A.C. No. 3452, June 23, 2014 3.
Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled
HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner, v. ATTY. GINES
ABELLANA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the
courts or his clients on the status of their causes exhibits his
unworthiness to remain a member of the Law Profession. This is
because he is always expected to be honest and forthright in his
dealings with them. He thereby merits the condign sanction of
suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this
administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. AbelJana
who had represented him as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-6970
entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v. Authographics, Inc., and Nelson
Yu of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.1 In the administrative
complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional
misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it
appear that he had filed Civil Case No. CEB-6970 on June
10, 1988, conformably with their agreement, although the
complaint was actually filed on June 14, 1988;
2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file
the reply vis-à-vis the answer with counterclaim, with his
omission having delayed the pre-trial of the case; (b)
inform the trial court beforehand that Samonte could not
be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for
the plaintiff’s side an unexplained absence detrimental to
Samonte as the plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit
required by the trial judge, only to eventually submit it
three months later;
hearings;
and
4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash
payments made by Samonte for his court appearances
and his acceptance of the case.
To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following
annexes, namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the
complaint on file in the RTC and of the cover page of the
complaint Atty. Abellana furnished him;2
2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and
a photocopy of the order issued on January 19, 1990 in
which the RTC observed that “[t]he formal offer of
plaintiff’s exhibits is rather very late;”3 and
3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated
that Atty. Abellana had failed to promptly attend court
hearings and to do other legal services required of him as
the counsel. In the lower left portion of the motion, Atty.
Abellana noted the motion subject to the reservation that
his attorneys fees should still be paid.4
On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on
the administrative complaint.
In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge
of falsification of documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the
complaint could be made only on June 14, 1988 instead of on June 10,
1988 because Samonte had not given enough money to cover the filing
fees and other charges totaling P5,027.76; and that Samonte shelled
out only P5,000.00, contrary to their agreement in April 1988 on paying
to him P10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing fees.
He asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless, because
he had filed the reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer
with counterclaim of the defendants on August 2, 1988, attaching as
proof the copies of the reply (Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his
comment);6 and that it was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled the
pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his non- attendance at the
hearings in Civil Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had
informed the RTC of his having been either stranded in another
province, or having attended the arraignment of another client in
another court, the presiding judge had opted not to await his arrival in
the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the formal
offer of exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte had failed to give
the duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits despite his request
because of the latter’s absence from the country. He countered that it
was Samonte who had been dishonest, because Samonte had given only
the filing fees plus at least P2,000.00 in contravention of their
agreement on the amount of P10,000.00 being his acceptance fees in
addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered by
receipts issued by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued for
the P200.00/appearance fee conformably with the practice of most
lawyers; and that Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.
Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion
to change counsel,8 stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the
courtesy of informing him beforehand on the intention of not meeting
his obligation to him as the counsel; that Samonte had been forced to
issue to him a check after the Branch Clerk of Court had told him that
his motion to change counsel would not be acted upon unless it carried
Atty. Abellana’s conformity as the counsel; and that he had duly
acknowledged the check.9
On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samonte’s letter dated May 8,
199010 embodying additional charges of falsification of documents,
dereliction of duty and dishonesty based on the reply and the annexes
Atty. Abellana had filed. Samonte noted in the letter that the reply
attached to the comment of Atty. Abellana was not authentic based on
the categorical statement of the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 5 of
the RTC in Cebu City to the effect that no such reply had been filed in
behalf of Samonte; and that the rubber stamp affixed on the reply
supposedly filed by Atty. Abellana in Samonte’s behalf was not also the
official rubber stamp of Branch 5.11  Samonte denied being the cause of
delay in the submission of the formal offer of exhibits, and reminded
that the documentary exhibits concerned had been shown to the trial
court during his testimony, with the opposing party not even objecting
to their authenticity.
Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for
all his legal services stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded
damages; that the amount demanded was P1.12 Million;12 that he paid
Atty. Abellana a total of P7,027.00 for filing expenses, plus P5,000.00
that he gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellana’s services after
discovering the latter’s inefficiency and fraudulent practices.
On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the
administrative complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation.
Proceedings in the IBP
On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and
present their evidence at 10:00 am on November 18, 1994.15 However,
the parties sought postponements.16 The hearing was reset several
times more for various reasons, namely: on December 9, 1994 due to
the IBP Commissioner being out of town, but telegrams were sent to the
parties on December 6, 1994;17 on April 12, 2002, with the hearing
being cancelled;18 and on March 7, 2003, with the hearing being
cancelled until further notice.19
On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January
7, 2005 from Atty. Abellana,20 seeking the dismissal of the
administrative complaint because of the lack of interest on the part of
Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that Samonte had always
sought the postponement of the hearings.
Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing
by motion filed on February 9, 2005,21 declaring his interest in pursuing
the administrative complaint against Atty. Abellana.
On March 22, 2005,22 IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes
set the mandatory conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference,
only Samonte appeared;23 hence, the IBP just required the parties to
submit their verified position papers within 30 days from notice.
Nonetheless, the IBP scheduled the clarificatory hearing on August 18,
2005.24
Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August
9, 2005, Atty. Abellana requested an extension of his period to submit
his own position paper allegedly to allow him to secure relevant
documents from the trial court.26

On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing.
The case was thereafter deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position
paper, reiterating his allegations against Atty. Abellana.27
Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position
paper dated August 17, 2005,28 in which he represented that although
he had been at times late for the hearings he had nonetheless efficiently
discharged his duties as the counsel for Samonte; that he had not
caused any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who had been
unavailable at times because of his work as an airline pilot; that the
complainant had discharged him as his counsel in order to avoid paying
his obligation to him; and that the complainant filed this disbarment
case after he lost his own civil case in the RTC. He attached all the
pleadings he had filed on behalf of the complainant, except the above-
stated replies.
On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty.
Abellana negligent in handling certain aspects of his client’s case, like
not filing a reply to the defendants’ answer with counterclaims in order
to deny the new matters raised in the answer; resorting to falsehood to
make it appear that he had filed the reply; and being considerably late
in submitting the formal offer of exhibits for Samonte, as noted even by
the trial judge in the order dated January 19, 1990. It observed that
although the negligence of Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice
his client’s case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney,
and his resort to falsehood and deceitful practices were a different
matter;30 noted that he had twice resorted to falsehood, the first being
when he tried to make it appear that the complaint had been filed on
June 10, 1988 despite the court records showing that the complaint had
been actually filed only on June 14, 1988; and the second being when
he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the reply
by producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively
different from that of the trial court’s; that he did not dispute the pieces
of material evidence adduced against him; that he had explained that
the reason for his delay in the filing of the complaint had been the
complainant’s failure to pay the agreed fees on time; and that he had
only stated that he had filed a reply, without presenting proof of his
having actually filed such in court.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of
Atty. Abellana, observing as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said
respondent has shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful
practices as a means to cover-up his delay and lack of diligence
in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a whole, the
respondent’s acts are nothing short of deplorable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended
that respondent Atty. Gines Abellana be disbarred from the
practice of law for resorting to false and/or deceitful practices,
and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits
a member of the bar. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the
findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty.
Abellana from the practice of law for one year, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously
ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex “A”, and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and for resorting to falsehood and/or
deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and
trustworthiness as befits member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1)
year.31 (Bold emphasis supplied)
On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration
based on the following grounds:32
A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the
undersigned from the practice of law for one (1) year is
too stiff in relation to the alleged unethical conduct
committed by the respondent;
B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not
fully supported with evidence;
 C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated
by testimonial evidence so that it is hearsay and self-
serving.
In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous
arguments, and stated that the “enumerations of failures are belied by
the existence of Reply to counterclaims, which were attached as
Annexes “8” and “9” of the Position Paper of respondent.”33 It is noted,
however, that Annex 8 and Annex 9 of Atty. Abellana’s position paper
were different documents, namely: Annex 834 (Manifestation and
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Counsel); and Annex
935 (Manifestation). Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were
already part of the records of the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo
V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court, did not execute any affidavit or
certification to the effect that both documents were inexistent. He
reminded that Samonte had only said that both documents “seemed to
be falsified documents” based on the certification of Atty. Nazareth on
the official rubber stamp of the court.
The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellana’s motion for
reconsideration.36
In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his
allegations against Atty. Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not
refute the charges against him; and noted that the reply that Atty.
Abellana had supposedly filed in the case was not even annexed either
to his position paper and motion for reconsideration.
On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be
allowed to submit certified true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings
he had submitted in the RTC.38
On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39
On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration.40
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration of Atty. Abellana.41
Ruling
We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by
virtue of their being substantiated by the records.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is
expected to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These
expectations, though high and demanding, are the professional and
ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have
been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this
country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law
Profession, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I, __________________________, do solemnly swear that I will
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its
Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote
or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to
the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God. (Emphasis supplied)
By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws
of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of
court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. Every lawyer is a
servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as
well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others.42 It is by no
means a coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and
trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
 deny because the RTC Judge had himself expressly noted the belated
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his filing in the order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was fortunate that
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for the RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and liberality by still admitting
information. the belated offer of evidence in the interest of justice.

In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of

Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and
Governors, Atty. Abellana challenged the sufficiency of the proof
trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the
presented against him by Samonte, contending that such proof had
RTC as the trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by
consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving evidence.
superimposing “0” on “4” in order to mislead Samonte into believing
that he had already filed the complaint in court on June 10, 1988 as
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary
promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had actually
proceedings against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required
done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the
to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent
belated filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount of
lawyers. Preponderant evidence means that the evidence adduced by
filing fees and his acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon,
one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of
did not excuse the falsification, because his falsification was not
the other.45 In order to determine if the evidence of one party is greater
rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by whatever reasons for filing
than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of
at the later date. He ought to remember that honesty and integrity were
Court instructs that the court may consider the following, namely: (a)
of far greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession than his
all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner
transactions with his client.
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing
the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
Atty. Abellana’s perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
continued misleading Samonte in explaining his mishandling of the
witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility
latter’s civil case. Worse, he also foisted his dishonesty on the Court no
so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the
less. To counter Samonte’s accusation about his not filing the reply in
number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is
the civil case, he knowingly submitted two documents as annexes of his
necessarily with the greater number.
comment during the investigation by the IBP, and represented said
documents to have been part of the records of the case in the RTC. His
The complainant’s evidence preponderantly established the
intention in doing so was to enhance his defense against the
administrative sins of Atty. Abellana. To start with, Atty. Abellana
administrative charge. But the two documents turned out to be forged
admitted superimposing the “0” on “4” but justified himself by claiming
and spurious, and his forgery came to be exposed because the rubber
that he had done so only because the complainant had not given to him
stamp marks the documents bore were not the official marks of the
the correct amount of filing fees required. Secondly, Atty. Abellana filed
RTC’s, as borne out by the specimens of the official rubber stamp of
a spurious document by making it appear as one actually filed in court
Branch 5 of the RTC duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the
by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed because the
Branch Clerk of Court.43 He defended his dishonesty by lamely claiming
rubber stamp imprint on his document was different from that of the
that “court personnel were authorized to accept filing of pleadings even
official rubber stamp of the trial court. He defended himself by stating
without the usual rubber stamp.”44 In these acts, he manifested his
that court personnel accepted papers filed in the court without
great disrespect towards both the Court and his client.
necessarily using the official rubber stamp of the court. He well knew, of
The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s course, that such statement did not fully justify his misdeed. Thirdly,
Atty. Abellana did not present any proof of his alleged filings, like
case was entirely warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the
certified copies of the papers supposedly filed in court. His omission to
hearings of the civil case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf
prove his allegation on the filings conceded that he did not really file
of his client way beyond the period to do so, a fact that he could not
them. And, lastly, Atty. Abellana misrepresented the papers he had
supposedly filed by stating that he was attaching them as Annex 8 and Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty.
Annex 9 of his comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned out to be Gines N. Abellana as a member of the Philippine Bar, and copies
papers different from those he represented them to be. furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for proper
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that dissemination to all courts in the country.
whoever is granted the privilege to practice law in this country should
remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve SO ORDERED.
their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to
falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s
misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public,
evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice
law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stem disciplinary sanctions.

The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading

his client and the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in
the handling of the client's case, were unmitigated. Still, the Court must
not close its eyes to the fact that Atty. Abellana actually finished
presenting his client's case; and that the latter initiated the termination
of Atty. Abellana's engagement as his counsel only after their
relationship had been tainted with mistrust. Thus, we determine the
proper sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr.,46 the respondent lawyer
was suspended for two months from the practice of law for representing
in court that the complainant had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit when
in truth the complainant had made no such agreement. The respondent
admitted the falsity of his representation, but gave as an excuse his
intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v. Magat,47 the
respondent had invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client by
stating that the complainant had filed a similar case of slight physical
injuries in another court, but his invocation was false because no other
case had been actually filed. He was suspended from the practice of law
for six months for making the false and untruthful statement in court.
For Atty. Abellana, therefore, suspension from the practice of law for six
months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a repetition
suffices.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22,

2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors subject
to the MODIFICATION that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is SUSPENDED
FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon
receipt of this decision, with the stern warning that any repetition by
him of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.
A.M. No. P-09-2646               June 18, 2012
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2911-P)
JUDGE AMADO S. CAGUIOA (ret.), Complainant,
vs.
ELIZABETH G. AUCENA, Court Legal Researcher II, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 4, Baguio City, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
The instant administrative case arose from a letter-complaint dated February 8,
2008 of complainant Judge Amado S. Caguioa, former Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 of Baguio City, charging respondent Elizabeth G.
Aucena, Court Legal Researcher II of the same court, with Dishonesty and
Falsification of Official Document relative to Civil Case No. 775-FC entitled, In the
Matter of the Custody of Minors, AAA, BBB and CCC, DDD, Petitioner, v. EEE,
Respondent.1
As borne by the records, on June 28, 2007, complainant judge issued the following
Order:
In chambers the respondent mother, EEE,2 agreed to give custody of her three (3)
minor children to the custody of (sic) the petitioner-auntie of the husband. While
she was allowed visitorial rights, it will always be under the watchful eyes of the
petitioner-auntie as she admitted that one time she lost her temper and inflicted
injuries to (sic) two of the children. She was admonished not to ever do it again.
SO ORDERED.3
Meanwhile, on November 10, 2007, Judge Caguioa retired from service. In his
letter-complaint addressed to Executive Judge Edilberto T. Claravall, 4 Judge
Caguioa alleged that the subject order was altered in January 2008, or almost two
months after his retirement. Judge Caguioa said that Court Stenographer Leonila
Fernandez admitted to him that she was instructed by respondent to type the
following as the last sentence of the order:
In view of the agreement of the parties, this case is hereby DISMISSED. 5
Afterwards, respondent had a copy of the Order received by the Records Section
of the City Prosecutor's Office (CPO) of Baguio City. Thereafter, when the Acting
Branch Clerk of Court refused to issue any certification based on the altered order,
the alteration became known to the staff. Complainant stated that respondent even
attempted to have the receipt of the copy of the altered order by the CPO ante-
dated to make it appear that the altered order was received on June 28, 2007.
With the refusal of the Acting Clerk of Court to issue the certification and the
prosecutor's office to ante-date the receipt of the order, respondent had to retrieve
the distributed orders and cover the alteration with correction fluid. Complainant
judge concluded that although no serious damage had resulted, the act is still
grave and must not be left unpunished. Thus, he asked for a proper administrative
investigation regarding the incident.
After being furnished with the copy of the complaint, Executive Judge Claravall
directed the respondent to explain why no administrative charge and/or criminal
complaint for falsification of document should be instituted against her. In
compliance with the order of the executive judge, respondent submitted her
explanation.
The case was referred by Executive Judge Claravall to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), which docketed the complaint as OCA-I.P.I. No. 08-2911-P.
The OCA forthwith required respondent to submit her Comment.
In her Comment dated October 2, 2008, respondent admitted having ordered the
insertion of the sentence in the order as alleged by the complainant, but contended
that it was done in good faith to complete a rather incomplete order which failed to
depict the real situation, that is, that the case was already dismissed because of
the agreement reached by the parties. Respondent denied that she attempted to
have the date of the receipt of the order by the CPO ante-dated. She admitted,
however, that her act of inserting the last sentence in the order was unjustified and
apologized for this error. She begged for understanding and leniency, since the act
was done purely in good faith with no malice or ill motives, and promised not to
commit the same mistake in the future. She informed the Court that this is the first
time that an administrative case has been filed against her and pleaded the court
that her sincere apology be accepted and that she be accorded with leniency.
In his Reply, complainant declared that the reasons offered by respondent are
untenable. He explained that it was incorrect for the respondent to assume that his
order was incomplete, since what transpired during the hearing was that the
mother gave up the custody of her children to their biological father's aunt. On the
contrary, the dismissal of the case, as respondent would have wanted, would
return the custody of the children to the mother.
In her Rejoinder dated December 21, 2008, respondent explained that when a
certificate of finality of the case was requested, she was under the impression that
no such certificate can be issued without an order expressly stating that the case
was finally disposed and terminated. Thus, out of compassion for the three (3)
minors involved, who had to process their papers to leave for the United States,
she caused the insertion of the above-mentioned sentence but she immediately
erased the sentence, upon realizing her honest mistake.
After evaluating the case, the OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as
a regular administrative matter, and respondent be found guilty of dishonesty and
be suspended from the service for six (6) months, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. 6
The Court, in its Resolution dated June 29, 2009, resolved to adopt and approve
the recommendation of the OCA, thus:
(1) RE-DOCKET this case as a regular administrative matter; and
(2) HOLD respondent Elizabeth G. Aucena GUILTY of dishonesty and
suspend her for six (6) months without pay, with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
A motion for reconsideration, dated August 25, 2009, was filed by the respondent
praying that the Court reduce the penalty imposed upon her, because a six (6)-
month suspension is too harsh considering that she is a widow and the only one
supporting her five (5) children.
On September 9, 2009, in response to the motion for reconsideration, the Court
issued a Resolution amending7 its June 29, 2009 resolution to read as follows:
1) RE-DOCKET this case as a regular administrative matter; and,
2) REQUIRE the parties to MANIFEST to the Court if they are willing to
submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed, within ten (10)
days from receipt of herein resolution.8
In response to the latest resolution of the Court, the respondent, on October 1,
2009, filed her Manifestation and Motion informing the Court that she was willing to
submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings and motions filed, and
likewise, manifested that she had already commenced serving her suspension
from September 2, 2009 to September 30, 2009, in view of the earlier resolution of
the Court, dated June 29, 2009.
In a Resolution dated December 9, 2009, the Court referred back the case to the
OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA, in its Report dated
March 30, 2010, recommended that respondent should be liable for dishonesty
and suspended for six months, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts shall be dealt with more severely, and that the period respondent did
not work, pursuant to the June 29, 2009 resolution, should be deducted from the 6-
month suspension, and considered as partial service of her penalty.
The Court's Ruling
The Court finds the recommendation of the OCA to be well taken and, thus, holds
respondent administratively liable for dishonesty.
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees
enunciates the State's policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. And no other office in the government service
exacts a greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness from an
employee than the judiciary. Persons involved in the dispensation of justice, from
the highest official to the lowest clerk, must live up to the strictest standards of
integrity, probity, uprightness and diligence in the public service. As the
assumption of public office is impressed with paramount public interest, which
requires the highest standards of ethics, persons aspiring for public office must
observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance with the law. 9
Respondent committed dishonesty by causing the unauthorized insertion of an
additional sentence in the trial court's order. Dishonesty has been defined as a
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness, lack of
integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of the individual
who failed to exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. 10 By
her act, she has compromised and undermined the public's faith in the records of
the court below and, ultimately, the integrity of the Judiciary. 11 To tolerate such act
would open the floodgates to fraud by court personnel.
Respondent's contention that she just inserted the sentence in order to complete a
rather incomplete order, and to depict the real situation,  i.e., that the case was
already dismissed because of the agreement reached by the parties, is not
acceptable. The insertion of an additional sentence in an order of the trial court,
regardless of the reason is not among her duties.12 A legal researcher's duty
focuses mainly on verifying legal authorities, drafting memoranda on evidence,
outlining facts and issues in cases set for pre-trial, and keeping track of the status
of cases.13
In Salvador v. Serrano,14 the Court held that courts have the inherent power to
amend and control their process and orders to make them conformable to law and
justice. But such power rests upon the judge and not to clerks of court who only
perform adjudicative support functions and non-adjudicative functions. In the same
vein, the power to amend court orders cannot be performed by a legal researcher.
It is well to remind that court personnel are obliged to accord the integrity of court
records of paramount importance, as these are vital instruments in the
dispensation of justice.

Under Section 52 (A) (1),15 Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in

the Civil Service,16 promulgated by the Civil Service Commission through
Resolution No. 99-1936 dated August 31, 1999 and implemented by Memorandum
Circular No. 19, series of 1999, dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal from the service for the first offense. However, the Court, in certain
instances, has not imposed the penalty of dismissal due to the presence of
mitigating factors such as the length of service, being a first-time offender,
acknowledgment of the infractions, and remorse by the respondent. 17 The Court
has also ruled that where a penalty less punitive would suffice, whatever missteps
may be committed by labor ought not to be visited with a consequence so severe.
It is not only for the law's concern for the workingman; there is, in addition, his
family to consider. Unemployment brings untold hardships and sorrows on those
dependent on wage earners.18

The compassion extended by the Court in these cases was not without legal basis.
Section 53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil
Service, grants the disciplining authority the discretion to consider mitigating
circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty.

Considering that this is respondent's first offense in her twenty-two (22) years of
service in the Judiciary, the admission of her act and her sincere apology for her
mistake, her firm resolve not to commit the same mistake in the future, and taking
into account that she is a widow and the only one supporting her five children, the
recommended penalty of suspension for a period of six (6) months is in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent ELIZABETH G. AUCENA, Court Legal Researcher II,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 4 of Baguio City, is found GUILTY of dishonesty. She
is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months without pay, effective
immediately upon her receipt of this Decision. She is STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
The period of suspension that respondent had previously served shall
be DEDUCTED from the six-month suspension and shall be considered as partial
service of the penalty imposed.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998
JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the
bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the
Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law.
On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative
complaint 1 for disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag,
whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code
of Ethics for Lawyers. 2
The complainant narrated:
The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of
Atty. Dominador M. Narag in the early seventies as a full-time
college instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as
a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita,
17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in
subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his influence as her
teacher, and as a prominent member of the legal profession
and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao,
Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her
resistance until the student acceded to his wishes.
They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various
circles in the community, but which they managed to from
me. It therefore came as a terrible embar[r]assment to me,
with unspeakable grief and pain when my husband
abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly
scandalous circumstances.
It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to
cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of
Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out
of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to
live with Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and morals
completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.
It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty.
Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us, his family, to live
with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in the
tertiary level[.] 3
This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. 4
On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received
from complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative
complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her
complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between
the respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering
from "emotional confusion arising from extreme jealousy." The truth, she
stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and responsible family
man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous
relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. 5 Supporting her
letter were an Affidavit of Desistance 6 and a Motion to Dismiss, 7 attached as
Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP commission on bar
discipline. 8 In a Decision dared October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of
Governors 9 dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute. 10
The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this
Court 11 received another letter 12 from the complainant, with her seven
children 13 as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her
husband. She explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him
because of his continuous threats against her. 14
In his Comment on the complainant's letter of November 11, 1991, filed in
compliance with this Court's Resolution issued on July 6,
1992, 15 respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be
affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife,
he alleged that she had voluntarily executed her Affidavit of
Desistance 16 and Motion to Dismiss, 17 even appearing before the
investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath "that she
prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free
will and affirmed the contents thereof."
In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied
abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he described his
wife as a person emotionally disturbed, viz:
What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an
incurably jealous and possessive woman, and every time the
streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or
complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum,
all without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the
consuming demands of her "loving" jealousy. Then, as is her
nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off,
she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the
Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of November
11, 1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of
jealousy. 18
On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the
Comment of respondent to the IBP. 19 In the hearing before IBP
Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the following: 20
2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have
left him not even a square meter of land, but gave him the
best legacy in life: a purposeful and meaningful education.
Complainant comes from what she claims to be very rich
parents who value material possession more than education
and the higher and nobler aspirations in life. Complainant
abhors the poor.
3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the
gentle ways of love, forgiveness, humility, and concern for
the poor. Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely
different environment. Her value system is the very opposite.
4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has
done all he could in thirty-eight (38) years of marriage to
protect and preserve his family. He gave his family
sustenance, a comfortable home, love, education,
companionship, and most of all, a good and respected name.
He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife and
children. Even in the most trying times, he remained calm and
never inflicted violence on them. His children are all now full-
fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully employed. . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a
social institution.
On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable
jealousy, Complainant has been systematically and
unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their marriage
and their family. Their marriage has become a torture
chamber in which Your Respondent has been incessantly
BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED, TORTURED, ABUSED,
and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by
the Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has
become a nightmare.
For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence
and bore the pain of his misfortune with dignity and with
almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their family and
their marriage. But this is not to be. The Complainant never
mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and
understanding. In fact, she became more fierce and
predatory.
Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your
Respondent does not seem in sight. The darkness continues
to shroud the marital and familial landscape.
Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation
from enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in "Death and the
Maiden", can the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live
together?
Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and
uncompromising mind whose only obsession now is to
destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with
perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan. . . .
5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and
unbending. But your Respondent never revealed these
destructive qualities to other people. He preserved the good
name and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the
marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or
for worse, in sickness and in health . . . Even in this case,
Your Respondent never revealed anything derogatory to his
 wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these
things to defend himself.
On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage,
Complainant tells everyone, everywhere, that her husband is
worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to
colleges and universities, professional organizations,
religious societies, and all other sectors of the community to
tell them how evil, bad and immoral her husband is. She tells
them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or any other
capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is
this love? Since when did love become an instrument to
destroy a man's dearest possession in life — his good name,
reputation and dignity?
Because of Complainant's virulent disinformation campaign
against her husband, employing every unethical and immoral
means to attain his ends, Your Respondent has been
irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and
humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he
who has been mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the
Complainant. 21
To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent
presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed
against him and Gina Espita:
3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty . . .
3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. . . .
3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S No.
89-114. . . .
3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage.
OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. . . .
3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061.
DISMISSED.
3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S. No.
92-109. DISMISSED. (. . .). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration.
DENIED. (. . .).
3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (. . .) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (. . .).
DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (. . .). Re-instituted (. . .).
3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (. . .). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending.
3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (. . .). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela.
Pending. . . . 22
In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred:
I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (. . .), picture
(. . .) are inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the
Supreme Court in "Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of
Appeals, et.al.", G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (. . .).
x x x           x x x          x x x
II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He
never courted Gina Espita in the Saint Louis College of
Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said woman
in the DTI. He never had or is having any illicit relationship
with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as
husband and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro
Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any other place. He
never begot a child or children with her. Finally, respondent
submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag are false
and fabricated, . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and
her two sons forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the
conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the
conjugal home many times with the help of mutual friends to
save the marriage and the family from collapse. He tried
several times to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of
the hearings of the disbarment case, he offered to return
home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag
refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. . . .
IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous,
violent, vindictive, scandalous, virulent and merciless wife
since the beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat,
battered, brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and
humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally,
emotionally, and psychologically, . . .
V. Complainant Julieta Narag's claim in her counter-
manifestation dated March 28, 1996, to the effect that the
affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996
was obtained through force and intimidation, is not true.
 Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and
absolutely without force or intimidation, as shown by the
transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of
Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge
Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal Case No. 12439,
People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the
Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man — a senior
citizen of 63 years — sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened
and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout and
arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His very
physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions
render him unfit and unable to do the things attributed to him
by the complainant. Please see the attached medical
certificates, . . ., among many other similar certificates
touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also suffering
from hypertension. 23
On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his
report, 24 recommending the indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the
practice of law. The material portions of said report read as follows:
Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial
evidence submitted by the contending parties, two (2) issues
are relevant for the disposition of the case, namely:
a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged
abandonment of respondent's own family and [whether he
was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita;
b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children
with Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as
appearing on paragraph 1(g) of respondent's Comment vis-a-
vis his handwritten love letters, the due execution and
contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility
for being allegedly forgeries, were never denied by him on the
witness stand much less presented and offered proof to
support otherwise.
Except for the testimonies of respondent's witnesses whose
testimonies tend to depict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag,
as an incurably jealous wife and possessive woman suffering
everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did not
present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-
examined on his sworn comment; much less did he present
his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the adulterous
relationship between him and their having begotten their
illegitimate children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and
Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse, respondent's denial that he
is the father of the two is a ground for disciplinary sanction
(Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467).
Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the
respondent subject to disciplinary action as a member of the
legal profession. 25
In its Resolution 26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved
the investigating commissioner's recommendation for the indefinite
suspension of the respondent. 27 Subsequently the complaint sought the
disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October
20, 1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated
November 30, 1997, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration.
After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence
presented by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants
the imposition of the penalty of disbarment.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 28 to the
practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.
Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be
suspended or disbarred. 29
Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. 30 Furthermore, such conduct must
not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree  31  or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances
as to shock the common sense of decency. 32
We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, "as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of
the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself
as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting
those moral standards."
Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family
in order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she
establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34
Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself. 35 were: Charlie
Espita, 36 Magdalena Bautista, 37 Bienvenido Eugenio, 38 Alice Carag, 39 Dr.
Jervis B. Narag, 40 Dominador Narag, Jr., 41 and Nieves F. Reyes. 42
Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated
complainant's charge against respondent in these categorical statements he
gave to the investigating officer:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag?
A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.
Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him?
A Yes, sir.
(Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag)
Q Why do you know Atty. Narag?
ATTY. NARAG:
Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner.
CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT
A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living
together as husband and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador.
x x x           x x x          x x x
During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie
Espita repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the
respondent, with whom she had two children:
Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband
and wife. You claim that?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that?
A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you have
already two children and I know that is really an immoral act which you cannot just
allow me to follow since my moral values don't allow me that my sister is living with
a married man like you.
Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in
the house?
A Yes, si[r].
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag?
A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family. 44
In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs.
Narag the love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty.
Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment
proceedings. 45
Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in
this wise:
Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case?
A I know him very well, sir.
Q Could you please tell us why do you know him?
A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of
Charlie Espita.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag?
A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir.
Q And this is located where?
A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir.
Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of
Atty. Narag?
A Yes, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as
husband and wife, is it not?
A Yes, sir. 46
Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple,
testified that she learned from the Narag children — Randy, Bong and
Rowena — that their father left his family, that she and her husband prodded
the complainant to accept the respondent back, that the Narag couple again
separated when the respondent "went back to his woman," and that Atty.
Narag had maltreated his wife. 47
On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able
to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another
woman. Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive
to testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed
worthy of belief.
Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that
respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested
his love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his own.
In addition, complainant, also submitted as evidence the cards that she
herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be
proved through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or
treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence
were written by one and the same person. 48 Besides, respondent did not
present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by
him; he merely denied that he wrote them.
While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty
not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to
remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his
moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his
cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and
present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court,
that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. 49 This he
failed to do.
Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina
Espita. At the same time, he depicts his wife as a "violent husband-beater,
vitriolic and unbending," and as an "insanely and pathologically jealous
woman," whose only obsession was to "destroy, destroy and destroy" him
as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges against
him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98)
pieces of documentary evidence 50 and ten (10) witnesses. 51
We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did
not establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the
profession that would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did
their testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had
abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two
children. Some of them testified on matters which they had no actual
knowledge of, but merely relied on information from either respondent
himself or other people, while others were presented to impeach the good
character of his wife.
Respondent may have provided well for his family — they enjoyed a
comfortable life and his children finished their education. He may have also
established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But
these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to
continue being a member of the noble profession of law.
We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties
— e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right
precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and
understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. 52 As a husband, he
is also obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity; and to render help and support. 53
Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away
from home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of
his work; instead, he abandoned his family to live with her paramour, who
bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position
to be a good husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly
under the care of their mother, must have scarcely felt the warmth of their
father's love.
Respondent's son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his
father's moral frailties in his testimony:
Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is
there a fault that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness?
A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional
part of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although am a God-fearing
person, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or her to at least
realize his mistakes, sir.
x x x           x x x          x x x
COMR. JOSE:
I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the
worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him
disbarred? That is the question.
CONTINUATION.
A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a
lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all
the pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime.
Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is
your flesh, his bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the
worst man on earth, is that what you are saying.
A Sort of, sir.
Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has
sinned, you have no more father, am I correct?
A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid
because my father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say
that? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure, sir, you did not give me love. 54
Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer
the trauma he went through:
Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your
father is maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission
the effect on you?
A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters,
especially my married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and
my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted ways. This is
one reason that affected us.
Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways?
A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she
could not face the people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a
well-known family in our community.
Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are
those.
A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows
so well that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my
mother.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Why did your wife leave you?
A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor.
Q In your wife's family?
A In our family, sir.
Q And what do you mean by that?
A What meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went
to the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a "puta" in provincial
government, which my mother-in-law hated him so much for this, which really
affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit
relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle
Dominic and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your
Honor. 55
Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage,
his acts prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted
marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and
respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.
We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova 56: "The moral delinquency
that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the
community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage."
In Toledo vs. Toledo, 57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of
law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman
who had borne him a child.
Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan, 58 the respondent was disbarred after the
complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an
adulterous relationship with a married woman. This Court declared that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar.
In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting
moral standards set for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa
vs. Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in
his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court."
WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision
be in the personal record of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of
the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar
Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC
[SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997.]
PATRICIA FIGUEROA, Complainant, v. SIMEON BARRANCO,
JR., Respondent.
Pablo S. Tolentino for complainant.
Jose Remi S. Maranon for Private Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
This is an administrative complaint filed by Patricia Figueroa way back in
1971, against respondent Simeon Barranco Jr., a successful bar
candidate in the 1970 Bar examination, praying thereto that herein
respondent be denied admission to the legal profession. In her petition,
complainant averred that respondent and she had been sweethearts,
that a child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent failed
to fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
Hence, complainant charged him of gross immorality.
The Supreme Court ruled that these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting permanent exclusion of herein respondent from
the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with the
complainant and promises to marry suggest a doubtful moral character
on his part but the same does not constitute gross immoral conduct. To
justify suspension or disbarment, the act complained of must not only
be immoral but grossly immoral. Additionally, even assuming that his
past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has
been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. Henceforth, the Court hereby dismissed the instant petition
and herein respondent should be allowed to take his lawyer’s oath.
SYLLABUS
REMEDIAL LAW; DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS;
GROSS IMMORALITY; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — Respondent
was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath because of charges of
gross immorality by complainant. Respondent bore an illegitimate child
with his sweetheart who claims that he did not fulfill his promise to
marry her after he passes the bar examinations. These facts do not
constitute gross immorality warranting permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. Engaging in premarital sexual
relations and promising to marry suggests a doubtful moral character
but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court
has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of
must be grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that
respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied admission to the legal
profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the
fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968.
Before he could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a
child out of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill
his repeated promises to marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F.
Sevilla in June and July 1971. Respondent and complainant were
townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their
teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town fiesta.
Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime
in 1960. Their intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on
December 11, 1964. 1 It was after the child was born, complainant
alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he
passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and
respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter’s birthdays.
Her trust in him and their relationship ended in 1971, when she learned
that respondent married another woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant’s motion, the Court authorized the taking of
testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972. In February 18, 1974,
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing
complainant’s failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking
to be relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by deposition.
Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons
in failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains
interested in the resolution of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the
Court denied respondent’s motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on
the ground of abandonment filed by respondent on September 17,
1979. 2 Respondent’s third motion to dismiss was noted in the Court’s
Resolution dated September 15, 1982. 3 In 1988, respondent repeated
his request, citing his election as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic
organizations and good standing in the community as well as the length
of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to take his
oath as a lawyer. 4
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for
failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an unreasonable period
of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer’s oath upon
payment of the required fees. 5
Respondent’s hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when
the Court, in response to complainant’s opposition, resolved to cancel
his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The IBP’s report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the
case and that respondent be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971
because of the charges of gross immorality made by complainant. To
recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart,
Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to
marry her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting
the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal profession. His
engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises
to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same
does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to
justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. "A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree." 6 It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community. 7chanroblesvirtual|
awlibrary
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang 8 quite relevant because mere
intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on
the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to
warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a
result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock. 9
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations
were evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s assertions that
she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to
see and be respondent’s girlfriend even after she had given birth to a
son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and intimate
relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual
congress with him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and
actively pursued their relationship and was not an innocent young girl
who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to
marry and settle permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate
a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a
sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of
love, not for any other reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a
woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to
make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing
the profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming
that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient
punishment therefor. During this time there appears to be no other
indiscretion attributed to him. 10 Respondent, who is now sixty-two
years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the
lawyer’s oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent

Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon
payment of the proper fees.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7902               March 31, 2009
TORBEN B. OVERGAARD, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. GODWIN R. VALDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
At bar is a Motion for Reconsideration,1 dated, October 21, 2008 filed by
respondent Godwin R. Valdez (Valdez), praying that the September 30, 2008
decision of this Court disbarring him from the practice of law be reconsidered by
remanding the records of the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline. He further prays that the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline be directed to receive his Answer, evidence and Position Paper and
thereafter, that he be absolved of the charges against him and that his name be
reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.2
We have previously decided in Torben B. Overgaard v. Atty. Godwin R.
Valdez,3 that respondent Valdez committed malpractice and gross misconduct in
his office as attorney and is thus unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in
him as a member of the bar.
The complainant, Torben Overgaard (Overgaard) engaged the services of
respondent Valdez as his legal counsel in two cases filed by him and two cases
filed against him. Despite the receipt of the full amount of legal fees of
₱900,000.00 as stipulated in a Retainer Agreement, the respondent refused to
perform any of his obligations under their contract for legal services, ignored the
complainant’s request for a report of the status of the cases entrusted to his care,
and rejected the complainant’s demands for the return of the money paid to him.
Complainant Overgaard filed a complaint for disbarment against Valdez before the
IBP. During the investigation, respondent Valdez did not participate despite due
notice. He was declared in default for failure to submit an answer and attend the
mandatory conference. He did not submit a position paper or attend the hearing.
On September 30, 2008, this Court held that respondent Valdez committed
multiple violations of the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
dispositive portion of this Decision states:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Godwin R. Valdez is hereby DISBARRED
and his name is ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is ORDERED
to immediately return to Torben B. Overgaard the amount of $16,854.00 or its
equivalent in Philippine Currency at the time of actual payment, with legal interest
of six percent (6%) per annum from November 27, 2006, the date of extra-judicial
demand. A twelve percent (12%) interest per annum, in lieu of six percent (6%),
shall be imposed on such amount from the date of promulgation of this decision
until the payment thereof. He is further ORDERED to immediately return all papers
and documents received from the complainant.4
xxxx
Hence, this Motion for Reconsideration filed on October 21, 2008, by respondent
Valdez, based on the following grounds:
I. RESPONDENT HAD ABSOLUTELY NO KNOWLEDGE THAT COMPLAINANT
HAD FILED CHARGES AGAINST HIM AND THAT THERE WERE DISBARMENT
PROCEEDINGS AND AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY THE INTEGRATED
BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.
II. HAD HE BEEN GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, HE WOULD HAVE
PRESENTED STRONG, VALID AND MERITORIOUS DEFENSES TO THE
CHARGES LEVELLED AGAINST HIM WHICH DEFENSES, CORRECTLY
APPRECIATED, WOULD HAVE TOTALLY EXONERATED HIM. 5
We deny the Motion for Reconsideration.
On the first issue, the respondent argues that the IBP has no jurisdiction over him
since proof of service of the initiatory pleading to the defendant is a jurisidictional
requirement.6 He states in his Motion for Reconsideration that "he had no inkling
whatsoever of the existence of the disbarment case filed by the complainant." 7 He
asserts that, in September 2006, he "abruptly abandoned his office at Suite 402
Pacific Irvine Bldg., 2746 Zenaida St., at Makati City following persistent and
serious threats to his physical safety and security x x x." 8 On the advice of his
close friends and clients to "lie low" and "make himself ‘scarce,’" 9 he stayed for a
few days in his residence at Imus, Cavite then relocated to Malaybalay City,
Bukidnon.10 He has been holding office and residing in Bukidnon since then, and
he only found out about the decision from a colleague in Bukidnon who read the
decision from the Court’s website.
He claims that because he "abruptly abandoned"11 his Makati office on September
2006, he was not able to receive the demand letter 12 sent by the complainant.13 He
was also not able to receive any of the notices, orders and other papers pertaining
to the disbarment proceedings because at the time these were sent to his Makati
office address, he was already holding office in Bukidnon.
Complainant Overgaard filed an "Opposition/Comment to the Motion for
Reconsideration"14 on December 9, 2008. He counters that respondent Valdez was
duly notified of the charge against him and of all the proceedings at the
IBP,15 since all notices were sent to "Suite 402 Pacific Irvine Bldg., No. 2746
Zenaida St., Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines,"16 which is the respondent’s
office address indicated in his letterhead and made known to the complainant and
to the public. He sent the respondent a letter dated November 27, 2006,
demanding that the latter return the documents and the ₱900,000.00 paid to him in
relation to the case. The demand letter was sent to the same address and was
received by one whose signature was "RRJ," as noted in the Registry Return
Receipt.17
Complainant Overgaard argues that respondent cannot claim ignorance of the
disbarment case against him, since this is a natural offshoot of a wrongful
act.18 Complainant Overgaard points out that when respondent Valdez left for
Bukidnon, he already knew that the complainant was looking for him and
demanding the return of the money and documents he received from the
complainant.19 The November 27, 2006 demand letter further contained a warning
that "[i]f [the respondent] will not return the documents and the money within ten
(10) days from receipt hereof, [the complainant] will bring the matter to the proper
authorities/forum for the redress of [his] grievances." 20 The complainant denies that
he or his business partners know of respondent’s whereabouts, and he argues that
it is the respondent’s duty as his counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a system
that efficiently takes into account all notices sent to him. 211avvphi1
We hold that respondent was given reasonable notice of the complaint for
disbarment against him.
A copy of the Complaint as well as the Order22 to answer the Complaint was sent
by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to the respondent’s Makati office
address, and it was duly received by the respondent. The Registry Return
Receipt23 shows that it was also received by one "RRJ," whose signature appears
on the space for the signature of the addressee’s agent. The respondent cannot
claim lack of knowledge of the complaint for disbarment against him when the
Complaint and the Order for him to submit an Answer were duly received by his
agent at his Makati law office. Succeeding notices in connection with the
disbarment proceedings were also sent to the respondent’s Makati law office. He
cannot escape liability for his misdeeds by feigning ignorance of the disbarment
case, since the notices in connection with the proceedings were sent to his office
address made known to the public and properly received by his agent.
Respondent Valdez was given full opportunity, upon reasonable notice, to answer
the charges against him and to present evidence on his behalf. The IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline was correct in proceeding with the investigation ex
parte, because it was due to the respondent’s own fault and negligence that he
was not able to submit an answer to the Complaint and participate in the
investigation. Rule 138, Section 30 provides that an attorney should be heard
before he is removed or suspended; but if, upon reasonable notice, an attorney
fails to appear and answer the accusations against him, the matter may be dealt
with ex parte. Rule 138, Section 30 states:
SECTION 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney
shall be removed or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has
had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, to
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or counsel. But if
upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court
may proceed to determine the matter ex parte. (Emphasis supplied.)
The respondent’s feeble excuse that he was no longer holding office at his Makati
office address at the time the Order of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline was
sent to him is unacceptable. Ordinary prudence would have guarded against his
alleged failure to receive the notices. All notices to the respondent were sent to his
Makati office address, which was the address made known to the public and to the
complainant. This is even the address printed on the letterhead of the Retainer
Agreement between the complainant and the respondent. And although the
respondent claims that he had to "make himself ‘scarce’" 24 due to threats to his life
and safety, this does not mean that he avoids the responsibility of taking account
of his mail. The respondent owes it to himself and to his clients to adopt a system
whereby he would be able to receive mail sent to his law office during his absence.
Assuming that circumstances would justify the respondent’s abrupt
abandonment25 of his Makati office, it absolutely does not give him the license to
abandon his clients as well.
This brings us to the second issue: whether or not respondent committed multiple
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility and thus his disbarment
should be sustained.
The respondent argues that he did not abandon his client. He denies that he
refused to perform any of his obligations under the contract for legal services
between himself and the complainant. He claims that he gave the complainant
legal advice, and that he searched for and interviewed witnesses in relation to the
cases he was handling for the complainant.26 He also denies that he ignored the
complainant’s requests for a report of the cases entrusted to his care. He claims
that he gave periodic status reports on the result of his work, that he returned the
documents in connection with the case, and that he rendered an accounting of the
money that he actually received.
We find that respondent’s disbarment should be upheld. From the facts of the
case, and based on his own admissions, it is evident that he has committed
multiple violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
In abruptly abandoning his law office without advising his client and without making
sure that the cases he was handling for his client were properly attended to during
his absence, and without making arrangements whereby he would receive
important mail, the respondent is clearly guilty of gross negligence. A lawyer
cannot simply disappear and abandon his clients and then rely on the convenient
excuse that there were threats to his safety. Even assuming that there were
serious threats to his person, this did not give him the permission to desert his
client and leave the cases entrusted to his care hanging. He should have at least
exercised reasonable and ordinary care and diligence by taking steps to ensure
that the cases he was handling were attended to and that his client’s interest was
safeguarded. If it was not possible for him to handle the cases entrusted to his
care, he should have informed the complainant of his predicament and asked that
he be allowed to withdraw from the case to enable the client to engage the
services of another counsel who could properly represent him. 27 Deplorably, the
respondent just disappeared, deserted his client and forgot about the cases
entrusted to his care, to the complainant’s damage and prejudice.
The respondent denies that he did not do anything in connection with the cases
included in the Retainer Agreement. He asserts that he reviewed the documents in
relation to the case and gave the complainant important advice. He claims that he
travelled to Bato, Camarines Norte to negotiate for an amicable settlement with the
members of the family of the adverse party in one of the cases filed against the
complainant.28 He also went to San Carlos City (Negros Oriental), Antipolo City,
and other parts of Metro Manila to interview and search for witnesses for the cases
that he was handling for the complainant.29
The respondent’s disbarment is not anchored on his failure to do anything in
relation the cases entrusted to his care, but on his abandonment of his client. He
will not be absolved from liability on the basis alone of these inconsequential acts
which he claims to have accomplished because the glaring fact remains that he
has failed to perform his essential obligations to his client, to the courts and to
society. As the complainant’s lawyer, the respondent is expected to serve his client
with competence and diligence.30 This includes not merely reviewing the cases
entrusted to his care and giving the complainant sound legal advice, but also
properly representing his client in court, attending scheduled hearings, preparing
and filing required pleadings, prosecuting the cases entrusted to his care with
reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for his client or
the court to prod him to do so. He should not idly sit by and leave the rights of his
client in a state of uncertainty.
The respondent’s acts and omissions were not just a case of inaction, but they
amount to deceitful conduct and are contrary to good morals. After assuring the
complainant that he would protect the latter’s interest and attend to the cases
included in the Retainer Agreement, he abandoned his client. It was only after the
complainant’s own inquiry that he discovered that the respondent never appeared
in court to represent the complainant in the cases filed against him, so much so
that he had no knowledge that warrants of arrest were already issued against him.
The respondent also failed to enter his appearance in the civil case for Mandamus,
Injunction and Damages that the complainant filed. After receiving the complete
amount of legal fees, giving the complainant initial legal advice, and interviewing
some witnesses, the respondent just disappeared and the complainant never
heard from him despite his continued efforts to contact the respondent.1avvphi1
The complainant put his trust in the respondent with full faith that the latter would
exert his best effort and ability in the prosecution and defense of his client’s cause.
But instead of devotion to his client’s cause, the respondent grossly neglected his
duties to his client. After all the representations he made to the complainant and
after receipt of the full amount of the legal fees, he absconded from his
responsibilities and betrayed his client’s trust. There is no excuse for this, and his
gross negligence and appalling indifference is unforgiveable.
On the Court’s finding that the respondent refused to return the money he received
from the complainant despite written and verbal demands and was not able to give
a single report regarding the status of the cases, the respondent claims that he
returned the documents to the complainant’s representative in the middle of July
2006,31 and that he also gave an accounting of the money he received sometime
immediately after it was demanded from him on July 25 or 26, 2006. The
respondent counters that although he initially received the amount of ₱900,000.00,
he gave ₱300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives for locating witnesses in favor
of the complainant in Antipolo City and other parts of Metro Manila. 32 He claims
that only ₱600,000.00 was actually received by him, and from this amount he drew
all expenses in connection with the complainant’s cases. The respondent further
avers that he made an accounting of the ₱600,000.00 received by him and offered
to return ₱250,000.00, but it was the complainant’s business partner who refused
to accept the ₱250,000.00 and insisted on the payment of the whole amount. 33
The complainant declared that he did not receive the documents being demanded
from the respondent, nor did he receive an accounting of the money he paid to the
respondent. He stated in his "Opposition/Comment to the Motion for
Reconsideration" that the respondent’s empty claims -- that he already returned
the documents sometime in the middle of July 2006 and that he rendered an
accounting of the money paid to him immediately after July 25 or 26, 2006 -- are
refuted by the demand letter sent by the complainant on November 27, 2006, four
months after the alleged time of return.
We agree with the complainant.
For these reasons, and those previously stated in the September 30, 2008
Decision of this Court, we find that respondent Valdez has committed multiple
violations of the canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He has failed
to observe the fundamental duties of honesty and good faith and, thus, we sustain
his disbarment.

If the respondent had indeed returned the documents sometime in the middle of
July 2006, he would have presented a receipt to prove such turnover of
documents. And if the respondent had indeed rendered an accounting of the
money that was paid to him, he would have attached a received copy of the
accounting to his Motion for Reconsideration. But he failed to do both. There was
no proof presented. We cannot rely on his bare allegation, especially when the
complainant demanded the return of the documents months after they were
allegedly returned.
Neither are we persuaded by the respondent’s explanation as to how and where
the ₱900,000.00 was spent. He claims that out of the ₱900,000.00, he only
received ₱600,000.00 because he paid ₱300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives.
In paying the intelligence operatives, he stated in his Motion for Reconsideration
that he deposited ₱100,000.00 to the Land Bank account of one Investigator
Operative Collado (Collado) sometime in the second week of January 2006, and
that the rest of the ₱200,000.00 was personally handed by him to Collado in the
last week of January 2006 at McDonald’s restaurant at the corner of Pasong Tamo
and J.P. Rizal Streets at Makati City.34
We must emphasize that the right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise, 36 and it may be extended or
withheld by this Court in the exercise of its sound discretion. As guardian of the
legal profession, this Court has ultimate disciplinary power over members of the
Bar in order to ensure that the highest standards of competence and of honesty
and fair dealing are maintained. We find that the respondent has fallen below such
exacting standard and is unworthy of the privilege to practice law.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. This Court’s en
banc decision in Administrative Case No. 7902 dated September 30, 2008, entitled
Torben B. Overgaard v. Atty. Godwin R. Valdez, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Such an account offered by the respondent is insufficient to free him from liability.
If the respondent indeed paid ₱300,000.00 to two intelligence operatives with the
knowledge of the complainant, he would have presented a receipt issued by
Collado, and he would have also presented a validated deposit slip or certification
as proof that he deposited the amount he claims to have deposited to Collado’s
account. His failure to attach proof of payment of the ₱300,000.00 to the
intelligence operatives does not only make his defense flawed, it also highlights his
incompetence in handling the money he received from the client.

It is a lawyer’s duty to properly account for the money he received from the
client.35 If indeed the respondent told the client that he would pay ₱300,000.00 to
two intelligence operatives, as he claims in his Motion for Reconsideration, he
should have held this money in trust, and he was under an obligation to make an
accounting. It was his duty to secure a receipt for the payment of this amount on
behalf of his client. But he failed to present any receipt or certification from Collado
that the payment was received. Since the respondent was not able either to
present an accounting of the ₱900,000.00 paid to him upon the complainant’s
demand, or to provide a sufficient and plausible explanation for where such
amount was spent, he must immediately return the same.
 imprisonment in case of insolvency, and warned that a repetition of a
similar act would be dealt with more severely.

SYLLABUS
SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 2343. July 30, 1982.]

1. LEGAL ETHICS; CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; IMPOSES A
STANDARD TO BE OBSERVED BY LAWYERS. — The Canons of
FACUNDO LUBIANO, Complainant, v. JOEL G.
Professional Ethics imposes upon the lawyer the duty of maintaining a
GORDOLLA, Respondent.
respectful attitude towards the court. He is likewise expected to treat
adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration. As
SYNOPSIS
such, he should never minister to the malevolence or prejudice of a
client in a trial or conduct of a cause (Section 18, Canons of Professional
Complainant Lubiano charged respondent Gordolla for his failure to
Ethics). He should be temperate in acts and words, a paragon in civility.
observe the standard expected of him as a member of the Bar, imposed
by the Canons of Professional Ethics, when, in a motion for
2. ID.; SECTION 20(b) OF RULE 138 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND THE
reconsideration filed by him as counsel for Robina Farms, Inc., he
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; STATEMENTS USED BY
described the award of separation pay to the complainant as "ill-gotten
RESPONDENT IN HIS MOTION VIOLATED CRITERION PROVIDED
wealth", the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission as an
THEREIN. — Complainant decries the statements contained in the
"unknowing" one, and the sheriff’s office as "a partner in ‘crime’."
motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order filed by
Respondent attributed said statements to his zeal and enthusiasm in the
respondent Gordolla, as counsel for Robina Farms, Inc., in NLRC Case
performance of his duty to uphold his client’s case and argued that they
No. RB-IV-22635-78-T. It is through a scrupulous preference for
are covered by the mantle of absolute privileged communication, being
respectful language that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance or
relevant and pertinent to the subject of inquiry in the NLRC case.
respect due to the courts and judicial officers, as mandated by Section
20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Canons of Professional
The Supreme Court held that, although the insouciant language used by
Ethics. Respondent’s choice of words manifestly falls short of this
respondent Gordolla does not constitute sufficient cause for his
criterion. In describing the award of separation pay to complainant
disbarment, it falls short of the criterion mandated by Section 20(b) of
Lubiano as "ill-gotten wealth", the decision of the National Labor
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Canons of Professional Ethics;
Relations Commission, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial
that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the
functions, as an "unknowing" one, and the sheriff’s office as a "partner
National Labor Relations Commission he remained a member of the Bar
in ‘crime’", respondent precariously ventured beyond the bounds of
whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice
propriety and civility.
and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of
law and ethics; and that, despite the fact that the rule of absolute
3. ID.; ID.; LAWYERS REMAIN SUBJECT TO COURT’S DISCIPLINARY
privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and
POWERS; ALTHOUGH STATEMENTS MADE IN PLEADINGS ARE
criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings, he
PRIVILEGED. — Respondent’s attempt to escape responsibility by
remains subject to the Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers for
attributing the insouciant language used in his motion for
lapses in the observance of his duty as a member of the legal
reconsideration to his zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of his
profession.
duty to uphold his client’s cause, is unavailing. Respondent became
unmindful of the fact that, in addressing the National Labor Relations
Respondent Gordolla is ordered to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary
Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-
bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
 administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The rule of absolute privileged
communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal
liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the
member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal
liability arising from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in
any committee thereof (Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution), but
nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the
legislature for said speech or debate (Osmeña v. Pendatum, 109 Phil,
863), a lawyer equally remains subject to the Court’s supervisory and
disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his duty as a
member of the legal profession.
4. ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT NOT DISBARRED FOR INSOUCIANT
LANGUAGE USED IN HIS MOTION, BUT ORDERED TO PAY FINE AND
WARNED; CASE AT BAR. — While the insouciant language used in his
motion does not constitute sufficient cause for disbarment of
respondent, the Court is not inclined to disregard them as merely trivial
and innocuous. Respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla is ordered to pay a
fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
is warned that a repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
DECISION
ESCOLIN, J.:
The Canons of Professional Ethics imposes upon the lawyer the duty of
maintaining a respectful attitude towards the court. He is likewise
expected to treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due
consideration. As such, he should never minister to the malevolence or
prejudice of a client in a trial or conduct of a cause 1 . He should be
temperate in acts and words, a paragon in civility.
For what is claimed as a failure of Atty. Joel G. Gordolla to observe this
standard, his disbarment is sought by complainant Facundo Lubiano.
Complainant describes the following statements contained in a motion
for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order filed by respondent
Gordolla, as counsel for Robina Farms, Inc., in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-
22635-78-T:cralawnad
"Meanwhile, the complainant, very eager to get hold of the ill-gotten
wealth (thru unknowing award by the Hon. Commission) has used the
Sheriff’s Office as his partner in ‘crime’ and the latter thru Sheriff
Juanito Atienza, is now and about to enforce the terror (sic) of the
award thru Writ of Execution."cralaw virtua1aw library
While the aforequoted paragraph does not constitute sufficient cause for
disbarment of respondent, We are not inclined to disregard the
insouciant language used by respondent as merely trivial and
innocuous. The language of a lawyer, oral or written, must be respectful
and restrained, in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession. It is
through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a lawyer
best demonstrates his observance or respect due to the courts and
judicial officers, as mandated by Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent’s choice of
words manifestly falls short of this criterion. In describing the award of
separation pay to complainant Lubiano as "ill-gotten wealth", the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, an administrative
body exercising quasi-judicial functions, as an "unknowing" one, and the
sheriff’s office as a "partner in ‘crime’", respondent precariously
ventured beyond the bounds of propriety and civility.
Respondent’s attempt to escape responsibility by attributing said
statements to his zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of his duty to
uphold his client’s cause, is unavailing. As this Court said in Rheem of
the Philippines v. Ferrer 2 :jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is but to repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even
excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a
virtue, if channeled in the right direction. However, it must be
circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and with due regard for
the proper place of courts in our system of government."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the
National Labor Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a
member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty
is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose
conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and
ethics 3 .
Respondent would argue that the statements in question, being relevant
and pertinent to the subject of inquiry in said case, are covered by the
mantle of absolute privileged communication; and that, as such, they
cannot be used as basis for any action, however false and malicious the
statements may be. We find no necessity to dwell at length on the issue
as to whether or not the statements in question are relevant, for in
either case this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its
supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to
that standard expected of them as members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule
of absolute privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer
from civil and criminal liability based on the statements made in the
pleadings. But like the member of the legislature who enjoys immunity
from civil and criminal liability arising from any speech or debate
delivered in the Batasan or in any committee thereof 4 , but
nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the
legislature for said speech or debate 5 , a lawyer equally remains
subject to this Court’s supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in
the observance of his duty as a member of the legal
profession.cralawnad

PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla is hereby

ordered to pay a fine of P200.00, payable to the Clerk of this Court
within ten (10) days from notice of this decision, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is further warned that a
repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.