BEWARE FAST TRACKING COMPLEX HIGH RISE BUILDINGS

Author: Skaik, Samer1

Abstract
In complex high rise projects, employers tend to fast track works where construction can begin while design is still
incomplete following three main phases of procurement. Shoring system and piling are firstly procured and awarded
to an enabling contractor. Upon completion of enabling works, main design and traditional tendering of the second
phase can be concluded in order for main construction works to commence on site. While main work is progressing,
design of specialist packages will be completed and nominated subcontractors are appointed in a timely manner
shaping the third phase of procurement. Such common phased construction usually results in substantial time saving
in project life cycle. However, many fast track projects suffer time and cost overruns due to inherent risks of fast
tracking such as design deficiencies and ambiguities in risk allocation between involved parties. This paper aims to
investigate pros and cons of fast track procurement approach for complex high rise projects and examine how relevant
risks are allocated among enabling contractors, main contractors, nominated subcontractors and project consultants
in theory and practice.

The paper will demonstrate an interesting case study of a fast track overseas super high rise building where an
Australian firm was appointed by the employer as a technical expert to provide a detailed report on the failure of
shoring system while the construction of five basements had just started next to marina. There were two different
failures that the Australian expert was supposed to assess their causes. First, a major deflection was observed on
neighbor’s shoring wall towards building plot which put a major area within the plot on hold by local municipality for
safety precautions. Second, water seepage started to show signals on the sides of the lift pit at the center of plot
despite the existence of running dewatering system. Then, seepage rapidly developed to a major flood filling the
excavated pit of 25 meters depth with water. The case study will also demonstrate another problem associated with
subcontract nomination which is another fast tracking approach in high rise buildings and will discuss the taken
measures by the project management team to redress problems and mitigate risks during construction. In conclusion,
lessons learnt from the case study will be summarized with recommendations to have better practice of fast tracking
approach in complex high rise buildings.

Keywords: dispute, expert report, fast track, high rise, phased construction, risk allocation, risk management.

1. Introduction
Flyvbjerg (2003) stated that due to complexity of projects, it is important for organizations to think about
approaches that minimize risks. In high rise projects, construction firms tend to fast track works where
construction can begin while design is still incomplete. Dey (2000) stated that those firms enjoy competitive
advantage. Fast tracking may be inevitable in complex projects due to lengthy design and construction
processes that are encountered using traditional methods. However, many fast track projects suffer time
and cost overruns at initial stages of the construction of main works due to design errors and lack of
coordination and communication between parties. U.S. Federal Facilities Council (2007) reported that 33
percent of fast-track projects have claims as compared to 7 percent of conservatively scheduled projects.
Many scholars touched base on this proposing mitigation measures to improve the performance of fast
track projects, but current practices are still unsatisfactory in construction industry.

1
Founder & Principal-Construction Management Guide, website: www.cmguide.org
& PhD Scholar- School of The Built Environment, Deakin University, email: sskaik@deakin.edu.au
1|Page
2. Methodology
An extensive Literature review will be conducted to gather and appraise information on fast tracking in
construction industry and associated benefits and challenges. Resources shall include latest journal papers,
conference proceedings, industry articles, case studies and the like with an attempt to emphasis on complex
projects as applicable. The Author selected a qualitative approach to collect primary data using a case study.
The selected case study will demonstrate the practice of fast tracking in a super high rise building
constructed overseas. With an in-depth analysis of incurred events, the case study will point out all
significant issues encountered in the application of fast tracking as a delivery method. The results will be
critically analyzed and evaluated, then general discussion will be held to assess the results and compare the
same with literature findings to come up with firm conclusions and recommendations.

3. Literature Review

3.1 Definition
Fast tracking approach had firstly appeared in early 1960s. Fast tracking is defined as an overlapping
between design and construction within a specified period of time (Fazio et al. 1998 and Songer et al. 2000).
Khoueiry et al. (2013) defines fast tracking as allowing downstream construction activities to start with
incomplete information from upstream design activities to achieve shorter project duration at the expense
of potential rework. ‘Design and Build’ procurement route is one of the most popular approaches of
implementing fast tracking, however the approach is usually inappropriate for complex projects unless used
deliberately for some packages within the project. For example, in high rise buildings, employers tend to
award shoring and piling to an enabling contractor on a ‘design and build’ basis once concept design is
completed to speed up the overall procurement. The target is to ensure that the enabling work scope is
completed latest upon the award of main contract to maximize the efficiency of fast tracking. Here, the
project manager’s role is quite essential in controlling the processes in each package in light of the agreed
schedule, budget and intended quality.

3.2 Application
Fast tracking can take many shapes and approaches in its application in construction industry. Figure (1)
below illustrates common differences in the approach between traditional and fast track projects. In high
rise buildings, there is a common practice to follow a specific procurement strategy to shorten project
schedule to the maximum. Shoring system and piling are likely to be procured firstly on a design & build
basis where the winning enabling contractor can commence construction at a very early stage of design
development. Upon completion of enabling works, main design of structural and architectural disciplines
will be completed together with tendering of such works. Then, the designer will continue working on the
design of other packages such as electromechanical work, Façade cladding and structural steelwork (Hackett
and Robinson, 2003).This arrangement must be defined in the main contract conditions as well as the bill of
quantities using provisional sums. The main contract should include a provision that gives the employer or
his representative the right to select and nominate certain subcontractors. Wilkie and Walker (2002) stated
that many forms of contract give employers the right to nominate subcontractors such as FIDIC, Australian
standard AS2142 and ICE conditions of contract. Fong (2004) said that the main benefit of nomination is to
proceed with construction works despite of incomplete design. The contractor’s programme should identify

2|Page
nomination dates upon which the employer should act diligently to appoint specialist subcontractors to
avoid delays to project.

Traditional
Concept Development Definition Design Procurement Commission Operation
Project
Construction

Concept Development
Fast Track
Definition
Project Design
Procurement
Construction
Commission Operation

Figure (1) Project Delivery Method: Traditional Project Vs Fast Track Project

3.3 Pros and Cons of Fast Tracking

There is no doubt that fast tracking approach saves tremendous time in project schedule compared with
traditional delivery method. This will directly result in considerable reduction in administration and indirect
costs associated with design, construction and management of project. Through four case studies, Eldin
(1997) concluded that applying concurrent engineering standards could reduce project schedule by up to
25% in comparison with traditional procurement. Having said that, intensive care is required to mitigate
challenges and pitfalls associated with the overall process. Moazzami et al. (2011) in their study concluded
that inaccurate cost estimating, cost overrun, design errors and omissions, delay damages, construction
rework, modifications and overlooked works are among the most common reasons for disputes in fast-
tracking.

Hoedemaker et al. (1999) mentioned that if a number of tasks undertaken simultaneously crosses the limit,
chances of abortive works as well as chances for time and cost overrun will increase substantially.
Probability of design errors tends to increase in fast track projects drastically due to the very tight schedule.
Many scholars such as Smith (1997) and Shang et al. (2005) argued that such approach offered by fast-
tracking does not necessarily come at the expense of quality or cost. Han et al. (2013) confirmed that design
errors which are leading to rework are deemed the primary contributor to schedule delays and cost
overruns. Pocock et al. (1996) asserted that lack of collaboration and poor coordination among involved
parties will lead to schedule slippage and project uncertainties. The poor underestimating of fast tracking
relationships within and between engineering, procurement and construction is another major reason for
the failure in fast track projects. Dehghan and Ruwanpura (2011) clarified that if too much overlapping is
implemented, then time saving benefits might be offset and even superseded by losses originating from
rework and extra cost. Songer and Molenaar (1996) highlighted that mistrust and lack of clear
communication between stakeholders make it more and more challenging.

Whilst employers enjoy considerable reduction in project timeframe in adopting fast tracking approach,
they lose cost certainty and put themselves under such risk till the last package is awarded and all gaps in
scope between different packages are identified. That is why; change orders are likely to increase
considerably. Project cost is usually much more than the cost of traditional projects due to potential abortive
work, crashing of activities and using more resources in a shorter period of time. Moazzami et al. (2011)
argued that although rework and site modifications problems are not specific to fast-tracking projects, their

3|Page
frequency is relatively higher in this approach. Expenses of potential rework leaves practitioners with the
challenge of determining optimal fast-tracking strategy to meet project schedule requirements while
avoiding excessive amounts of rework (Khoueiry et al., 2013). Quality of design information as well as
contract documents are compromised due to compressed design process and tight deadlines to float
tenders. Such drawbacks open doors for potential conflicts and claims during construction increasing the
chances of project failure.

3.4 Mitigation Measures

There are many attempts to improve performance of fast track projects and mitigate associated common
deficiencies. Some scholars insist that the approach must be utilized by experienced employers who can
understand and assess inherent risks in the process. Arian and Pheng (2007) mentioned that inexperienced
employers are more akin to adopt inadequate design resulting in many changes to drawings and contract
documents. However, in practice, inexperienced employers can use fast tracking approach effectively by
selecting construction management procurement route for project delivery. This route, if implemented
effectively, can mitigate poor communication and foster better collaboration between parties during each
phase in project life cycle. Chan (2007) emphasized that a suitable procurement route at project outset
makes the difference between successful or unsuccessful project completions. Cho et al., (2010) conducted
a research on the relationship between the fast-tracking and partnering and found out that fast track
projects could be more successful if they are combined with partnering. Wardani et al. (2006) argued that
employers have the tendency to select a procurement route, in which they are more familiar with,
irrespective of any difference between projects.

Elhag et al. (2005) claimed that project costs are more reliant on design consultants rather than contractors.
Hence, appointment of designers should follow strict selection criteria to minimize drawbacks. The designer
should be fully aware of the process pitfalls and ensure close communication channels with his employer
and other stake holders for smooth exchange of information. Design schedule may follow a different
technique as proposed by (Srour et al., 2013) that considers information exchange alongside task durations
in overlapping design and construction activities. This approach is not available using traditional scheduling
methods (i.e. critical path method). Design should be validated by a qualified third party. His main duty is to
peer review design and scope integrity between packages. It is imperative for the designer to advise his
employer as early as possible of all common risks generated from overlapping design with construction to
limit the employer’s expectations about deliverables since it is inevitable for design documents of a fast
track job to contain errors and ambiguities. Drafters of consultancy agreement should pay special attention
to the relevant risk allocation and should fairly allocate the risk to the party best able to manage it.

It is not uncommon for contractors to insert higher contingences in pricing as they do realize the risks of
rework due to repetitive deficiencies and mis-coordination in design documents of fast track projects.
Moazzami et al. (2011) as well as Dehghan and Ruwanpura (2011) mentioned that the usual consequence
of inequitable risk allocation is additional contingencies and premiums added by designers and contractors
to their bid price resulting in greater overall project cost. Employers can reduce such burden by requesting
contractors to tender based on a target cost or guaranteed maximum price with incentives if the overall
cost is found below certain threshold.

4|Page
Allocation of risks is another essential aspect that must be given utmost attention by employers while
drafting main contract documents. Existing standard forms of contract do not include clauses that clearly
address risks should traditional delivery of project is altered by fast tracking approach. Dehghan and
Ruwanpura (2011) emphasized on the non-availability of contractual framework specific to fast-track
projects and concluded that risks may not be allocated equitably to stakeholders. Pedwell et al., (1998)
studied the effects of fast tracking on the total project cost for various contract forms and types. They
concluded that fixed price contracts are not suitable compared with unit price and cost reimbursable types.

Standard forms of contract put an obligation on the main contractor to inspect, examine and satisfy himself
of the site condition and base his price on the site data and relevant interpretation. Employers tend to
allocate the risks of the soundness of executed enabling works to the main contractor and give him
opportunity to address and consider all issues during the tender stage to increase the level of cost certainty.
Clause 4.10 of FIDIC Red Book 1999 somehow addresses this approach which states:

…To the extent which was practicable (taking account of cost and time), the
Contractor shall be deemed to have obtained all necessary information as to risks,
contingencies and other circumstances which may influence or affect the Tender or
Works. To the same extent, the Contractor shall be deemed to have inspected and
examined the Site, its surroundings, the above data and other available information
and to have been satisfied before submitting the Tender as to all relevant matters…

Accordingly, if the main contractor reports some errors in executed works by the enabling contractor, the
employer may argue that the main contractor is deemed to be responsible of the soundness of executed
works as he should have considered the same during tendering pursuant to this clause. In Author’s opinion,
FIDIC Red Book does not assume any existence of executed enabling works to spell out liabilities limitation
on each party. Hence, standard FIDIC form is unsuitable for the phased construction without necessary
amendments. For instance, the above clause should be amended to clearly allocate risks resulting from
involving sequential contractors as each party is deemed to be responsible of his own faults as a rule of
thumb.

The above clause also raises another concern on what a main contractor could practically do during tender
stage where insufficient time is often given to tenderers to bid for complex projects. Robinson (2011, p 136)
concluded that contractors will invariably end up having limited time for closely scrutinizing tender
documents and site conditions, hence, they will be unable to pin point errors, omissions and discrepancies.
To avoid this, employers should deliberately decide the tendering period depending on the nature and
complexity of projects and they should be open to grant extensions should majority of bidders ask for the
same to avoid unpleasant disputes during construction.

Introduction of nominated subcontractors creates another center of attention towards preparation of

construction contracts to address procedures, rights and liabilities of involved parties. Wilkie & Walker
(2002) stated that nomination practice is never easy as it leads to many risks and challenges which may kill
the project. Moazzami et al. (2011) mentioned that confusing risk responsibilities for neglected tasks is
another legal problem between subcontractors and other contracting parties in fast-track projects and
recommended to have an appropriate contracting arrangement with open communication and strong

5|Page
coordination to minimize the risk of overlooking work elements. Nominated subcontractors should get
involved in design development as early as possible, so design errors can be avoided by having their design
requirements integrated. Main contractors should be also involved during nomination process to minimize
risks of scope conflict and increase the chances of work collaboration.

4. Case Study

4.1 Project Description

The selected project is a luxury residential super
tall building which is still under construction in the Street
United Arab Emirates with a configuration of five
basements, ground floor, five podiums and eighty
one stories with 340 m height. The building has
premium location overlooking the Arabian Gulf
and the marina offering stunning views. Another

Sea Side
super tall building is adjacent to the project plot as

Marina
illustrated in figure (2) constructed by the same
contractor. The building envelope is titling from
two sides creating a sophisticated skeleton with
modern façade design using a mix of curtain wall
and composite cladding. The Developer is one of
Neighbor
the largest players in the MENA Real Estate using
his in-house project management team. The
Figure (2) - Shoring layout
building was designed by a well reputed
international consultant operating worldwide. Enabling works were awarded to an overseas piling specialist
and commenced in May 2008 while the main work was awarded to one of the largest contractors in the
region and commenced in June 2011. Due to many disruptive events during design and construction stages
of both phases, the planned completion was drastically delayed as it will be explained in the next sections.

4.2 Procurement Strategy

The Employer has a fixed strategy to fast track all high rise projects by adopting three phases of construction.
In this project, the first phase covers enabling works where the designer endeavors to make the necessary
design information available as soon as possible to proceed with tendering and construction of shoring
system, excavation and piling works on a design and built basis. Concurrently, the second phase continues
with the main design being finalized and issued for traditional tendering while authorities design approvals
are sought simultaneously. The main scope covers structural and civil work works only while design of
electromechanical works is substantially completed but excluded from the main scope of work. The plan is
to appoint the Main Contractor (MC) by the completion of the enabling works to take over the site and
commence works in a timely manner. The third phase is to complete the design of around fifteen
subcontract packages including MEP, facade, lifts, BMU, Fit-out and roof steel structure and proceed with
tendering and nomination of specialist subcontractors in line with the project schedule. Table (1) below
shows segregated planned durations of each phase:

6|Page
 SN Description Phase Durations
in Months
1 Preliminary design 2
2 Tendering of enabling works 1 2
3 Construction of Enabling works – (Contract value = USD 13 M) 9
4 Detailed design of main works 6
5 Tendering of Main works 2 3
6 Construction of Main works (Contract Value = USD 140 M incl. 9) 36
7 Design of subcontract packages 5
8 Tendering of subcontract packages 3 12
9 Construction of subcontract works 30
Table (1) - Planned duration for design and construction in each phase

4.3 Allocation of Risks

The general conditions of contract selected for the enabling and main works is FIDIC 1987 reprinted 1992.
The contract with the Enabling Contractor (EC) is made on a fixed price lump sum basis while the main
contract is re-measured. The Employer made substantial amendments in the particular conditions in both
contracts re-allocating risks to favor his contractual position. The ‘Instruction to Tenderers’ for the main
tender works includes detailed provisions that put obligations on MC to examine and verify the existing site
conditions and include for any necessary cost to cover any observed issues. The designer’s agreement is of
a bespoke type including provisions that entitle the Employer to seek remedies against design deficiencies
or negligence of duties.

4.4 Project Problems

4.4.1 Design Issues
EC was appointed before obtaining authorities approval of preliminary design. The design was eventually
rejected due to insufficient number of lifts which hindered the commencement of shoring works on site.
After lengthy debate and discussion with authorities and specialist designers, the building was redesigned
to accommodate additional lifts. Concurrently, there was further debate about the final number of floors as
well as basements. Employer’s requirements were finalized calling for 81 stories and five basements. The
tender of enabling works was re-floated based on the revised design and new price was sought from EC who
amicably reached a revised agreement with the Employer. The work was resumed on site in August 2009
and completed in June 2011 resulting in an overall project delay of 15 months.

During the construction of main works, many design changes took place to correct errors and discrepancies
in contract drawings such as floor headroom, landscape roof, lifts shafts openings and slab edge limits, etc...
Many errors were highlighted by specialist subcontractors after being appointed by MC. Accordingly, the
Engineer issued revised set of construction drawings to correct errors and several variation orders were
issued to MC. MC also claimed for additional time of two months together with the prolongation cost due
to incurred abortive works on site.

4.4.2 Shoring Deflection

Diaphragm walls solution was selected for the shoring system as a robust watertight shoring supported by
temporary construction and ground anchors. The concept design of shoring system was undertaken by the
7|Page
designer to facilitate the tender of enabling works on a design and build basis. The existence of neighbor’s
diaphragm wall encouraged the EC to omit the planned diaphragm wall against the free standing party wall
as a value engineering exercise offered in his tender but there was no internal struts suggested to support
the existing party wall. Ground anchors could not be used for the shoring walls at the marina side due to
the proximity of marina as well as the huge
water pressure behind the walls.
Therefore, temporary contiguous piles
were built inside the plot against the
unanchored shoring wall and sand filling in
between was structurally sufficient to
support the wall. Due to this, the
substructure had to be built in two phases
allowing the tower area to progress by the
completion of first phase. Slabs built in the
first phase were used as a support for
internal struts, which were then inserted
at various levels as a replacement for
contiguous piles, to allow for excavation
Figure (3)- Internal strutting to support deflected wall
for the non-critical second phase.

In June 2011, MC took over the first phase from EC. MC did not report any worth mentioning issue about
the existing site conditions. MC decided to continue with the same design and configuration of the existing
dewatering system implemented by EC. Two months later, the Engineer suddenly observed a major
deflection on the party wall towards the project plot, despite the fact that MC had an obligation in the
contract to maintain daily survey records of the periphery walls. The local authority was notified, then a
direction was given to put half of the plot on hold as a safety precaution till the problem is resolved. MC had
still some work to do in the lift pit but was deprived the opportunity to work on the affected areas. EC
suggested to provide internal struts to support the deflected wall and provided strut design. The work was
carried out by a specialist subcontractor appointed under the main contract as a variation as shown in figure
(3). The overall incurred delay due to the wall deflection incident was 4 months.

4.4.3 First Seepage

While the main work was progressing in the raft at the lowest lift pit area as shown in figure (4), seepage
was observed on the sides of the localized excavation in October 2011 despite the presence of running
dewatering system. Emergency meetings were held with all concerned parties to assess the situation and
put an action plan to stop seepage. All parties pointed at a small section of constructed diaphragm walls on
the marina side where it had the shallowest toe level. Parties believed that the source of seepage is
developed beneath the diaphragm wall through cavities or fishers. Based on the technical advice, the
Employer appointed two specialists to investigate the site and do pressure grouting behind the diaphragm
wall to fill the cavities and fishers. Though, the seepage continued to increase drastically till a technical
decision was taken in November 2011 to switch off dewatering system and flood the site to avoid potential
catastrophic collapse of the shoring system. As a result, the project was completely paralyzed (See figure 5)
and an instruction was issued to MC to mitigate the losses and discharge all unnecessary staff and labors

8|Page
from site. The Employer also sent formal notices to all concerned parties including insuring agencies for
potential claims. During the suspension period, the Employer decided to add additional four floors and a
revised design was undertaken after concluding a structural feasibility study to use existing piles
configuration.

Figure (4) – Project status before first seepage Figure (5) – Project status after first seepage

To resolve the seepage issue, EC carried out intensive pressure grouting with tens of boreholes behind the
concerned wall to fill any developed cavities and considerable grouting materials were used. The Employer
also appointed external experts to investigate the roots of the seepage problem. The experts’ reports
concluded that the depth of the concerned diaphragm wall facing marina was not deep enough to act as a
cut off line. The reports explained that due to continuous discharge of water from dewatering system, piping
phenomena took shape gradually where the fine material was washed out causing fishers and cavities
beneath the diaphragm wall. Also, dewatering system was found inefficient as it did not consider the
proximity of marina and there was want of evidence that MC took measures to provide filters and
monitoring system to avoid sand wash out from deep well.

The lengthy discussions suggested to replace the short diaphragm wall with internal sheet piles and to
redesign the dewatering system. The discussions also emphasized some other unexpected issues related to
the expiry of ground anchors (designed for two years) and the lack of insurance for diaphragm walls
(Principal’s premises). Subsequently, an action plan was put forward to insure the walls then replace expired
anchors with new ones. In April 2012, the Employer appointed EC to carry out re-anchorage works as a
nominated subcontractor under the main contract. The stagnant water was then removed gradually to allow
for construction of sheet piles but EC found a major cavity in the internal face of the short diaphragm wall
while he was preparing for sheet pile installation. Then, it was decided to proceed with internal pressure
grouting as an alternative. Grouting was conducted in August 2012 and more than 25 m3 of fast hardening
concrete was pumped into the cavity which was sufficient to seal the cavity and stop the seepage. The
overall incurred delay due to the first seepage incident was 18 months.

4.4.4 Second Seepage

After stopping the seepage and completing re-anchoring works, water was pumped out from the pit and
MC resumed the works including the repair of executed works and improvement of dewatering system. In
November 2012, when the first 90% of the raft works progress was completed as shown in figure (6),
another seepage was observed from the same problematic diaphragm wall and water started to raise up in
9|Page
the pit as in figure (7). Immediately, EC mobilized on site to perform additional pressure grouting inside the
plot on the remaining line parallel to the affected diaphragm wall which was not grouted before.
Considerable amount of fast hardening grout was used to fill the new cavity and stop the seepage
completely. Though, the seepage damaged the waterproofing system below the raft as it was uplifted by
the ground water pressure (See figure 8). Both of MC and the Engineer recommended that all installed
reinforcement of 3000 tons to be removed in order to re-do the waterproofing to maintain the 20 years
waterproofing warranty.

Figure (6) – Project status before second seepage Figure (7) – Project status after second seepage

The Employer’s project manager suggested using innovative waterproof concrete such as Krystol Internal
Membrane (KIM) which is adopting crystalline technology to replace the traditional waterproofing system.
The suggestion aimed to maintain the executed works and save substantial time in repairing and reinstating
the reinforcement. This alternative offered the same warranty that specified waterproofing system was
required to give.

The MC as well as the Engineer objected the project

manager’s idea claiming they are unfamiliar with
this technology and did not show good intention to
collaborate positively with the Employer. Later, the
Engineer (after studying the alternative) accepted
to implement the alternative and provided new
specification to MC to follow who objected for
trivial reasons. Many lengthy discussions and
debates were held with MC till he eventually
accepted to adopt the alternative option provided
that self-compacted concrete is used instead of
specified mix as a variation to the main contract. Figure (8) – Damaged waterproofing under Raft
The Employer agreed and the Engineer issued the change order accordingly. Accordingly, MC commenced
the works and cast the raft in April 2013. The overall delay incurred due to the second seepage incident
consequences was 5 months.

10 | P a g e
4.4.5 Subcontract Nominations
After resolving all issues associated with the second seepage incident, project operations were resumed
normally. The Employer took preventive measures to avoid further seepage and appointed a specialist to
perform thorough cavity detection survey at the subsurface of problematic areas outside the plot using
Cross-hole Electrical Resistivity Tomography. The survey was expected to provide 3D sections of the
subsurface to show exact locations of cavities or anomalies, so pressure grouting can be used deliberately.
MC submitted three major claims covering deflection and seepage incidents but no determination was
issued by the Engineer due to complexity of claims. The Employer started to nominate specialist
subcontractors in accordance with the physical site progress but nominations were objected by MC. MC
insisted that subcontractors must contractually adhere to the original date for project completion. As a
result, all nominations were delayed drastically till an amendment letter to the contract was signed between
both parties to fix a practical date for completion to ease nomination while a new mechanism for assessing
the extension of time claims was also addressed in the amendment letter.

The Façade subcontractor’s scope includes design works that are not defined in the main contract
documents which was another reason for MC to object his nomination. Hence, the Employer endeavored
to appoint the Façade subcontractor directly to perform the design aspect of subcontract scope and the
Engineer issued the same to MC for construction. In addition, there were many gaps in subcontractors’
scope which entitled MC to object nomination until he received formal change orders to redress scope
conflict. The overall incurred delay due to all above issues was 4 months.

4.5 Project Disputes

In this complex project, the Employer had to undergo disputes with the designer, EC and MC and due to
space limitation, the paper will only address the disputes raised by MC in connection with deflection and
seepage incidents. MC claimed 23 months and USD 14 M but the Engineer was unable to issue any
determination or decision, so MC served a notice to commence arbitration. MC built his arguments on the
basis that defective shoring system was designed by others and therefore, MC is entitled for cost and time
compensation. The Employer argued that MC was obliged to visit the site during tender stage and highlight
any errors or issues with the existing works. Also, MC had an obligation to design adequate dewatering
system. The Employer referred to the following clauses in the Instruction to Tenderers and General
Conditions of Contract respectively:

“The Tenderer shall visit the site and shall be responsible for obtaining all information, which
may be necessary for the purpose of submitting a Tender and entering into a contract. He shall
carefully examine the Tender Documents and satisfy himself as to risks, obligations and
responsibilities to be undertaken in the Contract. In addition to the examination of the Tender
Documents, the Tenderers shall make whatever arrangements are necessary for them to
become fully informed regarding all existing and expected conditions and matters, which
might, in any way, affect the cost or performance of the Works. Any failure to fully investigate
the Site and I or the foregoing instructions shall not relieve the Tenderers from responsibility
for estimating properly any difficulties or procuring the successful performance of the Works.”
Instruction to tenderers.

“If, however, during the execution of the Works MC encounters physical obstructions or
physical conditions, other than climatic conditions on the Site, which obstructions or conditions
were, in his opinion, not foreseeable by an experienced contractor, MC shall forthwith give
11 | P a g e
4.6 notice thereof to the Engineer, with a copy to the Employer. On receipt of such notice, the
Engineer shall, if in his opinion such obstructions or conditions could not have been reasonably
foreseen by an experienced contractor, after due consultation with the Employer and MC,
determine etc...” General conditions of contract.

Appointment of the Australian Expert

Due to the complexity of technical issues associated with the disputes and despite the availability of experts’
reports about the causes of seepage, the Employer decided to procure first class international expert
following careful selection criteria. The aim was to clarify all technical problems associated with deflection
and seepage incidents to assist the Employer in understanding liabilities of parties under the contract
appropriately. Eventually, a well-known Australian Firm was appointed as a technical expert to prepare a
report that answers, inter alia, two main questions:

1- What has caused the wall deflection and seepage incidents and could have both incidents been
avoided by MC?
2- Were the diaphragm wall deflection and the geotechnical conditions foreseeable by MC?

The report was well prepared and detailed and it somehow concurred with the previous two reports about
the root of seepage incident. The report provided literature about the nature of geotechnical conditions in
the project area to better understand the issue. It emphasized on the importance of the effective
management of geotechnical risk during tender stage of engineering projects. The report referred to Clayton
(2011) who stated that if a project is managed to mitigate geotechnical risk, with high quality site
investigation, the probability of unforeseen ground conditions being encountered during construction
should reduce to a negligible risk level. The report mentioned the catastrophic sequence of events in the
shoring system in the adjacent tower site during March 2007 due to geotechnical issues. It concluded that
lesson learned from that events should have attracted more attention from all involved parties to the risky
nature of underground conditions.

About the wall deflection, the report found out the deflection happened due to a build-up of water in the
cavity between the party diaphragm wall and his tower basement wall which was sufficient to cause the
observed wall movement. The avoidance of such deflection requires the recognition for water to collect
between the two walls. If MC was aware of this hazard and the geometry of the two walls, a suitable
dewatering system could have been devised to manage this risk and should have been implemented.

Regarding the seepage, the report concluded that the short diaphragm wall was inadequately designed as
a water exclusion structure, being too shallow, without achieving a seal in an underlying impermeable
stratum. The stratum which consists of cemented rock and/or un-cemented sand overlying gypsiferous
sandstone and sand was subject to soil erosion by piping due to the high hydraulic head difference. The wall
was therefore subject to significant movement of groundwater beneath its base level causing the seepage.
The dewatering system was also accused not to be efficient enough but the report claimed that it is still a
secondary factor. The report mentioned that while MC is not responsible for the shoring design as it was
prepared by others, they did, however inherit the works and prudent practice would suggest that they
would identify the shortcomings through their own audit. The report revealed that the cause of seepage is
a function of both adverse ground & hydrological conditions and improper design of the diaphragm wall.
12 | P a g e
The report conclusion clearly identified the roots of the problems. Examining contractual liabilities under
the contract in light of the report findings was not an easy task to do. The allocation of risk in the contract
documents lacks clarity which opens the door for different legal views on how to interpret the wording. The
Employer appointed a claim consultant for this but the report lacked reasoning and clarity. It was evident
that the main contract did not consider the existence of executed works by EC and did not allocate potential
risks between the parties accordingly. Therefore, neither the Employer nor MC was confident of his
contractual stand regarding the dispute and they both agreed to appoint an adjudicator should attempts to
amicably settle the dispute fall short.

4.7 Commentary
The case study is a typical scenario of fast tracking high rise buildings which demonstrates the inherent risks
and shortcomings of the approach if not handled properly. The designer’s deficiency in coordinating and
communicating with the Employer’s as well as authorities during initial design affected the project schedule
significantly. The tight design schedule resulted in compromising the procedures in which the design process
should go through as per RIBA code of practice. The designer should have realized these risks and
highlighted them to the Employer and he should not have accepted to work with too optimistic and
unrealistic schedule. It is worth mentioning that the designer had notified the Employer informally of the
risk of going for less number of lifts than required by authorities, but he failed to provide a formal risk
assessment for the Employer’s decision prior to his engagement in design development.

The conditions of main contract did not specifically consider phased construction approach where some of
the temporary and permanent works were done by a different contractor. The cited clauses from the
contract as demonstrated above have a lot of ambiguities regarding what the wording of ‘practical’,
‘foreseeable’ and ‘experienced contractor’ would imply. It is also unclear about the extent of site
investigation and survey works that tenderers can afford during tender stage and the likelihood of holding
them liable for errors that were generated by others. It is understood that the Employer’s intention was to
transfer the relevant risks associated with the site condition and soundness of executed enabling works to
MC to increase cost certainty. However, the question is whether the Employer is fully aware of the legal
risks and consequences associated with generating one-sided contract.

The reluctance of the Engineer and MC to study and implement the Employer’s suggestion to mitigate the
losses due to the second seepage signifies another pitfall of fast tracking. There was no proactive attempts
by the parties to mitigate nomination problems efficiently. To ensure fast track success, involved parties
need to collaborate throughout the project life cycle to deal with upcoming shortcomings diligently and
openly. Apparently, each party acted in the same way should the project was procured traditionally. Blame
culture was dominant hindering a swift remedy plan to the incurred failures.

4.8 Lessons learnt

The following lessons learnt from the case study should stand as good practical guidelines for future similar
projects executed locally and internationally:

1- Fast tracking high rise buildings is inevitable from a viability aspect. However, project stakeholders
managing fast track projects should draw utmost attention to the inherent pitfalls and work out
appropriate risk management practice from the outset.

13 | P a g e
 2- Employers should fully understand that it is practically impossible to get a perfect design in a fast track
project. Consultancy agreement should be drafted in a fair manner that does not impose unreasonable
obligations on the designer; while it saves the employer should the designer performs substandard
works.
3- The designer should attempt to fully define, understand and freeze the employer’s requirements as
soon as possible through intensive workshop meetings and final requirements must be recorded
formally.
4- Tendering stage is very critical to project success if sufficient time is given to tenderers to study the
project characteristics including the existing site conditions. The employer’s intention to amend the
standard risk allocation should be discussed jointly with the concerned parties and recorded in detail to
avoid conflicts during execution.
5- Fixed price contracts are unsuitable for fast track projects as they lead to inevitable disputes.
6- Mandatory amendments should be made to the standard conditions of contract documents to deal with
risks resulting from errors in the design or workmanship of executed enabling works that were handed
over to MC.
7- Collaborative procurement routes are much more efficient in fast track projects than traditional routes.
Otherwise, all contracts based on traditional methods are to include a provision that puts an obligation
on the parties to act collaboratively and diligently in the design and execution of the works to increase
the probability of success.
8- Two stages tendering in fast track projects is always better than appointing different contractors for the
project phases to minimize the areas of conflict and retain the construction responsibility with a single
contractor.
9- Engage the potential contractors in the design and nomination processes as early as possible to improve
the communication, buildability and integrity of works.
10- Use innovative scheduling approaches and construction technologies to improve the performance of
fast track project and mitigate inherent risks.

3. Conclusion
In fast-track high rise projects, it is practically impossible to avoid deficiencies in design. On the contrary, the
employer enjoys early delivery of project if effective project and risk management processes are performed
throughout project life cycle. Engaging different contractors requires appointment of excellent design and
construction management teams to bridge the gaps in communication and coordination. Drafting of
contracts and selection of contract type should fairly recognize the shortfalls of fast tracking and reasonably
allocate risks among parties. Collaborative procurement methods such as alliancing and partnering can
significantly improve the performance of fast track projects.

References
1. Arian, F. and Pheng, L. (2007) Modeling for management of variations in building projects, Engineering,
Construction and Architectural Management , 14(5), 420-433.
2. Chan, C.T.W. (2007) Fuzzy procurement selection model for construction projects, Construction
Management and Economics, 25 (6), 611-618.

14 | P a g e
3. Cho KM, Hyun CT, Koo K, and Hong TH (2010). Partnering Process Model for Public-Sector Fast-Track
Design-Build Projects in Korea. Journal of Management in Engineering, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 1, 2010.
4. Clayton, C.R.I. (2011) Managing Geotechnical Risk-10 years on managing Geotechnical Risk Seminar,
S Wales Group, Geological Society, Cardiff University, 28 January 2011.
5. Dehghan, R., & Ruwanpura, J. Y. (2011) The mechanism of design activity overlapping in construction
projects and the time-cost tradeoff function. Procedia Engineering, 14, 1959-1965.
6. Dey, P.K. (2000) “Managing the projects in fast track”, The International Journal of Public Sector
Management, Vol. 13 No. 7, pp. 588-609. # MCB University Press, 0951-3558.
7. Eldin, N. N. (1997). Concurrent engineering: A schedule reduction tool. Journal of Construction
Engineering and Management, 123(3), 354-362.
8. Elhag, T. M. S., Boussabaine, A. H., & Ballal, T. M. A. (2005). Critical determinants of construction
tendering costs: Quantity surveyors’ standpoint. International Journal of Project Management, 23(7), 538-
545.
9. El Wardani, M. A., Messner, J. I., & Horman, M. J. (2006) Comparing procurement methods for design-
build projects. Journal of construction engineering and management, 132(3), 230-238.
10. Fazio, P., Mosheli, O., Theberge, P. and Revay, S (1998) “Design Impact of construction Fast-Track”,
Construction Management and Economics, 5.pp 195-208.
11. Flyvbjerg, B., Bruzelius, N. and Rothengatter, W., (2003) Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (forthcoming).
12. FIDIC (1999), Conditions of contract for building and engineering works designed by the Employer, First
edition.
13. Fong, C. (2004) “Law and Practice of Construction Contracts”, Third edition, Sweet & Maxwell Asia,
Singapore.
14. Hackett, M. and Robinson, I. (2003) Pre-contract practice and contract administration for the building
team, Blackwell Publishing.
15. Han, S., Love, P., & Peña-Mora, F. (2013) A system dynamics model for assessing the impacts of design
errors in construction projects. Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 57(9), 2044-2053.
16. Hoedemaker, G. M., Blackburn, J. D., & Van Wassenhove, L. N. (1999). Limits to Concurrency*. Decision
Sciences, 30(1), 1-18.
17. Khoueiry, Y., Srour, I., & Yassine, A. (2013) An optimization-based model for maximizing the benefits of
fast-track construction activities. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 64(8), 1137-1146.
18. Moazzami, M., Dehghan, R., & Ruwanpura, J. Y. (2011) Contractual Risks in Fast-Track Projects.
Procedia Engineering, 14, 2552-2557.
19. Pedwell K, Hartman FT, and Jergeas GF (1998). Project capital cost risks and contracting strategies.
Journal of Cost Engineering, Vol. 40 (1), pp. 37-41.
20. Pocock, J., and Liu, L. (1996) ‘‘Alternative approaches to projects: Better or worse?’’ Mil. Eng., 88 (578)
, 57–59.
21. Robinson, M. D. (2011). A Contractor's Guide to the FIDIC Conditions of Contract. John Wiley & Sons.
22. Shang, H., Anumba, C. J., Bouchlaghem, D. M., Miles, J. C., Cen, M., & Taylor, M. (2005) An intelligent
risk assessment system for distributed construction teams. Engineering, Construction and Architectural
Management, 12(4), 391-409.
23. Smith, R. P. (1997) The historical roots of concurrent engineering fundamentals. Engineering
Management, IEEE Transactions on, 44(1), 67-78.
24. Songer, A. D., and Molenaar, K. R. (1996) ‘‘Selective design-build: Public and private sector owner’s
attitudes.’’ J. Manage. Eng., 12 (6), pp 47– 53.
25. Srour, I. M., Abdul-Malak, M. A. U., Yassine, A. A., & Ramadan, M. (2013) A methodology for scheduling
overlapped design activities based on dependency information. Automation in Construction, 29, 1-11.
26. US Federal Facilities Council Technical Report No. 149 (2007). Reducing Construction Costs: Uses of
Best Dispute Resolution Practices by Owners, Proceeding Report.
27. Wilkie, R. and Walker, I. (2002) Commercial management in construction, Blackwell Publishing.

15 | P a g e