The Iranian constitution established the defining framework of the Iranian theocracy.

At the top

of the Iranian government is the Supreme Leader. The Supreme Leader of Iran is responsible for

the delineation and supervision of "the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran."1 The

Supreme Leader is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, controls the military intelligence

and security operations, and has the only power to declare war. The heads of the judiciary, state

radio and television networks, the commanders of the police and military forces and six of the

twelve members of the Council of Guardians are appointed by the Supreme Leader. Everything

flows from the Supreme Leader.

Understanding the complexities surrounding the establishment of the office of Supreme

Leader begins with recognizing Khomeini’s political philosophy, and the key to realizing his

concept of Islamic rule lies in the idea of the vilayat-e faqih (rule/guardianship of the leading

jurisprudent).2 This idea was first introduced by Khomeini in several of his writings. Shi'a

Muslims use the term Imam to describe the twelve leaders of their sect. Each Imam, a direct and

early descendant of the Prophet Mohammad, serves as a guide to the whole human race. The last

of these is said to have gone into occultation in the very early period of Islamic history and will

appear towards the end of time.3

The most pressing issue for Iranian Muslims was the question of who has the right to rule

in the absence of the twelfth Imam. Ayatollah Khomeini felt he solved the problem by arguing

that, “…as the moral and spiritual guardians of the people in the absence of the 12th Imam, the

1
2R. K. Ramazani, Revolutionary Iran (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988),
20.
3Ziauddin Sardar, “Iranians Hold a Dress Rehearsal for Revolution,” New Statesman, 26 July
1999, 23.
religious scholars were duty-bound to oversee the entire political process”. 4 The most prominent

scholar/jurist would thus be the Supreme Leader, and a council of leading jurists would serve as

guardian of the people.5 In a radical break with traditional Shi’a positions of political passivity,

Khomeini advocated the acquisition of temporal power by the clergy. He argued that it was the

duty of the Faqih to seize power and implement the precepts of Shari’a as best as he could: “He

declared obedience to the ruling jurist to be as incumbent on the believer as the performance of

prayer, and his powers to extend even to the temporary suspension of such essential rites of

Islam…”6

This ideology began to take root in 1978 as a popular consensus developed to overthrow

the Shah, but there was no agreement as to who would replace him. After the Shah stepped

down, a chaotic period ensued until Khomeini consolidated his position after the hostage crisis in

November 1979. The Shi'a clergy represented the only cohesive organization opposing the Shah

that had the three most important ingredients for a successful social movement: “…ideology

(Islam), leadership (Khomeini), and institutions (mosques).”7 Khomeini was a charismatic and

learned cleric, but he was not a Grand Ayatollah; nevertheless, Khomeini possessed the religious

credentials and political expertise necessary of a vilayat-e faqih. 8

4 Ibid, 24.
5 Rudy Jaafar, “An Islamic Revolution in Egypt?,” Fletcher School Journal/3, (2004): 13.
6 Middle East and North African Encyclopedia, “Theory of governance in Shi’ite Islam”; available
fromhttp://www.answers.com/topic/velayat-e-faqih; Internet; accessed on 3 December 2008.
7 Frank Okata, “Regime Change in Iran: An Analytic Framework,” Strategic Insight; available
from http://www.coionet.org.csulib.ctstateu.edu; Internet; accessed 17 November 2008.
8 Dariush Zahedi, The Iranian Revolution Then and Now, Indicators of Regime Instability,
(Boulder, Westview Press, 2001), 68-9.
 It may be argued that his credentials as vilayat-e faqih were evident during the

revolutionary years as he convinced a significant segment of the Iranian population to

participate, the people acquiescing to the future Supreme Leader’s judgment in the direction of

the country. It was most likely a major influence in getting the army to side with him after years

of loyalty to the Shah. It was most certainly crucial during the period immediately following the

revolution as he established the political landscape and dismissed the first elected president and

appointed another and consolidated his power as the nation’s unquestioned ruler.

The remaining branches of government basically operate at the behest of the supreme

leader. Directly under the Supreme Leader is the Executive Branch consisting of a president and

vice presidents. In two cases the wording of the constitution weakens the executive branch.

First, the Constitution defines the President as the highest state authority after the Supreme

Leader. This distinction is critical in that the president does not act unless approved by the

supreme leader. Second, presidential candidates must be approved by the Council of Guardians

prior to running.

The Council of Guardians is an appointed and constitutionally-mandated 12-member

council that wields considerable power and influence in Iran. The Council is a part of the

legislative branch. The Iranian constitution calls for the council to be composed of six Islamic

jurists, conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day to be selected by the Supreme

Leader of Iran, and six jurists, specializing in different areas of law, to be elected by the Judiciary

from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power, (who, in turn, is
also appointed by the supreme leader).9 The leader, through this governmental construct, is

granted immense influence over who is eventually elected president.10

The Council is also charged interpreting the constitution of Iran, supervising elections of,

and approving candidates to, the Assembly of Experts, the President and the Majlis, and, “…

ensuring…the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Majlis…with the criteria of Islam

and the constitution,”11 i.e. deciding whether to veto laws passed by the parliament.

The legislative branch consists of two other parts: the Majlis and the Expediency council,

however the power and influence lies with the Council. Before the Islamic Revolution, Majlis

was also the name of the lower house of the Iranian Legislature from 1906 to 1979, the upper

house being the Senate. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the Senate was abolished and in

the 1989 revision of the constitution, the National Consultative Assembly became the Islamic

Consultative Assembly. The Iranian legislature thus became unicameral. 12

Currently, the Majlis' 290 members13, five of whom represent non-Muslim religious

minorities, are popularly elected for four-year terms. The Majlis can force the dismissal of

cabinet ministers by no-confidence votes and can impeach the president for misconduct in office.

Again, the supreme leader has say in who runs for the Majlis as all candidates for the Majlis

9 Iranian Constitution, available from http://mellat.majlis.ir/CONSTITUTION/ENGLISH.HTM;

Internet; accessed 19 November 2008.
10 PBS, “The Structure of Power in Iran,” available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html; Internet; accessed 10 November 2008.
11 Ibid.
12 PBS, “The Structure of Power in Iran,” available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html; Internet; accessed 10 November 2008.

13 Ibid.
must be approved by the 12-member Council. The Expediency Council mediates between the

Majlis and the Guardian Council when and if there is an issue between the two.14

The Assembly of Experts, another level of government, meets for one week every year,

and consists of 86: “…’virtuous and learned’ clerics elected by the public to eight-year terms.”15

Like presidential and parliamentary elections, the Council of Guardians determines who can run

for a seat in the assembly. Members of the Assembly of Experts in turn elect the Supreme Leader

from within their own ranks and periodically reconfirm him. The Assembly has never been

known to challenge any of the Supreme Leader's decisions. Meetings have been generally held

behind closed doors and little was known about the decisions that were made. This secrecy

continued to be a sore point for many observers. 16

The constitution also tasks the Assembly: “…to choose a Supreme Leader in the event of

Imam Khomeini's demise, and to determine if the leader, or any member of the Leadership

Council, was capable of fulfilling his duties.”17 Originally, the constitution allowed for the

selection of either a single individual to the post of Supreme Leader or a council of appropriate

individuals to run the post. The selection process of the Assembly of Experts would be done by a

continuous reviewing of their performance. Additional revisions to the constitution removed the

14 CIAO Atlas, “Iran: Constitution and Institutions”; available from http://

www.cionet.org.csulib.ctstateu.edu/atlas/IR/Politics/Background/20060828_0376.html;
Internet; accessed on 3 December 2008.
15Iranian Constitution, available from http://mellat.majlis.ir/CONSTITUTION/ENGLISH.HTM;
Internet; accessed 19 November 2008.
16 International Crisis Group. “Iran, the Struggle for the Revolution’s Soul.” Available from
http://www.cionet.org/csulib.ctstsateu.edu; Internet; accessed 15 October 2008.

17Moshen Sazegara, “The New Iranian Government: Resurrecting Past Errors,” The Washington
Institute for Near East Policy/1013, (2005): 3.
potential for a council of individuals, making it so only a single individual could be elected by

the Assembly as Supreme Leader.18

The constitution is the codified embodiment of the Islamic laws that govern Iran. It is the

basis for the consolidation and distribution of power in the republic. Its various checks and

balances do less to balance the influence of a particular governmental body than to ensure that

the Supreme Leader has absolute control over the politics of the country. Each branch of

government is, through the Council of Guardians, assembled by either direct or indirect influence

of the Supreme Leader, and he has the constitutional imperative to manipulate those branches

and the policies that are emitted from them.

18 Rudy Jaafar, “An Islamic Revolution in Egypt?,” Fletcher School Journal/3, (2004): 11.