STATE OF MICHIGAN

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IN THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT

CITY OF DETROIT, MSC Docket No.: 161664

Plaintiff-Appellee,
COA Docket No.: 352240
v. Wayne Circuit Court No.: 19-003483-AV
36th District Court No.: 17-121449

COURTNEY RITCHIE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_____________________________________________________________________________/

ROOSEN, VARCHETTI & OLIVIER, PLLC VENTURE LAW, PLLC

Richard G. Roosen (P35222) H. Russel Smith (P35922)
Paul E. Varchetti (P49403) Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
James Varchetti (P79606) 24333 Southfield Road, Suite 103
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee Southfield, MI 48075.
P.O. Box 2305 (313) 231-2787
Mount Clemens, MI 48046
(586) 868-2737
(586) 868-0259 (Fax)

_____________________________________________________________________________/

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE’S ANSWER TO DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS …………………………………………………………………………i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ..........................................................................................................ii

STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION ......................................................................iii

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED ...............................................iv

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS...........................................................................................1

ARGUMENT

I. The lower courts correctly held that Defendant was the property owner during the
relevant years because a forfeiture, as defined in the General Property Tax Act
(“GPTA”), does not transfer ownership of real property..............................................4

A. Preservation and Standard of Review……………………………….............................4

B. Forfeiture is a defined term in the GPTA, and forfeiture does not result in the transfer
of ownership under the plain language of the term’s statutory definition………………...4

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF............................................................................8

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 INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

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CASELAW

Ford Motor Co v Dep’t of Treasury,

313 Mich App 572; 884 NW2d 587 (2015) ...…………………………………………….4

Haynes v Neshewat,
477 Mich 29; 729 NW2d 488 (2007) …………………………………………….……….7

Hines v Volkswagen of America, Inc,

265 Mich App 432; 695 NW2d 84 (2005) ………………………………………………. 4

Oliver v Smith,
290 Mich App 678; 810 NW2d 57 (2010) …………………………………………….….4

Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co,

___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2020) (Docket No. 156849) ……………………….…6, 8

Tryc v Mich Veterans’ Facility,

451 Mich 129; 545 NW2d 642 (1996) ……………………………………………..……..7

STATUTES & COURT RULES

MCL 211.1 ………………………………………………………………………………………..4
MCL 211.78(8)(b) ………………………………………………………………………… passim
MCL 211.78g(2)………………………………………………………………………………..…5
MCL 211.78k……………………………………………………………………………….……..5

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 STATEMENT OF THE BASIS OF JURISDICTION

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The Michigan Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave to

appeal from a decision rendered by the Michigan Court of Appeals under MCR 7.303(B)(1).

This situation encompasses the present application for leave to appeal because Defendant seeks

to appeal the Michigan Court of Appeals order that denied her delayed application for leave to

appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented.

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 COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED

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I. Did the lower courts correctly hold that Defendant was the property owner during
the relevant years because a forfeiture, as defined in the General Property Tax Act
(“GPTA”), does not transfer ownership of real property?

Court of Appeals answered: yes

Circuit Court answered: yes
District Court answered: yes
Defendant-Appellant answers: no
Plaintiff-Appellee answers: yes

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 COUNTERSTATEMENT OF FACTS

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For ease of reference, the transcript of the December 20, 2018 Motion for Summary

Disposition will be cited as “M Tr I”1

The facts of this case are straightforward. Defendant Courtney Ritchie owned several

properties in the City of Detroit. Under the General Property Tax Act (“GPTA”), MCL 211.1 et

seq., Plaintiff is entitled to collect property taxes on real property located within the City of

Detroit. Plaintiff sued Defendant to collect unpaid property taxes on Defendant’s properties

from tax years 2011 through 2013, which corresponded with Defendant’s ownership of the

properties in question. All the properties in question were foreclosed upon by 2014, and

therefore, were no longer owned by Defendant by that year.

Plaintiff moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(4) (lack of jurisdiction

over any defenses), (C)(7) (defenses waived), (C)(9) (failure to state a valid defense), and

(C)(10) (no genuine issue of fact). The crux of Plaintiff’s motion was that defendant waived any

defenses by failing to object to tax assessments, and there was no genuine issue of fact because

documentary evidence demonstrated that Defendant was liable for the delinquent taxes.

Defendant filed a response challenging the motion. Defendant asserted that one of the

properties at issue, 14116 Westbrook, was foreclosed prior to the tax years at issue. Defendant

provided a Notice of Judgment Foreclosure to prove this circumstance. Defendant also asserted

that she no longer owned the other properties during the tax years at issue because the properties

had been forfeited under the GPTA in previous years. To support this argument, Defendant

1
If not already filed with the Michigan Supreme Court by the Defendant-Appellant, the
transcripts are included in the lower court record filed with the Court of Appeals, which is
presumably available internally to the Michigan Supreme Court.
1
relied upon the definition of “forfeit” found in Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary rather than on the

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definition contained in the GPTA.

At the motion hearing, Plaintiff acknowledged that the evidence demonstrated that

Defendant did not own 14116 Westbrook during the tax years in question (M Tr I, 4).

Accordingly, Plaintiff requested that it receive a judgment for delinquent taxes only on the other

properties—excluding the Westbrook property—which totaled $3,670.97 (M Tr I, 4). In turn,

Defendant argued that she did not own the remaining properties because, while the properties

were not foreclosed, they had previously been forfeited under the GPTA (M Tr I, 5-6).

Defendant argued that a forfeiture under the GPTA resulted in a change of ownership of the

property such that she no longer owned the properties once they were forfeited (M Tr I, 6). The

court asked Defendant to provide legal authority to support this argument, and Defendant

asserted that Defendant was relying on the “regular dictionary meaning of the term that says that

you lost the property” (M Tr I, 7). Plaintiff countered that it is the judgment of foreclosure—not

the forfeiture—that transfers ownership of a property under the GPTA (M Tr I, 7-8). Plaintiff

referred Defendant and the Court to the language of a Judgment of Foreclosure itself, which cites

the GPTA for the proposition that the judgment of foreclosure vests title (M Tr I, 8-9).

The court summarized the matter stating that defendant argued that forfeiture is the

equivalent of foreclosure, and that Defendant admitted having no authority to support that

contention aside from the ordinary meaning of the word itself (M Tr I, 9). But the Court

explained that the statutory authority on the face of the deeds demonstrated that Defendant’s

position was erroneous (M Tr I, 9). The court continued that Defendant’s argument “is not

supported by the law. The law is relatively clear. You change title in these matters by the

judgment of foreclosure.” (M Tr I, 9). The court granted summary disposition in Plaintiff’s favor

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in relation to all properties except the Westbrook property (M Tr I, 10). Plaintiff received

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summary judgment in the amount requested.

Defendant filed a claim of appeal to the Wayne Circuit Court. Following oral argument,2

the Circuit Court entered an Opinion and Order that rejected Defendant’s arguments and

affirmed the decision of the 36th District Court. The Circuit Court determined that contrary to

Defendant’s claim, the GPTA itself defines “forfeiture,” and a forfeiture does not result in a

transfer of property under the statutory definition. Further, the Circuit Court concluded that

under longstanding caselaw, the statutory definition of forfeiture was the only definition it could

apply when interpreting the GPTA. See Opinion and Order Affirming Decision of 36th District

Court, 7/11/19.3

Defendant filed a claim of appeal by right, which the Court of Appeals dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction. City of Detroit v Ritchie, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered

August 13, 2019 (Docket No. 350029). Six months later, Defendant filed a Delayed Application

for Leave to Appeal, which the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit in the grounds

presented. City of Detroit v Ritchie, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 13,

2020 (Docket No. 352240). Defendant then filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court,

and Plaintiff’s Answer now follows.

2
Per Defendant-Appellant, there is apparently no transcript of the oral argument on appeal to the
Circuit Court, leaving only the Circuit Court’s written Opinion and Order.
3
The Wayne Circuit Court’s Opinion and Order is attached to Defendant-Appellant’s
Application for Leave to Appeal as Exhibit C.

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 ARGUMENT

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I. The lower courts correctly held that Defendant was the property owner during the
relevant years because a forfeiture, as defined in the General Property Tax Act
(“GPTA”), does not transfer ownership of real property.

A. Preservation of the Issue and Standard of Review

Generally, an issue must be raised in the trial court to be preserved for appellate review.

Hines v Volkswagen of America, Inc, 265 Mich App 432, 443; 695 NW2d 84 (2005). This issue

was preserved because it was addressed by the lower courts. Appellate courts review de novo a

trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition. Oliver v Smith, 290 Mich App 678,

683; 810 NW2d 57 (2010). Likewise, issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.

Ford Motor Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 313 Mich App 572, 583-584; 884 NW2d 587 (2015).

B. Forfeiture is a defined term in the GPTA, and forfeiture does not result in
the transfer of ownership under the plain language of the term’s statutory
definition.

The lower courts correctly held that Defendant owned the properties during the pertinent

tax years because a forfeiture under the GPTA does not result in a change of ownership. Further,

a recent decision from this Court explained the meaning of forfeiture and confirmed that it does

not result in a change of ownership. Accordingly, this Court should deny the application for

leave to appeal for failure to demonstrate that the issue presented warrants review.

The central question presented by Defendant’s application is whether a transfer of

ownership occurs when a property is “forfeited” pursuant to the General Property Tax Act

(“GPTA”), MCL 211.1 et seq. The crux of Defendant’s argument is that because her properties

were “forfeited” under the GPTA, ownership of the properties was supposedly transferred out of

her name, and Defendant should therefore not be liable for property taxes. But Defendant’s

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argument is simply incorrect: no transfer of property occurs when a property is forfeited under

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the GPTA because the statutory definition of “forfeited” and “forfeiture” provides that a

foreclosing government unit does not acquire any interest in the property when a property is

forfeited. Thus, under the GPTA, ownership of a forfeited property remains with the taxpayer.

Title—and therefore legal ownership—only changes after a judgment of foreclosure is entered.4

The plain language of the GPTA confirms this understanding of forfeiture. MCL

211.78(8)(b) specifically defines the words “forfeited” and “forfeiture” as used in the GPTA:

"Forfeited" or "forfeiture" means a foreclosing governmental unit[5] may seek a

judgment of foreclosure under section 78k[6] if the property is not redeemed as
provided under this act, but does not acquire a right to possession or any other
interest in the property. [MCL 211.78(8)(b) (emphasis added).]

Thus, the definition of “forfeiture” under the GPTA is clear and unambiguous: the term means

that a forfeited property merely becomes subject to foreclosure, but the foreclosing governmental

unit does not acquire a right to possession or any other interest in the forfeited property. The

application of this definition to the facts of this case is equally clear: Defendant’s properties were

forfeited—but not yet foreclosed—during the tax years at issue. Thus, under the definition of

“forfeited” in the GPTA, Defendant remained the owner of the properties and therefore remained

liable for property taxes.

Defendant argues that the GPTA only defines forfeiture with respect to the foreclosing

government unit by stating that the government does not acquire an interest in the forfeited

property. Defendant uses that observation to argue that the GPTA does not define whether the

4
See MCL 211.78g(2) (stating that absolute title to the property will vest in the county treasurer
on the March 31st succeeding entry of a judgment foreclosing the property).
5
The “foreclosing governmental unit” referenced in this statute means either the county treasurer
or the State of Michigan if the county elected to have the state foreclose on property. See MCL
211.78(8)(a).
6
MCL 211.78k provides the procedure and process for foreclosures pursuant to the GPTA.

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taxpayer retains ownership of the property after forfeiture. But Defendant’s argument is flawed

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given the plain language of the statute. Again, the language of MCL 211.78(8)(b) is clear: when

a property is “forfeited” that merely means that a foreclosing governmental unit has the authority

to foreclose on the property. Per that statute, the foreclosing governmental unit does not gain

any interest in the forfeited property, possessory or otherwise. MCL 211.78(8)(b). Thus, the

taxpayer’s ownership of the property remains undisturbed even after forfeiture; the effect of

forfeiture is merely that the property becomes subject to foreclosure at a later date.

Further, a recent opinion from this Court interpreted the GPTA and removed any doubt

about the meaning and effect of forfeiture under the GPTA. This Court’s recent opinion in

Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co explained:

First, the GPTA makes clear that “forfeiture” simply permits [the foreclosing
governmental unit] to seek a judgment of foreclosure. Forfeiture does not affect
title, nor does it give the county treasurer (or the state if the state is the foreclosing
governmental unit) any rights, titles, or interests to the forfeited property.
Therefore, we reject the premise that [the property owners] “forfeited” all rights,
titles, and interests they had in their properties by failing to pay their real-property
taxes. [Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, ___ Mich ___, at ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2020)
(Docket No. 156849), slip op at 13-14].

Thus, Rafaeli confirmed that a forfeiture for failure to pay property taxes does not affect title and

does not result in a change of ownership; the taxpayer that owns the property retains all rights,

title, and interest in the property after a forfeiture.

To circumvent the statutory definition of forfeiture, Defendant invites this Court to adopt

a dictionary definition of forfeiture or to rely on the definition of forfeiture from the context of

civil asset forfeiture. But this Court, like the lower courts, should decline Defendant’s invitation

because it is contrary to both longstanding caselaw and the rules of statutory interpretation.

First, Defendant suggests applying a dictionary definition of forfeiture, and Defendant’s

application asserts that “ ‘[f]orfeiture’ has a meaning and since it was not independently defined,

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must have the ordinary and normal use of the word when written.”7 This assertion is simply

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incorrect; the GPTA specifically defines forfeiture in MCL 211.78(8)(b). Indeed, despite arguing

that forfeiture was not defined in the GPTA, Defendant’s Application for Leave to Appeal cites

the statutory definition of forfeiture, which fatally undermines Defendant’s argument that it is

not defined by the GPTA.8 In any event, Defendant is simply incorrect that the ordinary

dictionary definition of the word forfeiture could apply with respect to the GPTA. Indeed, a

dictionary definition of “forfeiture” cannot be used because the GPTA provides a specific

definition for that term in in MCL 211.78(8)(b). “When a statute specifically defines a given

term, that definition alone controls.” Haynes v Neshewat, 477 Mich 29, 35; 729 NW2d 488

(2007) (emphasis added); Accord Tryc v Mich Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 136; 545

NW2d 642 (1996). Thus, the only definition of forfeiture that can have any meaning in the

context of the GPTA is the statute’s own definition of forfeiture contained at MCL 211.78(8)(b).

Defendant cannot select another definition from the dictionary when the Legislature specifically

defined forfeiture in the statutory scheme.

Second, Defendant suggests using the definition of forfeiture found in other legal

contexts, like civil asset forfeiture. But again, the definition of forfeiture in other legal contexts

is inapplicable here because the GPTA defines what forfeiture means, and the statutory definition

must control. See Haynes, 477 Mich at 35. Further, this Court specifically explained that

forfeiture under the GPTA should not be conflated with forfeiture in other areas of law, such as

civil asset forfeiture. Rafaeli, ___ Mich at ___, slip op at 14-15 (holding that the court of appeals

improperly sought guidance regarding the meaning of forfeiture under the GPTA by looking to

7
Defendant’s Application for Leave to Appeal, July 20, 2020, p 11.
8
Defendant’s Application for Leave to Appeal, July 20, 2020, p 10. (quoting the statutory
definition of forfeiture contained in MCL 211.78(8)(b)).

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caselaw addressing civil asset forfeiture). Thus, Defendant’s argument that this Court should

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adopt definitions of forfeiture from unrelated areas of law has already been rejected by this Court

in Rafaeli.

Accordingly, the arguments presented in Defendant’s Application lack merit, and the

statutory definition of forfeiture clearly resolves this matter in Plaintiff’s favor.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

In summary, the GPTA defines forfeiture in MCL 211.78(8)(b), and the statutory

definition is unambiguous: no transfer of ownership occurs when a property is forfeited. Instead,

the property merely becomes subject to foreclosure, and the government obtains no interest in

the property whatsoever merely because of forfeiture. See MCL 211.78(8)(b). And this Court

recently confirmed that taxpayer’s ownership of property is not disturbed by a forfeiture under

the GPTA. Rafaeli, ___ Mich at ___, slip op at 13-14. Accordingly, Defendant’s application

lacks merit and has not demonstrated grounds to invoke this Court’s discretionary review. See

MCR 7.305(B)(5).

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Court DENY Defendant’s Application for

Leave to Appeal for failure to demonstrate that the issue presented warrants review.

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Richard G. Roosen___________________

ROOSEN, VARCHETTI & OLIVIER, PLLC
Richard G. Roosen (P35222)
Paul E. Varchetti (P49403)
James Varchetti (P79606) James Varchetti (P79606)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 2305
Date: 8/17/2020 Mt. Clemens, MI 48046
OFN: 185402 (586) 868-2737