TUANDA V.

SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 110544, OCTOBER 17, 1995

FACTS:

Private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as industrial
labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor sectoral representative respectively, for the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary of the Department of
Local Government. They took their oath of office. Petitioners filed a petition with the Office of the
President for review and recall of said designations. However, the secretary of the local government
thru a letter denied the petition and enjoined Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents
as sectoral representatives. Undaunted, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Dumaguete City to
declare null and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral representatives.

Meanwhile, private respondents also filed before the Sandiganbayan a complaint against
petitioners for violation of section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 on the ground that petitioners refused to give
them their per diems, salaries and other privileges and benefits as sectoral representatives. Petitioners
filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings on the ground that a
prejudicial question exists in the civil case pending before the RTC of Dumaguete City.

The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the designations issued by the
Department of Local Government to the private respondents as sectoral representatives for having
been done in violation of Section 146 (2) of the Local Government Code. Meanwhile, the
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by
petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents may be considered as de facto public officers entitled to
compensation for services they actually rendered.

HELD:

The conditions and elements to be a de facto public officer are the following:

1. There must be a de jure office;

2. There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; And
3. There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the mentioned elements are present. There can be
no de facto officer where there is no de jure office or office to fill, although there may be a de facto
officer in a de jure office.
MALALUAN V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 120193, MARCH 6, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner Malaluan and Private Respondent Evangelista were both Mayoralty

candidates.  Private Respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly
elected Mayor against the Petitioner. Petitioner filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out
of the total 181 precincts of the said Municipality.  The trial court declared Petitioner as the duly elected
Municipal Mayor. The Private Respondent appealed the Trial Court’s decision to the COMELEC, which
declared Private Respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor.

The COMELEC found Petitioner liable for attorney’s fee, actual expenses for Xerox copies, and unearned
salary and other emoluments, en masse denominated as actual damages. 

Petitioner naturally contests that propriety and legality of this award upon private respondent on the
ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved during trial.  COMELEC on the other hand,
concluded in justifying that Private Respondent be awarded actual damages, and hold that since
Petitioner was adjudged the winner in the elections only by the Trial Court, the Petitioner is deemed to
have occupied the position in an illegal manner as a Usurper.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner acted as a usurper.

HELD:

NO. Petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who undertakes to act
officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the duties of an elective office under color
of election thereto. It must be reiterated that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the
proclamation made by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a winning candidate's right to
assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. It is deemed that the petitioner, therefore,
is a "de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession of the office and had discharged the duties
pertaining thereto" and is thus "legally entitled to the emoluments of the office." 
 MONROY V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-23258, JULY 1, 1967

FACTS:

Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15,
1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming
elections was filed with the Commission on Elections. Three days later, or on September 18, 1961,
petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. The Commission on Elections, per
resolution,1 approved the withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, respondent Felipe del Rosario, then
the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had
forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.

Court of First Instance (CFI) decided against the Petitioner Monroy.

Court of Appeals affirmed CFI’s decision in toto except for the award of moral damages which
was eliminated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner Monroy was considered a de facto officer and that he was liable to
Respondent Del Rosario for the salaries he was allegedly entitled to receive.

HELD:

Yes, Petitioner Monroy could be considered a de facto officer and he was thus liable to
Respondent Del Rosario for the salaries he was entitled to receive, being a rightful incumbent. A de
facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de
jure officer for whatever amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the
public office. It is the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful incumbent of a public office may recover
from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time of his wrongful tenure, even
though he (de facto officer) entered into the office in good faith and under color of title".
 PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 104639, JULY 14, 1995

FACTS:

Private Respondent Tito Dato was appointed as Assistant Provincial warden by Gov. Felix Alfelor.
Due to his lack of the civil service eligibility for the position, his appointment was only temporary,
renewed annually. Sometime later, Gov. Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from
temporary to permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service examination
for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was not favorably acted upon by the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Tito Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility
for the office he was appointed to. His appointment therefore remained temporary. After two years,
Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges were filed against him. On that
same year, the head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil Service Commission informed Gov. Alfelor
that the status of private respondent Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter
having acquired the eligibility needed. The change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11, 1974
- the date of release of said examination. Private respondent Dato was then acquitted of the charges
against him. He then requested the Governor for reinstatement and back wages which was not heeded
by the Governor.

Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court action for mandamus, to which he was
favored by the said court.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision with modification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondent Tito Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province
of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on March 16, 1976.

HELD:

NO. Private respondent Dato is not a permanent employee of the Province of Camarines Sur at
the time he was suspended. His lack of a civil service eligibility made his appointment temporary and
without a fixed and definite term and is dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing
power. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his
having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary
appointment into a permanent one. In such case, what is required is a new appointment since a
permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment — these are two distinct
acts of the appointing authority.
PABU-AYA V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 128082, APRIL 18, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Pabu-aya was appointed as Utility Worker on a permanent status. Later on, she was
appointed as Bookbinder II on a temporary status. On October 16, 1992, a year after her temporary
appointment, the Vice Governor of Negros Occidental, issued a Memorandum informing the petitioner
that her temporary appointment as Bookbinder II had already expired on September 16, 1993, and that
she could no longer continue in service. She wrote the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and acknowledged
therein her failure to perform her duties satisfactorily as Bookbinder II and promised that she would
improve her performance should her appointment be renewed. Petitioner appealed the memorandum if
the Vice Governor terminating her employment as Bookbinder II, to the Civil Service Commission, which
was dismissed by the Commission. Subsequently the petitioner filed with the respondent Commission a
request for reinstatement to her original position as Utility Worker, which was later on dismissed by the
Commission.

Petitioner on May 20, 1995 then filed a "Petition for Certiorari and/or Review" before this Court
which, however, referred the same to the respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision promulgated on
January 6, 1997, respondent Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed the said petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner’s subsequent
acceptance of a temporary appointment was an indication of her relinquishment of her position as a
permanent employee and thus foreclosed her right to contest her non-reinstatement.

HELD:

NO. As a general rule, the findings of fact of the respondents Commission and Court of Appeals
are accorded great weight. In the case at bar, respondent Court of Appeals acted properly when it gave
limited consideration to petitioner Pabu-aya's claim that had she known of the demotion in status from
that of a Utility Worker, on a permanent status, to that of Bookbinder II on a temporary status, she
would have stuck to her old permanent position of Utility Worker rather than put to naught her long
years of service in the government. It is a fact; however, that petitioner Pabu-aya freely took her oath of
office as Bookbinder II on a temporary status. Petitioner having accepted the position of Bookbinder II,
aware of the temporary nature of such appointment, she is deemed to have lost and/or waived
whatever right or privilege insofar as her tenurial security is concerned. For, an employee is entitled only
to such security of tenure as the appointment papers actually confer.
ORCULLO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. NO. 138780, MAY 22, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Norberto A. Orcullo, Jr. was hired as Project Manager IV by the Coordinating Council
of the Philippine Assistance Program (CCPAP)-BOT Center effective March 11, 1996. His employment
was contractual and co-terminous with the said project which was to end on January 30, 2000. On
September 23, 1996 or six (6) months from his assumption to office, petitioner received a
Memorandum, dated September 20, 1996, from one Jorge M. Briones, Assistance Director of CCPAP,
terminating petitioner's contractual employment with said agency effective September 30, 1996, which
was later on confirmed by the Executive Director of CCPAP. Petitioner then appealed to the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), which was later on dismissed by the commission. After the dismissal the petitioner
then filed a motion for reconsideration but was then denied by the CSC. He then filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals, which was also dismissed, thus this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner Orcullo, as a contractual and co-terminous with the project, is
protected by the tenurial security right embodied in the Constitution.

HELD:

NO. It is undisputed that petitioner's employment with CCPAP is contractual and co-terminous
in nature. Such a co-terminous employment falls under the non-career service classification of positions
in the Civil Service. A perusal of petitioner's employment contract will reveal that his employment with
CCPAP is qualified by the phrase "unless terminated sooner." Thus, while such employment is co-
terminous with the PAPS project, petitioner nevertheless serves at the pleasure of the appointing
authority as this is clearly stipulated in his employment contract.
OSEA V. MALAYA
G.R. 139821, JANUARY 30, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Eleonor Osea filed a protest case with the Civil Service Commission alleging that she
was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by the
then Secretary of DECS, upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur.
However, despite this, President Fidel Ramos, appointed respondent Corazon Malaya to the position of
Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

Petitioner claims that the appointment of respondent was made without prior consultation with
the Provincial School Board, in violation of Section 99 of the Local Government Code as well as her
vested right as the Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur. Petitioner prayed that
respondent’s appointment be recalled and set aside for being null and void. The Civil Service
Commission dismissed petitioner’s protest complaint. Petitioner field a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied. Hence, she filed a petition for review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s appointment require the mandatory consultation with the Local
School Board under Sec.99 of RA 7160.

HELD:

The portion of Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which states that “The
Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult the local school boards on the appointment
of division superintendents, district supervisors, school principals, and other school officials” applies to
appointments made by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Under the circumstances, the
designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of
appointment. Her designation partook of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City, where she
previously exercised her functions as Officer-in-Charge-Schools Division Superintendent, to Camarines
Sur. Clearly, therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 of prior
consultation with the local school board, does not apply.

Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment may be defined as

the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the functions of
a given office. On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction in
rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment.