1

Laurel v. Desierto
G.R. No. 145368. April 12, 2002

FACTS:

E.O. No. 128 was issued reconstituting the “National Centennial Commission”
and appointed to chair was Vice-President Laurel, petitioner. Subsequently, the
Philippine Centennial Expo ’98 Corporation (Expocorp) was created and petitioner
was among the nine incorporators, and was elected Expocorp Chief Executive
Officer. Senator Coseteng denounced alleged anomalies with the bidding contracts
to some entities and the petitioner was implicated. Upon investigation and
evaluation by the Office of the Ombudsman, the petitioner was indicted for
alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019). The
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss questioning the jurisdiction of the Office of the
Ombudsman, which was denied. He further filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied, hence the petition for certiorari assailing the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman for the reason that petitioner is not a public officer and that
Expocorp is a private corporation..

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is a public officer.

RULING:

Yes. The NCC performs executive functions and is, therefore, a public office.
Even assuming that Expocorp is a private corporation, petitioner's position as Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) of Expocorp arose from his Chairmanship of the NCC.
Consequently, his acts or omissions as CEO of Expocorp must be viewed in the light
of his powers and functions as NCC Chair. Since petitioner is chair of the NCC, he is
therefore a public officer. The Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case of the
petitioner since he is a public officer.

Fernandez v. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 116418, March 7, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Fernandez was serving as Director of the Office of Personnel

Inspection and Audit ("OPIA") while petitioner de Lima was serving as Director of
the Office of the Personnel Relations ("OPR"), both at the Central Office of the Civil
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Service Commission (CSC) in Quezon City. Petitioners assail the validity of

Resolution No. 94-3710 of the CSC and its authority to issue the same which
resolves to merge some offices including that of the petitioners to form the
Research and Development Office (RDO).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission had legal authority to issue
Resolution No. 94-3710 to merge the offices.

RULING:

Yes. The 1987 Revised Administrative Code had expressly authorized the
Commission to carry out "changes in the organization," as the need arises. Such
legislative authority was validly delegated to the CSC. Petitioners’ offices constitute
administrative subdivisions of the CSC which relate to the internal structure of the
CSC. These functions are related to one another, each of them being embraced by
a common or general subject matter. Internal organizations were rendered
necessary for the decentralization and devolution of the Commission's functions.

Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 130872, March 25, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz,

Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing
chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz,
and currently a member of its Sanguniang Bayan (SB) representing the Federation
of Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red
won the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by
then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz.
However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red that he could not yet sit as member of the
municipal council until the Governor of Marinduque had cleared his appointment.
When Red finally received his appointment papers, President Aquino was already
in power. But still Red was not allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the
Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to
receive his salary for more than a year. Finally Red was able to secure appointment
papers from the Aquino administration after three years and nine months from the
date he received his appointment paper from President Marcos. Subsequently,
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Red filed with the Office of the Ombudsman several criminal complaints against
the Mayor and Lenlie arising from the refusal of the two officials to let him assume
the position of KB sectoral representative. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision
finding the two accused guilty on all counts of estafa through falsification of
documents. The Sandiganbayan ruled that since Red was elected president of the
KB and took his oath of office sometime in 1985 before then Assemblywoman
Carmencita O. Reyes, his assumption of the KB presidency upon the expiration of
the term of accused Lenlie Lecaroz was valid. Conversely, the accused Lenlie
Lecaroz ceased to be a member of the KB on the last Sunday of November 1985
and, as such, was no longer the legitimate representative of the youth sector in
the municipal council of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is

appointed or chosen or has qualified.

RULING:

Yes. The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the
office has a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is
usually provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall
remain in office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected
and qualified even though it be beyond the term fixed by law. Under this
circumstance, the oath of office taken by Red before a member of the Batasang
Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths at that time, was invalid and
amounted to no oath at all. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never
qualified for the post, petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz remained KB representative to the
Sanggunian, albeit in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure
officer, or at least a de facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and all the
emoluments appertaining to the position. As such, he could not be considered an
intruder and liable for encroachment of public office.

Frivaldo v. COMELEC
257 SCRA 727

FACTS:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of

Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October 27,
1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President,
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Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his personal capacity, filed with the
Commission on Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo; election and
proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States on January 20, 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he
was naturalized in the United States as alleged but pleaded the special and
affirmative defenses that he had sought American citizenship only to protect
himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he said, was "merely forced
upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution by the
Martial Law Dictator's agents abroad. He added that he had returned to the
Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the restoration of democracy.
Respondent Commission on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20,
1988, to set the case for hearing on the merits. His motion for reconsideration was
denied in another Order dated February 21, 1988. He then came to this Court in a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Speaking for the public respondent, the
Solicitor General supported the contention that Frivaldo was not a citizen of the
Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American
citizen. As an alien, he was disqualified from public office in the Philippines.
Frivaldo claims that by actively participating in the elections in this country, he
automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws of the United States.
He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more,
already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of
his election on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.

RULING:

No. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office
but during the officer's entire tenure. Petitioner contends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered
Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions. If
he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our
country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts.

Mendoza v. Laxina
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G.R. 146875, July 14, 2003

FACTS:

In 1997, respondent took his oath and thereafter assumed office as the duly
proclaimed and elected barangay captain. Fermo, his rival candidate, filed an
election protest with the MTC. Fermo was declared as the winner in the Barangay
Elections. Hence, respondent vacated the position and relinquished the same to
Fermo. Thereafter, respondent filed a petition with the COMELEC questioning the
order of the trial court. The COMELEC issued a resolution annulling the order and a
writ of execution directing Fermo to vacate the office, but he refused to do so. This
did not, however, prevent respondent and his staff from discharging their
functions and from holding office. Respondent, on November 8, 1999 appointed
two people to become his secretary and treasurer. He was able to take his oath
again on November 16, 1999. It was only on the following day that Fermo turned
over all the assets and properties of the barangay. Sometime in 2000, petitioner
and other barangay councilors filed a complaint for violation of the anti-graft and
corrupt practices against Laxina’s appointees. They contended that defendants
made it appear in the payroll that he and his appointees rendered services starting
November 8, 1999 when, in truth, they commenced to serve only on November
17, 1999 after respondent took his oath and assumed the office of barangay
chairman. Defendants claimed that the taking anew of the oath of office as
barangay chairman was a mere formality and was not a requirement before
respondent can validly discharge the duties of his office. The Special Investigation
Committee on Administrative Cases of the City ruled that respondent had no
power to make appointments prior to his oath taking on November 16, 1999.
Respondent then appealed the case to the RTC. A summary judgment was
rendered by the trial court in favor of respondent. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Is the re-taking of an oath of office by a duly proclaimed but subsequently

unseated local elective official a condition sine qua non to the validity of his re-
assumption in office?

RULING:

No. Respondent was proclaimed as the winner in the 1997 barangay election
27, 1997 and thereafter assumed office. He is therefore vested with all the rights
to discharge the functions of his office. An oath of office is a qualifying
requirement for a public office; a prerequisite to the full investiture with the office.
It is only when the public officer has satisfied the prerequisite of oath that his right
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to enter into the position becomes plenary and complete. However, once
proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume
office and to exercise the functions thereof. When the COMELEC nullified the trial
court’s decision, the last actual peaceful uncontested situation preceding the
controversy was restored which referred to the stage when respondent was
occupying the office of Barangay Captain and discharging its functions. The
retaking of his oath of office was a mere formality.

Flores v. Drilon
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993

FACTS:

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as
the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent
Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged
with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. Said provision provides the President the power to appoint an administrator
of the SBMA provided that in the first year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor
shall be appointed as chairman and chief of executive of the Subic Authority.
Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional provision of Sec. 7,
first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no elective official shall
be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or
position during his tenure,".

ISSUE:

Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional

proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts.

RULING:

Yes. The Constitution expresses the policy against the concentration of

several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may
serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public
services. In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint
an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts.
Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it
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needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes

Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.

TUANDA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. NO. 110544, OCTOBER 17, 1995

FACTS:

Private respondents Delia Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were

designated as industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural labor
sectoral representative respectively, for the Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud,
Province of Negros Oriental by then Secretary of the Department of Local
Government. They took their oath of office. Petitioners filed a petition with the
Office of the President for review and recall of said designations. However, the
secretary of the local government thru a letter denied the petition and enjoined
Mayor Reynaldo Tuanda to recognize private respondents as sectoral
representatives. Undaunted, petitioners filed an action with the RTC of Dumaguete
City to declare null and void the designations of private respondents as sectoral
representatives.

Meanwhile, private respondents also filed before the Sandiganbayan a

complaint against petitioners for violation of section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 on the
ground that petitioners refused to give them their per diems, salaries and other
privileges and benefits as sectoral representatives. Petitioners filed a motion with
the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings on the ground that a
prejudicial question exists in the civil case pending before the RTC of Dumaguete
City.

The RTC rendered a decision declaring null and void ab initio the
designations issued by the Department of Local Government to the private
respondents as sectoral representatives for having been done in violation of
Section 146 (2) of the Local Government Code. Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution denying the motion for suspension of proceedings filed by
petitioners.

ISSUE:

Whether or not private respondents may be considered as de facto public

officers entitled to compensation for services they actually rendered.
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RULING:

The conditions and elements to be a de facto public officer are the following:

1. There must be a de jure office;

2. There must be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; And
3. There must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

One can qualify as a de facto officer only if all the mentioned elements are
present. There can be no de facto officer where there is no de jure office or office
to fill, although there may be a de facto officer in a de jure office.

MALALUAN V. COMELEC
G.R. NO. 120193, MARCH 6, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner Malaluan and Private Respondent Evangelista were both

Mayoralty candidates.  Private Respondent was proclaimed by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor against the Petitioner. Petitioner
filed an election protest with the RTC contesting 64 out of the total 181 precincts
of the said Municipality.  The trial court declared Petitioner as the duly elected
Municipal Mayor. The Private Respondent appealed the Trial Court’s decision to
the COMELEC, which declared Private Respondent to be the duly elected
Municipal Mayor.

The COMELEC found Petitioner liable for attorney’s fee, actual expenses for Xerox
copies, and unearned salary and other emoluments, en masse denominated as
actual damages. 

Petitioner naturally contests that propriety and legality of this award upon private
respondent on the ground that said damages have not been alleged and proved
during trial.  COMELEC on the other hand, concluded in justifying that Private
Respondent be awarded actual damages, and hold that since Petitioner was
adjudged the winner in the elections only by the Trial Court, the Petitioner is
deemed to have occupied the position in an illegal manner as a Usurper.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner acted as a usurper.

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RULING:

NO. Petitioner was not a usurper because, while a usurper is one who
undertakes to act officially without any color of right, the petitioner exercised the
duties of an elective office under color of election thereto. It must be reiterated
that the decision of a judicial body is no less a basis than the proclamation made
by the COMELEC-convened Board of Canvassers for a winning candidate's right to
assume office, for both are undisputedly legally sanctioned. It is deemed that the
petitioner, therefore, is a "de facto officer who, in good faith, has had possession
of the office and had discharged the duties pertaining thereto" and is thus "legally
entitled to the emoluments of the office." 

MONROY V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. L-23258, JULY 1, 1967

FACTS:

Petitioner Roberto Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal,

when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as representative of the
first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections was filed with the Commission on
Elections. Three days later, or on September 18, 1961, petitioner filed a letter
withdrawing said certificate of candidacy. The Commission on Elections, per
resolution,1 approved the withdrawal. But on September 21, 1961, respondent
Felipe del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as
municipal mayor on the theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon
his filing of the certificate of candidacy in question.

Court of First Instance (CFI) decided against the Petitioner Monroy.

Court of Appeals affirmed CFI’s decision in toto except for the award of moral
damages which was eliminated.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner Monroy was considered a de facto officer and that
he was liable to Respondent Del Rosario for the salaries he was allegedly entitled
to receive.

RULING:
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Yes, Petitioner Monroy could be considered a de facto officer and he was

thus liable to Respondent Del Rosario for the salaries he was entitled to receive,
being a rightful incumbent. A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the
salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure officer for whatever
amount of salary he received during the period of his wrongful retention of the
public office. It is the general rule then, i.e., "that the rightful incumbent of a public
office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during
the time of his wrongful tenure, even though he (de facto officer) entered into the
office in good faith and under color of title".

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 104639, JULY 14, 1995

FACTS:

Private Respondent Tito Dato was appointed as Assistant Provincial warden

by Gov. Felix Alfelor. Due to his lack of the civil service eligibility for the position,
his appointment was only temporary, renewed annually. Sometime later, Gov.
Alfelor approved the change in Dato's employment status from temporary to
permanent upon the latter's representation that he passed the civil service
examination for supervising security guards. Said change of status however, was
not favorably acted upon by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) reasoning that Tito
Dato did not possess the necessary civil service eligibility for the office he was
appointed to. His appointment therefore remained temporary. After two years,
Dato was indefinitely suspended by Gov. Alfelor after criminal charges were filed
against him. On that same year, the head of the Camarines Sur Unit of the Civil
Service Commission informed Gov. Alfelor that the status of private respondent
Dato has been changed from temporary to permanent, the latter having acquired
the eligibility needed. The change of status was to be made retroactive to June 11,
1974 - the date of release of said examination. Private respondent Dato was then
acquitted of the charges against him. He then requested the Governor for
reinstatement and back wages which was not heeded by the Governor.

Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court action for mandamus,
to which he was favored by the said court.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision with
modification.

ISSUE:
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Whether or not private respondent Tito Dato was a permanent employee of

petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on March 16,
1976.

RULING:

NO. Private respondent Dato is not a permanent employee of the Province of

Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended. His lack of a civil service eligibility
made his appointment temporary and without a fixed and definite term and is
dependent entirely upon the pleasure of the appointing power. The fact that
private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his
having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso
facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. In such case,
what is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a
continuation of the temporary appointment — these are two distinct acts of the
appointing authority.

PABU-AYA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 128082, APRIL 18, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Pabu-aya was appointed as Utility Worker on a permanent status.

Later on, she was appointed as Bookbinder II on a temporary status. On October
16, 1992, a year after her temporary appointment, the Vice Governor of Negros
Occidental, issued a Memorandum informing the petitioner that her temporary
appointment as Bookbinder II had already expired on September 16, 1993, and
that she could no longer continue in service. She wrote the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan and acknowledged therein her failure to perform her duties
satisfactorily as Bookbinder II and promised that she would improve her
performance should her appointment be renewed. Petitioner appealed the
memorandum if the Vice Governor terminating her employment as Bookbinder II,
to the Civil Service Commission, which was dismissed by the Commission.
Subsequently the petitioner filed with the respondent Commission a request for
reinstatement to her original position as Utility Worker, which was later on
dismissed by the Commission.

Petitioner on May 20, 1995 then filed a "Petition for Certiorari and/or
Review" before this Court which, however, referred the same to the respondent
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Court of Appeals. In a Decision promulgated on January 6, 1997, respondent Court

of Appeals denied due course and dismissed the said petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that

petitioner’s subsequent acceptance of a temporary appointment was an indication
of her relinquishment of her position as a permanent employee and thus
foreclosed her right to contest her non-reinstatement.

RULING:

NO. As a general rule, the findings of fact of the respondents Commission

and Court of Appeals are accorded great weight. In the case at bar, respondent
Court of Appeals acted properly when it gave limited consideration to petitioner
Pabu-aya's claim that had she known of the demotion in status from that of a
Utility Worker, on a permanent status, to that of Bookbinder II on a temporary
status, she would have stuck to her old permanent position of Utility Worker
rather than put to naught her long years of service in the government. It is a fact;
however, that petitioner Pabu-aya freely took her oath of office as Bookbinder II
on a temporary status. Petitioner having accepted the position of Bookbinder II,
aware of the temporary nature of such appointment, she is deemed to have lost
and/or waived whatever right or privilege insofar as her tenurial security is
concerned. For, an employee is entitled only to such security of tenure as the
appointment papers actually confer.

ORCULLO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. NO. 138780, MAY 22, 2001

FACTS:

Petitioner Norberto A. Orcullo, Jr. was hired as Project Manager IV by the

Coordinating Council of the Philippine Assistance Program (CCPAP)-BOT Center
effective March 11, 1996. His employment was contractual and co-terminous with
the said project which was to end on January 30, 2000. On September 23, 1996 or
six (6) months from his assumption to office, petitioner received a Memorandum,
dated September 20, 1996, from one Jorge M. Briones, Assistance Director of
CCPAP, terminating petitioner's contractual employment with said agency
effective September 30, 1996, which was later on confirmed by the Executive
Director of CCPAP. Petitioner then appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC),
which was later on dismissed by the commission. After the dismissal the petitioner
 13

then filed a motion for reconsideration but was then denied by the CSC. He then
filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which was also dismissed,
thus this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioner Orcullo, as a contractual and co-terminous with

the project, is protected by the tenurial security right embodied in the
Constitution.

RULING:

NO. It is undisputed that petitioner's employment with CCPAP is contractual

and co-terminous in nature. Such a co-terminous employment falls under the non-
career service classification of positions in the Civil Service. A perusal of
petitioner's employment contract will reveal that his employment with CCPAP is
qualified by the phrase "unless terminated sooner." Thus, while such employment
is co-terminous with the PAPS project, petitioner nevertheless serves at the
pleasure of the appointing authority as this is clearly stipulated in his employment
contract.

OSEA V. MALAYA
G.R. 139821, JANUARY 30, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Eleonor Osea filed a protest case with the Civil Service

Commission alleging that she was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by the then Secretary of DECS,
upon the endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur. However,
despite this, President Fidel Ramos, appointed respondent Corazon Malaya to the
position of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

Petitioner claims that the appointment of respondent was made without

prior consultation with the Provincial School Board, in violation of Section 99 of
the Local Government Code as well as her vested right as the Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur. Petitioner prayed that respondent’s
appointment be recalled and set aside for being null and void. The Civil Service
Commission dismissed petitioner’s protest complaint. Petitioner field a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, she filed a petition for review.
 14

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent’s appointment require the mandatory

consultation with the Local School Board under Sec.99 of RA 7160.

RULING:

The portion of Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 which states
that “The
Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall consult the local school boards
on the appointment of division superintendents, district supervisors, school
principals, and other school officials” applies to appointments made by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Under the circumstances, the
designation of respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur
was not a case of appointment. Her designation partook of the nature of a
reassignment from Iriga City, where she previously exercised her functions as
Officer-in-Charge-Schools Division Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly,
therefore, the requirement in Section 99 of the Local Government Code of 1991 of
prior consultation with the local school board, does not apply.

Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment

may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. On the other hand, a
reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one organizational unit
to another in the same department or agency which does not involve a reduction
in rank, status or salary and does not require the issuance of an appointment.

Sta. Maria v. Lopez,G.R. L-30773, February 18, 1970

Facts
On February 11, 1969, the graduate and undergraduate students of the UP College
of Education presented to President Salvador P. Lopez a number of demands
having a bearing on the general academic program and the physical plant and
services, with a cluster of special demands. In response, President Lopez created a
committee composed of eight graduate students, two undergraduate students,
and four faculty members. On March 17, 1969, Dean Sta. Maria gave President
Lopez a written summary of the dialogues he had with the committee and
enumerated in connection with the demands, the steps taken, the steps being
taken, and the steps to be taken in consultation with the faculty. But the students
were not to be appeased. For, Dean Sta. Maria, according to them, did not act on
some of their demands. On July 16, 1969, Adelaida E. Masuhud, President of the
UP Graduate Education Student Organization, led a group who visited President
 15

Lopez and submitted to him a progress report on the students’ demands taken up
with Sta. Maria since March 26, 1969. However, the Dean has failed to take further
action on the demands that have far reaching implications for the students, faculty
and the College as a whole.
As a consequence, problems, confusion and demoralization of students and faculty
have cropped up anew in the college. But on July 17, the Education Graduate
Student Organization boycotted their classes just the same. The President met the
striking students’ representatives and the faculty members of the College of
Education. Charges of favouritism were allegedly hurled by some of the faculty
members against Sta. Maria. The boycott fever infected other colleges. On July 22,
1969, the newly installed members of the UP Student Council voted to support the
education students’ strike. Armed with the vote of confidence of the education
faculty, on the same day, July 23, 1969, President Lopez issued the transfer order
herein challenged, Administrative Order 77. Simultaneously, President Lopez
appointed ad interim Professor Nemesio R. Ceralde as "acting Dean of the College
of Education, without additional compensation, effective July 23, 1969."

Issue
W/N the transfer of Sta. Maria is valid
Ruling
No. Petitioner’s contract of employment has a fixed term of five years. It is
not an appointment in an acting capacity. Nor is petitioner’s designation that of an
officer-in-charge as it is known in administrative practice. Nothing in the rules and
regulations of the university or its charter would indicate that a college dean
appointed with a term can be separated without cause. It was there stated that
"uncertainty of tenure and frequency of change in the incumbent of the position
are not for the best interests of the University." Again, there is nothing either in
the UP charter or code empowering the UP President or the Board of Regents to
insert such a clause — unless sooner terminated — as would authorize dismissal at
will. Petitioner, with a definite term of employment, may not thus be removed
except for cause. The reasons being that the removal was not expressly declared
to be exercisable at pleasure or at will; and that the fixity of the term of office
gives rise to the inference that he may be removed from office only for
misbehaviour as to which he shall be entitled to notice and hearing.

Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA

22
Facts
Prior to his joining the Pamantasan, Dr. Esteban had been a permanent employee
in the government service for twenty five (25) years. Until May 20, 1973, he was
officially connected with the Philippine College of Commerce, a state-owned
 16

educational institution as its Vice-President for Academic Affairs. At the

Pamantasan, Dr. Esteban was initially extended an ad interim temporary
appointment as Vice-President for Administration by Dr. Consuelo Blanco. Dr.
Esteban received from the Secretary of Pamantasan a 'Notification of Confirmation
of Temporary Appointment' dated June 28, 1973. His appointment was 'effective
May 21, 1973 until June 30, 1974, unless sooner terminated.' On July 5, 1974, the
Secretary of Pamantasan sent him a 'Notification of Renewal of Temporary
Appointment' indicating that his appointment was renewed 'effective July 1, 1974
until August 31, 1974.'
A month later, on August 30, 1974, he received from the University Secretary
another 'notification of renewal of temporary appointment' informing him that the
Board of Regents, on recommendation of the President of the University approved
the renewal of his appointment 'effective September 1, 1974 until June 30, 1975'
with an increased salary of P17,160 per annum. On June 26, 1975, he received
another 'Notification of Renewal of Temporary Appointment' as Vice-President for
Administration with a salary of P21, 760 per annum, 'effective July 1, 1975 until
June 30, 1976.' On July 26, 1975, Dr. Esteban discovered that he was not included
in the list of employees recommended for permanent appointments. He wrote Dr.
Consuelo Blanco requesting the conversion of his temporary appointment to a
permanent one, considering his two and half (2½) years’ service. On August 1,
1975, Dr. Esteban received a 'Notification of Ad Interim Appointment notifying him
that the president of the university had approved his appointment as Professor III
with a salary of P15,600 per annum 'effective August 1, 1975'. On August 7, 1975,
Dr. Consuelo Blanco, issued a memorandum circular terminating Dr. Esteban's
appointment as Vice-President for Administration effective July 31, 1975. His
appointment dated June 26, 1975 and effective until June 30, 1976 had been
withdrawn before it could be confirmed by the Pamantasan Board of Regents. On
the same date, Dr. Esteban appealed to the Civil Service Commission for the
protection of his tenure in the Pamantasan.

Issue
W/N the appointment of Dr. Esteban is permanent

Ruling
Yes. There is nothing in the Pamantasan Board of Regents' Resolution No.
485 which suggests that respondent Esteban's appointment was temporary. The
Board's action was to confirm or reject an existing ad interim appointment. If
respondent's appointment was intended to be temporary, it should have been
expressly stated. It cannot be made to rest on inconclusive evidence, especially
because a temporary appointment divests the temporary appointee of the
constitutional security of tenure against removal without cause even if he is a civil
service eligible. Under the law, he is entitled to full pay, allowances, and other
 17

benefits during the period that he was actually reporting for work and rendering
services in whatever capacity, whether teaching, research or administration. As of
backwages, the amount is generally based on the equivalent of three years'
earnings. Considering that in the case at bar, more than ten (10) years have
elapsed from the date respondent Esteban as to the true nature of his
appointment and "studiously suppressing" material data to effectively deprive the
latter of his rights as a permanent employee, we find an award of five (5) years
back pay to respondent Dr. Esteban just and equitable under the circumstances,
assuming he has not reached retirement age in the meantime.

Civil Service Commission v. De la Cruz,

G.R. 158737, August 31, 2004
Facts
Respondent Saturnino de la Cruz is an employee of the Air Transportation Office,
DOTC, presently holding the position of Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer of
the Aviation Safety Division. Respondent was promotionally appointed to the said
position on November 28, 1994, duly attested by the Civil Service Commission
(CSC). In a letter dated February 9, 1995, Annabella A. Calamba of the Aviation
Security Division of the ATO formally filed with the Department of Transportation
and Communication (DOTC) her protest against the promotional appointment of
respondent as Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer, claiming among others that
respondent did not meet the four-year supervisory requirement for said position.
On July 20, 1995, then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia rendered a decision finding
the protest without merit.
Apparently dissatisfied, Calamba appealed the decision of the DOTC Secretary to
the CSC-NCR. On November 18, 1997, the CSC-NCR rendered its decision upholding
the protest of Calamba and recalling the approval of respondent’s appointment as
Chief Aviation Safety Regulation Officer. Under date of December 11, 1997, ATO
Director Gilo wrote the CSC-NCR asking for the suspension of the order recalling
respondent’s appointment, citing several reasons in support thereof. On August
11, 1999, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, seeking
to nullify CSC Resolution Nos. 98-2970 and 99-1451. In a decision dated March 14,
2003, the Court of Appeals granted the petition by setting aside CSC Resolution
Nos. 98-2970 and 99-1451 and approving respondent’s appointment as Chief of
the Aviation Safety Regulation Office. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
subsequently denied in a resolution issued on June 17, 2003. Hence, the instant
petition for review.

Issue
W/N the appointment of de la Cruz is valid
 18

Ruling
Yes. In the appointment of division chiefs, as in this case, the power to
appoint rests on the head of the department. Sufficient if not plenary discretion
should be granted to those entrusted with the responsibility of administering the
offices concerned. They are in a position to determine who can best fulfill the
functions of the office vacated. Not only is the appointing authority the officer
primarily responsible for the administration of the office, he is also in the best
position to determine who among the prospective appointees can efficiently
discharge the functions of the position. Clearly then, there is no reason to
disapprove the appointment of respondent as Chief of the Aviation Safety
Regulation Office considering that he is fully qualified and evidently the choice of
the appointing authority. Between the Commission and the appointing authority,
we sustain the latter. Every particular job in an office calls for both formal and
informal qualifications. Formal qualifications such as age, number of academic
units in a certain course, seminars attended, etc., may be valuable but so are such
intangibles as resourcefulness, team spirit, courtesy, initiative, loyalty, ambition,
prospects for the future and best interest of the service. Given the demands of a
certain job, who can do it best should be left to the head of the office concerned
provided the legal requirements for the office are satisfied.

People v. Garcia,
G.R. 126252, August 30, 1999
Facts
For review is the conviction of accused-appellant JESUS GARCIA y MANABAT for
illegal possession of five (5) kilos of marijuana for which he was initially sentenced
to death. The prosecution’s case hinges on the testimony of Senior Inspector
OLIVER ENMODIAS. He recounted that on November 28, 1994, he and SPO3 JOSE
PANGANIBAN boarded a passenger jeepney from their office in Camp Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet, en route to Baguio City. He took the seat behind the jeepney
driver while SPO3 Panganiban sat opposite him. They were in civilian attire. When
the jeepney reached km. 4 or 5, Accused JESUS GARCIA boarded the jeepney
carrying a plastic bag. He occupied the front seat, beside the driver and placed the
plastic bag on his lap. After a couple of minutes, the policemen smelled marijuana
which seemed to emanate from accused’s bag. To confirm their suspicion, they
decided to follow accused when he gets off the jeepney. To corroborate accused’s
testimony, the defense presented MANUEL DE GUZMAN, a resident of Baguio City
and a neighbour of accused’s brother Nick Garcia. He came to know the accused in
1994 when accused visited his brother Nick, a few months before accused was
 19

arrested in November that same year. He recounted that in the afternoon of

November 28, 1994, while he was walking along Rizal Park, he noticed two (2) men
holding the accused’s hands and forcing him to a car. He was then about 8-10
meters away. He did not see the accused or any of the two men carrying a bag.
In a Decision, dated January 29, 1996, RTC Judge Pastor de Guzman, Jr. found the
accused guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs and sentenced him to suffer
the maximum penalty of death. On February 26, 1996, the accused moved for
reconsideration. 10 He reiterated his position that the uncorroborated testimony
of prosecution witness Inspector Enmodias was insufficient to establish his guilt.
He further contended that he should only be punished with reclusion perpetua. On
April 12, 1996, Judge de Guzman, Jr. filed an application for disability retirement.
The effectivity of his retirement was made retroactive to February 16, 1996. On
August 6, 1996, Acting Presiding Judge Eulogio Juan R. Bautista issued an Order 12
granting in part accused’s Motion for Reconsideration. For lack of aggravating
circumstance, the accused’s penalty for illegal possession of marijuana was
reduced from death to reclusion perpetua.

Issue
W/N the amendment for the penalty of the accuse is validly promulgated

Ruling
Yes. In the case at bar, the decision under review was validly promulgated.
Although the effectivity of Judge de Guzman, Jr.’s disability retirement was made
retroactive to February 16, 1996, it cannot be denied that at the time his subject
decision was promulgated on February 20, 1996, he was still the incumbent judge
of the RTC, Branch LX of Baguio City, and has in fact continued to hold said office
and act as judge thereof until his application for retirement was approved in June
1996. Thus, as of February 20, 1996 when the decision convicting appellant was
promulgated, Judge de Guzman, Jr. was actually discharging his duties as a de
facto judge. In fact, as of that time, he has yet to file his application for disability
retirement. To be sure, as early as 1918, we laid down the principle that where the
term of the judge has terminated and he has ceased to act as judge, his
subsequent acts in attempting to dispose of business he left unfinished before the
expiration of his term are void. 18 However, in the present case, as Judge de
Guzman, Jr. was a de facto judge in the actual exercise of his office at the time the
decision under review was promulgated on February 20, 1996, said decision is
legal and has a valid and binding effect on appellant.

Debulgado v. Civil Service Commission,

G.R. 111471, September 26, 1994
Facts
 20

Petitioner Rogelio R. Debulgado is the incumbent Mayor of the City of San Carlos,
Negros Occidental. On 1 October 1992, petitioner Mayor appointed his wife,
petitioner Victoria T. Debulgado, as General Services Officer, that is, as head of the
Office of General Services of the City Government of San Carlos. On 16 December
1992, public respondent Civil Service Commission received a letter from
Congressman Tranquilino B. Carmona of the First District of Negros Occidental,
calling attention to the promotional appointment issued by petitioner Mayor in
favor of his wife. From the report submitted by Director Jesse J. Caberoy of the
Iloilo City-CSRO No. 6, the Commission found that petitioner Mayor was the lawful
husband of the appointee, petitioner Victoria, the two (2) having been married
sometime in 1964. Director Caberoy also reported that the appointment papers
prepared by the Office of the City Mayor of San Carlos were submitted to the
Bacolod City CSC-Field Office on 28 October 1992, and that the appointment was
thereafter approved by Director Purita H. Escobia of that CSC-Field Office, on 18
November 1992. On 14 June 1993, petitioner Mayor and petitioner Victoria
received a copy of Resolution No. 93-1427 of the Commission. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration, contending that the statutory prohibition against nepotism
was not applicable to the appointment of Victoria as General Services Officer.
Petitioners also asserted that the Commission had deprived petitioner Victoria of
her right to due process by unilaterally revoking her appointment. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Commission on 21 July 1993.

Issue
W/N the Commission had gravely abused its discretion in recalling and
disapproving the promotional appointment given to petitioner Victoria after the
Commission after Director Escobia, had earlier approved that same appointment

Ruling
No. The action of the Commission was, in other words, taken in implementation of
Section 59, Book V, E.O. No. 292 and the relevant Implementing Regulations.
Because the promotional appointment in favor of petitioner Victoria was a
violation of Section 59, it was null and void as being contra legem. A void
appointment cannot give rise to security of tenure on the part of the holder of
such appointment. The Commission is empowered to take appropriate action on
all appointments and other personnel actions, e.g., promotions. Such power
includes the authority to recall an appointment initially approved in disregard of
applicable provisions of Civil Service law and regulations. The recall or withdrawal
by the Commission of the approval which had been issued by one of its Field
Officers, Director Escobia, was accordingly lawful and appropriate, the
promotional appointment of petitioner Victoria being void "from the beginning."
The approval issued by Director Escobia did not, as it could not, cure the intrinsic
vice of that appointment.
 21

Carpio-Morales v. CA,
G.R. 217126, Nov 10, 2015
Facts
On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and
Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr.
and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay,
Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,
otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with
the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall
Parking Building (Makati Parking Building). On September 9, 2014, the
Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding
investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if
warranted (1st Special Panel). Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive, on March
5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay,
Jr., et al, charging them with six (6) administrative cases for Grave Misconduct,
Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and
six (6) criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of
Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators
to conduct a preliminary investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB
Cases (2nd Special Panel). Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel
issued separate orders for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file
their respective counter-affidavits. On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive
suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by
Maricon Ausan, a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff. Prior to the hearing of the oral
arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present
petition before this Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which
granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the March 20,
2015 Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for
contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.

Issue
W/N the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s
petition for contempt in CA- G.R. SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.

Ruling
No. The Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding
the validity of the preventive suspension order subject of this case does not
preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the
 22

condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle'

is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a
case. The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable
officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect contempt because this
action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her effective
removal from office. However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015
Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to contempt
proceedings. Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a
comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the contempt
proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise
of its sound judicial discretion, may still opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s
contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same.