Flores v Drilon

Facts:
RA 7227 appointed Respondent mayor Gordon as chairman and chief executive officer of
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SMBA) for the first year of its operations from the effectivity
of the Act. This appointment is challenged by the petitioners as infringing the constitutional and
statutory provisions which states that no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. The Respondent
argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC) permits the appointment of a local
elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office.
Issue:
whether the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided, however,
That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of
Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority,"
violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts.
Ruling:
Yes. The provision is unconstitutional. The subject proviso directs the President to
appoint an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government posts. Since
this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7, first part., Art. IX-B, of the
Constitution. Here, the fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the
higher interest of the body politic is of no moment. Section 94 of the LGC is not determinative of
the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the
fundamental law of the land. Since an incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive
position, his appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his disqualification or
lack of eligibility.
Where the constitution or statutes declare that persons holding one office shall be
ineligible for election or appointment to another office, either generally or of a certain kind, the
prohibition has been held to incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so
that any attempt to hold the second is void.

Galido v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Galido and private respondent were candidates during the local elections for
the position of mayor. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor. Private respondent
Saturnino R. Galeon filed an election protest before the RTC which upheld the proclamation of
the petitioner. The respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC which then reversed the
RTC. The COMELEC found that the fifteen (15) ballots in the same precinct containing the
initial "C" after the name "Galido" were marked ballots and, therefore, invalid. Hence, the
petitioner filed this present case. In several cases decided by this Court, according to petitioner, it
was held that in the appreciation of ballots where there is no evidence aliunde of a purpose to
identify the ballots, the same should not be invalidated as marked ballots. The COMELEC thus
committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the cited decisions of this Court and
declared that the suffix "C" after the name Galido was in reality a countersign nd not a mere
erroneous initial.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision.
Ruling:
No. It is settled that the function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or
tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or involving elective barangay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence,
equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and
conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion, the
exercise of which should not be controlled unless such discretion has been abused to the
prejudice of either party.

Rivera v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Juan Garcia Rivera and private respondent Juan Mitre Garcia II were
candidates for the position of Mayor. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as
the duly elected Mayor by a majority of ten (10) votes.. Garcia filed an election protest with the
Regional Trial Court. After due hearing, and upon considering the report of a Revision
Committee it had earlier created, the trial court rendered its verdict finding Garcia to have
obtained 6,376 votes as against Rivera's 6,222. Rivera appealed to the COMELEC. COMELEC
sustained with modification the appealed judgment of the Regional Trial Court Declaring Garcia
as the duly elected Municipal Mayor, by a majority of 153 votes over Rivera instead of a
plurality of 154 votes. A motion for reconsideration was filed but COMELEC denied and issued
a writ of execution, thus, Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of Mayor.
Petitioner filed the present case. The supplemental ground raised by petitioner Rivera that the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion "by not excluding from the total votes of
Garcia at least ten (10) votes which were misappreciated in Garcia's favor, outside of those
objected votes already ruled upon by the COMELEC" does not deserve any consideration. If
true, it is an error in judgment, correctible by appeal, not by a petition for certiorari pursuant to
Rule 65, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
 No. We have closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision and find that the
said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by respondent COMELEC. A
painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. In
fact, fourteen (14) ballots originally adjudicated in Garcia's favor were overruled by the
Commission en banc, thus reducing the number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the
2,445 contested ballots. On the other hand, 16 ballots were added in Rivera's favor, thus
increasing the votes in his favor to 1,087 votes.
Moreover, the appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual determinations. It is
settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies are final unless
grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations. We find none in this case.
Borja v COMELEC – ADMIN CASE

Adormeo v COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their certificates of
candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent was
elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In
the election of 1998 he lost to Bernard Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again
won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
Petitioner filed a petition to disqualify Talaga from running for Mayor for the May 14,
2001 elections on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3)
consecutive terms.
Issue:
Whether or not Talaga is qualified to run for mayor for the 2001 elections
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms. For nearly two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was
disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections. Neither can respondent's victory in the recall
election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as "voluntary
renunciation" for clearly it was not. Hence, private respondent was not disqualified to run for
mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the
three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people's
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term
limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his
post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect.
Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.