Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 91158 May 8, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FELIPE SANGIL y VELISARIO, respondent.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Gil Roberto L. Zerrudo for respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUlNO, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision dated September 28, 1989, of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 15, convicting the appellant of the crime of rape.

The trial court's recital of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense and its findings of fact are
reproduced hereunder:

The victim-complainant Joselyn Sangil, a 19-year old lass testified that one midnight of September,
1983 (she was only 13 years old then), she was awaken by hands taking off her panty. She saw that it
was her father removing her panty. She tried to push her father away but her father was strong besides
he threatened her that he (father-accused) will kill her if she (witness-victim) will not submit to his
advances. Her father-accused was able to deflower her because of his threat. Even though they were all
sleeping in the same room (with her parents and brothers and sisters), she could not shout for help because of
fear. Being a virgin, she bled when her father thrust his penis into her vagina. After raping her, her father left
and returned to his own place to sleep. And then again in November 1984, her father raped her again and
just like the other time he (father) threatened to kill her it she would tell anyone about it. It was after her
sister Alicia became pregnant –– that she reported the incident to the police authorities. Alicia told her that it
was also their father who made her pregnant. During the confrontation with her sisters and mother, Araceli
and Lourdes also confessed that they also have been raped by the accused, and it was then when they
decided to file a complaint against their father-accused. While it is true that her father left to work in Saudi
Arabia in 1982, he returned on June 1983. He left again in 1984 and only stayed abroad for 6 months. She
did not see and know when her other 3 sisters were raped by their father. She was only told of this matter
during their confrontations (sessions). In fact had her sister Alicia did not become pregnant the fact that their
father raped them would not be revealed. She executed a written statement to this effect (Exh. A). She was
present when Dra. Fe Mesina prepared her Medical Report after examining her and her sisters, she was
emphatic about not shouting and seeking help when her father abused her because of the threats of her father.
She knows her father was very cruel and many times mauled her and her brothers and sisters in the past.

Dra. Fe Mesina, the Municipal Health Office of Calumpit, Bulacan, for the past 23 years, testified that on
January 27, 1989 she received a request (Exh. D) for medical examinations of 4 Sangil sisters including
Joselyn Sangil (complainant-victim in this case) for the alleged rape from the Police Station of Calumpit,
Bulacan. She conducted physical examination on the four (4) Sangil sisters and found out that the
subjects' physical virginity has been long lost before the said examination (TSN, 8-28-89, pp. 5 & 6) so
that she issued her own medical certification (Exh. E). The hymenal lacerations could have been inflicted
for more than a month or years before the date of examination. Alicia Sangil was pregnant when she examined
her and she (Alicia) gave birth on April 3, 1989 (Exh. F). Her patient told her that the author of her pregnancy
was their father (TSN, 8-28-89, p. 8). She likewise testified that a total laceration of the hymen can be caused
by sexual intercourse and all of the Sangil's sisters suffered total lacerations of their hymen. The fact remains
that the four Sangil sisters had been impregnated.

When Araceli Sangil was placed on the stand, she stated that in January, 1989 her sister Alicia confessed to
them that her pregnancy was authored by their father Felipe Sangil. She likewise learned that her other sisters
Joselyn and Lourdes were also raped by their father. She was so angry with her father. (TSN, 8-28-89, p. 17.)

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Q: Why did you get angry?

A: I got angry with him because I learned that it was not only me who was raped by him but also my sisters.

Q: Who were the other sisters of yours who were also raped by your father?

A: Alicia, Joselyn and Lourdes, sir.

She further stated that Joselyn was raped on September 1983 and November 1984. She, herself was ravished
by Felipe on June and August 1983. When her mother learned of this incidents, she got mad and when she
confronted her father about it, her father admitted the same. They did not file any complaint right away and
waited for their father either to leave their house or to ask for forgiveness either which he (accused) did not do
instead he got angry with them so that they were forced to file their complaint. After her father was arrested
and incarcerated, he (accused) wrote them letters of forgiveness (Exhs. G to G-4). She added that she was
raped 2 times in 1984, 2 times in 1985. She could not fight back nor complain because her father was very
cruel, although he does not drink, smoke or gamble. The first time that her father raped her she was hurt,
although she tried to ward him off he was still able to insert his penis inside her vagina. For two (2) times her
father poked a knife at her neck so that he was able to abuse her. All these raping incidents happened at the
place where her brothers and sisters were likewise sleeping.

For the defense, Lucia Baltazar testified that she is the mother of Felipe Sangil, the accused in this case and
the grandmother of Joselyn Sangil, the victim-complainant. In the past, her daughter-in-law will consult her on
whatever happened in their house. The matter of this case filed by her granddaughters against her son Felipe,
was never related to her. She just remembered one day, a long time ago, her daughter-in-law told her that one
of her (daughter-in-law) daughters was so mad that she would kill her father. When she (witness) confronted
this granddaughter, the latter remained mummed (sic) about it and told her nothing. She got sick when she
learned that his (sic) son Felipe was arrested, jailed and sentenced by a court, she tried to talk to her
granddaughters to settle the matter but she was refused.

Accused Felipe Sangil on the stand denied all allegations of the prosecution's witnesses. The only
reason why his daughters will complain against him was because of his cruelty to them. He admitted
being cruel to his children because of their hard headedness and their refusal to follow his orders. He
further stated that every time he and his wife would make love they would go to the kitchen to do it. He was
surprised when he was arrested and sent to jail. He asked why and was informed by the policemen that his
daughters filed a complaint against him. He admitted being cruel to his children especially when they do not
follow his orders. He boxes and even kicked them. The only reason he could think of why his daughters will file
a case against him was because for a long time now, his mother-in-law would like him to leave his house and
the land. He likewise denied siring the baby of his daughter Alicia. (TSN, 9-18-89, p. 8.)

Q: What you are telling the Court was that the husband of Corazon was the father of the child not you?

A: I could not sure that is my baby or that is the baby of the tricycle boy because I ordered her 3 times not to
ride on that tricycle but instead this Alicia Sangil told me that "Hayaan mo Ama gagawin ko ang iniisip mong
masama sa akin."

He likewise admitted having written letter to Araceli (Exh. G). He asked forgiveness for maltreating them.

In the assessment of the evidences presented by both the prosecution and the defense in this case, the Court
finds that the scale of justice titled in favor of the prosecution by proof beyond reasonable doubt, considering
the following:

A young girl of 19, a student and who is not known to be a woman of loose morals, would not falsely impute
the offense of rape against the accused (who is her father). It is hardly probable that she will, and can much
less fabricate matters and thereby undergo the travails of a public trial, exposing herself to humiliation and
embarrassment by unravelling nasty matters against her virginity, by lodging against the accused so grave and
serious charge, if not true. (Pp. vs. Caluba, G.R. No. 38691, 19 Feb. 86, Second Division, Cuevas, J.)

Even if the complainant-victim had only filed this case five (5) to six (6) years after the complaint incidents
(when she was only 13 years when this happened) — one should not expect a thirteen year old girl who is
being sexually assaulted to act like an adult or like a mature and experienced woman who would know what to
do under such difficult circumstances and who would have the courage and intelligence to disregard a threat
on her life and the members of her family and complain immediately that she had been forcibly deflowered. It is
no uncommon for young girls to conceal for sometime the assaults on their virtue because of the rapist's threat
on their lives (P. vs. Ibaloy Yakap, G.R. No. 66010-12, 31 July 86, Second Division, Gutierrez, Jr., J.) and more
particularly the culprit is their own cruel and violent father.
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Furthermore, it is hard to believe that an unmarried teenager, student would endure the shame and
embarrassment of being publicly known that she had been ravished and would undergo the attendant
difficulties of a court proceeding if she and her family were not sincerely and strongly motivated by a common
desire to obtain retribution against the person who grieviously wronged them. (P. vs. Manalo, G.R. No 49810,
13 Oct. 86, Second Division, Alampay, J.)

More importantly, the accused himself admitted while on the witness stand that "he was not sure whether the
child of his pregnant daughter, who also filed a rape charged against him, was his or that of Corazon's
husband 's (TSN, Sept. 18, 1989, p. 8).

There is no doubt to the mind of the Court that accused Felipe Sangil committed rape upon his own daughter
Joselyn Sangil.

The accused Felipe Sangil who become (sic) an outcast in his own family, his four daughters had charged him
with rape, a daughter named Alicia had given birth and declared his grandchild as his own, an incest
relationship, pure and simple. During the trial, the Court reminded the daughter Joselyn that her father might
be sentenced or incarcerated to a life imprisonment, and despite the warning given by the Court, the daughter
was adamant and refused to be merciful. There is no doubt on the mind of the Court that accused had raped
his daughters, a mere denial would not extricate him from this predicament (charges), it has been ruled that
"No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and ravished
unless that is the Truth. It is her natural instinct to protect her honor." Much more the offender is her father, the
ignomony of this fact cannot be erased or iradicated (sic) by silence. While it took this complainant Joselyn to
confess her experience only after the lapse of more than five years and only after her sister became pregnant
and devulge (sic) the true mysterious facts of their family life. The abuse of confidence and relationship must
be taken into consideration of (sic) the gravity of the offense committed. Imagine a father exercising coital
relationship with his four daughters, this is shocking to the conscience. (pp. 49-52, Original Record.)

On January 29, 1989, Joselyn gave and signed a sworn statement before Pfc. De la Cruz, and Pat. R. Sabino
of the Municipal Police of Calumpit, Bulacan, accusing her father of having raped her twice: the first time in
September 1983 and the second time in November 1984. The pertinent portion of her "Sinumpaang Salaysay"
are quoted below:

T Bakit ka naririto ngayon sa himpilan ng Pulisya ng Calumpit, Bulacan?

S Ihahabla ko po ang aking ama si Felipe Sangil.

T Bakit mo naman siya ihahabla?

B Dahil sinira po niya ang aming puri.

T Sino-sino ba ang sinira ang puri ng iyong ama?

S Ako po, at yong tatlo kong mga kapatid sina sina Alicia, Araceli, at Lourdes.

T Kailan ba nangyari ang sinasabi mong sinira ng iyong ama ang iyong puri at saan lugar?

S Noon pong Setyembre 1983 sa aming bahay sa Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan.

T Matagal na palang nangyari bakit naman ngayon ka lang nagsusumbong dito sa Pulis?

S Kasi po tinatakot po ako at binabantaan na papatayin pag kami ay nagsumbong kahit kanino.

T Papano ba ang ginawa sa iyo ng iyong ama sa pagkuha ng iyong puri na sinasabi mo?

S Noon po ako ay natutulog at ako ay inalisan ng panty ng aking ama at binantaang papatayin pag hindi ako
pumayag sa kanyang kagustuhan, kaya ang ginawa ko po ay umiyak na lang ako at nagawa na po ng aking
ama ang kanyang gusto.

T Ano ba ang naramdaman mo ng gawan ka ng iyong amang si Felipe Sangil ang bagay na iyon?

S Nasaktan po ako.

T May pinagsumbungan ka ba na ibang tao sa pangyayaring ito sa iyo?

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S Wala po, pero ngayon ay ipinagtapat ko sa aking ina ang ginawa sa akin ng aking ama si Felipe Sangil.

T Ilang beses ba ginawa sa iyo ng iyong ama ang pagpugay sa iyong puri?

S Dalawang beses po, iyong isa ay noong Nobiembre 1984 sa amin ding bahay na ganoon ding pamamaraan.

T Sinabi mo pati ang iyong mga kapatid ay ginagawan din ng ganoon ng iyong amang si Felipe Sangil nakikita
mo ba pag isinasagawa ng iyong ama ang ganoong bagay?

S Hindi po, pero nagkausap-usap po kaming magkakapatid at nagkatapatan kami sa ginagawa sa amin ng
aming ama. (p. 18, Original Record.)

On February 2, 1989, she signed the following criminal complaint in English before Municipal Judge Celerina
B. Caluag who, after conducting a preliminary examination of the charge, issued a warrant for the arrest of the
accused:

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

The undersigned complainant, on oath, accuses Felipe Sangil of the crime of Rape committed as follows:

That on or about month of November 1984, at barangay Balungao, Municipality of Calumpit, Province of
Bulacan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused with lewd designs
qualified by force and intimidation and at knife point did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with Joselyn Sangil, 18 yrs. old, single, his daughter against the will
and consent of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW:

JOSELYN SANGIL
(Complainant).

(p. 3, Original Record.)

On March 31, 1989, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfredo L. Geronimo filed the following information against
the appellant:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, on complaint of the offended party Joselyn Sangil y
Villanueva accuses Felipe Sangil y Velisario of the crime of rape, penalized under the provisions or Article 335
of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about the month of September 1983, in the municipality of Calumpit, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force,
violence and intimidation, and taking advantage of his ascendancy, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Joselyn Sangil y Villanueva his own daughter, of 13 years of age,
against her will and in their house or dwelling. (p. 4, Rollo.)

After trial, judgment was rendered by Judge Carlos C. Ofilada on September 28, 1989, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Felipe Sangil y Velisario guilty by proof beyond reasonable
doubt and in accordance with Art. 335 Revised Penal Code, he as hereby sentenced to suffer life
imprisonment. (The crime of Rape shall be punished by Reclusion Perpetua), he is likewise ordered to
pay the offended party the sum of P30,000.00 as damages and may costs. (pp. 52-53, Record.)

In due time, the aroused appealed to this Court, assailing only the jurisdiction of the trial court but none of its
findings on the criminal liability of the accused. The lone assignment of error alleges that:

The trial court erred in hearing and deciding this case when it never acquired jurisdiction over the same due to
the lack of a proper complaint from the offended party charging accused-appellant of rape on September 1983.
(p. 69, Rollo.)

The appeal is anchored on Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

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Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness ––

xxx xxx xxx

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any
case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be.
(Emphasis supplied.)

and which is reproduced in Sec. 4, par. 3, Rule 110 of the 1964 Rules of Court and Sec. 5, Rule 110 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Since the criminal complaint which Joselyn signed on February 2, 1989 accused her father of having
raped her in November 1984, the defense contends that he could not be prosecuted for, and the trial
court had no jurisdiction to convict him of having raped his daughter in September 1983, as alleged in
the information.

The appeal is bereft of merit.

The jurisdictional requirement that a prosecution for rape should be commenced by a complaint of the
aggrieved party, by her parents, grandparents or guardian, pursuant to Sec. 5, Par. 3 of Rule 110 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, was satisfied in this case.

The information was based on the first complaint which Joselyn lodged with the Municipal Police of
Calumpit, Bulacan, and which is contained in her Sinumpaang Salaysay dated January 27, 1989. in that
"sworn" statement (it was not actually sworn to before the Municipal Judge although the
proper jurat was typewritten at the bottom of the "salaysay") she categorically stated in Tagalog, that
she was raped twice by her father –– the first time in September 1983 and the second time in November
1984.

T Kailan ba nangyari and sinasabi mong sinira ng iyong ama ang iyong puri at saan lugar?

S Noon pong Setyembre 1983 sa aming bahay sa Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan.

x x x           x x x          x x x

T Ilang beses ba ginawa sa iyo ng iyong ama ang pagpugay sa iyong puri?

S Dalawang beses po, yong isa ay noong Nobiembre 1984 sa amin ding bahay na ganoon ding pamamaraan.
(p. 18, Original Record.)

That accusation was repeated by Joselyn during the trial proper:

Fiscal:

Q. Do you recall of any sad incident that happened sometime in that month of September, 1983?

A. There was ma'm.

Court: What time did it happen?

Witness:

A. Night sir, about midnight of September, 1983, sir.

Fiscal:

Q. Will you tell us what was that sad incident that happened that night of September, 1983?

A. Ginawan ako ng masama ng aking ama.

Q. What do you mean by that "ginawan ng masama ng iyong ama?"

5
A. Ni rape po, ginahasa po, ng aking ama.

Q. What is the name of your father?

A. Felipe Sangil, ma'm.

Q. Is this Felipe Sangil the same accused in this case?

A. Yes, ma'm.

Q. Will you point to him if he is around?

Interpreter: Witness pointed to a man who answered by the name Felipe Sangil.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q. Was this incident repeated?

A. Yes, ma'm.

Q. When?

A. November, 1984.

Court: Over a year after?

A. Yes. sir.

Fiscal:

Q. What happened in that incident?

A. It is just the same as first time.

Q. And just the same you did not report this incident to anybody?

A. No, ma'm.

Q. Why?

A. He is going to kill me. (pp. 3-20, tsn, Aug. 18, 1989.)

The phrase "complaint filed by the offended party" as used in Section 5, Rule 110 showed be given a liberal or
loose interpretation meaning a "charge, allegation, grievance, accusation or denunciation" (p.158, West's Legal
Thesaurus Dictionary) –– rather than a strict legal construction, for more often than not the attended party who
files it is unschooled in the law. The purpose of the complaint in Section 5, Rule 110, is merely to initiate or
commence the prosecution of the accused. The victim's "sinumpaang salaysay" which was prepared in the
vernacular, and the "complaint" in English, which must have been prepared for her by someone else,
complement each other, when read together, and satisfy the legal definition of a "complainant" as "a sworn
statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended
party . . ." (Sec. 3, Rule 110, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The Court is not inclined to disregard her
salaysay (complaint) for mere lack of an oath for that would amount to suppressing her anguished cry for
redress.

The trial judge's conviction ("there is no doubt in the mind of the court") "that the accused had raped his
daughters" is a finding that merits the highest respect of this Court for he had unmatched opportunity, denied
to this Court, to hear the witnesses testify, assess their credibility, and observe their demeanor under
questioning (People vs. Francisco, 182 SCRA 305; People vs. Besa, 183 SCRA 533). We have no hesitancy in
sustaining the conviction of the accused.

However, the correct penalty for the crime of rape is reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment. Trial courts
should be careful in using the proper designation of the penalties prescribed by the statutes to avoid
misunderstanding as to the scope and consequences of the penalties (People vs. Ansing, 190 SCRA 374;
People vs. Dekingco, 189 SCRA 512; People vs. Manalansan, 189 SCRA 619). The Revised Penal Code has
6
its own table of penalties, which some special laws do not follow strictly. Life imprisonment is not synonymous
with reclusion perpetua for the latter carries the accessory penalties prescribed in Article 41 of the Revised
Penal Code, which life imprisonment does not (People vs. Del Pilar, 188 SCRA 37).

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the trial court, we hereby AFFIRM it with
modification of the imposable penalty for the crime of rape which is reclusion perpetua, with the accessory
penalties provided by law. The appellant in further ordered to pay the offended party damages in the increased
sum of P40,000 on view of the unnatural, heinous and repulsive nature of the crime committed. Costs against
the appellant, Felipe Sangil y Velisario.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 122274 July 31, 1996

SUSAN V. LLENES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ISAIAS P. DICDICAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 11, HON. AMADO B.
BAJARIAS, SR., Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Branch 7, and VIVIAN G. GINETE, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

The key issue raised in this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is whether the
filing with the office of the Ombudsman of a complaint against a government official for grave oral defamation
interrupts the period of prescription of such offense.

We find this issue to be important enough to merit our attention. We thus resolved to give due course to the
petition, consider the private respondent's comment on the petition1 as the answer thereto, and decide it on the
basis of the pleadings which have sufficiently discussed the issue.

The factual and procedural antecedents are not disputed.

On 13 October 1993, private respondent Vivian G. Ginete, then officer-in-charge of the Physical Education and
School Sports (PESS) Division of the Regional Office of Region VII in Cebu City of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
(hereinafter Ombudsman-Visayas) a complaint for grave oral defamation 2 allegedly committed on 23
September 1993 by petitioner Susan V. Llenes, an Education Supervisor II of the same Regional Office.

The petitioner was required to file a counter-affidavit pursuant to Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, but she failed to do so.

In his resolution of 15 March 1994,3 Antonio B. Yap, Graft Investigation Officer I of the said office,
recommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cebu City for the filing of the
necessary information against the petitioner. This resolution was approved by the Deputy Ombudsman-
Visayas.

On 28 March 1994, the City Prosecutor of Cebu City filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Cebu City an
information4 for grave oral defamation against the petitioner. This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 35684-R
and assigned to Branch 7 thereof.

On 30 May 1994, the petitioner filed a motion to quash 5 the information on the ground that the "criminal action
or liability" has been extinguished. She contended that under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense
7
of grave oral defamation prescribes in 6 months and that since the information was filed only on 28 March
1994, or 186 days or 6 months and 6 days after its alleged commission, the crime had then already prescribed.
In support thereof, she cited the decision in "Zalderia 6 vs. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992, 211
SCRA 277," wherein this Court ruled that the filing of an information at the fiscal's office will not stop the
running of the prescriptive period for crimes.

In her opposition,7 the private respondent cited Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of the Court which
provides, inter alia, that for offense not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases and which
fall within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, the filing of the complaint
directly with the said court or with the fiscal's office interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.
The filing of the complaint by the private respondent with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Visayas was
equivalent to the filing of a complaint with the fiscal's (now prosecutor's) office under said Section 1 pursuant to
its powers under Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989. The
private respondent further claimed that Zaldivia is inapplicable because it involves an offense covered by the
rule on summary procedure and it explicitly stated that Section 1 of Rule 110 excludes cases covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Municipal Trial Court, per public respondent Judge Bajarias, denied the motion to quash in the order of 18
July 1994.8 It fully agreed with the stand of the private respondent.

Her motion to reconsider9 the above order having been denied on 29 November 1994,10 the petitioner filed with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu a special civil action for certiorari,11 which was docketed therein as Civil
Case No. CEB-16988. The case was assigned to Branch 11.

In its decision of 3 July 1995,12 the RTC, per public respondent Judge Isaias P. Dicdican, affirmed the
challenged orders of Judge Bajarias of 18 July 1994 and 29 November 1994. It ruled that the order denying the
motion to quash is interlocutory and that the petitioner's remedy, per Acharon vs. Purisima,13 reiterated
in People vs. Bans,14 was to go to trial without prejudice on her part to reiterate the special defense she had
invoked in her motion to quash and, if after trial on the merits an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
therefrom in the manner authorized by law. Besides, the petitioner has not satisfactorily and convincingly
shown that Judge Bajarias has acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders considering that the
ground invoked by her does not appear to be indubitable. And even assuming that the MTC erred in venturing
an opinion that the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman is equivalent to the filing of a
complaint with the fiscal's office, such error is merely one of judgment. For, there is no decided case on the
matter, and the substantive laws have not clearly stated as to what bodies or agencies of government should
complaints or informations be filed in order that the period of prescription of crimes or offenses should be
considered interrupted. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code simply states that the prescriptive period shall be
interrupted by the "filing of the complaint or information" and has not specified further where such complaint or
information should be filed.

Since the Regional Trial Court denied her motion to reconsider15 the decision in the order of 23 August
1995,16 the petitioner filed this special civil action wherein she reiterates the arguments she adduced before the
two courts below. The private respondent likewise did nothing more in her responsive pleading than reiterate
what she had raised before the said courts.

The basic substantive laws on prescription of offense are Article 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code for
offenses punished thereunder, and Act No. 3326, as amended, for those penalized by special laws. Under
Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of grave oral defamation, which is the subject of the
information in Criminal Case No. 35684-R of the MTC of Cebu, prescribes in 6 months. Since Article 13 of the
Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood to be of 30 days, then grave
oral defamation prescribes in 180 days.17 Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.

In the instant case, the alleged defamatory words were directly uttered in the presence of the offended party on
23 September 1993. Hence, the prescriptive period for the offense started to run on that date.

The matter of interruption of the prescriptive period due to the filing of the complaint or information had been
the subject of conflicting decisions of this Court. In People vs. Tayco,18 People vs. Del Rosario,19 and People
8
vs. Coquia,20 this Court held that it is the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court,  viz. the
court having jurisdiction over the crime, which interrupts the running of the period of prescription. On the other
hand, in the first case of People vs. Olarte,21 a case for libel, this Court held that the filing of the complaint with
the justice of the peace court even for preliminary investigation purposes only interrupts the running of the
statute of limitations.

However, the decision of 28 February 1967 of this Court in the second case of People vs. Olarte 22 resolved
once and for all what should be the doctrine, viz., that the filing of the complaint with the municipal trial court
even for purposes of preliminary investigation only suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Thus:

Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two lines of decisions following
differing criteria in determining whether prescription of crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents
holds that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace (now municipal judge) does interrupt the
course of the prescriptive term: People vs. Olarte, L-13027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited therein; People vs.
Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. Another series of decisions declares
that to produce interruption the complaint or information must have been filed in the proper court that has
jurisdiction to try the case on its merits: People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs.
Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court has
reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is,
and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing on the complaint in the Municipal
Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt
the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information
cannot try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: First, the text of Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint
or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step
of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his
part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

And it is no argument that Article 91 also expresses that the interrupted prescription "shall commence to run
again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted", thereby indicating
that the court in which the complaint or information is filed must have power to acquit or convict the accused.
Precisely, the trial on the merits usually terminates in conviction or acquittal, not otherwise. But it is in the court
conducting a preliminary investigation where the proceedings may terminate without conviction or acquittal, if
the court should discharge the accused because no prima facie case has been shown.

Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the doctrine of the cases of People vs. Del
Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; and People vs. Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.

Then, in its decision of 30 May 1983 in Francisco vs. Court of

Appeals,23 this Court not only reiterated Olarte of 1967 but also broadened its scope by holding that the filing of
the complaint in the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation also suspends the running of the prescriptive
period. Thus:

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that . . . .

Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court in People vs. Tayco held that the complaint or information
referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court and not the denuncia or accusation lodged by
the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court, because under this rule it is so
provided that the period shall commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the
complaint or information terminated without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that the
proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal or conviction of the accused.

The basis of the doctrine in the Tayco case, however, was disregarded by this Court in the Olarte case, cited
by the Solicitor General. It should be recalled that before the Olarte case, there was diversity of precedents on
the issue of prescription. One view declares that the filing of the complaint with the justice of the peace (or
municipal judge) does interrupt the course of prescriptive term. This view is found in People v. Olarte, L-13027,
June 30, 1960, October 16, 1959; People v. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588, 590. The other pronouncement is that to
produce interruption, the complainant or information must have been filed in the proper court that has
jurisdiction to try the case on its merits, found in the cases of People v. del Rosario, L-15140, December 29,
1960; People v. Coquia. L-15456, June 29, 1963.
9
The Olarte case set at rest the conflict views, and enunciated the doctrine aforecited by the Solicitor General.
The reasons for the doctrine which We find applicable to the case at bar read:

xxx xxx xxx

As is a well-known fact, like the proceedings in the court conducting a preliminary investigation, a proceeding
in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without conviction or acquittal.

As Justice Claudio Teehankee has observed:

To the writer's mind, these reasons Logically call with equal force, for the express overruling also of the
doctrine in People vs. Tayco, 73 Phil. 509, (1941) that the filing of a complaint or denuncia by the offended
party with the City Fiscal's Office which is required by law to conduct the preliminary investigation does not
interrupt the period of prescription. In chartered cities, criminal prosecution is generally initiated by the filing of
the complaint or denuncia with the city fiscal for preliminary investigation. In the case of provincial fiscals,
besides being empowered like municipal judges to conduct preliminary investigations, they may even reverse
actions of municipal judges with respect to charges triable by Courts of Fist Instance . . . .

Clearly, therefore, the filing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor by the offended party,
later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the
alleged defamatory remarks were committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts the period of
prescription. (emphasis supplied)

This Court reiterated Francisco in its resolution of 1 October 1993 in Calderon-Bargas vs. Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Metro Manila.24

Sec. 1. How instituted. — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the
institution of criminal actions shall be as follows:

(a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, by filing the complaint with the
appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;

(b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by
filing the complaint or information directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However,
in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.

In all cases, such institution shall interrupt the period of prescription of the offense charged. (emphasis
supplied)

The rule, however, is entirely different under Act No. 3326, as amended, whose Section 2 explicitly provides
that the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the institution of judicial proceedings, i.e., the filing of the
complaint or information with the court. The said section reads:

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of  judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin
to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy. (emphasis supplied)

And so, in Zaldivia vs. Reyes,25 this Court held that the proceedings referred to in said Section 2 are "judicial
proceedings," which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court.

Zaldivia, however, provides no safe refuge to the petitioner, and her invocation thereof misplaced. In the first
place, it involved a violation of an ordinance, which is covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. By its
express mandate, Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court does not apply to cases covered by the Rule on
Summary Procedure. Second, since the ordinance in question partakes of a special penal statute Act No. 3326
is then applicable; hence, it is the filing in the proper court of the complaint or information which suspends the
running of the period of prescription. In Zaldivia, this Court categorically interpreted Section 9 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure to mean that "the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is
actually filed in court and not on any date before that, "which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act No. 3326.

10
What is then left to be determined is whether the filing of the private respondent's complaint for grave oral
defamation with the office of the Ombudsman-Visayas is equivalent to filing the complaint in the prosecutor's
office such that it interrupted the prescriptive period for grave oral defamation.

Sec. 12 and 13(1), Articles XI of the Constitution provide:

Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed
in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate case,
notify the complaints of the action taken and the result thereof.

Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:

1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

Corollarily, Section 13, 15(1), and 16 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
which Congress enacted pursuant to paragraph 826 of the aforementioned Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution, provides as follows:

Sec. 13. Mandate. — The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient
service by the Government to the people.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties — The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
function and duties:

1. Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage from any investigatory agency of the Government, the investigation
of such cases.

Sec. 16. Applicability. — The provisions of this Act shall apply to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and
nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during
his tenure in office.

Needless to state, these broad constitutional and statutory provisions vest upon the Ombudsman and his
Deputies the power to initiate or conduct preliminary investigations in criminal cases filed against public officers
or employees, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Thus, in Deloso vs. Domingo,27 this
Court held.

As protector of the people, the office of the Ombudsman has the power, function and duty "to act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials" (Sec. 12) and to "investigate . . . any act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." (Sec. 13[1].) The Ombudsman is also
empowered to "direct the officer concerned," in this case the Special Prosecutor, "to take appropriate action
against a public official . . . and to recommend his prosecution" (Sec. 13[3]).

The clause "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime
committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public
official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be
related to or be connected with or arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.

It must, however, be stressed that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any illegal act or omission of
any public officer is not an exclusive authority; rather, it is a "shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged."28

A public officer, as distinguished from a government "employee," is a person whose duties involved the
exercise of discretion in the performance of the functions of government. 29 The petitioner, being an Education

11
Supervisor II of the Regional Office of Region VII of the DECS, is a public officer. The Ombudsman-Visayas
then has authority to conduct preliminary investigation of the private respondent's complaint against the
petitioner for grave oral defamation. Undoubtedly, the rationale of the first Olarte case, reiterated as the
controlling doctrine in the second Olarte case which was broadened in Francisco and reiterated in Calderon-
Bargas, must apply to complaints filed with the Office of the Ombudsman against public officers and
employees for purposes of preliminary investigation. Accordingly, the filing of the private respondent's
complaint for grave oral defamation against the petitioner with the Ombudsman-Visayas tolled the running of
the period of prescription of the said offense. Since the complaint was filed on 13 October 1993, or barely
twenty days from the commission of the crime charged, the filing then of the information on 28 March 1994 was
very well within the six-month prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for want of merit.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992

ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168, Regional
Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:

According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan
was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Petitioner
entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. At
the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other.
Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car
and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number.
The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one
round of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office showed that
the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.

The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect had come
from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The
police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by petitioner from the cashier of the bake
shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as
the same person who had shot Maguan. Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the
police launched a manhunt for petitioner.

On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he
was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An
eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the
gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio
("Prosecutor") informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to
preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.

On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information could be filed in
court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).

Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an
information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the
information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the
accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
12
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, 4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was
filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro
Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last page of the motion itself that he interposed no
objection to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00.

On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the
Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same
date, approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released
that same day.

On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that
petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation, which motion had been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro,
who also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a
copy of petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.

Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and
cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution shall have concluded its
preliminary investigation.

On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the following: (1)
the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled; petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order
to surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.

On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Supreme Court
assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and void because no preliminary
investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right to due process. Petitioner also moved for
suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion
was, however, denied by respondent Judge.

On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.

By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.

On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of petitioner on
23 August 1991.

On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his arraignment.

On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to
admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, petitioner was arraigned. In
view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court
then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October;
and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November 1991. 11

On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus 12 in the Court of Appeals. He alleged that in
view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition for certiorari earlier filed by him, after the lapse
of more than a month, thus prolonging his detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.

On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus.  13 The petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the other, were
subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to restrain his
arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.

On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its first witness.

13
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the two (2)
petitions, on the following grounds:

a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and charged had
been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation. At the time he showed up at
the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the confrontation at the San Juan Police
Station, one witness positively identified petitioner as the culprit.

b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He waived his right
to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the Rules.

c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the trial court had
the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment order (issued by
the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner was given to the custody of the
Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be granted.

On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for petitioner also
filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's conformity.

On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari was filed. On 14 October 1991, the Court
issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below
until further orders from this Court.

In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a lawful
warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go; and second, whether
petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We consider these issues seriatim.

In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case, petitioner had been
validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2
July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work, petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at
the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one
of the seven (7) cases consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc.,
v. Ramos, et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected fourteen
(14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested. Accordingly, in the view of the
Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court were applicable and because
petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was
legally justified in filing the information for murder even without preliminary investigation.

On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the
police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the
crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers
who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal
knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless
arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary
investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this
case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality of the warrantless
arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the
ground that such offenses constituted "continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an
outlawed organization like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was
arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location in
time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing crime."

Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant case falls
within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides as follows:

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest
a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;

14
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where
he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith
delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.

Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers obviously
were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither
could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the
"arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had
shot Maguan. The information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to take down the
alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That
information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of
Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:

Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested without a
warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, on the
basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting office or person

However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-
availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for
bail as provided in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days
from its inception.

If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted, the accused
may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner prescribed in this Rule.
(Emphasis supplied)

is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not
state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had
slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated
homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to
determine whether there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112
was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a
condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a
preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since
petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject
only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation.

Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary investigation, we
note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. As
earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court,
petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The
Solicitor General contends that that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the
Prosecutor, and that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary investigation may be
predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be conducted by the Prosecutor, not by
the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for
murder had already been filed with the Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner

15
was aware of this fact at the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo
v. Mogul,  19 this Court held:

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima
facie case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in
the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such
stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and
recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. While it is true that the
fiscal has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or
not, once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper
in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only qualification is that the
action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused., or the right of the People to due
process of law.

xxx xxx xxx

The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of
the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the
Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the
case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge
on what to do with the case before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)

Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and not for a re-
investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation), and since the Prosecutor himself did file with the
trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's
omnibus motion was in effect filed with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a
preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation,
and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary
investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken) supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of
Rule 112 of the Revised Court was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be
held to have been substantially complied with.

We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation. While that right is
statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a
component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted
before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. The accused in a criminal trial is
inevitably exposed to prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To
deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of his right to due
process.

The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation in the instant
case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that the right to preliminary
investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at
arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary
investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of
Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being
forced to stand trial.

Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had waived his right
to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison,  23 we did hold that appellants there had waived their right to
preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without
previously claiming that they did not have the benefit of a preliminary investigation."  24 In the instant case,
petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus
motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash
bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably imply
waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in court
asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized that petitioner's claim to
preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.

16
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord preliminary
investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal
justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25

It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to bail. This was
equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence of guilt then in his hands was
not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of respondent Judge recalling his own order
granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly
arbitrary considering that no evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been
submitted to respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before. It
follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.

The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case, trial on the
merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4) witnesses, impact upon,
firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly, petitioner's right to be released on bail?
Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary investigation conducted in respect of the charge against
him? Does petitioner remain entitled to be released on bail?

Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains entitled to a
preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the merits should be
suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that
the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on hand, conclude that probable
cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on
hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner
was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was forced to
undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste, to
the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did
so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23
August 1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear
petitioner's vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary
investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an
obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with
counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel
once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made
of record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and
prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of
his detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was
because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run
the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is frequently the only test of truth in the judicial
process.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled to be released
on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning petitioner's guilt be, in the
reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move in the trial court for cancellation of
petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a careful and objective assessment of the evidence
on record, to grant or deny the motion for cancellation of bail.

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary investigation and to
bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the record would be to legitimize the
deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission
and effectively to dilute important rights of accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to
require the State to accord petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point,  could turn
out ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And, in any
case, it would not be idle ceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the rights and liberties of
its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to respect those rights and liberties.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of the trial
court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary investigation of
the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary investigation within a period of
fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial
Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

17
Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any lawful order that the trial court
may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation.

No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Medialdea, Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the majority decision penned by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano but am at a loss for reasons why
an experienced Judge should insist on proceeding to trial in a sensational murder case without preliminary
investigation inspite of the vigorous and continued objection and reservation of rights of the accused and
notwithstanding the recommendations of the Prosecutor that those rights must be respected. If the Court had
faithfully followed the Rules, trial would have proceeded smoothly and if the accused is really guilty, then he
may have been convicted by now. As it is, the case has to go back to square one.

I agree with Justice Isagani Cruz "that the trial court has (apparently) been moved by a desire to cater to public
opinion to the detriment of the impartial administration of justice." Mass media has its duty to fearlessly but
faithfully inform the public about events and persons. However, when a case has received wide and
sensational publicity, the trial court should be doubly careful not only to be fair and impartial but also to give
the appearance of complete objectivity in its handling of the case.

The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and persistent in getting the true facts of a
case is present in all cases but it is particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of
those unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside. Unlike the accused in this case
who enjoys the assistance of competent counsel, a poor defendant convicted by wide and unfavorable media
coverage may be presumed guilty before trial and be unable to defend himself properly. Hence, the importance
of the court always following the Rules.

While concurring with Justice Feliciano's ponencia, I am constrained to add the foregoing observations
because I feel they form an integral part of the Court's decision.

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I was one of the members of the Court who initially felt that the petitioner had waived the right to preliminary
investigation because he freely participated in his trial and his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution
witnesses. A closer study of the record, however, particularly of the transcript of the proceedings footnoted in
the ponencia, reveals that he had from the start demanded a preliminary investigation and that his counsel had
reluctantly participated in the trial only because the court threatened to replace him with a counsel de oficio if
he did not. Under the circumstances, I am convinced that there was no waiver. The petitioner was virtually
compelled to go to trial. Such compulsion and unjustified denial of a clear statutory right of the petitioner
vitiated the proceedings as violative of procedural due process.

It is true that the ruling we lay down here will take the case back to square one, so to speak, but that is not the
petitioner's fault. He had the right to insist that the procedure prescribed by the Rules of Court be strictly
observed. The delay entailed by the procedural lapse and the attendant expense imposed on the Government
and the defendant must be laid at the door of the trial judge for his precipitate and illegal action.

It appears that the trial court has been moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the
impartial administration of justice. The petitioner as portrayed by the media is not exactly a popular person.
18
Nevertheless, the trial court should not have been influenced by this irrelevant consideration, remembering
instead that its only guide was the mandate of the law.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:

I regret that I cannot agree with the majority opinion in this case. At this point, after four (4) prosecution
witnesses have already testified, among them an eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman who
shot Eldon Maguan inside his car in cold blood, and a security guard who identified the plate number of the
gunman's car, I do not believe that there is still need to conduct a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of
which would be to ascertain if there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the
petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty thereof (which the prosecutor, by filing
the information against him, presumably believed to be so).

In the present stage of the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, to return the case to the Prosecutor to
conduct a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the 1985 Rule on Criminal Procedure would be
supererogatory.

This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police work, with ample media coverage,
led to the identification of the suspect who, seven (7) days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police
station to verify news reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. Upon entering the station, he was
positively identified as the gunman by an eyewitness who was being interrogated by the police to ferret more
clues and details about the crime. The police thereupon arrested the petitioner and on the same day, July 8,
1991, promptly filed with the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal, a complaint for frustrated homicide against him. As
the victim died the next day, July 9, 1991, before an information could be filed, the First Assistant Prosecutor,
instead of filing an information for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder on July 11, 1991 in the
Regional Trial Court, with no bail recommended.

However, the Provincial Prosecutor, acting on the petitioner's omnibus motion for preliminary investigation and
release on bail (which was erroneously filed with his office instead of the court), recommended a cash bond of
P100,000 for his release, and submitted the omnibus motion to the trial court for resolution.

Respondent Judge Benjamin Pelayo must have realized his impetuosity shortly after he had issued: (a) his
order of July 12, 1991 approving the petitioner's cash bail bond without a hearing, and (b) his order of July 16,
1991 granting the Prosecutor leave to conduct a preliminary investigation, for he motu propio issued on July
17, 1991 another order rescinding his previous orders and setting for hearing the petitioner's application for
bail.

The cases cited in page 15 of the majority opinion in support of the view that the trial of the case should be
suspended and that the prosecutor should now conduct a preliminary investigation, are not on all fours with
this case. In Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 and People vs. Monton, 23 SCRA 1024, the trial of
the criminal case had not yet commenced because motions to quash the information were filed by the
accused. Lozada vs. Hernandez, 92 Phil. 1053; U.S. vs. Banzuela, 31 Phil. 565; San Diego
vs. Hernandez, 24 SCRA 110 and People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277 are also inapplicable because in
those cases preliminary investigations had in fact been conducted before the informations were filed in court.

It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a preliminary investigation, it is not
a constitutional right. Its absence is not a ground to quash the information (Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan, 177
SCRA 354). It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the information (Rodis vs.
Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618), nor constitute an infringement of the right of the accused to confront
witnesses (Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).

The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important than his application for release on
bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary investigation is not more important than the hearing of the
application for bail. The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the preliminary
investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended, but should be allowed to proceed for it will
accomplish a double purpose. The parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (1) whether or not there is
probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more importantly (b) whether or not the
evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally
foreclose the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt.

The bail hearing may not be suspended because upon the filing of an application for bail by one accused of a
capital offense, "the judge is under a legal obligation to receive evidence with the view of determining whether
evidence of guilt is so strong as to warrant denial of bond." (Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210; Hadhirul Tahil vs.
19
Eisma, 64 SCRA 378; Peralta vs. Ramos and Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, 71 Phil. 271; Padilla vs. Enrile, 121
SCRA 472; Ilagan vs. Ponce Enrile, 139 SCRA 349; People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123)

The abolition of the death penalty did not make the right to bail absolute, for persons charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong, are not bailable (Sec. 3, Art. III, 1987
Constitution). In People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489, we called down the trial court for having granted the
motion for bail in a murder case without any hearing and without giving the prosecution an opportunity to
comment or file objections thereto.

Similarly this Court held in People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512:

. . . due process also demands that in the matter of bail the prosecution should be afforded full opportunity to
present proof of the guilt of the accused. Thus, if it were true that the prosecution in this case was deprived of
the right to present its evidence against the bail petition, or that the order granting such petition was issued
upon incomplete evidence, then the issuance of the order would really constitute abuse of discretion that would
call for the remedy of certiorari. (Emphasis supplied.)

The petitioner may not be released pending the hearing of his petition for bail for it would be incongruous to
grant bail to one who is not in the custody of the law (Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888).

I respectfully take exception to the statements in the ponencia that the "petitioner was not arrested at all" (p.
12) and that "petitioner had not been arrested, with or without a warrant" (p. 130). Arrest is the taking of the
person into the custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense (Sec. 1,
Rule 113, Rules of Court). An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest (Sec. 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court). When Go walked
into the San Juan Police Station on July 8, 1991, and placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities
who clamped him in jail after he was identified by an eyewitness as the person who shot Maguan, he was
actually and effectively arrested. His filing of a petition to be released on bail was a waiver of any irregularity
attending his arrest and estops him from questioning its validity (Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 SCRA 377; Bagcal
vs. Villaraza, 120 SCRA 525).

I vote to dismiss the petition and affirm the trial court's order of July 17, 1991.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 110436 June 27, 1994

ROMAN A. CRUZ, JR., petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), and OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, respondents.

Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsianlo for petitioner.

The Solicitor Generalfor the People of the Philippines.

REGALADO, J.:

The present original action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus seeks the reversal of the Orders issued by
respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14252, dated February 17, 1993 1 and May 12,
1993, 2 denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion and Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.

The facts are summarized in the Memorandum of public respondents as follows:

20
1. The Government Service Insurance System (the GSIS, for short) filed two separate criminal complaints
against petitioner Roman A. Cruz, Jr., a former public official who used to be the President and General
Manager of the GSIS and, also, the President of the Manila Hotel, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended. The first complaint against petitioner was filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor
(the OSP, for short) and docketed as OSP-88-02028 while the second, which involved the same set of facts,
was filed with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (the PCGG, for short) but which was later
endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and docketed as OMB-0-91-0986. . . .

2. A preliminary investigation was conducted by the PCGG where petitioner duly submitted his counter-
affidavit. As a consequence’ of said investigation, an Information was filed with the first Division of the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 14134, charging petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019. . . .

3. During the proceedings before the OSP, petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. The OSP, however,
denied the motion and filed with the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan an Information charging petitioner
with Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents (Articles 171 and 315 of the Revised Penal Code),
docketed as Criminal Case No. 14252. Petitioner was deemed by the OSP to have waived his right to submit a
counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. . . .

4. As a result of the filing of two informations with respondent Sandiganbayan involving the same accused
(herein petitioner) and the same set of facts, Criminal Case No. 14252 was consolidated with Criminal Case
No. 14134 which was pending before the First Division of respondent Sandiganbayan. . . .

5. Respondent Sandiganbayan, however, remanded the consolidated cases against petitioner to the Office of
the Ombudsman for reinvestigation inasmuch as:

a) the Information in Criminal Case No. 14134 was ordered dismissed in compliance with the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, et al., G.R. Nos. 92319-20, October 2, 1990, which declared null
and void the preliminary investigations conducted by the PCGG in all criminal cases involving matters which
were the subject matter of civil cases earlier filed; and

b) the Information in Criminal Case No. 14252 was correctly assailed by petitioner as having been filed without
the proper preliminary investigation. . . .

6. During the preliminary investigation conducted anew by the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner submitted
his counter-affidavit and supporting documents. After the completion of said investigation, Prosecutor
Leonardo P. Tamayo of the Office of the Ombudsman prepared a Resolution dated February 11, 1992, which
recommended the withdrawal of the Information in Criminal Case No. 14252. . . .

7. Respondent Ombudsman, however, despite the above recommendation of the investigating prosecutor
ordered the prosecution to proceed under the existing Information in Criminal Case No. 14252 on his
observation, viz:

Let us not do the defending for the accused. The explanations offered are too strained to be believed. At best
they are matters of defense for the accused to prove at the trial.

The alleged character of the funds involved being confidential and requires no auditing is totally immaterial. It
could even explain why this anomaly was committed. . . .

8. Petitioner thus filed with respondent Sandiganbayan (First Division) an Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information, dated September 17, 1992, wherein he prayed ". . . for the production of (the) record of the
preliminary investigation), and that the information be quashed outright or the disapproval of the Ombudsman
set aside, or in the alternative, that the Office of the Ombudsman be ordered to conduct further proceedings,
particularly the handwriting analysis prayed for by the petitioner which would establish who committed the
alleged falsification. . . .

On February 17, 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution dated February 15, 1993, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Omnibus Motion of accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. is DENIED for lack of merit. . . .

10. A Motion for Reconsideration, dated April 12, 1993, of the aforequoted Resolution was filed by
petitioner . . . .

21
11. On May 12, 1993, respondent Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. of this Court’s Resolution dated
February 17, 1993 is DENIED for lack of merit. . . .

12. Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition. 3

Petitioner contends that respondent Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion:

1. In not dismissing the information considering that the Ombudsman’s approval of the order dismissing the
complaint did not state the factual or legal basis therefor;

2. In not requiring the production of the record of the preliminary investigation in wanton disregard of
petitioner’s right to due process;

3. In not dismissing the information considering that, as found by the investigating prosecutor, the money
received by petitioner was a cash advance; and

4. In not requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct further proceedings.

We do not find the instant petition to be impressed with merit as to warrant the extraordinary writs prayed for.

The information filed against herein petitioner charging him with estafa through falsification of public
documents and for which he stands to be tried before respondent court alleges:

That on or about or during the period from March 26, 1984 to May 11, 1984, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, at the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, Roman Cruz, Jr.,
then President and General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and likewise
President of the Manila Hotel, hence a public official having been duly appointed/elected and qualified as such,
taking advantage of his position, by means of deceit, committing an offense in relation to his office, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify Manila Hotel Invoices, Transportation, Charge, Cash,
Budget for Food and Drinks vouchers in the aggregate amount of P350,000.00 and then make it appear that
the GSIS management and staff had a five-day coordination meeting at the Manila Hotel from March 23 to 30,
1984 at the cost of P350,000.00, for which reason the GSIS paid/issued its check with No. 039511 dated May
11, 1984 in the amount of P350,000.00 which check was deposited to the account of the Manila Hotel, and
thereafter cause the Manila Hotel to issue its check with No. 007272 dated May 11, 1984 in the amount of
P350,000.00 payable to Roman Cruz, Jr. or himself, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew that
there was no such five-day GSIS management and staff coordination meeting conducted/held at the Manila
Hotel; and further thereafter convert and appropriate to his own personal use and benefit/deposit the said
check to his own personal account with the Far East Bank and Trust Co. the said check/amount of
P350,000.00 to the damage and prejudice of the GSIS and/or Manila Hotel and/or the government in the said
amount of P350,000.00. 4

I. Petitioner initially submits that respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing the information considering that the Ombudsman’s disapproval of the order dismissing the
complaint did not state the factual or legal basis therefor, in violation of the cardinal rules set forth in Ang
Tibay, et al. vs. CIR, et al. 5 The submission is premised on the theory that said rules apply to a preliminary
investigation which is to be considered quasi-judicial in nature. Petitioner avers that it is the duty of the
Ombudsman to assess the evidence and defenses of the respondent in deciding a case, a failure wherein
constitutes a violation of one’s right to due process of law. He further claims that "while the duty to deliberate
does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support the decision. The Ombudsman in this case not only failed to decide right
but has nothing at all to support his decision." 6

Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the Office of the Ombudsman is not exercising quasi-judicial or
quasi-legislative powers because "it does not act as a court" when it conducts preliminary investigation of
cases falling under its jurisdiction.

It is settled that the conduct of a preliminary investigation, which is defined as "an inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial," 7 is, like court proceedings, subject to the requirements of both substantive and
procedural due process. This is because, a preliminary investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding

22
wherein the prosecutor or investigating officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. As
we held in Cojuangco, Jr. vs. PCGG, et al.:  8

. . . It must be undertaken in accordance with the procedure provided in Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure. This procedure is to be observed in order to assure that a person undergoing such
preliminary investigation will be afforded due process.

As correctly pointed out by petitioner, an indispensable requisite of due process is that the person who
presides and decides over a proceeding, including a preliminary investigation, must possess the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge.

Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court,
it is not a casual affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the
commission of the crime with the end in view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared
against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of
the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial
court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation has then been
called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be
heard and for the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.

The authority of a prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside or to conduct a preliminary
investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even a regional trial court judge. While the
investigating officer, strictly speaking is not a "judge," by the nature of his functions he is and must be
considered to be a quasi-judicial officer.

In the present case, petitioner asserts that his right to due process was violated in that respondent
Ombudsman failed to assess and consider the evidence presented by petitioner in disapproving the
recommendation for dismissal of the case by the investigating prosecutor, and his ruling is not supported by
the evidence on record. The argument is specious.

His submission that he was deprived of his right to due process hinges on the erroneous assumption that the
order of the Ombudsman for the filing of the necessary information is lacking in any factual or legal basis. Such
a conclusion, however, stems from the fact that said order did not entail a discussion of the rationale for the
Ombudsman’s action.

It may seem that the ratio decidendi for the Ombudsman’s order may be wanting but this is not a case of a total
absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the evidence presented. What is actually
involved here is merely a review of the conclusion arrived at by the investigating prosecutor as a result of his
study and analysis of the complaint, counter-affidavits, and the evidence submitted by the parties during the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman here is not conducting anew another investigation but is merely
determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation given by the investigating prosecutor, that is,
whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact of the latter. Verily, it is
discretionary upon the Ombudsman if he will rely mainly on the findings of fact of the investigating prosecutor
in making a review of the latter’s report and recommendation, as the Ombudsman can very well make his own
findings of fact. There is nothing to prevent him from acting one way or the other. As a matter of fact, Section 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides that "where the investigating assistant fiscal recommends the
dismissal of the case but his findings are reversed by the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor
on the ground that a probable cause exists, the latter may, by himself, file the corresponding information
against the respondent or direct any other assistant fiscal or state prosecutor to do so, without conducting
another preliminary investigation. 9

With more reason may the Ombudsman not be faulted in arriving at a conclusion different from that of the
investigating prosecutor on the basis of the same set of facts. It cannot be said that the Ombudsman
committed a grave abuse of discretion simply because he opines contrarily to the prosecutor that, under the
facts obtaining in the case, there is probable cause to believe that herein petitioner is guilty of the offense
charged.

As aptly pointed out by respondent court in its resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, "to the
Ombudsman, the narration of facts by Prosecutor Tamayo, . . . demonstrated adequate cause to prosecute the
accused Cruz." 10 Furthermore, public respondents, in their Memorandum, correctly observed that "(f)rom the
tenor of respondent Ombudsman’s statement, it is clear that he agreed with the findings of facts of the
investigating prosecutor but disagreed with the latter’s conclusion on the import and significance of said
findings. On the basis of the findings of facts of the investigating prosecutor, which were not disputed by
petitioner, respondent Ombudsman believed that there was sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime had been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof." 11
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Petitioner argues that the indication of disapproval by the Ombudsman which consists merely of two
paragraphs fails to point out the issues and relevant facts and is consequently whimsical, capricious and
arbitrary. Such proposition is fallacious. The mere fact that the order to file an information against petitioner
consists only of two paragraphs is not sufficient to impute arbitariness or caprice on the part of the
Ombudsman, absent a clear showing that he gravely abused his discretion in disapproving the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. Neither is it tainted with vindictiveness or oppression. He
disapproved the recommendation of the special prosecutor because he sincerely believed that there is
sufficient evidence to indict the accused. This is an exercise of the Ombudsman’s power based upon
constitutional mandate, and the courts should not interfere in such exercise.

The rule is based not only upon the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the
Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the
Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would
be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private
complaint. 12

II. Petitioner next avers that the error of respondent court in not requiring the production of the record of the
preliminary investigation is two-fold. First, it was in violation of the constitutional right against arbitrary arrests
because probable cause was not "personally determined by the judge," considering that the records of the
preliminary investigation were not elevated to the judge for examination. Second, it was in violation of
petitioner’s right to due process of law since he was deprived of the opportunity to examine the evidence
against him and prepare his defense.

On the first issue, petitioner relies on the ruling in Lim, Sr., et al. vs. Felix, et al.  13 which held that —

If a judge relies entirely on the certification of the prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is
made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The judge commits a
grave abuse of discretion.

The conduct of a preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an investigation for the
determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the information or one for the determination of a probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first aspect of preliminary investigation is executive in nature.
It is part of the prosecution’s job. The second kind of preliminary investigation, which is more properly called
preliminary examination, is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge.14

For the latter, in the exercise of the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof
he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. 15

Coming now to the case at bar, contrary to petitioner’s thesis, respondent court, in its resolution promulgated
on February 17, 1993 denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information, found the existence of probable
cause after making a deliberate and exhaustive review of the facts obtaining in the case. Thus:

All of the above logical process, which is supported both by the finding of fact in the Resolution and by
admissions in the Motion of the accused, lead to the conclusion that probable cause exists against accused
Roman Cruz, Jr., for acts described in the Information in the instant case.

The narration of facts culled from the record (as affirmed by both parties) support the narration of facts in the
Information. The superficial analysis of the admissions made above indicate that the elements of Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code as well as of Articles 171 and 172 thereof may probably be established.

It is true that the Manila Hotel eventually treated the P350,000.00 as a "cash advance" to him. Accused Cruz,
however, does not claim that there were cash advances made by him as a consequence of which he received
this sum. Nor has accused Roman Cruz said that he had obtained a loan or cash advance from the Manila
Hotel for a particular purpose for which he was expected to subsequently render an accounting. All that Manila
Hotel’s subsequent description of this amount as a "cash advance," in fact, says is that when it turned out that
P350,000.00 could not be properly accounted for, it had to be treated as an amount which accused Cruz had
to pay back; thus, accountingwise, a cash advance.
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For accused to have received such a large amount from a company of which he was the President required
him to sign a receipt which would specify clearly what he was receiving it for. If he received the sum as a cash
advance for some future expense, the Manila Hotel documents would clearly so demonstrate. If he received it
as a cash advance (against his salaries or other benefits), it would appear as a loan in Manila Hotel’s books.
Accused Cruz, however, has said no such thing in any of his pleadings nor apparently has he so stated during
the preliminary investigation.

In other words, accused Cruz as President of the Manila Hotel — and, therefore, in a position of great fiduciary
nature — received P350,000.00 in 1984 either for a non-existent reason or for a false reason.

He may have an explanation. As of this time, however, if the evidence on record is actually presented at trial,
enough evidence would exist to put accused Roman A. Cruz, Jr. at peril of his liberty and would require him to
explain his side of the matter.

A case has, therefore, been demonstrated in the record and in the averment of accused Cruz himself that the
crime charged has probably been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. (Emphasis
supplied.) 16

Petitioner would have respondent court order the production of the records of the preliminary investigation in its
determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. First and foremost,
as hereinabove stated, in a preliminary examination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the court is not
tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that the
judge personally evaluates the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecution in determining
probable cause. 17 This is precisely what respondent court did. In resolving the issue of probable cause,
respondent court made an in-depth analysis of the findings of fact of Prosecutor Tamayo, as well as the
Omnibus Motion submitted by petitioner. The correctness of these facts was not even questioned by herein
petitioner but, on the contrary was expressly affirmed in the latter’s Omnibus Motion dated September 17, 1992
wherein it was stated that "(t)he Order issued by the investigating prosecutor . . . contains a lucid narration of
the relevant facts."

The case of Lim cited by petitioner is not applicable to the present case because, in the former, a warrant of
arrest was issued by the respondent judge therein without conducting his own personal evaluation of the case
even if only on the basis of the report submitted by the fiscal. Instead, the respondent therein simply declared:
"Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the
existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect
on its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor’s certification in each information . . . .
This is far from what actually transpired before the Sandiganbayan as reflected by the records in this case.
Hence, the ruling in Lim cannot be properly invoked.

As to the second issue, petitioner relies on the provisions of Section 8, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 8. Record of preliminary investigation. — The record of the preliminary investigation whether conducted
by a judge or a fiscal, shall not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court. However, the
said court, on its own initiative or that of any party, may order the production of the record or any part thereof
whenever the same shall be necessary in the resolution of the case or any incident therein, or shall be
introduced as evidence by the party requesting for its production.

Petitioner’s prayer for the production of the record is intended not only for proper observance of the
constitutional requirement that probable cause be determined personally by the judge, but also to enable him
to examine the evidence and prepare his defenses and for trial.

Public respondents contend that the production of the record of the preliminary examination is not necessary
since petitioner can always resort to any of the modes of discovery available to an accused under the Rules of
Court, specifically citing Section 11 of Rule 116, which provides:

Sec. 11. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution. — On motion of the
accused showing good cause and with notice to all parties, the court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression,
or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, of
any written statements given by the complainant and other witnesses in any investigation of the offense
conducted by the prosecution or any other investigating officers, as well as of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not otherwise privileged, which
constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case, and which are in the possession or
under the control of the prosecution, the police, or any other law investigating agencies.

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This rule refers to the right of the accused to move for production or inspection of material evidence in the
possession of the prosecution. It authorizes the defense to inspect, copy or photograph any evidence of the
prosecution in its possession after obtaining the permission of the court. A motion showing good reasons for
the granting of the permission must be filed by the defense for this purpose, with notice to all parties. 18

It will be noted at the outset that precisely, as suggested by public respondents, herein petitioner, in asking for
the production of the records of the preliminary investigation in order to enable him to prepare for his defense
and for trial, is actually trying to avail of this mode of discovery. There was good cause shown for the motion to
produce the records, that is, so that they may be introduced as evidence by the party requesting for their
production, which is one of the grounds provided for under Section 8, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

It is true that the granting of permission lies within the discretion of the court. However, respondent court in this
case has failed to sufficiently justify its refusal to have the records of the preliminary investigation produced
before it so that petitioner may use them for his defense, either in its resolutions denying petitioner’s Omnibus
Motion and Motion for Reconsideration, or in the pleadings and Memorandum filed by herein respondents
before this Court. Consequently, we find no reason to deny petitioner the right to avail of such mode of
discovery. If only for the reason that petitioner should be given the opportunity to inspect the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation solely for the purpose of enabling him to prepare for his defense
and for trial, this questioned resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan should be modified.

III. It is likewise contended that respondent court abused its discretion in not dismissing the information
considering that, as found by the investigating prosecutor, the money received by petitioner was a cash
advance for which he can only be held civilly liable, but which civil liability has already been extinguished.
Citing the case of Yong Chan Kim vs. People, et al., 19 which held that a cash advance is in the form of a loan
and, therefore, there can be no estafa committed, petitioner argues that he only incurred civil liability for the
cash advance he obtained from the Manila Hotel. However, he contends that such liability had allegedly been
extinguished when his leave credits and other benefits were withheld, the total of which was more than
sufficient to liquidate the advance made.

Also, it is argued that petitioner was denied due process when respondent court failed to remand the case to
the Ombudsman for further proceedings for the purpose of determining the persons who actually forged the
questioned documents by conducting a handwriting analysis. This would have secured him from hasty and
malicious prosecution, and would even have led to the discovery of the true culprit, if indeed documents had
been fabricated.

It must here be stressed that a preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the persons against whom it is taken in jeopardy. 20

The established rule is that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of
the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief
that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. 21

Conformably therewith, the arguments raised by herein petitioner that the cash advance is actually in the form
of a loan and therefore no criminal liability attaches, and that respondent court should have remanded the case
for further investigation to determine the true identity of the forgers, are all matters of defense which are best
presented during the trial before respondent court for its consideration.

The main function of the government prosecutor during the preliminary investigation is merely to determine the
existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he finds it to be so. And, probable
cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a
reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was
guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. 22

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman found that there was sufficient ground to believe that petitioner is guilty of
the crime charged on the basis of the factual findings of Prosecutor Tamayo in the latter’s Order dated
February 11, 1992 which were arrived at after taking into consideration the evidence presented by the parties.
A cursory perusal of the records of this case will show that the findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman
are supported by substantial evidence, hence the same should be considered conclusive. 23

Furthermore, the Ombudsman’s findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing said findings
on the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is liable
for estafa through falsification of public documents, petitioner is clearly raising questions of fact here. 24 His
26
arguments are anchored on the propriety of or error in the Ombudsman’s appreciation of facts. Petitioner
cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only
questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. 25 Insofar as this third issue is
concerned, therefore, we find that no grave abuse of discretion has been committed by respondents which
would warrant the granting of the writ of certiorari.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions appealed from are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that respondent
Ombudsman is DIRECTED to produce the pertinent records of the preliminary investigation before the
Sandiganbayan at the proper juncture of the proceedings therein and on sufficient justification therefor.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

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