LAZATIN v. DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN and SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No.

147097,
June 5, 2009 (Third Division), Peralta

Facts:

Ombudsman filed a complaint charging petitioners Carmelo F. Lazatin, Marino A.

Morales, Teodoro L. David and Angelito A. Pelayo with Illegal Use of Public Funds as
defined and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of
Section 3 (a) (e) of RA 3019 as amended.

Ombudsman alleged that there were irregularities in the use of then

Congressman Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Dund (CDF) for 1996, (1) he
was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF, (2) he signed
vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer,
and (3) he received, as claimant 18 checks amounting to Php 4, 868, 277.08, and (4)
he, with the help of other petitioners, converted the CDF to cash.

After the preliminary investigation, a Resolution was issued recommending the

filing against petitioners of fourteen (14) counts EACH of Malversation of Public Funds
and violation of RA 3019. It was APPROVED by the Ombudsman; hence 28
informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioners filed their MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION which were

GRANTED by the Sandiganbayan and ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the
cases. Thus, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) submitted a Resolution to the
Ombudsman, RECOMMENDING THE DISMISSAL of the cases for lack of evidence.

Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) to REVIEW the
OSP Resolution. In a Memorandum, OSP RECOMMENDED THE DISSAPPROVAL of
the OSP Resolution and that it be DIRECTED TO PROCEED WITH TRIAL of the cases
against petitioners.

Ombudsman ADOPTED the OLA Memorandum and the cases were returned to
the Sandiganbayan for AGGRESSIVE PROSECUTION of the subject cases.

Hence, petitioners filed this PETITION FOR CERTIORARI alleging that: (1)
Ombudsman had no authority to overturn the OSP Resolution which dismissed the case
of the petitioners because accordingly in Sec.13, Art XI, of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman is clothed only with the power to watch, investigate, and recommend the
filing of proper cases against erring officials, but it had no power to prosecute; (2) OSP
is intended to be a separate and distinct entity from Ombudsman, which has the power
to prosecute, and thus the latter has no authority over the OSP; (3) RA 6770 “The
Ombudsman Act of 1989” which made OSP an organic component of the Ombudsman
should be struck down for being unconstitutional; (4) they should be absolved because
the checks issued to Lazatin were reimbursement for the advances he made from his
personal funds for expenses incurred in the projects badly needed by Pinatubo victims.

Issue/s: Whether or not RA 6770, “The Ombudsman Act,” granting the Office of the
Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office is
unconstitutional.

Ruling:

No. It has long been settled that RA 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman
prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office has no constitutional
infirmity. This issue had been fully dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. Office of
the Ombudsman.

In that case, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powers to the Ombudsman
is in accordance with the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides
that the Ombudsman, “shall exercise such other functions or duties as may be provided
by law.”

The fact that the OSP is subsumed under the Office of the Ombudsman was
likewise upheld by the Court in Acop. It was explained thus:

...the then existing Tanodbayan, henceforth knows as the Office of

the Special Prosecutor, “shall continue to function and exercise its powers
as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on
the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution...” It follows
then that Congress may remove...or grant it other powers, except those
powers conferred by the Constitution on the Office of the Ombudsman.

Pursuing the present line of reasoning, when one considers that by

express mandate of par. 8, Sec. 13, Art. XI of the Constitution, the
Ombudsman may “exercise such other powers or perform function or
duties as may be provided by law,” it is indubitable then that Congress
has the power to place the Office of the Special Prosecutor under the
Office of the Ombudsman...Congress may remove some of the powers
granted to the Tanodbayan...and transfer them to the Ombudsman...This
Congress did through...RA 6770.

The Court, basing its ratio decidendi on its ruling in the aforementioned case
declared that the OSP is “merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may
only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman
and ruled that under RA 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the
Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.
 The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and
not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code,
“Judicial decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part
of the legal system of the Philippines.”

This doctrine requires adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a

country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court. The decision
becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land...based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument. ( Fermin v. People)

It is a doctrine of policy, grounded on the necessity of securing certainty and

stability of judicial decisions. “Stand by the decisions and disturb not what is settled.
Stare decisis simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one
case should be applied those that follow if the facts are substantially the same...absent
any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike...a bar
to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.” (YMCA v. Remington Steel Corporation )

Abandonment must be based only on strong and compelling reasons. In theis

case, petitioners have not shown any compelling reason that the doctrine of stare
decisis should not be applied in this case.

Wherefore, petition is DISMISSED.