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Conflict Termination
and Military Strategy
Coercion, Persuasion, and War

edited by
Stephen J. Cimbala
and Keith A. Dunn

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CNA LIBRARY
Westview Press / Boulder and London
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 Preface

; _Y!WllLm!=f:tvotve:ct-trei-Jt"a conference n September

aval War Colle e Island. erence par-
ticipants drawn from the academic world and government were brought
together to discuss an often overlooked issue: namely, the role of conflict
termination as it applies to U.S. military strategy formulation. ______,,,
is volume, eleven specialists i~ ~tionaLsecur-i-ty--affirirsaifa1yze
the theory and practice o con 1ct termination in U.S. and USSR military
strategy and how the strategic issues relating to conflict termination
change as one moves across the conflict spectrum. They also discuss
the different ways that the various U.S. military services can and cannot
contribute to conflict termination goals.
This volume would not have been possible without the support and
assistance of several people, and we want to express our appreciation
formally. Rear Admiral Ronald F. Marryott, President of the Naval War
College at the time of the conference, graciously ·made the facilities of
his fine institution available for the conference participants. Robert
Wood, Dean of the Center for Naval War Studies, hosted the conference
and generously supported the conference with much needed financial
assistance. Bud Hay, Center for Naval War Studies, played a critical
role in convincing the powers that be in the Navy and at the Naval
War College that a conference on conflict termination was worthwhile
and should occur. Debbie Tavares and CDR Joseph Meyertholen relieved
us of the conference administrative burdens. As usual, they did a
wonderful job, and we gratefully acknowledge their professional assistance.
Finally, and most important, we want to express our appreciation to
the conference participants, who took time from their busy schedules
to play an active role in the conference. Their perceptive comments
helped the contributors to sharpen their arguments when they revised
their articles for publication.
We dedicate this volume to our families, who once again suffered

xi
 Stephen J. Cimbala
communications during war is to fight until one · or both sides are
exhau.sted. If communications can be preserved, peace terms might be
negotiated well before the fighting stops; modern communication tech-
~ology _allows political leaders to reach theater forces with direct and
immediate orders.
.Ra~mond L. Garthoff examines Soviet perspectives on conflict ter-
mm~tJon ~d their ap~l!cation to Soviet military doctrine and strategy.
Soviet pohttcal and mthtary leaders emphasize the connection between
war and poli~ics .. Questions about the resort to war, conduct of war
and_ war termmahon have both political and military components. The
Soviets do not articulate scenarios of defeat or surrender. Their writers
expe_c t that a general war or most major wars· will be coalition wars.
~urmg nuclear war after the initial exchange of strikes the role of
diplomacy will increase. One of the tasks of intrawar di~lomacy will
be ~o we~~en the adversary coalition. Soviet thinking about war and
Soviet military doctrine underwent significant transitions from the mid-
I9?0s to the mid-l~?0s. In the late 1960s, Soviet military doctrine
-~htft~d !o a recognition of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, with various
imphcat10ns for war and diplomacy. It might be in the interest of both
~uperp?wers to_ avert the ~isaster of general nuclear war, according to
the revised Sovie~ formulation~. More scenarios below the level of general
nuclear war received emphasis from Soviet writers. Soviet recognition
that "flexib_Ie ~esponse" was a possible NATO (and Warsaw Pact) strategy
l~d . t_o their mcreased acceptance of limited war. Soviet interest in,
hm1tm~ war~ ~o the uses of conventional weapons also grew. Development
of Soviet 1mlttary doctine and force structure from the late 1960s into
the 1980s- has been designed to provide options for limiting war.
Noneth~less, the Soviets recognize that the choice of limiting war to
convent10nal or less than general nuclear thresholds might not be theirs.
They have even acknowledged the possibility that war between super-
powers could cause c~anges in Soviet objectives after war began.
Three authors consider the roles of ground, naval and air forces in
U.S. war termination. Robert Killebrew argues that deterrence as a
conc~pt i_s more applicable to nuclear than to conventional war. The
contnbutton that ground forces can make to ending wars is scenario
de~enden~. l!se of forces will depend upon policy objectives. Original
p~lt_cy obJecl!ves can be changed after the conflict begins. In fact, most
mihtary strategic plans are open-ended. War plans cover the first acts
more often than they address the conclusion. These difficulties are
compo~nde? by the diversity of the international system today compared
to e'.11'her_times when it was dominated by major European powers.
Prohf~ratton of sophisticated armaments into developing countries and
terrorist groups has increased the costs of even small wars. Killebrew
The Endgame and War 11
addresses the difficulty of using ground forces in war termination for
conventional and counterinsurgency conflicts. Success in counterinsur-
gency requires an understanding of the special requirements of that
kind of warfare. U.S. experience and traditions are oriented to more
conventional conflicts, as Manwaring also noted. "Winning" in low
intensity conflicJs, according to Killebrew, is forcing the level of violence
back down to a level that can be handled by indigenous, civil authorities.
Nor is the ending likely to be clear cut. U.S. forces must act in tandem
with host country forces in ambiguous circumstances; the measure of
success is the dfrninished need for U.S. assistance as ho~t country forces
attain operational objectives. Ground forces operations under these
conditions, if they are to succeed, will be short in duration, of low
rofile, and devoid of elaborate logistics.
Linton Brooks denies that the United States has a "maritime" strategy
as a counterpoint to a land oriented or continental strategy. Insted,
forward maritime options are in his judgment best designed to contribute
to successful NATO coalition warfare and war termination. War ter-
mination rather than victory is the proper objective to which maritime
forces can contribute, since the alternative is mutual nuclear devastation.
Yet Americans have inherited a tradition of total victory in conflicts
defined as struggles between good and evil. Navies can serve the objectives
of war terminatiqn in several ways. The case of the Central Front in
Europe is illustrative. NATO must avoid losing the "short war" while
preparing for protracted conflict. During the short war, maritime forces
can help to prevent political collapse of the alliance. In the extended
phase, naval forces can help to prevent military defeat by maintaining
sea lanes of communication. But preventing defeat is insufficient; NATO
needs a strategy for prevailing in an extended war. The added ingredients
which would allow the West to prevail have been suggested to be: nuclear
weapons; Western industrial superiority in protracted war; a NATO
conventional retaliatory offensive; high technology conventional weapons;
anp/or playing ' l~hina card." Brooks finds these alternatives deficient,
compared to the proper exploitation of U.S. maritime superiority.
Forward maritime operations should be tasked to destroy the Soviet
general purpose fleet and to place at risk the strategic nuclear correlation
of forces by threatening Soviet strategic ballistic missile submarines.
Combined with stalemate on the Central Front, U.S. maritime pressure
-" on the Soviet homeland will create high incentives for them to seek
war termination.
Thomas A. Fabyanic considers the relationship between airpower and
war termination. The functional missions of airpower are ordnance
delivery, airlift and surveillance/reconnaissance. Fabyanic examines each
of these functional applications of airpower across a spectrum of conflict
 10
Conflict Termination
Through M~itime Leverage
Linto~ F Brooks

... even though the maritime school faces up to the necessity for choice.
its choice is a wrong one. . ·. . a primarily maritime strategy cannot
adequately protect our vital interests in Eurasia because it cannot adequately
deter a great land-based power like the U.S.S.R. It is an unbalanced
strategy . . . that ignores geopolitical realities. . . .
Ambassador Robert Komcr 1

Advocates of a greater military focus on Europe, of whom former

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Robert Komer is a leading
example, frequently claim the United States faces a choice between a
maritime and continental strategy. They denigrate as "navalists" those
who favor more aggressive use of navies, accusing them of promoting
a primarily maritime strategy, irrelevant to Europe's defense, at the
expense of the necessary continental strategy. The accusation is false.
The United States does not have a "maritime" strategy in the sense
the critics claim, nor does any responsible U.S. Navy leader advocate
such a strategy. Far from writing off Europe, the renaissance in Navy
strategic thinking is groping toward a method of keeping the national
strategy of the United States- which includes the continental defense
of Western Europe- viable in an era of nuclear parity and substantial
imbalance in European land forces. Rather than criticizing, advocates
of so-called NATO-first policies should welcome the new emphasis on
forward maritime options as offering one of the few realistic hopes for
continuing the historic American guarantee of Western Europe's security.
The national strategy of the United States has two aspects: to deter
war and, should war come, to seek war termination on favorable term s.
Those who argue maritime forces are overemphasized or irrelevant base
their claims on the belief that the navy and maritime operations will

161
 Linton Brooks
162 F.
have little direct impact on a Soviet decision to initiate war on the
Central Front. Critics fail to recognize that, should deterrence fail, the
navy has unique relevance for war termination even if the Soviets do
not fully comprehend that relevance in advance. By arguing for increased
emphasis on Europe, the Komer school may have the perverse and
unintended effect of increasing the prospect of a stalemate while denying
the opportunity for war termination leverage should deterrence fail.
Deterrence and War Termination
.!c_.lJ
The concept of deterrence is well recognized in the United States.
We all know, or think we know, what deterre·nce is, although there are
endless debates over how to achieve it. War termination "on favorable
terms" is less well understood. Use of the phrase "war termination,"
as opposed to victory, represents an explicit admission that total victory
over an opponent who has a strategic nuclear capability is not possible.
The Soviet leadership would not be deterred from using strategic nuclear
weapons by the threat of the Soviet Union's physical destruction if the
only alternative were its political destruction or conquest. Thus, our
war aims must, from the start, recognize that any future war will end
in some form of negotiated settlement short of total victory.
This stress on limited war aims is at odds with the historic American
military outlook. From the Civil War, World War I and World War II
Americans have inherited a tradition of total victory in conflicts perceived
as ultimate struggles of good against evil. American discomfort with
limited war aims can be seen in our attitude toward the Korean War,
widely considered a failure-or at best a draw-even though the United
States accomplished its stated goal of preserving the independence and
territorial integrity of South Korea. Dissatisfaction with our limited
aims in Korea has been a feature of the American defense debate for
thirty years. But, like Korea, mast wars in history have been for limited
aims, and any future war with the Soviet Union must have limited
objectives as well.
What should these limited aims be? What does it mean to seek war
termination "on favorable terms"? Ifa war is going badly, war termination
on favorable terms may mean no more than seeking the best deal
obtainable. Alternatively, if a war is going well, favorable terms implies
a political gain perceived as worth the lives and money already expended.
, Thus, during actual hostilities, there are a wide range of war termination
terms one might accept as "favorable," or at least not unacceptably
unfavorable. Before hostilities, however, there is only one acceptable
war aim for NATO: restoration of the status quo ante bel/um, i.e.,
restoration of the territorial integrity and political independence of
Conflict Termination Through Maritime Leverage 163
NATO. Anything less is politically unacceptable, but so is anything
more. Whatever the strategic merits of establishing sweeping pre-hos-
tilities war aims (e.g., to dismember the Warsaw Pact) such aims are
unlikely to prove acceptable to many of our allies, who view NATO
as entirely a defensive alliance, both in purpose and in tactics.
Navies and Deterrence
How are navies and what has come to be called the Maritime Strategy
(actually the maritime component of the national military strategy)
relevant to deterrence and war termination? Can they be relevant to
one and not the other? Let us first consider deterrence, specifically
deterrence of a large scale Soviet attack in Europe.
At the outset we must reject the notion that the Soviets are anxious
for war. Absent some other overriding reason, the Soviets, like the
United States, are not sufficiently upset by the status quo to try to
change it by force and thereby risk annihilation. The uncertainty of
nuclear escalation, the frequent Soviet success in gaining foreign policy
objectives without war, the inherent conservatism of Soviet leaders and
the Marxist doctrine that history is on their side, all act to decrease
Soviet incentives for a major war with the West. Given this, war in
Europe is not likely to occur as a long-planned act of Soviet policy.
Rather it will be the result of a Soviet decision that sees war as the
lesser evil during a European crisis, probably one growing out of an
extra-European situation.
Were a major confrontation between the Soviets and the United States
to occur in, for example, Korea or Southwest Asia, both sides would
take increased security precautions worldwide. Should the Soviets misread
the precautions taken in Europe as indicative of a NATO decision to
attack, they might assume hostilities were imminent and preemp~ively
attack in accordance with their long-established doctrine. Alternatively,
if hostilities appeared imminent outside Europe, the Soviets, while they
might want to limit the war, might conclude that they could not and
that the war would eventually spread to Europe. Thus they might elect
to attack in Europe under the assumption that they had no choice.
Containing extra-European crises is, therefore, an obvious means for
the West to avoid a major war with the Soviets. As the chief agent for
dealing with third world crises, the navy has a unique role to play in
preventing escalation of a local problem to the point where war in
Europe is a serious option.
What of the situation where, for whatever reason, the Soviets do
consider an attack in Europe as a serious option? The Navy contribution
to deterrence at that point is less clear. Since maritime operations might
 /64 Linton F. Brooks
have little influence on the short term outcome in Central Europe, some
conclu?e such operations have only limited relevance to deterrence at
the brtnk of war. By this logic, because the Soviets do not think in
maritime terms, they are unlikely to be deterred by maritime actions
in. time of crisis. The validity of this argument is beyond the scope of
this paper. What is important is that even if it is correct, maritime
power may still play an important role in war termination.
Navies and War Termination
Those who conclude the navy will not contribute directly to deterrence
on the Central Front often assert that, beyond maintaining the Atlantic
res_upply lines, maritime force is completely irrelevant to war in Europe.
It 1s not. The best deterrent is widely, and correctly, perceived to be a
strong warfighting capability. But a complete linkage between deterrence
and warfighting exists if, and only if, both sides understand the situation
in advance. If they do not, a force which, in the event, may make a
great deal of difference in war termination might be incorrectly discounted
before hostilities and not deter. Thus, Soviet pre-hostilities blindness to
the importance of navies may mean the United States Navy will be
relevant to war termination e11en if it is irrelevant to deterrence.
Should deterrence fail , NATO faces three distinct tasks. First it must
avoid losing the short war on the Central Front. The navy can c~ntribute
to this task indirectly by demonstrating a Upited States intent to defend
all i~s allies, not simply those located near the Central Front, and thqs
helpmg to avert the political collapse of the Alliance. As the Secretary
of the Navy has recently noted, "No coalition of free nations can survive
a strategy which begins by sacrificing its more exposed allies to a dubious
military expendiency." 2 The direct contribution of the Navy is Jess
certain. While carrier based aircraft might make a contribution to
? lunting an initial air offensive, by its very nature maritime power is
mherently most effective over a longer term. Thus, the current Maritime
Strategy or any plausible variant carries the implicit assumption that
NATO's forces in Europe can avoid defeat if faced with some form of
blitzkreig attack.
. NATO's second task is to avoid losing the long war. Here the navy
1s relevant. Without effective control of the sea lines of communication
to Euro_pe the land forces cannot be sustained. In additionl carrier-
based air power may play an increasingly significant role as attrition
of land based aircraft increases. But failing to lose the long war- like
failing to lose the short war- is not enough. Avoiding defeat on the
battle_field may not avoid political defeat. All alliances are fragile,
especially when, as is inevitable in war, the risks and burdens of battle
<{onflid Termination Through Maritime Leverage 165
<\Te unevenly distributed. In a long war there is significant risk of NAI"O's
political collapse. Thus, unless the Soviets can be pushed out of G ermany,
NATO has only two strategies: lose quickly or lose slowly. If the West
is to achieve war termination on favorable terms, it needs something
else.
The Se~rch for Something Else
NATO's traditional "something else" was nuclear weapons. Histor-
ically, neither analysts nor military leaders have expected NATO's
conventional capability to bring about war termination. If it became
necessary, tactical nuclear weapons were expected to drive the Sov iets
from Western Europe (or, indeed, to deter them from ever coming there
in the first place). NATO' s formal strategy, embodied in MC 14/ 3, still
implies a readiness to use deliberate escalation in the highly probable
event direct defense fails to halt a Soviet invasion. NATO's Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe, General Bernard P. Rogers, frequently
speaks of the need to use nuclear weapons to avoid defeat. 3 Thus, in
our rhetoric, such weapons still serve as the "something else." With
the loss of American nuclear superiority, however, the utility of nuclear
escalation has become more and more suspect. As Henry Kissinger
noted in 1979, "it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the
credibility of the threat of mutual suicide." 4 While we should foreclose
no options in advance, nuclear escalation will be at best a difficult
decision and at worst an impossible one. We need something better.
What other candidates are av::Jilable? Some argue that if NATO can
avoid the loss of the long war and gain a stalemate with existing forces,
the vast industrial potential of the United States will be brought to
bear, inevitably leading to the Warsaw Pact's expulsion from NATO
territory. The arsenal of democracy will bring victory as it has twice
before. Some go as far as to suggest that the "Soviets could very well
fear the industrial potential of the United States almost as much as
they dread unlimited war." 5 While comforting, this theory has at least
four drawback~. First, it fails to deal with the danger of political collapse
mentioned earlier. Second, the longer the war, the greater the chance
of miscalculation leading to nuclear escalation. Third, even if ultimately
successful, such a strategy will entail immense destruction in Western
Europe. Finally, it is not at all clear the "arsenal of democracy" approach
is still within our capability. America' s immense accomplishments in
increasing production in World War 11 involved far simpler weapons
and far different labor and industrial conditions. Repeating them today
may be beyond our grasp. 6
166 Linton F. Brooks
If bringing the industrial potential of the United States to bear may
not work, what might? Some advocates of maneuver warfare on a
strategic scale suggest NATO should conduct its own invasion of Warsaw
Pact terri!~ry, th_us both disrupting follow-on echelons and providing
counterva1hng seizures of territory which might then be exchanged as
part of a process of restoring the status quo. Samuel Huntington, the
best. known exponent of this view, argues that deterrence requires a
~etaltatory compon~nl which "can best take the form of provision for,
~n the case of a Soviet attack, a prompt conventional retaliatory offensive
mto Eastern Europe." 7 The notion of conventional retaliation has been
extensively debated. Even if its logic is accepted as impeccable· its
current political acceptability to our allies-who view it as inconsi~tent
with NATO's defensive orientation- is minute.a
_Advocates of high-technology weapons (so-called emerging technol-
o~es) sugge_st ~hat technology will serve as our "something else." By
usmg our significantly greater technical prowess, we can devise force
multipliers of such effectiveness that they will permit NATO forces to
?lunt_ an attack and expel an adversary. 9 Precision guided munitions,
mtelhgence fusion capabilities, real-time targetting systems and a host
of similar programs are presented by their advocates as' having the
ability to contribute to conventional victory in a European conflict.
Quite apart from the hotly debated questions of exactly how much
~everage technology can provide, this approach is valid, if at all, only
m the future. But while the strategist may be interested in the conduct
and outcome of a war in 1995, his absolute requirement is to be able
to carry out his responsibilities today, and today technology is not able
to provide our "something else."
Some, confusing political with military leverage, may see the "China
card" as a possible option. The last great European war was, after all,
won largely because of a land power attacking from the east. It is clear
the So'\.iets fear the Chinese. Should war come, it is obviousl~ in NATO's
interest. that China be at least a hostile neutral, if for no other reason
than to keep Soviet Far East forces tied down. But only one who has
raised optimism to new heights can believe that the Chinese would see
it in their interest to become an active belligerent in a war between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or if they did, that the People' s Liberation
Army, which had its hands full with Vietnam, will have the same impact
on the Soviets as the Soviets had on the Germans in World War II.
Finally, some reject the need for anything beyond existing NATO
forces. They argue that, given time to mobilize, NATO would not only
not lose the short war, it would win, driving Warsaw Pact forces from
NATO territory and forcibly restoring pre-war borders. If this is correct
and if the Soviets were prepared to accept such a result without escalation'
'
Conflict Termination Through Maritime Leverage 167
nothing else is required. Given the strong body of contrary opinion,
however, it may be imprudent to base planning solely on the belief that
Europe can be defended entirely by existing, in-theater conventional
means. Certainly the public dialogue in NATO in the past decade
suggests the allies do not believe their conventional defense is sufficient
and do not plan to take the expensive and politically difficult steps
which would make it so. We thus are back to our search for "something
else."
Maritime Power as "Something Else"
If NATO's ground and air forces alone can at best prevent defeat
but cannot restore NATO' s territorial integrity, and if neither nuclear
weapons nor industrial mobilization nor high technology nor China are
sufficient, what, -if anything, is left? Despite the skepticism of the critics,
one possible answer is the aggressive use of maritime forces. Fonvard
operation of the United States Navy will enable the Alliance to play
on two rrtajor Soviet concerns: the nuclear balance and the integrity of
the ·Soviet homeland. In addition, maritime power offers a means to
widen the geographic scope of the war, threatening Soviet interests
outside those in the narrow theater of central Europe and thus offering
the chance to "deny the Soviets their kind of war by exerting global
pressure. . . ." 10
The first task in this forward, aggressive use of maritime force is the
effective destruction of the Soviet fleet, which, when accomplished, will
have the additional benefit of eliminating Soviet capability to interdict
reinforcement and resupply routes to Europe. Destroying the Soviet
general purpose fleet will not, in and of itself, bring about war termination.
The Soviet fleet is not central to Sovie~ prosecution of the war. Destroying
that fleet, however, will ensure a long war can be sustained by removing
the Soviet ability to threaten the sea lines of communication between
the United States and Europe. Of greater importance, eliminating the
Soviet fleet opens the way for the United States to take military action
that will provide war termination leverage.
Interdicting the reinforcement and resupply of Europe is only a
secondary task for the Soviet Navy. Soviet general purpose naval forces
exist primarily to defend the Soviet homeland and to protect Soviet
SSBNs. _If the U.S. Navy can destroy t_he Soviet fleet, includ_ing its land-
based atr arm, the navy can offer a dire o Soviet territor y,
both with sea-base air power and with amphibious forces. The fact
that such a threat may seem implausible to some in the United S(ates
is irrelevant; it is plausible to a cadre of Soviet policy makers who
168 Linton F. Brooks
have seen foreign troops- including Americans- on their soil three
times in their lifetime.
The Nuclear Balance and War Termination
Neither attacking Soviet peripheral interests outside Europe nor
threatening air or amphibious attack on the Soviet homeland is the
most important war termination leverage the navy has to offer. Far
more significant is the navy's ability to alter dramatically the nuclear
balance or, in Soviet terms, the nuclear correlation of forces. While
Soviet doctrine may be shifting towards a conventional war option,"
Soviet leaders still assume that a war between the two superpowers has
a high probability of escalating to the nuclear level. An important goal
of Soviet conventional operations in Europe, for example, is to destroy
or degrade NATO nuclear forces and their supporting command and
control: The Soviets therefore place great importance on the constant
evaluation of the nuclear correlation of forces.
The Navy can alter those Soviet calculations, most obviously by
attacking SSBNs. Far from being the dangerously destabilizing course
some allege, such attacks represent an acceptable risk, especially since
they offer significant war termination leverage. While some suggest that
"even the appearance of such a campaign could trigger dire conse-
quences," 12 the facts are not so clear. The Soviet Navy acceptance of
such attacks as an integral component of conventional war has been
made clear by such authoritative spokesmen as former Soviet Navy
Commander Sergei Gorshkov, who noted several years ago, that, among
the "main efforts of a fleet," the "most important of them has become
the use of the forces of the fleet against the naval strategic nuclear
systems of the enemy with the aim of disrupting ... their strikes...." 13
Even if Soviet doctrine did not recognize the prospect of such attacks
as legitimate, escalation serves no useful purpose to the Soviets. Almost
by definition, any U.S. action important enough to have war termination
leverage carries some risk of escalation. But the risk may be acceptable
as a unique means of gaining war termination leverage.
Not only can maritime forces alter the Soviet estimate of Soviet
nuclear capabilities, they can also increase the magnitude of the nuclear
threat the Soviets must face. As the Soviet fleet is eliminated, both
carrier strike aircraft (which the Soviets view as a significant nuclear
threat) and nuclear Tomahawk missiles will be in a position to threaten
the Soviet homeland. Objectively, the incremental increase in allied
nuclear capability these forces offer is small. Similarly, the destruction
of even a large fraction of the Soviet SSBN force will result in only a
limited decrease in total Soviet nuclear strike capability. But the Soviets,
t
I
Conflict Termination Through· Maritime Leverage 169
with their military conservatism and penchant for constant calculation,
will not ignore either factor. They will see their calculation of the
correlation of forces constantly growing less favorable.
The fear that the war may escalate and the fact that such escalation
is less and less attractive every day provides a powerful incentive for
war termination. lt i$ particularly powerful if combined with a prospect
of stalemate on the Central Front (i.e., if NATO is, while not winning,
at least not losing), and with war termination terms which seek, not
the destruction of the Soviet empire, but the restoration of the status
quo.
To many, the concept of deliberate attacks on SSBNs seems dangerously
escalatory and destabilizing. It offers the spectre of a "use or lose"
situation and thus is seen as far too risky. In an interesting illustration
of the ability to hold contradictory points of view, some of these same
critics suggest such attacks would have no influence on Soviet behav ior.
No war with the Soviet Union is without immense risk. But a Soviet
nuclear strike on the United States would result in immensely destructive
retaliation. It is difficult to see why the Soviets would elect the physical
destruction of their state unless the only alternative "<ere its political
destruction. If, therefore, allied war termination aims 40 not extend to
the breakup of the Soviet Empire but rather to som~ form of restoration
of the status quo, a Soviet nuclear strike seems unlikely. 14
The Question of Costs
Some critics who might be prepared to accept the potential relevance
of maritime war termination leverage still conclu9e that the United
States cannot afford the type of navy such leverage requires. 15 Recognizing
that NATO must avoid immediate defeat before war termination leverage
can be relevant, they conclude that scarce resources should be applied
to the conventional defense of Europe. Some argue further that if only
the funds devoted to new carrier battle groups were shifted to Central
Front defense NATO would be capable of successful direct defense,
preserving the territorial integrity of the Alliance without the need for
risky attacks on strategic forces. The argument is superficially plausible.
On closer examination, however, it is flawed.
The first flaw is the implicit assumption that funds " saved" from the
navy would be devoted to European defense in sufficient enough quantities
to dramatically alter the situation. There is little in recent history to
suggest such a proposition is valid. NATO's unwillingness to devote
sufficient resources to direct defense in Europe is a long-standing problem;
there is no logical reason to assume the Alliance would become more
willing if the United States reduced spending on its navy.
170 Linton F. Brooks
The second flaw in thfa argument is a blurring of time frames.
Increased conventional capability, like high technology, is a solution for
the future. But strategists have an obligation to decide how to bring
about acceptable war termination today. Even if the critics were correct,
the United States will require war termination leverage until the presumed
increased conventional capabilities become available.
Finally, those who would shift resources away from maritime ca-
pabilities have elected to compete with the Soviets almost entirely on
their terms. Such an approach- opposing one of the largest land armies
in history in a high intensity conflict on the territory of our allies-
carries with it the twin possibilities of the political collapse or the
devastation of NATO, possibilities in many ways as grave as the escalation .
risks critics deplore.
Conclusion
Western strategists must consider both deterrence and, should deter-
rence fail, war termination. Should deterrence fail what is needed in
Central Europe is enough force to prevent a Soviet blitzkrieg and to
permit us to hold for a protracted period. 16 Once we have that we either
need an increase in conventional capability sufficient to allow us to win
in Europe before the inherent strains of a coalition war cause the Alliance
to fragment or we need "something else" to induce war termination.
Aggressively used, the navy may offer that something else. Such a course
is not without risk; a risk-free war with the Soviet Union is a contradiction
in terms. But none of the alternatives appear superior.
Critics of aggressive forward maritime operations suggest that the
"basic flaw in any maritime strategy is that, even if we swept the other
superpower from the seas and pulverized all its naval bases, this would
not suffice to prevent it from dominating the European landmass." 17
Such an argument ignores the need for war termination leverage. Indeed,
contrary to being irrelevant, maritime power may offer NATO its best
hope. First, the United States Navy is the chief military instrument for
avoiding the escalation of crisis which could lead to a risk of war in
Europe. Second, maritime superiority is essential to a protracted conflict.
Finally, and most significantly, if war comes, maritime power, unlike
any other attainable force, offers some prospect for war termination
leverage. Without this leverage there remain only surrender, stalemate
or nuclear escalation-an insufficient choice for the United States and
its allies.
It is possible to argue the navy will not be able to provide the war
termination leverage suggested in this paper. Proponents of a significant
maritime component of national strategy recognize this fact. But those
Conflict Termination Through Maritime Leverage 171
I
who do not accept a maritime war termination answer must at least
reqognize maritime proponenis are asking the right question. The
maritime "something else" is ti1e combined effect of altering the nuclear
balance and broadening the geographic scope of a future war. This
argument may be wrong, but those who believe it is need to set forth
a superior and realistic approach to inducing war termination.
As nuclear escalation becomes less and less credible, deterrence of
conventional war becomes more and more determined by traditional
force considerations. What those considerations- avoiding a blitzkreig,
posturing for a wider war, displaying resolve-have in common is that
they have all failed in the past. They may fail again. If they do and
we find ourselves in a war with the Soviets, it will be unacceptable to
have only the choice between stalemate and holocaust. For war ter-
mination, we will need something else.
Notes
The op1mons expressed in this paper are those of the auihor and do not
necessarily repect the views of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations or
any other component of the Department of Defense.
1. Robert W. Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense? (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Abt Publishers, 1984), p. 67.
2. John F. Lehman, Jr., "The 600-Ship Navy," Supplement to United States
Naval Institute Proceedings (January 1986), p. 36.
3. In a September 1983 int~rview, for exarpple, General Rogers. said "if we
are attacked conventionally, w~ can only sustdin ourselves conventionall~ fo_r a
relatively short time. I then 'till be forced to . . . ask for the authorization
... to use nuclear weapons."· Quoted in Armed Forces Journal International
(September 1983), p. 74.
4. Henry A. Kissinger, "The Future of NATO," in NATO: The Next Thirty
Years, ed. Kenneth A. Myers (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), p. 7.
5. Ralph Sanders and Joseph E. Muckerrpan, II, "A Strategic Rationale for
Mobilization," in Mobilization and the Nati4nal Defense, ed. Hardy L. Merritt
and Luther F. Carter (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1985),
p. 19.
6. For a fuller discussion of the structural changes leading to this conclusion
see Mobilization and the National Defense, pp. 25- 110, passim.
7. Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Re-
taliation in Europe," in Military Strategy in Transition, eds. Keith A. Dunn
and William O. ~taudenmaier (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984), p. 23.
8. For a counterargument suggesting such a strategy is politically feasible
see ibid. pp. 36- 38.
 172 Linton F Brooks

9. ~. for ex~mp1R, then Presidential Scie~ Advisor George A. Keyworth,

II, "Technology and the Nuclear Treadmill," Air Force Magazine, Vol. 67, No.
II (November 1984), pp. 126-129.
10. Admiral James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," Supplerpent to
United States Naval lnstitufe Proceedings (January 1986), p. 14.
11. For a detailed discu~ion of this shift see James M. McConnell, "Shifts
in Soviet Views on the Proper Focus of Military Development," World Politics,
Vol. ~XXVII, No. 3 (April 1985), pp. 317- 343. .
ti, Barry R. Posen, "Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's ,poµclukio.n
Northern flank" in Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, ed. Steven E. Miller j. ., .
. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), P· 100. ., i'"',•
13. Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei G. Gorshkov, The ·..: ..
Seapower of the State (Annapolis, Md.: Naval I~stitute Press, 1979), p. 221.
14. In commenting on an earlier draft of this paper Stephen Cimbala observed
the Soviets may not perceive U.S. war aims as limited if their homeland and '
strategic forces are at risk and second echelon forces are being attacked on
Warsaw Pact (or even Soviet) territory. This underscores the need for some
method of communicating the nature of U.S. war aims to the Soviets during
hostiljties. Io addition, the absence of escalation is not the same as successful
war termination. Fred Charles Ikle's Every War Must End (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1971) documents the inherent difficulty of war termination
and the tendency of states to continue fighting well past the point where they
"should" stop. These problems apply to any attempt at war termination. None
of the alternatives tQ the approach suggested here seem superior.
15. This, of course, is the fundamental issue Komer raises.
16. For an argument both that a blitzkrieg can be denied today and that
such denial is a sufficient conventional deterrent, see John J. Mearsheimer,
Conventional Deterrence, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1983),
pp. 16S- 188. This argument would be more comforting were it not for the fact
that in most of Mearsheimer's case studies deterrence failed. Thus the situation
postulated in this paper- a failure of deterrence coupled with an inability of
either side to gain victory quickly- appears plausible, suggesting that war
termination leverage of some sort may be required.
17. Komer, Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense? p. 106.

About the Contributors
tinton F. Brooks is a Navy captain currently serving as director of
Defense Programs on the National Security Council Staff. He has served
at sea in submarines and destroyers including command of the USS
Whale (SSN-638). Ashore he has been assigned to a variety of strategy
and policy positions on the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations and
the Secretary of Defense. He was the director, Strategic and Theater
Nuclear Warfare Policy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Captain
Brooks holds degrees from Duke and the University of Maryland and
is a distinguished graduate of the United States Navy War College.
Stephen J. Cimbala has contributed to the field of defense studies and
foreign policy for many years. He is professor of political science at
Pennsylvania State University, where he teaches courses in international
relations, foreign policy, and Western European politics. His current
interests include war termination, deterrence, and strategic nuclear issues
in general.
Keith A. Dunn is a Senior Fellow at the Strategic Concepts Development
Center, National Defense University. Formerly, he was the senior policy
analyst at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. He
is the co-author of Strategic Implications of the Continental-Maritime
Debate and co-editor of Military Strategy in Transition: Defense and
Deterrence in the 1980s and Alternative Military Strategies for the
Future.
Thomas Fabyanic is assistant vice president for research and technology
at American National Management Corporation in Vienna, Virginia.
He is a distinguished graduate of the Air War College and holds an
M.A. and Ph.D. from St. Louis University. He has served as a research
associate at the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University,
and has taught at tbe U.S. Air Force AcarlPmy, the Air War College,
and the University of South Florida. His military-related writings include
Strategic Air Attack {n the United States Air Force and numer~us journal
articles. A retired 4-s. Air Force pfficer, his military service includes
194
About the Contributors 195
almost 200 F-4 Phantom combat missions during the Vietnam War and
ex.tensive C-130 tactical airlift experience.
Raymond L. Garthoff is a Senior Fellow in foreign policy studies at the
Brookings Institution. He is a retired Foreign Service Officer and served
as ambassador to Bulgaria. He is author of the recently published Detente
and Confrontation: American-Soviet R elations from Nixon to Reagan
and many other works in the fields of Soviet political and military
affairs, including Soviet Military Doctrine, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear
Age, and Soviet Military Policy.
Geoffrey Kemp is Senior Fellow at Georgetown University Center for
Strategic and International Studies. From 198 I- 1985 he was special
assistant to the president for national security affairs in the White House
and senior director for Near East and South Asia on the NSC staff.
From 1971- 1981 he was on the faculty of the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Dr. Kemp received his B.A. and M.A.
degrees from Oxford University and his Ph.D. from MIT. He has written
extensively on national security problems.
Robert B. Killebrew is an Army lieutenant colonel, who has served in
unconventional, ainnobile, and parachute infantry units. He holds mas-
ters' degrees in history and international relations. He has contributed
numerous articles to professional military journals and is the author of
Conventional Defense and Total Deterrence: Assessing NATO's Strategic
Options. During 1983- 1984, he was the American Defense Fellow at
the Center for International Relations, Queen's University, Canada. At
the time that his chapter was written, he was director of plans, XVIII
Airborne Corps.
Max G. Manwaring is a senior analyst in the Directorate for Low
Intensity Conflict at the U.S. Southern Command. Formerly, he served
in the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and as
chief of the Central America section of the Defense Intelligence Agency's
Research Directorate. He has authored various studies and articles
dealing with security related matters and is co-author of Defending
Europe: The Iberian Connection.
Barry Schneider is a senior defense analyst at the National Institute
for Public Policy. A former foreign affairs officer at ACDA and a defense
and arms control consultant to a number of members of Congress, Dr.
Schneider is the co-editor of Current Issues in U.S. Defense Policy and
of Missiles for the Nineties, ICBMs and Strategic Policy. He has taught