Kyra Majewski

PHL 230W
Final Essay Prompt #3 (Debating Climate Ethics)
First Draft

The fate of the climate becomes increasingly jeopardized by rising levels of pollution and

the resulting destruction of various ecologies. Questions of environmental justice arise and

governments and organizations scramble to organize and act. Failure to fully coordinate goals

and interests is inevitable, because different powers have conflicting stakes in the industries that

contribute to environmental degradation. Fear of paying reparations and taking responsibility for

the harm committed (past, future, and present) on ecologies and populations further restricts

coordination. However, when enacting and discussing policy change, one main obstacle appears,

making it difficult to even establish a framework on which to develop climate policy. This

obstacle is climate ethics. Whether or not to write new policy using climate ethics as the

foundation is incredibly troubling to policymakers and governments as a whole, internationally.

While it is usually agreed upon that there are ethical considerations relevant to enacting any

policy, constructing policy using ethical principles to guide its outcomes is a contested approach.

Stephen Gardiner and David Weisbach take two opposing perspectives on this matter in their co-

authored book Debating Climate Ethics. It begins with Gardiner’s argument in favor of climate

ethics, then turns to Weisbach’s argument in favor of self-interest based climate policy, and

finishes with their responses to one another. I will examine their arguments in detail, in order to

contribute a perspective of my own to the debate.

Stephen Gardiner begins his defense of climate ethics with the assertion that ethics are

fundamental in addressing what he describes as the “perfect moral storm.”1 It is necessary that

climate policy addresses the aspects of humanity affected by climate change, going beyond just

1 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 8.
limiting greenhouse gas emissions. Gardiner states that ethical decisions that affect “justice,

rights, political legitimacy, community, and humanity’s relationship with nature”2 are intrinsic to

climate policy. Environmental justice and rights range from the human right to clean water,

examined by Maude Barlow in Blue Future,3 to the ability to breathe clean air and experience

healthy nature. Identifying the most pressing problem of climate change, the degradation of the

quality of life (both human and non-human), requires concepts outside of the rational economic

perspective. To make decisions on climate policy without these considerations would be a

flawed, shortsighted approach, according to Gardiner.4 An economic “realist” focuses on short-

term, single-track solutions, such as an initial change in the emission levels of countries and

immediate economic trends. This is one of his strongest reasons for supporting climate ethics,

fearing that an approach based solely on economic realism would have immoral aspects, such as

what he calls “climate extortion,” or the pressuring of smaller, poorer nations to pay off

wealthier, more developing nations to limit their pollution.5

An important point that Gardiner makes regarding the failure to consider climate ethics in

climate policy is the inherent bias towards the term ‘ethics’ as a whole when discussing policy.

Ethical concepts as governing principles are often dismissed for being too utopian or idealistic in

nature, contrasting with the ultra-realist economic approach. The serious discussion of ethics in

politics is often belittled with demeaning language that works to frame ethical concerns as

irrelevant and detrimental to policy-making.6 This point is brought up by Stephen Gardiner in

Part II of the text, and will be discussed further later. Gardiner asserts the opposite point that

operating without ethics puts the world at an even greater risk for acting unjustly, inviting the

2 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 8.

3 Maude Barlow, “The Fight for the Right to Water,” in Blue Future (The New Press, 2014), 20-32.
4 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 11.
5 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 9.
6 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 48.
domination of poorer nations by wealthier ones. It appears that Gardiner views sustainability and

its necessity through the lens of the Brundtland definition presented in Living Well Now and in

the Future, written by Randall Curren and Ellen Metzger. Defined in this text, the Brundtland

definition of sustainability “entails a standard of global justice”7 that coincides with Gardiner’s

position that ethics are invaluable in climate policy.

Gardiner addresses Weisbach’s position on the economic realist approach to climate

policy throughout the first section of the text. He is skeptical of an economic realist approach for

the reasons touched upon above, such as the diminished value of justice and the limited scope of

the perspective in terms of time and populations. However, he is also concerned about the

adequacy of the economic realist to address the complexity of the perfect storm that is climate

change. Climate change is considered a wicked problem, defined by Sandra Batie in Wicked

Problems and Applied Economics, as “untamed problems, are dynamically complex, ill-

structured, public problems” without single causes or solutions.8 Gardiner notes the “dispersion

of causes and effects” as well as the “fragmentation of agency” common in attempts to address

climate policy.9 He goes on to criticize the optimism of Weisbach concerning the capabilities of

existing institutions, institutions he deems inadequate in effectively confronting all facets of the

climate change problem.10 Lastly, Gardiner focuses on Weisbach’s support of self-interest

climate policy, which involves reducing emissions quickly and cost-effectively. Gardiner asserts

that the term “self” is not robust against time and the changing world, as what is defined as one’s

“self” will change over time to be all-encompassing beyond borders and generations.11 Acting in

one’s own-self interest in an unsustainable practice when applied universally, and cooperation

7 Randall Curren and Ellen Metzger, Living Well Now and in the Future (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2017), 15.
8 Sandra S. Batie, Wicked Problems and Applied Economics (Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, 2008), 1.
9 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 16.
10 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 19 & 67.
11 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 65.
will be essential to our health and survival. An analysis of Weisbach’s argument against climate

ethics is necessary to understand Gardiner’s criticisms of the economic realist perspective.

David Weisbach, an economist, holds a far more conservative view than his colleague,

Stephen Gardiner. Being an economic realist, Weisbach’s criticism of climate ethics is reliant on

the opposing theory of self-interest in conjunction with the flaws present in existing theories of

ethics. He posits the importance of acting in our own self-interest, meaning quickly and cost-

effectively in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, which he calls “a surprisingly near-term

problem.”12 Doing so requires practical policy-making without pondering ethical implications.

Weisbach begins his section of the text with the assertion that existing ethical theories suffer

from “serious and systematic flaws”13 that render them woefully insufficient in addressing

problems of climate change. He goes on to analyze two flaws in great detail, the first being the

existence of “climate change blinders” described as the tendency of philosophers to almost

exclusively use climate policy as a way to address ethical issues.14 This is an intelligible

objection, as there have been many cases of environmental injustice that may be conflated with

exploitation of poverty, such as the Flint water crisis, or the toxic disaster of Love Canal. Here,

those in power weaponized nature against vulnerable populations for economic gain, which isn’t

so much an issue of climate instability, but corruption and greed. The second flaw he identifies is

the infeasibility of actions suggested by ethical decisions about climate change.15 He gives the

example of distribution equity, which he argues is impossible in our current world given the

extent of existing inequality. This, to me, resembles an argument against affirmative action, and

my response is just because inequality is institutionalized at this point doesn’t mean efforts to

12 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 179.

13 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 139.
14 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 139-140.
15 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 141.
increase equality are futile. He, however, sees these theories as wholly inadequate, and without

enough time to wait for new theories to arise, he has dismissed climate ethics altogether. This is

interesting, as Gardiner notes early on that economic realist policies “often end up appealing to

wider ethical values, such as global welfare or limited intergenerational responsibility.”16 He

claims that ethics are inherent to policy-making, though Weisbach remains a climate ethics

denier.

Weisbach’s response to Gardiner largely takes the form of rejecting ethical theories as a

feasible way to address climate change, as described above. There is greater emphasis on

disproving Gardiner’s defense of climate ethics than on an effective alternative theory. Weisbach

does go on to question the practicality of climate ethics, using specific scenarios17 involving

distribution equity in order to convey the impracticality of distribution ethics in a starkly unequal

world. He also discusses the utopian nature of climate ethics and their tendency to detract from

effective policy-making. He states that talks of ethics are “at best idle chatter, and at worst, divert

our attention from actual solutions."18 This coincides with his opinion on climate change

blinders, restricting development of efficient, quick, and cheap methods of reducing greenhouse

gas emissions. Weisbach makes very cohesive arguments against climate ethics, but I believe

degrades the ethical approach a bit more than what is appropriate.

My perspective on the issue is fragmented, as is the issue itself. It is difficult to dispel one

perspective here in favor of the other here, solely because of the complexity of addressing

climate change. It would be inaccurate for me to say that I was completely swayed by Gardiner

or Weisbach, though I most definitely see the merits in each argument. In response to Gardiner, I

agree with Weisbach in that there are idealistic tendencies present in ethical approaches to

16 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 9.

17 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 206 & 207.
18 Stephen M. Gardiner and David A. Weisbach, Debating Climate Ethics, 142.
climate policy. These are not simple situations that can be solved with sending large sums of

money to developing nations in the name of distributive justice for climate reparations. There are

certainly flaws in existing ethical theories and frameworks, a point conceded by Gardiner, and I

agree that there is no time to wait for a new theory to emerge. The practicality of using these

existing theories to take action is overestimated, especially theories reliant on distributional

equity of use of common goods, such as natural resources and the atmosphere, seeing as unequal

industrial development has forever unbalanced these scales. However, how different is

developing a plan to address climate change and environmental injustice using the most basic

principles of justice, such as those proposed by Rawls19 in Justice as Fairness, and working from

there, adapting them to construct a just strategy to combat climate change? The incredibly

complex problem of developing climate policy that is effective and feasible will be complicated

no matter what framework is used to address it. I do not believe that survival should be an issue

of economics. Although I appreciate and agree with Weisbach’s emphasis on the urgency of the

issue, I believe that if significant changes and serious actions are going to occur, considerations

should be made for the future beyond a couple generations. Self-interest in the immediate future

can only get an individual or group so far considering everyone wants the same thing, instant

gratification in terms of greenhouse gas emissions and cost-efficiency. Cooperation beyond

national identity is essential to address a problem that extends into every jurisdiction, every

human-occupied space. Weisbach discounts the intrinsic presence of ethics in policy-making in

general, placing too much value on the economic interests of governments and industries. There

are certain facets of humanity, such as the wellbeing and survival of our species, that should exist

outside of an economic context. However, I understand the extent to which money governs the

world, and how unlikely it is that that will change until we are too far gone.

19 Rawls, J., & Kelly, E., Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2001), 42-43.
 Works Cited

Barlow, Maude. “The Fight for the Right to Water.” In Blue Future. The New Press, 2014.

Batie, Sandra S. Wicked Problems and Applied Economics. Agricultural and Applied Economics

Association, 2008.

Curren, Randall and Ellen Metzger. Living Well Now and in the Future. Massachusetts: The MIT

Press, 2017.

Gardiner, Stephen M. and David A. Weisbach. Debating Climate Ethics. New York: Oxford

University Press, 2016.

Rawls, J., & Kelly, E. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of

Harvard University Press, 2001. 42-43