp. on graded films shown in its cinemas in Cebu City shall
be remitted to Cebu City pursuant to City Ordinance LXIX, Chapter XI,
Section 42.
2. Civil Case No. CEB-35529 entitled City of Cebu v. Film
Development Council of the Philippines:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the disquisitions, judgment is rendered in
favor of the City of Cebu against the Film development Council of the
Philippines, as follows:
1. Declaring Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act No. 9167 otherwise
known as an Act Creating the Film Development Council of the
Philippines, Defining its Powers and Functions, Appropriating Funds
therefor and for other purposes, void and unconstitutional;
2. Declaring that the Film Development Council of the Philippines
cannot collect under Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 as of the finality
of this Decision;
3. Declaring that Intervenor SM Cinema Corporation has the
obligation to remit the amusement taxes, withheld on graded cinema
films to respondent FDCP under Sections 13 and 14 of R.A. 9167 for
taxes due prior to the finality of this Decision, without surcharges;
4. Declaring that after the finality of this Decision, all amusement
taxes withheld and those which may be collected by Intervenor SM on
graded films shown in SM Cinemas in Cebu City shall be remitted to
petitioner Cebu City pursuant to City Ordinance LXIX, Chapter XI,
Section 42.
As to the sum of PhP 76,836,807.08 remitted by the Intervenor SM to
petitioner City of Cebu, said amount shall be remitted by the City of
Cebu to petitioner FDCP within thirty (30) days from finality of this
decision in G.R. Nos. 203754 and 204418 without interests and
surcharges. Since Sections 13 and 14 of Republic Act No. 9167 were
declared void and unconstitutional, all remittances of amusement
taxes pursuant to said Sections 13 and 14 of said law prior to the date
of finality of this Decision shall remain valid and legal. Cinema
proprietors who failed to remit said amusement taxes to petitioner
FDCP prior to the date of finality of this Decision are obliged to remit
the same, without surcharges, to petitioner FDCP under the doctrine
of operative fact.
SO ORDERED.
SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TRINIDAD H. REPUNO, BIENVENIDO
LUMBERA, BONIFACIO P. ILAGAN, NERI JAVIER COLMENARES,
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO, M.D., SAMAHAN NG EX-
DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT ARESTO (SELDA),
represented by DIONITO CABILLAS, CARMENCITA M.
FLORENTINO, RODOLFO DEL ROSARIO, FELIX C. DALISAY, and
DANILO M. DELA FUENTE, Petitioners,
vs.
REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ (in his capacity as the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Reservist and Retiree Affairs, Armed Forces
of the Philippines), The Grave Services Unit (Philippine Army),
and GENERAL RICARDO R. VISAYA (in his capacity as the Chief of
Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines), DEFENSE SECRETARY
DELFIN LORENZANA, and HEIRS OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
represented by his surviving spouse Imelda Romualdez Marcos,
Respondents.
RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., RENE A.Q. SAGUISAG, JR., RENE
A.C. SAGUISAG III, Intervenors.
G.R. No. 225973
Peralta, J.
8 November 2016
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, in his personal and official capacities and
as a member of Congress and as the Honorary Chairperson of the
Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearance (FIND); FAMILIES
OF VICTIMS OF INVOLUNTARY DISAPPEARANCE (FIND),
represented by its Co-Chairperson, NILDA L. SEVILLA; REP.
TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR.; REP. TOMASITO S.
VILLARIN; REP. EDGAR R. ERICE; and REP. EMMANUEL A.
BILLONES, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA; DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA; AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT.
GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA; AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ; and HEIRS OF
FERDINAND E. MARCOS, represented by his surviving
spouse IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 225984
8 November 2016
LORETTA ANN PARGAS-ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, AIDA F.
SANTOS-MARANAN, JO-ANN Q. MAGLIPON, ZENAIDA S.
MIQUE, FE B. MANGAHAS, MA. CRISTINA P. BAWAGAN, MILA D.
AGUILAR, MINERVA G. GONZALES, MA. CRISTINA V.
RODRIGUEZ, LOUIE G. CRISMO, FRANCISCO E. RODRIGO, JR.,
LIWAYWAY D. ARCE, and ABDULMARI DE LEON IMAO, JR.,
Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, AFP CHIEF OF
STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, and PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) Administrator Lt. Gen.
Ernesto G. Carolina (Ret.), Respondents.
G.R. No. 226097
8 November 2016
HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, JOEL C. LAMANGAN, FRANCIS X.
MANGLAPUS, EDILBERTO C. DE JESUS, BELINDA O.
CUNANAN, CECILIA GUIDOTE ALVAREZ, REX DEGRACIA
LORES, SR., ARNOLD MARIE NOEL, CARLOS MANUEL,
EDMUND S. TAYAO, DANILO P. OLIVARES, NOEL F. TRINIDAD,
JESUS DELA FUENTE, REBECCA M. QUIJANO, FR. BENIGNO
BELTRAN, SVD, ROBERTO S. VERZOLA, AUGUSTO A.
LEGASTO, JR., and JULIA KRISTINA P. LEGASTO, Petitioners,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE
SECRETARY DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT.
GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, AFP DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
REAR ADMIRAL ERNESTO C. ENRIQUEZ, and PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO) of the DND, Respondents.
G.R. No. 226116
8 November 2016
ZAIRA PATRICIA B. BANIAGA, JOHN ARVIN BUENAAGUA,
JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JUAN ANTONIO RAROGAL
MAGALANG, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE DELFIN N. LORENZANA,
AFP CHIEF OF STAFF RICARDO R. VISAYA, ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE ERNESTO G.
CAROLINA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 226117
8 November 2016
ALGAMAR A. LATIPH, Petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY DELFIN N. LORENZANA, sued in his capacity as
Secretary of National Defense, LT. GEN. RICARDO R. VISAYA, in
his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and LT. GEN. ERNESTO G. CAROLINA (ret.), in his capacity as
Administrator, Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO),
Respondents.
G.R. No. 226120
8 November 2016
LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her capacity as SENATOR OF THE
REPUBLIC and as TAXPAYER, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY
DELFIN LORENZANA, AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RICARDO
R. VISAYA, UNDERSECRETARY ERNESTO G. CAROLINA, in his
capacity as PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE (PVAO)
ADMINISTRATOR and B/GEN. RESTITUTO L. AGUILAR, in his
capacity as SHRINE CURATOR AND CHIEF VETERANS
MEMORIAL AND HISTORICAL DIVISION and HEIRS OF
FERDINAND EDRALIN MARCOS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 226294
8 November 2016
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
En Banc
Dissenting Opinions: Sereno, C.J. Carpio, J. Leonen,
J. Caguioa, J.
Concurring Opinion: Bersamin, J.
Separate Concurring Opinion: Brion, J.
Separate Opinion: Perez, J. Mendoza, J.
Decision
PERALTA, J.:
In law, as much as in life, there is need to find closure. Issues
that have lingered and festered for so long and which
unnecessarily divide the people and slow the path to the future
have to be interred. To move on is not to forget the past. It is to
focus on the present and the future, leaving behind what is better
left for history to ultimately decide. The Court finds guidance
from the Constitution and the applicable laws, and in the
absence of clear prohibition against the exercise of discretion
entrusted to the political branches of the Government, the Court
must not overextend its readings of what may only be seen as
providing tenuous connection to the issue before it.
Facts
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then
candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte (Duterte) publicly announced that he
would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
(Marcos) at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani (LNMB). He won the May 9,
2016 election, garnering 16,601,997 votes. At noon of June 30, 2016,
he formally assumed his office at the Rizal Hall in the Malacafian
Palace.
On August 7, 2016, public respondent Secretary of National Defense
Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the public respondent
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), General
Ricardo R. Visaya, regarding the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, to
wit:
Subject: Interment of the late Former President Ferdinand Marcos
at LNM
Reference: Verbal Order of President Rodrigo Duterte on July 11,
2016.
In compliance to (sic) the verbal order of the President to implement
his election campaign promise to have the remains of the late former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos be interred at the Libingan ng mga
Bayani, kindly undertake all the necessary planning and preparations
to facilitate the coordination of all agencies concerned specially the
provisions for ceremonial and security requirements. Coordinate
closely with the Marcos family regarding the date of interment and the
transport of the late former President’s remains from Ilocos Norte to
the LNMB.
The overall OPR for this activity will [be] the PVAO since the LNMB is
under its supervision and administration. PVAO shall designate the
focal person for this activity who shall be the overall overseer of the
event.
Submit your Implementing Plan to my office as soon as possible.1
On August 9, 2016, respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C.
Enriquez issued the following directives to the Philippine Army (PA)
Commanding General:
SUBJECT: Funeral Honors and Service
TO: Commanding General, Philippine Army
Headquarters, Philippine Army
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City
Attn: Assistant Chief of Staff for RRA, G9
1. Pursuant to paragraph 2b, SOP Number 8, GHQ, AFP dated 14
July 1992, provide services, honors and other courtesies for the
late Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos as indicated:
[x] Vigil -Provide vigil-
[x] Bugler/Drummer
[x] Firing Party
[x] Military Host/Pallbearers
[x] Escort and Transportation
[x] Arrival/Departure Honors
2. His remains lie in state at Ilocos Norte
3. Interment will take place at the Libingan ng mga Bayani, Ft.
Bonifacio, Taguig City. Date: TBAL.
4. Provide all necessary military honors accorded for a President
5. POC: Administrator, PVAO
BY COMMAND OF GENERAL VISAYA2
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the following were filed by
petitioners:
1. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition3 filed by Satumino Ocampo
and several others,4 in their capacities as human rights advocates or
human rights violations victims as defined under Section 3 (c) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Recognition Act of 2013).
2. Petition for Certiorari-in-Intervention5 filed by Rene A.V. Saguisag,
Sr. and his son,6 as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers,
and his grandchild.7
3. Petition for Prohibition8 filed by Representative Edcel C. Lagman, in
his personal capacity, as member of the House of Representatives
and as Honorary Chairperson of Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearance (FIND), a duly-registered corporation and organization
of victims and families of enforced disappearance, mostly during the
martial law regime of the former President Marcos, and several
others,9 in their official capacities as duly-elected Congressmen of the
House of Representatives of the Philippines.
4. Petition for Prohibition10 filed by Loretta Ann Pargas-Rosales,
former Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights, and several
others,11 suing as victims of State-sanctioned human rights violations
during the martial law regime of Marcos.
5. Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition12 filed by Heherson T.
Alvarez, former Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, who fought
to oust the dictatorship of Marcos, and several others,13 as concerned
Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
6. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition14 filed by Zaira Patricia B.
Baniaga and several others,15 as concerned Filipino citizens and
taxpayers.
7. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition16 filed by Algamar A. Latiph,
former Chairperson of the Regional Human Rights Commission,
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by himself and on behalf of
the Moro17who are victims of human rights during the martial law
regime of Marcos.
8. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition18 filed by Leila M. De Lima as
member of the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines, public official
and concerned citizen.
Issues
PROCEDURAL
1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy.
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions.
3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of
administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts.
SUBSTANTIVE
1. Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP
Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, when they issued the assailed memorandum
and directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte
to implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of
Marcos interred at the LNMB.
2. Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed
memorandum and directive violate the Constitution, domestic and
international laws, particularly:
(a) Sections 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27 and 28 of Article II, Section 1 of
Article III, Section 17 of Article VII, Section 1 of Article XI, Section 3(2)
of Article XIV, and Section 26 of Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution;
(b) R.A. No. 289;
(c) R.A. No. 10368;
(d) AFP Regulation G 161-375 dated September 11, 2000;
(e) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
(f) The “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”
of the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly; and
(g) The “Updated Set of Principles for Protection and Promotion of
Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity” of the U.N.
Economic and Social Council;
3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth
from the Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the
Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier
and former President to interment at the LNMB.
4. Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of
the remains of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they
entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains
shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines.
Opinion
The petitions must be dismissed.
PROCEDURAL GROUNDS
Justiciable controversy
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the
Court unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present:
(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or
issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.19 In this case, the absence of the first two
requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the
last two superfluous.20
An “actual case or controversy” is one which involves a conflict of
legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.21 There must be a contrariety of legal rights that
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence.22 Related to the requisite of an actual case or
controversy is the requisite of “ripeness,” which means that something
had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a
court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of
the challenged action.”23 Moreover, the limitation on the power of
judicial review to actual cases and controversies carries the
assurance that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the
other branches of government.24 Those areas pertain to questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
govemment.25 As they are concerned with questions of policy and
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure,26 political questions used to be beyond the ambit of judicial
review. However, the scope of the political question doctrine has been
limited by Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution when it
vested in the judiciary the power to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte’s decision to
have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political
question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his
powers under the Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land of the public domain
devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom
that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no
taint of grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion, as discussed
below, President Duterte’s decision on that political question is
outside the ambit of judicial review.
Locus standi
Defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question,27 locus standi requires that a party alleges such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.28 Unless a person has sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining an injury as a result of an act complained of, such proper
party has no standing.29 Petitioners, who filed their respective
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, in their capacities
as citizens, human rights violations victims, legislators, members of
the Bar and taxpayers, have no legal standing to file such petitions
because they failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer
direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at the
LNMB.
Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that
public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.30 In this
case, what is essentially being assailed is the wisdom behind the
decision of the President to proceed with the interment of Marcos at
the LNMB. As taxpayers, petitioners merely claim illegal disbursement
of public funds, without showing that Marcos is disqualified to be
interred at the LNMB by either express or implied provision of the
Constitution, the laws or jurisprudence.
Petitioners Saguisag, et al.,31 as members of the Bar, are required to
allege any direct or potential injury which the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, as an institution, or its members may suffer as a
consequence of the act complained of.32 Suffice it to state that the
averments in their petition-in-intervention failed to disclose such injury,
and that their interest in this case is too general and shared by other
groups, such that their duty to uphold the rule of law, without more, is
inadequate to clothe them with requisite legal standing.33
As concerned citizens, petitioners are also required to substantiate
that the issues raised are of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.34 In cases involving such issues, the imminence and clarity of
the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity
for prudence.35 In Marcos v. Manglapus,36 the majority opinion
observed that the subject controversy was of grave national
importance, and that the Court’s decision would have a profound
effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of national life.
The ponencia explained that the case was in a class by itself, unique
and could not create precedent because it involved a dictator forced
out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political,
economic and social havoc in the country and who, within the short
space of three years (from 1986), sought to return to the Philippines to
die.
At this point in time, the interment of Marcos at a cemetery originally
established as a national military cemetery and declared a national
shrine would have no profound effect on the political, economic, and
other aspects of our national life considering that more than twenty-
seven (27) years since his death and thirty (30) years after his ouster
have already passed. Significantly, petitioners failed to demonstrate a
clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights.
As human rights violations victims during the Martial Law regime,
some of petitioners decry re-traumatization, historical revisionism, and
disregard of their state recognition as heroes. Petitioners’ argument is
founded on the wrong premise that the LNMB is the National
Pantheon intended by law to perpetuate the memory of all Presidents,
national heroes and patriots. The history of the LNMB, as will be
discussed further, reveals its nature and purpose as a national military
cemetery and national shrine, under the administration of the AFP.
Apart from being concerned citizens and taxpayers, petitioners
Senator De Lima, and Congressman Lagman, et al.37 come before the
Court as legislators suing to defend the Constitution and to protect
appropriated public funds from being used unlawfully. In the absence
of a clear showing of any direct injury to their person or the institution
to which they belong, their standing as members of the Congress
cannot be upheld.38 They do not specifically claim that the official
actions complained of, i.e., the memorandum of the Secretary of
National Defense and the directive of the AFP Chief of Staff regarding
the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, encroach on their prerogatives
as legislators.39
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, one should have availed first of all the means
of administrative processes available.40 If resort to a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy should be
exhausted first before the court’s judicial power can be sought.41 For
reasons of comity and convenience, courts of justice shy away from a
dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed
and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned
every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case.42 While
there are exceptions43 to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, petitioners failed to prove the presence of any of those
exceptions.
Contrary to their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to
seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive
before the Secretary of National Defense. The Secretary of National
Defense should be given opportunity to correct himself, if warranted,
considering that AFP Regulations G 161-375 was issued upon his
order. Questions on the implementation and interpretation thereof
demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion, requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of his office to determine
technical and intricate matters of fact. If petitioners would still be
dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, they could elevate the
matter before the Office of the President which has control and
supervision over the Department of National Defense (DND).44
Hierarchy of Courts
In the same vein, while direct resort to the Court through petitions for
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
allowed under exceptional cases,45 which are lacking in this case,
petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but
can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and
concurrent jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order and
injunction when proven necessary.
In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural
grounds alone. Even if We decide the case based on the merits, the
petitions should still be denied.
SUBSTANTIVE GROUNDS
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is ( 1) done contrary to
the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.46
None is present in this case.
I.
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in
accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB should not be
allowed because it has the effect of not just rewriting history as to the
Filipino people’s act of revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also
condoning the abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby
violating the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a “post-
dictatorship charter” and a “human rights constitution.” For them, the
ratification of the Constitution serves as a clear condemnation of
Marcos’ alleged “heroism.” To support their case, petitioners invoke
sections 2,47 11,48 13,49 23,50 26,51, 2752 and 2853 of Article II, Sec. 17
of Art. VII,54 Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV,55 Sec. 1 of Art. XI,56 and Sec. 26 of
Art. XVIII57 of the Constitution.
There is no merit to the contention.
As the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) logically reasoned out,
while the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a
people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding
principles to just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law
period such as the proposed Marcos burial at the LNMB.
Tañada v. Angara58 already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the
Constitution are not self-executing. Thus:
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of
principles and state policies.” The counterpart of this article in the
1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation” by
Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to
be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts.
They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of
its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of
laws. As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs.
Morato, the principles and state policies enumerated in Article II x x x
are not “self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can give rise
to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.”
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor that broad
constitutional principles need legislative enactments to implement
them x x x.
xxx
The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement
of broad constitutional principles are sourced from basic
considerations of due process and the lack of judicial authority to
wade “into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making.
“59
In the same vein, Sec. 1 of Art. XI of the Constitution is not a self-
executing provision considering that a law should be passed by the
Congress to clearly define and effectuate the principle embodied
therein. As a matter of fact, pursuant thereto, Congress enacted R.A.
No. 6713 (“Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees”), R.A. No. 6770 (“The Ombudsman Act of 1989”),
R.A. No. 7080 (“An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Plunder”), and Republic Act No. 9485 (“Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007”).
To complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued
various orders, memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of
behavior/code of conduct/ethical standards of officials and employees;
workflow charts/public transactions; rules and policies on gifts and
benefits; whistle blowing and reporting; and client feedback program.
Petitioners’ reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII
of the Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the
constitutional duty of educational institutions in teaching the values of
patriotism and nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec.
26 of Art. XVIII is a transitory provision on sequestration or freeze
orders in relation to the recovery of Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth. Clearly,
with respect to these provisions, there is no direct or indirect
prohibition to Marcos’ interment at the LNMB.
The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII pertaining to the duty of
the President to “ensure that the laws be faithfully executed,” which is
identical to Sec. 1, Title I, Book III of the Administrative Code of
1987,60 is likewise not violated by public respondents. Being the Chief
Executive, the President represents the government as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his or her department.61 Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the
President has the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry
into execution the law.62 The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its
being inherently executive in nature and is intimately related to the
other executive functions.63 It is best construed as an imposed
obligation, not a separate grant of power.64 The provision simply
underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that
the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute
them.65
Consistent with President Duterte’s mandate under Sec. 17, Art. VII of
the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not
contravene R.A. No. 289, R.A. No. 10368, and the international
human rights laws cited by petitioners.
A. ON R.A. NO. 28966
For the perpetuation of their memory and for the inspiration and
emulation of this generation and of generations still unborn, R.A. No.
289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial
place of the mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines,
national heroes and patriots.67 It also provided for the creation of a
Board on National Pantheon to implement the law.68
On May 12, 1953, President Elpidio R. Quirino approved the site of
the National Pantheon at East Avenue, Quezon City.69 On December
23, 1953, he issued Proclamation No. 431 to formally “withdraw from
sale or settlement and reserve as a site for the construction of the
National Pantheon a certain parcel of land located in Quezon City.”
However, on July 5, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 42 revoking Proclamation Nos. 422 and 431, both series of 1953,
and reserving the parcels of land embraced therein for national park
purposes to be known as Quezon Memorial Park.
It is asserted that Sec. 1 of R.A. No 289 provides for the legal
standard by which a person’s mortal remains may be interred at the
LNMB, and that AFP Regulations G 161-375 merely implements the
law and should not violate its spirit and intent. Petitioners claim that it
is known, both here and abroad, that Marcos’ acts and deed—the
gross human rights violations, the massive corruption and plunder of
government coffers, and his military record that is fraught with myths,
factual inconsistencies, and lies—are neither worthy of perpetuation in
our memory nor serve as a source of inspiration and emulation of the
present and future generations. They maintain that public respondents
are not members of the Board on National Pantheon, which is
authorized by the law to cause the burial at the LNMB of the
deceased Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
Petitioners are mistaken. Both in their pleadings and during the oral
arguments, they miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases
as to their supposition that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are
one and the same. This is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is
distinct and separate from the burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289.
The parcel of land subject matter of President Quirino’s Proclamation
No. 431, which was later on revoked by President Magsaysay’s
Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered by Marcos’
Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at
present. To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate
any funds for its construction or the creation of the Board on National
Pantheon. This is indicative of the legislative will not to pursue, at the
moment, the establishment of a singular interment place for the mortal
remains of all Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and
patriots. Perhaps, the Manila North Cemetery, the Manila South
Cemetery, and other equally distinguished private cemeteries already
serve the noble purpose but without cost to the limited funds of the
government.
Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as relevant to the issue, still,
petitioners’ allegations must fail. To apply the standard that the LNMB
is reserved only for the “decent and the brave” or “hero” would be
violative of public policy as it will put into question the validity of the
burial of each and every mortal remains resting therein, and infringe
upon the principle of separation of powers since the allocation of plots
at the LNMB is based on the grant of authority to the President under
existing laws and regulations. Also, the Court shares the view of the
OSG that the proposed interment is not equivalent to the consecration
of Marcos’ mortal remains. The act in itself does not confer upon him
the status of a “hero.” Despite its name, which is actually a misnomer,
the purpose of the LNMB, both from legal and historical perspectives,
has neither been to confer to the people buried there the title of “hero”
nor to require that only those interred therein should be treated as a
“hero.” Lastly, petitioners’ repeated reference to a “hero’s burial” and
“state honors,” without showing proof as to what kind of burial or
honors that will be accorded to the remains of Marcos, is speculative
until the specifics of the interment have been finalized by public
respondents.
B. ON R.A. NO. 1036870
For petitioners, R.A. No. 10368 modified AFP Regulations G 161-375
by implicitly disqualifying Marcos’ burial at the LNMB because the
legislature, which is a co-equal branch of the government, has
statutorily declared his tyranny as a deposed dictator and has
recognized the heroism and sacrifices of the Human Rights Violations
Victims (HRVVs)71 under his regime. They insist that the intended act
of public respondents damages and makes mockery of the mandatory
teaching of Martial Law atrocities and of the lives and sacrifices of its
victims. They contend that “reparation” under R.A. No. 10368 is non-
judicial in nature but a political action of the State through the
Legislative and Executive branches by providing administrative relief
for the compensation, recognition, and memorialization of human
rights victims.
We beg to disagree.
Certainly, R.A. No. 10368 recognizes the heroism and sacrifices of all
Filipinos who were victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or
involuntary disappearance, and other gross human rights violations
committed from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986. To restore
their honor and dignity, the State acknowledges its moral and legal
obligation” to provide reparation to said victims and/or their families for
the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations and damages they
experienced.
In restoring the rights and upholding the dignity of HRVVs, which is
part of the right to an effective remedy, R.A. No. 10368 entitles them
to monetary and non-monetary reparation. Any HRVV qualified under
the law73shall receive a monetary reparation, which is tax-free and
without prejudice to the receipt of any other sum from any other
person or entity in any case involving human rights violations.74 Anent
the non-monetary reparation, the Department of Health (DOH), the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the
Department of Education (DepEd), the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED), the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA), and such other government agencies are required
to render the necessary services for the HRVVs and/or their families,
as may be determined by the Human Rights Victims’ Claims Board
(Board) pursuant to the provisions of the law.75
Additionally, R.A. No. 10368 requires the recognition of the violations
committed against the HRVVs, regardless of whether they opt to seek
reparation or not. This is manifested by enshrining their names in the
Roll of Human Rights Violations Victims (Roll) prepared by the
Board.76 The Roll may be displayed in government agencies
designated by the HRVV Memorial Commission (Commission).77 Also,
a Memorial/Museum/Library shall be established and a compendium
of their sacrifices shall be prepared and may be readily viewed and
accessed in the internet.78 The Commission is created primarily for
the establishment, restoration, preservation and conservation of the
Memorial/Museum/Library/Compendium.79
To mernorialize80 the HRVVs, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of R.A. No. 10368 further mandates that: (1) the
database prepared by the Board derived from the processing of
claims shall be turned over to the Commission for archival purposes,
and made accessible for the promotion of human rights to all
government agencies and instrumentalities in order to prevent
recurrence of similar abuses, encourage continuing reforms and
contribute to ending impunity;81 (2) the lessons learned from Martial
Law atrocities and the lives and sacrifices of HRVVs shall be included
in the basic and higher education curricula, as well as in continuing
adult learning, prioritizing those most prone to commit human rights
violations;82 and (3) the Commission shall publish only those stories of
HRVVs who have given prior informed consent.83
This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners’ logic that the beneficial
provisions of R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the
prohibition on Marcos’ burial at the LNMB. It would be undue to
extend the law beyond what it actually contemplates. With its victim-
oriented perspective, our legislators could have easily inserted a
provision specifically proscribing Marcos’ interment at the LNMB as a
“reparation” for the HRVV s, but they did not. As it is, the law is silent
and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what
is simply not there. It is irregular, if noft unconstitutional, for Us to
presume the legislative will by supplying material details into the law.
That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
Considering the foregoing, the enforcement of the HRVVs’ rights
under R.A. No 10368 will surely not be impaired by the interment of
Marcos at the LNMB. As opined by the OSG, the assailed act has no
causal connection and legal relation to the law. The subject
memorandum and directive of public respondents do not and cannot
interfere with the statutory powers and functions of the Board and the
Commission. More importantly, the HRVVs’ entitlements to the
benefits provided for by R.A. No 10368 and other domestic laws are
not curtailed. It must be emphasized that R.A. No. 10368 does not
amend or repeal, whether express or implied, the provisions of the
Administrative Code or AFP Regulations G 161-375:
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored. In order to effect a repeal by implication,
the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant
with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand
together. The clearest case possible must be made before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never
presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and
convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must
be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly
enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not
suffice. x x x84
C. ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAWS
Petitioners argue that the burial of Marcos at the LNMB will violate the
rights of the HRVVs to “full” and “effective” reparation, which is
provided under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights(ICCPR),85 the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to
a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law86adopted by the U.N. General
Assembly on December 16, 2005, and the Updated Set of Principles
for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to
Combat Impunity87 dated February 8, 2005 by the U.N. Economic and
Social Council.
We do not think so. The ICCPR,88 as well as the U.N. principles on
reparation and to combat impunity, call for the enactment of legislative
measures, establishment of national programmes, and provision for
administrative and judicial recourse, in accordance with the country’s
constitutional processes, that are necessary to give effect to human
rights embodied in treaties, covenants and other international laws.
The U.N. principles on reparation expressly states:
Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained
herein do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations
but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the
implementation of existing legal obligations under international human
rights law and international humanitarian law which are
complementary though different as to their norms[.][Emphasis
supplied]
The Philippines is more than compliant with its international
obligations. When the Filipinos regained their democratic institutions
after the successful People Power Revolution that culminated on
February 25, 1986, the three branches of the government have done
their fair share to respect, protect and fulfill the country’s human rights
obligations, to wit:
The 1987 Constitution contains provisions that promote and protect
human rights and social justice.
As to judicial remedies, aside from the writs of habeas
corpus, amparo,89 and habeas data,90 the Supreme Court
promulgated on March 1, 2007 Administrative Order No. 25-
2007,91 which provides rules on cases involving extra-judicial killings
of political ideologists and members of the media. The provision of
the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the prevention of the victim’s
re-traumatization applies in the course of legal and administrative
procedures designed to provide justice and reparation.92
On the part of the Executive Branch, it issued a number of
administrative and executive orders. Notable of which are the
following:
1. A.O. No. 370 dated December 10, 1997 (Creating the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee on Human Rights)
2. E.O. No. 118 dated July 5, 1999 (Providing for the Creation of a
National Committee on the Culture of Peace)
3. E.O. No. 134 dated July 31, 1999 (Declaring August 12, 1999 and
Every 12th Day of August Thereafter as International Humanitarian
Law Day)
4. E.O. No. 404 dated January 24, 2005 (Creating the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines Monitoring Committee [GRP-MCJ on
Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law)
5. A.O. No. 157 dated August 21, 2006 (Creating an Independent
Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings)
6. A.O. No. 163 dated December 8, 2006 (Strengthening and
Increasing the Membership of the Presidential Human Rights
Committee, and Expanding Further the Functions of Said
Committee)93
7. A.O. No. 181 dated July 3, 2007 (Directing the Cooperation and
Coordination Between the National Prosecution Service and Other
Concerned Agencies of Government for the Successful Investigation
and Prosecution of Political and Media Killings)
8. A.O. No. 197 dated September 25, 2007 (DND and AFP
Coordination with PHRC Sub-committee on Killings and
Disappearances)
9. A.O. No. 211 dated November 26, 2007 (Creating a Task Force
Against Political Violence)
10. A.O. No. 249 dated December 10, 2008 (Further Strengthening
Government Policies, Plans, and Programs for the Effective
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights on the Occasion of the
60th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights)
11. E.O. No. 847 dated November 23, 2009 (Creating the Church-
Police-Military-Liaison Committee to Formulate and Implement a
Comprehensive Program to Establish Strong Partnership Between the
State and the Church on Matters Concerning Peace and Order and
Human Rights)
12. A.O. No. 35 dated November 22, 2012 (Creating the Inter-Agency
Committee on Extra-Legal Killings, Enforced Disappearances, Torture
and Other Grave Violations of the Right to Life, Liberty and Security of
Persons)
13. A.O. No. 1 dated October 11, 2016 (Creating the Presidential
Task Force on Violations of the Right to Life, Liberty and Security of
the Members of the Media)
Finally, the Congress passed the following laws affecting human
1. Republic Act No. 7438 (An Act Defining Certain Rights of Person
Arrested, Detained or Under Custodial Investigation as well as the
Duties of the Arresting, Detaining and Investigating Officers and
Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof)
2. Republic Act No. 8371 (The Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act of
1997)
3. Republic Act No. 9201 (National Human Rights Consciousness
Week Act of 2002)
4. Republic Act No. 9208 (Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003)
5. Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004)
6. Republic Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006)
7. Republic Act No. 9372 (Human Security Act of 2007)
8. Republic Act No. 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women)
9. Republic Act No. 9745 (Anti-Torture Act of 2009)
10. Republic Act No. 9851 (Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against
Humanity)
11. Republic Act No. 10121 (Philippine Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Act of 2010)
12. Republic Act No. 10168 (The Terrorism Financing Prevention and
Suppression Act of 2012)
13. Republic Act No. 10353 (Anti-Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearance Act of 2012)
14. Republic Act No. 10364 (Expanded Anti-Trafficking In Persons Act
of 2012)
15. Republic Act No. 10368 (Human Rights Victims Reparation And
Recognition Act of 2013)
16. Republic Act No. 10530 (The Red Cross and Other Emblems Act
of 2013)
Contrary to petitioners’ postulation, our nation’s history will not be
instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting
through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB. Whether
petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already
engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the
present generation of Filipinos. As to the unborn, it must be said that
the preservation and popularization of our history is not the sole
responsibility of the Chief Executive; it is a joint and collective
endeavor of every freedom-loving citizen of this country.
Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the
Human Rights Victims' Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial
Commission in the memorialization of HRVVs, the National Historical
Commission of the Philippines (NHCP), formerly known as the
National Historical Institute (NHI),94 is mandated to act as the primary
government agency responsible for history and is authorized to
determine all factual matters relating to official Philippine
history.95 Among others, it is tasked to: (a) conduct and support all
kinds of research relating to Philippine national and local history; (b)
develop educational materials in various media, implement historical
educational activities for the popularization of Philippine history, and
disseminate, information regarding Philippine historical events, dates,
places and personages; and (c) actively engage in the settlement or
resolution of controversies or issues relative to historical personages,
places, dates and events.96 Under R.A. Nos. 10066 (National Cultural
Heritage Act of 2009)97 and 10086 (Strengthening Peoples'
Nationalism Through Philippine History Act),98 the declared State
policy is to conserve, develop, promote, and popularize the nation’s
historical and cultural heritage and resources.99 Towards this end,
means shall be provided to strengthen people’s nationalism, love of
country, respect for its heroes and pride for the people’s
accomplishments by reinforcing the importance of Philippine national
and local history in daily life with the end in view of raising social
consciousness.100 Utmost priority shall be given not only with the
research on history but also its popularization.101
II.
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias
Petitioners contend that the interment of Marcos at the LNMB will
desecrate it as a sacred and hallowed place and a revered national
shrine where the mortal remains of our country’s great men and
women are interred for the inspiration and emulation of the present
generation and generations to come. They erred.
A. NATIONAL SHRINES
As one of the cultural properties of the Philippines, national historical
shrines (or historical shrines) refer to sites or structures hallowed and
revered for their history or association as declared by the
NHCP.102 The national shrines created by law and presidential
issuance include, among others: Fort Santiago (Dambana ng
Kalayaan) in Manila;103 all battlefield areas in Corregidor and
Bataan;104 the site of First Mass in the Philippines in Magallanes,
Limasawa, Leyte;105 Aguinaldo Shrine or Freedom Shrine in Kawit,
Cavite;106 Fort San Antonio Abad National Shrine in Malate,
Manila;107 Tirad Pass National Shrine in Ilocos Sur;108 Ricarte
Shrine109 and Aglipay Shrine110 in Batac, Ilocos Norte; Liberty Shrine
in Lapu-Lapu, Cebu;111 “Red Beach” or the landing point of General
Douglas MacArthur and the liberating forces in Baras, Palo,
Leyte;112 Dapitan City as a National Shrine City in Zamboanga Del
Norte;113 General Leandro Locsin Pullon National Shrine in Hamtic,
Antique;114 and Mabini Shrine in Polytechnic University of the
Philippines—Mabini Campus, Sta. Mesa, Manila.115 As sites of the
birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent
leaders of the nation, it is the policy of the Government to hold and
keep the national shrines as sacred and hallowed place.116 P.D. No.
105117 strictly prohibits and punishes by imprisonment and/or fine the
desecration of national shrines by disturbing their peace and serenity
through digging, excavating, defacing, causing unnecessary noise,
and comrmtting unbecoming acts within their premises. R.A. No.
10066 also makes it punishable to intentionally modify, alter, or
destroy the original features of, or undertake construction or real
estate development in any national shrine, monument, landmark and
other historic edifices and structures, declared, classified, and marked
by the NHCP as such, without the prior written permission from the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCAA).118
As one of the cultural agencies attached to the NCAA,119 the NHCP
manages, maintains and administers national shrines, monuments,
historical sites, edifices and landmarks of significant historico-cultural
value.120In particular, the NHCP Board has the power to approve the
declaration of historic structures and sites, such as national shrines,
monuments, landmarks and heritage houses and to determine the
manner of their identification, maintenance, restoration, conservation,
preservation and protection.121
Excluded, however, from the jurisdiction of the NHCP are the military
memorials and battle monuments declared as national shrines, which
have been under the administration, maintenance and development of
the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) of the DND. Among the
military shrines are: Mt. Samat National Shrine in Pilar,
Bataan;122 Kiangan War Memorial Shrine in Linda, Kiangan,
Ifugao;123 Capas National Shrine in Capas, Tarlac;124 Ricarte National
Shrine in Malasin, Batac, Ilocos Norte;125 Balantang Memorial
Cemetery National Shrine in Jaro, Iloilo;126 Balete Pass National
Shrine in Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya;127 USAFIP, NL Military Shrine and
Park in Bessang Pass, Cervantes, Ilocos Sur;128 and the LNMB in
Taguig City, Metro Manila.129
B. THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI
At the end of World War II, the entire nation was left mourning for the
death of thousands of Filipinos. Several places served as grounds for
the war dead, such as the Republic Memorial Cemetery, the Bataan
Memorial Cemetery, and other places throughout the country. The
Republic Memorial Cemetery, in particular, was established in May
1947 as a fitting tribute and final resting place of Filipino military
personnel who died in World War II.
On October 23, 1954, President Ramon D. Magsaysay, Sr. issued
E.O. No. 77, which ordered “the remains of the war dead interred at
the Bataan Memorial Cemetery, Bataan Province, and at other places
in the Philippines, be transferred to, and reinterred at, the Republic
Memorial Cemetery at Fort Wm Mckinley, Rizal Province” so as to
minimize the expenses for the maintenance and upkeep, and to make
the remams accessible to the widows, parents, children, relatives, and
friends.
On October 27, 1954, President Magsaysay issued Proclamation No.
86, which changed the name of Republic Memorial Cemetery
to Libingan Ng Mga Bayani to symbolize “the cause for which our
soldiers have died” and to “truly express the nations esteem and
reverence for her war dead.130
On July 12, 1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No.
423, which reserved for military purposes, under the administration of
the AFP Chief of Staff, the land where LNMB is located. The LNMB
was part of a military reservation site then known as Fort Wm
McKinley (now known as Fort Andres Bonifacio).
On May 28, 1967, Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208, which
excluded the LNMB from the Fort Bonifacio military reservation and
reserved the LNMB for national shrine purposes under the
administration of the National Shrines Commission (NSC) under the
DND.
On September 24, 1972, Marcos, in the exercise of his powers as the
AFP Commander-in-Chief, and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081
dated September 21, 1972, and General Order No. 1 dated
September 22, 1972, as amended, issued Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1 which reorganized the Executive Branch of the National
Government through the adoption of the Integrated Reorganization
Plan (IRP). Section 7, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII thereof abolished
the NSC and its functions together with applicable appropriations,
records, equipment, property and such personnel as may be
necessary were transferred to the NHI under the Department of
Education (DEC). The NHI was responsible for promoting and
preserving the Philippine cultural heritage by undertaking, inter alia,
studies on Philippine history and national heroes and maintaining
national shrines and monuments.131
Pending the organization of the DEC, the functions relative to the
administration, maintenance and development of national shrines
tentatively integrated into the PVAO in July 1973.
On January 26, 1977, President Marcos issued P.D. No. 1076.
Section 7, Article XV, Chapter I, Part XII of the IRP was repealed on
the grounds that “the administration, maintenance and development of
national shrines consisting of military memorials or battle monuments
can be more effectively accomplished if they are removed from the
[DEC] and transferred to the [DND] by reason of the latter’s greater
capabilities and resources” and that “the functions of the [DND] are
more closely related and relevant to the charter or significance of said
national shrines.” Henceforth, the PVAO—through the Military Shrines
Service (MSS), which was created to perform the functions of the
abolished NSC—would administer, maintain and develop military
memorials and battle monuments proclaimed as national shrines.
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued the
Administrative Code. The Code retains PVAO under the supervision
and control of the Secretary of National Defense.132 Among others,
PVAO shall administer, develop and maintain military shrines.133 With
the approval of PVAO Rationalization Plan on June 29, 2010,
pursuant to E.O. No. 366 dated October 4, 2004, MSS was renamed
to Veterans Memorial and Historical Division, under the supervision
and control of PVAO, which is presently tasked with the management
and development of military shrines and the perpetuation of the heroic
deeds of our nation’s veterans.
As a national military shrine, the main features, structures, and
facilities of the LNMB are as follows:
1. Tomb of the Unknown Soldiers – The main structure constructed
at the center of the cemetery where wreath laying ceremonies are
held when Philippine government officials and foreign dignitaries visit
the LNMB. The following inscription is found on the tomb: “Here lies a
Filipino soldier whose name is known only to God.” Behind the tomb
are three marble pillars representing the three main island groups of
the Philippines—Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Buried here were the
remains of 39,000 Filipino soldiers who were originally buried in Camp
O’Donnell Concentration Camp and Fort Santiago, Intramuros,
Manila.
2. Heroes Memorial Gate – A structure shaped in the form of a large
concrete tripod with a stairway leading to an upper view deck and a
metal sculpture at the center. This is the first imposing structure one
sees upon entering the grounds of the cemetery complex.
3. Black Stone Walls – Erected on opposite sides of the main
entrance road leading to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldiers and just
near the Heroes Memorial are two 12-foot high black stone walls
which bear the words, “I do not know the dignity of his birth, but I do
know the glory of his death.” that General Douglas MacArthur made
during his sentimental journey to the Philippines in 1961.
4. Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor Memorial Pylon –
Inaugurated on April 5, 1977 by Secretary Renato S. De Villa in
memory of the defenders of Bataan and Corregidor during World War
II. This monument is dedicated as an eternal acknowledgment of their
valor and sacrifice in defense of the Philippines.
5. Korean Memorial Pylon – A towering monument honoring the 112
Filipino officers and men who, as members of the Philippine
Expeditionary Forces to Korea (PEFTOK), perished during the Korean
War.
6. Vietnam Veterans Memorial Pylon – Dedicated to the members
of the Philippine contingents and Philippine civic action groups to
Vietnam (PHILCON-V and PHILCAG-V) who served as medical,
dental, engineering construction, community and psychological
workers, and security complement. They offered tremendous
sacrifices as they alleviated human suffering in war-ravaged Vietnam
from 1964–1971. Inscribed on the memorial pylon are the words: “To
build and not to destroy, to bring the Vietnamese people happiness
and not sorrow, to develop goodwill and not hatred.”
7. Philippine World War II Guerillas Pylon – Erected by the
Veterans Federation of the Philippines as a testimony to the
indomitable spirit and bravery of the Filipino guerillas of World War II
who refused to be cowed into submission and carried on the fight for
freedom against an enemy with vastly superior arms and under
almost insurmountable odds. Their hardship and sufferings, as well as
their defeats and victories, are enshrined in this memorial.134
Contrary to the dissent, P.D. No. 105135 does not apply to the LNMB.
Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208 predated P.D. No. 105,136 the
LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated
in the latter.137 The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly covered in
the catchall phrase “and others which may be proclaimed in the future
as National Shrines” is erroneous because:
(1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105.
(2) Following the canon of statutory construction known as ejusdem
generis,138 the LNMB is not a site “of the birth, exile, imprisonment,
detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation.” What
P.D. No. 105 contemplates are the following national shrines: Fort
Santiago (“Dambana ng Kalayaan”), all battlefield areas in Corregidor
and Bataan, the site of First Mass in the Philippines, Aguinaldo Shrine
or Freedom Shrine, Fort San Antonio Abad National Shrine, Tirad
Pass National Shrine, Ricarte Shrine, Aglipay Shrine, Liberty Shrine,
“Red Beach” or the landing point of General Douglas MacArthur and
the liberating forces, Dapitan City, General Leandro Locsin Fullon
National Shrine, and Mabini Shrine. Excluded are the military
memorials and battle monuments declared as national shrines under
the PVAO, such as: Mt. Samat National Shrine, Kiangan War
Memorial Shrine, Capas National Shrine, Ricarte National Shrine,
Balantang Memorial Cemetery National Shrine, Balete Pass National
Shrine; USAFIP, NL Military Shrine and Park, and the LNMB.
(3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine
under the jurisdiction of the PVAO. While P.D. No. 1 dated September
24, 1972 transferred the administration, maintenance and
development of national shrines to the NHI under the DEC, it never
actually materialized. Pending the organization of the DEC, its
functions relative to national shrines were tentatively integrated into
the PVAO in July 1973. Eventually, on January 26, 1977, Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1076. The PVAO, through the MSS, was tasked to
administer, maintain, and develop military memorials and battle
monuments proclaimed as national shrines. The reasons being
that “the administration, maintenance and development of national
shrines consisting of military memorials or battle monuments can be
more effectively accomplished if they are removed from the [DEC] and
transferred to the [DND] by reason of the latter’s greater capabilities
and resources” and that “the functions of the [DND] are more closely
related and relevant to the charter or significance of said national
shrines.”
The foregoing interpretation is neither narrow and myopic nor
downright error. Instead, it is consistent with the letter and intent of
P.O. No. 105.
Assuming that P.O. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive
words “sacred and hallowed” refer to the LNMB as a place and not to
each and every mortal remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of
Marcos at the LNMB does not diminish said cemetery as a revered
and respected ground. Neither does it negate the presumed individual
or collective “heroism” of the men and women buried or will be buried
therein. The “nation’s esteem and reverence for her war dead,” as
originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing
Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That being said, the
interment of Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the
physical, historical, and cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national
military shrine.
At this juncture, reference should be made to Arlington National
Cemetery (Arlington), which is identical to the LNMB in terms of its
prominence in the U.S. It is not amiss to point that our armed forces
have been patterned after the U.S. and that its military code produced
a salutary effect in the Philippines' military justice system.139 Hence,
relevant military rules, regulations, and practices of the U.S. have
persuasive, if not the same, effect in this jurisdiction.
As one of the U.S. Army national military cemeteries,140 the Arlington
is under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army.141 The
Secretary of the U.S. Army has the responsibility to develop, operate,
manage, administer, oversee, and fund the Army national military
cemeteries in a manner and to standards that fully honor the service
and sacrifices of the deceased members of the armed forces buried or
inumed therein, and shall prescribe such regulations and policies as
may be necessary to administer the cemeteries.142 In addition, the
Secretary of the U.S. Army is empowered to appoint an advisory
committee, which shall make periodic reports and recommendations
as well as advise the Secretary with respect to the administration of
the cemetery, the erection of memorials at the cemetery, and master
planning for the cemetery.143
Similar to the Philippines, the U.S. national cemeteries are
established as national shrines in tribute to the gallant dead who have
served in the U.S. Armed Forces.144 The areas are protected,
managed and administered as suitable and dignified burial grounds
and as significant cultural resources.145 As such, the authorization of
activities that take place therein is limited to those that are consistent
with applicable legislation and that are compatible with maintaining
their solemn commemorative and historic character.146
The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials.
The PVAO, which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain
military shrines, is under the supervision and control of the DND. The
DND, in turn, is under the Office of the President.
The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of
Government is a self-executing provision of the Constitution and does
not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be limited,
much less withdrawn, by the legislature147. This is why President
Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992 Agreement148between
former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the remains of
Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President,
he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered
into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he
considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will
be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the
power to reserve for public use and for specific public purposes any of
the lands of the public domain and that the reserved land shall remain
subject to the specific public purpose indicated until otherwise
provided by law or proclamation.149 At present, there is no law or
executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB
is located from the use it was originally intended by the past
Presidents. The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos
as a former President and Commander-in-Chief,150 a legislator,151 a
Secretary of National Defense,152 a military personnel,153 a
veteran,154 and a Medal of Valor awardee,155 whether recognizing his
contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use
requirement. The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses
incidental to the burial is granted to compensate him for valuable
public services rendered.156Likewise, President Duterte’s
determination to have Marcos’ remains interred at the LNMB was
inspired by his desire for national healing and reconciliation.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty prevails
over petitioners’ highly disputed factual allegation that, in the guise of
exercising a presidential prerogative, the Chief Executive is actually
motivated by utang na loob (debt of gratitude) and bayad
utang(payback) to the Marcoses. As the purpose is not self-evident,
petitioners have the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of
their claim. They failed. Even so, this Court cannot take cognizance of
factual issues since We are not a trier of facts.
C. AFP REGULATIONS ON THE LNMB
A review of the regulations issued by the AFP Chief of Staff as to who
may and may not be interred at the LNMB underscores the nature and
purpose of the LNMB as an active military cemetery/grave site.
On May 13, 1947, the Chief of Staff of the Philippine Army, by the
direction of the President and by order of the Secretary of National
Defense, issued General Orders No. 111, which constituted and
activated, as of said date, the Graves Registration Platoon as a unit of
the Philippine Army.
On February 2, 1960, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary
of National Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-371
(Administrative and Special Staff Services, Grave Registration
Service), which provided that the following may be interred in the
LNMB: (a) World War II dead of the AFP and recognized guerillas; (b)
Current dead of the AFP; (c) Retired military personnel of the AFP; (d)
Remains of former members of the AFP who died while in the active
service and in the Retired List of the AFP now interred at different
cemeteries and other places throughout the Philippines or the
Secretary of National Defense; and (e) Others upon approval of the
Congress of the Philippines, the President of the Philippines or the
Secretary of National Defense. The regulation also stated that the
AFP Quartermaster General will be responsible for, among other
matters, the efficient operation of the Graves Registration Service; the
interment, disinterment and reinterment of the dead mentioned above;
and preservation of military cemeteries, national cemeteries, and
memorials.
On July 31, 1973, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary of
National Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-372 (Administration
and Operation of AFP Graves Registration Installations), which
superseded AFP Regulations G 161-371. It provided that the following
may be interred in the LNMB: (a) Deceased Veterans of the Philippine
Revolution of 1896/World War I; (b) Deceased World War II members
of the AFP and recognized guerillas; (c) Deceased military personnel
of the AFP who died while in the active duty; (d) Deceased retired
military personnel of the AFP; (e) Deceased military personnel of the
AFP interred at different cemeteries and other places outside the
LNMB; and (f) Such remains of persons as the Commander-in-Chief
of the AFP may direct. The remains of the following were not allowed
to be interred in the LNMB: (a) The spouse of an active, or retired,
deceased military personnel, recognized guerillas who himself/herself
is not a military personnel; and (b) AFP personnel who were retireable
but separated/reverted/ discharged for cause, or joined and aided the
enemy of the Republic of the Philippines, or were convicted of capital
or other criminal offenses, involving moral turpitude. The regulation
also stated that the Quartermaster General shall be responsible for,
among other matters, the efficient operation of the AFP graves
registration installations; the interment, disinterment and reinterment
of deceased military personnel mentioned above; and the
preservation of military cemeteries, proper marking and official
recording of graves therein.
On April 9, 1986, AFP Chief of Staff Fidel V. Ramos, by order of
National Defense Minister, issued AFP Regulations G 161-373
(Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which
superseded AFP Regulations G 161-372. It enumerated a list of
deceased person who may be interred at the LNMB, namely: (a)
Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or Commanders-in-Chief,
AFP; (c) Ministers of National Defense; (d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e)
General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active and retired military
personnel of the AFP; (g) Veterans of Philippine Revolution of 1896,
WWI, WW II and recognized guerillas; and (h) Government
Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artist and other deceased persons
whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Batasang Pambansa or the Minister of National
Defense. The regulation also stated that the Quartermaster General
shall be responsible for the allocation of specific section/areas for the
said deceased persons, while the Commanding Officer of the
Quartermaster Graves Registration Company shall be charged with
the preparation of grave sites, supervision of burials at LNMB and the
registration of graves.
On March 27, 1998, the AFP Chief of Staff, by order of the Secretary
of National Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-374 (Allocation of
Cemetery Plots at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani), which superseded
AFP Regulations G 161-373. It provided that the following may be
interred in the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents or
Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense; (d)
Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f) Active
and retired military personnel of the AFP; (g) Veterans of Philippine
Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas; (h)
Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other
deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been
approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of
National Defense; and (i) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense,
CSAFP, Generals/Flag Officers, Dignitaries, Statesmen, National
Artists, widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National Defense
and Chief of Staff. The remains of the following were not allowed to be
interred in the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized
personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude. Like AFP Regulations G 161-373, it stated
that the Quartermaster General shall be responsible for the allocation
of specific section/areas for the deceased persons, whereas the
Commanding Officer of the Quartermaster Graves Registration Unit
shall be charged with the preparation of grave sites, supervision of
burials, and the registration of graves.
Finally, on September 11, 2000, the AFP Chief of Staff, by the order
of the Secretary of National Defense, issued AFP Regulations G 161-
375 (Allocation of Cemetery Plots at the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani),
which superseded AFP Regulations G 161-374. The regulation stated
that the Chief of Staff shall be responsible for the issuance of
interment directive for all active military personnel for interment,
authorized personnel (such as those former members of the AFP who
laterally entered or joined the Philippine Coast Guard [PCG] and the
Philippine National Police [PNP], and retirees, veterans and reservists
enumerated therein. The Quartermaster General is tasked to exercise
over-all supervision in the implementation of the regulation and the
Commander ASCOM, PA through the Commanding Officer of Grave
Services Unit is charged with the registration of the deceased/graves,
the allocation of specific section/area at the LNMB for interment of
deceased, the preparation of grave sites, and the supervision of
burials.
Under AFP Regulations G 161-375, the following are eligible for
interment at the LNMB: (a) Medal of Valor Awardees; (b) Presidents
or Commanders-in-Chief, AFP; (c) Secretaries of National Defense;
(d) Chiefs of Staff, AFP; (e) General/Flag Officers of the AFP; (f)
Active and retired military personnel of the AFP to include active
draftees and trainees who died in line of duty, active reservists and
CAFGU Active Auxiliary (CAA) who died in combat operations or
combat related activities; (g) Former members of the AFP who
laterally entered or joined the PCG and the PNP; (h) Veterans of
Philippine Revolution of 1890, WWI, WWII and recognized guerillas;
(i) Government Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists and other
deceased persons whose interment or reinterment has been
approved by the Commander-in-Chief, Congress or the Secretary of
National Defense; and (j) Former Presidents, Secretaries of Defense,
Dignitaries, Statesmen, National Artists, widows of Former Presidents,
Secretaries of National Defense and Chief of Staff. Similar to AFP
Regulations G 161-374, the following are not qualified to be interred in
the LNMB: (a) Personnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service; and (b) Authorized
personnel who were convicted by final judgment of an offense
involving moral turpitude.
In the absence of any executive issuance or law to the contrary, the
AFP Regulations G 161-375 remains to be the sole authority in
determining who are entitled and disqualified to be interred at the
LNMB. Interestingly, even if they were empowered to do so, former
Presidents Corazon C. Aquino and Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III,
who were themselves aggrieved at the Martial Law, did not revise the
rules by expressly prohibiting the burial of Marcos at the LNMB. The
validity of AFP Regulations G 161-375 must, therefor, be sustained for
having been issued by the AFP Chief of Staff acting under the
direction of the Secretary of National Defense, who is the alter ego of
the President.
x x x In Joson v. Torres, we explained the concept of the alter ego
principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency and its limit in this
wise:
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive,
and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive
and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by
and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by
the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
(Emphasis ours, citation omitted.)157
It has been held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to
law has the force and effect of law and, until set aside, is binding upon
executive and administrative agencies, including the President as the
chief executor of laws.158
1. Qualification under the AFP Regulations
AFP Regulations G 161-375 should not be stricken down in the
absence of clear and unmistakable showing that it has been issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
ofjurisdiction. Neither could it be considered ultra vires for purportedly
providing incomplete, whimsical, and capricious standards for
qualification for burial at the LNMB.
To compare, We again refer to the U.S. Army regulations on
Arlington. In the U.S., the Secretary of the Army, with the approval of
the Secretary of Defense, determines eligibility for interment or
inurnment in the Army national military cemeteries.159 Effective
October 26, 2016, the rule160 is as follows:
Only those who qualify as a primarily eligible person or a derivatively
eligible person are eligible for interment in Arlington National
Cemetery, unless otherwise prohibited as provided for in §§
553.19161–553.20,162 provided that the last period of active duty of the
service member or veteran ended with an honorable discharge.
(a) Primarily eligible persons. The following are primarily eligible
persons for purposes of interment:
(1) Any service member who dies on active duty in the U.S. Armed
Forces (except those service members serving on active duty for
training only), if the General Courts Martial Convening Authority
grants a certificate of honorable service.
(2) Any veteran retired from a Reserve component who served a
period of active duty (other than for training), is carried on the official
retired list, and is entitled to receive military retired pay.
(3) Any veteran retired from active military service and entitled to
receive military retired pay.
(4) Any veteran who received an honorable discharge from the Armed
Forces prior to October 1, 1949, who was discharged for a permanent
physical disability, who served on active duty (other than for training),
and who would have been eligible for retirement under the provisions
of 10 U.S.C. 1201 had the statute been in effect on the date of
separation.
(5) Any veteran awarded one of the following decorations:
(i) Medal of Honor;163
(ii) Distinguished Service Cross, Air Force Cross, or Navy Cross;
(iii) Distinguished Service Medal;
(iv) Silver Star; or
(v) Purple Heart.
(6) Any veteran who served on active duty (other than active duty for
training) and who held any of the following positions:
(i) President or Vice President of the United States;
(ii) Elected member of the U.S. Congress;
(iii) Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States or
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States;
(iv) A position listed, at the time the person held the position, in 5
U.S.C. 5312164 or 5313165 (Levels I and II of the Executive Schedule);
or
(v) Chief of Mission of a Category 4, 5, or 5+ post if the Department of
State classified that post as a Category 4, 5, or 5+ post during the
person’s tenure as Chief of Mission.
(7) Any former prisoner of war who, while a prisoner of war, served
honorably in the active military service, and who died on or after
November 30, 1993.
(b) Derivatively eligible persons. The following individuals are
derivatively eligible persons for purposes of interment who may be
interred if space is available in the gravesite of the primarily eligible
person:
(1) The spouse of a primarily eligible person who is or will be interred
in Arlington National Cemetery. A former spouse of a primarily eligible
person is not eligible for interment in Arlington National Cemetery
under this paragraph.
(2) The spouse of an active duty service member or an eligible
veteran, who was:
(i) Lost or buried at sea, temporarily interred overseas due to action
by the Government, or officially determined to be missing in action;
(ii) Buried in a U.S. military cemetery maintained by the American
Battle Monuments Commission; or
(iii) Interred in Arlington National Cemetery as part of a group burial
(the derivatively eligible spouse may not be buried in the group burial
gravesite).
(3) The parents of a minor child or a permanently dependent adult
child, whose remains were interred in Arlington National Cemetery
based on the eligibility of a parent at the time of the child’s death,
unless eligibility of the non-service connected parent is lost through
divorce from the primarily eligible parent.
(4) An honorably discharged veteran who does not qualify as a
primarily eligible person, if the veteran will be buried in the same
gravesite as an already interred primarily eligible person who is a
close relative, where the interment meets the following conditions:
(i) The veteran is without minor or unmarried adult dependent
children;
(ii) The veteran will not occupy space reserved for the spouse, a
minor child, or a permanently dependent adult child;
(iii) All other close relatives of the primarily eligible person concur with
the interment of the veteran with the primarily eligible person by
signing a notarized statement;
(iv) The veteran’s spouse waives any entitlement to interment in
Arlington National Cemetery, where such entitlement might be based
on the veteran’s interment in Arlington National Cemetery. The
Executive Director may set aside the spouse’s waiver, provided space
is available in the same gravesite, and all close relatives of the
primarily eligible person concur;
(v) Any cost of moving, recasketing, or revaulting the remains will be
paid from private funds.
There is a separate list of eligible with respect to the inurnment of
cremated remains in the Columbarium,166interment of cremated
remains in the Unmarked Area,167 and group burial.168 As a national
military cemetery, eligibility standards for interment, inurnment, or
memorialization in Arlington are based on honorable military
service.169 Exceptions to the eligibility standards for new graves,
which are rarely granted, are for those persons who have
made significant contributions that directly and substantially
benefited the U.S. military.170
Judging from the foregoing, it is glaring that the U.S. Army regulations
on Arlington and the AFP Regulations G 161-375 on the LNMB, as a
general rule, recognize and reward the military services or military
related activities of the deceased. Compared with the latter, however,
the former is actually less generous in granting the privilege of
interment since only the spouse or parent, under certain conditions,
may be allowed “if space is available in the gravesite of the primarily
eligible person.”
It is not contrary to the “well-established custom,” as the dissent
described it, to argue that the word “bayani”in the LNMB has become
a misnomer since while a symbolism of heroism may attach to the
LNMB as a national shrine for military memorial, the same does not
automatically attach to its feature as a military cemetery and to those
who were already laid or will be laid therein. As stated, the purpose of
the LNMB, both from the legal and historical perspectives, has neither
been to confer to the people buried there the title of “hero” nor to
require that only those interred therein should be treated as a “hero.”
In fact, the privilege of internment at the LNMB has been loosen up
through the years. Since 1986, the list of eligible includes not only
those who rendered active military service or military-related activities
but also non-military personnel who were recognized for their
significant contributions to the Philippine society (such as government
dignitaries, statesmen, national artists, and other deceased persons
whose interment or reinterment has been approved by the
Commander-in-Chief, Congress or Secretary of National Defense). In
1998, the widows of former Presidents, Secretaries of National
Defense and Chief of Staff were added to the list. Whether or not the
extension of burial privilege to civilians is unwarranted and should be
restricted in order to be consistent with the original purpose of the
LNMB is immaterial and irrelevant to the issue at bar since it is
indubitable that Marcos had rendered significant active military service
and military-related activities.
Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and
Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a
military personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his
alleged human rights abuses and corrupt practices, we may disregard
Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but we cannot deny
him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he held
or the awards he received. In this sense, We agree with the
proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as
a person. While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either.
Certainly, just a human who erred like us.
Our laws give high regard to Marcos as a Medal of Valor awardee and
a veteran. R.A. No. 9049171 declares the policy of the State “to
consistently honor its military heroes in order to strengthen the
patriotic spirit and nationalist consciousness of the military.”172 For
the “supreme self-sacrifice and distinctive acts of heroism and
gallantry,”173 a Medal of Valor awardee or his/her
dependents/heirs/beneficiaries are entitled to the following social
services and financial rewards:
1. Tax-exempt lifetime monthly gratuity of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(₱20,000.00), which is separate and distinct from any salary or
pension that the awardee currently receives or will receive from the
government of the Philippines;174
2. Precedence in employment in government agencies or
government-owned or controlled corporation, if the job qualifications
or requirements are met;
3. Priority in the approval of the awardee’s housing application under
existing housing programs of the government;
4. Priority in the acquisition of public lands under the Public Land Act
and preferential right in the lease of pasture lands and exploitation of
natural resources;
5. Privilege of obtaining loans in an aggregate amount not exceeding
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) from government-
owned or controlled financial institutions without having to put up any
collateral or constitute any pledge or mortgage to secure the payment
of the loan;
6. Twenty (20%) percent discount from all establishments relative to
utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants, recreation and sport centers and
purchase of medicine anywhere in the country;
7. Twenty (20%) percent discount on admission fees charged by
theaters, cinema houses and concert halls, circuses, carnivals and
other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement;
8. Free medical and dental services and consultation in hospital and
clinics anywhere in the country;
9. Exemption from the payment of tuition and matriculation fees in
public or private schools, universities, colleges and other educational
institutions in any pre-school, baccalaureate or post-graduate courses
such as or including course leading to the degree of Doctor of
Medicine (MD), Bachelor of Laws (LLB), and Bachelor of Science in
Nursing (BSN) or allied and similar courses; and
10. If interested and qualified, a quota is given to join the cadet corps
of the Philippine Military Academy or otherwise priority for direct
commission, call to active duty (CAD) and/or enlistment in regular
force of the AFP.
On the other hand, in recognizing their patriotic services in times of
war and peace for the cause of freedom and democracy; for the
attainment of national unity, independence, and socioeconomic
advancement; and for the maintenance of peace and order,175 R.A.
No. 6948, as amended,176 grants our veterans177 and their dependents
or survivors with pension (old age, disability, total administrative
disability, and death) and non-pension (burial, education,
hospitalization, and medical care and treatment) benefits as well as
provisions from the local governments. Under the law, the benefits
may be withheld if the Commission on Human Rights certifies to the
AFP General Headquarters that the veteran has been found guilty by
final judgment of a gross human rights violation while in the
service, but this factor shall not be considered taken against his next
of kin.178
2. Disqualification under the AFPRegulations
Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed
none of the disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-375. He
was neither convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral
turpitude nor dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged from active
military service.
Petitioners, however, protest that a narrow interpretation of the AFP
regulations disregards historical context and the rule on statutory
construction. They urge the Court to construe statutes not literally but
according to their spirit and reason.
It is argued that Marcos committed offenses involving moral turpitude
for his gross human rights violations, massive graft and corruption,
and dubious military records, as found by foreign and local courts as
well as administrative agencies. By going into exile, he deliberately
evaded liability for his actions. And by allowing death to overtake him,
he inevitably escaped the prospect of facing accountability for his
crimes. They also contend that his removal in the 1986 popular
uprising is a clear sign of his discharge from the AFP. The People
Power Revolution was the direct exercise of the Filipinos' power to
overthrow an illegitimate and oppressive regime. As a sovereign act, it
necessarily includes the power to adjudge him as dishonorably
discharged from the AFP.
Furthermore, according to petitioners, to limit the application of the
disqualifying provisions of AFP Regulations G 161-375 only to
soldiers would be unfair (since, unlike Presidents, soldiers have an
additional cause for disqualification) and lead to absurd results
(because soldiers who were dishonorably discharged would be
disqualified for acts that are less atrocious than that committed by
Marcos). Also, the AFP regulations would place Marcos in the same
class as the other Philippine Presidents when in fact he is a class of
his own, sui generis. The other Presidents were never removed by
People Power Revolution and were never subject of laws declaring
them to have committed human rights violations. Thus, the intended
burial would be an act of similarly treating persons who are differently
situated.
Despite all these ostensibly persuasive arguments, the fact remains
that Marcos was not convicted by final judgment of any offense
involving moral turpitude. No less than the 1987 Constitution
mandates that a person be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law and that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf.”179 Even the U.N. principles
on reparation and to combat impunity cited by petitioners
unequivocally guarantee the rights of the accused, providing that:
XIII. Rights of others
27. Nothing in this document is to be construed as derogating from
internationally or nationally protected rights of others, in particular the
right of an accused person to benefit from applicable standards of due
process.
xxx
PRINCIPLE 9. GUARANTEES FOR PERSONS IMPLICATED
Before a commission identifies perpetrators in its report, the
individuals concerned shall be entitled to the following guarantees:
(a) The commission must try to corroborate information implicating
individuals before they are named publicly;
(b) The individuals implicated shall be afforded an opportunity to
provide a statement setting forth their version of the facts either at a
hearing convened by the commission while conducting its
investigation or through submission of a document equivalent to a
right of reply for inclusion in the commission’s file.
To note, in the U.S., a person found to have committed a Federal or
State capital crime (i.e., a crime which a sentence of imprisonment for
life or death penalty may be imposed) but who has not been convicted
by reason of not being available for trial due to death or flight to avoid
prosecution, may be ineligible for interment, inumment, or
memorialization in an Army national military cemetery. Nevertheless,
such ineligibility must still observe the procedures specified in §
553.21.180
The various cases cited by peutioners, which were decided with
finality by courts here and abroad, have no bearing in this case since
they are merely civil in nature; hence, cannot and do not establish
moral turpitude.
Also, the equal protection clause is not violated. Generally, there is no
property right to safeguard because even if one is eligible to be buried
at the LNMB, such fact would only give him or her the privilege to be
interred therein. Unless there is a favorable recommendation from the
Commander-in-Chief, the Congress or the Secretary of National
Defense, no right can be said to have ripen. Until then,
such inchoate right is not legally demandable and enforceable.
Assuming that there is a property right to protect, the requisites of
equal protection clause are not met.181 In this case, there is a real and
substantial distinction between a military personnel and a former
President. The conditions of dishonorable discharge under the Articles
of War182 attach only to the members of the military. There is also no
substantial distinction between Marcos and the three Philippine
Presidents buried at the LNMB (Presidents Quirino, Garcia, and
Macapagal). All of them were not convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. In addition, the classification between a military personnel
and a former President is germane to the purposes of Proclamation
No. 208 and P.D. No. 1076. While the LNMB is a national shrine
for militarymemorials, it is also an active military cemetery that
recognizes the status or position held by the persons interred
therein.
Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service.
PVAO expressly recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A.
No. 6948, as amended. Petitioners have not shown that he was
dishonorably discharged from military service under APP Circular 17,
Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge Prior to Expiration of Term
of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of the Articles of
War.183 The NHCP study184 is incomplete with respect to his entire
military career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the
AFP.
With respect to the phrase “[p]ersonnel who were dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from the service,” the same should be
viewed in light of the definition provided by AFP Regulations G 161-
375 to the term “active service” which is “[s]ervice rendered by a
military person as a Commissioned Officer, enlisted man/woman,
probationary officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and service rendered by him/her as a civilian official or
employee in the Philippine Government prior to the date of his/her
separation or retirement from the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for
which military and/or civilian service he/she shall have received pay
from the Philippine Government, and/or such others as may be
hereafter be prescribed by law as active service (PD 1638, as
amended).”185 To my mind, the word “service” should be construed as
that rendered by a military person in the AFP, including civil service,
from the time of his/her commission, enlistment, probation, training or
drafting, up to the date of his/her separation or retirement from the “Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever
AFP. Civil service after honorable separation and retirement from the it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic
AFP is outside the context of “service” under AFP Regulations G 161- formulation, ‘discretion is not unconfined and vagrant’ but ‘canalized
375. within banks that keep it from overflowing.”186 At bar, President
Duterte, through the public respondents, acted within the bounds of
Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos’ ouster from the
the law and jurisprudence. Notwithstanding the call of human rights
presidency during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his
advocates, the Court must uphold what is legal and just. And that is
dishonorable separation, reversion or discharge from the military
not to deny Marcos of his rightful place at the LNMB. For even the
service. The fact that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of the
Framers of our Constitution intend that full respect for human rights is
AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the principle of
available at any stage of a person’s development, from the time he or
supremacy of civilian authority over the military. Not being a military
she becomes a person to the time he or she leaves this earth.187
person who may be prosecuted before the court martial, the President
can hardly be deemed “dishonorably separated/reverted/discharged There are certain things that are better left for history—not this
from the service” as contemplated by AFP Regulations G 161-375. Court—to adjudge. The Court could only do so much in accordance
Dishonorable discharge through a successful revolution is an extra- with the clearly established rules and principles. Beyond that, it is
constitutional and direct sovereign act of the people which is beyond ultimately for the people themselves, as the sovereign, to decide, a
the ambit of judicial review, let alone a mere administrative regulation. task that may require the better perspective that the passage of time
provides. In the meantime, the country must move on and let this
It is undeniable that former President Marcos was forced out of office
issue rest.
by the people through the so-called EDSA Revolution. Said political
act of the people should not be automatically given a particular legal WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions
meaning other than its obvious consequence—that of ousting him as are DISMISSED. Necessarily, the Status Quo Ante Order is
president. To do otherwise would lead the Court to the treacherous hereby LIFTED.
and perilous path of having to make choices from multifarious
(Sgd)
inferences or theories arising from the various acts of the people. It is
DIOSDADO M. PER
not the function of the Court, for instance, to divine the exact
Associate Justice
implications or significance of the number of votes obtained in
elections, or the message from the number of participants in public WE CONCUR:
assemblies. If the Court is not to fall into the pitfalls of getting
embroiled in political and oftentimes emotional, if not acrimonious, (Sgd)
debates, it must remain steadfast in abiding by its recognized guiding MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
stars—clear constitutional and legal rules—not by the uncertain, Chief Justice
ambiguous and confusing messages from the actions of the people. (Sgd) (Sgd)
Conclusion ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VE
Associate Justice Associate Justice
In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there
was a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of (Sgd) (Sgd)
jurisdiction which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
check and override an act entrusted to the judgment of another Associate Justice Associate Justice
branch. Truly, the President’s discretion is not totally unfettered.
(Sgd) (Sgd) If the absence of an express prohibition were to be the primary or sole
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
determinant of the merits of this case, then even the processing clerk
Associate Justice Associate Justice of the administrative office supervising the LMB could decide this
matter by simply ticking off the appropriate box in a Yes or No
(Sgd) (Sgd)
question that asks: “Is there an express statute that prohibits a
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
President from burying a former bemedalled soldier or president in
Associate Justice Associate Justice
the Libingan ng Mga Bayani? If yes, bury. If no, do not bury.”
(Sgd) (Sgd)
To the contrary, the case can only be decided by deeply and
BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
holistically analyzing the extent and implications of the legal
Associate Justice Associate Justice
phenomenon called the power to exercise presidential discretion, and
(Sgd) (Sgd) how it should be measured in this case.
MARIVIC M.V.F. LEONON FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
In light of allegations that the decision to bury the late President will
Associate Justice Associate Justice
run counter to the Constitution, statutory standards and judicial
(Sgd) pronouncements, this Court must take a step back in history to
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA understand what the Constitution that it is defending stands for;
Associate Justice whether it is in danger of being violated in spirit or in letter; and
whether this danger is of such kind and degree that the exercise of
Certification presidential discretion should be restrained. This Court must also
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the compare the statutory standards that have been raised and determine
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation whether the course of action proposed by the President would run
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. counter to those standards. This Court must also examine the
doctrines and language employed in many of its decisions if it is to
(Sgd) guard against heresy directed at the spirit of the Constitution that
MARIA LOURDES P.A.couldSERENO
undermine not just one doctrine, but perhaps the moral
Chief Justice legitimacy of the Court itself.
Dissenting Opinions This is how consequential any statement coming from the Court on
this issue could be.
SERENO, C.J.:
THE COURT’S BOUNDEN DUTY IS NOT ONLY TO PRESERVE
The whole thesis of respondents on the substantive issues lies in the
THE CONSTITUTION, BUT ALSO ITSELF.
absence of an express prohibition against the burial of former
President Marcos; hence, they argue that this Court cannot It has been posited that the Court should not meddle in a political
characterize the current President’s decision to have him buried at maneuver that the President is compelled to make. Whether it is a
the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LMB) as one made in grave abuse of maneuver that is animated by the need to maintain credibility in the
discretion. eyes of important supporters, or whether it is necessary to advance
unity in this country, is not a motivation that the President should be
Nothing can be more wrong, and no view more diminishing of the
accountable for.
Judiciary’s mandated role under the 1987 Constitution.
Likewise, it has been proposed that this Court should look beyond the
past and shift its focus to today’s political reality—that the present
decision-maker is the most powerful and the most popular politician in
the republic; that for him to undertake the reforms he has promised
requires that he be able to deliver on his promises; that the key to
unity in this day and age is to forgive the past and give former
President Marcos the honors due the office that he held and the
bemedalled soldiering he rendered; and that in any event, the state
has enacted many measures not only to compensate Martial Law
victims but also to advance the cause of human rights.
At the initial stage of any discussion in this Court, these kinds of
arguments are usually met with skepticism by its Members under the
express unction of the Constitution as interpreted in the post-Marcos
decisions.1For the relevant judicial powers provisions of the 1987
Constitution impels the Court to relegate the political question
argument, and any semblance of such argument—deference, political
wisdom, etc.—to a status of non-importance, especially if it fails to
satisfy the threshold test. Simply put, that test is whether indeed the
question is one addressed to purely political exercises internal to the
workings of the legislature;2 or whether, on the part of the President,
there are no legal standards against which his particular action can be
evaluated.3 Indeed, the Court has, in questions of grave national
importance, generally exercised judicial review when the allegations
of grave abuse of discretion are sufficiently serious.
For the implications of this case goes to the very fulcrum of the
powers of Government: the Court must do what is right by correctly
balancing the interests that are present before it and thus preserve
the stability of Philippine democracy.
If the Court unduly shies away from addressing the principal question
of whether a decision to bury the former President would contradict
the anti-Martial Law and human rights underpinnings and direction of
the 1987 Constitution, it would, wittingly or unwittingly, weaken itself
by diminishing its role as the protector of the constitutional liberties of
our people. It would dissipate its own moral strength and
progressively be weakened, unable to promptly speak against actions
that mimic the authoritarian past, or issue judicial writs to protect the
people from the excesses of government.
This Court must, perforce, painstakingly go through the process of
examining whether any claim put forth herein by the parties genuinely
undermines the intellectual and moral fiber of the Constitution. And,
by instinct, the Court must defend the Constitution and itself.
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS THE EMBODIMENT OF THE
FILIPINO NATION’S ENDURING VALUES, WHICH THIS COURT
MUST ZEALOUSLY PROTECT.
Countless times, this Court has said in so many words that the 1987
Constitution embodies the Filipino’s enduring values.4 The protection
of those values has consequently become the duty of the Court. That
this is the legal standard by which to measure whether it has properly
comported itself in its constitutional role has been declared in various
fashions by the Court itself.
See, for example, how this Court articulated its duty to protect the
environrnent.5 women,6 children,7 labor,8the indigenous people,9 and
consistently, those who have been or are in danger of being deprived
of their human rights.10
Note the power that the Constitution vests in the Court to actively
promulgate rules for the protection of human rights, and how the
Court in tum described this duty when it promulgated the writs
of kalikasan, habeas data, and amparo.11
Any conclusion in this case that betrays a lack of enthusiasm on the
part of this Court to protect the cherished values of the Constitution
would be a judicial calamity. That the Judiciary is designed to be
passive relative to the “active” nature of the political departments is a
given. But when called upon to discharge its relatively passive role,
the post-1986 Supreme Court has shown zealousness in the
protection of constitutional rights, a zealousness that has been its
hallmark from then up to now. It cannot, in the year 2016, be reticent
in asserting this brand of protective activism.
NOT EVERYTHING LEGALLY REQUIRED IS WRITTEN IN BLACK
AND WHITE; THE JUDGE’S ROLE IS TO DISCERN WITHIN THE
PENUMBRA.
As early as 1950, the Civil Code, a creation of the Legislature, has
instructed the Judiciary on how to proceed in situations where there is
no applicable law or where there is ambiguity in the legislation that
seems to apply to the case at hand. The code provides:
Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws.
Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws,
it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
I do not believe that this Court is bereft of sufficient guides that can
aid in the exercise of its role of protecting and advancing constitutional
rights. It must with a magnifying lens examine whether clear intent,
historical references, and express mandates can be found in the 1987
Constitution and whether these are relevant to this case. We must
pick them out and examine them. The ill-gotten wealth statutes, the
remedial human rights legislation—all describe the burden of a nation
that must recover from the financial and moral plunder inflicted upon
this nation by Marcos, his family and his cronies. We must get our
bearings from these guideposts and find out if they instruct us on what
must be done with respect to his proposed burial beyond the express
and implied condemnation of the wrongs he has committed against
the country. The pronouncements of this Court and those of the
Sandiganbayan, the legal pleadings and administrative propositions
submitted by the Philippine government to international and local
tribunals from 1987 to the present—a full 29 years—from these we
must infer an indication of the treatment that should be given to the
proposed action of the Government.
That constitutional and statutory interpretation is the bread and butter
of adjudication is beyond cavil. From the oldest cases in the Philippine
Reports to its latest decision,12 this Court has been in the business of
filling in gaps, interpreting difficult texts, so that “right and justice will
prevail.” That this is the entire reason for the existence of the Judiciary
is self-evident. The end of “judg-ing” is not to do what an
administrative clerk can very well do; it is to ensure that “right and
justice” will prevail.
Indeed, that judges must interpret statutes as well as declare the
existence and protection of individual rights so that “justice and right”
might prevail has been the essence of an independent Judiciary. This
has been so from the time that the necessity for such independence
was first recognized by the 1215 Magna Carta signed by King John;
that no man, not even the highest ruler of the land—and King John
believed in his divine right to rule—can exercise power in such a way
that denies the fundamental liberty of any man.
And the modern Judiciary has progressed considerably from that time.
The Philippine Judiciary will thus be measured by the universal
standard of whether it has discharged its power of review, so that
“right and justice will prevail.”
There was a time when this Court hid under the “political question”
doctrine and evaded constitutional and moral responsibility for the
long period of suppression of the people’s basic rights. Rightly so, that
same Court, after the repudiation by our people of the Marcos regime
in 1986, likewise repudiated the acts of the majority of the Court
during Martial Law.
This Court cannot afford to retrogress and make the same mistakes
as those made by its predecessor courts during Martial Law. To do so
would possibly merit the same kind of condemnation that former
President Marcos reaped in the fullness of time.
IS THE PREFERENCE FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS ENCODED IN THE LEGAL DNA OF THE CONSTITUTION?
There is no question that the importance given to human rights is
encoded in the very building blocks of the Philippine Constitution. For
the Constitution to make sense, the Supreme Court has to recognize
that it is programmed to reject government actions that are contrary to
the respect for human rights, and to uphold those that do.
The recognition of the hallowed place given to the protection of
human rights has been tirelessly repeated by all the Justices who ever
walked the halls of Padre Faura. Not one has said that it was
unimportant; or that it should be sacrificed at the altar of something
else—not economic progress, not even peace—not even by those
who saw when, why, and how Martial Law began and progressed.
Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno has said:
The sole purpose of government is to promote, protect and preserve
these [human] rights. And when government not only defaults in its
duty but itself violates the very rights it was established to protect, it
forfeits its authority to demand obedience of the governed and could
be replaced with one to which the people consent. The Filipino people
exercised this highest of rights in the EDSA Revolution of February
1986.13
Chief Justice Puno unequivocably repudiated the “ends-justifies-
means” mantra of Martial Law when he catapulted the rights that
Marcos trampled upon to the highest pinnacle of government
priorities, and when as Chief Justice he made as his tenure’s flagship
the promulgation of the extraordinary and novel human rights writs
of amparo and habeas data.
If it is true that when the Government itself violates the very rights it
was established to protect, that violation forfeits its right to govern,
then it becomes necessary for this Court to reject any governmental
attempt that encourages the degradation of those rights. For this
Court guards not only against clear and direct violations of the
Constitution, but also against actions that lead this country and its
rulers to a slippery slope that threatens to hurl its people to the abyss
of helpless unprotectedness.
Contrary to the thesis of my esteemed colleague Justice Diosdado
Peralta, the constitutional provisions guaranteeing the protection of
human rights are not inert, coming to life only when there is a specific
law that would make these rights accessible in specific cases. Each
right that is sought to be protected by the Constitution acts as a
prohibition against the Government’s derogation of those rights. Not
all of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution direct the commission
of positive acts. Yet these rights can, under the right circumstances,
be invoked either singly or collectively to bar public officers from
performing certain acts that denigrate those rights.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE
ISSUES
Credit must be given to the Solicitor General for immediately agreeing
that the Constitution, decisions of this Court, human right statutes and
the ill-gotten wealth laws and proceedings—in their totality—condemn
the Martial Law regime of the late President Marcos, his family and his
cronies.14 Nevertheless, he posits that all of these are in the past;
human rights victims are to be compensated, anyway; and the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth would continue, including the pursuit of
criminal cases against the Marcos family and their cronies. In other
words, while he admits that it would be most difficult to make former
President Marcos out as a hero, considering the latter’s martial rule
and recorded plunder, nevertheless, Marcos was a bemedalled war
soldier, and that, in addition, his being a former President who was
never dishonorably discharged as a soldier—this fact alone—entitles
him to be interred at the LMB. To the Solicitor General, it is non
sequitur for human rights victims to claim that the burial of Marcos at a
cemetery called Libingan ng mga Bayani will entomb him as a hero
and negate the plethora of legal pronouncements that he is not.
The candid admission made by the Solicitor General has made the
job of this Court much easier. For the substantive issue now boils
down to whether, in fact and in law, the proposed burial of the late
President Marcos at the LMB
(1) will derogate from the state’s duty to protect and promote human
rights under the Constitution, domestic statutes, and international law.
(2) will violate Presidential Decree No. 105, and Republic Act Nos.
10066, 10086 and 289;
(3) is an unconstitutional devotion of public property to a private
purpose;
(4) is an illegal use of public funds;
(5) cannot be sourced from the residual powers of the President or his
powers to reserve lands for public purposes;
(6) cannot find legal mooring in AFP Regulation G 161-375;
(7) is in violation of the clause on faithful execution of the laws
and thus the proposed burial is unconstitutional and illegal, and the
presidential discretion sought to be exercised is being committed in
grave abuse of discretion.
On the procedural points, this Opinion fully agrees with the Dissenting
Opinion of Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, Jr., but will
nevertheless, attempt to augment what has been so ably discussed
by Justice Caguioa on the political question defense.
On the substantive points, I fully agree with Justice Caguioa,
whose Dissenting Opinion had first been proposed as the main
decision. I had prepared this Opinion to elucidate my independent
understanding of some of the issues he has covered.
Discussion
I.
THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO RESOLVE THIS
CONTROVERSY UNDER THE EXPANDED CONCEPT OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
Respondents contend that the issue in this case is a matter within the
discretion of the Executive and must consequently be considered
beyond our power of judicial review.
As will be further discussed, this Court cannot refuse to review an
issue simply because it is alleged to be a political question. That train
has departed a long time ago. Prevailing jurisprudence is a generation
apart from the former usefulness of the political question doctrine as a
bar to judicial review. The reason for that departure—Philippine
Martial Law experience.
A. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, respondents can no
longer utilize the traditional political question doctrine to impede
the power of judicial review.
The 1987 Constitution has expanded the concept of judicial
review15 by expressly providing in Section 1, Article VIII, as follows:
Section 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The above provision delineates judicial power and engraves, for the
first time, the so-called expanded certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.16
The first part of the provision represents the traditional concept of
judicial power involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part represents the expansion of judicial
power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory; that is, the discretion of the political departments of
the government.17
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, particularly in the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature, as well as to declare
their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction, should they be
tainted with grave abuse of discretion.18
The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission provide the
nature and rationale of this expansion of judicial power. In his
Sponsorship Speech, former Chief Justice and Constitutional
Commissioner Roberto R. Concepcion stated:
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the
defense of political questions and got away with it. As a
consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of
habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the defense
of political question. And the Supreme Court said: “Well, since it is
political, we have no authority to pass upon it.” The Committee on the
Judiciary feels that this was not a proper solution of the questions
involved. It did not merely request an encroachment upon the rights of
the people, but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof
during the martial law regime…
xxx xxx xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the
agencies and offices of the govermnent as well as those of its officers.
In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether
or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess ofjurisdiction, or so capriciously as to
constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or
lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means
that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters
of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.19 (Emphasis supplied)
The expansion of judicial power resulted in constricting the reach of
the political question doctrine.20 Marcos v. Manglapus21 was the first
case that squarely dealt with the issue of the scope of judicial
power vis-a-vis the political question doctrine under the 1987
Constitution. In that case, the Court explained:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the
determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not
established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the
official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is
for the latter alone to decide.22
The prerogative of the Court to review cases in order to determine the
existence of grave abuse of discretion was further clarified in Estrada
v. Desierto:23
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of
the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial
review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused
on the “thou shalt not’s” of the Constitution directed against the
exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however, courts
are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to
prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court
power of doing nothing.24 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
Notably, the present Constitution has not only vested the judiciary with
the right to exercise judicial power, but made it a duty to proceed
there with—a duty that cannot be abandoned “by the mere specter of
this creature called the political question doctrine.”25 This duty must be
exercised “to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter
does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.”26
Chief Justice Concepcion had emphatically explained to the 1986
Constitutional Commission that the Supreme Court, which he had
been a part of, used the political question theory to avoid reviewing
acts of the President during Martial Law, and thus enabled the
violation of the rights of the people. In his words:
It [referring to the refusal of the Supreme Court to review) did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it,
in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime.27
The question I now pose to my colleagues in the Majority: “Are we
not, by refusing to pass upon the question of the effects of the Marcos
burial at the LMB, encouraging authoritarianism, plunder, and the
violation of human rights, by signaling that what Marcos and his
Martial Rule represents is not anathema?”
B. In the exercise of its expanded judicial power, the Court has
decided issues that were traditionally considered political
questions.
Following the effectivity of the present Constitution, only a select
number of issues continue to be recognized by the Court as truly
political and thus beyond its power of review. These issues include
the executive’s determination by the executive of sovereign or
diplomatic immunity,28 its espousal of the claims of its nationals
against a foreign government,29 and the electorate’s expression of
confidence in an incumbent official.30
Apart from these matters, all other acts of government have been the
subject of the expanded certiorarijurisdiction of the Court under Article
VIII, Section II of the Constitution. As demonstrated in the following
cases, the Court has reviewed the acts of the President, the Senate,
the House of Representatives, and even of independent bodies such
as the electoral tribunals and the Commission on Elections, even for
acts that were traditionally considered political.
ACTS OF THE PRESIDENT
The Court in Marcos v. Manglapus31 ascertained the validity of the
President’s determination that the return of the Marcoses posed a
serious threat to the national interest and welfare, as well as the
validity of the prohibition on their return. As previously stated, the
political question doctrine was first invoked—and then rejected—by
the Court in that case in view of its expanded power of judicial review
under the 1987 Constitution.
The Court then reviewed the constitutionality of a presidential veto
in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr.32 It ruled that “the political question
doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the
rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court.”
The expanded power of judicial review was likewise utilized to
examine the grant by the President of clemency in administrative
cases;33 and the President’s power to call out the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.34 The
Court even tackled the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration
in Estrada v. Desierto.35 Although it resolved the question as a
constitutional issue, the Court clarified that it would not defer its
resolution based merely on the political question doctrine.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,36 it was the validity of then President
Arroyo’s declaration of national emergency that was assailed before
the Court. Significantly, it reviewed the issue even while it recognized
that the matter was solely vested in the wisdom of the executive:
While the Court considered the President’s “calling-out” power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that “this
does not prevent an examination of whether such power was
exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.” This
ruling is mainly a result of the Court’s reliance on Section 1, Article
VIII of 1987 Constitution which fortifies the authority of the courts to
determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the
political departments. Under the new definition of judicial power, the
courts are authorized not only “to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,” but also “to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.”37 (Citations omitted)
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,38 even the
President’s creation of a Truth Commission was reviewed by the
Court. As will be further explained, the fact that the commission
was created to implement a campaign promise did not prevent
the Court from examining the issue.
ACTS OF THE LEGISLATURE
The Court has likewise exercised its expanded power of judicial
review in relation to actions of Congress and its related bodies.
In Daza v. Singson,39 it reviewed the manner or legality of the
organization of the Commission on Appointments by the House of
Representatives. While the review was premised on the fact that the
question involved was legal and not political, the Court nevertheless
held that “even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that
now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.”
In later cases, the Court rejected the political question doctrine and
proceeded to look into the following political acts of the legislature: (a)
the decision of the House of Representatives to allow the dominant
political party to change its representative in the House Electoral
Tribunal;40 (b) the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
require the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its
inquiry;41 (c) the propriety of permitting logging in the country;42 (d) the
validity of the filing of a second impeachment complaint with the
House of Representatives;43 (d) the validity of an investigation
conducted in aid of legislation by certain Senate committees;44 and (e)
the decision of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice to
take cognizance of two impeachment complaints.45
We also exercised our constitutional duty “to determine whether or not
there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the Senate when it ratified the
WTO Agreement and the three Annexes thereof in Tañada v.
Angara.47 The Court firmly emphasized in that case that “it will not
shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold
the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion
brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer,
agency, instrumentality, or department of the govemment.”48
LATEST JURISPRUDENCE
The most recent jurisprudence in this area remains in line with the
notion of expanded certiorari jurisdiction. The Court has been
consistent in its rejection of the political question doctrine as a bar to
its expanded power of review.
In 2013, the constitutionality of the pork barrel system was resolved
in Belgica v. Ochoa.49 While the Court clarified that the issue involved
legal questions, it nonetheless rejected the invocation of the political
question doctrine and upheld the expanded judicial powers of the
Court.
In 2014, Araullo v. Aquino III50 delved into the constitutionality of the
Disbursement Acceleration Program of the executive department,
again emphasizing the Court’s expanded power of review.
In 2015, the Court in The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on
Elections51 rejected the application of the political question doctrine. It
ruled that the right of the non-candidate petitioners to post the subject
tarpaulin in their private property was an exercise of their right to free
expression. In rejecting the COMELEC’s political question defense, it
held that “the concept of a political question… never precludes judicial
review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a
fundamental individual or collective right.”52
A few months after Diocese of Bacolod, the policy of the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC) requiring judges of first-level courts to render five
years of service before they could qualify as applicants to second-
level courts was assailed as unconstitutional in Villanueva v. Judicial
and Bar Council.53 The Court resolved the issue by stating “since the
formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the
petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of
the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on
whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said
policy.”54
Early this year, the Court in Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr.,55 determined the
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of
America. The Court affirmed therein its expanded jurisdiction:
The power of judicial review has since been strengthened in the 1987
Constitution. The scope of that power has been extended to the
determination of whether in matters traditionally considered to be
within the sphere of appreciation of another branch of government, an
exercise of discretion has been attended with grave abuse. The
expansion of this power has made the political question doctrine “no
longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or
the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions
from judicial inquiry or review.”56 (Citations omitted)
Notably, while there were instances when the Court deferred from
interfering with an issue involving a political question, it did so not
because political questions were involved but because of a finding
that there was no grave abuse of discretion.57 Otherwise stated, the
Court still exercised its expanded judicial power, but found no reason
to annul the questioned acts. It held in Defensor-Santiago v.
Guingona, Jr.,58 “the all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the
Court ‘to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government’ is restricted only by
the definition and confines of the term ‘grave abuse of discretion.’”
It is evident from this long line of cases that the Court can no longer
refuse to adjudicate cases on the basis of the “political question
doctrine.” Whenever issues of a political nature are raised before it, it
is the duty of the Court to meet the questions head-on for as long as
grave abuse of discretion or constitutionality is seriously involved.
C. The assertion that the burial is intended to implement an
election campaign promise does not render the matter non-
justiciable.
In view of the above rulings of this Court, it is evident that we must
resolve the present controversy, notwithstanding the allegation that
the decision of the President to allow the burial is purely political in
character. That the order was supposedly founded on an “election
campaign promise” does not transform the matter into a political issue
that is beyond our power to review.
In fact, in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,59 the Court
reviewed the validity of the creation of the Truth Commission, despite
its recognition that the act was meant to implement a campaign
promise made by then President Benigno Aquino III:
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior
to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator Benigno
Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, “Kung walang corrupt, walang
mahirap.” The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his
ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good senator to
the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found
a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and
corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30,
2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).60
Even under those circumstances, however, the Court still decided the
controversy and ultimately declared the creation of the Truth
Commission unconstitutional. While I maintain my dissenting view
because unknowable standards were imposed in that case, I believe
that the Court correctly took cognizance of the dispute,
notwithstanding the fact that a campaign promise was involved. There
is no reason for the Court to deviate from that course in the present
case.
Having established the duty of the Court to review the assailed acts, it
is now necessary to examine whether the decision of the President to
allow the burial of former President Marcos at the LMB is consistent
with the Constitution and the laws.
II.
THE PRESIDENT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND IN VIOLATION OF HIS DUTY TO FAITHFULLY EXECUTE
THE LAWS WHEN HE ORDERED THE BURIAL OF MARCOS IN
THE LIBINGAN NG MGA BAYANI.
The 1987 Constitution mandates the president to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed.61 This duty of faithful execution circumscribes all
the actions of the President as the Chief Executive. It also limits every
exercise of his discretion. As this Court declared in Almario v.
Executive Secretary:
Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever
it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic
formulation, “discretion is not unconfined and vagrant” but “canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing.”
The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing
laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful
execution of the laws by the President:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National
Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully
execute the relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best
construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a
separate grant of power. It simply underscores the rule of law
and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not
above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them. This is
precisely why the law provides that “[a]dministrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary
to the laws or the Constitution.”62 (Citations omitted and emphasis
supplied)
In fulfilling this duty, the President is not only obligated to enforce the
express terms of the Constitution or the statutes; he is likewise bound
to implement any right, duty, or obligation inferable from these primary
sources.63 This rule finds support in Cunningham v. Neagle,64 in which
the United States Supreme Court suggested that the duty of the
President to faithfully execute the law is not limited to the
enforcement of the express terms of acts of Congress or of
treaties, that duty extends to “all rights, duties and obligations
growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations,
and all the protection implied by the nature of the government
under the Constitution.”65
As a consequence of these principles, any act of the President that
contravenes the law, its policies, or any right or duty inferable
therefrom must be considered grave abuse of discretion.66 By the
same token, a refusal to execute the laws when necessary must be
invalidated in the absence of any statutory justification.67
As will be demonstrated, the directive of President Duterte to allow the
burial of Marcos at the LMB contravenes the constitution, laws,
policies, and jurisprudence. Moreover, the basis for the directive was
an invalid regulation issued by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) in excess of its statutory authority. Considering that the order
was made in contravention of law, it cannot be justified by mere
reference to the President’s residual powers. Such act is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
A. Statutes and jurisprudence establish a clearpolicy to condemn
the acts of Marcos and what he represents, which effectively
prohibits the incumbent Presidentfrom honoring him through a
burial in the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
It is the duty of the Court to give effect not only to the letter of the law,
but more importantly to the spirit and the policy that animate it.
In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,68 the Court explained:
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we
must keep them so. x x x
The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent. For what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is
not within the letter thereof; and that which is within the letter but not
within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing
which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute
as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the
statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the
lawmakers.69
To carry out this duty, the Court must examine not only the subject
law itself, but the entire body of related laws including the
Constitution, domestic statutes, administrative issuances and
jurisprudence. It is only by taking a holistic view of the matter that the
Court can ensure that its reading of the law is consistent with the spirit
thereof. In Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC,70 we explained
the importance of taking a holistic view when interpreting the law:
Third, the assumption that there is, in all cases, a universal plain
language is erroneous. In reality, universality and uniformity of
meaning is a rarity. A contrary belief wrongly assumes that language
is static.
The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic
rather than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the
historical, the contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial
interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social
ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus,
chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the
Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes the
Constitution—saligan—demonstrates this imperative of constitutional
primacy.
Thus, we refuse to read Section 5.2(a) of the Fair Election Act in
isolation. Here, we consider not an abstruse provision but a stipulation
that is part of the whole, i.e., the statute of which it is a part, that is
aimed at realizing the ideal of fair elections. We consider not a
cloistered provision but a norm that should have a present
authoritative effect to achieve the ideals of those who currently read,
depend on, and demand fealty from the Constitution.71
In this case, we are being asked to decide whether the President may
validly order the burial of Former President Marcos in the LMB. The
resolution of this question requires more than an examination of the
text of APP Regulations 161-375. More than finding a textual anchor,
we are compelled by this issue to scrutinize the implications of the
President’s order and determine if it conflicts with the text, the policy,
and the spirit of the law.
At its core, the present dispute turns on whether the state,
through the President and the AFP, may legally honor Former
President Marcos and his family. For that is the essence of the
proposed burial at the LMB regardless of whether Marcos is to
be buried as a hero, as a soldier or as a former president. A clear
understanding of our Constitution, laws, jurisprudence, and our
international obligations must lead to the conclusion that the
grant of any such honors for the late dictator is prohibited.
Setting aside the validity of APP Regulations 161-375 for the moment,
their blind application to the present case would be an egregious
mistake. Considering that various laws and jurisprudence reveal the
clear policy of the state to denounce both former President Marcos
and the Martial Law regime, it would be inappropriate, if not absurd,
for the state to honor his memory.
1. MARCOS IS PERPETUATED AS A PLUNDERER AND A
PERPETRATOR OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN OUR
ORGANIC AND STATUTORY LAWS.
As soon as the EDSA Revolution succeeded in 1986, the
revolutionary government—installed by the direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people72—declared its objective to immediately
recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by Marcos, his family, and his
cronies. The importance of this endeavor is evident in the fact that it
was specifically identified in the 1986 Provisional Constitution as part
of the mandate of the people. Article II, Section 1 of that Constitution
states:
Section 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a New
Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative
power.
The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate
of the people to:
xxx xxx xxx
d) Recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and
supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the
people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets of
accounts;
Pursuant to this mandate, then President Corazon Aquino issued
three executive orders focused entirely on the recovery of the ill-
gotten wealth taken by Marccs and his supporters:
a) Executive Order No. 173 created the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) tasked to, among others, assist the
President in the “recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates x x x by taking undue advantage of
their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.”74
b) Executive Order No. 275 authorized the freezing and sequestration
of assets pertaining to Marcos, his relatives, associates, dummies,
agents or nominees, which had been “acquired by them directly or
indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds
or properties owned by the Government of the Philippines.”76 or “by
taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.”77
c) Executive Order No. 1478 empowered the PCGG to file and
prosecute all cases it had investigated pursuant to Executive Order
Nos. 1 and 2.
All three executive orders affirmed that Marcos, his relatives and
supporters had acquired assets and properties through the improper
or illegal use of government funds or properties by taking undue
advantage of their office, authority, influence, or connections. These
acts were proclaimed to have caused “grave damage and prejudice to
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.”79
The gravity of the offenses committed by former President Marcos
and his supporters even prompted the Court to describe the mandate
of the PCGG as the recovery of “the tremendous wealth plundered
from the people by the past regime in the most execrable thievery
perpetrated in all history.”80 The importance of this mandate was
further underscored by the sovereign Filipino people when they
ratified the 1987 Constitution, including the following provision:
Article XVIII
Transitory Provisions
Section 26. The authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders
under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986 in relation to the
recovery of ill-gotten wealth shall remain operative for not more than
eighteen months after the ratification of this Constitution. However, in
the national interest, as certified by the President, the Congress may
extend said period.
Apart from being declared a plunderer, Marcos has likewise been
pronounced by the legislature as a perpetrator of human rights
violations. In Republic Act No. (R.A.) 10368, the state recognized the
following facts:
a) Human rights violations were committed during the Martial Law
period “from September 21, 1972 to February 25, 1986 by persons
acting in an official capacity and/or agents of the State;”81 and
b) A number of these human rights violations occurred because of
decrees, declarations or issuances made by Marcos;82 and by “acts of
force, intimidation or deceit”83 done by him, his spouse, Imelda
Marcos, and their immediate relatives by consanguinity or affinity,
associates, cronies and subordinates.84
Because of the human rights violations perpetrated by Marcos and his
associates, the legislature has decreed that victims are entitled to
both monetary85 and non-monetary86 reparations to be principally
sourced from the funds transferred to the Philippine government by
virtue of the Order of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.87 Those
funds were earlier declared part of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos
family and forfeited in favor of the Philippine government.
The statements in the above laws were clear indictments by both
the revolutionary government and the legislature against the
massive plunder and the countless abuses committed by Marcos
and his cronies during his tenure as President. These laws not
only condemn him as a thief; they equally recognize his criminal
liability for the atrocities inflicted on innumerablevictims while he
was in power.
2. DECISIONS OF THIS COURT HAVE DENOUNCED THE
ABUSES COMMITTED BY MARCOS DURING THE MARTIAL LAW
DICTATORSHIP.
Apart from earning the condemnation of the legislature, Marcos and
the Martial Law regime have likewise received harsh criticism from
this Court. In dozens of decisions, it denounced the abuses he had
committed; the pernicious effects of his dictatorship; and the grave
damage inflicted upon the nation by his corruption, thievery, and
contempt for human rights. Foremost among these denunciations are
found in are four cases ordering the forfeiture of the ill-gotten wealth
he amassed with the assistance of his relatives and cronies.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,88 the Court forfeited a total of USD 658
million in favor of the government. These funds, contained in Swiss
deposit accounts in the name of certain foundations, were declared ill-
gotten, as they were manifestly out of proportion to the known lawful
income of the Marcos family. The Court used the same reasoning
in Marcos, Jr. v. Republic'" to justify the forfeiture of the assets of
Arelma, S.A., valued at USD 3,369,975 in 1983.
On the other hand, in Republic v. Estate of Hans Menzi90 and
in Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan,91 the Court scrutinized the beneficial
ownership of certain shares of Bulletin Publishing Corporation and
Philippine Telecommunications Investment Corporation, respectively.
The Court concluded in the two cases that the shares, although
registered in the names of cronies and nominees of Marcos, were part
of the ill-gotten wealth of the dictator and were subject to forfeiture.
It must be emphasized that in the preceding cases, the Court noted
the grand schemes employed by Marcos and his supporters to
unlawfully amass wealth and to conceal their transgressions.
In Yuchengco, it declared:
In PCGG v. Pena, this Court, describing the rule of Marcos as a “well-
entrenched plundering regime” of twenty years, noted the “magnitude
of the past regime’s ‘organized pillage’ and the ingenuity of the
plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of the experts and best
legal minds available in the market.” The evidence presented in this
case reveals one more instance of this grand scheme. This Court—
guardian of the high standards and noble traditions of the legal
profession—has thus before it an opportunity to undo[,] even if only to
a certain extent, the damage that has been done.92 (citations omitted)
In addition to the plunder of the public coffers, Marcos was harshly
condemned by this Court for the human rights abuses committed
during the Martial Law period.93 In Mijares v Ranada, et al.,94 it stated:
Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have
yet to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of
freedom and the fundamental structures and processes of democracy
have been much lauded, according to a significant number, the
changes, however, have not sufficiently healed the colossal damage
wrought under the oppressive conditions of the martial law
period. The cries of justice for the tortured, the murdered, and
the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts of
the fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief due
them cannot be extended through the same caprice or whim that
characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage done was not
merely personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the
iniquitous past has to involve the award of reparations due within the
confines of the restored rule oflaw.
The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights
violations who, deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the
man who once held absolute rule over this country, have chosen
to do battle instead with the earthly representative, his
estate.95 (Emphasis supplied)
Marcos himself was severely criticized for abuses he
had personally committed while in power. For instance, he was found
to have unlawfully exercised his authority for personal gain in the
following cases: (a) Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan,96 in which he ordered
the general manager of the Manila International Airport Authority to
directly remit to the Office of the President the amount owed by the
agency to the Philippine National Construction Corporation;
(b) Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto,97 in which Marcos made a marginal note prohibiting the
foreclosure of the mortgaged assets of Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills
and waiving the liabilities of the corporation and its owners to the
National Investment and Development Corporation; and (c) Republic
v. Tuvera,98 in which Marcos himself granted a Timber License
Agreement to a company owned by the son of his longtime aide, in
violation of the Forestry Reform Code and Forestry Administrative
Order No. 11.
Marcos was likewise deemed personally responsible for the
corruption of the judicial process in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan.99 Affirming the findings of a commission created to
receive evidence on the case, the Court stated:
The Court adopts and approves the Report and its findings and holds
on the basis thereof and of the evidence received and appreciated by
the Commission and duly supported by the facts of public record and
knowledge set forth above and hereinafter, that the then President
(code named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from
Malacanang Palace “a scripted and pre-determined manner of
handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;” and
that “the prosecution in the Aquino Galman case and the
Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist”, and which not only prevented the prosecution to
fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could
have otherwise presented, but also pre-determined the final outcome
of the case” of total absolution of the twenty-six respondents accused
of all criminal and civil liability.
xxx xxx xxx
The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning to end, the then
President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming
resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to
corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the
Aquino-Galman murder cases. x x x
Indeed, the secret Malacafiang conference at which the authoritarian
President called together the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
and Tanodbayan Fernandez and the entire prosecution panel headed
by Deputy Tanodbayan Herrera and told them how to handle and rig
(moro-moro) the trial and the close monitoring of the entire
proceedings to assure the pre-determined ignominious final outcome
are without parallel and precedent in our annals and
jurisprudence.100 (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the abuses committed, the Court condemned the Marcos
years as a “dark chapter in our history,”101 a period of “national
trauma”102 dominated by a “well-entrenched plundering
regime,”103 which brought about “colossal damage wrought under the
oppressive conditions of the Martial Law period.”104 The attempt by
the dictator to return to the country after the EDSA Revolution was
even described by the Court as “the case of a dictator forced out of
office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic
and social havoc in the country.”105
The foregoing pronouncements are considered part of the legal
system of the Philippines106 and must be considered binding, since
they are integral parts of final and immutable judgments. It may be
presumed that the Court made the above declarations only after a
judicious consideration of the evidence and the applicable law.
Consequently, those declarations cannot be questioned, reversed, or
disregarded without running afoul of the doctrine of immutability of
judgment. This doctrine of finality of judgments applies even to the
highest court of the land.107
The claim that judgment has not been rendered against Marcos for
the plunder and the atrocities committed under his regime is belied by
the declarations of this very Court. In his Separate Opinion in Olaguer
v. Military Commission No. 34,108 former Chief Justice Claudio
Teehankee wrote of our nation’s history during the Martial Law
regime, and it would be well to recall his words:
It was a long and horrible nightmare when our people’s rights,
freedoms and liberties were sacrificed at the altar of “national security”
even though it involved nothing more than the President-dictator’s
perpetuation in office and the security of his relatives and some
officials in high positions and their protection from public
accountability of their acts of venality and deception in government,
many of which were of public knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The treacherous assassination on August 21, 1983 of the martyred
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., within minutes of his arrival at the Manila
International Airport, although ringed with 2,000 soldiers, shocked and
outraged the conscience of the nation. After three years of exile
following almost eight years of detention since martial law, Aquino,
although facing the military commission’s predetermined death
sentence, supra, yet refused proper travel documents, was returning
home “to strive for genuine national reconciliation founded on justice.”
The late Senator Jose W. Diokno who passed away this year was
among the first victims of the martial law coup d’etat to be locked up
with Senator Aquino. In March, 1973, all of their personal effects,
including their eyeglasses were ominously returned to their homes.
Their wives’ visitation privileges were suspended and they lost all
contact for over a month. It turned out that Aquino had smuggled out
of his cell a written statement critical of the martial law regime. In swift
retribution, both of them were flown out blindfolded to the army camp
at Fort Laur in Nueva Ecija and kept in solitary confinement in dark
boarded cells with hardly any ventilation. When their persons were
produced before the Court on habeas corpusproceedings, they were a
pitiable sight having lost about 30 to 40 lbs. in weight. Senator Diokno
was to be released in September, 1974 after almost two years of
detention. No charges of any kind were ever filed against him. His
only fault was that he was a possible rival for the presidency.
Horacio Morales, Jr., 1977 TOYM awardee for government service
and then executive vice-president of the Development Academy of the
Philippines, was among the hard-working government functionaries
who had been radicalized and gave up their government positions.
Morales went underground on the night he was supposed to receive
his TOYM award, declaring that “(F)or almost ten years, I have been
an official in the reactionary government, serviced the Marcos
dictatorship and all that it stands for, serving a ruling system that has
brought so much suffering and misery to the broad masses of the
Filipino people. (I) refuse to take any more part of this. I have had
enough of this regime’s tyranny and treachery, greed and brutality,
exploitation and oppression of the people,” and “(I)n rejecting my
position and part in the reactionary government, I am glad to be finally
free of being a servant of foreign and local vested interest. I am happy
to be fighting side by side with the people.” He was apprehended in
1982 and was charged with the capital crime of subversion, until he
was freed in March, 1986 after President Corazon C. Aquino’s
assumption of office, together with other political prisoners and
detainees and prisoners of conscience in fulfillment of her campaign
pledge.
Countless others forfeited their lives and stand as witnesses to the
tyranny and repression of the past regime. Driven by their dreams to
free our motherland from poverty, oppression, iniquity and injustice,
many of our youthful leaders were to make the supreme sacrifice. To
mention a few: U.P. Collegian editor Abraham Sarmiento, Jr., worthy
son of an illustrious member of the Court pricked the conscience of
many as he asked on the front page of the college paper: Sino ang
kikibo kung hindi tayo kikibo? Sino ang kikilos kung hindi tayo kikilos?
Kung hindi ngayon, kailan pa? He was locked up in the military camp
and released only when he was near death from a severe attack of
asthma, to which he succumbed. Another TOYM awardee, Edgar
Jopson, an outstanding honor student at the Ateneo University,
instinctively pinpointed the gut issue in 1971—he pressed for a “non-
partisan Constitutional Convention;” and demanded that the then
president-soon-to-turn dictator “put down in writing” that he was not
going to manipulate the Constitution to remove his disqualification to
run for a third term or perpetuate himself in office and was called
down as “son of a grocer.” When as he feared, martial law was
declared, Jopson went underground to continue the struggle and was
to be waylaid and killed at the age of 34 by 21 military troops as the
reported head of the rebel movement in Mindanao. Another activist
honor student leader, Emmanuel Yap, son of another eminent
member of the Court, was to disappear on Valentine’s Day in 1976 at
the young age of 24, reportedly picked up by military agents in front of
Channel 7 in Quezon City, and never to be seen again.
One of our most promising young leaders, Evelio B. Javier, 43,
unarmed, governor of the province of Antique at 28, a Harvard-trained
lawyer, was mercilessly gunned down with impunity in broad daylight
at 10 a.m. in front of the provincial capitol building by six mad-dog
killers who riddled his body with 24 bullets fired from M-16 armalite
rifles (the standard heavy automatic weapon of our military). He was
just taking a breather and stretching his legs from the tedious but
tense proceedings of the canvassing of the returns of the presidential
snap election in the capitol building. This was to be the last straw and
the bloodless EDSA revolt was soon to unfold. The Court in Javier vs.
Comelec, through Mr. Justice Cruz, “said these meager words in
tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth
because he dared to speak against tyranny. Where many kept a
meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and
fawned in hopes of safety and even reward, he chose to fight. He was
not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power
did not awe him. His was a singular and all-exacting obsession: the
return of freedom to his country. And though he fought not in the
barricades of war amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell, he
was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his
people against the enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race too,
who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark
enslavement. He did not see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but
in a very real sense Evelia B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer
because he was, like Saul and Jonathan, ‘swifter than eagles and
stronger than lions.’”109 (Citations omitted)
The pronouncements of the Court on this matter must be respected
and considered conclusive. Hence, while Marcos may have evaded a
criminal proceeding by choosing to go on exile after the EDSA
Revolution, the atrocities committed against the Filipino people during
his regime must be remembered. Our declarations on this matter
cannot be disregarded or forgotten, as Chief Justice Teehankee
reminded us in Olaguer:
The greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of human
memory. We must note here the unforgettable and noble
sacrifices of the countless brave and patriotic men and women
who feel as martyrs and victims during the long dark years of the
deposed regime. In vacating the death sentence imposed on the
petitioners who survived the holocaust, we render them simple justice
and we redeem and honor the memory of those who selflessly offered
their lives for the restoration of truth, decency, justice and freedom in
our beloved land.110 (Emphasis supplied)
3. THE PRESIDENT MAY NOT CONTRADICT OR RENDER
INEFFECTIVE THE DENUNCIATIONS, OR THE POLICIES AND
PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN THE FOREGOING STATUTES AND
JURISPRUDENCE.
It is the obligation of the President to give effect to the
pronouncements of the Legislature and the Judiciary as part of his
duty to faithfully execute the laws. At the very least, the President
cannot authorize an act that runs counter to the letter and the spirit of
the law.
In this case, the foregoing statutes and jurisprudence condemning
Marcos and his regime effectively prohibit the incumbent President
from granting him any form of tribute or honor. The President’s
discretion in this matter is not unfettered. Contrary to the assertions
of respondents, the President cannot arbitrarily and whimsically
decide that the acts attributed to Marcos during Martial Law are
irrelevant, solely because “he possessed the title to the
presidency until his eventual ouster from office.”111
Indeed, it would be the height of absurdity for the Executive
branch to insist on paying tribute to an individual who has been
condemned by the two other branches of government as a
dictator, a plunderer, and a human rights violator. Whether
Marcos is to be buried in the LMB as a hero, soldier, or former
President is of little difference. The most important fact is that
the burial would accord him honor. For the Court to pretend
otherwise is to sustain a delusion, as this controversy would not
have arisen if not for this reality.
A state of affairs that would allow Marcos to reap any accolade or
tribute from the state using public funds and property would obviously
contradict the laws and judicial findings described above. Clearly,
there is more than sufficient basis to reject the proposed burial.
B. The AFP does not have the power to determine which persons
are qualified for interment in the Libingan.
The argument of respondents that the burial is permitted under AFP
Regulations 161-375 is unavailing, as the AFP does not have the
authority to select which persons are qualified to be buried in the
LMB. For this reason, the enumeration contained in AFP Regulations
161-375 must be deemed invalid.
In Proclamation No. 208,112 then President Marcos reserved a certain
parcel of land in Taguig—the proposed site of the LMB—for “national
shrine purposes.” This parcel of land was placed “under the
administration” of the National Shrines Commission (NSC). The NSC
was later transferred to the Department of National Defense (from the
Department of Education) and then abolished through the Integrated
Reorganization Plan. The functions of the former NSC were then
transferred to the National Historical Institute (NHI).
On 26 January 1977, Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1076113 created
the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) under the Department
of National Defense. The PVAO was tasked to, among others,
“administer, maintain and develop military memorials and battle
monuments proclaimed as national shrines.” P.D. 1076 also abolished
the NHI and transferred its functions to the PVAO. The transferred
functions pertained to military memorials, including the authority to
“administer” the LMB.
The authority of the PVAO to administer, maintain and develop
the LMB pertains purely to the management and care of the cemetery.
Its power does not extend to the determination of which persons are
entitled to be buried there. This authority pertains to Congress,
because the power to deal with public property, including the
right to specify the purposes for which the property may be
used, is legislative in character.114 Accordingly, the provision in AFP
Regulations 161-375 enumerating the persons qualified to be interred
in the LMB cannot bind this Court.
At any rate, the APP Regulations cannot be considered in isolation.
As part of the legal system, administrative issuances must be
interpreted and implemented in a manner consistent with statutes,
jurisprudence, and other rules.115 In the same manner, the purported
discretion of the President to determine the persons who may be
interred in the LMB must be considered limited by statutes and judicial
decisions.116
Since the proposed interment of Marcos in the LMB runs counter to
law as explained in the preceding section, APP Regulations 161-375
must be interpreted to mean that Marcos is specifically disqualified
from being buried in that cemetery. Only by adhering to this
interpretation can the Court ensure that the issuance is in harmony
with other existing laws. Consequently, we cannot choose to
implement AFP Regulations 161-375 exclusively while disregarding
the statutes and jurisprudence referred to above.
C. The burial cannot be justified by mere reference to the
President’s residual powers; it is not unfettered, and such power
can only be exercised in conformity with the entire Constitution.
During the oral arguments, respondents attempted to justify the
decision of the President to allow the burial primarily on the basis of
his residual power.117 Citing Marcos v. Manglapus118 and Sanlakas v.
Executive Secretary,119 they argued that the President is vested with
powers other than those enumerated in the Constitution and statutes,
and that these powers are implicit in the duty to safeguard and protect
the general welfare.120
It must be emphasized that the statement in Marcos v.
Manglapus acknowledging the “President’s residual power to
protect the general welfare of the people” was not unconditional.
The Court, in fact, explicitly stated that only acts “not forbidden” by
the Constitution or the laws were permitted under this concept:
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare
and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President’s residual power
to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the
duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase
Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but
also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or
the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra,
at 153]. It is a power borne by the President’s duty to preserve and
defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in
the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed
[see Hyman,The American President, where the author advances the
view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any
government and is best lodged in the President].121(Emphasis
supplied)
The Court in that case also reiterated the underlying principles that
must guide the exercise of presidential functions and powers, residual
or otherwise:
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance
of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to
guide governmental action. But such does not mean that they are
empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in
drawing a plan of government, and in directing implementing action
for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any decision
as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these
principles, among other things, and adhere to them.122 (Emphasis
supplied)
Clearly, the residual power of the President cannot be used to justify
acts that are contrary to the Constitution and the laws. To allow him to
exercise his powers in disregard of the law would be to grant him
unbridled authority in the guise of inherent power. Clearly, that could
not have been the extent of the residual powers contemplated by the
Court in Marcos v. Manglapus.
To reiterate, the President is not above the laws but is, in fact, obliged
to obey and execute them.123 This obligation is even more paramount
in this case because of historical considerations and the nature of the
norms involved, i.e., peremptory norms of human rights that are
enshrined both in domestic and international law.
III.
TO ALLOW MARCOS TO BE BURIED IN THE LIBINGAN NG MGA
BAYANI WOULD VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW AS AN INDEPENDENT SOURCE OF STATE OBLIGATIONS,
AND WOULD NEGATE THE REMEDIES PROVIDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 10368.
An examination of the vast body of international human rights law
establishes a duty on the part of the state to provide the victims of
human rights violations during the Marcos regime a range of effective
remedies and reparations. This obligation is founded on the state’s
duty to ensure respect for, and to protect and fulfill those rights.
Allowing the proposed burial of Marcos in the LMB would be a clear
violation of the foregoing international law obligations. Consequently,
the planned interment must be enjoined in light of Article II, Section II
of the Constitution, the established principle of pacta sunt servanda,
and the fact that the state has already acknowledged these duties and
incorporated them in our domestic laws.
A. Under international law, the Philippines is obligated to provide
effective remedies, including holistic reparations, to human
rights victims.
The obligation of the Philippines to respect, protect, and fulfill human
rights has its legal basis in international agreements and customary
international law. As will be discussed, this obligation includes the
duty to provide effective remedies, which, in turn, incorporates the
grant of holistic reparations to victims of human rights violations.
1. THE PHILIPPINES IS BOUND TO RESPECT, PROTECT, AND
FULFILL HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS
AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW.
124
As a party to the United Nations (UN) Charter and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),125 the Philippines is
bound to comply in good faith with our obligations therein pursuant to
the principle of pacta sunt servanda.126 These treaties form the
normative foundation of the duty of the state to provide effective
remedies and reparations to victims of human rights violations.
The promotion, protection and fulfilment of human rights norms are
obligations woven throughout the entire UN Charter, beginning with
the Preamble which “reaffirm[s] faith in fundamental human rights, in
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small.”127 In line with this
statement, the promotion of “universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion”128 was identified as one of the
basic purposes of the United Nations.129 These principles became part
of a concrete obligation via Article 56 of the Charter, as states were
mandated to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the UN
for the achievement of its purposes.130
On the other hand, the ICCPR obligates states parties to respect and
ensure the human rights of all individuals within its territory. Article
2(1) of this covenant provides:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.
Interpreting this provision, the United Nations Human Rights
Committee131 (UNHRC) issued General Comment No. 31132 declaring
that the obligation in Article 2(1) is owed not just to individuals as the
rights holders under the ICCPR, but to every state party
therein.133 The duty to respect basic human rights is likewise
considered an erga omnes obligation in view of the importance of the
rights involved.134 In other words, it is an obligation towards the
international community as a whole.135
Further establishing the obligation to respect human rights is the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) which defines and
codifies human rights norms provided for in the UN Charter.
Considered the most important human rights document in the
world,136 the UDHR enumerates the human rights that states are
bound to respect, including the right to life, liberty, and security of
persons;137 the prohibition against torture and arbitrary arrest or
detention;138 and the right to freedom from interference with one’s
privacy, family, home, or correspondence.139 While not a legally
binding treaty, the UDHR is generally considered a codification of the
customary international law on human rights.140 Hence, it binds all
nations including the Philippines.
The foregoing instruments clearly create rights that every state is
obliged to recognize and respect. To give effect to these entitlements,
a violation of protected rights brings about the obligation on the part of
the offending state to provide a corresponding remedy.
2. THE DUTY TO RESPECT, PROTECT, AND FULFILL HUMAN
RIGHTS INCLUDES THE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE AN
EFFECTIVE REMEDY.
The international guarantee of a remedy for human rights violations is
well established141 as one of the bedrock principles of contemporary
international human rights law.142 Ubi ius ibi remedium— “where there
is a right, there is a remedy.”143 It is settled that gross human rights
violations give rise to a right to remedy for victims, which in tum
implies a duty on the part of states to provide the same.144 This
obligation is based on the principle that failure to provide an adequate
remedy for violations renders the duty to respect the rights involved
meaningless and illusory.145
Under Treaties
International human rights law instruments, both global and regional,
impose upon states the duty not merely to offer a remedy, but also to
ensure that the remedy provided is “effective.” This rule is clearly
demonstrated in the provisions discussed below.
It is an accepted principle that “[e]veryone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.”146 This
rule is further developed in Article 2 of the ICCPR, which provides:
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein
recognized are violated shall have an effective remedy,
notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons
acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his
right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or
legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided
for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of
judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted.147
Explaining the nature of the obligations imposed by this provision, the
UNHRC stated that the grant of reparations to individual victims is a
central component of this legal obligation.148
A similar guarantee of effective remedies is included in the
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination
(CERD),149 while the Convention against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against
Torture)150 refers to an equivalent right in the form of redress and
compensation.151 This right to redress was clarified in General
Comment No. 3152 of the UN Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) as
a comprehensive reparative concept, which embraces both “effective
remedy” and “reparation.” Redress “entails restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition and refers
to the full scope of measures required to redress violations under the
Convention.”153The committee also emphasized that reparative
measures must take into account the particular needs of the victims
and the gravity of the violations committed against them.154
Even regional instruments such as the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,155 the
American Convention on Human Rights,156 and the Protocol to the
African Charter,157 provide for effective remedies for human rights
violations.
Under Customary International Law
At the same time, customary international law, as discerned from the
law of state responsibility and the progressive development of human
rights treaty law, is further solidifying the legal basis of the right to
remedy of victims of human rights violations.158
The Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts codified by the International Law Commission (ILC
Articles) provides that state responsibility arising from an
internationally wrongful act159gives rise to the duty to make
reparations. Under the ILC Articles, a state held liable for the breach
of an obligation may be required to perform the following acts: (1)
cessation of the violation,160 (2) guarantee of non-repetition,161 and (3)
full reparation for the injury caused.162
Because of the emergence of human rights in international law,163 the
duty to remedy a breach under the ILC Articles is deemed owed not
only to the injured state as traditionally imagined, but also to
individuals whose human rights have been impaired by the breach
under a state’s jurisdiction.164 The right to effective remedies and just
reparations for individual victims may be culled from the obligations of
the state to cease violations, guarantee non-repetition and make full
reparation.165 This right is further affirmed by Article 33 of the ILC
Articles, which declares that the obligation of the state to provide
reparations is “without prejudice to any right, arising from the
international responsibility of a State, which may accrue directly to any
person or entity other than a State.”166
To further substantiate the existence of a rule of customary
international law on this matter, two declarations approved by the
UNHRC and the UN General Assembly, respectively, may be cited.
The Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance167 issued by the UNHRC is a body of principles
concerning enforced disappearances, including a provision for the
right of victims of acts of enforced disappearance to adequate
compensation and complete rehabilitation.168
On the other hand, the Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for
Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power169offers guidelines in relation to
abuse of economic and political power. Through this declaration, the
UN General Assembly recognized that millions of people suffer harm
as a result of crime and abuse of power, and that these victims are
entitled to prompt redress and access to the mechanisms of
Justice.170
These instruments and customary norms of international human rights
law clearly provide for the duty to grant effective remedies to a victim
of violations. More than being an essential component of other
substantive norms, they create a distinct obligation; hence, the failure
to provide effective remedies is an additional and independent
violation of internationally recognized human rights.171
Defining Effective Remedies
Because an exact definition of an effective remedy is not provided by
the foregoing international instruments, it is necessary to examine the
interpretations of authorized bodies, as well as the theory and practice
of international courts, in order to determine the exact scope of the
obligation.172
As the succeeding discussion will show, the duty to provide an
“effective remedy” does not embrace a singular concept. Rather, that
duty embodies a variety of measures more aptly referred to as holistic
“reparations.”
3. THE OBLIGATION OF THE STATE TO PROVIDE AN
EFFECTIVE REMEDY INCORPORATES THE DUTY TO OFFER
HOLISTIC REPARATIONS.
The right to effective remedy is comprised of two dimensions:
procedural and substantive.173 As explained by the UNCAT in General
Comment No. 3:
The obligations of States parties to provide redress under Article 14
are two-fold: procedural and substantive. To satisfy their procedural
obligations, States parties shall enact legislation and establish
complaints mechanisms, investigation bodies and institutions,
including independent judicial bodies, capable of determining the
right to and awarding redress for a victim of torture and ill-treatment,
and ensure that such mechanisms and bodies are effective and
accessible to all victims. At the substantive level, States parties shall
ensure that victims of torture or ill-treatment obtain full and effective
redress and reparation, including compensation and the means for
as full rehabilitation as possible.174 (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, the procedural dimension refers to the legal means by
which alleged human rights violations are addressed by an impartial
authority; the substantive dimension involves prompt and effective
reparation for the harm suffered. 175
The right to reparations is therefore but one side of an effective
remedy, and is a crucial element in delivering justice to victims.176 As
such, the duty to provide reparations is as binding as the duty to
provide effective remedies. This principle is clearly enunciated in
international instruments, to the extent that it has achieved a non-
derogable status.177 As the International Criminal Court (ICC)
in Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Lubanga
Case)178 ratiocinated:
The Chamber accepts that the right to reparations is a well-
established and basic human right, that is enshrined in universal
and regional human rights treaties, and in other international
instruments, including the UN Basic Principles; the Declaration of
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power;
the Guidelines on Justice in Matters involving Child Victims and
Witnesses of Crime; the Nairobi Declaration; the Cape Town
Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the
Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social Reintegration of
Child Soldiers in Africa; and the Paris Principles. These international
instruments, as well as certain significant human rights reports, have
provided guidance to the Chamber in establishing the present
principles.179 (Emphasis supplied)
Understanding Reparations
The term reparation is derived from the word repair. Thus, it is often
perceived as making of amends by providing recompense to persons
who suffered loss or harm due to gross human rights
violations.180 Within the context of State responsibility, it pertains to a
series of actions expressing the State’s acknowledgment and
acceptance of its responsibility in consequence of the gross violations.
Reparation therefore denotes all types of redress for victims of human
rights violations,181 all seeking to make them whole again to the fullest
extent possible. The Chorzow Factory case182 decided by the
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in 1928 provides the
leading definition of the concept:
Reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all consequences of the
illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all probability,
have existed if that act had not been committed.183
Reparation, as a means to provide redress for past violations, goes to
the very heart of human protection. It has been recognized as a “vital
process in the acknowledgment of the wrong done to the victim, and a
key component in addressing the complex needs of victims in the
aftermath of violations of international human rights and humanitarian
law.”184 As explained by the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights (IACtHR) in its Report on the Implementation of the Justice and
Peace Law:185
The [Inter-American Court of Human Rights] considers that, beyond
the established legal system, the State has a key role and a primary
responsibility to guarantee that victims of crimes against international
law will have effective access under conditions of equality to
measures of reparation, consistent with the standards of international
law governing human rights. Access to reparations for victims of
crimes against humanity must never be subject exclusively to
determination of the criminal liability of the perpetrators, or the prior
disposal of their personal goods, licit or illicit.186
xxx xxx xxx
The State must play a primary, rather than a secondary, role in
guaranteeing victim’s access to reparations in accordance with the
standards of international law.187
UN Reparations Principles
The most important text dealing with the concept of reparations is the
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human
Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
(UN Reparations Principles).188 This text is regarded as the
international standard for the provision of reparations around the
world.189
The UN Reparations Principles was the product of the work of
Theodoor Van Boven, who was appointed in 1989 by the United
Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, to examine the possibility of developing basic
principles and guidelines on remedies for gross violations.190 Van
Boven’s work resulted in a landmark final report in 1993, also known
as the Van Boven Principles, which declared that human rights
violations give rise to a right of reparation for victims.191 These
principles attribute the State’s duty to make such reparations to its
obligation to afford remedies and ensure respect for human rights and
fundamental freedorns.192
After 15 years of consideration, the UN General Assembly adopted
the UN Reparations Principles on 16 December 2005193 without a
vote. While these principles are argued to be soft law, they are
considered binding on states because they elucidate the basic
standards applicable to reparations internationally and
domestically.194 The number of states in the UN General Assembly
that accepted the resolution by consensus likewise indicates the
authoritative weight of the principles, and signifies the status of these
rules as part of emerging customary international law.195
It must be emphasized that the UN Reparations Principles is not a
source of new commitments but rather a statement of existing
obligations, as it expresses the content of international law on
reparations to ensure that this is respected. This view was explicitly
set out in the prefatory statement of the principles:
Emphasizing that the Basic Principles and Guidelines contained
herein do not entail new international or domestic legal obligations but
identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the
implementation of existing legal obligations under international human
rights law and international humanitarian law which are
complementary though different as to their norms xxx.196
Therefore, the state obligation to provide reparations to victims of
human right violations—as established in this text—takes its
normative character from existing legal obligations under international
human rights law. As declared in the Preamble197 and Parts I198 and
II199 of the UN Reparations Principles, the underlying framework of
this document is grounded on the right to effective remedies
enshrined in international human rights law.
“Adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered” is, in
fact, a component of the remedies required to be accorded to victims
of gross violations of international human rights law, and serious
violations of international humanitarian law.200 Elaborating on the
purpose and scope of reparation, the UN Reparations Principles
provides:
IX. Reparation for harm suffered
15. Adequate, effective and prompt reparation is intended to promote
justice by redressing gross violations of international human rights law
or serious violations of international humanitarian law. Reparation
should be proportional to the gravity of the violations and the harm
suffered. In accordance with its domestic laws and international legal
obligations, a State shall provide reparation to victims for acts or
omissions which can be attributed to the State and constitute gross
violations of international human rights law or serious violations of
international humanitarian law. In cases where a person, a legal
person, or other entity is found liable for reparation to a victim, such
party should provide reparation to the victim or compensate the State
if the State has already provided reparation to the victim.
xxx xxx xxx
18. In accordance with domestic law and international law, and taking
account of individual circumstances, victims of gross violations of
international human rights law and serious violations of international
humanitarian law should, as appropriate and proportional to the
gravity of the violation and the circumstances of each case, be
provided with full and effective reparation, as laid out in principles 19
to 23, which include the following forms: restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.
Holistic Approach to Reparations
Although the PCIJ in the Chorzow Factory case201 declared that the
ultimate goal of reparation is restitutio in integrum,202 or the return of
the victims to a situation prior to the unlawful conduct, it is
acknowledged that human rights violations are impossible to rectify.
As aptly stated by Special Rapporteur Van Boven in his final report:
It is obvious that gross violations of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, particularly when they have been committed on a massive
scale, are by their nature irreparable. In such instances any remedy
or redress stands in no proportional relationship to the grave
injury inflicted upon the victims. It is nevertheless an imperative
norm of justice that the responsibility of the perpetrators be clearly
established and that the rights of the victims be sustained to the fullest
possible extent.203 (Emphasis supplied)
This view was seconded by Judge A.A. Cancado Trindade of the
IACtHR in his Separate Opinion in Bulacio v. Argentina.204 He opined
“the harm cannot be erased. Instead, reparations for human rights
violations only provide the victims the means to attenuate their
suffering, making it less unbearable, perhaps bearable.”205
These statements reflect the underlying idea that the reparations in
the UN Reparations Principles are envisioned to extend beyond the
pecuniary or material dimension. Rather, holistic reparation is the key.
This conclusion is supported by Principles 19 to 23 of the UN
Reparations Principles pertaining to the five forms of full and effective
reparation:
19. Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victrm to the
original situation before the gross violations of international human
rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law
occurred. Restitution includes, as appropriate: restoration of liberty,
enjoyment of human rights, identity, family life and citizenship, return
to one’s place of residence, restoration of employment and return of
property.
20. Compensation should be provided for any economically
assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity of
the violation and the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law, such as:
(a) Physical or mental harm;
(b) Lost opportunities, including employment, education and social
benefits;
(c) Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of earning
potential;
(d) Moral damage;
(e) Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicine and
medical services, and psychological and social services.
21. Rehabilitation should include medical and psychological care as
well as legal and social services.
22. Satisfaction should include, where applicable, any or all of the
following:
(a) Effective measures aimed at the cessation of continuing violations;
(b) Verification of the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth to
the extent that such disclosure does not cause further harm or
threaten the safety and interests of the victim, the victim's relatives,
witnesses, or persons who have intervened to assist the victim or
prevent the occurrence of further violations;
(c) The search for the whereabouts of the disappeared, for the
identities of the children abducted, and for the bodies of those killed,
and assistance in the recovery, identification and reburial of the
bodies in accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the
victims, or the cultural practices of the families and communities;
(d) An official declaration or a judicial decision restoring the dignity,
the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely
connected with the victim;
(e) Public apology, including acknowledgement of the facts and
acceptance of responsibility;
(f) Judicial and administrative sanctions against persons liable for the
violations;
(g) Commemorations and tributes to the victims;
(h) Inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in
international human rights law and international humanitarian law
training and in educational material at all levels.
23. Guarantees of non-repetition should include, where applicable,
any or all of the following measures, which will also contribute to
prevention:
(a) Ensuring effective civilian control of military and security forces;
(b) Ensuring that all civilian and military proceedings abide by
international standards of due process, fairness and impartiality;
(c) Strengthening the independence of the judiciary;
(d) Protecting persons in the legal, medical and health-care
professions, the media and other related professions, and human
rights defenders;
(e) Providing, on a priority and continued basis, human rights and
international humanitarian law education to all sectors of society and
training for law enforcement officials as well as military and security
forces;
(f) Promoting the observance of codes of conduct and ethical norms,
in particular international standards, by public servants, including law
enforcement, correctional. media, medical, psychological, social
service and military personnel, as well as by economic enterprises;
(g) Promoting mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social
conflicts and their resolution;
(h) Reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or allowing gross
violations of international human rights law and serious violations of
international humanitarian law.
Clearly, aside from addressing the injuries suffered by victims through
financial compensation, reparation also addresses a broader set of
issues, through the prevention of future human rights violations. It
addresses “democracy, good governance, and building an inclusive
political community. Reparations includes recognition,
acknowledgment of violations and state responsibility. It can
contribute to structural transformation"206 while also seeking to
promote peace and reconciliation.207 This holistic approach to
reparation is followed in other human rights institutions like the
UNCAT, the UNHRC, the ICC, the IACtHR and the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR).
General Comment No. 3 of the UNCAT emphasizes that “monetary
compensation alone may not be sufficient redress for a victim of
torture and ill-treatment. The Committee affirms that the provision of
only monetary compensation is inadequate for a State party to comply
with its obligations under article 14.”208General Comment No. 31 of
the UNHRC likewise notes that “where appropriate, reparation can
involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as
public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and
changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as bringing to justice
the perpetrators of human rights violations.”209
The holistic approach was likewise applied by the ICC to the Lubanga
Case,210 in which it held that victims of war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide have a fundamental right to receive
reparations. The trial chamber observed that reparations “go beyond
the notion of punitive justice, towards a solution which is more
inclusive, encourages participation and recognizes the need to
provide effective remedies for victims.”211It then explained that
reparations must be applied in a broad and flexible manner, so as to
allow it to approve the widest possible remedies for violations of the
rights of the victims.212
In Blazek v. Czech Republic, the UNHRC declared that a remedy is
only effective if it results in adequate measures of reparation granted
to victims. It further provided that the approach must be holistic so as
to put the needs and interests of the victim at the center of the
process with the aim of restoring the latter’s dignity.213
For its part, the IACtHR made it clear that as a principle of
international law, every violation of an international obligation that
results in harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation. In this
respect, the Court ruled that reparation
consists in full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which includes the re-
establishment of the previous situation. If this is not feasible, as in
most cases of human rights violations, the Court will determine
measures to guarantee the rights that have been violated and to
redress the consequences of the violations. Therefore, the Court has
found it necessary to award different measures ofreparation in order
to redress the damage fully, so that, in addition to pecuniary
compensation, measures of restitution, rehabilitation and satisfaction,
and guarantees of non-repetition, have special relevance to the harm
caused.214
It is noteworthy that the IACtHR has constantly addressed human
rights violations of a widespread nature, which can be attributed to the
authoritarian regimes and violent conflicts in Latin America during the
1970s and early 1980s.215 Consequently, IACtHR rulings are
particularly relevant to our discussion of the authoritarian Marcos
regime.
Lastly, while the ECHR has awarded “just satisfaction” partaking of a
pecuniary nature in most of its cases,216 the intention to provide a
holistic approach in providing effective satisfaction can be discerned
in its Vagrancy Cases against the Belgian Government:
[I]f the victim, after exhausting in vain the domestic remedies before
complaining at Strasbourg of a violation of his rights, were obliged to
do so a second time before being able to obtain from the Court just
satisfaction, the total length of the procedure instituted by the
Convention would scarcely be in keeping with the idea of the effective
protection of human rights. Such a requirement would lead to a
situation incompatible with the aim and object of the Convention.217
Nevertheless, the provisions of Article 50 which recognise the Court’s
competence to grant to the injured party a just satisfaction also cover
the case where the impossibility of restitutio in integrum follows from
the very nature of the injury; indeed common sense suggests that this
must be so a fortiori.218
B. The burial would contravene the duty of the Philippines to
provide reparations to victims of human rights violations during
the Marcos regime.
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the Philippines is
obligated to provide holistic reparations to victims of human rights
violations during Martial Law. In fact, as discussed in the previous
section, R.A. 10368 acknowledged the “moral and legal obligation [of
the State] to recognize and/or provide reparation to said victims
and/or their families for the deaths, injuries, sufferings, deprivations
and damages they suffered under the Marcos regime.”219 As stated in
the Explanatory Note of House Bill No. 54—one of the progenitors of
R.A. 10368—this recognition was one of the main features of the law:
Among the important features of this bill are:
One, Congress recognition that those who have filed a case against
the Marcoses before the US Federal District Court in Hawaii and are
given favorablejudgment are considered human rights violations
victims. This is called legislative cognizance.
Two, any person who has secured or can secure a favorable
judgment from any court in the country arising from a human rights
violation is given a so-called conclusive presumption that he or she is
a human rights violation victim.
Three, some ten billion pesos of funds seized from bank accounts and
discovered investments of the Marcos family shall be used to
compensate the victims; and
Four, an independent Human Rights Victims Compensation Board is
created attached to, but not necessarily under the direct supervision f
the CHR to ensure the proper disposition of the funds guided by this
Act.
No amount of money can really be enough to compensate our living
heroes and those survived by their kinds for the democracy that our
people are now enjoying. The least we can do though is pass this bill
to honor, in our small way, the sacrifices, that they have made for our
country.220
The law also recognized the binding nature of the Decision of the US
Federal District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii,221 by creating a conclusive
presumption that the claimants in the case against the Estate of
Ferdinand Marcos were human rights violations victims.222 In that
case, compensatory and exemplary damages were awarded to (a) the
class plaintiffs who were declared to have been tortured; or (b) the
heirs and beneficiaries of those who were summarily executed, or
who disappeared while in the custody of Philippine military or
paramilitary groups.223 Several petitioners in the present case were
claimants therein and are thus conclusively considered victims of
human rights during the Marcos regime.
Both monetary224 and non-monetary225 forms of reparations were
provided for in R.A. 10368. These measures notwithstanding, the
members of the Bicameral Conference Committee emphasized the
symbolic value of recognition in acknowledgment of the fact that
material forms of reparation are not sufficient to atone for the suffering
of the victims of atrocities:
Sen. Guingona: Page 5, letter (d) “Monetary Compensation refers to
financial consideration equivalent to.” Then, we changed
“economically assessable damage” just to—We just make it “refers to
financial consideration extended to human rights violation victims.”
Ang rationale dito kasi this one implies—The present definition
implies that the damage—When you're human rights victim, it
can be equivalent to a material damage when actually there is no
adequate compensation when your human rights are violated. So
we just make it just “financial consideration extended to human
rights violation victims as defined in this Act.” Ganoon.
Rep. Lagman: Baka instead of financial consideration, maski iyong
consideration, ano, eh—Ah, financial reparation.
Sen. Guingona: Okay. Rep. Lagman: Reparation.
Sen. Guingona: Reparation. Instead of “economically assessable”
parang sinasabi mo you[r] right has been violated but that’s
equivalent to this amount.226
xxx xxx xxx
Sen. Arroyo: xxx Here, we seemed to be concerned about the
physical aspects of human rights, meaning torture and all that. But
take for instance, those who were economically depressed, harassed.
You mean to say the family of Chino Roces, who lost his entire Manila
Times and his family, is not really living in poverty xxx.
Now they will not ask for compensation but they would want
recognition. This is the purpose of recognition. That is why to us
that roll of honor is very important. Because to others, they just
want to be recognized.227 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering the foregoing, the intent is that not only must material
reparation be provided by the state to human rights victims, the
prohibition against public acts and symbolisms that degrade the
recognition of the injury inflicted—although not expressly mentioned in
the statute—are likewise included in the obligation of the state.
Therefore, while the passage of legislative measures and the
provision of government mechanisms in an effort to comply with this
obligation are lauded, the State’s duty does not end there.
Contrary to the implications of the ponencia, the statutes, issuances,
and rules enacted by the different branches of government to promote
human rights cannot suffice for the purpose of fulfilling the state’s
obligation to the human rights victims of former President Marcos.
These enactments cannot erase the violations committed against
these victims, or the failure of the state to give them justice; more
important, these enactments cannot negate the further violation of
their rights through the proposed burial.
It must be emphasized that the obligation owed by the Philippine
government to the victims of human rights violations during Martial
Law is distinct from the general obligation to avoid further violations of
human rights. As distinct species of obligations, the general duty to
prevent further human rights violations cannot offset the right of past
victims to full and holistic reparations. Their rights under international
law have already been violated; they have already disappeared, been
tortured or summarily executed.228 The government cannot choose to
disregard their specific claims and assert that it has fulfilled its
obligation to them merely by enacting laws that apply in general to
future violations of human rights.
As will be further discussed, victims of human rights violations during
the Martial Law regime have a distinct right to holistic reparations,
including the grant thereof in symbolic form.
1. SYMBOLIC REPARATION IS AN INDISPENSABLE FACET OF
AN ADEQUATE REPARATIONS REGIME.
Symbolic forms of reparation are mandated by international law and
are considered hallmarks of any reparations regime.229 Within the
framework of the UN Reparations Principles, satisfaction and
guarantees of non-repetition are described as symbolic, because they
involve a greater intangible element.230 On the other hand, restitution,
compensation, and rehabilitation are typically financial or material in
character. As earlier explained, a comprehensive and holistic program
of reparations is expected to contain aspects of both.231
Symbols as sources of meaning
The collective dimension of symbolic reparations is the source of their
value.232 Symbolic reparations extend beyond the victim and their
families, and represent a demand for recognition, respect, dignity, and
hope for a safe future.233 They assist communities as a whole in
dealing with the process of remembering and commemorating the
past.234 In other words, symbolic measures provide moral
reparation,235 which is considered by victims to be of equal or higher
importance than material or physical reparation.
The United Nations, in its guidelines for reparation programs for post-
conflict states, describes the significance of symbolic reparations in
this manner:
As many recent reparations programmes have been proposed by
truth commissions (which have broader mandates and goals than
typical judicial instances), they are becoming less like mere
compensation mechanisms and are increasingly proposing more
complex reparations measures, including symbolic ones.
Individualized letters of apology signed by the highest authority in
Government, sending each victim a copy of the truth commission’s
report and supporting families to give a proper burial to their loved
ones are some of the individual symbolic measures that have been
tried with some success in different contexts. Some of the collective
symbolic measures that have been tried are renaming public spaces,
building museums and memorials, rededicating places of detention
and torture, turning them into sites of memory, establishing days of
commemoration and engaging in public acts of atonement. Like other
reparations measures, symbolic benefits are, at least in part, geared
towards fostering recognition. However, in contrast to other
benefits, symbolic measures derive their great potential from the
fact that they are carriers of meaning, and therefore can help
victims in particular and society in general to make sense of the
painful events of the past. Symbolic measures usually turn out to
be so significant because, by making the memory of the victims
a public matter, they disburden their families from their sense of
obligation to keep the memory alive and allow them to move on.
This is essential if reparations are to provide recognition to
victims not only as victims but also as citizens and as rights
holders more generally.236 (Emphasis supplied)
Restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation under the UN
Reparations Principles, while necessary, are lacking in this symbolic
dimension. Monetary forms of reparation can indeed provide funds for
certain necessities and improve the future of victims, but without
more, it is unlikely that they would lead to the justice sought.
Moreover, it has been observed that human rights victims want an
apology, above all else.237 They also place a premium on obtaining
recognition of the harm done to them.238 In contrast, financial
reparations or damages are considered less important than emotional
or symbolic reparations, because the former fail to squarely address a
person’s need for “dignity, emotional relief, participation in the social
polity, or institutional reordering.”239 If given in isolation, monetary
reparation may even have a trivializing effect on suffering in certain
cultural, social, and political contexts.240
Forms of Symbolic Reparation
Because of its peculiar nature, symbolic reparation takes various
forms. An examination of the UN Reparations Principles, as well as
the decisions of international and regional courts, reveals that different
measures have been utilized to satisfy this requirement.
The following have been identified as examples of measures intended
to offer satisfaction to victims of atrocities: (a) “verification of the facts
and full and public disclosure of the truth”;241 (b) “an official declaration
or a judicial decision restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights
of the victim and of persons closely connected with the victim”;242 (c)
“public apology”;243 and (d) “commemorations and tributes to the
victims.”244These methods deal with the emotional, psychological, and
symbolic aspects of the suffering of the victims,245and are primarily
concerned with the restoration of their dignity through an
acknowledgment by the state of the harm done.
Guarantees of non-repetition, on the other hand, focus on reform and
restructuring initiatives pursuant to the state’s commitment to never
again engage in the practices that led to human rights
violations.246 The actual steps taken by state institutions represent the
guarantees of non-repetition. These steps include “promoting
mechanisms for preventing and monitoring social conflicts and their
resolution”247 and “reviewing and reforming laws contributing to or
allowing gross violations of international human rights law.”248
Meanwhile, the ICC in the Lubanga Case considered the conviction
and the sentence issued by the Court itself as forms of reparation on
account of their significance to the victims and the communities.249 In
turn, the IACtHR—the most progressive court in terms of granting
reparations to victims of human rights violations—has ordered the
following measures as part of “other forms of reparation”: (a) the
construction of monuments to commemorate the suffering of
victims,250 (b) the naming of a school after them,251 (c) the designation
of a day of remembrance for them,252 (d) the conduct by the state of
public ceremonies offering apologies in honor of the fallen;253 ( e) the
establishment of memorial scholarships;254 and (f) human rights
courses.255
Memorials as Symbolic Reparation
In a report on memorialization processes utilized by states
transitioning from conflicts or periods of repression, Farida Shaheed,
the UN Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights,
identified memorials as “physical representation[s] or commemorative
activities, located in public spaces, that concern specific events
regardless of the period of occurrence (wars and conflicts, mass or
grave human rights violations), or the persons involved (soldiers,
combatants, victims, political leaders or activists for example).”256
In recent times, memorials have become principally focused on
honoring the victims of human rights atrocities. As Special Rapporteur
Shaheed explained, memorials were utilized as a means of “ensuring
recognition for the victims, as reparation for mass or grave violations
of human rights and as a guarantee of non-recurrence,”257 as well as
a way to combat injustice and promote reconciliation.258 This trend
was followed in post-conflict states, where memorials commemorating
victims of human rights violations were regularly established. The
Report states:
An exhaustive list of all truth and reconciliation commissions that have
advocated the construction of memorials is beyond the scope of this
document. Nevertheless, one should mention the recommendations of
the truth and reconciliation commissions in El Salvador, Germany,
Guatemala, Peru, Morocco and South Africa and the commission of
inquiry in Chad, even though not all their recommendations were
implemented.
The Commission on the Truth for El Salvador clearly called in its
report for the construction of a national monument in El Salvador
bearing the names of all victims of the conflict, recognition of their
good name and the serious crimes of which they were the victims and
the institution of a national holiday in memory of the victims of conflict
as a symbol of reconciliation.
Similarly, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala
recommended, among other things, that monuments and parks be
constructed and the names of victims assigned to public buildings and
highways in memory of the victims. The Commission stated that “the
historical memory, both individual and collective, forms the basis of
national identity.”259
The reason behind the creation of memorials intended to
commemorate victims of atrocities was explained by Special
Rapporteur Shaheed in relation to the duty to provide symbolic
reparations:
With the passage of time, memorials have shifted from honouring
soldiers dying in the line of duty to a victim’s perspective and new
visions of reconciliation. Starting in the 1980s, the creation of
memorials has become linked to the idea that ensuring public
recognition of past crimes is indispensable to the victims, essential for
preventing further violence and necessary for redefining national
unity. Memorialization is often a demand of victims and society at
large and the path to national reconciliation is seen to pass through
not only legal reparations, but also symbolic reparations such as
mernorials.P''
2. THE PROPOSED BURIAL WOULD BE THE ANTITHESIS OF AN
ACT OF SYMBOLIC REPARATION.
In the present case, the dispute also involves the creation of a
memorial in the form of a burial plot located at the LMB. Instead of
commemorating victims, however, the memorial proposes to honor
Marcos, the recognized perpetrator of countless human rights
violations during the Martial Law regime. The establishment of this
memorial would accomplish the exact opposite of what is intended by
symbolic reparation, and would consequently violate the obligations of
the Philippines under international human rights law.
For reasons previously discussed, the burial of Marcos would be more
than a simple matter of the interment of his remains, because it would
involve his victim’s right to symbolic reparations. Undoubtedly, to
honor the very perpetrator of human rights atrocities would be the
direct opposite of the duty of the state to respect, promote, and fulfil
human rights.
These conclusions are supported by the opmion of UN Special
Rapporteur Pablo De Greiff in the analogous case of another dictator,
General Francisco Franco of Spain, and his burial place—the Valle de
las Caidos(Valley of the Fallen).261 The site, located in Madrid, serves
as a monument and a memorial, as it is also the burial ground of
almost 34,000 other individuals. The structure, however, is still
considered by many as “an exaltation of Francoism”262 and a reminder
of the forced labor of thousands of political prisoners who were
compelled to build the structure.263
In his Report on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and
guarantees of non-recurrence,264 Special Rapporteur De Greiff
studied the fate of symbols of Franco ism in relation to the then newly
enacted 2007 Law of Historical Memory.265 This law dealt with the
recognition of victims of human rights violations during the Spanish
Civil War and the 40-year regime of General Franco.
Special Rapporteur De Greiff reviewed, in particular, the effects of a
provision in the Law of Historical Memory requiring the removal of all
memorials related to Franco and the latter’s dictatorship. In his report,
he welcomed the measures introduced to combat the exaltation of
the coup d’etat, the Civil War, and the repression by the Franco
dictatorship, particularly through the removal of symbols and
monuments.266 He further
noted “majority of inventoried symbols and monuments had been
removed, and that the remaining symbols and monuments either
required a lengthy administrative procedure or considerable expense,
or were subject to protection rules for their historic or artistic value.”267
As part of the implementation of the Law of Historical Memory, the
removal of Valle de las Caidos was proposed because of its ties to
General Franco and Francoism. However, because the structure
could not be removed without disturbing the burial grounds of other
individuals,268 De Greiff made the following recommendation with
respect to the site:
The site can be put to good use and “reinterpreted”, with suitable
techniques and pedagogy, in favour of the promotion of truth and
memory, and given an educational and preventive purpose. It can
hardly be construed as a place devoted to peace and
reconciliation, so long as silence is maintained about the facts
relevant to the context and origin of the site, and especially while
the flower-covered tomb of the dictator remains in the centre of
the monument.269 [Emphasis supplied]
The necessity for the reinterpretation and “recontextualization” of
the Valle de las Caídos highlights the fact that far from being an
ordinary burial plot, the final resting place of a dictator and perpetrator
of human rights violations is a symbol and a source of meaning. The
meaning it conveys, particularly to the victims of atrocities, cannot be
underestimated. Special Rapporteur Shaheed, in her report on
memorialization processes, also expressed concerns about the
monuments and sites intended to honor past oppressive regimes:
The question is how to manage an architectural legacy with strong
symbolic connotations when oppressive regimes collapse. Should a
new democratic Government destroy, conserve or transform these
legacies? Answers vary from situation to situation, frequently giving
rise to intense controversy, including amongst victims. Striking
examples include debates in Spain over the memorial in Valle de las
caidos (the Valley of the Fallen) where Franco is buried, in Bulgaria
over the mausoleum of former communist leader Georgy Dimitrov,
which was finally destroyed, and in Germany over Hitler’s bunker, now
located beneath a parking lot in the centre of Berlin, marked only by a
small sign.270
Shaheed therefore concludes “the choice to conserve, transform
or destroy always carries meaning and so needs to be
discussed, framed and interpreted.”271 In this undertaking, the
concerns and views of victims are given primary consideration
and for good reason—they are, after all, the persons most
affected by any decision on the matter.
In this case, the victims of human rights violations have
expressed their objection to the proposed burial of Marcos in the
LMB. They assert that the burial would constitute a state-
sanctioned narrative that would confer honor upon him.272 This,
in turn, would subject his human rights victims to the same
indignity, hurt, and damage that they have already experienced
under his regime.273
These opinions must be given paramount consideration by the state in
compliance with its duty to provide symbolic reparations to victims of
human rights atrocities. For the President to allow the burial in
disregard of these views would constitute a clear contravention of
international human rights law and would amount to grave abuse of
discretion.
C. The burial would run counter to the duty of the state to
combat impunity.
As part of their obligation to protect and ensure human rights under
international law,274 states have the duty to combat impunity and hold
perpetrators of human rights violations accountable. In fact, the clear
nexus between the impunity of perpetrators of gross violations of
human rights, and the failure to provide adequate reparation to the
victims275 indicate that the two obligations must go hand in hand.
In his report, Special Rapporteur Theodoor Van Boven concluded that
“in many situations where impunity has been sanctioned by the law or
where de facto impunity prevails with regard to persons responsible
for gross violations of human rights, the victims are effectively barred
from seeking and receiving redress and reparation.”276 His conclusion
is unsurprising, given the significant role of reparations in ensuring
that the perpetrators are held responsible for their actions.
Certainly, states cannot claim to look after the interest of the victims
and at the same time endorse a social and political climate where
impunity prevails. This incongruity would be tantamount to a violation
of the victim’s right to effective remedy and reparations. In Van
Boven’s words, “it is hard to perceive that a system of justice that
cares for the rights of victims can remain at the same time indifferent
and inert towards the gross misconduct of perpetrators.”277
THE UN IMPUNITY PRINCIPLES
The primary instrument providing for the duty to combat impunity is
the UN Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human
Rights through Action to Combat Impunity (UN Impunity
Principles).278Like the UN Reparations Principles, this document does
not impose new obligations, but only frames and emphasizes the
existing state obligations under international human rights law. This
rule is apparent in the Preamble of the Principles, which cites the UN
Charter and the UDHR as the bases for the statement that “the duty of
every State under international law to respect and to secure respect
for human rights requires that effective measures should be taken to
combat impunity.”279
In these Principles, the UN Human Rights Committee enumerates the
acts from which impunity may arise. Principle 1 states:
Impunity arises from a failure by States to meet their obligations to
investigate violations; to take appropriate measures in respect of the
perpetrators, particularly in the area of justice, by ensuring that those
suspected of criminal responsibility are prosecuted, tried and duly
punished; to provide victims with effective remedies and to ensure
that they receive reparation for the injuries suffered; to ensure the
inalienable right to know the truth about violations; and to take other
necessary steps to prevent a recurrence of violations.280
A reading of the UN Principles on Impunity reveals the close
relationship between impunity and the concepts of reparations and the
preservation of memory.
IMPUNITY AND THE RIGHT TO REPARATION
The provision of effective remedies and reparations for victims has
been recognized as one of the means to combat impunity. Principles
31 and 34 provide:
PRINCIPLE 31. RIGHTS AND DUTIES ARISING OUT OF THE
OBLIGATION TO MAKE REPARATION
Any human rights violation gives rise to a right to reparation on the
part of the victim or his or her beneficiaries, implying a duty on the
part of the State to make reparation and the possibility for the victim to
seek redress from the perpetrator.
xxx xxx xxx
PRINCIPLE 34. SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO REPARATION
The right to reparation shall cover all injuries suffered by victims; it
shall include measures of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
and satisfaction as provided by international law.
In particular, symbolic reparations are considered significant. In his
Report281 on the Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human
Rights Violations (Civil and Political),282 Special Rapporteur Louis
Joinet concluded:
On a collective basis, symbolic measures intended to provide moral
reparation, such as formal public recognition by the State of its
responsibility, or official declarations aimed at restoring victim’s
dignity, commemorative ceremonies, naming of public thoroughfares
or the erection of monuments, help to discharge the duty of
remembrance. In France, for example, it took more than 50 years for
the Head of State formally to acknowledge, in 1996, the responsibility
of the French State for the crimes against human rights committed by
the Vichy regime between 1940 and 1944. Mention can be made of
similar statements by President Cardoso concerning violations
committed under the military dictatorship in Brazil, and more
especially of the initiative of the Spanish Government, which recently
conferred the status of ex-servicemen on the anti-Fascists and
International Brigade members who fought on the Republican side
during the Spanish civil war.283
THE DUTY TO PRESERVE MEMORY
Another facet of the fight against impunity involves the duty of a state
to preserve the memory of its people. In this regard, the UN Impunity
Principles requires states to combat any measure that tends to
encourage people to forget or downplay past human rights violations.
Principle 3 provides:
PRINCIPLE 3. THE DUTY TO PRESERVE MEMORY
A people’s knowledge of the history of its oppression is part of its
heritage and, as such, must be ensured by appropriate measures in
6lfulfillment of the State’s duty to preserve archives and other
evidence concerning violations of human rights and humanitarian law
and to facilitate knowledge of those violations. Such measures shall
be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in
particular, at guarding against the development of revisionist and
negationist arguments.
While the UN Impunity Principles sees reconciliation and justice as
the primary goals, it is firm in asserting that these goals may not be
achieved by disregarding human rights atrocities that occurred in the
past. In fact, the principles emphasize that before true reconciliation
can be achieved, the human rights violators must be held
accountable. This dictum is reflected in the Preamble of the
instrument:
Aware that there can be no just and lasting reconciliation unless the
need for justice is effectively satisfied,
Equally aware that forgiveness, which may be an important element of
reconciliation, implies, insofar as it is a private act, that the victim or
the victim’s beneficiaries know the perpetrator of the violations and
that the latter has acknowledged his or her deeds,
xxx xxx xxx
Convinced, therefore, that national and international measures must
be taken for that purpose with a view to securing jointly, in the
interests of the victims of violations, observance of the right to know
and, by implication, the right to the truth, the right to justice and the
right to reparation, without which there can be no effective remedy
against the pernicious effects of impunity.284
Consistent with the foregoing, the UN Impunity Principles imposes
restrictions on certain rules of law like limiting the entitlement of
perpetrators to amnesties and other measures of clemency. In
Principle 24, the restrictions are imposed even when clemency
measures are “intended to establish conditions conducive to a peace
agreement or to foster national reconciliation.”285 Joinet, in his report,
emphasizes the importance of accountability in the context of
reconciliation:
[T]here can be no just and lasting reconciliation without an effective
response to the need for justice; as a factor of reconciliation,
forgiveness, insofar as it is a private act, implies that the victim must
know the perpetrator of the violations and that the latter has been in a
position to show refentance. For forgiveness to be granted, it must
first have been sought.286
In this case, the burial of Marcos in the LMB would be tantamount
to a disregard of the human rights violations perpetrated by his
regime. To allow it to proceed would sanction an egregious act
of impunity and allow the government to bestow an honor that is
clearly not due upon a perpetrator of human rights violations. To
allow it would be a rampant violation of the rights of victims
under international law.
In the process of mapping through the vast body of international
human rights law, each tum leads to the conclusion that the burial of
Marcos in the LMB would be incompatible with the international
obligations of the Philippines. For the Court to permit the burial would
be to sanction these violations and allow the state to disregard the
latter’s duty to provide effective remedies to victims of human rights
violations, particularly its duty to provide symbolic reparations and to
combat impunity.
INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES IN
PHILIPPINE LAW
The foregoing principles of international law have been incorporated
in Philippine law as part of two domestic statutes intended for the
protection of human rights.
As discussed above, R.A. 10368 was enacted pursuant to generally
accepted principles of international law. as well as the specific
obligations of the Philippines under international human rights laws
and conventions.287In accordance with these principles, the statute
recognized the “heroism and sacrifices of all Filipinos who were
victims of summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary
disappearance and other gross human rights violations” and vowed to
“restore the victim’s honor and dignity” through the grant of
reparations to victims and/or their families.288
The same principles were likewise incorporated in R.A. 9851,289 a
statute penalizing crimes against international humanitarian law,
genocide, and other crimes against humanity. In providing remedies
for offenses under this law, courts were specifically mandated to
follow international principles relating to reparations for victims,
including restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation.290 The statute
also enumerated the sources of international law that may guide the
courts in the application and interpretation of the statute. These
sources include international instruments, decisions of international
courts and tribunals, as well as writings of most highly qualified
publicists and authoritative commentaries.
The obligation of the state to provide holistic reparations for victims of
human rights violations is, therefore, enshrined in both international
and domestic laws. This obligation includes the responsibility to
provide victims with reparations—both financial and symbolic—in
recognition of their suffering and heroism. The grant of reparations
should likewise go hand in hand with the duty of the state to combat
impunity by holding perpetrators of human rights violations
accountable.
As previously discussed, the proposed burial of former President
Marcos in the LMB contravenes these principles, because it would
honor the identified perpetrator of human rights violations. As such, it
would accomplish the exact opposite of what is intended to be
accomplished by international and domestic principles on reparations,
i.e., to recognize and honor the sufferings of victims; and to make
amends for the physical, emotional and psychological harm they have
sustained. The burial would also perpetuate a climate of impunity, as
it would effectively disregard the human rights violations perpetrated
by Marcos and permit the state to honor him despite his
transgressions.
Clearly, the President cannot sanction the burial without going against
domestic and international principles, as well as his solemn oath to
faithfully execute the law.
IV.
PUBLIC FUNDS AND PROPERTY CANNOT BE USED FOR THE
BURIAL AS IT SERVES NO LEGITIMATE PUBLIC PURPOSE.
On a final note, I must point out that the discretion of the President in
this case is not unlimited, as argued by respondents. Because their
proposal involves public funds and property, certain rules must be
complied with.
Respondents propose the use of a portion of the LMB, a national
cemetery owned by the government, for the interment of Marcos.
They likewise intend to use money from the government coffers for
the preparation and maintenance of the gravesite, as well as for
military honors to be accorded to the deceased by the AFP.
Considering that public resources would be used for the interment, it
is necessary for this Court to determine if the planned expenditures
are for a legitimate public purpose. The reason is simple—public
property, including public funds, belongs to the people.291 Hence, it is
the duty of the government to ensure the prudent use of these
resources at all times to prevent dissipation and waste.292 As a
necessary corollary to these principles, it is settled that public property
and funds may only be used for public purposes.293
This Court has explained the nature and the meaning of the term
“public purpose” in the context of public expenditures in several
cases. It has declared that the term includes not only activities that will
benefit the community as a body and are related to the traditional
functions of govemment,294 but also those designed to promote social
justice, general welfare and the common good.295 This broad
understanding of the public purpose requirement, however, does not
authorize the use of public funds and property for unmistakably
personal and political motives.296
Ultimately, the validity of a public expenditure depends on the
essential character of its direct object. In Alban v. Fernando,297 the
Court explained:
In Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, the Court laid down the test
of validity of a public expenditure: it is the essential character of the
direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity
and not the magnitude of the interests to be affected nor the
degree to which the general advantage of the community, and
thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their
promotion.Incidental advantage to the public or to the State resulting
from the promotion of private interests and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business does not justify their aid by the use of public
money.298(Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing standard, the validity of public expenditures
must be determined based on the nature of the particular expense
involved, and the public purpose sought to be accomplished.
As will be explained in further detail, the proposed burial would
promote only the private interest of the Marcos family.
Significantly, respondents have failed to prove that any sort of public
purpose would be served by the planned interment; in fact, the event
would contravene the public purposes of the LMB. Consequently, the
intended public expenditure cannot be allowed.
A. The burial would contravene the public purpose of
the Libingan ng mga Bayani.
The government in this case proposes to shoulder the expenses for
the burial of Marcos in the LMB, a military cemetery maintained on
public property and a declared national shrine. The expenses
contemplated are comprised of the cost of a plot inside a military
cemetery, the maintenance expenses for the gravesite, and the cost
of military honors and ceremonies.299
Generally, burial expenses are not borne by the government because
interments are customarily private affairs. However, as exceptions to
the foregoing rule, public expenditure is allowed in the case of
cemeteries that serve certain public purposes, for instance: (a) burial
grounds set aside for the indigent in the name of social justice;300 and
(b) cemeteries reserved for individuals deemed worthy of honor and
reverence, i.e., the nation’s war dead, soldiers or dignitaries, of the
govemment.301 The LMB belongs to this second exception.
Formerly known as the Republic Memorial Cemetery, the LMB was
designated by former President Ramon M. Magsaysay as the national
cemetery for the nation’s war dead in 1954. Through Executive Order
No. 77,302 he ordered that the remains of the war dead interred at the
Bataan Memorial Cemetery and other places be transferred to the
LMB to accord honor to dead war heroes; improve the accessibility of
the burial grounds to relatives of the deceased; and consolidate the
expenses of maintenance and upkeep of military cemeteries. He
thereafter issued Proclamation No. 86,303 which renamed the
cemetery to “Libingan ng mga Bayani,” because the former name was
“not symbolic of the cause for which our soldiers have died, and does
not truly express the nation’s esteem and reverence for her war
dead.”
It is therefore evident that the LMB is no ordinary cemetery, but a
burial ground established on public property to honor the nation’s war
dead and fallen soldiers. Further, the designation of the cemetery as a
national shrine confirms its sacred character and main purpose, that
is, to serve as a symbol for the community and to encourage
remembrance of the honor and valor of great
Filipinos.304 Respondents themselves acknowledged this fact when
they argued that the LMB implements a public purpose because it is a
military shrine and a military memorial.305
To allow the LMB to fulfill the foregoing purposes, it has been and
continues to be the recipient of public funds and property. Not only
was the cemetery established on land owned by the government,
public funds are also being utilized for the cost of maintenance and
other expenses. The use of these resources is justified because of the
public purpose of the site. As a necessary consequence of this
principle, an expenditure that does not further this public purpose is
invalid.
Applying the foregoing standards, the proposed expenditures for the
burial of Marcos in the LMB must be considered invalid. As earlier
discussed, Marcos was an ousted dictator and disgraced
president. Consequently, he is clearly not worthy of
commendation from the state and no public purpose would be
served by his interment therein. In fact, his burial in the LMB
would result in a contravention of the public purpose of the site
as it would no longer be a sacred symbol of honor and valor.
B. Respondents have not explained how the burial would serve
the avowed policy of national unity and healing.
Considering that the public purpose of the LMB would not be served
by the interment, we must now examine the other public purpose
supposedly fulfilled by the proposal. According to respondents, that
purpose pertains to national unity and healing. In their Comment, they
contend:
Undeniably, no cadaver has polarized this nation for the longest time
other than that of the former President Marcos. Thus, President
Duterte deems that it is but high time to put an end to this issue by
burying the mortal remains of a former President, Commander-in-
Chief: and soldier.
President Duterte’s decision to accord respect to the remains of
former President Marcos is not simply a matter of political
accommodation, or even whims. Viewed from a wider perspective,
this decision should be dovetailed to his war against corruption and
dangerous drugs, and his recent dealings with the CPP/NPA/NDF. All
these are geared towards changing the national psyche and
beginning the painful healing of this country.306
xxx xxx xxx
It should likewise be emphasized that President Duterte’s order to
allow former President Marco’s interment at the Libingan is based on
his determination that it shall promote national healing and
forgiveness, and redound to the benefit of the Filipino people. Surely,
this is an exercise of his executive prerogative beyond the ambit of
judicial review.307
It is significant to note, however, that respondents fail to explain how
the burial would lead to national unity and healing. Consequently, their
statements remain meaningless assertions. To emphasize, mere
reference to an avowed public purpose cannot automatically justify
the use of public funds and property. This Court must still review the
validity of the declared purpose of public expenditure, as well as the
reasonable connection between the objective and the proposed
means for its attainment. Our duty to safeguard public funds and
property demands no less. To reiterate, “[p]ublic funds are the
property of the people and must be used prudently at all times with a
view to prevent dissipation and waste.”308
Furthermore, as previously discussed, it is the essential character of
the direct object of public expenditure that determines its
validity,309 and not the incidental advantage derived from it by the
community. Hence, assuming for the sake of argument that the burial·
would bear an incidental benefit of promoting unity and healing, this
supposed benefit would not erase the reality that the interment would
principally be for the promotion of the personal interest of former
President Marcos and his family.
C. The burial would promote only the private interest of the
Marcos family.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the burial would ultimately
benefit only the Marcos family. No general advantage is derived by
the public from the interment; as it stands, divisiveness instead of
unity has resulted from the plan.
The circumstances surrounding the order of the President to allow the
burial likewise reveal the political color behind the decision. In their
Comment, respondents admit that the President ordered the burial to
fulfill a promise made during his presidential campaign.310 It must be
pointed out, however, that the President made that pledge not at any
random location, but while campaigning in Ilocos Norte,311 a known
stronghold of the Marcos family. During the oral arguments held in this
case, it was also revealed that the preparations for the burial were
prompted by a letter sent by the Marcos heirs to Secretary Lorenzana,
urging him to issue the orders required for the interment at the earliest
opportunity.312
Needless to state, the private interest of the Marcos family and the
personal objective of the President to fulfill a pledge to his political
allies will not justify the proposed public expenditure for the burial.
Indeed, it is completely unseemly for the Marcos family to expect
the Filipino people to bear the financial and emotional cost of
burying the condemned former President even while this country
has yet to recover all the ill-gotten wealth that he, his family, and
unrepentant cronies continue to deny them.313 It is wrong for this
Government and the Marcos family to refer human rights victims
to the financial reparation provided by Republic Act 10386 as
recompense, which moneys will come, not from the private
wealth of the Marcos family, but from the money they illegally
acquired while in office, and on which the Philippine state spent
fortunes to recover. Every Filipino continues to suffer because of
the billions of unwarranted public debt incurred by the country
under the Marcos leadership;314 and every Filipino will incur
more expenses, no matter how modest, for the proposed burial.
No situation can be more ironic indeed.
Epilogue
Stripped to its core, this case involves an order by the President to
bury a dictator—one declared to have perpetrated human rights
violations and plundered the wealth of the nation—with all the
trappings of a hero’s burial. It may not be an express declaration, as
respondents themselves concede that the President does not have
the power to declare any individual a hero, but it is a pronouncement
of heroism nevertheless. It is far from being an empty statement bereft
of significance. As respondents themselves recognize, the nature of
the office held by the President provides him the opportunity to
“profoundly influence the public discourse x x x by the mere
expediency of taking a stand on the issues of the day.”315 Clearly, the
order of the President to allow the burial is, at the very least, a
declaration that Marcos is worthy of a grave at a cemetery reserved
for war heroes, despite the objections of countless victims of human
rights violations during the Martial Law regime. It is an executive
pronouncement that his memory may be preserved and maintained
using public funds.
Justice Isagani Cruz once stated: “liberty is not a gift of the
government but the rights of the governed.”316Throughout his regime,
Marcos trampled upon this statement by his own acts and those of his
subordinates, in a stampede wrought by the fervor to supposedly
protect the nation from lawless elements. It pitted Filipino against
Filipino, masking each face in shades of black or white and sowing
fear and terror whilst reaping a harvest of public treasure. The nation
was silenced. But people like petitioners persevered, keeping in their
hearts the essence of Justice Cruz’s words. They fought, and the
people ultimately rose and won back the freedom we all now enjoy.
The statement continues:
Every person is free, save only for the fetters of the law that limit but citizen’s rights, a chilling legacy of the Marcos regime that curiously
do not bind him unless he affronts the rights of others or offends the survives to this very day, long after the death of the dictator.
public welfare. Liberty is not derived from the sufferance of the
Respondents may deny the implications of their actions today,319 but
government or its magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself,
the symbolism of the burial will outlive even their most emphatic
which merely affirms but does not grant it. Liberty is a right that
inheres in every one of us as a member of the human family.317 refutations. Long after the clarifications made by this administration
have been forgotten, the gravesite at the LMB will remain. That is the
To forget that Marcos took this right away from the citizens of the peculiar power of symbols in the public landscape—they are not only
Philippines would be the peak of intellectual and moral complacency. carriers of meaning, but are repositories of public memory and
As a nation of laws, we cannot tolerate anything less than the full ultimately, history.
remembrance of a dark past from which we derive lessons that we
For the Court to pretend that the present dispute is a simple question
imbue into the legal firmament. We cannot tolerate another instance in
of the entitlement of a soldier to a military burial is to take a regrettably
which our rights would be run to the ground, in which we would lose
myopic view of the controversy. It would be to disregard historical
sight of the values held in our own Constitution, the symbols we hold
truths and legal principles that persist after death. As important, it
dear, the aspirations we cherish. The LMB is revered because of the
would be to degrade the state’s duty to recognize the pain of
symbolism it carries. One treatise on geography and public memory
explains: countless victims of Marcos and Martial Law. Regardless of the
promised national unity that the proposed burial will bring, I cannot, in
Cemeteries, as one type of memorial space, create a symbolic good conscience, support such an expedient and shortsighted view of
encounter between the living and the dead in the form of individual Philippine history.
gravesites and the ritual activities taking place in the burial space. In
WHEREFORE I vote to GRANT the Petitions.
contrast to communal cemeteries, national cemeteries are state
shrines that belong to the national narrative of the people. The heroes
buried there—most prominently national leaders and fallen soldiers—
are privileged members of the national pantheon.318
A grave in the LMB is a testament to the honor and valor of the
person buried therein. The Marcos family has long sought a burial for
the dictator at this site for this exact reason.
The Court cannot order that a particular event be remembered in a
particular way, but it can negate an act that whimsically ignores legal
truths. It can invalidate the arbitrary distillation of the nation’s
collective memory into politically convenient snippets and moments of
alleged glory. The Court is empowered to do justice, and justice in this
case means preventing a whitewash of the sins of Marcos against the
Filipino people.
The burial of Marcos in the earth from whence he came is his right,
despite all that he did. However, his burial in the grave of heroes on
the impulse of one man would continue the desecration of other
G.R. No. 220598
GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
(First Division), Respondents
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN,, J.:
On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions
for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April
6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTSthe petitioners' respective
demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-
0174 as to the petitioners GLORIAMACAPAGAL-
ARROYO and BENIGNOAGUAS for insufficiency of
evidence; ORDERS the immediate release from detention of said
petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 1
On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman,
has moved for the reconsideration of the decision, submitting that:
I. THIS HONORABLE COURT'S GIVING DUE COURSE TO A
CERTIORARI ACTION ASSAILING AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER
DENYING DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE VIOLA TES RULE 119,
SECTION 23 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHICH PROVIDES
THAT AN ORDER DENYING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
SHALL NOT BE REVIEWABLE BY APPEAL OR BY
CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERRORS
WHICH AMOUNT TO A VIOLATION OR DEPRIVATION OF THE
STATE'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
A. THE DECISION REQUIRES ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS IN THE
PROSECUTION OF PLUNDER, VIZ. IDENTIFICATION OF THE
MAIN PLUNDERER AND PERSONAL BENEFIT TO
HIM/HER, BOTH OF WHICH ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THE TEXT
OF REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7080.
B. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS
NOT FULLY TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING BUT NOT
LIMITED TO THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE
CONFIDENTIAL/INTELLIGENCE FUND (CIF) DISBURSEMENT
PROCESS, QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE OF CO-MINGLING OF
FUNDSAND AGUAS' REPORTS TO THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
(COA) THAT BULK OF THE PHP365,997,915.00 WITHDRAWN
FROM THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE'S
(PCSO) CIF WERE DIVERTED TO THE ARROYO-HEADED
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.
C. ARROYO AND AGUAS, BY INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION,
IN CONSPIRACY WITH THEIR COACCUSED IN SB-12-CRM-0174,
COMMITTED PLUNDER VIA· A COMPLEX ILLEGAL SCHEME
WHICH DEFRAUDED PCSO IN HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF
PESOS.
D. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PLUNDER WERE
NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED BY THE PEOPLE SHOWS, BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT, THAT ARROYO, AGUAS AND THEIR COACCUSED IN
SB-12-CRM-0174 ARE GUILTY OF MALVERSATION.2
In contrast, the petitioners submit that the decision has effectively
barred the consideration and granting of the motion for
reconsideration of the State because doing so would amount to the
re-prosecution or revival of the charge against them despite their
acquittal, and would thereby violate the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy.
Petitioner Gloria M. Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) points out that the
State miserably failed to prove the corpus delicti of plunder; that the
Court correctly required the identification of the main plunderer as well
as personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury to
enable the successful prosecution of the crime of plunder; that the
State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in the
charge; that to sustain the case for malversation against her, in lieu of
plunder, would violate her right to be informed of the accusation
against her because the information did not necessarily include the
crime of malversation; and that even if the information did so, the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy already barred the
re-opening of the case for that purpose.
Petitioner Benigno B. Aguas echoes the contentions of Arroyo in
urging the Com1 to deny the motion for reconsideration.
In reply, the State avers that the prohibition against double jeopardy
does not apply because it was denied its day in court, thereby
rendering the decision void; that the Court should re-examine the
facts and pieces of evidence in order to find the petitioners guilty as
charged; and that the allegations of the information sufficiently
included all that was necessary to fully inform the petitioners of the
accusations against them.
Ruling of the Court
The Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit.
To start with, the State argues' that the consolidated petitions
for certiorari were improper remedies in light of Section 23, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court expressly prohibiting the review of the denial of
their demurrer prior to the judgment in the case either by appeal or
by certiorari; that the Court has thereby limited its own power, which
should necessarily prevent the giving of due course to the petitions
for certiorari, as well as the undoing of the order denying the
petitioners' demurrer to evidence; that the proper remedy under
the Rules of Court was for the petitioners to proceed to trial and to
present their evidence-in-chief thereat; and that even if there had
been grave abuse of discretion attending the denial, the
Court's certiorari powers should be exercised only upon the
petitioners' compliance with the stringent requirements of Rule 65,
particularly with the requirement that there be no plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, which they did not
establish.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, pertinently provides:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. – xxx
xxxx
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer
to evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by
appeal or by certiorari before judgment. (n)
The argument of the State, which is really a repetition of its earlier
submission, was squarely resolved in the decision, as follows:
The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions
for certiorari because the Sandiganbayan, as shall shortly be
demonstrated, gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
The special civil action for certiorari is generally not proper to assail
such an interlocutory order issued by the trial court because of the
availability of another remedy in the ordinary course of law. Moreover,
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that
"the order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or
by certiorari before judgment." It is not an insuperable obstacle to this
action, however, that the denial of the demurrers to evidence of the
petitioners was an interlocutory order that did not terminate the
proceedings, and the proper recourse of the demurring accused was
to go to trial, and that in case of their conviction they may then appeal
the conviction, and assign the denial as among the errors to be
reviewed. Indeed, it is doctrinal that the situations in which the writ
of certiorari may issue should not be limited, because to do so -
x x x would be to destroy its comprehensiveness and usefulness. So
wide is the discretion of the com1 that authority is not wanting to show
that certiorari is more discretionary than either prohibition
or mandamus. In the exercise of oursuperintending control over
other courts, we are to be guided by all the circumstances of
each particular case 'as the ends of justice may require.' So it is
that the writ will be granted where necessary to prevent a
substantial wrong or to do substantial justice.
The Constitution itself has imposed upon the Court and the other
courts of justice the duty to correct errors of jurisdiction as a result of
capricious, arbitrary, whimsical and despotic exercise of discretion by
expressly incorporating in Section 1 of Article VIII the following
provision:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The exercise of this power to
correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the
contrary or for the sake of the convenience of one side. This is
because the Court has the bounden constitutional duty to strike
down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it is
committed. Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character
and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the
petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy
of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. As we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the
trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it
capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the
absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment for plunder, and despite the absence of the factual
bases to expect a guilty verdict.3
We reiterate the foregoing resolution, and stress that the prohibition
contained in Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is not an
insuperable obstacle to the review by the Court of the denial of the
demurrer to evidence through certiorari. We have had many rulings to
that effect in the past. For instance, in Nicolas v. Sandiganbayan,4the
Court expressly ruled that the petition for certiorari was the proper
remedy to assail the denial of the demurrer to evidence that was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion or excess of jurisdiction, or
oppressive exercise of judicial authority.
Secondly, the State submits that its right to due process was violated
because the decision imposed additional elements for plunder that
neither ' Republic Act No. 7080 nor jurisprudence had theretofore
required, i.e., the identification of the main plunderer, and personal
benefit on the part of the accused committing the predicate crime of
raid on the public treasury. The State complains that it was not given
the opportunity to establish such additional elements; that the
imposition of new elements fu1iher amounted to judicial legislation in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; that the Court
nitpicked on the different infirmities of the information despite the
issue revolving only around the sufficiency of the evidence; and that it
established all the elements of plunder beyond reasonable doubt.
The State cites the plain meaning rule to highlight that the crime of
plunder did not require personal benefit on the part of the raider of the
public treasury. It insists that the definition of raids on the public
treasury, conformably with the plain meaning rule, is the taking of
public money through fraudulent or unlawful means, and such
definition does not require enjoyment or personal benefit on the part
of plunderer or on the part of any of his co-conspirators for them to be
convicted for plunder.
The submissions of the State are unfounded.
The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for
personal benefit in the predicate act of raids on the public
treasury have been written in R.A. No. 7080 itself as well as
embedded in pertinent jurisprudence. This we made clear in the
decision, as follows:
A perusal of the information suggests that what the Prosecution
sought to show was an implied conspiracy to commit plunder among
all of the accused on the basis of their collective actions prior to,
during and after the implied agreement. It is notable that the
Prosecution did not allege that the conspiracy among all of the
accused was by express agreement, or was a wheel conspiracy or a
chain conspiracy.
This was another fatal flaw of the Prosecution.
In its present version, under which the petitioners were charged,
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (Plunder Law) states:
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder: Penalties. - Any public
officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-
gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total
value of at least Fifty million pesos (₱50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of
the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,
the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all
ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit
or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State. [As Amended by
Section 12, Republic Act No. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)]
Section l(d) of Republic Act No. 7080 provides:
Section 1. Definition of terms. - As used in this Act, the term:
xxxx
d. "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business enterprise
or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of
the public officer concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares
of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or
other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking undue advantage of official positi0n, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice
The law on plunder requires that a particular public officer must
be identified as the one who amassed, acquired or accumulated
ill-gotten wealth because it plainly states that plunder is
committed by any public officer who, by himself or in connivance
with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity,
business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate
amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through
a combination or series of overt criminal acts as described in
Section l(d) hereof. Surely, the law requires in the criminal
charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be
a main plunderer and her co-conspirators, who may be members
of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordim1tes or other persons. In other words, the
allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the
information was appropriate because the main plunderer would
then be identified in either manner. Of course, implied
conspiracy could also identify the main plunderer, but that fact
must be properly alleged and duly proven by the Prosecution.
This interpretation is supported by Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, where
the Court explained the nature of the conspiracy charge and the
necessity for the main plunderer for whose benefit the amassment,
accumulation and acquisition was made, thus:
There is no denying the fact that the "plunder of an entire nation
resulting in material damage to the national economy" is made up of a
complex and manifold network of crimes. In the crime of plunder,
therefore, different parties may be united by a common purpose. In
the case at bar, the different accused and their different criminal acts
have a commonality - to help the former President amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the Amended
Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is
not that each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal
gambling, that each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise
tax, that each accused ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares
of Belle Corporation and receive commissions from such sale, nor that
each unjustly enriched himself from commissions, gifts and kickbacks;
rather, it is that each of them, by their individual acts, agreed to
participate, directly or indirectly, in the amassing, accumulation
and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for former President
Estrada. 5 [bold underscoring supplied for emphasis]
Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can
commit by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the
identification in the information of such public official as the main
plunderer among the several individuals thus charged is logically
necessary under the law itself. In particular reference to Criminal
Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, the individuals charged therein -
including the petitioners - were 10 public officials; hence, it was only
proper to identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10
accused who herself or himself had amassed, accumulated, or
acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total value of at least
₱50,000,000.00.
The phrase raids on the public treasury as used in Section 1 (d) of R.
A. No. 7080 is itself ambiguous. In order to ascertain the objective
meaning of the phrase, the act of raiding the public treasury cannot be
divided into parts. This is to differentiate the predicate act of raids on
the public treasury from other offenses involving property, like
robbery, theft, or estafa. Considering that R.A. No. 7080 does not
expressly define this predicate act, the Court has necessarily resorted
to statutory construction. In so doing, the Court did not adopt the
State's submission that personal benefit on the part of the accused
need not be alleged and shown because doing so would have
defeated the clear intent of the law itself,6 which was to punish the
amassing, accumulating, or acquiring of ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱150,000,000.00 by any
combination or series of acts of misappropriation, conversion, misuse,
or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury.
As the decision has observed, the rules of statutory construction as
well as the deliberations of Congress indicated the intent of Congress
to require personal benefit for the predicate act of raids on the public
treasury, viz.:
The phrase raids on the public treasury is found in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080, which provides:
Section l .Definition of Terms. – xxx
xxxx
d) Ill-gotten wealth means any asset, prope1iy, business enterprise or
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two
(2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of
public funds or raids on the public treasury;
xxxx
To discern the proper import of the phrase raids on the public
treasury, the key is to look at the accompanying
words: misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of
public funds. This process is conformable with the maxim of
statutory construction noscitur a sociis, by which the correct
construction of a particular word or phrase that is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings may be made
by considering the company of the words in which the word or
phrase is found or with which it is associated. Verily, a word or
phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases, and its meaning may, therefore, be modified
or restricted by the latter.
To convert connotes the act of using or disposing of another's
property as if it were one's own; to misappropriate means to own, to
take something for one's own benefit; misuse means "a good,
substance, privilege, or right used improperly, unforcsccably, or not as
intended;" and malversation occurs when "any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or
shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any
other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or
partially." The common thread that binds all the four terms together is
that the public officer used the property taken. Considering that raids
on the public treasury is in the company of the four other terms that
require the use of the property taken, the phrase raids on the public
treasury similarly requires such use of the property taken.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in contending that the
mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act
of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a
sociis, raids on the public treasury requires the raider to use the
property taken impliedly for his personal benefit.7
The Prosecution asserts that the Senate deliberations
removed personal benefit as a requirement for plunder. In not
requiring personal benefit, the Sandiganbayan quoted the following
exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tafiada, viz.:
Senator Enrile. The word here, Mr. President, "such public officer or
person who conspired or knowingly benefited". One does not have
to conspire or rescheme. The only element needed is that he
"knowingly benefited". A candidate for the Senate for instance, who
received a political contribution from a plunderer, knowing that the
contributor is a plunderer and therefore, he knowingly benefited from
the plunder, would he also suffer the penalty, Mr. President, for life
imprisonment?
Senator Tafiada. In the committee amendments, Mr. President, we
have deleted these lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5, on page 3. But, in a
way, Mr. President, it is good that the Gentleman is bringing out these
questions, I believe that under the examples he has given, the Court
will have to...
Senator Enrile. How about the wife, Mr. President, he may not agree
with the plunderer to plunder the country but because she is a dutiful
wife or a faithful husband, she has to keep her or his vow of fidelity to
the spouse. And, of course, she enjoys the benefits out of the plunder.
Would the Gentleman now impute to her or him the crime of plunder
simply because she or he knowingly benefited out of the fruits of the
plunder and, therefore, he must suffer or he must suffer the penalty of
life imprisonment?
The President. That was stricken out already in the Committee
amendment.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. Lines 1 to 4 and part of line 5
were stricken out in the Committee amendment. But, as I said, the
examples of the Minority Floor Leader are still worth spreading
the Record. And, I believe that in those examples, the Court will have
just to take into consideration all the other circumstances prevailing in
the case and the evidence that will be submitted.
The President. In any event, 'knowingly benefited' has already been
stricken off."
The exchanges between Senator Enrile and Senator Tañada reveal,
therefore, that what was removed from the coverage of the bill and the
final version that eventually became the law was a person who was
not the main plunderer or a co-conspirator, but one who personally
benefited from the plunderers' action. The requirement of personal
benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his co-conspirators by
virtue of their plunder was not removed.
As a result, not only did the Prosecution fail to show where the money
went but, more importantly, that GMA and Aguas had personally
benefited from the same. Hence, the Prosecution did not prove the
predicate act of raids on the public treasury beyond reasonable
doubt. 8
Thirdly, the State contends that the Court did not appreciate the
totality of its evidence, particularly the different irregularities
committed in the disbursement of the PCSO funds, i.e., the
commingling of funds, the non-compliance with LOI No. 1282, and the
unilateral approval of the disbursements. Such totality, coupled with
the fact of the petitioners' indispensable cooperation in the pilfering of
public funds, showed the existence of the conspiracy to commit
plunder among all of the accused.
The contention lacks basis.
As can be readily seen from the decision, the Court expressly granted
the petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence and dismissed the
plunder case against them for insufficiency of evidence because:
x x x the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to
evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite the
absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict. 9
Such disposition of the Court fully took into consideration all the
evidence adduced against the petitioners. We need not rehash our
review of the evidence thus adduced, for it is enough simply to stress
that the Prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of plunder -
that any or all of the accused public officials, particularly petitioner
Arroyo, had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth in
the aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
Fourthly, in accenting certain inadequacies of the allegations of the
information, the Court did not engage in purposeless nitpicking, and
did not digress from the primary task of determining the sufficiency of
the evidence presented by the State against the petitioners. What the
Court thereby intended to achieve was to highlight what would have
been relevant in the proper prosecution of plunder and thus enable
itself to discern and determine whether the evidence of guilt was
sufficient or not. In fact, the Court categorically clarified that in
discussing the essential need for the identification of the main
plunderer it was not harping on the sufficiency of the information, but
was only enabling itself to search for and to find the relevant proof that
unequivocally showed petitioner Arroyo as the "mastermind" - which
was how the Sandiganbayan had characterized her participation - in
the context of the implied conspiracy alleged in the information. But
the search came to naught, for the information contained nothing that
averred her commission of the overt act necessary to implicate her in
the supposed conspiracy to commit the crime of plunder. Indeed, the
Court assiduously searched for but did not find the sufficient
incriminatory evidence against the petitioners. Hence, the
Sandiganbayan capriciously and oppressively denied their demurrers
to evidence.
Fifthly, the State posits that it established at least a case for
malversation against the petitioners.
Malversation is defined and punished under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, which reads thusly:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. - Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate
the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take
such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation
does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if
the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not
exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than
six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos
but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds
the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the
penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the
amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the
property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by RA
1060).
The elements of malversation are that: (a) the offender is an
accountable public officer; (b) he/she is responsible for the
misappropriation of public funds or property through intent or
negligence; and (c) he/she has custody of and received such funds
and property by reason of his/her office. 10
The information in Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-017411 avers:
The undersigned Assistant Ombudsman and Graft Investigation and
Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuse
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ROSARIO C. URIARTE, SERGIO
O. VALENCIA, MANUEL L. MORATO, JOSE R. TARUC V,
RAYMUNDO T. ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, BENIGNO
B. AGUAS, REYNALDO A. VILLAR and NILDA B. PLARAS, of the
crime of PLUNDER, as defined by, and penalized under Section 2 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
committed, as follows:
That during the period from January 2008 to June 2010 or sometime
prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, then the President of the Philippines,
ROSARIO C. URIARTE, then General Manager and Vice Chairman,
SERGIO 0. VALENCIA, then Chairman of the Board of Directors,
MANUEL L. MORA TO, JOSE R. TARUC V, RAYMUNDO T.
ROQUERO, MA. FATIMA AS. VALDES, then members of the Board
of Directors, BENIGNO B. AGUAS, then Budget and Accounts
Manager, all of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO),
REYNALDO A. VILLAR, then Chairman, and NILDA B. PLARAS, then
Head of Intelligence/Confidential Fund Fraud Audit Unit, both of the
Commission on Audit, all public officers committing the offense in
relation to their respective offices and taking undue advantage of their
respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or
influence, conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally 'amass,,
accumulate and/or acquire directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE
MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN THOUSAND NINE
HUNDRED FIFTEEN PESOS (PHP365,997,915.00), more or less,
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or
similar schemes or means, described as follows:
(a) diverting in several instances, funds from the operating budget of
PCSO to its Confidential/Intelligence Fund that could be accessed
and withdrawn at any time with minimal restrictions, and converting,
misusing, and/or illegally conveying or transferring the proceeds
drawn from said fund in the aforementioned sum, also in several
instances, to themselves, in the guise of fictitious expenditures, for
their personal gain and benefit;
(b) raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several
instances, the above-mentioned amount from the
Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and or
unlawfully transferring or conveying the same into their possession
and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and
fictitious expenditures; and
(c) taking advantage of their respective official positions, authority,
relationships, connections or influence, in several instances, to
unjustly enrich themselves in the aforementioned sum, at the expense
of, and the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the
Republic of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
In thereby averring the predicate act of malversation, the State did not
sufficiently allege the aforementioned essential elements of
malversation in the information. The omission from the information of
factual details descriptive of the aforementioned elements of
malversation highlighted the insufficiency of the allegations.
Consequently, the State's position is entirely unfounded.
Lastly, the petitioners insist that the consideration and granting of the
motion for reconsideration of the State can amount to a violation of
the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because their
acquittal under the decision was a prior jeopardy within the context of
Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
The insistence of the petitioners is fully warranted. Indeed, the
consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration of the
State will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee
against double jeopardy.
The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12-
CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for insufficiency of
evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged
against them. In People v. Tan, 12the Court shows why:
In People v. Sandiganbayan, this Com1 explained the general rule
that the grant of a demurrer to evidence operates as an acquittal and
is, thus, final and unappealable, to wit:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at
bar, is ''filed after tile prosecution had rested its case," and when
the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of
the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the
accused." Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of
demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be
to place the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one
of acquittal, the case ends there.
xxxx
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions.
In People v. Laguio, Jr., this Court stated that the only instance when
double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion, thus:
... The only instance when double ,jeopardy will not attach is when the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous
acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must
clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to
a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice. 13
The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double
jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a new and independent
prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had
attached. 14 As such, every acquittal becomes final immediately upon
promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment.
With the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion
for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy because it would effectively
reopen the prosecution and subject the petitioners to a second
jeopardy despite their acquittal.
It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy provides to the accused three related
protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for
the same offense after acquittal; protection against a second
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection
against multiple punishments for the same offense. 15The rationale for
the three protections is expounded in United States v. Wilson: 16
The interests underlying these three protections arc quite
similar. When a defendant has been once convicted and
punished for a particular crime, principles of fairness and finality
require that he not be subjected to the possibility of further
punishment by being again tried or sentenced for the same
offense.Ex pa rte Lange, 18 Wall 163 (1874); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S.
176 (1889). When a defendant has been acquitted of an offense,
the Clause guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to
make repeated attempts to convict him,
"thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal,
and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that, even though
innocent, he may be found guilty."
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-188 (1957).
The policy of avoiding multiple trials has been regarded as so
important that exceptions to the principle have been only
grudgingly allowed. Initially, a new trial was thought to be
unavailable after appeal, whether requested by the prosecution
or the defendant. See United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287 (No.
15,204) (CCD Mass. 1834) (Story, J.). It was not until 1896 that it
was made clear that a defendant could seek a new trial after
conviction, even though the Government enjoyed no similar
right. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662. (Bold underscoring
supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.