ZULUETA VS.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996

Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

Respondents: Court of Appeals and Alfredo Martin
Ponente: J. Mendoza

Facts:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her
from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence;

Held:
(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is
the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition
in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by
contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the
constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows
with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The review for petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

[GR L-69809, 16 October 1986]
FACTS:
Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico after
demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension
as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor
was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. since Atty. Gaanan
listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged Gaanan and
Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such
that its use to overheard a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of
communication between two parties using a telephone line.

HELD:
No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone or dictagraph, or
other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. this section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot
be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are of common
usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone conversation. The
telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the
phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension
telephone.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage,
through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups
from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some
unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listeneing , in order to
be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other similar nature.

Ching v. Goyanko

Facts:
Joseph Goyanko and Epifania dela Cruz were married. During the marriage, they acquire a certain
property in Cebu. In 1993, Joseph executed a deed of sale over the property in favor of his common-law-
wife Maria B. Ching. After Joseph's death, his children with Epifania discovered the sale. They thus filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property and damages against
Ching, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and of the TCT and the issuance of a new one in
favor of their father Goyanko.

Issue:

Was the sale made by Joseph Goyanko in favor of his common-law wife valid?

Held:

No. The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law relationships.

Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose cause, object, or purposes is contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are void and inexistent from the very
beginning.

Article 1352 also provides that: “Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce no effect
whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.”

Additionally, the law emphatically prohibits the spouses from selling property to each other subject to
certain exceptions. Similarly, donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so
because if transfers or conveyances between spouses were allowed during marriage, that would destroy
the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the exercise
of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of marriage, which is
the cornerstone of family law. The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage, otherwise, “the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than
those in legal union.”

As the conveyance in question was made by Goyangko in favor of his common- law-wife, it was null and
void. (Ching vs Goyanko, Jr., G.R. No. 165879, November 10, 2006 citing Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun,
G.R. No. L-57499, June 22, 1984)

Francisco Chavez
vs.
RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NTC
G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008
FACTS: Sometime before 6 June 2005, the radio station dzMM aired the Garci Tapes where the parties
to the conversation discussed “rigging” the results of the 2004 elections to favor President Arroyo. On 6
June 2005, Presidential spokesperson Bunye held a press conference in Malacañang Palace, where he
played before the presidential press corps two compact disc recordings of conversations between a
woman and a man. Bunye identified the woman in both recordings as President Arroyo but claimed that
the contents of the second compact disc had been “spliced” to make it appear that President Arroyo was
talking to Garcillano.
However, on 9 June 2005, Bunye backtracked and stated that the woman’s voice in the compact discs
was not President Arroyo’s after all.3 Meanwhile, other individuals went public, claiming possession of the
genuine copy of the Garci Tapes. Respondent Gonzalez ordered the NBI to investigate media
organizations which aired the Garci Tapes for possible violation of Republic Act No. 4200 or the Anti-
Wiretapping Law.
On 11 June 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television stations that airing the
Garci Tapes is a ” cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or
authorizations” issued to them. On 14 June 2005, NTC officers met with officers of the broadcasters
group KBP, to dispel fears of censorship. The NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement expressing
commitment to press freedom
On 21 June 2005, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner), as citizen, filed this petition to nullify the
“acts, issuances, and orders” of the NTC and respondent Gonzalez (respondents) on the following
grounds: (1) respondents’ conduct violated freedom of expression and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern under Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, and (2) the NTC
acted ultra vires when it warned radio and television stations against airing the Garci Tapes.
ISSUE: The principal issue for resolution is whether the NTC warning embodied in the press release of 11
June 2005 constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on freedom of expression.
1. Standing to File Petition
Petitioner has standing to file this petition. When the issue involves freedom of expression, as in the
present case, any citizen has the right to bring suit to question the constitutionality of a government action
in violation of freedom of expression, whether or not the government action is directed at such citizen.
Freedom of expression, being fundamental to the preservation of a free, open and democratic society, is
of transcendental importance that must be defended by every patriotic citizen at the earliest opportunity.
2. Overview of Freedom of Expression, Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment
Freedom of expression is the foundation of a free, open and democratic society. Freedom of expression
is an indispensable condition8 to the exercise of almost all other civil and political rights. Freedom of
expression allows citizens to expose and check abuses of public officials. Freedom of expression allows
citizens to make informed choices of candidates for public office.
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution prohibits the enactment of any law curtailing freedom of
expression:
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Thus, the rule is that expression is not subject to any prior restraint or censorship because the
Constitution commands that freedom of expression shall not be abridged. Over time, however, courts
have carved out narrow and well defined exceptions to this rule out of necessity.
The exceptions, when expression may be subject to prior restraint, apply in this jurisdiction to only four
categories of expression, namely:
pornography,
false or misleading advertisement,
advocacy of imminent lawless action, and
danger to national security.
All other expression is not subject to prior restraint.
Expression not subject to prior restraint is protected expression or high-value expression. Any content-
based prior restraint on protected expression is unconstitutional without exception. A protected
expression means what it says – it is absolutely protected from censorship. Thus, there can be no prior
restraint on public debates on the amendment or repeal of existing laws, on the ratification of treaties, on
the imposition of new tax measures, or on proposed amendments to the Constitution.
If the prior restraint is not aimed at the message or idea of the expression, it is content-neutral even if it
burdens expression. A content-neutral restraint is a restraint which regulates the time, place or manner of
the expression in public places without any restraint on the content of the expression. Courts will subject
content-neutral restraints to intermediate scrutiny. An example of a content-neutral restraint is a permit
specifying the date, time and route of a rally passing through busy public streets. A content-neutral prior
restraint on protected expression which does not touch on the content of the expression enjoys the
presumption of validity and is thus enforceable subject to appeal to the courts.
Expression that may be subject to prior restraint is unprotected expression or low-value expression. By
definition, prior restraint on unprotected expression is content-based since the restraint is imposed
because of the content itself. In this jurisdiction, there are currently only four categories of unprotected
expression that may be subject to prior restraint. This Court recognized false or misleading advertisement
as unprotected expression only in October 2007.
Only unprotected expression may be subject to prior restraint. However, any such prior restraint on
unprotected expression must hurdle a high barrier. First, such prior restraint is presumed unconstitutional.
Second, the government bears a heavy burden of proving the constitutionality of the prior restraint.
Prior restraint is a more severe restriction on freedom of expression than subsequent punishment.
Although subsequent punishment also deters expression, still the ideas are disseminated to the public.
Prior restraint prevents even the dissemination of ideas to the public.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, such expression may be subject to
subsequent punishment,27 either civilly or criminally. Similarly, if the unprotected expression does not
warrant prior restraint, the same expression may still be subject to subsequent punishment, civilly or
criminally. Libel falls under this class of unprotected expression.
However, if the expression cannot be subject to the lesser restriction of subsequent punishment, logically
it cannot also be subject to the more severe restriction of prior restraint. Thus, since profane language or
“hate speech” against a religious minority is not subject to subsequent punishment in this jurisdiction,
such expression cannot be subject to prior restraint.
If the unprotected expression warrants prior restraint, necessarily the same expression is subject to
subsequent punishment. There must be a law punishing criminally the unprotected expression before
prior restraint on such expression can be justified.
The prevailing test in this jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of government action imposing
prior restraint on three categories of unprotected expression – pornography,31 advocacy of imminent
lawless action, and danger to national security – is the clear and present dangertest.32 The expression
restrained must present a clear and present danger of bringing about a substantive evil that the State has
a right and duty to prevent, and such danger must be grave and imminent.
Prior restraint on unprotected expression takes many forms – it may be a law, administrative regulation,
or impermissible pressures like threats of revoking licenses or withholding of benefits.34 The
impermissible pressures need not be embodied in a government agency regulation, but may emanate
from policies, advisories or conduct of officials of government agencies.
3. Government Action in the Present Case
The government action in the present case is a warning by the NTC that the airing or broadcasting of the
Garci Tapes by radio and television stations is a “cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation
of the licenses or authorizations” issued to radio and television stations. The NTC warning, embodied in a
press release, relies on two grounds. First, the airing of the Garci Tapes “is a continuing violation of the
Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued
to radio and TV stations.” Second, the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated, and subsequent
investigation may establish that the tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation.
The NTC does not claim that the public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes unprotected expression that
may be subject to prior restraint. The NTC does not specify what substantive evil the State seeks to
prevent in imposing prior restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes. The NTC does not claim that the
public airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, of grave and
imminent character, that the State has a right and duty to prevent.
The NTC did not conduct any hearing in reaching its conclusion that the airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes a continuing violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. There is also the issue of whether a
wireless cellular phone conversation is covered by the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
Clearly, the NTC has no factual or legal basis in claiming that the airing of the Garci Tapes constitutes a
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law. The radio and television stations were not even given an
opportunity to be heard by the NTC. The NTC did not observe basic due process as mandated in Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.
The NTC concedes that the Garci Tapes have not been authenticated as accurate or truthful. The NTC
also concedes that only “after a prosecution or appropriate investigation” can it be established that the
Garci Tapes constitute “false information and/or willful misrepresentation.” Clearly, the NTC admits that it
does not even know if the Garci Tapes contain false information or willful misrepresentation.
4. Nature of Prior Restraint in the Present Case
The NTC action restraining the airing of the Garci Tapes is a content-based prior restraint because it is
directed at the message of the Garci Tapes. The NTC’s claim that the Garci Tapes might contain “false
information and/or willful misrepresentation,” and thus should not be publicly aired, is an admission that
the restraint is content-based.
5. Nature of Expression in the Present Case
The public airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression because it does not fall under any of the
four existing categories of unprotected expression recognized in this jurisdiction. The airing of the Garci
Tapes is essentially a political expression because it exposes that a presidential candidate had allegedly
improper conversations with a COMELEC Commissioner right after the close of voting in the last
presidential elections.
Obviously, the content of the Garci Tapes affects gravely the sanctity of the ballot. Public discussion on
the sanctity of the ballot is indisputably a protected expression that cannot be subject to prior restraint. In
any event, public discussion on all political issues should always remain uninhibited, robust and wide
open.
The rule, which recognizes no exception, is that there can be no content-based prior restraint on
protected expression. On this ground alone, the NTC press release is unconstitutional. Of course, if the
courts determine that the subject matter of a wiretapping, illegal or not, endangers the security of the
State, the public airing of the tape becomes unprotected expression that may be subject to prior restraint.
However, there is no claim here by respondents that the subject matter of the Garci Tapes involves
national security and publicly airing the tapes would endanger the security of the State.
The airing of the Garci Tapes does not violate the right to privacy because the content of the Garci Tapes
is a matter of important public concern. The Constitution guarantees the people’s right to information on
matters of public concern. The remedy of any person aggrieved by the public airing of the Garci Tapes is
to file a complaint for violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law after the commission of the crime. Subsequent
punishment, absent a lawful defense, is the remedy available in case of violation of the Anti-Wiretapping
Law.
While there can be no prior restraint on protected expression, there can be subsequent punishment for
protected expression under libel, tort or other laws. In the present case, the NTC action seeks prior
restraint on the airing of the Garci Tapes, not punishment of personnel of radio and television stations for
actual violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law.
6. Only the Courts May Impose Content-Based Prior Restraint
The NTC has no power to impose content-based prior restraint on expression. The charter of the NTC
does not vest NTC with any content-based censorship power over radio and television stations.
In the present case, the airing of the Garci Tapes is a protected expression that can never be subject to
prior restraint. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that the airing of the Garci Tapes
constitutes unprotected expression, only the courts have the power to adjudicate on the factual and legal
issue of whether the airing of the Garci Tapes presents a clear and present danger of bringing about a
substantive evil that the State has a right and duty to prevent, so as to justify the prior restraint.
Any order imposing prior restraint on unprotected expression requires prior adjudication by the courts on
whether the prior restraint is constitutional. This is a necessary consequence from the presumption of
invalidity of any prior restraint on unprotected expression.
7. Government Failed to Overcome Presumption of Invalidity
Respondents did not invoke any compelling State interest to impose prior restraint on the public airing of
the Garci Tapes. The respondents claim that they merely “fairly warned” radio and television stations to
observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent NTC circulars on program standards. Respondents have
not explained how and why the observance by radio and television stations of the Anti-Wiretapping Law
and pertinent NTC circulars constitutes a compelling State interest justifying prior restraint on the public
airing of the Garci Tapes.
Violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Law, like the violation of any criminal statute, can always be subject to
criminal prosecution after the violation is committed. Respondents have not explained how the violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Law, or of the pertinent NTC circulars, can incite imminent lawless behavior or
endanger the security of the State.
8. The NTC Warning is a Classic Form of Prior Restraint
The NTC press release threatening to suspend or cancel the airwave permits of radio and television
stations constitutes impermissible pressure amounting to prior restraint on protected expression. Whether
the threat is made in an order, regulation, advisory or press release, the chilling effect is the same: the
threat freezes radio and television stations into deafening silence. Radio and television stations that have
invested substantial sums in capital equipment and market development suddenly face suspension or
cancellation of their permits. The NTC threat is thus real and potent.

Conclusion
In sum, the NTC press release constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on protected expression.
There can be no content-based prior restraint on protected expression. This rule has no exception.

People v. Nazario (ngaa ari na di??)

Facts:

Eusebio Nazario was charged in violation of refusal and failure to pay his municipal taxes
amounting to Php 362.62 because of his fishpond operation provided under Ordinance 4, Series of
1955, as amended. He is a resident of Sta. Mesa Manila and just leases a fishpond located at
Pagbilao, Quezon with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. The years in question of failure to
pay was for 1964, 1965, and 1966. Nazario did not pay because he was not sure if he was covered under
the ordinance. He was found guilty thus this petition.
Issues:

1. Whether or not Ordinance 4, Series of 1955, as amended null and void for being ambiguous
and uncertain
2. Whether or not the ordinance was unconstitutional for being ex post facto

Held:

No, the coverage of the ordinance covers him as the actual operator of the fishpond thus he comes with
the term “Manager”. He was the one who spent money in developing and maintaining it, so despite
only leasing it from the national government, the latter does not get any profit as it goes only to
Nazario. The dates of payment are also clearly stated “Beginnin and taking effect from 1964 if the
fishpond started operating in 1964”.
2. No, it is not ex post facto. Ordinance 4 was enacted in 1955 so it can’t be that the amendment under
Ordinance 12 is being made to apply retroactively. Also, the act of non-payment has been made
punishable since 1955 so it means Ordinance 12 is not imposing a retroactive penalty

The appeal is DISMISSED with cost against the appellant.

Matabuena v. Cervantes

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)

March 31, 1971
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law
spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years
after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died.
Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral
relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at
the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code
inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-
law relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during
marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires
that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and
improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive
policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily result in
appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is entitled to one-half of
the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.

MARIO R. MELCHOR, petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent.
G.R. No. 95398
August 16, 1991

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Mario R. Melchor entered into a contract with Cebu Diamond Construction for the construction
of Phase I of the home Technology Building of Alangalang Agro-Industrial School of Alangalang,
Leyte, for the price of P488, 000. Pablo Narido, chief accountant of the school, issued a
certificate of availability of funds to cover the construction cost. Narido, however, failed to sign
as a Witness to the contract, contrarily to the requirement of Section I of Letter of Instruction (LOI)
No. 968.
While the construction of Phase I was under way, the contractor, in a letter dated November 8, 1983
addressed to Melchor, sought an additional charge of P73,000 equivalent to 15% of the stipulated
amount due to an increase in the cost of labor and construction materials. The petitioner then sent
a letter asking for the approval of the Regional Director of the Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports (MECS) on the contractor's additional charge which the latter later approved.

The contractor requested series of extensions for the completion of the construction which the
petitioner granted. However, the contractor later gave up the project mainly to save itself from further
losses due to, among other things, increased cost of construction materials and labor.
The Commission on Audit Regional Director, Cesar A. Damole, disallowed the payment of P515,305.60
in post-audit on the ground that the contract was null and void for lack of signature of the
chief accountant of the school as witness to it.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner should be held personally liable for the amount paid for the
construction of a public school building on the ground that the infrastructure contract is null and
void for want of one signature?

RULING:

The Court finds that the contract executed by the petitioner and Cebu Diamond Construction is
enforceable and, therefore, the petitioner should not be made to personally pay for the building already
constructed.

In the case before us, the chief accountant issued a certificate of availability of funds but failed to sign
the contract as witness. But since Section 86 states that the certificate shall be attached to and become
an integral part of the proposed contract, then the failure of the chief accountant to affix his
signature to the contract was somehow made up by his own certification which is the basic and more
important validating document. We agree with the petitioner's view that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of LOI 968 in the execution of the contract.

LESSON:
It is a rule of statutory construction that the court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice or would defeat the clear purpose
of the lawmakers.

Vda. De Ape v. Ca
456 SCRA 193 – Civil Law – Law on Sales – Elements of a Contract of Sale – Consent Vitiated
Cleopas Ape died in 1950 and left a parcel of land (Lot 2319) to his 11 children. The children never
formally divided the property amongst themselves except through hantal-hantal whereby each just
occupied a certain portion and developed each.
On the other hand, the spouses Lumayno were interested in the land so they started buying the portion of
land that each of the heirs occupied. On 11 Apr 1973, one of the children, Fortunato, entered into a
contract of sale with Lumayno. In exchange of his lot, Lumayno agreed to pay P5,000.00. She paid in
advance P30.00. Fortunato was given a receipt prepared by Lumayno’s son in law (Andres Flores).
Flores also acted as witness. Lumayno also executed sales transactions with Fortunato’s siblings
separately.
In 1973, Lumayno compelled Fortunato to make the the delivery to her of the registrable deed of sale over
Fortunato’s portion of the Lot No. 2319. Fortunato assailed the validity of the contract of sale. He also
invoked his right to redeem (as a co-owner) the portions of land sold by his siblings to Lumayno.
Fortunato died during the pendency of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid contract of sale?
HELD: No. Fortunato was a “no read no write” person. It was incumbent for the the other party to prove
that details of the contract was fully explained to Fortunato before Fortunato signed the receipt.
A contract of sale is a consensual contract, thus, it is perfected by mere consent of the parties. It is born
from the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the sale and upon the
price. Upon its perfection, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, that is, the vendee may
compel the transfer of the ownership and to deliver the object of the sale while the vendor may demand
the vendee to pay the thing sold. For there to be a perfected contract of sale, however, the following
elements must be present: consent, object, and price in money or its equivalent.
For consent to be valid, it must meet the following requisites:
(a) it should be intelligent, or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers;
(b) it should be free and
(c) it should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence, intimidation
or undue influence; spontaneity by fraud.
Lumayno claimed that she explained fully the receipt to Fortunato, but Flores’ testimony belies it. Flores
said there was another witness but the other was a maid who also lacked education. Further, Flores
himself was not aware that the receipt was “to transfer the ownership of Fortunato’s land to her mom-in-
law”. It merely occurred to him to explain the details of the receipt but he never did.