Modernity and Authority in The Political Thought of Jouvenel PDF

THE SENSITIVE CITIZEN:
MODERNITY AND AUTHORITY IN THE

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF
BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL
Du Contract Social de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, precede d'un essai sur

la politique de Rousseau. (Geneve: Les Editions Du Cheval Aile,
1947).
Power, The Natural History of Its Growth. Translated by J. F.
Huntington. Preface by D. W. Brogan (London: Hutchinson,
1948).
Problems of Socialist England. Translated by J. F. Huntington. (Lon-
don: Batchworth Press, 1949).
The Ethics of Redistribution. (England: Cambridge University
Press, 1951).
Sovereignty, An Inquiry into the Political Good. Translated by J. F.
Huntington. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).
The Pure Theory of Politics. (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963).
The Art of Conjecture. ( New York: Basic Books, 1967).
Arcadie: Essais sur le Mieux-Vivre. (Paris: SEDEIS, 1968).
Du Principat: et Autres Reflexions Politiques. (Paris: Hachette,
1972).'
We are not merely, or even mainly, a thinking machine. We are a

sensitive organism. The joys of the mind are experienced by only
a few; is that a good reason to regard them as superior? I think
not! I think the more important experiences are those of our affec-
tive nature and that its right cultivation will come to be regarded
as the most important part of education.
Bertrand de Jouvenel, "Toward a Political Theory of Education".
"C'est la chaine des sentiments qui ont marque la succession de
mon titre."
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions
* While an extensive bibliography of Jouvenel's writings is appended to this

essay, two important articles complement the above books: "Authority: The Effi-
cient Imperative," Nomos I- Authority (New York, 1959) and "A Discussion of
Freedom," Cambridge Journal, September, 1953.
2 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
J ean-Jacques Rousseau claimed to understand the nature and lim-

itations of modern political institutions more clearly than any of his
contemporaries. Yet, we are aware that Rousseau's writings were
often ignored, derided, or censured in his own time and since have
often been either misunderstood or neglected.
We should not be surprised, therefore, to discover Rousseau's
contemporary disciple, Bertrand de Jouvenel, suffers from a similar
neglect and misunderstanding. Despite his seventeen books and over
two hundred articles, only two commentaries have been devoted to
his writings in this country and both are isolated chapters , in works
of broader focus. , The French commentaries by Gur, Touchard,
and Pisier either were written too early to grasp the breadth of Jou -
venel's accomplishment or simplify his purposes, thereby distorting
his teaching. 2 Mlle. Pisier, for instance, gives no attention to Jou-
venel's concern for future conditions. Carl Slevin, 3 on the other
hand, devotes himself to careful analysis of Jouvenel's understand-
ing of economics and technology at the expense of the philosophic
basis of Jouvenel's teaching. Apparently the few commentaries to
date have been either too brief or too narrow to capture the essence
of Jouvenel's teaching.
Moreover, it is unfortunate that Jouvenel's writings have been
so generally neglected by American political scientists, for he writes
from the perspective of the sensitive citizen participating in all of
the nuances of political order, and so his writing spans not only po-
litical philosophy but economics, history of ideas, sociology, and
anthropology as well. Works like On Power and Sovereignty, tracing
the origins and dangers of absolutism whether monarchic or demo-
cratic are now in paperback and widely circulated. But they seldom
seem seriously studied. More recent works like The Art of Conjec-
ture or The Pure Theory of Politics have remained in relative ob-
i See Roy Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought (Oxford University

Press, 1966) Chapter 7 and Dante Germino, Beyond Ideology (New York: the
Macmillan Company, 1968) Chapter 7.
2
See Andre Gur, "Bertrand de Jouvenel ou le rove politique d'une generation"
in Melanges Paul E. Martin (Geneva, 1961); Jean Touchard, Histoire des hides
politiques, Vol. II (Paris, 1962); Evelyn Pisier, Autorite et libertd clans les ecrits
politiques de Bertrand de Jouvenel and her somewhat modified argument in "Les
idees politiques de Bertrand de Jouvenel" Revue Politique et Parlementaire,
April 1972, pp. 29-42.
3
Carl Slevin, "Social Change and Human Values: A Study of the Thought of
Bertrand de Jouvenel," Political Studies, Vol XIX, No. I, pp. 49-62.
MODERNITY AND AUTHORITY IN BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL 3
scurity. Jouvenel's earliest studies of the relation of politics and eco-

nomics, Economie Dirigee, Problems of Socialist England, or The
Ethics of Redistribution, are almost unobtainable; while his most
recent research in futurist studies, now compiled in two sets of essays
Du Principat and Arcadie, have not been translated from the French
and have been completely neglected.
Perhaps because of this breadth of interest and concern, Jouven-
el's writings have prompted his few commentators to quite diverse
and often conflicting judgments on his purposes and principles. He
has variously been accused of aristocratic leanings, a liberal infatu-
ation with progress, Hobbesian tendencies, conservative bias, a ro-
mantic yearning for the past, and a behavioral oversimplification
of politics. 4
Before turning directly to Jouvenel, however, it will be appro-
priate to speak briefly of Jean-Jacques Rousseau whom Jouvenel
consistently refers to as "my greatest teacher." 5
ROUSSEAU AND JOUVENEL
At the height of the Enlightenment, when progress, reason, in-

finite perfectibility were watch-words in the Academy, Rousseau
shocked and angered his contemporaries by painting a pessimistic
picture of modern society sinking into despotism. The Enlighten-
ment, he argued, was blind to the real dynamics of political life
leading to despotism because it was blind to the dynamics of man
himself. The classics focused upon reason as the essential determi-
nant of man. Following Hobbes, Rousseau perceived that reason and
speech arose late in the evolution of man and had to be preceded by
more basic impulses. Thus the moderns were correct in seeking the
basic components of man through intellectual schemes like State of
Nature. But, these same moderns, Hobbes and Locke especially,
4 For each accusation, see in order Richard Weaver, Commonweal August 19,
f
1949; Willmoore Kendall, The Conservative Af irmation, (Chicago: Henry Reg-
nery, 1963); Robert Macpherson, Political Quarterly, 1967; Dennis Brogan, New
York Times, December 6, 1957; Hans Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958); and Roger Masters, Yale Review, October,
1964.
6 See Jouvenel's "Essai Sur la politique de Rousseau" as well as the essays
"Rouseau's Theory of the Forms of Government" and "Rousseau the Pessimistic
Evolutionary" in Du Principat. Compare to Jouvenel's own essay on the Evolution
of the Forms of Government. Finally see Power pp. 247; 270-271; Sovereignty,
pp. 94 and 114; and "A Discussion of Freedom," p. 113.
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
failed in their attempt when they attributed to man in his natural

state attitudes and behavior which could only arise from long social
experience. To the classics, virtue was natural, that is in keeping with
the essence of man. To the moderns, vice was natural; pride,
avarice, cunning, and material self-interest were seen as essential,
i.e. natural, to man. In opposition to both, Rousseau claims to show
us the real man for the first time-a man without vice and without
virtue. In seeking the "most basic movements of the simple soul,"
Rousseau is led to the instincts and the sentiments. Neither reason
nor aggression, but moderate self-preservation and natural pity mark
the character of the human animal.
Rousseau pushes the secular and individualist principles of mod-
ern political philosophy to their limit. Thus Rousseau represents
both a summit and a crisis in modern political philosophy, for he
presents man without a fixed nature, acting upon his affections. His
essence would be his liberty. Yet, man, whose essence is freedom, is
presently enslaved. How has this transition occurred; what is its
remedy? Rousseau responds at one time by tracing the evolution
from primitive savage to citizen. At other times he traces the evolu-
tion of customs, mores, and society itself; while still other times he
follows the evolution of the forms of government in both theory and
in practice. Whatever route his analysis follows one position re-
mains constant for Rousseau. All social order is conventional. "So-
cial order is a right-a sacred right, which serves as the basis for all
other rights; it does not, that is to say, flow from force. Yet it does not
flow from nature either. It therefore rests upon agreements." 6
From the conventionality of all political order, two difficulties
emerge. Which regime is the best, that is to say, which form of con-
vention is most in keeping with man's freedom. Since Rousseau be-
lieves in a natural decline of regimes from their foundation in liber-
ty to their ultimate collapse in tyranny, in the long run all regimes
are inadequate. To reconcile personal liberty and political authority
in the short run, Rousseau considers two possibilities, one on the
level of the small city in the Social Contract, the other on the level
of the individual caught in the large state in the Emile. Both possi-
bilities stress the disorder of the large nation and both underscore
the necessity of the return to the small and natural community.
6 Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter I.

Rousseau's political philosophy may, then, be said to have two

fundamental teachings, one about man which is optimistic, the other
about society which is highly pessimistic. In each of these teachings,
Bertrand de Jouvenel is "consciously" the disciple of Rousseau. Sov-
ereignty, which is the best single exposition of Jouvenel's teachings,
concludes with this admission: "The idea here advanced is not new,
it is fundamental to Rousseau's Social Contract. Even this genius,
however, failed to make it understood. Chastened by this example,
let us spare no trouble in stressing it. "7
With the publication of Sovereignty, Jouvenel paraphrased
Rousseau's critique of both modern and classical political philos-
ophy. "We reject utterly both these theories-domination from with-
out and voluntary association; our own theory is that of an associa-
tion brought about by the summons of man."8 Thus, he is led to
argue "working upon men's affections is characteristic of Politics." 9
While the faculty of reason "may lie relatively unused in the ma-
jority of a people," Jouvenel1 writes "there is not a man anywhere
who is incapable of emotion." 0
Paralleling Rousseau's search for the most basic movements of
the simple soul, Jouvenel proposes in The Pure Theory of Politics
"to seek out in the complexity of Politics those elements which are
simple and present semper et ubique." 11 This smallest identifiable
component of politics is found to be "the action of speech upon
deed' ' the "moving of man by man." Jouvenel laments that political
scientists have rarely studied this most basic phenomenon and there-
by have drastically undervalued the role of the group in politics.
They were the rare spirits, the Rousseaus and the Jeffersons .. .
they know the real man, who needs warmth, comradeship, the team
spirit, and can make noble sacrifices for his side. The machine
whose foundations are laid in empirical psychology can make the
pretensions of political philosophy look meaningless and ridicu-
lous. 12
In On Power Jouvenel reiterates and clarifies this starting point:
7 Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty, pp. 302-3.

8 Ibid, p. 29.
9 Bertrand de Jouvenel, The Pure Theory of Politics, p. 53.
19 Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power, p. 273.
11 Pure Theory, p. 10.
12 On Power, pp. 270-71.
This twofold misconception of basing social order either on en-

lightened self-interest or on repressive constraint is due to defective
observation.
Neither the most far-sighted calculations nor fear of punishment
determines to any marked extent the conduct of man in the con-
crete, either in what he does or in what he refrains from doing.
His actions are governed by feelings and13beliefs which dictate to
him his behavior and inspire his impulses.
With one exception to be noted below, Jouvenel appears to be in
complete agreement with Rousseau's teaching on both man and so-
ciety. Concerning man, Jouvenel and Rousseau both: (1) criticize
the classical view of man as aristocratically biased in claiming reason
to be the nature of man, (2) express admiration for the achievements
of Hobbes, yet both reject Hobbes's bourgeois possessiveness as so-
cially conditioned and not belonging to the essence of man, (3)
elevate the affective drives of man above the rational, and so (4)
seem ultimately to identify the essence of man as freedom or liberty.
Concerning the evolution of society, Jouvenel and Rousseau both:
(1) perceive a movement or more properly an evolution of society
from liberty to slavery, from better to worse, (2) pessimistically pre-
dict a natural tendency to despotism (tyranny in Rousseau, Caesar-
ism or the Principat in Jouvenel), (3) attack the Utopian hopes of
their contemporaries as intellectual disorder leading to further po-
litical disorder, (4) move from a recognition that man's essence is
liberty to a belief that the fundamental problem for political philos-
ophy is the question of authority: why anyone should obey any po-
litical decision?, and finally, (5) display attachment to the small ru-
ral community and seek a tentative resolution of the tension between
authority and liberty within such a setting.
BEYOND ROUSSEAU: THE NATURE OF FREEDOM
Jouvenel's one major break with Rousseau occurs over the na-
ture of liberty. As he often notes, "liberty is what the West upholds.
But Western minds are far from agreeing on the content of liber-
ty." 14 Our analysis of Jouvenel's thought begins with his attempt to
clarify the content of liberty. For this purpose, careful consideration
of Sovereignty and the essay "A Discussion of Freedom" are indis-
pensable.
13Ibid, p. 367.
14 Bertrand de Jouvenel, "A Discussion of Freedom," Cambridge Journal (Sep-
tember, 1953) p. 707. See also Sovereignty, p. 247.
In both works Jouvenel attacks two common misconceptions

about liberty. The first arises in the view of liberty developed by
Hobbes and Spinoza and unfortunately shared by the majority of
citizens today. 15 This view equates the extent of a person's liberty
with the reach of his power. This "geometric view" of liberty likens
the individual to "a small sovereign state which has . . . its own do-
16
minion."
Jouvenel vehemently rejects this equation of liberty with power.
Freedom from impediment is not liberty. Rather, "the striving here
represented against limits is properly the striving of man's will to
power" and "anyone who understands Liberty in these terms has no
true understanding of Liberty." 17 In Sovereignty, Jouvenel refers to
this desire of every man for addition to his power as "the story of
human imperialism."
Not only is the Hobbesian teaching false, it is also dangerous.
Hobbes' teachings about man's will to power are utilized by Jouvenel
to emphasize a "serious lesson for our Western democracies," a les-
son about liberty. "To the entire extent to which progress develops
hedonism and moral relativism, to which individual liberty is con-
ceived as the right of man to obey his appetites, nothing but the
strongest of powers can maintain society in being. "18
This geometric misconception of liberty rests upon a view of
man as a-social and isolated in his essential condition. Jouvenel, in
contrast, has always argued that "man is an animal made for life in
society.... In general we behave as good neighbors and scrupulous
cooperators, for that to us is second nature." 19 His belief in the so-
ciability of man marks once again Jouvenel's break with Rousseau
and leads him to attack the second misconception about liberty.
"The 'isolated' man is not a natural phenomenon but a product
of intellectual abstraction . . . groups as secondary phenomena re-
sulting from a synthesis of individuals is a wrong approach; they "29
should be regarded as primary phenomena of human existence.
Consciously and carefully, Jouvenel separates himself from Rous-
seau on this one point. Singling out the first literary model held up
15 Sovereignty p. 243.
16 "A Discussion of Freedom," p. 709.
17 Ibid, p. 715 and Sovereignty p. 259.
18 Sovereignty, p. 246.
19 On Power p. 367, and Sovereignty pp. 28, 56, 57, 260; Pure Theory of Poli-
tics pp. 45 and if. and The Art of Conjecture p. 9.
20 Pure Theory, p, 44.
THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
to young Emile, Jouvenel responds, "man is no Robinson Crusoe,

not even within his four walls." 21 First in Sovereignty and later at
great length in The Pure Theory of Politics, Jouvenel specifically
rejects Rousseau's formulation of natural freedom in Book One of
the Social Contract:
The famous battle-cry, "Man is born free" is the greatest non-

sense. . . . Man is in essence an heir entering on the accumulated
heritage of past generations. . . . It is a major folly of modern times
to fill the individual with ideas of what society owes to him rather
than of22what he owes to society. The wise man knows himself for
debtor.
Rousseau's conception of natural liberty or autonomy cannot be re-

jected without also implicitly rejecting Rousseau's later preservation
of that liberty in the General Will. The General Will, like natural
liberty, is an intellectual abstraction and a dangerous one. "Liberty is
not our more or less illusory participation in the absolute sovereignty
of the social whole over the parts; it is, rather, the direct, immediate,
and concrete sovereignty of man over himself, the thing which allows
and compels him to unfold his personality, gives him mastery over
and responsibility for his destiny. "23 The illusion of absolute liber-
ty and its social counterpart, the General Will, are actually more dan -
gerous to true liberty than is Hobbes's self-interested possessiveness.
Jouvenel sees in this intellectual abstraction of Rousseau the foun-
dation of totalitarianism:
It is psychologically necessary to successful totalitarianism that man

feels himself a mere part, whereas Hobbesian man feels himself
most vividly a whole. Totalitarian man centers his affections on
something outside of himself, at the center of gravity of the social
body. But whom do we find advocating a displacement of this
kind? The author of The Social Contract, not the Leviathan. 24
Despite this rejection of the General Will and natural liberty,
Jouvenel assumes that the basic principles and insights of Rousseau's
political philosophy are permanently valid. He pictures Rousseau
presenting his readers with two kinds of liberty and two kinds of
dependence. According to Rousseau, there exists the natural or ab-
21 "A Discussion Freedom," p. 715.
22 Sovereignty pp. 261-2.
23 Power p. 317.
24 Sovereignty p. 238 see also Power pp.. 248 and if. See also the analysis of
Talmon and Chapman.
MODERNITY AND AUTHORITY IN BERTRAND DE JOUVENEI. 9
solute liberty of the animal in the state of nature and the social or
moral liberty of man in society. The first rests solely upon the in-
stincts of self-preservation and natural pity. The second depends
upon man's formulating his own actions, "obeying only himself" in
the words of The Social Contract. Rousseau's two forms of depen-
dence are summarized in the Emile as "one upon things, which is
natural, and the other upon men, which is social. Dependence upon
things, implying no moral relations, detracts nothing from freedom."
But, dependence upon others destroys freedom.
In somber fact a man is never free from obligations, but some

he appreciates himself and some are formulated for him by a
superior in power. He is free in so far as the formulator of his 25
obligations is none other than himself. Herein resides his dignity.
The substitution of social indebtedness for absolute liberty, oc-
curs in all of Jouvenel's writings. 26 This movement beyond Rous-
seau does not deny social liberty, quite the contrary, it focuses our
attention upon it. For example, in part II of The Pure Theory of
Politics, Jouvenel begins by tersely reiterating that "man is not born
free but dependent," 27 and then deduces five axioms about man in
society that form the focus of his writings for the past fifteen years.
Since the individual begins life in a condition of dependence, he
must also begin his actions in a "previously structured environ-
ment." Thus Jouvenel's first two axioms become: (1) "Man is born
dependent" and (2) "man operates in a structured environment."
Yet man's moral or social freedom, that is the freedom to form his
own obligations and actions, is also real. Therefore, (3) "that man
is free is an unquestioned axiom." And this social freedom intimates
or infers a fourth axiom: (4) "Man is susceptible to promptings."
Man's social freedom is rooted in his affective nature which links him
to others and allows him to effect social change through concerted
action. In this sense, only the future "is a field of liberty and
power." Thus Jouvenel is led to his final axiom: (5) "Man is forward
looking. "28
25 Ibid, p. 262 and Power p. 317 Jouvenel fully accepts Rousseau's positions on
social freedom and the two forms of dependence. Indeed .he opens his essay "A
Discussion of Freedom" by quoting approvingly the previous passage from Emile.
26 For instance see Pure Theory of Politics pp. 44 and if., Sovereignty p. 262,
and "A Discussion of Freedom" p. 716.
27 Pure Theory, p. 45 and following.
2
8 For greater elaboration of axioms 4 and 5 see The Art of Conjecture, p. 5
and following.
In light of these axioms Jouvenel's theoretical and practical ef-

forts of the past fifteen years become comprehensible. As early as the
publication of Sovereignty, Jouvenel had argued "the essential free-
dom, as I see it, is the freedom to create a gathering, to generate a
group and thereby introduce in society a new power, a source of
movement and change." 20 Clearly, Jouvenel's concerns even at
this date are not simply with the past. Shortly after the publication
of this work, Jouvenel was appointed to the "Group 85 Plan" in
France and later formed the Futuribles Society of which he is now
President. Within this international grouping of social scientists,
each scholar works in his own area of competence, preparing state-
ments about the "possibilities" citizens will have to face in the "fu-
ture." Jouvenel warns us this is neither prophesy nor knowledge.
"We do not regard FUTURIBLES' essays as `end products' but as
fuel for developing discussion of the future. "30
Our label has been chosen with intent: the word "futuribles," bor-
rowed from the sixteenth-century Spanish thinker Luis Molina, re-
membered for his emphasis on free will, associates the two no-
tions of future and possibility: the stressing of possibility is not
meant to reject mere wishful thinking, but, also and mainly, the
assumption that the future is already "given." Our group quite
definitely states the view that what shall be depends upon our
choices: it is precisely because the future depends upon our de-
cisions and actions, and these in turn upon our opinions regarding
the future, that the latter so much need to be stated, weighed, and
tested. 31
Our liberty requires that we be able to exercise choice. Without
forethought and consideration of the future, we become incapable of
acting and, instead, are constantly in the position of reacting in ways
determined by the pressures of the environment that surrounds us.
Such is the teaching of The Art of Conjecture. While differing in
format from Jouvenel's earlier work in the history of ideas and in-
stitutions, books like The Pure Theory of Politics, The Art of Con-
jecture, Du Principat, and Arcadie can be seen as continuing to em-
phasize the need of protecting economic and social liberty by con-
sidering alternatives that will face us in the future. 32 Jouvenel's
3 0 Futuribles, p. X.
1
3 Ibid,p.XI.
32 This would seem to be the aim Jouvenel hopes to accomplish in his present
position as President and Director General of S.E.D.E.I.S.
most recent collection of essays, Du Principat, links analysis of past

development to a consideration of future options and seems to argue
that both concerns are essential if we are to preserve the realm of
action for today's citizens.
Man's liberty may be seen to operate on two different but related
levels. First, there exists the moral or social or political freedom
adopted from Rousseau. Second, there exists an economic liberty,
consisting of each individual's freedom to act in pursuit of his own
material benefits. To exercise this second dimension of his liberty, the
individual must be forward looking, must engage in forecasting.
Jouvenel takes the word forecast literally-to cast ahead or be-
fore. His forecasting is then "an art tied to practical needs." 33 Men
formulate projects, they forecast future conditions and seek to as-
sure the success of their projects by enlisting the strength and sup-
port of other individuals in their projects. Thus economic and moral
liberty constantly interact, for the success of any economic project
requires an appeal to the moral liberty of others. Operating in an
environment previously structured by the projects of others and cur-
rently a meeting ground for other passionate and projecting individ-
uals, success depends not merely upon the stability of the environ-
ment but more directly upon the reception of our project by oth-
ers.
Unfortunately, both economic and moral liberty are diminished
in contemporary society by the growth of massive institutions politi-
cal and corporate, by reliance upon political experts in national
and local decision-making, and by the centralization of power into
fewer and fewer hands. Throughout modern society a monolith is
emerging and freedom is vanishing. In all of Jouvenel's writings, and
especially in those devoted to Rousseau, Jouvenel praises Rous-
seau for being the first to perceive and warn of this threat to liberty:
This dawned upon me many years ago, while studying the Social
Contract, when I found it to be, not a hopeful prescription for a
Republic to come, but a clinical analysis of political deterioration.
In the Social Contract Rousseau offered no recipe for turning the
government of a large and complex society into a democracy: on the
contrary, he offered a demonstration that great numbers and grow-
ing activity of government called for by increasing complexity of
relations, inevitably led to the centralization of political authority
34
in a few hands, which he regarded as the opposite of democracy.
33 Art of Conjecture, p. 128.
34 "Rousseau's Theory of the Forms of Government" in Du Princi pat.
For Jouvenel, this theory of "pessimistic evolution" outlined in

the Discourse on the Origins and Foundations of Inequality Among
Men and in The Social Contract provides the "very core" of Rous-
seau's teaching and has been "almost entirely disregarded." 35 While
praising Rousseau's analysis of the dynamics of power and even ac-
cepting it as his own in the essay "Sur 1'Evolution des formes de
Gouvernement," Jouvenel suggests Rousseau did not satisfactorily
explain "the source from which Power draws the strength necessary
to effect this usurpation. "36 Jouvenel, therefore, proposes to carry
Rousseau's analysis one step further by probing the nature of State
Power and the tactics for dealing with Power's expansive tendency.
This analysis is one of the main accomplishments of On Power37
and of Sovereignty.
THE DISORDER OF MODERNITY
"The history of the West from the time of Europe's fragmenta-

tion into sovereign states shows us an almost uninterrupted advance
in the growth of governmental Power." 38 This growth of state
Power, vividly detailed in On Power, Sovereignty, and most re-
cently in the essay "Du Principat," provides a constant theme and
an unwavering point of reference in Jouvenel 's writings.
The increase in Power has been accompanied by a centralization
of Power into a single head, the principat. Both these tendencies
lead directly to the replacement of the citizen by the expert in polit-
ical and economic decision-making. Thus the individual less and
less initiaties his own projects or forms his own goals. This loss of
mastery or, in truth, loss of liberty arises both as a result of the natu-
ral "egoist" tendency of Power and as a result of our false opinions
about Power. In combination these forces are leading all modern
regimes, parliamentary and presidential as well as oligarchic, toward
what Jouvenel variously terms Caesarism, the social protectorate,
despotism, dictatorship, or most often the "Principat": "principat
est la nom generique que j'ai propose pour designer tous ces regimes
35 Ibid. See also Roger Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau.

30 Power, p. 35.
37 Ibid, footnote 33, Chapter II, p. 386. "Rousseau meant by `prince' the to-
tality of the components of government: It is what is in this book I have called
Power."
38 Ibid, p. 127.
contemporains oil le corps politique se trouve en fait regi par une

setae tete." 39
As he writes toward the close of On Power, "Every people is today
being swept along on the same current though not all at the same
rate towards the social protectorate." 40 Our modern age then wit-
nesses a return of absolute Power masked in democratic and par-
liamentary robes. And, for Jouvenel, it is precisely this hidden na -
ture of our modern regimes which renders them more dangerous
than all earlier forms of absolutism.
Since "the struggle to magnify itself is of Power's essence" at all
ti mes and in all regimes, Jouvenel rejects all simply technological
understandings of modernity while simultaneously recognizing that
belief in the efficacy of technology is a vital component in our con-
temporary misunderstanding of Power. By rejecting any chrono-
logical meaning for modernity, Jouvenel suggests "modernity" must
be understood as a philosophic-political vision of man and of Power.
This modern vision perceives man as both secular and relativist,
while viewing Power as instrumental. Power, it is then argued, be-
comes dangerous only when misguided men seize control. This vision
distorts the true nature of state Power. Moreover, this intellectual
disorder both allows and encourages political disorder by paving the
way for a transfer of responsibility from the individual to the state
and thereby destroying liberty.
"Modernity" appears to possess three dimensions for Jouvenel: a
metaphysical dimension which relativizes good and evil thereby mak-
ing each individual his own measure, 41 an epistemological dimen-
sion which builds utopian and individualized hopes for success upon
this relativism, and a political dimension which leads to either vio-
lence or dictatorship when utopian hopes conflict. Of the three di-
mensions, the first provides Jouvenel with the foundations for the
rest. Moreover, his analysis of the widespread acceptance of this vi-
sion in our time, leads Jouvenel to expose three crises resulting from
modernity and to question the validity of the very principles of mod-
ern political philosophy.
The Intellectual Crisis. In Jouvenel's own words, On Power
3 9 Du Principat, p. 133.
40 Power, p. 353.
41 This view can be found in Plato's Gorgias, see also Eric Voegelin, Plato and
Aristotle, p. 24 and following.
"described the stages in the growth of the public authority" and "it
also noted an attendant phenomenon which may be called the moral
emancipation of public authority." 42 Recognizing that social order
and cohesion were the products of a powerful community of beliefs
during the Middle Ages, Jouvenel looks to the "rationalist crisis" for
the seeds of our current opinion that man is the measure of all
things. While studying the political philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes,
and Spinoza, he asks "can we fail to note the coincidence of the
breakdown of beliefs from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries
with the elevation of absolute monarchies during the same peri-
od." 43 The Cartesian attack upon reason, Hobbes's rejection of stan-
dards of good and evil, Spinoza's attack upon revelation, all led to
the position that man is the measure of all things. Yet, writes Jou-
venel, this is precisely "the capital blunder of our time" to consider
everything, even right and wrong or justice and injustice, to be mat-
ters of opinions:
For once man is declared "the measure of all things" there is no

longer a true, or a good, or a just, but only opinions of equal
validity whose clash can be settled only by political or military
force; and each force in turn enthrones in its hour of triumph44a
true, a good, and a just which will endure just as long as itself.
Modernity as a loss of the absolute induces an intellectual crisis
wherein men recognize no ground from which their order flows.
All becomes rootless and arbitrary. With no recognizable or agree-
able source of human order, individual preference assumes the task
of ordering life. As Thomas Hobbes demonstrates, when individual
preferences collide in such a setting warfare erupts. The intellectual
relativism of the first crisis leads ultimately to political disarray and
the acceptance of violence.
The Spiritual Crisis. Both Power and Sovereignty parallel this
intellectual crisis with a spiritual crisis. Jouvenel details the move-
ment from religious and monarchic sovereignty to popular sover-
eignty at great length. Following the analysis of L'Oyseau, Jouvenel
concedes sovereignty was already "a prodigiously healthy plant" by
1600. The only obstacles to its growth were the three orders of law
derived from Christian writers like Aquinas (the eternal, natural,
and positive or human law). Then, all three forms of law came to
42 Sovereignty, p. XI.
43 Power, p. 211, also p. 308.
44 Ibid, p. 212, also Sovereignty, pp. 290-91.
MODERNITY AND AUTHORITY IN BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, 15
be abrogated by three historical developments: "Irreligion, legal

positivism, and sovereignty of the people." 45 Moreover, irreligion
assisted in enthroning popular sovereignty and so destroying the
final restraints. 46
Freed from religious and moral sanction, popular sovereignty
may give birth "to a more formidable despotism than divine sov-
ereignty." 47 As Jouvenel notes, Thomas Hobbes "does not infer
the unlimited right of Power from the sovereignty of God; he infers
it from the sovereignty of the People." 48 Jouvenel often reiterates
the Hobbesian nature of "modernity." For example, Sovereignty,
written as "a direct sequel to Power," reminds us that "Hobbes re-
jects the notion of Blessedness to be reached by subjection of the
lower appetites to the higher, and substitutes for it that of Felici-
ty." 48 For Hobbes, felicity as we know, consists in the endless pur-
suit of desire after desire that "ceathist only in death." "The vision
of man seen by Hobbes is in essence the modern view, though it is
seldom that things are now put as brutally as this." 60 In Hobbes'
understanding man is the measure of his own good and it follows
that he is "will to power-a will which becomes ever more aggres-
51
sive."
The vast majority who accept Hobbes's relativism and natural-
ism attempt to make their position more palatable by arguing that
skepticism and relativism lead to toleration. Jouvenel strikingly ar-
gues to the contrary that such toleration is typically the effect of
skepticism in the intellectual who takes no active part in the man -
agement of the state and not its effect in the man of action. "In the
man of action, moral relativism and skepticism as to the absolute
and universal value of his principles are no obstacle to fanatical be-
lief in their immediate value as regards his own clan at the actual
moment; they do not weaken in the least his will to impose his prin-
52
ciples."
46 Power, p. 33. "Merely by taking away from the three following expressions
the first one-God the author of Power, the people who confer Power, the rulers
who receive it and exercise it. It is affirmed, after this abstraction, that Power
belongs to society in full fee simple and is then conferred by it alone on its rulers.
That is the theory of Popular Sovereignty."
47 Ibid, p.42.
48 Ibid, p. 33.
50 Ibid, p. 234 and 243.
51 Ibid, p.235.
52 Ibid, p. 289. -
Thus, the intellectual and spiritual crises of modernity comple-

ment one another and produce of necessity a political crisis wherein
men act fanatically and often irrationally in the pursuit of goals
whose value we are not even allowed to discuss for each individual is
judge of his own good. In this relativist vision, we are now subjected
not to Crusades or Inquisitions but to the rampaging "desires of our
nature" and since our nature is regarded as essentially carnal these
53
desires become "dreams of the flesh."
The Political or Historical Crisis.
Let no man think that the democratic character of the group is

preserved because those who will and act are representatives. What
is done by the representative is not done by the represented, who
just because he does not do it and carries none of the burdens
and responsibilities, has no democratic activity. Rousseau was right
in denying that the people can be represented. Democracy 54
exists to
the extent that the individual has a hand in what is done.
Power, that is the institutions of Government, has a natural ten-
dency to grow and increase. A natural society, according to Jouvenel,
would be quite small, tribal or familial perhaps. The large societies
of today result "not from the instinct of association, but from that
of domination." "Conquest and nothing but conquest gives birth to
large formations." J5 Paralleling St. Augustine, Jouvenel claims the
modern state "is in essence the result of the successes achieved by a
band of brigands who superimpose themselves on small distinct so-
cieties." 56
Now the citizen does not often view his government in such a
harsh and glaring light. That, says Jouvenel, is precisely the trouble.
With the intellectual assent of popular sovereignty, we, that is the
modern citizens, have come to believe that the institutions of gov-
ernment are beneficially serving our interests. Moreover, Jouvenel
warns, governmental Power "expands under cover of the beliefs en-
5
tertained about it." 7
As early as The Problems of Socialist England, Jouvenel "casts
light on the crisis of Western democracy, on the problem of power
53 Ibid, p. 292.
54 Problems of Socialist England p. 131 see also essay "Quesque c'est lademo
cratie" in Du Principat, p. 19 and following.
55 Power, p. 99.
56 Ibid, p. 100.
57 Ibid, p. 23.
as its effective exercise passes from the hands of an oligarchy, sub-

ject only to periodical electoral checks, to those of an as yet imper-
fectly educated, and inconsistently motivated, popular majority." 58
The rise of popular government demands that its citizens exhibit
an understanding of the nature and proper function of government.
Unfortunately, this understanding has not arisen and, in fact, shows
few signs of emerging. Instead Jouvenel discovers "a tragic propen -
sity to regard sovereign power as entitled in its own right to do and
take what it pleases so long as it is in competition between political
"59
groups. The modern citizen naively assumes that Power won in
a fair contest will behave fairly as a victor and that such a victorious
Power possesses the absolute right to act as it sees fit. How did this
democratic absolutism arise? And why has it been accepted by the
modern citizen?
In large measure, the political necessity of the First and Second
World Wars, patriotism and the call to action, were used to link
the affective nature of man to large scale planning and machinery
established by the Government. During these crises men and material
fell entirely under the control of the government. Property was tak-
en and consumption was rationed. Through universal conscription,
a man's life could be "given" to and for the state. Extensive use of
these measures, detailed by Jouvenel in Apres la defaite, 00 slowly
gave birth to the misunderstanding that such control was a natural
function of the state-in peace as well as in war. During war these
controls had been justified as necessary for national defense; they
proved to be effective. In peace, this effectiveness became their jus-
tification.
This misunderstanding is "tragic," to use Jouvenel's phrase, for
it leads directly to a loss of liberty both economic and moral. Effec-
tive state planning, even in peace time, requires massive organs in
which "man is more of a passive spectator and less of a participant."
State planning limits decision-making to a select group-the experts;
most citizens serve only as cogs in the plan, turning with it, unable
to direct it. The citizen is no longer involved in political decisions
but rather is acted upon and responds to the decisions of others. He
is, in fact, no longer citizen. To counteract this loss of freedom, all
citizens must exercise responsibility, must have "a hand in what is
58 Problems of Socialist England, p. VII.

50lbid, p. 16.
90 Apr&s la Ddfaite (Paris: 1941)
18 TIE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER
done." Jouvenel seeks not only democratic control, but, more im-
portantly, democratic responsibility. The democratic citizen himself
must decide how planning is to be used.
A concrete example of the tragic results of inadequate under-
standings of state Power, is given in The Ethics of Redistribution,
where Jouvenel focuses upon the common opinons which regard
redistribution of incomes and consumer goods as a "social" and not
a "political" problem. The realignment of income is perceived as an
unqualified social benefit. But what is the effect upon the recipient
of this redistribution? What machinery is required to achieve it?
What coercion will be used to enforce it? Long before the now com-
monplace attacks upon the degrading effects and bureaucratic unre-
sponsiveness of urban welfare systems, Jouvenel sought to "stress
values commonly disregarded in this debate." 61 His main teaching
demonstrates that redistribution is "as much political" as social.
"The more redistribution, the more power to the state." While ad-
miring the sentiments and affections which prompt the movement
toward redistribution, Jouvenel's central concern remains the ef-
fect of redistribution upon our liberty and so he concludes "redis-
tribution is in effect far less a redistribution of free income from the
richer to the poorer, as we imagined, than a redistribution of power
from the individual to the state." 62 It would then seem that our
affections are not always sufficient to preserve our liberty.
In place of examples like redistribution over which one might
agree or disagree, On Power, (1945), often considered Jouvenel's
finest work, traces the intellectual roots of our misconceptions about
Power to the rise of modern political philosophy with Descartes and
Hobbes.
Jouvenel begins with an analysis of two common opinions. The
first opinion believes Power is something good in itself, the creator,
protector, and benefactor of society, establishing harmony wherein
each member can live and develop as he likes. Jouvenel then selects
historical examples to remind his readers that the Power House, the
government, has been the destroyer as well as the creator of the social
63
bond. The cruelist oppression, excessive taxation, senseless vio-
lence, and social dislocation can all frequently be attributed to Pow-
er; and no ruler, whether one, few, or many, is exempt from these
61 Ethics of Redistribution, p. IX.

62 Ibid, p. 73.
63 Power, p. 290.
possibilities. The second opinion views Power as essentially a men-

ace, an evil to be restricted and, if possible, eliminated. Yet, we are
led to see that even the most oppressive and selfish of Powers will be
led "to advance the interests of the community and to pursue social
ends." Jouvenel contends this is a "wholly natural transition" for
Power "must become social to last." 64
The historical study of Power and the logical analysis of Power
both lead to the same conclusion:
We posited at the beginning a Power whose essence was egoist;

we saw it acquire a social nature. We have now reached the posi-
tion of positing a Power whose essence is social and seeing it ac-
quire an egoist nature. This convergence of rational sequences leads
us to the irrational conclusion of the whole matter: in the make-
up of Power in the raw, two natures are necessarily found in as-
sociation. In whatever way and in whatever spirit it has been es-
tablished, Power is neither angel nor brute, but, like man himself,
a composite creature, uniting in itself two contradictory natures. 66
Given Power's composite nature, we can understand why the
illusion that Power is simply benefactor represents the most danger-
ous opinion. "Egoism" is inescapable for Power. 66 Jouvenel never
tires of warning "it is of Power's essence not to be weak," 6 't "the
struggle to magnify itself is of Power's essence." 68
First in On Power and later in Du Principat, Jouvenel warns
that "differences between forms of government in societies and the
changes within the same society are but the accidents" of Power.
What Jouvenel seeks is the commonality-the essential core of Pow-
er. Thus his analysis in On Power consciously breaks off "from in-
quiring into what is the best form of Power-from political ethics-
to ask what is the essence of Power-to construct a political meta-
physic." 6"
Jouvenel chooses for his image of Power the Minotaur: the beast
that devours men. 70 According to classical myth, the Minotaur was a
foul beast born of a queen's adultery. Half man and half bull, the
64 Ibid, p. 110.
86 Ibid, p. 144.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid, p. 11.
68 Ibid, p. 4 see also pp. 135, 137, and 162.
69 Ibid, p. 17.
70 Ibid, p. 4 and following. See also Maurice Duverger, The Idea of Politics,
image of Janus in introduction.
monster was so hideous and so dangerous King Minos hid it away in

a labyrinth built by the architect Daedalus. After Crete's defeat of
Athens, Crete required that Athens regularly send seven of its finest
young men and seven virgins to fulfill the debt. The Athenians were
then sent into the labyrinth where they would encounter the mon-
ster unexpectedly and be devoured. Only Theseus, son of the king of
Athens, was able to find his way in the labyrinth by using a golden
thread. Thus he was able to kill the beast and escape.
The Minotaur is a strange image for State Power; but, Jouvenel
has chosen this image to shock his readers out of their optimistic
illusions about state power. In the Greek myth, the labyrinth masked
the beast and only the man who could find his way in the maze was
safe. Today our opinions mask the true nature of Power. Following
Theseus, Jouvenel hopes to unmask the Minotaur and so lead us safe-
ly through the maze of opinions and away from the jaws of the beast.
Many citizens hold the opinion that evils befall the citizens of a
state only once a power hungry man gains a position of power. But
this is clearly false. All men desire addition to their power. "In every
condition of life and social position a man feels himself more of a
man when he is imposing himself and making others the instru-
ments of his will," that is, writes Jouvenel, "the incomparable plea-
71
sure."
The egoism of Power seems to be matched by an egoism in each
individual. To believe that egoism or violence belong only to mon-
archic or aristocratic power is then a fatal error. The democratic rev -
olutions have not established a new kind of Power but merely trans-
ferred title to the instruments of Power. "We have seen the old Power
cast out. But this revolution has not been followed by Power's dis-
memberment; far from it. What has perished in the upheaval have
been the spiritual authorities which obstructed Power's advance... .
What is called the coming of democracy is really the conveyance of
the established Power to new owners." 72 Again we note the linkage
between the intellectual, spiritual, and political crises of modernity.
Moreover, it would seem that popular sovereignty lies at the root of
all three.
Popular sovereignty, according to Jouvenel, is a myth, and not
an edifying one. "Popular sovereignty may give birth to a more for-
midable despotism than divine sovereignty." 73 Jouvenel laments
71 Ibid, p. 121 and pp. 116-118. See also Sovereignty, p. 259.
72 Ibid, p. 236. also p. 129. See also Du Principat p, 131 and following.
73 Ibid, p.42.
this was not always the case. The democratic principle he contends
was conceived initially as the pragmatic sovereignty of the law but
74
later degenerated into the fictional sovereignty of the people.
It is possible with the help of prudently balanced institutions to

provide everyone with effective safeguards against Power. But, there
are no institutions on earth which enable each separate person to
have a hand in the exercise of Power, for Power is command, and
everyone cannot command. Sovereignty of the people is, therefore,
nothing but a fiction, and one which must in the long run prove
destructive of individual liberties... (for) when once Power is
based on the sovereignty of all, the distrust comes to seem unrea-
sonable and the vigilance pointless: and the limits set on authority
no longer get defended. 75
Here lies the central paradox of modern political institutions.
While proclaiming to advance the liberty of the individual, modern
democratic theory obsfuscates the true nature of state Power and al-
lows for a slow but steady deterioration of that liberty. "If the natu-
ral tendency of Power is to grow, and if it can extend its authority
and increase its resources only at the expense of the notables, it fol-
lows that its ally for all time is the common people. The passion for
absolutism is, inevitably, in conspiracy with the passion for equal-
ity." 76 Thus Jouvenel is often led to defend the notables not in the
sense of a return to Aristocracy and its class privileges but rather
because only the proliferation of sources of authority can create a
situation of social balance that will deter the natural egoist ten-
dencies of Power.
Summation: The Legitimacy Crisis. We have seen the political

crisis and the intellectual crisis are intimately connected in Jouven-
el's understanding of modernity. The point of departure for both
components of modern philosophy, the political in Hobbes and the77
intellectual in Descartes, is the same; both begin with the word "I".
Rejecting Medieval thought in general, modern political philos-
ophy begins with a "fearful and atheistic individualism." Then
by means of an "arbitrary simplification" the diverse and compet-
ing forces in society are dissolved. The sovereign was no longer seen
as one authority among many. Instead of being the crown of a com-
74Ibid, p. 254.
75 Ibid, p.256.
76 Ibid, p. 177 also pp. 185, 187, 188.
plex social edifice, the sovereign became in modern political philos-

ophy the pivot of the edifice. Not only Descartes and Hobbes, but
Locke as well as Pufendorf and even Rousseau, began to think in
these terms. "The idea of an entity completely empowered to regu-
late all behaviors made a resounding entry into political science. It
was the hour of sovereignty in itself ... (and) the least reflection
makes it clear that, once the principle of the unchecked and un-
bounded sovereignty of a human will is admitted, the resulting re-
gime is in substance the same, to whatever person, real or fictive, this
sovereign will is attributed." 78
Jouvenel concludes that the theory of "sovereignty in itself" is
identical with the doctrine of popular sovereignty and is "but a new
version of the 'theories of despotism advanced in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. "79 Jouvenel, then, contends that our mod-
ern democratic theory is fundamentally Hobbesian, and that this
despotism is not being recognized by the modern citizen in the un-
certainty about contemporary theories of law and legitimacy. Here
we find the culmination of the intellectual and political crises in the
crisis of legitimacy.
Law has become rootless or, in Jouvenel's phrase, "ambula-
tory. "80 The,supremacy of law, Jouvenel reminds us, is necessary to
the restraint of Power's egoistic nature. The necessary condition of
this supremacy of law is the existence of a law older than the state.
But, this is precisely what modern political philosophy denies:
The modern problem is here posed for us. When law has ceased
to be a thing in its essential parts untouchable, a thing sustained
by the beliefs held in common by the whole of society, when it
has become, even in respect of fundamental morals, a thing modifi-
able at the pleasure of the legislator, one of two consequences must
follow: either a monstrous spawning of laws at the bidding of every
interest which agitates and of every opinion which stirs, or else
their planned economy by a master who knows his mind and will
drive society to accept
81
whatever rules of conduct he thinks it nec-
essary to prescribe.
When all first principles have been cast into the "melting-pot of
skepticism" and legislative authority reigns "unlimited," where are
the sources of obligation to be found which will provide order and
78 Ibid, pp. 198-99.
79 Ibid.
80 Power, p. 399.
81 Ibid, p. 307.
stability for the citizen? The sensitive citizen knows "the mounting
"82
flood of modern laws does not create law.
THE INTELLECTUAL RESPONSE TO DISORDER
Following his rejection of modernity, Jouvenel is plunged into a

search for the well-ordered structure of society. 83 He offers us no
simple remedy, no quick or easy solution to the disorders of modern-
ity. 84 Rather, Jouvenel's response to modernity entails an appeal
to the modern citizen to return to his basic affections and inclina-
tions if he is to establish a correct social order. This appeal takes the
form of clarifying three distinct areas of our political life: (1) the
various forms and proper functioning of authority, (2) the funda-
mental attractiveness of the small community, and (3) the sub-
stance of the common good. Of the three, the examination of au-
thority best exposes Jouvenel's conception of man and thus supplies
a foundation for the other two concerns.
Forms and Functions of Authority. In Nomos I Bertrand de 85
Jouvenel sets out "to propose a definition for the term authority."
The result is to define authority as "the efficient imperative." A
project which is adopted by others and brought to fruition is then
an "authoritative" project. Any citizen able to convince others to
support or follow his initiatives would be an authority. This broad,
social understanding of authority will also be found detailed in Sov-
ereignty, where Jouvenel writes: "what I mean by authority is the
ability of a man to get his own proposals accepted. . . . It is certain
that, were men deaf to all authority, they would have among them
neither cooperation nor security . . . in short, no society. "86
But, clearly some proposals are accepted at the point of a gun,
like the thief who demands my wallet. 87 Jouvenel, in keeping with
82 Ibid.
83 Sovereignty, p. XI. "Each of us, even if he gives no thought to it, has a politi-
cal activity and exercises an authority; we should achieve awareness of this role
and of the obligations which it entails and should strive to play it better."
84 See Pure Theory of Politics, Addendum pp. 204-212, entitled "The Myth
of the Solution."
85 "Authority, the Efficient Imperative," in Carl J. Friedrich, Nomos I: Au-
thority (New York, 1956) p. 159.
87 Jouvenel's analysis seems clearly superior to the identification of authority

and coercion to be found in theorists like David Easton. For Easton commands
obeyed at the point of a gun are "coercive" but are nonetheless "authoritative"
See Systems Analysis p. 292, and following.
his defense of social liberty and democratic responsibility, always ex-

cludes such coercion from his understanding of authority. While au-
thority is the faculty of inducing assent, "to follow an authority is a
voluntary act."8 8 Jouvenel underscores this necessity of choice by
adding, "in any voluntary association that comes to my notice I see
the work of a force: that force is authority." 89 By emphasizing the
freedom to choose or to reject the proposals of others, Jouvenel is
able to maintain the compatibility of authority and liberty. Indeed,
authority is as essential to the life of man in society as is liberty.
The phenomenon called "authority" is at once more ancient and

more fundamental than the phenomenon called "state"; the natural
ascendency of some men over others is the principle of all human
organizations and all human advances. The political phenomenon
is something much wider and more"90
general than what is commonly
denoted by the word "political.
Rejecting the arbitrary distinction between state and society,
Jouvenel proposes two ways of viewing this basic phenomenon
called authority. On the one hand, authority is the founder and con-
stitutive element of a society; on the other hand, authority is the im-
pulsive quality of various individuals within an existing society. The
two, as we shall see, are closely related.
Authority, according to Jouvenel, creates society by providing a
common undertaking, by rallying others to a common action. Au-
thority is then "the creator of the social tie," the force possessed by
the founding father. We remember that neither force, as depicted
by Hobbes, nor voluntary mystical association, as seen by Rous-
seau, are true conceptions of the source of political order for Jou-
venel:
there must be an individual who takes the initiative, who calls

others together and prevails upon them (or some of them) to join
with him. Thus at the inception of91a body politic of any kind, there
is a relationship of pure authority.
This founder, who first pulls upon the affective nature of his fel-
lows, Jouvenel labels the auctor. The term auctor he derives from
the Latin root of authority auctoritas. "The word auctoritas derives
89 Ibid, p. 29. Emphasis added.
9
o Ibid, p. 39.
91 "Authority: the Efficient Imperative," p. 162.
from the verb augere, `augment,' and what authority or those in

authority constantly augment is the foundation. " ° 2
Jouvenel articulates this augmentation or "additive" function of
the auctor by conceiving him as a source or architect." 3 The func-
tion of the auctor is not simply to create an aggregate, but an en-
during aggregate. Like the architect, the auctor intends his construc-
tion to be durable. This is the 94aim and raison d'etre of "pure poli-
tics"-the formation of the city.
For Jouvenel, therefore, any proper study of politics begins with
a study of the auctor; this, in fact, was the main fault of classical
political philosophy. "It overlooked the role of the founder-the
auctor-in the formation of the group" 95 and so underrated the
role of affection in political life. While the actual function of the
auctor may vary from "creator of a work, father or ancestor, founder
of a family or a city," nevertheless, in the final analysis "the auctor is
the man whose advice is followed, to whom actions of others must in
reality be traced back." 9a Future authorities depend upon and build
upon the structure established by the auctor, their prompting often
refer back to the original foundation for their legitimacy. Thus the
auctor continues to prompt through the medium of memory. In the
promptings of later authorities, the auctor still lives as creator of the
tradition that is being augmented, enlarged, and developed. Yet this
continuity is possible only in an atmosphere of shared beliefs:
One thing is certain: that no aggregate can hold together if the

ties which bind it are downward only, from, that is to say, the
auctor to each participant.... Also required is acceptance of each
of the members of the symbols common to all, which have become
incorporated in the spirit of each and become for him the real bind-
97
ing tie for him to the rest.
The ability to bring others to accept our projects is a phenome -

non sui generis which Jouvenel proceeds to differentiate. Authority
9
2 Compare to Carl Friedrich, The Philosophy of Law in Historical Perspective
pp. 220-205 and to Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, pp. 92-93. All
three rely upon Cicero's analysis in De Legibus and De Res Publica but see also
Cicero's first use of "Auctoritas" in De Senectute which has nothing to do with
political foundations.
94 Ibid, pp. 24-25.
9
5 Ibid, p.298.
96 Ibid, p. 30.
97 Ibid, p. 28.
in action-efficient imperatives at work-is clearly visible in every fac-

et of social life. Therefore, writes Jouvenel, "what the inquiring
mind first sees in any human formation are the emergent authori-
ties." 98 In every area of society from household to head of state, in-
dividuals instigate others to accept and follow their projects; thus,
"I came to picture the entire movement of society as an unceasing
flow of authoritative initiatives." 99 The capacity to initiate is termed
the vis politicia by Jouvenel and is differentiated into three modes:
(1) the capacity to bring a unity of wills into being, the auctor; (2)
the capacity to lead this unity of wills into action, the dux; loo and (3)
the capacity to institutionalize this cooperative action, the rex.
Since existing societies display unending patterns of fresh initia-
tives competing with one another, this conflict must be moderated
or overcome if the achievement of the auctor is to endure. New au-
thorities of the auctor type will destroy the existing aggregate and
establish aggregates of their own which will in turn be overrun. The
preservation of existing aggregates depends upon the proper func-
tioning of the authorities termed dux and rex. Jouvenel first de-
veloped the dualism of dux and rex in On Power to symbolize the
dual nature of kingly Power. Power, we saw, was both egoist and so-
cial. This dualism Jouvenel paralleled to a fundamental dualism in
the kings of old. On the one hand, the king was a warrior; on the
other hand, he was a priest. As a warrior he could call together the
other men of his group; but he was still only "a man among men."
"For him to be more than that there must be joined to his office of
dux, as we may call it, the office of rex, which is religious in charac-
ter. The rex is he in whom the ancient ritual"191 office and the ancient
magical power are subsumed and gathered up.
Any society exhibits a complex system of individuals who advo-
cate change and individuals who "seek to repair the insecurity caused
by initiatives." In Sovereignty those who seek to propose projects
and expand the number of projects are called dux, those who seek
to mediate and regulate are called rex. Moving beyond ancient king-
ship, the office of leadership, dux is symbolized by Bonaparte at the
Bridge of Arcola, The office of adjustment, rex, is symbolized by St.
Louis under the oak of Vincennes. Later, in The Pure Theory of Poli-
fl
8 Power, p. 194.
99 Sovereignty, p. XIII.
10o Ibid, pp. 21-22.
101 Power, p. 84.
tics Jouvenel adopts the more sociological labels intenders and- at

tenders, but his meaning is constant.
In every social grouping, the functioning of dux and rex fluctu-
ate, one following upon the other in a sine-wave pattern. "It is not
very difficult to be an effective Intender; it is far easier than to be an
effective Attender." 102 Attention is what is needed, yet the man of
attention operates under a handicap. "Trouble may arise from any
point; and it is the handicap of the Attender that he is expected to
"103
abate any trouble.
While Intending is the easier task and at times the pleasanter
role for social authority, an ordered society requires more than the
unbounded pursuit of the citizen's desires. Jouvenel recognizes that
some of the , forces in the society must remember and invoke the
common beliefs from which past action flowed. Such evocation
will limit the potentially limitless pursuit of desire and so allow for
stability. Thus, Jouvenel writes, it appears
as if human societies cannot support for very long a central power

which is continually of the dux species. A preservative authority
is normally at the head of a society and the authorities which make
for change are at work under its aegis.104Only at intervals is an
authority of the latter species at the head.
While this dualism of dux and rex appears inevitable and natu-
ral, "it depends upon the capacity proper to the rex whether the 106
additive achievement of the dux becomes a lasting aggregation."
Following his differentiation of three modes of authority, Jou-
venel proceeds to differentiate formal from informal authority. In
The Pure Theory of Politics he develops the distinction as follows:
I want to use the word "authority" to denote the position in which

A finds himself in relation to B's who "look up to him".... This
use of the word, however, conflicts with the usage of the jurists.
To them, Authority, (I shall spell it with a capital whenever the
word is taken in this sense) means the right to command, implying
a corresponding duty to obey. Constitutional
100
law delimits positions
of Authority and their competence.
102 pure Theory of Politics, p. 174.

103 Ibid, p. 175.
104 Sovereignty, pp. 53-54.
105 Ibid, p. 22 also p. 5 and 34.
106 Pure Theory of Politics, p. 100.
Jouvenel demonstrates the logical possibility of a society in which

there is authority without Authority: "the limit case of Perfect
Democracy, of a body politic in existence without any established
Authority." 107 This limit case might arise in a nascent society where
there "is not and cannot be a political authority as distinct from the
social authority." 108 If, as Jouvenel appears to contend, established
Authority must have been "a late-corner to history," why did it arise
at all? Necessity, responds Jouvenel, and "we have already seen what "1os
makes it necessary; that is, the possibility of divisive instigations.
Each individual may potentially instigate others; the content and
goals of such instigation seems endlessly open. Thus, as any social
grouping grows in size, the possibility and even the inevitability of
conflict between instigators or social authorities grows proportion-
ately. Constituted or established Authority attempts to moderate the
i mpending social conflict.
Social conflict, however, is inevitable and cannot be erased.
The duality of Authority and authority represents a "natural ten-
u
sion" existing in all political systems. ° Indeed, the term "tension"
may be too mild for Jouvenel writes "Formal and informal author-
111
ity are potentially at war on all levels of society." And, again,
"between authorities which are similar112 in kind and unlimited in
scope, the natural state of things is war." Natural or pure author-
ity appears disruptive of the social order-ending either in the frus-
tration of all initiations or in the establishment of monolithic con-
trol, i.e. the Minotaur. While the modern vision accepts only pure
authority, Jouvenel seeks to emphasize the necessity and benefits of
Constituted Authority.
Unlike pure authority, Constituted Authority is restricted as to
the projects it can advance, the content and limits of its proposals
being defined by the terms of its construction. Each formally con-
structed Authority is erected under different guidelines which de-
pend upon the desires of the constructors and the circumstances of
construction. Jouvenel labels these restrictions "pragmatic" since he
conceives no essential restrictions to the promptings of authority.
While these restrictions are pragmatic or even arbitrary, they are also
107 Ibid, p. 131.

108 Power, p. 343.
111 "Authority" p. 164.
112 Power, p. 136.
beneficial. Conflict and uncertainty are reduced, and most projects

destructive of the fabric of the group are outlawed by the terms of
construction:
Herein lies the great difference between formal Authority and in-
formal authority. Both are capable of moving men ... and this
ability to do, through the energies of other men, is power. But
in the case of informal authority, anything and everything it is in
fact capable of getting done is its power. Not so in the case of
formal Authority: it rests upon an idea which defines and limits its
exercise, so113that its legitimate achievements differ from its possible
efficiency.
To the existing social group, each form of authority is necessary:
Informal authority is the better liked: it does not follow that it is

best. Informal authority is natural and the power it gives is natural.
But all power is dangerous and natural power far the most dan-
gerous. . . . Formal authority can demand obedience because it in-
vokes a right: but the right which it invokes, because
114
it is a right,
has a legitimate scope and assigned boundaries.
While all authority implies the ability to have one's proposals
accepted, a position of Power enlarges this force, adding to personal
attraction the force of shared belief and institutionalized coercion.
The threat of the Minotaur hangs over every exercise of authority
for Jouvenel. All Power is dangerous. One authority will destroy
its competitors, if it is able, for the Minotaur is expansive by nature.
Notice that Jouvenel's conception of "right" is entirely conven-
tional. He does not reject the basic thesis of modern political phil-
osophy that all social order is convention. Despite his recognition
of the disorder of modernity, Jouvenel accepts this conventionality
and merely seeks to avoid the violence and loss of liberty that tend
to arise in the modern vision. Jouvenel, in other words, seeks a mod-
ern solution to the modern problem.
The institutionalizing of authority attempts to avoid the dan-
gers of the Minotaur's aggressive nature. Jouvenel seeks to justify
the purely conventional aspects of social order on the basis of the
benefits conferred by conventional stability. The image of the raven-
ous beast, the Minotaur, gives way to a new image for Formal or Con-
stituted Authority. The organs of social control, Constituted Author-
ity, are depicted as a giant statue with a replaceable head. "The
4 Ibid, p. 124.
11
statue has been set up at some previous time and lasts through many
generations; but the face must be that of a living and active magis-
trate. The end of a life, of a term, removes the transient head from the
enduring shoulders. There is now a void to be filled, the oppor-
tunity for a new man to lift his head onto the shoulders of the
statue.... "11e
The Seductive Appeal of Authority. The smooth functioning
of moderating authorities, however, cannot be taken for granted.
Jouvenel's appeal to Constituted Authority amounts to a tactic in
the face of modernity, not a solution to the dangers of modernity.
Jouvenel warns that the function of rex becomes increasingly diffi-
cult as the society grows. This difficulty, he reminds us, had been
described by Rousseau under the concept "the dimensional law."
As -the society becomes larger and larger, two related movements
occur: the agencies of government or the tentacles of Power grow
and extend but the effective ll6 control of these instruments passes to
fewer and fewer magistrates. In the large nation, no one knows
his fellow citizens face to face. 117 And as this knowledge of friend
and foe is lost, a substitute must be developed. Laws, the convention-
ally accepted and sanctioned relations, becomes Jouvenel's substitute
for the loss of community. Law seeks to preserve the achievement of
the auctor, to bind the community together.
But this substitute is not enduring either. For, as the community
grows, the seductive appeal of authority grows and the conventional
stability is threatened. As we have already seen, "ambulatory law"
is not an effective restraint upon the desires of men. The substitu-
tion of law for shared community of belief opens the door for the
return of personal power. Jouvenel underscores the permanent
danger in authority's appeal to our affective nature in part one of
The Pure Theory of Politics. Chapter two, which is written in the
form of a dialogue and appears to be the core of Jouvenel's message,
questions the relation of Wisdom and Activity under the title "The
Pseudo-Alcibiades."
The dialogue presents a confrontation between Socrates and his
ex-pupil Alcibiades. Alcibiades left the Academy to enter the "real"
world of political action and intrigue. At the time of this dialogue,
he has already risen to a position of prominence in the Assembly.
116 Ibid, p. 118.

116 Du Principat, pp. 131-137. See also p. 63 and following.
The dialogue opens with Socrates questioning his former pupil on

the good or evil of his proposed naval campaign. Since both Jouvenel
and his readers are aware of the outcome of the campaign upon
Athenian politics, we shudder when Alcibiades proclaims that he
desires to act and to be praised by men. He suggests he has become
more proficient in the handling of the assembly than Pericles. While
admitting that Alcibiades knows how to promote action, Socrates
desires to question the right and wrong of proposed actions. The an-
tagonistic positions are set in the dialogue by Alcibiades:
A: It may be that I have only acquired a part of statecraft, but it
is the efficient part. It may be that you possess the more im-
portant part but it is an inefficient part . . . you must grant
that I possess a form of knowledge which you lack . . . how to
influence the decisions and actions of Athenians.
S: I refuse to speak of this skill as knowledge.
A: But you must, Socrates. And you must recognize that it is
valuable knowledge.
Turning to the image of the weaver in the Statesman, Alcibiades
argues
A: Each warp-thread is opinionated and elusive; therefore cast-
ing just one woof-thread to bind all of these individuals in
a common action takes a spell binder . . . (but) Socrates,
how could you understand me? You have never experienced
the response of the many . . . Brave echo, which not only
returns my words, but turns them into deeds! . . . Knowing
and getting others to Know is your pursuit, Socrates. Doing
and getting others to Do is mine.
Then in conclusion, Alcibiades argues
A: It is an absorbing game, which brings out the best as well
as the worst within us. To those who have played it, this is
politics. . . . This is how history is made.
S: A tale of adventures and misadventures, full of sound and
fury....
A: A tale of men ... men need and enjoy this stirring of the
Ils
blood.
118 Pure Theory of Politics, pp. 27 and following.
Initially, three positions are developed in this short section of

the dialogue. First, the use of rhetoric, the manipulation of emo-
tions, getting others to do, this is politics. The image of the skilled
craftsman of the Statesman is replaced by the slight of hand spell-
binder. Second, this action is politics only "to those who have played
it." The criticism of the meditating philosopher who has never ex-
perienced the thrill of addressing the masses is rejected. Alcibiades
boasts that he could convince the Assembly to accept the expedition
or to reject it. He calls upon Socrates to address the Athenians and
before the crowd to demonstrate the evil of his proposed "adven-
ture." If Socrates cannot do this, he is de facto unfit to criticize Al-
cibiades. Third, Jouvenel allows Alcibiades to cut Socrates short;
then, Alcibiades is given the final word in the dialogue with no re-
buttal from Socrates. The Socratic speech cut short by the aggressive
Alcibiades comes from Macbeth. The full text would read:
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,

That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
119
signifying nothing.
By cutting Socrates' speech short, Jouvenel apparently tells us this

is not a tale told by an idiot. He appears to warn us that Alcibiades
truly deserves to be heard. Some critics of the dialogue complain
that Socrates is too apparently a "straw-man," too readily bested by
Alcibiades. Such criticism misses the central issue. Jouvenel has taken
Alcibiades side against Socrates in the dialogue. Why? Jouvenel de-
sires to stress and elevate the affective side of man neglected by the
classics. That is to say, Jouvenel seeks his solution to the dangers of
modernity within the limits of modern political philosophy. He will
not appeal to reason to resolve the dilemmas of the sentiments.
Alcibiades, like most political actors, views action as an end in it-
self. The study of Alcibiades then provides two important lessons.
First, political activity undirected by wisdom is dangerous. And, sec-
ond, 120
political activity is not highly sensitive to the teachings of wis-
dom. Alcibiades had the benefit of the finest teacher, yet it did not
profit Athens.
119 Shakespeare, Macbeth, Act V, Scene 5.

, MODERNITY AND AUTHORITY IN BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL 33
Since political activity is not especially sensitive to wisdom, the

statesman who wishes to avoid social conflict does not appeal to 121
reason. Instead, he works upon the affections of the citizens,
which lead them to join in the projects of others. Politics rests upon
the two prongs of "promotion and confidence." If all citizens sought
only to propose and instigate, chaos would result. Fortunately, most
citizens also comply in the projects of others. This compliance is the
122
"cardinal virtue of social man." The naturalness of compliance
explains both the success and the danger of our Alcibiades.123
In summation, "the man of the project is a lover." The affec-
tive individuals who follow him are also lovers and this attraction
has an element of blindness to it. Every project, like the Syracusean
expedition, carries with it the prospect of danger-hidden and sud-
den danger to the project, to the lover and to his followers. "The
very process of moving implies a risk of debasement for the moved
124
and for the mover." This risk is always present-it is present even
when men act carefully and conscientiously. Moreover, this danger is
often magnified since the man of the project need not be a conscien-
tious or careful lover. "Observation regrettably suggests that the
sport of moving men is enjoyed in itself even when the operation 126
is
not inspired by a high purpose or addressed to a salutary end."
Thus, Jouvenel's intellectual response to the crisis of modern-
ity produces not remedies but a pessimistic recognition of the dan-
ger inherent in all authority. Jouvenel advises us: limit the scope of
constituted Authority, remember your communal links to the past,
preserve the multiplicity of natural authorities which assist in pre-
serving liberty. Yet, this same voice warns, political activity is quite
insensitive to such wisdom. The image of the Minotaur still lurks
behind us.
THE AFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO DISORDER
The limited gains to be acquired by unmasking the Minotaur

lead Jouvenel to a second, more individualized and affective, re-
sponse to the disorder created by modernity's loss of absolutes. Jou-
venel begins this affective response by reminding us of three earlier
121 Ibid, p. 53.

122 Ibid, p. 71.
125 Ibid, p. 9.
conclusions. The small community is natural; the large nation is the

128
result of conquest. The "entire existence of man in society rests
127
on confidence." And, finally, contemporary students of politics
have generally ignored the "small societies" 128 and this has led to
a "disastrous under-valuation of the truly basic communities."'"
We have already seen Jouvenel's attachment to the small com-
munity, the basic grouping without Constituted Authority, the face-
to-face direct democracy. Here "a man meets no one he does not
know" and all citizens are linked to one another by "familiar cus-
toms." 130 While such a society cannot endure, because the wider and
more developed a society131becomes "the less can the climate of trust-
fulness" be maintained," still it might serve as the model for exist-
ing society. While, "it is bound to fall to pieces in proportion as hu-
132
man groupings becomes more complicated," we might be able to
attach ourselves to the small communities within every large society.
Jouvenel returns us for a final time to that neglected core of Rous-
seau's teaching. "The role of established Authority must inevitably
increase as the body politic grows in size, complexity, and hetero-
133
geneity. This is the `Dimensional Law'." That excessive size was
incompatible with certain political forms was recognized by Aris-
totle notes Jouvenel: "beyond a certain level of the population, the
organization of the state is adapted to a nation (ethnos) that is
governed rather than to a city (polis) that governs itself."'" How-
ever,
No writer ever stated more clearly than Rousseau that true pop-
ular participation in government requires a small community, that
in a large state it is a myth; that men in a large state are in fact,
and must inevitably be subjects, on which score he of course
rejected the large state as incapable of a good form of government
just as Aristotle had said. Observing that this historical trend was
129 Power, p. 99.

127 Ibid, p. 364.
128 Problems of Socialist England, p. 128 and also 133.
129 Sovereignty, p. 56 and following.
130 Art of Conjecture, p. 241.
132 Ibid, p. 264.
134 Art of Conjecture, p. 78. See also Futuribles, p. 97.
"Political Consequences
of the Rise of Science," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist December 1963, p. 2, See
also Aristotle, Politics, Book 7, Chapter 4.
towards the large state. he felt that it was away from a morally
good form of government) ."
In Arcadie, the conclusion of Sovereignty, and the essays on
Rousseau, Jouvenel's second response to the disorder of modernity is
addressed to "those who feel attachment to common joys and sor-
rows," for they alone recognize "that the intensity of138the common
emotion is in inverse ratio to the size of the society." As the state
grows, Power and formality increase, institutions expand, commerce
flourishes, yet we have seen "the 13necessary cohesion of society cannot
be produced by Power alone." 7 Beyond the institutions of coer-
cion there must exist "a deep community of feeling" which is ca-
pable of producing an acknowledged ethic and of maintaning the
inviolability of law. In his neglected essay, "The Political Conse-
quences of the Rise of Science," Jouvenel states his argument suc-
cinctly: "Simply common beliefs, robustly held, are the walls of a
-
city: these are cracking. 138 This dissolution of common beliefs re
sults directly from the general acceptance of modernity's vision of
each man as his own measure. Moreover, this dissolution of affective
ties leads to a loss of "man's greatest boon under the sun:" "the I
and Thou relationship."'"
The Dream of Icaria. Within the large and complex society
there persists a longing for the small, freer, face-to-face community.
Utilizing the images of Babylon for the large nation and Icaria or
Arcadie for the small community, Jouvenel seeks an alternative to
the growth of Power in Babylon in the return to Icaria. We long
for a correspondence between our judgments and the judgments of
our fellow men. We wish our voluntary actions to be approved and
supported. In such a setting harmony and freedom "149
would coalesce
and this is "the basic supposition of all Utopias.
The noblest dream is one which supposes such caritas among the
members of society that when one is about to act or speak, the
others, in fond admiration, make silence, ready to applaud what
his love for them will inspire him to do or say, which will be at
the same time the most suitable thing and yet original, there
135 Futuribles, p. 99. See also "Rousseau, the Pessimistic Evolutionary" in Du
Principat, p. 251 and following.
137 Power, p. 388.
138 "Political Consequences of the Rise of Science," p. 8.
139 Pure Theory of Politics, p. 65 also 66.
140 "A Discussion of Freedom," p. 717.
being in love an inventiveness which goes beyond expectation. Such

a situation is not without roots in reality. Such is indeed the re-
lation between a well-loved king and his people, between an adored
actor and his audience, between the lover and the loved. Such is
also the mutual respect existing say in a circle of philosophers
who respect each other for their common devotion to truth, and
.
hunger for each other's contributions) "
The dream recurs in all societies "for men never resign them-
142
selves to Babylon being Babylon." It does no good to repeat the
conventionality of Babylon, that all the laws are merely means by
which Babylon can be preserved and are not expressions of any
moral laws. Man seems naturally to believe laws should reflect a
moral consciousness. And in Babylon, that is to say in our present
society, there is no longer sufficient moral unity for the law to reflect.
The triumph of Descartes and Hobbes produces a dispersion of per-
sonal judgments so that legislation "taken as a whole will always
seem to each private judgment in some respects unjust." Thus the
143
longing for Icaria is "a natural feature of Babylon," or as Jou-
venel says "the dream of Icaria is144forever being born again spon-
taneously in the heart of Babylon."
, The Danger of Utopia. While claiming to pity the man who
has never experienced the "noble temptation" to "build Cities of the
145
Sun," Jouvenel proceeds to warn us of the dangers inherent in
this dream. Jouvenel's second or affective response to modern-
ity retains the conventionality of all political order and now seeks to
satisfy the affective passions and moderate the economic passions
through attachment to the small community. Yet, this second re-
sponse too is tenuous.
Two dangers in the dream of Icaria would seem to lead to the
condemnation of those who would pursue the dream. First, by en-
couraging smaller, closer associations, the formal and legal supports
of the larger community are undermined and the citizens thus at-
tracted are further isolated from the larger city. Second, and more im-
"14s
portantly, "there is tyranny in the womb of every Utopia. "All
the builders of Utopias have imagined a paradise of liberty, and
141Ibid, p. 718. Perhaps Jouvenel has in mind here the relationship between
Rousseau and Madame de Warren in The Confessions.
143 "A Discussion of Freedom" p. 724.
146 Power, p. 354.
every political action based on these foundations has led to tyranni-

147
cal regimes."
Why is this true: must the highest of dreams produce the basest
of regimes? In answer Jouvenel points to the divergent opinions pro-
duced by man's liberty. "The founders of democracy always believed
that the free expression of opinions would secure, by a sort of natu-
ral selection, the survival and triumph of the most rational opin-
148
ions. Experience has not verified this hypothesis." The opposite
tends to occur and then the ruler in pursuit of Utopia becomes will-
ing to subject or tyrannize the individuals in the name of the moral
good of the group. Images of Rousseau "forcing his fellows to be
free" or of the Committee of Public Safety signing death decrees in
the name of "The People of France" come readily to mind. Sorel,
for instance, provides a case study of the modern tendency to com-
bine the "moral beliefs of martyrdom" with "the manners of gang-
sters." If man's essence lies in his personal liberty the "the most im-
moral of all beliefs is the belief that it can be moral to suspend the
operation of all moral beliefs for the sake of one ruling (supposedly
moral) passion. "149 Even Jouvenel's affective response to modernity
opens the way for the return of personal dominion.
The Return to Babylon. Jouvenel finds himself driven to three
related conclusions at the end of his affective response:
The first is that the small society, as the milieu in which man is
first found, retains for him an infinite attraction; the next, that he
undoubtedly goes to it to renew his strength; but, the last, that
any attempt to graft the same features on a large society is utopian
and leads to tyranny. With that admitted, it is clear that as social
relations become wider and more various, the common good con-
ceived as reciprocal trustfulness cannot be sought in methods which
the model of a small, closed society
150
inspires; such a model is, on the
contrary, entirely misleading.
Jouvenel leads his readers back to Babylon with its conventions
and artificially imposed order. "Babylonian society is nonetheless in
151
good working order." If less inspiring, Babylon is more real and
less dangerous than Icaria thanks to a system of pragmatic laws
which "prohibit actions which would destroy the social organism,
147 Ibid, p. 264.
148 Problems of Socialist England, p. 156.
149 pure Theory of Politics, p.181.
151 "A Discussion of Freedom" p. 723.
and make mandatory some behaviors necessary to social prosperity."

"As these laws do not draw their authority from common belief, the
real principle of obedience to them is the fear of repression from a
strong government."152In short, we have an Austinian legality, a Hob-
besian government.
Whether we speak of it as realism or as pessimism, Jouvenel clear-
ly warns his audience that our vision must be lowered to be effective.
"153
"It is impossible to establish a just social order, he warns those
attracted by Icaria, for justice is a quality of the human will and not
a scheme of institutions. The preservation of Babylon seems to be-
come the highest political goal:
Be he philosopher or ruler, whoever claims to be the guardian of

the collective social interest is a dangerous man. The highest legiti-
mate aim that men can set for themselves is to discover what basic
conditions are necessary for the continued existence of a society
and favorable to the advancement of the well being of its members.
The most obvious and time-honoured of these conditions is avoid-
ance of destruction by some hostile grouping, of wasting away by the
exhaustion of material
154
resources, and of break-up by the dissolution
of emotional ties.
Apparently accepting the modern quest for comfortable self-

preservation, Jouvenel advocates that we focus our attention on the
rex, on the limiting of the central Power and on the development of
more accurate forecasting. All of these efforts will increase what ben-
efits Babylon can confer. "It is, in short, no use concluding that so-
cial friendship should, more than anything else, engage the atten-
tion of the magistrate, when we cannot formulate in the concrete
155
any means open to the magistrate for promoting this friendship."
Ultimately, Jouvenel counsels us this concrete concern for the ben-
efits of Babylon may have strange benefits for he suggests to us that
in the concrete polis of Athens "the condemnation of Socrates might
not have happened; in the Platonic Republic it was bound to oc-
156
cur."
152 Ibid.
154 Ibid,p. 129.
155 Ibid,pp. 131-32.
156Ibid, p. 128.
JOUVENEL: ANCIENT OR MODERN?
In 1964 Bertrand de Jouvenel addressed an International Politi-

cal Science Association in Geneva, Switzerland with these words:
"The political scientist is a teacher of public men in the making. .
His first and foremost function is to address future citizens and po-
tential magistrates, and157fit them for participation in the manage-
ment of public affairs." Initially at least, our judgment on the
teachings and accomplishment of Bertrand de Jouvenel must rest
upon how well he has accomplished this task. But first let us con-
sider the judgment of three general groups of critics.
Many commentators despair of fitting Jouvenel into a "tradition-
alist or a behavioralist" mold. 158 Others simply accept the pessi-
mistic vision which closes On Power at face value. Michael Polanyi
writes "it is a wise and beautiful book but its message is melancholy.
For though it tells us what we would need, it seems silently to con-
cede that this is something no effort of ours can contrive."'" The
conclusion of On Power is, indeed, pessimistic, perhaps even fatalis-
tic:
Useless Cassandras! And why so useless? Perhaps societies are gov-
erned in their onward march by laws of which we are ignorant. Do
we know whether it is their destiny to avoid the mortal errors
which best them? Or whether they are not led into them by the
same dynamism which carried them to their prime? Whether their
seasons of blossoms and fruitfulness are not achieved at a cost of a
destruction of the forms in which their strength was stored? After
the fireworks display the darkness of a formless mass, destined to
ls0
despotism or anarchy.
But, as we have fully seen above, Jouvenel's teaching has a practical

bearing as well. Polanyi is wrong if he assumes Jouvenel offers no
counsel for our present condition, just as Morgenthau is101misled if he
sees in Jouvenel only a nostalgic "evocation of the past."
Closer to the truth are those commentators who express a reserved
or mixed judgment on Jouvenel's accomplishment. Stanley Parry
157 "Political Science and Prevision, " American Political Science Review March,
1965, pp. 29 and following.
158 Political Science Review (March, 1964), p. 120.
159 Hibbert Journal, (July, 1958), p. 421.
180 Power, p. 378.
"
151 Hans Morgenthau, "The evocation of the past: Bertrand de Jouvenel,
The Restoration of American Politics, (Chicago, 1962), pp. 44-53.
praises Jouvenel's conscious attempt "to escape from the irrelevant

orthodoxies dominant in modern thought and break through to a
162
theory based on a realistic appraisal of modern society." Parry
suggests that political theory contains two elements. "First it de-
scribes the dilemma of political life that arises out of the human con-
dition; secondly, it offers a solution to that dilemma in the form of a
163
constitution." Jouvenel has brilliantly carried out the first task:
"there can be no mistaking the dilemma: political action by its very
nature tends to the destruction of the established political or-
164
der." The second task he laments remains unfinished. Substan-
tially the same judgment is rendered by Dante Germino. According
to Germino, Jouvenel's writings "attest to the experiential reality
of inner moral restraints on the use of power." Yet, when faced with
the disordering results of modern relativism and hedonism, he "fails
to arrive at or articulate clearly substitute symbols for the natural
"ls5
law.
Finally, critics like Willmoore Kendall and Robert Macpherson
see in this failure a "fall into modernity" for Jouvenel himself. In
The Conservative Affirmation Kendall praises Jouvenel for cutting
through the false and misleading distinction between state and soci-
ety to focus directly on the question "what fosters human coopera-
tion and what hinders it?" Yet Kendall bluntly contends that Jou-
venel's "teachings on the level of political ethics are, quite simply,
wrong." He accuses Jouvenel of doing to political ethics precisely
what Jouvenel himself accuses modern man of doing to politics, that
is to"166
say, he "launches them upon the treacherous sea of relativ-
ism. Kendall quite correctly perceives that Jouvenel identifies
the common good167with human cooperation, friendship, warmth,
and predictability. And then he berates Jouvenel for falling into
the individualized conception of good that characterizes Hobbes and
Locke and leads to the breakdown of society. Pushing even further,
Macpherson advanced the thesis in 1967 that Jouvenel seemed in
168
danger of becoming the "twentieth century's Hobbes."
162 Stanley Parry, Review of Politics, XXIII (1961), p. 288.
163 Stanley Parry, National Review, ( May 19, 1964), p. 410.
164 Parry, Review of Politics, op. cit.
165 Dante Germino, Beyond Ideology, The Revival of Political Theory, ( New
York, 1967), p. 147.
166 Willmoore Kendall, The Conservative Affirmation, (Chicago, 1964).
167 Sovereignty, p. 123. See also pp. 21, 100-102, 111-12, Pure Theory of Poli-
tics, p. 123, "Political Economy of Gratuity," in Arcadia, pp. 9 and following and
"The Idea of Welfare" Cambridge Journal, August, 1952, pp. 647 and following.
168 Robert Macpherson, Political Science Quarterly, (1967). p. 141.
None of these conflicting interpretations take into account Jou-

venel's dependence upon Rousseau or his professed intention-fit-
ting citizens for participation in public affairs. If we are properly to
link our judgment of Jouvenel's teaching to his own intention, we
must remember that not all future citizens are alike. Jouvenel has
from the beginning rejected the absolute equality of men. Natural
inequalities of sensibility, reason, forcefulness, and attractiveness
for instance are integral components of any social setting. More-
over, Jouvenel recognizes that his own readers differ in insight and
sensitivity and, at times, he comments discretely to the "wise" or the
"attentive" reader. 169 Given this concern for the attentive reader,
it seems likely that some of the conflicting interpretations of Jouven-
el arise from failing to consider the possibility that Jouvenel ad-
dresses himself to two different audiences; the many and the atten-
tive. To accomplish his task of fitting future citizens for political ac-
tion, two different, and perhaps conflicting, teachings must be ad-
dressed to the two audiences.
Recognizing Jouvenel's warning that our own societies have wide-
ly accepted the principles of Thomas Hobbes, his teaching for the
many will have to operate within this limit. If men accept ethical
and political relativism, what political teachings and techniques
help them to avoid the growth of the Leviathan or the Minotaur,
what techniques preserve as far as possible the blessings of coopera-
tion. Jouvenel's response as we have detailed it covers a broad front.
He warns us of the true egoist nature of Power. He reminds us of
our past indebtedness. He seeks to elevate our opinion of Constitut-
ed, and thus limited, Authority. He encourages the development of
forecasting. He seeks to expand the local authorities which protect
our liberty from the encroachment of the central Power. Thus we
may say of Jouvenel's first teaching that it is indeed modern, but not
Hobbesian. Jouvenel personally rejects Hobbes's conceptions of lib-
erty and felicity. Instead, Jouvenel may be linked with Montesquieu,
Rousseau, and Tocqueville, to those moderns who seek a necessary
and beneficial adjustment of the Hobbesian theory.
Jouvenel returns us to the pinnacle of modern thought scaled by
Rousseau as he seeks to preserve Locke's comfortable self-preserva-
tion in a aura, not of fear, but of friendship and acceptance. He
169 For example see the closing passage of "A Discussion of Freedom," p. 724;
or Power, p. 117 for "the thinker" as opposed to "the multitude"; or Sovereignty,
pp. 283-89; or Jouvenel's introduction to Hobbes' translation of Thucydides, pp.
XIII-XIV.
seeks to transform "the joyless quest for joy" to use Strauss's telling
phrase, into a more satisfying life by elevating the affective over the
economic nature of man. He hopes to moderate the more aggres-
sive passions associated with economic self-interest with the gentle
or humane passions of comradeship, sympathy, pity and the like.
This moderation is necessary for without it society moves swiftly to-
ward dictatorship.
In such a setting, Jouvenel's second teaching is directed toward
those, like himself, who recognize the inadequacy of the Hobbesian
teachings. They must "cherish the simple terms which are capable
of moving the hearts of all men." 170 As the conclusion to Sovereign-
ty reiterates, "The political experience of liberal democracies has
shown that, in everything pertaining to the order of material inter-
ests . . . accord on any scale has "171
never been seen except when the
moral sentiments were involved. The sensitive citizens within
the large Hobbesian communities must seek to preserve respect for
unrewarded services, family, social friendship, shared hopes-that
is, for all the expressions of man's affective nature.
This task for the few is rendered difficult since the elevation of
man's affective nature leads necessarily to a diminished role for
philosophy or for reason. 172 The Pseudo-Alcibiades teaches us that
political activity is not highly sensitive to wisdom. "Noting this fact
does not diminish our ardour for the acquisition of wisdom, but in-
duces us to regard another pursuit as also of some importance: that
is, seeking to understand what people actually do in Politics."'"
With Rousseau, Jouvenel notes that once the process of dissolution
has begun, the only remedy lies in Hobbesian solutions. 174 In the
best of times, one can only hope that the appeal to affection will
not be perverted. "That is why Rousseau links his vision of a demo-
cratic city with the silence on the part of the philosophers." If the
city is sustained by common beliefs robustly held, then "the neces-
sary and sufficient condition for the effective working of Rousseau-
esque democracy is the exclusion of beliefs from discussion." 176 In
both Rousseau and Jouvenel this elevation of affection over wisdom

171 Ibid, p. 294.
172 See essay by Leo Strauss, "The Intention of Rousseau," Social Research,
Vol. 14, 1947.
173 Pure Theory of Politics, p. 17 also p. 107. Sovereignty, p. 219.
175 Ibid.
leads to a paradox nicely articulated by both Leo Strauss and Roger

Masters. "The subordination of reason to sentiment which so many
commentators emphasize is based on reason itself; reason shows that
man's freedom, the source of thought, is not fully realized in
thought." 176
Thus we must conclude that Jouvenel fails to resolve or even
probe this paradox and so fails satisfactorily to relate reason and sen-
timent in his political philosophy. This failure leads Jouvenel to
equate the common good with any human cooperation, no matter
how grand or base its objectives. Also, this failure limits Jouvenel's
understanding of human dependence to a physiological and emo-
tional level, never reaching the depths of ontological dependence
177
probed by theorists like Voegelin or Guardini. Finally, the analysis
of authority rooted solely upon sentiment seems trapped on the level
of sociological description. Clearly Jouvenel's rex experiences a de-
sire to preserve and to order which seems to be essentially different
from the desire to prompt others. Yet, Jouvenel is unable to explore
this impulse toward order because it would require the replacing of
sentiment by reason as the highest element in man. Whether Jou-
venel can place it in writing or not, his analysis of the rex demon-
strates that we are not content to be Alcibiades.
Working within the limits of modern political philosophy, Jou-
venel's teaching to the many is both wise and beneficial. Further-
more, by rejecting Rousseau's natural liberty or autonomy, Jouvenel
removes the seeds of revolution or anarchism that may be latent in
178
Rousseau.
Jouvenel's teaching to the attentive few, however, must be chal-
lenged. Having shown the need to move from economic passion to
sentiment, Jouvenel has not demonstrated the superiority of senti-
ment over reason for the few. In Jouvenel's analysis the isolation of
the philosopher links Rousseau to Plato. "Rousseau's advice regard-
ing existing societies was that which he gave to Emile: it was to keep
aloof, to escape as far as possible from the sway of the sovereign
and the prevailing opinions."1 79 Separated or isolated from the
political city, both Plato and Rousseau according to Jouvenel
176 Roger Master, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau, p. 63, footnote 29.
177 See Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, Romano Guardini, The
Death of Socrates and Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion.
178 See my essay "The Perennial Appeal of Anarchism" Policy, Winter, 1974
for the linkage between Rousseau and modern revolutionary theory.
"dream of a city in which coincidence of judgments would be so

great that a man-Plato, that is to say, or Rousseau-would be as joy-
fully and spontaneously himself in the forum as he is in his own
retreat." 8°
The rule of wisdom and the rule of affection, however, while not
necessarily opposed, are not synonymous either. Jouvenel understands
this and so his final teaching leads us to the Emile and to the Re-
public. To his great merit, in defining the limits of modern politi-
cal philosophy, Jouvenel reopens the question of the highest life for
man as citizen. He leads us to the fundamental choice personified
by Plato and Rousseau. This teaching is neither pessimistic nor
Hobbesian, but as he himself expressed it in Sovereignty, "the work-
ings of a questioning spirit."
MICHAEL R. DILLON
La Salle College
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS:
L'Am.erique en Europe, le plan Marshall et la cooperation intercon-

tinentale. Paris: Plon, 1948.
Apres la Defaite. Paris: Plon, 1941.
Arcadie: essais sur le mieux-vivre. Paris: Sedeis, 1968.
The Art of Conjecture. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1967.
Du Contrat Social de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, precede d'un essai sur
la politique de Rousseau. Geneve: Les Editions Du Cheval Aile,
1947.
Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inegalite parmi les
hommes. Bertrand de Jouvenel's translation of Rousseau's dis-
course complete with notes. Paris: Gallimard, 1965.
L'Economie Dirigee. Le programme de la nouvelle generation.
Paris: Librairie Valois, 1928.
The Ethics of Redistribution. England: Cambridge University Press,
1951.
Futuribles. Rand Corporation paper P-3045. Santa Monica: Rand
Corporation, 1965.
Futuribles: studies in conjecture. Geneva, Droz, Volume I, 1963,
Volume II, 1965.
Power, the natural history of its growth. Translated by J. F. Hunting-

ton. Preface by Denis W. Brogan. London: Hitchinson, 1948.
Du Principat et autres reflexions politique. Paris: Hachette, 1972.
Problems of Socialist England. Translated by J. F. Huntington. Lon-
don: Batchworth Press, 1949.
The Pure Theory of Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963.
Sovereignty, an inquiry into the political good. Translated by J. F.
Huntington. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.
ARTICLES:
"L'apport des theories du welfare a la theorie politique normative,"

Economie Appliquee, V (1952), 411-428.
"Aspects sociaux et politiques du developpemente economique,"
Bulletin SEDEIS, 818, Avril, 1962, 33.
"Authority: the efficient imperative," Nomos I-Authority. Edited by
Carl Friedrich. New York: Atherton Press, 1959, 159-160.
"De 1'autorite," Federation, XII (1955), 5-15.
"Les Conditions du Bonheur," les Editions de la Baconniere (1961).
"A discussion of freedom," Cambridge Journal, September, 1953,
707-724.
"L'epoque de la suprematie europeenne," Federation, 97, Fevrier,
1953, 115-125.
"L'essence de la politique," Revue Francaise de Science Politiques
(1952), 641-652.
"The factors of diffusion," Confluence, September, 1953, 69-81.
"From Political Economy to Political Ecology," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, October, 1957, 287-291.
"Du Groupe," Revue Francaise de Science Politique (1955), 49-62.
"The Idea of Welfare," Cambridge Journal, August, 1952, 647-661.
"Instabilite des regimes," Tour d'Horizon, Janvier, 1959, 65-76.
"L'instabilite ministerielle en France," Federation (1952), 201-210.
"Invitation a la theorie politique pure," Revue Internationale
d'histoire politique et constitutionelle (1957), 86-91.
"Liberte d'opinion et lumiere naturelle," Federation, Janvier, 1952,
18-32.
"Le mythe egalitaire et la justice sociale," Nouvelle Revue de l'Econ-
omie Contemporaine, XXXV (1952), 7-11.
"On the Nature of Political Science," American Political Science Re-
view, December, 1961, 773-779.
"The nature of politics," Cambridge Journal, May, 1954, 451-465.

"Order and Organization," On Freedom and Free Enterprise: Essays
in honor of Ludwig von Mises. Princeton: D. von Nostrand &
Co., 1956.
"Planning in France, technique and lessons," Moorgate and Wall
Street, Autumn, 1961, 24-39.
"Political Consequences of the Rise of Science," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, XIX (1963), 2-8.
"Political Economy and Gratuity," Virginia Quarterly Review,
XXXV (1959), 513-526.
"Political Science and Prevision," American Political Science Re-
view, LIX (1965), 29-38.
"Pre-discussion-the condition of democracy," Spectator, July 3,
1964, 7.
"Les previsions de croissance," Bulletin SEDEIS, Futuribles numero
68 (1963), 1-23.
"Principate," Political Quarterly, XXXVI (1965), 20-51.
"Reflexions sur la justice sociale," Nouvelle Revue de l'Economie
Contemporaine, XXXIX (1952), 4-6.
"Rousseau the Pessimistic Evolutionist," Yale French Studies,
XXVIII (1961-1962), 83-96.
"Une science de la politique est-elle possible?" Revue des Travaux de
l'Acaddmie des Sciences morales et politiques, CXI (1958), 51-
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"Utopia, 1980," Spectator, February 14, 1964, 204.
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THE SENSITIVE CITIZEN:

MODERNITY AND AUTHORITY IN THE

Du Contract Social de Jean-Jacques Rousseau, precede d'un essai sur

We are not merely, or even mainly, a thinking machine. We are a

* While an extensive bibliography of Jouvenel's writings is appended to this

J ean-Jacques Rousseau claimed to understand the nature and lim-

i See Roy Pierce, Contemporary French Political Thought (Oxford University

scurity. Jouvenel's earliest studies of the relation of politics and eco-

ROUSSEAU AND JOUVENEL

At the height of the Enlightenment, when progress, reason, in-

failed in their attempt when they attributed to man in his natural

6 Rousseau, The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter I.

Rousseau's political philosophy may, then, be said to have two

7 Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty, pp. 302-3.

This twofold misconception of basing social order either on en-

BEYOND ROUSSEAU: THE NATURE OF FREEDOM

In both works Jouvenel attacks two common misconceptions

to young Emile, Jouvenel responds, "man is no Robinson Crusoe,

The famous battle-cry, "Man is born free" is the greatest non-

Rousseau's conception of natural liberty or autonomy cannot be re-

It is psychologically necessary to successful totalitarianism that man

In somber fact a man is never free from obligations, but some

In light of these axioms Jouvenel's theoretical and practical ef-

most recent collection of essays, Du Principat, links analysis of past

For Jouvenel, this theory of "pessimistic evolution" outlined in

THE DISORDER OF MODERNITY

"The history of the West from the time of Europe's fragmenta-

35 Ibid. See also Roger Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau.

contemporains oil le corps politique se trouve en fait regi par une

For once man is declared "the measure of all things" there is no

be abrogated by three historical developments: "Irreligion, legal

Thus, the intellectual and spiritual crises of modernity comple-

The Political or Historical Crisis.

Let no man think that the democratic character of the group is

as its effective exercise passes from the hands of an oligarchy, sub-

58 Problems of Socialist England, p. VII.

61 Ethics of Redistribution, p. IX.

possibilities. The second opinion views Power as essentially a men-

We posited at the beginning a Power whose essence was egoist;

monster was so hideous and so dangerous King Minos hid it away in

It is possible with the help of prudently balanced institutions to

Summation: The Legitimacy Crisis. We have seen the political

plex social edifice, the sovereign became in modern political philos-

THE INTELLECTUAL RESPONSE TO DISORDER

Following his rejection of modernity, Jouvenel is plunged into a

87 Jouvenel's analysis seems clearly superior to the identification of authority

his defense of social liberty and democratic responsibility, always ex-

The phenomenon called "authority" is at once more ancient and

there must be an individual who takes the initiative, who calls

from the verb augere, `augment,' and what authority or those in

One thing is certain: that no aggregate can hold together if the

The ability to bring others to accept our projects is a phenome -

in action-efficient imperatives at work-is clearly visible in every fac-

tics Jouvenel adopts the more sociological labels intenders and- at

as if human societies cannot support for very long a central power

I want to use the word "authority" to denote the position in which

102 pure Theory of Politics, p. 174.

Jouvenel demonstrates the logical possibility of a society in which

107 Ibid, p. 131.

beneficial. Conflict and uncertainty are reduced, and most projects

Informal authority is the better liked: it does not follow that it is

116 Ibid, p. 118.