Condition of Employment

Working Conditions and Rest Periods;

Hours of Work;
Employment Relationship;
Management Authority;
Essentiality of Employment Relationship;

Tests of Employment Relationship;

Economic Dependence Test: two-tiered test involving:

(1) the putative employer's power to control the employee with respect to
the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished; and
(2) the underlying economic realities of the activity or relationship.

Four fold test;

In determining the existence of employer-employee relationship, the
elements that are generally considered comprises the so-called
"four fold test" namely:
(a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (
(b) the payment of wages;
(c) the power of dismissal; and
(d) the employer's power to control the employee with respect to the means
and methods by which the work is to be accomplished.

Evidence of Employment: Identification Card, Vouchers, SSS

Registration, Memorandum

Kinds of Employees;
The provision merely distinguishes between two kinds of employees,
i.e., regular and casual.

General rights of Employer over conditions of Employment; 

Excluded Employees
Cases:

G.R. Nos. 174040-41 September 22, 2010

INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL, Petitioner,vs.
WATERFRONT INSULAR HOTEL DAVAO, Respondent.

FACTS: That sometime in 2000, respondent Waterfront sent DOLE Region XI

a Notice of Suspension of Operations (to be implemented for 6 months) due
to serious business losses.

During the period of suspension, DIHFEU-NFL, the recognized labor

organization of Waterfront, sent a proposed agreement to help the company
resume its business and for employees to keep their jobs. In the proposal,
the union agreed to lessen the then wage of employees and expressly
waived its rights to renegotiate the same, among others. Thus, in 2001,
respondent resumed its business operations. However, in 2002, the mother
federation of the union filed a complaint before the NCMV alleging that the
diminution of wage and benefits were done through an unlawful moa. The
MOA was also not signed and ratifies, as required in the union's cbl.

ISSUE: Whether or not the diminution of wage was unlawful

RULING: No. The labor code does not prohibit a union from offering and
agreeing to reduce wages and benefits of the employees. The right to free
collective bargaining, as stated in jurisprudence, includes the right to
suspend it.

Furthermore, although the MOA was not ratified in accordance to its cbl, the
same does not render it invalid. The record shows that after the MOA was
signed, the members of the union individually signed the reconfirmation of
employment which contained the new salary and benefits scheme.

SSS vs Ubana GR No. 200114

Benitez and Santa Fe Labor Union - FFW vs Santa Fe Moving and Relocation
Services GR No. 208163
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard vs BLR GR No. 21145
Samonite et al vs La Salle Greenhills Inc GR No. 199683
University of Immaculate Concepcion vs Office of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment GR No. 178085-179086
G.R. No. L-48645 January 7, 1987
"BROTHERHOOD" LABOR UNITY MOVEMENT, ET AL
vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA

FACTS: The petitioners are workers who have been employed at the San
Miguel Parola Glass Factory as “pahinantes” or “kargadors” for almost seven
years. They worked exclusively at the SMC plant, never having been
assigned to other companies or departments of San Miguel Corp, even when
the volume of work was at its minimum. Their work was neither regular nor
continuous, depending on the volume of bottles to be loaded and unloaded,
as well as the business activity of the company.

However, work exceeded the eight-hour day and sometimes, necessitated

work on Sundays and holidays. -for this, they were neither paid overtime
nor compensation.

Sometime in 1969, the workers organized and affiliated themselves with

Brotherhood Labor Unity Movement (BLUM). They wanted to be paid to
overtime and holiday pay.

They pressed the SMC management to hear their grievances. BLUM filed a
notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations in connection with the
dismissal of some of its members.

San Miguel refused to bargain with the union alleging that the workers are
not their employees but the employees of an independent labor contracting
firm, Guaranteed Labor Contractor.

The workers were then dismissed from their jobs and denied entrance to the
glass factory despite their regularly reporting for work. A complaint was filed
for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practices.

ISSUE : Whether or not there was employer-employee relationship between

the petitioner-workers of BLUM and San Miguel Corp.

HELD: Yes. In determining if there is an existence of the relationship, the

four-fold test was used by the Supreme Court which are a) the selection and
engagement of the employee, b) Payment of wages c) Power of dismissal,
and d) Control Test where the employer’s power to control the employee
with respect to the means and methods by which work is to be
accomplished.
In this case, the records fail to show that San Miguel entered into mere oral
agreements of employment with the workers. Considering the length of time
that the petitioners have worked with the company, there is justification to
conclude that they were engaged to perform activities necessary in the usual
business or trade. Despite past shutdowns of the glass plant, the workers
promptly returned to their jobs. The term of the petitioner’s employment
appears indefinite and the continuity and habituality of the petitioner’s work
bolsters the claim of an employee status.

As for the payment of the workers’ wages, the contention that the
independent contractors were paid a lump sum representing only the
salaries the workers where entitled to have no merit. The amount paid by
San Miguel to the contracting firm is no business expense or capital outlay of
the latter. What the contractor receives is a percentage from the total
earnings of all the workers plus an additional amount from the earnings of
each individual worker.

The power of dismissal by the employer was evident when the petitioners
had already been refused entry to the premises. It is apparent that the
closure of the warehouse was a ploy to get rid of the petitioners, who were
then agitating the company for reforms and benefits.

The inter-office memoranda submitted in evidence prove the company’s

control over the workers. That San Miguel has the power to recommend
penalties or dismissal is the strongest indication of the company’s right of
control over the workers as direct employer.
Sevilla vs Court of Appeals GR No. 44182-3

G.R. No. 64948 September 27, 1994

MANILA GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioner,vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FERMIN LLAMAR,
respondents.

FACTS: Three separate proceedings were all initiated by or on behalf of

herein private respondent Remberto Evio and his fellow caddies. These were
originally filed with the Social Security Commission (SSC) via petition of
seventeen (17) persons who styled themselves "Caddies of Manila Golf and
Country Club-PTCCEA (Philippine Technical, Clerical, Commercial Employees
Association) for coverage and availment of benefits under the Social Security
Act as amended.

The petition, docketed as SSC Case No. 5443, alleged in essence that
although the petitioners were employees of the Manila Golf and Country
Club, a domestic corporation, the latter had not registered them as such
with the SSS.

In the case before the SSC, the respondent Club filed answer praying for the
dismissal of the petition, alleging in substance that the petitioners, caddies
by occupation, were allowed into the Club premises to render services as
such to the individual members and guests playing the Club's golf course
and who themselves paid for such services; that as such caddies, the
petitioners were not subject to the direction and control of the Club as
regards the manner in which they performed their work; and hence, they
were not the Club's employees.

Subsequently, all but two of the seventeen petitioners of their own accord
withdrew their claim for social security coverage, avowedly coming to realize
that indeed there was no employment relationship between them and the
Club. The case continued, and was eventually adjudicated by the SSC after
protracted proceedings only as regards the two holdouts, Fermin Llamar and
Raymundo Jomok.

The Commission dismissed the petition for lack of merit, saying that the
caddy's fees were paid by the golf players themselves and not by respondent
club. While respondent club promulgates rules and regulations on the
assignment, deportment and conduct of caddies the same are designed to
impose personal discipline among the caddies but not to direct or conduct
their actual work. And that in fact, a golf player is at liberty to choose a
caddy of his preference regardless of the respondent club's group rotation
system and has the discretion on whether or not to pay a caddy. Quoting the
SC, the Commission ruled that in the determination of the existence of an
employer-employee relationship, the "control test" shall be considered
decisive.

An appeal against SSC’s decision in claiming that there was the caddies were
not employees of Manila Golf Country Club, was taken to the Intermediate
appellate Court by the union representing Llamar and Jomok. Months before
the decision, Jomok dismissed his appeal at his own instance, leaving Llamar
the lone appellant.

Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision, reversing SSC’s findings

after finding out that the country club had control over the caddies in the
following circumstances:

the promulgation of no less than twenty-four (24) rules and regulations just
about every aspect of the conduct that the caddy must observe, or avoid,
when serving as such, any violation of any which could subject him to
disciplinary action, which may include suspending or cutting off his access to
the club premises;

the devising and enforcement of a group rotation system whereby a caddy is

assigned a number which designates his turn to serve a player;

the club's "suggesting" the rate of fees payable to the caddies.

Manila Gold filed a petition for certiorari to SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not persons rendering caddying services for members of

golf clubs and their guests in said clubs' courses or premises are the
employees of such clubs and therefore within the compulsory coverage of
the Social Security System (SSS)

HELD: NO. The caddies are not employees of the club.

As long as it is, the list made in the appealed decision detailing the various
matters of conduct, dress, language, etc. covered by the petitioner's
regulations, does not, in the mind of the Court, so circumscribe the actions
or judgment of the caddies concerned as to leave them little or no freedom
of choice whatsoever in the manner of carrying out their services. In the
very nature of things, caddies must submit to some supervision of their
conduct while enjoying the privilege of pursuing their occupation within the
premises and grounds of whatever club they do their work in. For all that is
made to appear, they work for the club to which they attach themselves on
sufference but, on the other hand, also without having to observe any
working hours, free to leave anytime they please, to stay away for as
long they like. It is not pretended that if found remiss in the
observance of said rules, any discipline may be meted them beyond
barring them from the premises which, it may be supposed, the Club
may do in any case even absent any breach of the rules, and without
violating any right to work on their part. All these considerations
clash frontally with the concept of employment.

It can happen that a caddy who has rendered services to a player on one
day may still find sufficient time to work elsewhere. Under such
circumstances, he may then leave the premises of petitioner and go to such
other place of work that he wishes. Or a caddy who is on call for a particular
day may deliberately absent himself if he has more profitable caddying, or
another, engagement in some other place. These are things beyond
petitioner's control and for which it imposes no direct sanctions on the
caddies. . . .”
DY KEH BENG, petitioner, vs. INTERNATIONAL LABOR and MARINE
UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. No. L-32245 May 25, 1979

FACTS: Petitioner, Dy Keh Beng, proprietor of basket factory, was charged

with ULP for discriminatory acts defined underSec 4(a), subparagraph (1 &
4), R.A. No. 875 by dismissing on September 28-29, 1960, respectively,
Carlos N. Solanoand Ricardo Tudla for their union activities.

After PI was conducted, a case was filed in the CIR for in behalf of the ILMUP
and two of its members, Solano and Tudla. Dy Keh Beng contended that he
did not know Tudla and that Solano was not his employee because the
latter came tothe establishment only when there was work which he did on
pakiaw basis. According to Dy Keh Beng, Solano was not his employee for
the following reasons:
(1) Solano never stayed long enough at Dy’s establishment;
(2) Solano had to leave as soon as he was through with the order given
him by Dy;
(3) When there were no orders needing his services there was nothing for
him to do;
(4) When orders came to the shop that his regular workers could not fill it
was then that Dy went to his address in Caloocan and fetched him for
these orders; and
(5) Solano's work with Dy's establishment was not continuous.

According to petitioner, these facts show that respondents Solano and Tudla
are only piece workers, not employees under Republic Act 875, where an
employee is referred to as shall include any employee and shag not be
limited to the employee of a particular employer unless the act explicitly
states otherwise and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a
consequence of, or in connection with any current labor dispute or because
of any unfair labor practice and who has not obtained any other
substantially equivalent and regular employment. while an employer
includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or
indirectly but shall not include any labor organization (otherwise than when
acting as an employer) or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of
such labor organization. Petitioner also contends that the private
respondents "did not meet the control test in the fight of the ... definition of
the terms employer and employee, because there was no evidence to show
that petitioner had the right to direct the manner and method of
respondent's work.
He points to the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. v. Nieves Baens del
Rosario, et al.,L-13130, October 31, 1959, where the Court ruled that:

The test ... of the existence of employee and employer relationship is

whether there is an understanding between the parties that one is to render

personal services to or for the benefit of the other and recognition by them
of the right of one to order and control the other in the performance of the
work and to direct the manner and method ofits performance.

The CIR found that there existed an employee-employer relationship

between Dy Keh Beng and complainants Tudla andSolano, although Solano
was admitted to have worked on piece basis.Hence, this petition for
certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not an employee employer relation existed between

petitioner Dy Keh Beng and the respondentsSolano and Tudla

HELD: The Court also noted the decision of Justice Paras in the case of
“Sunrise Coconut Products Co. Vs. CIR (83 Phil 518, 523)that “judicial
notice of the fact that the so-called "pakyaw" system mentioned in this case
as generally practiced in our country, is, in fact, a labor contract-between
employers and employees, between capitalists and laborers.”

With regard to the control test the SC said that “It should be borne in mind
that the control test calls merely for theexistence of the right to control the
manner of doing the work, not the actual exercise of the right.” Considering
the findingby the Hearing Examiner that the establishment of Dy Keh Beng is
"engaged in the manufacture of baskets known askaing, it is natural to
expect that those working under Dy would have to observe, among others,
Dy's requirements of sizeand quality of the kaing. Some control would
necessarily be exercised by Dy as the making of the kaing would be
subjectto Dy's specifications. Parenthetically, since the work on the baskets
is done at Dy's establishments, it can be inferred thatthe proprietor Dy could
easily exercise control on the men he employed.

The petition was dismissed. The Court affirmed the decision of the CIR

Angelina Francisco vs NLRC GR No. 170087

Domasig vs NLRC GR No. 118101
Flores et al vs Nuestra GR No. 66890
Opulencia Ice Plant vs NLRC GR No. 98368
Labor Congress of the Phil vs NLRC GR No. 123938
Paguio vs NLRC, GR No. 147816
Villamaria vs CA et al GR No. 165881
Makati Habersahery Inc vs NLRC GR No. 83380-81
Maraguinot and P. Enero vs NLRC et al and Viva Films GR No. 120969
Orlando Fram Growers vs NLRC GR No. 129076
San Miguel Brewere Sales vs Ople GR No. 53615
Phil Telegraph and Telephone Co vs NLRC GR No. 118978
National Sugar Refineries Corp vs NLRC GR No. 101761
Penaranda vs Baganga Plywood Corp et al GR No. 159577
San Miguel Brewery vs Democratic Labor Organization GR No. L-18353