CASE DIGEST NUMBER 11

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals

G.R. No. L-47421, May 14, 1990

Facts:
Private respondent, Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc. is a non-stock corporation. It maintains a
golf course and operates a clubhouse with a lounge, bar and dining room, but these facilities are
for the exclusive use of its members and accompanied guests, and it charges on cost-plus-
expense basis. As such, it claims it should have been exempt from payment of privilege taxes
were it not for the last paragraph of Section 191-A of R.A. No. 6110, otherwise known as the
"Omnibus Tax Law." Section 191-A. A vetoed message from the President however made their
claims illegal according to the Court of Tax Appeals. As already mentioned, the Court of Tax
Appeals, upon petition by the club, sustained the latter's position reasoning that the veto
message was clear and unqualified, as in fact it was confirmed three years later, after much
controversy, by the Office of the President.
Issue:
Whether the presidential veto referred to the entire section or merely to the imposition of 20%
tax on gross receipts of operators or proprietors of restaurants, refreshment parlors, bars and
other eating places which are maintained within the premises or compound of a hotel, motel or
rest houses.
Ruling:
We agree with then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza and his associates that inclusion of
hotels, motels and rest houses in the 20% caterer's tax bracket are "items" in themselves within
the meaning of Sec. 20(3), Art. VI of the 1935 Constitution which, therefore, the President has
the power to veto. An "item" in a revenue bill does not refer to an entire section imposing a
particular kind of tax, but rather to the subject of the tax and the tax rate. In the portion of a
revenue bill which actually imposes a tax, a section identifies the tax and enumerates the
persons liable therefor with the corresponding tax rate. To construe the word "item" as referring
to the whole section would tie the President's hand in choosing either to approve the whole
section at the expense of also approving a provision therein which he deems unacceptable or
veto the entire section at the expense of foregoing the collection of the kind of tax altogether.
The evil which was sought to be prevented in.

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 CASE DIGEST NUMBER 12
Gonzales vs. Macaraig Jr.
G.R. No. 87636, November 19, 1990

Facts:
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General
Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items
included in the proposed budget submitted by the President. Congress presented the said Bill to
the President for consideration and approval. On 29 December 1988, the President signed the
Bill into law, and declared the same to have become Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven
(7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed.

In February 1989, the Senate, in the same Resolution No. 381 mentioned at the outset that the
veto by the President of Section 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without
any force and effect; hence, the aforesaid Section 55 remains. This Petition for Prohibition/
Mandamus was filed, with a prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of
Section 55, and seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing Rep. Act No. 6688. No
Restraining Order was issued by the Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution.

Ruling:
Notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of
any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the President’s veto power as previously
defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso
merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the
subject of a separate veto. But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the
executive power to veto, 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) are not provisions in the
budgetary sense of the term as stated in Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution.
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to
some "particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this
requirement. Consequently, Section 55 (FY ‘89) and Section 16 (FY ‘90) although labeled as
"provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the
purpose of the President’s veto power.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this
Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
 CASE DIGEST NUMBER 13
Senate vs. Ermita
GR 169777, April 20, 2006
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that the President has committed grave abuse of
powers by issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other
Purposes”last September 28, 2005. Petitioners pray for its declaration as void for being
unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation. The public hearing was
sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. But there
are some officials that weren’t able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as
provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
Issue:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section
2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress,
valid and constitutional?
Ruling:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order
No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers,
Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation under the Constitution, and For Other
Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.

CASE DIGEST NUMBER 14

BENGZON vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
G.R. No. 89914, November 20, 1991

Facts:
Petitioners filed for a prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief from the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from requiring herein
petitioners to testify and produce evidence related to the latter’s inquiry on the sale of equity of
Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez to the Lopa Group. In the aforementioned case, Romualdez is
accused of various acts of corruption and embezzlement of funds, which were supposedly
hidden through various corporations. On Sept. 13 1988, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile in his privilege
speech called upon to look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with
regard to RA No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners contend that the
order of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee for them to testify is not within its jurisdiction or
legislative purpose, and is in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights.
Respondent Committee on the other hand claims that the court cannot inquire into the motives
of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations under the doctrine of separation of
powers.

Issue:
WON the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee has a valid legislative purpose in requiring the
petitioners to attend said inquiries and testify concerning the said case.

Ruling:

No. SC ruled that the Committee cannot require herein petitioners to participate and
answer questions as the law states that the power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations
is specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also
extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.
In this case, It appears that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not
really "in aid of legislation" because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the
President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature.

NOTE:
 WON the SC has jurisdiction to review the motives of lawmakers in conducting
legislative investigations.

Yes. SC ruled that while it is true that each branch of government has their own distinct
set of roles and responsibilities, it does not follow that the distinctions between the branches are
intended for them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The purpose of
the principle of checks and balances is to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. The Court has provided that the allocation of constitutional
boundaries is a task which the judiciary must perform under the Constitution.

CASE DIGEST NUMBER 15

Lorenzo Shipping v Distribution Management Association of the Philippines
G.R. No. 155849, August 31, 2011
Facts:
A Letter-Resolution was issued by Maritime Industry Authority on the 4 th of June 2001,
advising the respondent that a computation of the required freight rate adjustment by MARINA
was no longer required for freight rates officially considered or declared deregulated in
accordance with the Memorandum. The petitioners brought this special civil action for contempt
or indirect contempt of court against the respondents, insisting that the publication of the Sea
Transport Update constituted indirect contempt of court of penalty, unjustly and baselessly
insinuating that the petitioners were privy to some illegal act, and worse, that the publication
unfairly debased the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Did the statements contained in the Sea Transport Update constitute or amount to
indirect contempt of court?
Ruling:
Contempt of Court is defined as the willful disregard or disobedience of a public
authority. It is the interruption or disobedience or the presence of insolent language as to disturb
the proceedings or impair the due of such body. The petitioners failed to present the whole
publication of the Sea Transport Update constituted that was allegedly constituting the acts that
are to be punishable as indirect contempt of court.
The phrases are not as critical of the Court and how fast the resolutions in the previous case
were issued, or as inciting DMAP’s members to defy the resolutions. The test for criticizing a
judge’s decision is, therefore, whether or not the criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and
does not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Viewed through the prism of the test, the
Sea Transport Update was not disrespectful, abusive, or slanderous, and did not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. Thereby, the respondents were not guilty of indirect contempt of
court.

The power to punish for contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its inherent power in order to
retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. WHEREFORE,
the petition for indirect contempt is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.

CASE DIGEST NUMBER 16

Romero II vs. Estrada
G.R. No. 174105, April 2, 2009

Facts:

Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc.,
were invited on an investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The said investigation will aid
the Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic Act 8042 other known as the
Migrant Workers Act.

Issue:

Whether the Senate Committee’s inquiry is sub judice to the subject raised at hand?

Ruling:

YES. The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is
not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

CASE DIGEST NUMBER 17

Neri vs Senate

G.R. No. 180643, September 4, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Neri appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about 11 hours
on matters concerning the National Broadband Project. Petitioner disclosed that then
COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He narrated that he informed President Arroyo of the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on discussions relating to
the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer invoking "executive privilege." Respondent Committees
persisted in knowing Neri’s answers to their 3 questions by requiring him to appear and testify
once more but they found Neri’s explanations unsatisfactory. Neri was cited in contempt of
respondent Committees and his arrest and detention was ordered until his appearance and
testimony. Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by
executive privilege?

Ruling:

Yes, the communications elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive
privilege. The Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the petitioner to answer the three questions
asked during the Senate inquiry because the information sought by the three questions are
properly covered by the presidential communications privilege, and executive privilege was
validly claimed by the President, through the Executive Secretary. Considering the elements of
presidential communications privilege: (1) the communications relate to a quintessential and
non-delegable power of the President; (2) the communications were received by a close advisor
of the President, Secretary Neri being a member of the Cabinet and by virtue of the proximity
test, he is covered by executive privilege; and (3) there was no adequate showing by the
respondents of the compelling need for the information as to justify the limitation of the privilege,
nor was there a showing of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

CASE DIGEST NUMBER 18

Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks
G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007

Facts:
On February 1, 2005, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice Chairperson of the respondent,
delivered a privilege speech denouncing petitioner SCB-Philippines for selling unregistered
foreign securities in violation of the Securities and Regulations Code (RA No. 8799) and urging
the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the
occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity in the future. Prior to this he introduced P.S.
(Philippine Senate) Resolution No. 166 which did directed the respondent to do the
aforementioned inquiry.
In response to the invitation for the initial hearing, petitioner through counsel submitted a
letter that stressed there were already cases pending in court allegedly involving the same
issues subject of the inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of the
respondent to continue with the inquiry.
 Issue(s):
W/N an inquiry in aid of legislation could investigate an issue that was already taken in
cognizance by the courts without encroaching upon the judicial powers of said courts.

Ruling:
Yes. In citing Bengzon Jr. vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to strengthen their position
that issue of WON SCB-Philippines illegally sold unregistered foreign securities is already
preempted by the courts that took cognizance of the issue, the respondent, by this
investigation, would encroach upon the judicial powers vested solely in these courts,
THEIR ARGUMENT IS MISPLACED(emphasis by me )

Central to the Courts ruling in Bengzon, the SBRC was without any constitutional
mooring (constitutional support) to conduct the legislative investigation, was the courts
determination that the intended inquiry was not in aid of legislation. The Court found out that
the speech of Senator Enrile, which sought investigation contained no suggestion of any
contemplated legislation(this was the reason they stopped it); it merely called upon the Senate
to look into possible violations of Section 5, RA No. 3019.
In contrast, PS Resolution No. 166 is explicit on the subject and nature of the inquiry to
be and already being conducted by the respondent Committee, as found in the last three
whereas clauses thereof:
1. Existing laws including the Securities Regulation Code seem to be inadequate
2. The regulatory intervention by the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) and BSP
(Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) likewise appears inadequate
3. There is a need for remedial legislation to address the situation.

This fallacy (their argument) is made more glaring when we consider that at the
conclusion of his privilege speech, Senator Enrile urged the Senate to immediately conduct an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, as to prevent the occurrence of a similar fraudulent activity
in the future.
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or a quasi-
judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Surely, the
exercise of sovereign legislative authority, of which the power if legislative inquiry is an essential
component, cannot be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative investigation. As stated
in Arnault vs Nazareno; “A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence
of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.
(This is the purpose of the inquiries and in this case the reason why the Senate is investigating
the case).
PETITION, MANIFESTATION and MOTION DENIED for being moot and academic.
 CASE DIGEST NUMBER 19
Akbayan vs Aquino
G.R. No. 170516 July 16, 2008
Facts:
Petitioners, Congressman Tanada and Aguja filed House Resolution No. 551 for the
inquiry of the bilateral trade agreements. Herein respondent, Undersecretary Aquino, Chairman
of the Philippine Coordinating Committee, to further study and negotiate the proposed JPEPA,
and to furnish the Committee with a copy of the latest draft. However, Usec. Aquino did not
heed the request. But Usec. Aquino assured the Congressmen that they shall be provided with
copy of the JPEPA once the negotiations are completed and as soon as a thorough legal review
of the proposed agreement has been conducted.
Congressman Herminio G. Teves, requested Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita to furnish it
with all documents on the subject including the latest draft of the proposed agreement, the
requests and offers etc. Respondent Ermita had the same response. Congressman Aguja also
requested respondents Neri and Abon to furnish a copy but the respondents averred that they
have no copy of the draft and the respondents were certain that Usec. Aquino shall provide
them with the draft once the negotiations are finalized.
Petition for mandamus and prohibition was filed by the petitioners, as congresspersons, citizens
and taxpayers, requesting respondents to submit to them the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
Petitioner emphasize that the refusal of the government to disclose the said agreement violates
their right to information on matters of public concern and of public interest. That the non-
disclosure of the same documents undermines their right to effective and reasonable
participation in all levels of social, political and economic decision making.
Respondent herein invoke executive privilege. They relied on the ground that the matter sought
involves a diplomatic negotiation then in progress, thus constituting an exception to the right to
information and the policy of full disclosure of matters that are of public concern like the JPEPA.
That diplomatic negotiation are covered by the doctrine of executive privilege.
Issue:
Whether the information sought by the petitioners are of public concern and are still covered by
the doctrine of executive privilege.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court Ruled that diplomatic negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged
in this jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It bears emphasis,
however, that such privilege is only presumptive. For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a
type of information as privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all
instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the claim is made may it be
determined if there is a public interest that calls for the disclosure of the desired information,
strong enough to overcome its traditionally privileged status.
The court adopted also the doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus, Wherein petitioners were seeking
information from the President’s representatives on the state of the then on-going negotiations
of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing that “secrecy
of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom
of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information.

CASE DIGEST NUMBER 20

Gudani vs Senga
G.R. No. 170165 August 15, 2006
Facts:
Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFT to appear at a public
hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security. The hearing was
scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections, particularly allegations of
massive cheating and the audio excerpt phone conversation between President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgillio Garcillano. Petitioners were
designated in the maintenance of peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of
Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan (petitioners), and AFP Chief of
Staff Senga were among invited. Gen. Senga unable to attend but nonetheless issued a
Memorandum noting Petitioners to attend the hearing. By the time petitioners have departed
Baguio for Manila, A message transmitted to the PMA Superintendent from Gen. Senga stating,
“Per instructions of her excellency PGMA, no AFP personnel shall appear before any
congressional or senate hearing without her approval. Inform BGEN Gudani and LTC Balutan
accordingly”. Nonetheless, Both Petioners were present as the hearing started, and they both
testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections. Petitioners seek annulment of a directive from
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enjoining them and other military officers from testifying
before Congress without the Presidents Consent.
Issue:
Whether or not the President has authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
Ruling:
Yes, Section 18, Article VII, The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines. As Commander-in-Chief, absolute authority over the persons and
actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President
to restrict travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be
sanctioned under civilian law. By virtue of her power, and that as a consequence a military
officer who defies such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any
chamber of congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against
the consent of the president has adequate remedies under law to compel such
attendance. Any military official whom congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the president may
be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final
judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the president has the duty to
faithfully execute.
The Court ruled, that the president could not impose a blanket prohibition barring executive
officials from testifying before Congress without the President’s consent notwithstanding the
invocation of executive privilege to justify such prohibition. Should neither branch yield to the
other branch’s assertion, the constitutional recourse is to the courts, as the final arbiter of the
dispute. It is only the courts that can compel, with conclusiveness, attendance or not-attendance
in legislative inquiries. Petitioners testified before the senate despite an order from their
commanding officer and their commander-in-chief for them not to do so, in contravention of the
traditions of military discipline which we affirm today. The issues raised by petitioners could
have very well been raised and properly adjudicated if the proper procedure was observed.
Petitioners could have been appropriately allowed to testify before the senate without having to
countermand their commander-in-chief and superior officer. Wherefore, the petition is denied