`Beauty': Some Stages in the History of an Idea

Author(s): Jerome Stolnitz

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Apr. - Jun., 1961), pp. 185-204
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
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'BEAUTY': SOME STAGES IN THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA

BY JEROME STOLNITZ

We have to catch ourselvesup in orderto recognizethat 'beauty'

has recededor even disappearedfromcontemporaryaesthetictheory.
For, like other once influentialideas, it has simplyfaded away. Far
more venerable thanl the concepts of 'fine art'" and 'aesthetic,'2
'beauty' has been, traditionally,the dominant concept in aesthetic
theory,art criticism,and ordinaryaestheticdiscourse.But when we
catch ourselvesup, we see how littlethe word'beauty' occursin works
published in this century,relative to 'art' and 'aesthetic.' "What is
beauty?," the question which has been at the center of aesthetic
theorysince the Hippias Major, is not the questionput by many re-
cent thinkers.They devote themselvesto the analysisof 'fineart' and
the phenomenologyof aesthetic experience, inquiries in which
'beauty' is treatedonly casually and incidentallyor else ignoredalto-
gether.As the genericvalue-term,'beauty' has been replacedby some
such locutionas 'aestheticvalue.' It is in the discussionof aesthetic
value that 'beauty' gets most attention,but even here it is only one
among othervalue-categories,and its treatmentis fairlyperfunctory.
Onlyrarelyis the approachof the contemporary aestheticianset forth
so consciouslyand explicitlyas it is by H. N. Lee, who says of
'beauty' that it "is best used to denoteonly a part of the generalfield
of aestheticvalue, and that part need not be carefullydelimited,but
can be leftmoreor less vague." 3
What is most strikingabout the use of 'beautiful'in currentart
criticismand discourseis not that the termis just one among a host
of value-predicates.It is, rather,that 'beautiful'seems now oftento
be used pejorativelyor invidiously.One can say on behalf of a work
of art, "It may not be beautiful,but .... " Somethingmore and, im-
plicitly,somethingbetterthan beauty is appealed to. Those modern
artistswho will not have it that the creationof beauty is theirgoal,
have fosteredthe transvaluationof the term.When a workis only
beautiful,it is inoffensive, or it is in an orthodoxstyleor genre,or it
is excessivelytrimor neat. Most importantof all, it can be beautiful
withoutbeing expressive.The latterterm,more than any otherprob-
ably, has supplanted'beautiful'in our aestheticvocabulary.It refers
to those works which suggest more than they 'say,' and/or those
whichexpose the soul of the artist,and/orthose whichare 'moving,'
'stirring,''gripping.'Beauty, if it has the characteristicscited above,
must seem pallid by comparisonand to demand beauty will almost
certainlyobstructthe purposesof expressionand expressiveness.
1 Cf.below,note8. 2 Cf.below,textafternote26.
3 H. N. Lee, Perception
and Aesthetic
Value (New York,1938),98.
185

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186 JEROME STOLNITZ

The declineof 'beauty'has takenplace tacitlyand, so to speak,

in ourowntime.My purposein thispaperis to traceout
unofficially
the causesand the patternof thisdecline.Thus farI have spoken
onlyof thepresentcentury, roughly. But the greatwatershedin the
historyof 'beauty,'as of otheraestheticconcepts,is the XVIIIth
century.That centuryuniquely-suchis the argument of the paper
-set goingthe forceswhichdisplace'beauty'fromthe positionit
had enjoyedin classicaland Renaissancethought.What is now an
unthinkinggesture is theresult,severaltimesremoved,ofa concerted
effortofreasonin theXVIIIth century.
The discussionwill be confinedto the Britishthinkersof the
period,in whomaesthetictheory,as we knowit, verylargelyorig-
inated.4They can be readilytreatedtogether because,fromthe be-
ginningof the centuryto its end,theysharesubstantially the same
presuppositions,methods,and purposes.And theywerethe prime
moversin thedemotion of'beauty.'Theircongenitalresistance
to the
authorityofalientraditions,theirdeterminationto makea freshstart
and to thinkit out forthemselves, theirvigorousand sensitive,if
oftenunsystematic thinking,togethershatteredthe old intellectual
frameworks and altered,forgoodand all, the conceptwhichwas at
theheartofthem.

Muchofthespeculation abouttheartswhichwas carriedon prior

to theXVIIIth century was devotedto theartisticgenres.The 'rules'
wereformulated outoftheconviction thatthegenres,likethegenera
of naturalobjects,"have theirimmutableand constantforms, their
specificshape and function."15The compendious statementof their
properlawswas thegoal of innumerable Renaissanceand neo-classi-
cal treatisespatternedon Aristotle,Horace,and Vitruvius.But are
thesetreatisesworksin 'aesthetics'?This is a largequestion,deserv-
ingofa fulleranswerthancan be givenhere;yetit mustbe raisedif
we are to understandtheachievement of Britishthought.
Bosanquetholds that therewas "an intermission of aesthetic
philosophy. . . fromthe time of Plotinus to the eighteenthcentury
of ourera."6 The treatisesseemto bearhimout.Whatwe nowcon-
sider 'aestheticphilosophy'both employsand analyzes concepts
4Cf. ErnstCassirer,The Philosophyof the Enlightenment, trans.Koelln and
Pettegrove(Boston,1955), 312; Paul 0. Kristeller,
"The ModernSystemof the
Arts: A Studyin the Historyof Aesthetics,"thisJournal,XII (1951), 496-497,
XIII (1952), 27; W. J. Bate, From Classicto Romantic:Premissesof Taste in
Eighteenth-CenturyEngland (Cambridge, Mass., 1946), vii, 171. Also,cf. below,
note11 et seq. 5 Cassirer,op. cit.,290.
6 BernardBosanquet,A HistoryofAesthetic (London,1922),166f.

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 'BEAUTY': HISTORY OF AN IDEA 187

whichreferto artisticand aestheticphenomena 7 generally.The

treatisesare oftenlittlemorethantechnicalmanuals.Moreover, they
are usuallydevotedto just one of theartsor to somegenre,e.g.,the
epic,withina particular art.Andyet,theyarenotto be ignoredalto-
gether.A treatiseapproachesaesthetics, so faras it analyzes,though
it be onlyin relationto the specificgenre,aestheticconceptswhich
have a reference beyondthe genre.The use of such a conceptevi-
dencesthebeliefthatthereis a largerfieldof data-call it, waiving
the historicalsolecism,'the aesthetic'-towhichthe genreis related
and ofwhichit is a part.The beliefmaybe and doubtlesswas largely
inarticulate.If it is thereat all, however,Bosanquet'sdictummust
be qualified.
Whichaestheticconcept,then,unifiesthevarioustreatises?That
of 'fineart,'hardlyor not at all. Priorto theXVIIIth century, this
concepthad notyetarisenor it was onlytentativeand inchoate.8 If
thetreatisesareto be classified as 'aesthetics'
at all,it can onlybe by
reference to theconceptof 'beauty.'9 Again,therewillbe littleor no
analysisof'beauty'in general, in a treatisedevotedto theproportions
ofthehumanbodyorthesubjectsappropriate to theode.Yet beauty
is theultimateconcernofthewriter, forhe takesit to be the goalof
the art-form he is discussing.The wholepointof formulating the
'rules'is thatwhentheyare satisfiedand the genretherebyattains
itsperfection, theobjectis 'beautiful.'ThusAlberti,speakingonlyof
architecture, calls forthe "Number,Finishingand Collocationof the
severalmembers," but whentheseare present,he says,'beauty're-
sults.'0'Beauty' is not, forthe Renaissance and neo-classicaltheorist,
limitedto his particularart-form.It has a generaland inclusiveref-
erence which 'fineart,' when it is used at all, lacks. 'Beautiful,' the
generictermwhichdesignatesthe value of each of the arts,unites
thestudiesofall ofthem.
But even if Bosanquet's judgmentis too severe,there can be no
question that XVIIIth-century British thoughtis a major turning-
point.Addisongives the lead. In the first,at all systematicstatement
in Britishaesthetics,'-the conceptionof aesthetictheoryjustifies
7 How muchmoreconvenient term,otherthan
it wouldbe to have a collective
'aesthetic'itself,
to designate thesephenomena.
8 Cf.Kristeller,op. cit.,498,510ff.
9 Cf. WilliamK. Wimsatt, Jr.,and CleanthBrooks,LiteraryCriticism: A Short
History(New York,1957),262.
10 "On Architecture," in ElizabethG. Holt,ed.,LiterarySourcesofArtHistory
(Princeton, 1947),133-136.
11Shaftesbury antedatesthe Spectatorpapersby a fewyears,but cf. Jerome
Stolnitz,"On the Significance of Lord Shaftesbury in ModernAestheticTheory,"
Philosophical Quarterly (1961).

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188 JEROME STOLNITZ

Addison's claim that it is "entirelynew." 12

Following"the new way of ideas," whichcatalogues experiencein
termsof the facultiesof awareness,the centralconceptin aesthetics
is that of the facultyof aestheticresponsiveness.So "the pleasuresof
the imagination"make up the subjectmatterof the Spectatorpapers
on aesthetics(nos. 411-421). Like his predecessors, of course,Addison
did not use the word "aesthetic." But he began move toward the
to
conceptionof 'the aesthetic'whichwas to becomeconspicuousin later
thought.The imaginationwas set offfromthe facultiesof sensation
and understanding.Neitherof the lattercan appropriatelydefinethe
subject that Addison wished to discuss. The pleasures of sense are,
at once, too "gross"13 and insufficiently "innocent."14 The pleasures
of understandingare "refined,"15 but theyinvolve cognitiveactivity,
a "bent of thought."16 When, however,"we are struck,we know not
how,withthe symmetry of any thing,"17 thereis not,nor could there
be any reflectiveexaminationof the "causes and occasions of it." 18
The "pleasures of the imagination" are furtherspecifiedby their
disinterestedness. Addison did not work out this concept in any de-
tail, but he distinguishedthe satisfactionof "a man of polite imagina-
tion" on viewingthe "fieldsand meadows" fromthat of a man who
delightsin theirpossession.'9
'Aesthetic experience' provides the conceptual generality and
unitywhichwas lackingin earlierthought.Addison does not confine
himselfto a single art or genre.He discusses literature,music, and
painting,sculpture,and architecture, because they all have common
effectsupon the imagination.20 Moreover,natural objects have com-
parable effects.21Thereforenatureis, in respectof its aestheticworth,
groupedtogetherwiththe finearts and studiedalong withthem.The
Renaissance and neo-classical treatises are constrictedand unsys-
tematicby contrast.But Addison extendsthe range of the aesthetic
even farther.He speaks perceptivelyof the aestheticquality to be
found in history,the sciences,22and intellectualactivitygenerally:
". ... a truthin the understandingis as it werereflectedby the imagi-
nation; we are able to see somethinglike colour and shape in a no-
tion."23 For Addison,indeed, "almost every thing about us" 24 can
be aestheticallyvaluable.
12 Spectator
no. 409,in The Worksof JosephAddison,ed. Greene(New York,
1856),VI, 321. Firstedition,1712.
13Spectatorno. 411,op. cit.,p. 324. 14 Ibid.,p. 325. 15 Ibid.,p. 324.
16Ibid.,p. 325. 17Ibid.,pp. 324-325. 18Ibid., p. 325; cf.,also, no. 412, pp.
329-330.
19Ibid.,p. 325. 20 Spectator no. 416,pp. 347-349.
21 Spectatorno. 414. 22 Spectator no. 420.
23 Spectatorno. 421, p. 370. 24 Spectatorno. 413, p. 334.

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 (BEAUTY : HISTORY OF AN IDEA 189

But if theconceptsof 'art'and 'theaesthetic'takeon newpromi-

nencein Addison,just theoppositeis trueof 'beauty.'Aesthetic ex-
periencehas becomethechiefconcernofthetheorist and,as we shall
see in detailin the following section,he devoteshimselfto the ex-
aminationof its feltquality.He no longer,in the firstinstanceat
least,looksoutwardto thegenres.Addison'sargument thatthe'rules'
arenotofthefirst importance in criticism,25
has its counterpart in his
aesthetictheory.The searchfor 'rules,'i.e., the conditionsunder
whichan objectin a givengenreachievesbeauty,becomesa second-
ary question.Even so considered, however,'beauty'is no longer
unique.For objectscan be aesthetically valuablein otherwaysthan
justbeingbeautiful. Addisonfindsthat'thepleasuresoftheimagina-
tion'can be arousednotonlyby whatis beautiful, but also by things
that are 'great,'i.e., sublime,and by thingsthat are 'novel'or 'un-
common.' 26

Here,then,is thesignificance ofAddison's'entirely new'approach

fortheconceptof 'beauty':insofaras 'aesthetictheory'occursat all
priorto the XVIIIth century, it is forthe mostpart relativelyill-
defined. Far morethanany other,'beauty'is its distinguishing con-
cept.Speculationcentersupon 'thenatureofbeauty'and 'beautiful'
is usedto designateaestheticvalue ofwhatever kind.Addisonmakes
a consciousattemptto definethe fieldof study.The distinguishing
conceptis "the aesthetic,"i.e., "pleasuresof the imagination when
experience is non-sensual,non-cognitive and disinterested."
This con-
ceptis logicallypriorto and inclusiveof 'art'and 'beauty.'Therefore
'beauty'is no longerthe centralconceptin aesthetics;its meaning
is no longerthe sole or eventhe chiefproblemforthe theorist;and
it is notthesole category of aestheticvalue.
II
The Britishwere buoyedby the Lockean convictionthat, as
Hutchesonput it, "we need littlereasoningor argument, sincecer-
taintyis onlyattainableby distinctattentionto whatwe are con-
scioushappensin ourminds."27The aversionto abstracttheorizing
is sharedby all our philosophers,
but it is mostvirulentin Burke,
who announcesthat he will proceedby "a diligentexamination of
our passionsin our own breasts."28 The job of the aestheticianis
thatof 'thenew way of ideas,'viz.,to inventorize'the pleasuresof
25Cf.Spectatorno. 409,p. 321.
26 Spectator
no. 412,p. 327; cf.,also,no. 415,p. 346.
27 [Francis
Hutcheson], An Essay on theNatureand Conductof thePassions
and Affections
(London,1728),2. Italicsomitted.
28 EdmundBurke,
A Philosophical EnquiryintotheOriginof our Ideas of the
Sublimeand Beautiful(1757), ed. Boulton(London,1958),1.

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190 JEROME STOLNITZ

theimagination' or 'theemotions oftaste'andreducethemto psycho-

logicalsimples.
Thus Alexander Gerardanalyzes'taste'intothe following 'simple
principles':novelty,sublimity, beauty,imitation,harmony, the ri-
diculous,virtue.29 He intendsthisto be an exhaustiveenumeration
of the 'perceptions' whichare peculiarto tasteand therefore of their
corresponding objects.In morerecentjargon,it is an enumeration of
thekindsofaestheticresponseand ofthevariousclassesof aesthetic
objects.
I wantto call attention, first, to theverycomplexity of Gerard's
scheme.The XVIIIth century, farmorethananypreviousage, con-
centrated uponthe natureof the aestheticresponse.Whenaesthetic
thoughtwas directedprincipally to the art-form or genre,the effect
upon the spectatorwas eitherignoredaltogether or referred to by
means of some omnium-gatherumtermsuch as 'pleasure'or 'de-
light.'30'The newwayofideas'putsa premium on,is indeeddevoted
to the meticulous discrimination of different kindsof 'ideas' or 'per-
ceptions'fromeach other.The lumpingtogether of diverseaesthetic
responsestherefore giveswayto a greatproliferation of the 'species'
of suchresponse.So Gerard,a half-century afterAddison,takesover
the latter'striadand adds severalmore.He does so becauseof the
deliverances of introspection. Since it is 'perceptions' whichare in
question,whatis experiencedas a difference in kindis a difference in
kind.Therefore GerardregardsAddison'sschemeas not adequateto
"the sentiments of tastein all its forms." 31 Hence the secondthing
that I wouldemphasizeis that,forGerard,the 'principles of taste'
are 'simple' and therefore
32 irreducible to each other.Like Shaftes-
buryand Hutchesonbeforehim,Gerardaffirms thisby sayingthat
"the powersof taste are . . . to be reckonedsenses."33 And he de-
scribesa senseas "a powerwhichsuppliesus withsuchsimpleper-
ceptionsas cannotbe conveyedby anyotherchannel."34
Third,we can now see how 'beauty'standsin Gerard'stheory.
'Taste' is thefoundational concept,as 'imagination' was forAddison.
Logically,'beauty'is one amonga numberof 'principles' whichare
subordinate to 'taste'and coordinate but independent amongthem-
selves.Psychologically, novelty,sublimity, andtherestarenotderiva-
tive fromor compounded out of it. It mightbe added that,of the
various'principles,''beauty'is not even the most interesting, for
29Alexander Gerard,An Essay on Taste (Edinburgh,17591,17642).
30 ReneWellek, A HistoryofModernCriticism (London,1955),I, 21.
3' Op. cit.,74. 32Phenomenologicallythoughnot,forGerard,analytically;cf.
94, 151-153n.Onlytheformer concerns
us here.
33 Op. cit., 151n. 34 Ibid.,150-151n.
Italicsomitted.

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 'BEAUTY : HISTORY OF AN IDEA 191

Gerard. For thoughhe devotes much more attentionto beauty and

sublimitythan to the others,he treatsbeauty and sublimityat equal
length.
At the beginningof the century,the traditionalview that "What-
ever,indeed,is sublime,is beautiful,"35 is stillheld. At the verysame
time, however,Addison sets off'sublimity'from'beauty'36 and he,
Gerard,and others,introducevarious othercategoriesinto aesthetics
alongside that of "beauty." Of all these concepts,"sublimity"is in-
comparablythe most important.For the impact of 'sublimity'upon
aestheticthoughtis the singlemostpotentforcein dislodging'beauty'
fromits formerlyunchallengedprimacyamong the value-categories.
To show this, we must turn to Edmund Burke who, of all the
British,set forththe oppositionbetween "beauty" and "sublimity"
most vigorouslyand uncompromisingly. Addison describedthe ex-
perience of the sublime as one of "astonishment. . . stillnessand
amazement," that of beauty as "cheerfulnessand delight."38 More-
over,he took beautifulobjects to be symmetrical,39 whereassublime
objects are "too big" for the mind to grasp. Yet he believed that
40

the propertiesof beauty and sublimitycan be united in the same

object and that, when they are, our pleasure is increased.4'Lord
Kames assertedthat the emotionsof beauty and sublimityare clearly
different,as are most of the properties.Yet he arguedthat an object
cannotbe sublimeunlessit possessessome of the attributesof beauty,
e.g., proportion.42Gerard, as we have seen, consideredbeauty and
sublimityirreduciblydistinct. Still he took the experienceof the
sublime,like that of beauty,to be pleasurable.43For Burke,however,
beauty and sublimityare, conceptually,not only distinctbut mutu-
ally exclusive; existentially,they are not only separate but very
nearlyirreconcilable.
Like the centurygenerally,Burke marks the distinctionbetween
themby examiningfeltexperience.Whereas beauty arouses pleasure
("love"),44 "sublime" is definedby referenceto "delight,"45 an affec-
tive state which is not pleasurable and yet not merelypainful,but
rather"blended with . . . uneasiness."46 The sublime induces "that
35Joseph Trapp, quoted in Samuel H. Monk, The Sublime:A Studyof Critical
Theoriesin XVIII-Century England (New York, 1935), 59. Italics in original.On
the meaningand use of "sublime" priorto the XVIIIth century,cf. Monk, op. cit.,
chaps. I-II.
36 Cf. above, beforereferenceto note 26.
3 Spectator no. 412, p. 328. 38 Ibid.,p. 329. 39 Spectatorno. 411, pp. 324-325.
40 Spectator no. 412, pp. 327-328. 41 Ibid., pp. 328, 331.
42 [Henry Home], Lord Kames, Elements of Criticism (1762), 7th ed. (Edin-

burgh, 1788),I, 211-213. 43 Op. cit.,11. 44 Op. cit.,91.

45Ibid.,36. 46Ibid.,46.

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192 JEROME STOLNITZ

state of the soul, in which all its motionsare suspended,with some

degreeof horror"47; the beautifuldoes not paralyze,but rather're-
laxes' and 'melts.'48 The upshot is that it is 'hard' or 'impossible'for
the experienceof beauty to be had at the same time as that of sub-
limity,withoutdetrimentto the distinctivecharacterof each.49When
Burke turned to the objects of these experiences,he ranged their
attributesin mutual opposition: the sublimeis vast,50the beautiful,
small, the sublime is rugged,the beautiful,delicate, and so on.5'
Burke grants that these propertiesmay, 'in the infinitevariety of
natural combinations,'52 sometimesco-existin the same thing.Even
then,he concludes,they remain 'opposite and contradictory.' 53

This theoryadmitsinto the realmof the aestheticand legitimizes

elementsnot only different fromthose traditionallyassociated with
beauty but antitheticalto it; the experiencethus described,further-
more,is taken to be of greatervalue than that of beauty.
On the side of the percipient,such termsas 'pleasure' which had
been used casually by earlier theoriststo describethe aesthetic re-
sponse,54 were doubtless excessivelyvague. Still they betokenedthe
belief that the aestheticexperienceis freeof 'negative' feelings.For
Burke, the feelingof horror,thoughonly in 'some degree,'occursin
veritablyaesthetic experience,55 in the perceptionof poetry,music,
and the otherarts,and of nature as well.56On the side of the object,
the propertyof beauty had traditionallybeen identifiedwith some
kind of formalordering,'harmony,''symmetry,' etc.57For Burke,sub-
lime objects are 'vast' and 'infinite,' 58 i.e., they defy and transcend
any formalorderingand bounds. Closely related to the classical in-
sistenceon formis the demand forclarityand lucidityin the object.
For Burke, anotherof the attributesof sublime objects is their 'ob-
scurity.'59 "[A] great clearnesshelps but little towardsaffecting the
passions,"6O whereaswe are moved most greatlyby what is 'dark,un-
certain,confused.'61
It is this last aspect of the experienceof sublimity,i.e., its intense
emotion,whichseems to make it of greatervalue than the experience
of beauty, for Burke. He nowheresays this explicitly.Throughout,
however,he is concernedwith intense emotionalarousal and he in-
sists that the sublime "is productiveof the strongestemotionwhich
47Ibid.,57. Burkeis heredescribing "astonishment,"
the"highest"effect of the
sublime.
48Ibid.,149-151. 49Ibid.,113-114. 50Cf.,however, 57. 5' Ibid., 124. 52 Ibid.
53Ibid.,125; cf.,also,5, 159.
54Cf. above,note30. 55 Ibid.,73.
56 Ibid.,59ff. 57 Cf. below,note77ff. 58 Ibid.,72-74.
159Ibid.,58-60. 630Ibid.,60. 631Ibid., 59.

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 'BEAUTY : HISTORY OF AN IDEA 193

the mind is capable of feeling."62 The experienceof beauty comes to

seem slightby contrastand beauty itself,fragileand attenuated.0364
In commonwith all of the XVIIIth-centuryBritishthinkers,but
to a greaterextentthan any of them,Burke pushes back the bound-
aries of the aesthetic.The finalstep logicallywould be to make room
foruglinesswithinthe realm of aestheticvalue. As the contradictory
of 'beauty,'it had necessarilybeen excluded.Such necessityno longer
obtains,however,when 'beauty' is no longeridentifiedwith 'aesthetic
value' and when the 'negative'feelingsof pain and aversion,usually
associatedwiththe perceptionof ugliness,are admittedinto aesthetic
experience.As a XXth-centuryphilosopherhas put it, once aesthetics
accepts "the sublime, the terrible,the satirical . . . why not the ugly
as well?" Bs Burke's discussionof uglinessis very briefand unsatis-
factory.Yet it is importantto note that he takes it to be "con-
sistent"66 withthe sublime,whichis a kind of aestheticvalue, and he
holds that uglinesscan becomesublimewhen"unitedwithsuch quali-
ties as excitea strongterror."17
The concept of sublimity has been less prominentin recent
thoughtthan it was for Burke and most XVIIIth-centurythinkers.
If there is any one categorywhich has supplanted 'beauty' in our
own time,it is probably,I suggestedearlier,68'the expressive.'It is
remarkable,however,how many of the characteristicsof Burke's
'sublimity' have attached themselves to 'expressiveness,'viz., the
absence of formalpreciseness,emotionalpower,the stimulationeven
of painful emotions,'obscurity.'Sublimityis, almost in its very na-
ture,a relativelyrare phenomenon.'Sublime' cannot,therefore, serve
as the garden varietypredicatewhich designatesthe most frequent
kind of aestheticvalue. 'Expressive,'by contrast,can functionin this
way because it has a much widerdenotation.It can be and is applied
to worksof art whichare highlydiversein theirscale, style,and con-
tent. But if 'expressive'now parallels 'beautiful'in importance,it is
largelybecause the conceptof 'sublimity'firstpointedup the limita-
tions and deficienciesof 'mere beauty.'
III
The three sectionsof this paper treat the concept of 'beauty' at
levels of decreasinggenerality.I tried to show firstthat, in the
XVIIIth century,the field of aesthetics was no longer organized
around the concept of 'beauty' and second, that 'beauty' was no
62 Ibid., 39. 63 Ibid.,"Introduction," lxxv. 64 Lord Kames latersaysthatthe
sublime"raisesthemostdelightful ofall emotions." Op. cit.,I, 248.Kamesis not,of
course,using'delightful' in Burke'ssense.
65 W. T. Stace,The Meaning ofBeauty(London,1929),82.
66 Ibid.,119. 67 Ibid.,119. 68 Cf. above,secondparagraph.

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194 JEROME STOLNITZ

longerthe sole nor even the chiefvalue-category.Yet even if it lost

pride of place, 'beauty' mightstill have been used to denote one im-
portantkind of aestheticexperienceand aesthetic value. Indeed, it
was so used in the XVIIIth century.Even so considered,however,the
conceptsuffersa profoundtransformation, which,I shall argue,helps
to explain its presentstatus in aesthetictheory.
We have seen that whenthe Britishtookthe turninward,'beauty'
came to designateone of the species of 'taste' or 'imagination.'For
Addison and his successors,it marked offa kind of experiencedis-
tinguishableintrospectively fromotherkindsof aestheticexperience.
This can be called the phenomenal sense of beauty. The terms
'beauty' and 'beautiful'had, however,been used traditionallyto de-
note objects or the propertyof objects. I shall call this the objective
sense.69The transpositionof the termswas markedimplicitlyby the
introductionof such locutionsas 'the emotionof beauty' or 'the per-
ceptionof beauty,'when it was not proclaimedovertly,as by Hutch-
eson: "Let it be observed,that in the followingpapers, the word
beautyis taken forthe idea raised in us." 70
Like all the British,however,Hutcheson also spoke of 'beauty'
in thingsand not simplyas a figureof speech. If thereis any incon-
sistencyin this, it is unimportant,so long as Hutcheson remained
faithfulto his originalintentby construing'beautiful'as a relational
predicate.He does so when he speaks of beauty in the objectivesense
as the 'real quality in . . . objects' which 'excites' the idea of beauty.7'
He will not considerit a propertywhose existenceand natureare in-
dependent of perception: "[Were] there no mind with a sense of
beauty to contemplateobjects, I see not how they could be called
beautiful."72
Hence, that beauty is, in the firstinstance,an idea, does not pre-
clude tryingto determinewhich propertyor propertiesmake things
beautiful.This is an empiricalquestion.Hutcheson treatsit as such,
forhe speaks of 'examining'73 or 'discovering'74 the salientproperty.
He findsthat it is 'uniformity amidst variety.'75 Since 'beautiful'is,
forHutcheson,relationalwhereas'uniformity amidstvariety'on any
showingis not, the lattercannot expressthe meaningof the former.
69 Exceptwhereotherwise indicated,
all futurereferencesto 'beauty'are to this
senseoftheterm.
70 [FrancisHutcheson],An InquiryintotheOriginalofourIdeas ofBeautyand
Virtue(1725), 4thed. (London,1738),7. Italicsin original.Cf.,similarly,Gerard,
op. cit.,43; David Hume,"Of theStandardof Taste,"in Philosophical Works,ed.
Greenand Grose(London,1875),III, 268-269.
71 Ibid.,7. 72 Ibid.,14-15.Italicsomitted.Cf.,also,70.
73 Ibid.,16. 74 Ibid.,7.
75 Ibid.,17. Hutcheson's
'absolutebeauty'onlyis in questionhere.

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 'BEAUTY': HISTORY OF AN IDEA 195

It remainsan empiricalquestionwhetherobjectswhichpossessuni-
formity in varietydo,indeed,'excite'theidea ofbeautyand whether
onlytheydo so. Theremusttherefore be at least the possibility
of
negativeevidence.
Yet it seemsquiteclearthatHutchesonwillnotacceptthispossi-
bility.He grantsthat objectswhichshould 'naturally'arousethe
'pleasantidea of beauty'sometimes failto do so and thatwe some-
timesfind"objectspleasantand delightful, whichare not naturally
apt to give any such pleasures."76 But he does not take thisto be
negativeevidence.Hutchesonnowhereadmitsthat objectsof the
latterkindinducethe distinctive idea of beauty.They are 'unnat-
urally'agreeable,but theyare not beautiful.Nor do objectsof the
former classforfeit theirclaimto be called'beautiful'whentheyfail
to please."[Men] have an aversionto objectsofbeauty,and a liking
to othersvoid of it, but underdifferent conceptions than thoseof
beautyor deformity." 77 That thisis a necessary,
' nota factualtruth,
for Hutcheson,becomesclear later when he so defines'sense of
beauty'thatit can respondonlyto "objectsin whichthereis uni-
formity amidstvariety." 78 That beautiful objectspossessuniformity
in varietyis not,as had at firstappeared,an empirical generalization,
forit cannotbe otherwise.
What we see herein Hutchesoncan be seen,in one formor an-
other,in all of the Britishaestheticians. Havingtakenthe turnin-
ward,theymusthold that,as Kames puts it, "Beauty,in its very
conception, refersto a percipient."79 At thesametime,theyidentify
the properties in virtueof whichthingsare beautifulto the percip-
ient, as the propertieswhich earlier,non-relativist theorieshad
singledout to define'beauty'in the objectivesense,viz.,uniformity
in variety,harmony, proportion, and utility.None of thesehas any
inherent reference to feltresponse.The Britishhad then,somehow,
to establisha particularly strongconnection betweenthe occurrence
of theseproperties and the appropriate experiencein thepercipient.
Else, on the one hand,the relativism endemicto 'the new way of
ideas'or,on theother,thereceivedtheories ofobjectivebeauty,must
be givenup. It is thistensionwithinthe conception of 'beauty'or,
moreprecisely, amongthe conceptions of 'beauty'whichstimulated
muchof the dialecticof Britishaesthetictheory,chieflywhenthe
besettingproblemof 'taste'had to be facedup to.
Hutchesonguaranteedthe relationbetween'uniformity amidst
variety'andtheexperience ofbeautybymakinganyotherimpossible.
76 Ibid.,73.
77 Ibid.,80; cf.,also,4, 81-83. 78 Ibid.,80. Italicsomitted.
79 Op. cit., I, 208.

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196 JEROME STOLNITZ

Gerardheld thatuniformity, variety,and proportion 'render'things

80 forthey'are naturally
beautiful 81 of the sentiment
productive' of
beauty.Yet hereas elsewhere in XVIIIth-century thought, natureis
foundto be less stable and assuredthan could be wished.Gerard
wouldnot therefore abandonhis theoryof objectivebeauty: "Men
are,withfewexceptions, affected by the qualitieswe have investi-
gated:but thesequalitiesthemselves are,withoutany exception, the
constituentsof excellence."
82 Or one couldsimply denythatthereis
anyproblem, in fact.Thus Burke:"I neverremember thatanything
beautiful. . . was ever shewn,thoughit were to an hundredpeople,
thattheydid liotall immediately agreethatit was beautiful." 83
These,and other,comparable contrivances evidencethedialectical
instabilityof 'beauty.'The conceptwas therefore especiallyvulner-
able in an age whosetemperwas critical, not to say irreverent. The
formulasof 'unity,''proportion,' and the rest,whichhad passed
musterin previousages,werenowcalledintoquestion.A man would
put forward his theoryof objectivebeautyon one page and, on the
next,engagein a vigorouspolemicagainstthoseof his contempo-
raries.These polemicslefttheirmark.As the centurygrewolder,
therewas increasingly greaterdiscouragement overthepossibility of
findingany formulathat wouldwork,issuingfinallyin skepticism
thatanysuchformulaexists.When,in thislatterstage,the concept
of objectivebeautyseemsto have becomeintractable, attention was
directedto its logicalcharacter,to explainwhyit had to be rejected.
I shalltreatthe critiqueof the varioustheoriesof beautyunder
the headings,the empiricalargumentand the phenomenological
argument, and the critiqueof the conceptitselfunderthe heading,
thelogicalargument.
The firsttypeof argument is 'empirical'just in the sensethatit
appealsto thedata of aestheticexperience. For all XVIIIth-century
Britishaesthetics,felt responseis the indispensableand decisive
evidenceof theexistenceofbeauty.84 We have seenthatHutcheson,
Gerard,and Burketriedto keepoutthenastyfactsin onewayor an-
other.Butsuchad hocdevicescouldnotlongremaineffective in an age
committed to empiricism. Moreover,thesephilosophers, like their
fellows,thoughtto groundtheirrespectivetheoriesof beauty on
experiential fact.It is therefore
meetingthemon theirowntermsto
adduce evidencethat objectspossessingthe properties whichthey
singledout are not solely,or universally, or both,the objectsof the
experience of beauty.
8Oop. cit.,129.
82 Ibid.,74. Italicsin original.
81Ibid.,74.
83 Op. Cit., 15.
84 Cf.Kames,op. cit.,I, 378.

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 'BEAUTY : HISTORY OF AN IDEA 197

Anynumberofexamplescouldbe quoted,but sincetheargument

fromnegativeinstances, hereas elsewhere, is fairlyrudimentary, the
following may suffice:
Against"proportion": "Turningour eyes to the vegetablecrea-
tion,we findnothingthereso beautifulas flowers;but flowers are
almostof everysortof shape,and of everysortof disposition.85 ...
How manybirdsare therethat varyinfinitely fromeach of these
standards[of proportion], and fromeveryotherwhichyou can fix,
withproportions and oftendirectly
different, oppositeto each other!
and yetmanyof thesebirdsare extremely beautiful." 86
Against "uniformity in variety": "[This] definition, however
applicableto one or otherspecies,is farfrombeingjust withrespect
to beautyin general:varietycontributes no shareto thebeautyof a
moralaction,norof a mathematical theorem.... [Uniformity] amid
varietyamong ugly objects, affordsno pleasure."87 Whereupon
Kames adds a logicalpoint: "[To] definebeautyas arisingfrom
beautifulobjectsblendedtogether in a due proportion of uniformity
and variety,wouldbe too grossto pass current." 88
Against"utility"or "fitness":"[A] toadis as fitforthepurposes
of its natureas a turtle-dove; and we mayremarkof artificial orna-
ments,thattheyare mostlyof littleor no utility." 89
This kindof argument is doubtless, as I have noted,ratherfacile
and not verysophisticated. But its cumulativeeffectin XVIIIth-
centurythoughtcannotbe ignored.The theoriesof 'proportion' or
'harmony,''uniformity in variety'and 'utility,'and especiallythe
first,90are as venerableas can be, in the historyof aesthetics. They
couldand did retaintheirprominence whentherewas no obligation
in theoryto put themto thetestofaestheticexperience. The British
turnthe empiricalargument againsteach of themand, as we shall
see,it undermines beliefin all of them.
The phenomenological argument is used less frequently, but it is
considerably moreinteresting. For it is based on an idea whichori-
ginatesin the XVIIIth centuryand has been a chieflegacyof that
century to lateraesthetictheory:'theaestheticattitude.'That there
is a modeof attentionand perception peculiarto the aestheticex-
perience, so mucha commonplace in ourowntime,was firstexplicitly
recognized byLordShaftesbury 91 and,as we haveseen,byAddison,92
85 Burke,op. cit.,94. 86Ibid.,95.
87 Kames,op. cit.,I, 324-325. 88Ibid.,325.
89 J. Donaldson,The ElementsofBeauty(Edinburgh, 1780),6.
90"Harmony, we know,has beenthe acceptedsynonym forbeautyor forthe
artist'sgoal throughall theages of a philosophyof art."KatherineE. Gilbertand
HelmutKuhn,A HistoryofAesthetics, rev.ed. (Bloomington,Indiana,1953),186.
91 Cf. thepaperreferred to above,note11. 92 Cf. above,p. 188.

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198 JEROME STOLNITZ

in the openingyears of the century.Both emphasizedtwo aspects of

the aestheticattitude: 1) The aestheticpercipientis not motivated
by personaladvantage; he attendsto the object 'forits own sake.' 93
2) Aestheticresponseis 'immediate,'in the sense that it takes place
withoutdiscursivereflection.94Hutchesonlater united 1) and 2) by
describing aesthetic "perceptions" as "pleasant and . . . painful, im-
mediately,and that without any knowledgeof the cause of this
pleasure or pain, or how the objects exciteit, or are the occasions of
it; or without feelingto what fartheradvantage or detrimentthe
use of such objects mighttend."95
The phenomenologicalargumentis the argument that certain
propertieswhichhave been thoughtto make thingsbeautiful,cannot
do so, because the perceptionof these propertiesis incompatiblewith
the aestheticattitude.
Of the prevailingtheoriesof beauty, that of 'usefulness'is most
obviouslyvulnerableto this argument,on the groundsof 1). There is
a subtle formof this theory,suggestedby Hume,96of which this is
not true.On this view,utilityis apprehended,not in relationto one's
personaladvantage,but as the objectivepropertyof a thingwhichis
skilfullyadapted to certainends that someone,anyone,does or might
pursue.The percipientcan then be disinterested.On a more straight-
forwardversionof the theory,however,he cannot be disinterested.
If the utilityof the object is consideredwith an eye to one's "farther
advantage or detriment,"then,so far frombeing beautiful,it is not
even aesthetic.Hutcheson thereforedistinguishedvery sharply the
"joy" aroused by an object "upon our apprehendingourselvespos-
sessed of it" fromthe experienceof beauty.97Indeed, if the latteris
even "accompanied" by the former,then, Hutcheson admonished,
"we must be very great indeed,beforewe can have any pleasure by
this sense [i.e., the sense of beauty]." 98

Burke vigorouslyrepudiated the theory of the "inner senses,"

whichhe thoughtobscurantistand uneconomical.99Yet he took over
completelythe beliefin aestheticimmediacywhichShaftesburyand
Hutcheson had expressed by means of this theory: ". . . the appear-
ance of beauty as effectually
causes some degreeof love in us, as the
applicationof ice or fireproducesthe ideas of heat or cold." 100But
93Anthony, Earl ofShaftesbury, Characteristics (1711),ed. Robertson(London,
1900),II, 55-56; cf.,also,I, 296; II, 127-128. 94Ibid.,I, 251: II, 63, 137.
95 FrancisHutcheson, Inquiryinto... Beautyand Virtue,4.
96 David Hume,A TreatiseofHumanNature(1739), ed. Selby-Bigge (Oxford,
1896), 364, 576ff.Cf., also, FrancisHutcheson,A Systemof Moral Philosophy
(London,1755),I, 16.
97 Essay on . .. thePassionsand Affections, 28. Italicsomitted.
98Ibid.,102.Italicsomitted. Cf.,also,171-172. 99Op. cit.,27. 100 Ibid.,92.

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 'BEAUTY : HISTORY OF AN IDEA 199

this is not how proportionis apprehended.For that, the mediation

of discursive,rational processesis required.As Berkeleyhad put it,
"the comparingparts one with another,the consideringthem as be-
longingto one whole [is] the workof reason.... Proportions,there-
fore,are not, strictlyspeaking,perceivedby the sense of sight,but
only by reason."101
Burke's argument,then, can be set out in this way: "[Beauty]
demands no assistance from our reasoning"; but proportionis "a
creatureof the understanding, ratherthan a primarycause actingon
the senses and imagination"; therefore,"I have great reason to
doubt,whetherbeauty be at all an idea belongingto proportion."102
By the middleof the century,the empiricaland phenomenological
argumentsmade themselvesfelt. This is shown in various ways.
Burke repudiatedeach and all of the traditionaltheoriesof beauty.103
Lord Kames did not go so far,for he continuedto avail himselfof
"uniformityand variety,"104 "proportion,"105 and "utility."106 But
in Kames, theirlogical status is alteredand diminished:"It may sur-
prise some readers to find variety treated as only contributingto
make a trainof perceptionspleasant,when it is commonlyheld to be
a necessaryingredientin beauty of whateverkind."107 Indeed, Kames
became skepticalthat thereare any propertiescommonto all beauti-
ful objects.'08In later authors,the attack upon the formulastakes a
new turn. The empiricalargumentproceededby the fairlysimple-
minded method of showing that some beautiful objects do not
possess the propertyin question and that others which do, fail to
arouse beauty,in the phenomenalsense. This argumentcan function
at all only if such a phrase as 'uniformity in variety' is thoughtto
have a determinatemeaning and denotation.The more subtle and
far more damningcriticismis to show that this is not the case. Thus
Donaldson says of 'uniformityand variety' that they are "terms
comprehendingthe nature of all things,rather than containinga
descriptionalone of what is beautiful."109
By the closing decades of the century,discouragementover the
possibilityof findinga successfulformulaof objective beauty, has
turnedinto despair. Kames' skepticismof any such formulawas ex-
pressed almost incidentallyin the middle of his chapteron humor.
Twenty years later, such skepticismmoved into the forefrontof
aestheticthoughtand took a firmhold. Donaldson (1780) says at the
101 Alciphron, in The Worksof GeorgeBerkeley, ed. Fraser(Oxford,1871),II,
119.Italicsin original. 102 Op. cit.,92.
103 Op. cit., 112. 104 Op. cit., ch. IX. 305ff. 106Ibid., 198.
105 Ibid., 199ff.,
107 Ibid.,324. 108 Ibid., 273.
109 Donaldson, op. cit.,5.

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200 JEROME STOLNITZ

very beginningof his work: "The common errorof most of our

modern writersoni beauty has been, that they have supposed all
things,in orderto appear completelybeautiful,subject to one fixed
principle."llO Alison (1790), similarly,fails to find "any single
principle" acceptable. These "principles" are, he says, "true to a
certain extent,though I believe also, that they have arisen froma
partial view of the subject."111
The fin-de-siecletheoristsmighthave concludedthat no previous
theoryhad made out the propertieswhichare commonand peculiar
to beautifulthings,but that a new and moreenlightenedeffort might
do so. Yet insteadof seekingotherformulas,theyquestionedthe very
enterpriseof seeking formulas,which is, to Alison, "altogetherim-
possible."112
In this,theirinstinctswere surelyright.The formulashad to be
given up, ultimately,not because of this or that versionof the em-
pirical or the phenomenologicalargument,but because of the dia-
lectical tensionat the very heart of Britishaesthetics.The formulas
wereinheritedfromways of thinkingwhoseconceptionof beauty was
exclusiveand aristocratic.'Harmony'or 'unity'set offa fairlylimited
class of objects,did so, indeed,by defining'beauty.' For the new way
of thinking,'beauty,' in the firstinstance,designatessome phenom-
enal state: 'cheerfulness'(Addison),113 'love' (Burke),114 or 'sweet-
ness and gaiety' (Kames).115 Beauty, in the objective sense, must
accordinglymean "that which arouses the 'idea' or 'perception'of
beauty." 116 There is thereforeno a priorilimitationupon the things
that mightbecome membersof the class of 'beautifulobjects.' If a
thingdoes, in fact,arouse the appropriateexperience,it gains entry.
As we have already seen, to Addison,who initiatedthe new way of
thinking,"almost everythingabout us [has] the powerof raisingan
agreeable idea in the imagination."117 Gerard deploredthe fact that
"beauty. . . is applied to almost every thing that pleases us," 118
but the whole impulse of British aesthetics was to encourage and
sanctionsuch usage. The paramountdifficulty, however,for'harmony'
or any otherformula,whenthe rangeof 'beauty'becomescatholicand
inclusive,is not that there are now a great many things to which
'beautiful'is properlyapplied. The difficulty, indeed a fatal one, is
110 Ibid.,5. Cf.,also,HughBlair,Lectures andBellesLettres(1783),
on Rhetoric
11thed. (London,1809),I, 92.
111Archibald Alison,Essays on theNatureand Principlesof Taste (1790), 4th
ed. (Edinburgh, 1815),I, 316. 112Ibid.,I, 316.
113 Cf. above, note 38. 114 Cf. above, note 44. 115 Op. cit., I, 197. 116 Cf.
above,note71 et seq.
117 Cf. above,note24. 118 Op. cit.,43. Italicsin original.

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 'BEAUTY : HISTORY OF AN IDEA 201
that therecan be no limitsin theoryto the area withinwhichthe
properties of beautifulthingsare to be sought.
The contrast betweenHutcheson, at thebeginning ofthecentury,
and Alison,at its end, is instructive here. As we have seen, to
Hutchesonobjectswhichlackuniformity in varietysometimes please
and otherswhichpossessthe property, sometimes do not,thoughin
neithercase "underthe conceptionsof beauty and deformity." 119
Hutchesonwishedto explainthesefactsand the explanationmust,
of course,be foundwithinthe percipient.It must be something
idiosyncratic, which thereforedisrupts'natural' perception.For
Hutchesonit is, chiefly, association:"Associationsof ideasmakeob-
jectspleasantand delightful, whicharenotnaturallyapt to giveany
such pleasures."120 So associationis, as he says,'accidental,'121 an

obtrusion, in any eventforeign to the experience of beautyitself.122

Yet it is Hutchesonhimself,even more than his predecessors
Shaftesbury and Addison,who proclaimsand givesimpetusto the
CopernicanRevolutionin aesthetics.The aestheticpercipient is in-
stalledat thecenterof thingsand his responsedetermines whichob-
jects are beautiful.Later thinkers, e.g.,Hume,Gerard,and Kames,
setting themselves to study the natureand conditionsof aesthetic
response,wereall to findthe mechanisms of associationat workin
the experienceof beauty.So far frombeing casual or accidental,
associationoccurswidelyor pervasively.It must therefore be ac-
creditedas legitimately aesthetic.Finally,in Alison,associationbe-
comesthe uniquelycrucialelementin aestheticexperience. It is, in-
deed, definitive of "the emotionof beauty."123 Alisonacceptsand
insistsuponthe conclusion whichHutchesonwouldnot accept,viz.,
thatevenwhenthe associationis whollypersonalor eccentric, when
"certain qualities or appearances . . . are connectedwith our own
privateaffections or remembrances," 124 the object of perceptionis
beautiful.It is beautifuljust becauseit has triggered theassociation.
At thispoint,thereis nothingto keep 'beautiful'frombeingin-
finitelyaccommodating in its denotation. At thispoint,too,the old
question,"Whichproperties in thingsmake thembeautiful?,"be-
comesnotso muchunanswerable as irrelevant.
It is againstthisbackground thatthe logicalargument mustbe
understood. The argument was put forthat the turnof thecentury.
Not surprisingly, the irrelevance of the traditionalquestionwas as
yet only dimlyrecognized. A theorysuch as Alison'sdemandeda
119Cf. above,note77. 120 Op. cit.,73. 121 Ibid.,4, 73.
122 Cf. MartinKallich,"The Associationist
Criticismof FrancisHutchesonand
David Hume,"Studiesin Philology, XLIII (1946), 645-651.
123 Op. cit.,I, 3ff.
124 Ibid.,II, 422; cf.,also,I, 24,84-85,287-288;II, 192-193.Cf.,
I, 130.
however,

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202 JEROME STOLNITZ

radicallydifferentunderstanding of 'beauty'and it was too soonfor

that.But thoughtherewas nothingto replacethem,the collapseof
theformulas was so patentin thethought ofthecentury thatit must
be explained.What is thereabout 'beauty'in the objectivesense
whichmakesit intractable? Appropriate to a philosophical twilight,
attentionturnedto languageand linguistic usage.The formulas had
to failbecausethe term'beauty'is highlypolyguousor intolerably
vague.The logicalargument is theargument thatit is systematically
impossibleto determine whichproperties are commonand peculiar
to beautifulthingsor whether thereare anysuchproperties.
Lord Kames had alreadythoughtit worthremarking that men
apply'beautiful'notonlyto sensoryobjectsbut also in speakingof
"a beautifultheorem,a beautifulconstitution of government." 125

in in
This was a passingobservation Kames but Dugald Stewartit
became much more.Stewartsurveysall of the XVIIIth century
retrospectively.'26
The workingcapitalof his own theory-'beauty,'
'taste,'etc.-is inheritedfromthe century.He is, how-
'sublimity,'
ever,sufficiently
detachedfromits concerns to pointto theirfutility
and to diagnosethe causes: "It has longbeen a favouriteproblem
with philosophers, to ascertainthe commonquality or qualities,
whichentitlesa thingto the denomination of beautiful;but the
successoftheirspeculations has beenso inconsiderable thatlittlecan
be inferredfromthembut theimpossibility of theproblemto which
theyhavebeendirected." 127 Thesetheories "haveevidently originated
in a prejudice,whichhas descendedto moderntimes fromthe
scholasticages;-that whena wordadmitsof a varietyof significa-
tions,thesesignificationsmustall be speciesof thesamegenus;and
mustconsequently includesomeessentialidea commonto everyin-
dividualto whichthe generictermcan be applied."128 Stewartun-
dertakesto explainthe "greatvarietyof acceptations" of "theword
Beauty"129and he comesup witha schememuchlikeWittgenstein's
"familyresemblances." GivenobjectsA, B, C, D, E, Stewartpoints
out thatA mayhave a qualityin commonwithB, B withC, C with
D, and D withE, "while,at thesametime,no qualitycan be found
whichbelongsin commonto any threeobjectsin the series."130 The
125 Op. cit.,II, 522.Italicsomitted.
Cf.,also,I, 197,222; also,cf.above,note87.
126 Stewartfallschronologically outsidetheXVIIIth century but,as I indicate
above,his chiefproblemsand conceptsare all of a piece withits thought.Prof.
Hippledescribes himas "a writerwhoaimedto subsumeand reinterpret thespecu-
lationof the century."
WalterJohnHipple,Jr.,The Beautiful,The Sublime,and
thePicturesque in Eighteenth-Century
BritishAestheticTheory(Carbondale,Ill.,
1957),284.
127 Dugald Stewart,Philosophical
Essays (Edinburgh,1810), 211. Italics in
original. 128Ibid.,214. 129Ibid., 210 130Ibid.,217. Italics in original.

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 'BEAUTY : HISTORY OF AN IDEA 203

meaningof 'beauty,'Stewartexplains,has broadenedand thenal-

teredimperceptibly as it has beenappliedsuccessively to theobjects
in such a series.Thus A and E are now both called 'beautiful,'
thoughtheyhave no property in commnon.
It followsfromthis strikingand forcefulargumentthat the
traditionalquest foressenceis necessarily futile.No 'singleprin-
ciple' I3" exists.Still,evenon Stewart'sshowing, 'beauty'retainsthe
'signification' of somequality,evenif onlythequalitycommonto A
and B. The termmay,however,lose its purchase,not on someone
referential meaningbut on referential meaningaltogether. Then it
pointsto nothingin the objectbut onlyregisters the factthat the
object has induceda certainexperience. RichardPayne Knight,a
contemporary of Stewart,echoesKames in notingthat 'beautiful'is
applied to "a materialsubstance,a moralexcellence,or an intel-
lectualtheorem," "a problem, a syllogism, ora period."132 But he also
makesthisacuteobservation:"The wordBeautyis a generalternm of
approbation, of themostvagueand extensivemeaning." 133

This dissolvingof preciseness and accompanying promiscuity of

applicationis not merelya linguisticphenomenon. The last of the
XVIIIth-century Britishtheorists calledattention to it becausethey
knewthatthe same thinghad happenedat the level of conceptual
analysisthroughout thecentury. Noneoftheirpredecessors had taken
'beauty,'in the objectivesense,to be merely"a generaltermof ap-
probation." Yet it is transformed in thiswaythatthetermseemsto
emergeout oftheferment oftheirthought.'Harmony'and theother
conceptswith whichthey had thoughtto assign referential sig-
nificance to 'beauty,'are caughtin the crossfire of the empiricaland
phenomenological arguments. Moreimportant, whentheBritishcon-
verted'beautiful'into a relationalpredicate,theyinvitedprecisely
the consequencewhichPayne Knightdecries,viz.,that the termis
"appliedindiscriminately to almosteverythingthatis pleasing."134
They soughtto restrictbeautyto that particularkindof aesthetic
experience whichit arouses,but it was not easy to set limitsto the
experience. Indeed,in the absenceof a scrupulous definition of "the
aestheticattitude,"it was difficult to keep "beauty"frombeingap-
pliedevento whatpleasesnon-aesthetically. The wayis opento the
view of recentthinkers, that "beauty"is nothingbut, in Payne
Knight'sphrase,"a generaltermofapprobation."
The conceptof "beauty"commended itselfto traditional thought
becauseoftheassumption thatit had orcouldbe givena determinate
131 Cf. above,note111.
AnAnalytical
132 Knight,
InquiryintothePrinciplesofTaste (London,18052),9.
133 Ibid. 134 Ibid.,9. Cf.above,note118.

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204 JEROME STOLNITZ

meaningand therefore a viableapplicationto objectsor to theprop-

ertiesof objects.Afterthe XVIIIth century,this assumptionis
weakenedor vitiatedformanythinkers. The effectcan be seen in
recentaestheticians.Eithertheygiveup on the conceptaltogether,
or,likeProfessor Lee,135theytreatit, but witha greatdeal of diffi-
denceand reserve, resigningthemselves to its insuperable
vagueness.
Or they take a radicallydifferent approachfromthat of earlier
thought,viz., to put it summarily, to concentrate on "use" rather
than"meaning."
University of Rochester.
35Cf.abo've,note3.

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