REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.

PILAR ESTIPULAR
G.R. No. 136588 | July 20, 2000

FACTS:

This case is rooted in a Petition for Reconstitution of Title filed by Pilar Estipular before the
Regional Trial Court of La Union. In her Petition for Reconstitution of Title, the petitioner, Pilar
Estipular, declared that she [was] the only surviving legal heir of the late Fermin Estipular, who died
intestate in Caba, La Union. During his lifetime, Fermin was issued Certificate of Title No. 154 duly
registered in his own name by the Register of Deeds of La Union covering a parcel of land located at
Barrio Liquicia, Caba, La Union, with an area of 6.1253 hectares. The said Certificate of Title was either
destroyed or burned as a result of the burning of the Register of Deeds of La Union during the last World
War.

On June 15, 1994, the court a quo ordered that a Notice of Hearing be published for two
successive issues of the Official Gazette and be posted at the main entrance of the Municipal Building of
Caba, La Union at least thirty (30) days from the initial hearing set for September 8, 1994 (Records, p. 8).
A Certificate of Posting was submitted by Branch Sheriff Romeo Obiena proving that copies of the
Petition and Notice of Hearing were posted at the main entrance of Municipal Building of Caba, La
Union (Records, p. 9). However, the National Printing Office advised the lower court to reschedule its
original date of hearing as it could not meet the schedule of publication (Records, p. 11). On August 12,
1994, another Notice of Hearing was issued by the trial court, resetting the initial hearing to December 7,
1994. (Records, p. 13). In view thereof, a second Certificate of Posting was issued by Branch Sheriff
concerning the administrative case (Records, p.16). In the same manner, the National Printing Office
issued a Certificate of Publication showing that the said petition for reconstitution was published in the
Official Gazette for two successive weeks on October 17 and 24, 1994.

After the presentation of evidence, the lower court rendered the questioned decision. Although
the Notice of Hearing had not been posted at the main entrance of the provincial building, the CA held
that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not supposed substantial compliance with the requirements of Republic Act No. 26 is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the trial court over the case.

HELD:

No. Requirements indicated in Republic Act No. 26 are mandatory and compliance with them is
jurisdictional. Section 13 of the said Act states that:

"Sec. 13. The Court shall cause a notice of the petition, filed under the preceding section, to be published,
at the expense of the petitioner, twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette, and to be posted on the
main entrance of the provincial building and of the municipal building of the municipality or city in
which the land is situated, at least thirty days prior to the date of hearing. The court shall likewise cause a
copy of the notice to be sent, by registered mail or otherwise, at the expense of the petitioner, to every
person named therein whose address is known, at least thirty days prior to the date of the hearing. Said
notice shall state, among other things, the number of the lost or destroyed certificate of title if known, the
name of the registered owner, the name of the occupants or persons in possession of the property, the
owner of the adjoining properties, the location, area and boundaries of the property, and the date on which
all persons having any interest therein must appear and file their claim or objection to the petition. The
petitioner shall, at the hearing, submit proof of publication, posting and service of the notice as directed
by the court."

In the present case, it is undisputed that the Notice of Hearing of respondent’s Petition for
Reconstitution was not posted at the main entrance of the provincial building. Under the circumstances, it
is clear that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because of its own lapse, which
respondent failed to cure.
 EMILIO GONZALES LA’O vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 160719 |  January 23, 2006

FACTS:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) is the registered owner of three parcels of
land with an area of around 821 square meters, with a five-storey building and the other improvements
thereon.

The GSIS and the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC), entered into a "lease-purchase" agreement (first contract). On December 22, 1980,
petitioner offered to purchase the property. Later, GSIS and petitioner executed a "lease-purchase"
agreement (second contract). Under the same contract, GSIS obligated itself to construct for the OGCC a
three-storey building on the Manila Bay reclaimed area or to make available another property acceptable
to the OGCC, to be conveyed to the Republic under the same or mutually acceptable terms and conditions
as those of the first contract. In the meantime, the OGCC was allowed to continue occupying the second
to the fifth floors of the building at an annual rental of P100,000, payable to petitioner. Furthermore,
petitioner was entitled to lease out the ground floor and collect the corresponding rentals.

In 1989, after the overthrow of Marcos (in 1986), respondents filed before the RTC of Manila,
Branch 41 a complaint against petitioner alleging several issues, which is primarily actually anchored to
one main issue: the validity of the second contract.

Petitioner asserts that it is the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case
at bar because the complaint involved the annulment of a fraudulent conveyance of government property
to a Marcos crony and the recovery of such "ill-gotten wealth" by the government.  Furthermore, for
failure to consolidate this civil case with the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan [charging petitioner with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019], this case should be considered abandoned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the case should be within the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan and not that of RTC.

HELD:

It is correct that Sandiganbayan and not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case at bar; however,
the issue of jurisdiction was raised only for the first time in the Petitioner’s memorandum before the
Supreme Court. While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings since it is conferred by law, it is nevertheless settled that a party may be barred
from raising it on the ground of estoppel. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an
adverse decision on the merits, it is improper and too late for the losing party to question the jurisdiction
of the court. A party who has invoked the jurisdiction of a court over a particular matter to secure
affirmative relief cannot be permitted to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape liability. Thus
petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the court a quo.
SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY
and LUCIA BAGUIO
G.R. No. L-21450 | April 15, 1968

FACTS:

The spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court
of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from
them the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until
the whole obligation is paid, plus costs - one month after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 296 known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties,
but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc.

After trial upon the issues thus joined, the Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and,
after the same had become final and executory, the Court issued a writ of execution against the
defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution against the Surety's bond, against which the Surety filed a written opposition. Thereafter the
necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs filed a
second motion for execution against the counterbond. Upon its failure to file such answer, the Court
granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.

Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without
the required summary hearing provided for in Section 17 of Rule 59 of the Rules of Court. As the Court
denied the motion, the Surety appealed to the Court of Appeals. The CA affirmed the order appealed
from.

Five days after the Surety received notice of the decision; it filed a motion asking for extension of
time within which to file a motion for reconsideration. This motion was granted, but instead of such
answer or opposition, the Surety filed the motion to dismiss in the ground that CFI has no jurisdiction
over the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the issue of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal.

HELD:

 The rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law,
and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection
may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the
present case, the Court is of the opinion that the Surety is now barred by  laches from invoking this plea at
this late hour for the purpose of annuling everything done heretofore in the case with its active
participation.

As already stated, the action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19,
1948, that is, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss on January 12, 1963
raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the
rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of
the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for
the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
 VINCENT E. OMICTIN vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division) and
GEORGE I. LAGOS
G.R. No.148004 | January 22, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a
complaint for two counts of estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati against private
respondent George I. Lagos. Private respondent filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the basis of a
prejudicial question because of a pending petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
involving the same parties. The trial court, in an order dated September 8, 1999, denied respondent’s
motion to suspend proceedings and motion to recuse. His motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the trial court in its order issued on October 29, 1999, respondent filed with the CA the petition
for certiorari assailing the aforesaid orders. The CA granted the motion to suspend proceedings.

On January 18, 2001, the SEC case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 214, pursuant to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC implementing the Securities and
Regulation Code (Republic Act No. 8799) enacted on July 19, 2000, vesting in the RTCs jurisdiction over
intra-corporate disputes.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies.

HELD:

Yes. It has been established that prejudicial question exists to warrant the suspension of the
criminal proceedings pending the resolution of the intra-corporate controversy that was originally filed
with the SEC. Likewise, by analogy, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The
issues raised by petitioner particularly the status of Saag Phils., Inc. vis-à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as
the question regarding the supposed authority of the latter to make a demand on behalf of the company,
are proper subjects for the determination of the tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case which in this case
is the RTC of Mandaluyong, Branch 214. These issues would have been referred to the expertise of the
SEC in accordance with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction had the case not been transferred to the RTC
of Mandaluyong.

Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in
determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency
has determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
Hence, the RTC of Mandaluyong where the intra-corporate case is pending has the primary jurisdiction to
determine the issues under contention relating to the status of the domestic corporation, Saag Phils., Inc.,
vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the domestic corporation, the
determination of which will have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The law recognizes that, in place
of the SEC, the regular courts now have the legal competence to decide intra-corporate disputes.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ELESEO CHENG

 G.R. No. 120158-59 | September 15, 1997

FACTS:

The herein criminal cases were commenced with the filing of two Informations for the crime of
murder against herein accused-appellant Eleseo Cheng, Alejandro Malubay, and Salvador Sioco.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued, following which, judgment was rendered convicting accused-
appellant. Accused-appellant filed motion for reconsideration of said decision, raising the following
grounds: (1) that because he was a member of the Integrated National Police on his tour of duty on the
date and time of the incident as charged, jurisdiction over the offense and authority to hear, try, and
decide the case against him is conferred on a court martial, not a civil court, and (2) in the alternative, that
assuming ex gratia that the court has jurisdiction, the prosecution evidence engendered reasonable doubt
in many aspects, thus, his conviction is erroneous. The motions, as well as its supplement, were denied by
the trial court in its order dated November 7, 1994.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

HELD:

NO. While it is true that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case cannot be waived and may
be assailed at any stage in the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal, this ruling presupposes that
the factual basis for determining such want of jurisdiction is extant in the record of the case and is borne
by the evidence. Should there be nothing on record which may indicate lack of jurisdiction; this Court
will sustain the existence thereof.

The record reveals that on February 21, 1989, when the crimes charged were committed, accused-
appellant was undoubtedly in active service. Under Paragraph (a) of Section 1, of Presidential Decree No.
1850, exclusive jurisdiction over accused-appellant and the offense should have pertained to the courts
martial save only in the following exceptions, namely: (2) court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the
accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of his
separation from active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise
provided by law;

During the hearing, there is an express judicial admission by accused-appellant that as of May 20,
1989, he was already separated from active service in the INP. Thus, just like in the case of  People
vs. Dulos (237 SCRA 141 [1994]) this issue of jurisdiction may be disposed of by stating that while it is
true that Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1850, as amended, vests exclusive jurisdiction upon courts
martial to try criminal offenses committed by members of the INP, whether or not done in the actual
performance of their official duties, accused-appellant's case falls under the second exception contained in
the proviso of the section which confers upon civil courts jurisdiction over the person of the accused
where he was discharged from active service without military jurisdiction having duly attached over him
before his separation. The court, a quo, therefore had jurisdiction over accused-appellant for the offenses
charged.

MA. CONCEPCION L. REGALADO vs. ANTONIO S. GO

 G.R. No. 167988 | February 6, 2007

FACTS:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Resolution
dated 30 August 2004 of the Court of Appeals, finding petitioner Ma. Concepcion L. Regalado (Atty.
Regalado) guilty of indirect contempt. Likewise assailed in this petition is the Resolution denying her
Motion for Reconsideration. The present controversy stemmed from the complaint of illegal dismissal
filed before the Labor Arbiter by herein respondent Antonio S. Go against Eurotech Hair Systems, Inc.
(EHSI), and its President Lutz Kunack and General Manager Jose E. Barin.

On 16 July 2003, after the promulgation of the Court of Appeals decision but prior to the receipt
of the parties of their respective copies, the parties decided to settle the case and signed a Release Waiver
and Quitclaim with the approval of the Labor Arbiter. In view of the amicable settlement, the Labor
Arbiter, on the same day, issued an Order dismissing the illegal dismissal case with prejudice. After the
receipt of a copy of the Court of Appeals decision, respondent Go, through counsel, filed, on 29 July
2003, a Manifestation with Omnibus Motion seeking to nullify the Release Waiver and Quitclaim dated
16 July 2003 on the ground of fraud, mistake or undue influence. In the same motion, respondent Go,
through counsel, moved that petitioner Atty. Regalado be made to explain her unethical conduct for
directly negotiating with respondent Go without the knowledge of his counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court of appeals committed a manifest error of law in ruling that petitioner is
estopped from challenging its authority to entertain the contempt charges against her.

HELD:

YES. Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." Estoppel by laches may be
invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to
that in the landmark case of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. In Sibonghanoy, the defense of lack of jurisdiction
was raised for the first time in a motion to dismiss filed by the Surety almost 15 years after the questioned
ruling had been rendered. Clearly, the factual settings attendant in Sibonghanoy are not present in the case
at bar. Petitioner Atty. Regalado, after the receipt of the Court of Appeals resolution finding her guilty of
contempt, promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration assailing the said court’s jurisdiction based on
procedural infirmity in initiating the action. Her compliance with the appellate court’s directive to show
cause why she should not be cited for contempt and filing a single piece of pleading to that effect could
not be considered as an active participation in the judicial proceedings so as to take the case within the
milieu of Sibonghanoy. Rather, it is the natural fear to disobey the mandate of the court that could lead to
dire consequences that impelled her to comply.
EMERITO M. RAMOS, SUSANA B. RAMOS, EMERITO B. RAMOS, JR., JOSEFA RAMOS DE LA
RAMA, HORACIO DE LA RAMA, ANTONIO B. RAMOS, FILOMENA RAMOS LEDESMA,
RODOLFO RAMOS, VICTORIA RAMOS TANJUATCO, and TEOFILO TANJUATCO vs.
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. L-29352 | October 4, 1971

FACTS:

This is a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a

writ of preliminary injunction to restrain respondent Central Bank of the Philippines (hereinafter
designated as the CB) from enforcing and implementing the Monetary Board Resolution No. 1263,
adopted on 30 July 1968, excluding the Overseas Bank of Manila (hereinafter termed the OBM) from
clearing with the Central Bank, that was ordered implemented on 31 July 1968, and Resolution No.
1290, adopted on 1 August 1968, granting authority to the OBM Board of Directors to suspend
operations thereof, which was implemented on 2 August 1968. Both stated resolutions were taken
and assailed by the Supreme Court. Thereafter, on 13 August 1968, the CB Monetary Board
adopted Resolution No. 1333, ordering the Superintendent of Banks to proceed to the liquidation of
the OBM, under Section 29 of the Central Bank Act. As already noted, implementation of this
resolution was restrained by this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not this Supreme Court has jurisdiction to restrain the implementation of CB
Resolution No. 1333.

HELD:

YES. Before the Central Bank adopted said Resolution No. 1333 on 13 August 1968 the
Court had already taken cognizance of the petition, assailing Resolutions Nos. 1263 and 1290 of
the Monetary Board as "patent acts of liquidation," violative of its alleged commitment to
rehabilitate the overseas Bank; and the Court, in fact, already had required the Central Bank to
answer the petition on 12 August 1962, prior to the adoption of Resolution No. 1333. The latter
resolution is clearly an act in pursuance of the policy outlined in the previous resolutions (1263
and 1290) enjoined by this Court. Hence, if jurisdiction was already acquired to delve into the
validity of Resolutions 1263 and 1290 (and this the Central Bank admits), there is no cogent
reason why, after such jurisdiction had been acquired, the Court should be deprived thereof by
the subsequent adoption of Resolution 1333, particularly because the latter, in relation to the
antecedent facts, appears to be no more than a deliberate effort to evade the jurisdiction of this
Court, and have the case thrown back to the Court of First Instance.