CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF AN ENTRY in order that a person may avail of any one of them.
in order that a person may avail of any one of them. The present petition apparently satisfies the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Benguet and ANITA PO alias VERONICA PAO, assisted by her mother HELEN
POA, respondents.
Can a petition for a change of name and the correction of certain entries in the civil registry be joined in the
same proceeding? This is the issue posed in this petition for review of a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Baguio and Benguet.
The record of the case discloses that on August 28, 1968, the herein private respondent Anita Po alias
Veronica Pao, a resident of Baguio City, filed with the then Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet a
Petition for the change other name from Anita Po to Veronica Pao.2 For this purpose, she also sought court
permission to have her birth records corrected in that her father's name appearing as PO YU be corrected to
PAO YU and her mother's name recorded as PAKIAT CHAN be changed to HELEN CHAN. At the time the
litigation was commenced, the petitioner was a 16-year old minor. Thus, she was assisted in the case by her
mother. The suit was docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 642.
The petitioner alleged before the trial court that the maiden name of her mother is Helen Chan and that the
given name Pakiat written on her birth certificate is actually the given name of her maternal grandmother. The
petitioner also asserted that the name of her father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as erroneously written in her birth
certificate and as such her real surname is Pao. She assigns these alleged errors to the common
misunderstanding of Chinese names. The petitioner also averred that she had been baptized by a Catholic
priest and that she was christened as Veronica Pao, the first being her Christian given name and the latter
being the correct spelling of her surname; that since her childhood up to the present, she had always been
known and referred to as Veronica Pao and not Anita Po.
On the basis of these allegations, the petitioner asked the trial court to allow her change of name and to order
the correction of her records in the Local Civil Registrar's Office at La Trinidad, Benguet to conform to the
name Veronica Pao. She also asked the trial court to order the correction of her father's name recorded in her
birth certificate from Po Yu to Pao Yu, as well as her mother's name appearing as Pakiat Chan changed
to Helen Chan.
At the hearing scheduled by the trial court on March 4,1969, the Office of the Solicitor General presented its
Opposition to the Petition and sought the dismissal of the same. The thrust of the said Opposition is that the
remedies prayed for by the petitioner cannot be allowed by the mere submission of the said Petition. The
pertinent portions of the written arguments in the Opposition are as follows —
... A petition for change of name is filed under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court ... and a petition for correction or
cancellation of entries in the Civil Register is filed under Rule 108 of the same Rules... . Rule 103 and Rule 108
are distinct and separate from each other and each provides for different requirements that must be satisfied
1
requirements of Rule 103 on change of name but fails insofar as the request for correction of certain entries is
concerned because the civil registrar concerned and the other parties affected by the corrections sought to be
made have not been included in the petition as required by section 3 of Rule 108. And from the nature of the
change sought to be made by the herein petitioner in her surname, it seems that orderly and proper
procedure requires that a correction be first made of the alleged errors in the names of the petitioner's
parents to justify her petition for change of name. Thus, petitioner alleges that her father's name is correctly
Pao Yu but the same is recorded in her birth certificate as Po Yu However, in the said birth certificate,
petitioner's name appears as Anita Po following the name of her father as registered in the same birth
certificate, which is Po Yu. It therefore appears that until the name of the father is shown to have been
registered erroneously, there is no justification for allowing the petitioner to use the surname Poa The
importance and necessity of first determining the propriety of the corrections sought to be made by the
herein petitioner before allowing her to change her name is magnified when it is noted that the corrections
sought involve the very identity of the parents of the herein petitioner, without a clear-cut clarification of
which, the court may unwittingly allow itself to become an instrument in the substitution in a public record of
the Identities of certain persons.
In view of these circumstances, it appears that considered as a petition for change of name, the present
petition does not state a cause of action considering that on the basis of the data appearing in the birth
certificate, petitioner's father is Po Yu and not Pao Yu And the present petition can not be considered
(sufficient) in form and substance as a petition for correction because it does not satisfy the requirements set
forth by section 3 (Rule 108) of the Rules of Court and there is no allegation of how the alleged error was
committed.
In a Decision dated July 24,1969, the trial court, with respondent Judge Feliciano Belmonte presiding therein,
ruled in favor of the petitioner. 4 The petitioner was allowed to change her name from Anita Po to Veronica
Pao. The court also allowed the correction of the names of her parents as prayed for in the Petition in the
registry of birth. The Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad Benguet was ordered to implement the corresponding
corrections.
On behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, the Office of the Solicitor General elevated the case to this Court
by way of the instant Petition. 5 The Solicitor General raises the following issues —
(1) Whether or not the private respondent Anita Po alias Veronica Pao has presented a proper and reasonable
cause for the change of her name; and
(2) Whether or not the names Po Yu and Pakiat Chan appearing in the birth certificate of Anita Po can be
changed in the same proceeding for the change of name of Anita Po.
The parties having submitted their respective briefs, the case is now submitted for decision.
We have gone through the entire record of the case and We find merit in the instant Petition.
The allegations of the private respondent are not disputed by the petitioner. The respondent Judge rendered
judgment in accordance with these undisputed facts. A conclusion of a court drawn from undisputed facts
raises a question of law. 6 The issues raised in the instant Petition are directed against the conclusions arrived
at by the respondent Judge and drawn from undisputed facts. Taking into account these observations and
considering that the resolution of the issues raised herein would not require this Court to re-examine the
evidence presented before the trial court, We hold that the two issues raised in this Petition are questions of
law. Inasmuch as the two issues are related to each other, they will be resolved together.
In fine, the petitioner maintains that her correct name is Veronica Pao inasmuch as Veronica is her Christian
name and Pao is the surname of her father. She does not, however, deny that the name of her father
appearing in her birth certificate is Po Yu and not Pao Yu. She assigns the discrepancy to mere clerical error.
An examination of her allegations reveal that her claim to the supposed correct name of  Veronica Pao is
predicated on the assumption that the correct name other father is Pao Yu and not Po Yu as recited in her own
birth certificate. The assumption is baseless, absent any proof that the name other father in her birth
certificate was entered erroneously. As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, until the
name of her father is shown to have been registered in her birth certificate erroneously, there is no
justification for allowing the petitioner to use the surname Pao. The corrections sought by the petitioner
involve the very Identity of her parents. Surely, the propriety of such corrections should first be determined in
a different proceeding more adversary in character than the summary case instituted by the petitioner with
the trial court. Aside from the change of her name, the petitioner seeks a correction of entries in the civil
registry for the benefit of her parents. This she may not do through a summary proceeding. The summary
procedure for correction of the civil register under Rule 108 is confined to innocuous or clerical errors and not
to a material change in the spelling of a surname as prayed for by the petitioner.  7 A clerical error must be
apparent on the face of the record and should be capable of being corrected by reference to the record
alone. 8 The petitioner seeks more than just the correction of a clerical error.
Moreover, under Section 3 of Rule 108, when cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is
sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
should be made parties to the proceeding. An inspection of all the pleadings filed by the petitioner with the
trial court shows that the local civil registrar concerned was never made a party to the proceeding. Said civil
registrar being an indispensable party, a final determination of the case cannot be made. 9
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the
other for the sole purpose of expediency To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules
of Court allowing the change of one's name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon
meritorious grounds. If both reliefs are to be sought in the same proceedings all the requirements of Rules 103
and 108 must be complied with.
2
Accordingly, We hold that the Petition filed with the trial court is not sufficient in form and substance and
should have been dismissed by the trial court for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in
Special Proceeding Case No. 642 dated July 24,1969 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared to be without force or
effect. The entries in the local civil registry of La Trinidad, Benguet pertaining to the petitioner Anita Po and
her parents Po Yu and Pakiat Chan stand as they were before such Decision. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Local Civil Registrar of La Trinidad, Benguet for his information and implementation. We make
no pronouncement as to costs.
MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA,  Petitioners, vs.
THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, minor PATRICK ALVIN TITULAR
BRAZA, represented by LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR and LUCILLE C. TITULAR, Respondents.
Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as "Pablito Sicad
Braza," were married1 on January 4, 1978. The union bore Ma. Cristina’s co-petitioners Paolo Josef 2 and Janelle
Ann3 on May 8, 1978 and June 7, 1983, respectively, and Gian Carlo 4 on June 4, 1980.
Pablo died5 on April 15, 2002 in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.
During the wake following the repatriation of his remains to the Philippines, respondent Lucille Titular (Lucille)
began introducing her co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma.
Cristina thereupon made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate 6 from the
Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental with the following entries:
Name of Child : PATRICK ALVIN CELESTIAL TITULAR
Date of Birth : 01 January 1996
Mother : Lucille Celestial Titular
Father : Pablito S. Braza
Date Received at the Local January 13, 1997
Civil Registrar :
Annotation : "Late Registration"
Annotation/Remarks : "Acknowledge (sic) by the father Pablito Braza on January 13, 1997"
 Remarks : Legitimated by virtue of subsequent marriage of parents on April 22,
1998 at Manila. Henceforth, the child shall be known as Patrick Alvin
Titular Braza (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
7 marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in
Ma. Cristina likewise obtained a copy  of a marriage contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married on
April 22, 1998, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file on December 23, 2005 before the Regional Trial Court
of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition 8 to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the
Local Civil Register.
Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille and Pablo,
said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma. Cristina and Pablo,
petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with respect to his legitimation,
the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name "Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon,
Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Parick to DNA testing  to
determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in
his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.
On Patrick’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, the trial court, by Order 9 of September 6, 2007,
dismissed the petition without prejudice, it holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the
court, which is not acting as a family court under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul
the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA
test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration having been denied by Order 10 of November 29, 2007, they filed the
present petition for review.
Petitioners maintain that the court a quo may pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy
even in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar. Citing Cariño v. Cariño,11 Lee v. Court of
Appeals12 and Republic v. Kho,13 they contend that even substantial errors, such as those sought to be
corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108. 14
The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy
and filiation.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis a vis Article 412 of the Civil Code 15 charts the procedure by which an entry in
the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used
only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is
one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a
mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of
3
a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. 16
The allegations of the petition filed before the trial court clearly show that petitioners seek to nullify the
connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.
Petitioners insist, however, that the main cause of action is for the correction of Patrick’s birth records 17 and
that the rest of the prayers are merely incidental thereto.
Petitioners’ position does not lie. Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s
marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not
by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 18 of the Family
Code, respectively, hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said
Code.1avvphi1
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such
as the petition filed before the court a quo.
Petitioners’ reliance on the cases they cited is misplaced.
Cariño v. Cariño  was an action filed by a second wife against the first wife for the return of one-half of the
death benefits received by the first after the death of the husband. Since the second wife contracted marriage
with the husband while the latter’s marriage to the first wife was still subsisting, the Court ruled on the validity
of the two marriages, it being essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the death benefits.
In Lee v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that contrary to the contention that the petitions filed by the therein
petitioners before the lower courts were actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer was not to declare that the
petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng as stated in their records of birth but to establish that
they are not the latter’s children, hence, there was nothing to impugn as there was no blood relation at all
between
the petitioners and Keh Shiok Cheng. That is why the Court ordered the cancellation of the name of Keh Shiok
Cheng as the petitioners’ mother and the substitution thereof with "Tiu Chuan" who is their biological mother.
Thus, the collateral attack was allowed and the petition deemed as adversarial proceeding contemplated
under Rule 108.
In Republic v. Kho, it was the petitioners themselves who sought the correction of the entries in their
respective birth records to reflect that they were illegitimate and that their citizenship is "Filipino," not
Chinese, because their parents were never legally married. Again, considering that the changes sought to be
made were substantial and not merely innocuous, the Court, finding the proceedings under Rule 108 to be
adversarial in nature, upheld the lower court’s grant of the petition.
It is thus clear that the facts in the above-cited cases are vastly different from those obtaining in the present
case.
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,vs.DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR
GENERAL, Respondents.
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch
11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari 2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. 3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. 4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada
soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was
shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on
January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and
registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of
the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage
between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of
1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision, 7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not
the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, 8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine
law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
4
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III; 10 the
provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." 11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC
ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino
spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case,
as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the
Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The
Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments, 14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void 15 and voidable16 marriages. In both
cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at
the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
cause arising after the marriage. 17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
citizens.18 recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to
remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, 19 enacted
already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
law.26
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino
prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the law
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no
this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused
rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to
to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between
dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article
the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital
26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the
bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which
to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:
not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 22
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
title of the thing; and
Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital
status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the (b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence
Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. 24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the
Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond; 25 Article 17 of To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party
the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law. 27
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

5
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench
not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign and the bar to what had been done.
is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." 28 This
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all
herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or in another action
his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own
where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not." 35
In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity and status
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the
that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the
Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies
registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:
attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in
the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) entered:
authenticated by the seal of his office.
(a) births;
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, 30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce. 31 Under this (b) deaths;
situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we
(c) marriages;
deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law. (d) annulments of marriages;

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will be (e) divorces;
served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time,
will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive (f) legitimations;
evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake (g) adoptions;
of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata 32 between (h) acknowledgment of natural children;
the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 33
(i) naturalization; and
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign
(j) changes of name.
judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper
basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books,
effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
(1) Birth and death register;
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded dissolved marriages.
the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

6
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of
the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in
relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res
judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce
decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone
of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, 36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 37 – both of
which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a
marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For
being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition
is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for
the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without
judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a
special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule
108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied
with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It
also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located;38 that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest
must be made parties to the proceedings; 39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a
newspaper of general circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the
present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial
proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
7
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the
REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy
of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), Respondent.
Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of
Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live
birth1 shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez
Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR  CHANGE OF
NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG."
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that
his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage." 2 Respondent also
submitted his academic records from elementary up to college 3 showing that he carried the surname
"Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. 4 In the 1998, 2001
and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name
"JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."5
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, 6 respondent amended his petition by alleging therein
compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.7
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside
in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. 8 And a copy
of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court
which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. 9
By Decision of January 8, 2009,10 the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar
of Makati City to:
1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein
respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG";
3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis
and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court
by Order of July 2, 2009, 11 hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure
question of law.
The Republic assails the decision in this wise: I. . . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME… INVOLVES THE
CHANGE OF [RESPONDENT’S] CIVIL STATUS FROM LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE, SHOULD
BE MADE THROUGH APPROPRIATE ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS…
II. THE TRIAL COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED THE DELETION OF THE NAME OF
RESPONDENT’S FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH CERTIFICATE.12 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondent’s
parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,
hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. 13
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondent’s parents’ date of marriage and the name of
respondent’s father from the entries in respondent’s birth certificate, 14 the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction,
such order not being in accord with respondent’s prayer reading:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the Honorable Court issue an
order allowing the change of name of petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO to
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG, and that the Honorable Court order the Local Civil
Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to reflect the said change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the premises. 15 (underscoring supplied)
Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in nature. He cites the serving
of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the
OSG; the posting of copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before the
hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to appear on behalf of the Republic;
the publication of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and
the fact that no oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing. 16
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds
including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when
the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d)
8
when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith
and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice
public interest.17 Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. 18 In Alfon, the Court
allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in
order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname
of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was
lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough
to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his
parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant
respondent’s supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic19 categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate
to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings . . ."
Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate,  Rule 108 applies. It
reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties
to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in
which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was
registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the
RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.
Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote 20 in support of his claim that his change of name was
effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Belmonte,21 illuminates, however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103] regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the
other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules
of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon
meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)
Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies,
respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside
from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents
in the case.
Republic v. Labrador22 mandates that "a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil
registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have
any interest that would be affected thereby." It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation
to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.
Labayo-Rowe23 highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties in a petition which involves
substantial and controversial alterations. In that case, the therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe
(Emperatriz) filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat,
Jr. and Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz alleged that her name
appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her
civil status appearing in the birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as "married" on "1953 Bulan" are
erroneous because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the data in said
birth certificate.
The trial court found merit in Emperatriz’s petition and accordingly directed the local civil registrar to change
her name appearing in her children’s birth certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil
status in Victoria’s birth certificate from "married" to "single" and the date and place of marriage to "no
marriage."
On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order of the trial court involved a
question of law, the Court nullified the trial court’s order directing the change of Emperatriz’ civil status and
the filiation of her child Victoria in light of the following observations:
9
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been
made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with
the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or represented. The truth is best ascertained
under an adversary system of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would be substantially impaired if her status would
be changed from "legitimate" to "illegitimate." Moreover, she would be exposed to humiliation and
embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter.  The fact that
the notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof
was served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all the other
provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority
under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules "shall not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights." If Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless
changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to
comprehend substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule
would thereby become an unconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase or modify substantive
rights. This situation is not contemplated under Article 412 of the Civil Code. 24 (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides: SEC. 4. Notice and publication.—Upon the
filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause
the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition.—The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to
different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the
second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are
mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted,
which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition
(15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).
This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals. 25 In that case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina)
filed a petition for correction of entries in the birth certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion
Maravilla to June Salvacion "Gustilo," Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her daughter’s real father.
Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court a "CONSTANCIA" wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter. The
trial court granted the petition.
After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of the
Order of the trial court granting the change of June’s family name to Gustilo.
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, filed before the
appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the
trial court’s Order as Mary Joy was, by Barco’s claim, also fathered by Gustilo.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-in-intervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in Nadina’s petition for correction
of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to
exhaustively identify all the affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of
Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. 1awphi1 Her interest was
affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando
would affect her ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of
Mary Joy’s existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to
whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the
granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or
illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. x x x x.
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section
3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x x x x.26 (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho, 27 Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the civil registrar as the sole
respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil
registry of Butuan City, and correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlito’s minor children. Carlito and
his siblings requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of their mother Epifania to
"Filipino," instead of "Chinese," and the deletion of the word "married" opposite the phrase "Date of marriage
of parents" because their parents ─ Juan and Epifania ─ were not married. And Carlito requested the
correction in the birth certificates of their children of his and his wife’s date of marriage to reflect the actual
date of their marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course of the hearing of the petition,
Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his wife from Maribel to "Marivel."
The Khos’ mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that she was not married to Juan who
died before the filing of the Khos’ petition.
10
The trial court granted the petition.
On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos’ parents rendered the trial of the petition
short of the required adversary proceedings and the trial court’s judgment void, this Court held that when all
the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of hearing cures the
failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court noted that the affected parties were already
notified of the proceedings in the case since the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the
petition respecting their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual date of his
marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the Khos’ petition for change of their civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself took the witness stand declaring that she was not married to their
father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil
registrar and the parties who would naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or
cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who is inadvertently left out or
is not established to be known by the petitioner to be affected by the grant of the petition or actually
participates in the proceeding is notified through publication.
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of
marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of
Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.
ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Armi A. Alba, and ARMI A. ALBA,
in her personal capacity, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C. HERRERA, Respondents.
Assailed in this petition for certiorari1 are the February 27, 2004 decision 2 and the May 14, 2004 resolution 3 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883, which dismissed petitioner’s original action for annulment of
judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, and denied the motion for reconsideration,
respectively.
The antecedent facts show that on October 21, 1996, private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a
petition5 for cancellation of the following entries in the birth certificate of "Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.", to wit:
(1) the surname "Herrera" as appended to the name of said child; (2) the reference to private respondent as
the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the alleged marriage of private respondent to the child’s
mother, Armi A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong City. He claimed that the challenged entries
are false and that it was only sometime in September 1996 that he learned of the existence of said birth
certificate.
Private respondent alleged that he married only once, i.e., on June 28, 1965 with Ezperanza C. Santos and
never contracted marriage with Armi nor fathered Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr. In support thereof, he presented
certifications from the Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City 6 and the National Statistics Office,7 both stating that
they have no record of marriage between private respondent and Armi.
On November 12, 1996, private respondent filed an amended petition, 8 impleading Armi and "all the persons
who have or claim any interest in th[e] petition."9
On November 27, 1996, the trial court issued an Order setting the petition for hearing on January 24, 1997,
and directed the publication and service of said order to Armi at her address appearing in the birth certificate
which is No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, and to the Civil Registrar of the City of Manila and the Solicitor
General. The full text of the order, reads:
In a verified Amended Petition for Correction of Entry, the Petitioner prays, inter alia, that the following
entries appearing in the subject Certificate of Live Birth be deleted:
1. All informations having reference to him as the father of the child mentioned therein;
2. The surname "Herrera" appended to the child’s name;
3. His alleged marriage with the natural mother of the child.
Finding the Petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the Petition be set for hearing on January 24,
1997 at nine o’clock in the morning before this Branch at Rooms 447-449, Fourth Floor, Manila City Hall. All
interested parties are hereby notified of the said hearing and are ordered to show cause why the Petition
should not be granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published at the expense of the Petitioner, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Manila, and raffled pursuant to P.D. 1079.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the City of Manila with
copies of the Petition and of this Order.
Let the same be likewise furnished the Private Respondent Armi Alba Herrera at the address indicated in the
subject Certificate of Live Birth.
On January 13, 1997, before the scheduled January 24, 1997 hearing, the trial court issued an Amended
Order11 with substantially the same contents, except that the hearing was re-scheduled to February 26, 1997.
A copy of said Amended Order was published in "Today", a newspaper of general circulation in Manila in its
January 20, 27, and February 3, 1997 issues. Copies thereof were also sent to Armi at No. 418 Arquiza St.,
Ermita, Manila, on January 17, 1997, the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Solicitor General.
11
At the scheduled hearing on February 26, 1997, the counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General appeared
but filed no opposition to the petition. Armi, on the other hand was not present. The return of the notice sent
to her had the following notation:
This is to certify that on January 17, 1997, the undersigned [process server] personally served a copy of the
Amended Order in Sp. Proc. No. 96-80512 dated January 13, 1997 to the private respondent, Armi Alba
Herrera at … 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, but failed and unavailing for reason that (sic), private respondent
is no longer residing at said given address.12
On April 1, 1997, the court a quo rendered a decision which became final and executory on June 2, 1997. 13 The
dispositive portion thereof, states:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the
entry under the name of the child, the surname Herrera, Jr.[,] is ordered deleted, and the child shall be known
as ROSENDO ALBA; and that the entry under the date and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982,
Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila for proper correction and entry.
SO ORDERED.14
Private respondent filed a motion 15 for amendment of the decretal portion of the decision to include the
cancellation of all entries having reference to him as the father of petitioner minor. This was granted in the
August 11, 1997 order of the trial court as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, and pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the correction of the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., in such a way that the
entries under the name of the child, the surname Herrera, Jr., and the name of the father Rosendo Caparas
Herrera are ordered deleted, and the child shall be known as ROSENDO ALBA; and the entry under the date
and place of marriage, the date August 4, 1982, Mandaluyong, MM is likewise ordered deleted or cancelled.
SO ORDERED.16
On November 24, 2000, Armi and petitioner minor filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court
of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over their person. She allegedly came to
know of the decision of the trial court only on February 26, 1998, when San Beda College, where her son was
enrolled as a high school student, was furnished by private respondent with a copy of a court order directing
the change of petitioner minor’s surname from Herrera to Alba.
Armi averred that private respondent was aware that her address is at Unit 302 Plaza Towers Condominium,
1175 Lorenzo Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila, because such was her residence when she and private respondent
cohabited as husband and wife from 1982 to 1988; and her abode when petitioner minor was born on March
8, 1985. Even after their separation, private respondent continued to give support to their son until 1998; and
that Unit 302 was conveyed to her by private respondent on June 14, 1991 as part of his support to petitioner
minor. According to Armi, her address i.e., No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, as appearing in the birth
certificate of their son, was entered in said certificate through the erroneous information given by her sister,
Corazon Espiritu. She stressed that private respondent knew all along that No. 418 Arquiza St., is the residence
of her sister and that he deliberately caused the service of notice therein to prevent her from opposing the
petition.
In his answer, private respondent denied paternity of petitioner minor and his purported cohabitation with
Armi. He branded the allegations of the latter as "false statements coming from a polluted source." 17
On February 27, 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition holding, among others, that petitioner
failed to prove that private respondent employed fraud and purposely deprived them of their day in court. It
further held that as an illegitimate child, petitioner minor should bear the surname of his mother. 18 Petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, the instant petition. Under Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, judgments
may be annulled on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud.
Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her minor child depends
on the nature of private respondent’s action, that is, in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. An action in
personam is lodged against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing
itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to
subject that person’s interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. 20
Hence, petitions directed against the "thing" itself or the res,21 which concerns the status of a person, 22 like a
petition for adoption,23 annulment of marriage,24 or correction of entries in the birth certificate, 25 as in the
instant case, are actions in rem.
In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try
and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is
not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the  res.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is
brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and made effective. 26 The service of summons or notice to the defendant is
not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction but merely for satisfying the due process
requirements.27
In the case at bar, the filing with the trial court of the petition for cancellation vested the latter jurisdiction
over the res.  Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the status or
legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised
12
Rules of Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court. 28 Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is
vested with jurisdiction over the subject matter.
The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and the publication thereof in a newspaper of
general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the requirement of due process, the essence of which
is an opportunity to be heard. Said address appeared in the birth certificate of petitioner minor as the
residence of Armi. Considering that the Certificate of Birth bears her signature, the entries appearing therein
are presumed to have been entered with her approval. Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all
indispensable parties, including Armi and petitioner minor, which binds the whole world to the judgment that
may be rendered in the petition. An  in rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. 29 The
absence of personal service of the order to Armi was therefore cured by the trial court’s compliance with
Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
In Barco v. Court of Appeals, the trial court granted a petition for correction/change of entries in a minor’s
birth certificate to reflect the name of the minor’s real father as well as to effect the corresponding change of
her surname. In seeking to annul said decision, the other children of the alleged father claimed that they are
indispensable parties to the petition for correction, hence, the failure to implead them is a ground to annul the
decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals denied the petition which was sustained by this Court on the
ground, inter alia, that while petitioner is indeed an indispensable party, the failure to implead her was cured
by the publication of the order of hearing. Thus –
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the
petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her
ward’s share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joy’s existence
at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner
under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For
example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her
spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates
earnest effort on her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above.
Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the
defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication, thus:
Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general the rules.33 The deed cannot thus be the basis of ascribing knowledge of Armi’s address to private respondent
circulation in the province. inasmuch as the authenticity thereof was neither admitted by private respondent nor proven by petitioners.

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the While Armi presented the alleged love letters/notes from private respondent, they were only attached as
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section annexes to the petition and not formally offered as evidence before the Court of Appeals. More importantly,
3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out. The Court of Appeals correctly noted: said letters/notes do not have probative value because they were mere photocopies and never proven to be
an authentic writing of private respondent. In the same vein, the affidavits 34 of Armi and her sister, Corazon
The publication being ordered was in compliance with, and borne out by the Order of January 7, 1985. The
Espiritu, are of no evidentiary weight. The basic rule of evidence is that unless the affiants themselves are
actual publication of the September 22, 1983 Order, conferred jurisdiction upon the respondent court to try
placed on the witness stand to testify on their affidavits, such affidavits must be rejected for being hearsay.
and decide the case. While "nobody appeared to oppose the instant petition" during the December 6, 1984
Stated differently, the declarants of written statements pertaining to disputed facts must be presented at the
hearing, that did not divest the court from its jurisdiction over the case and of its authority to continue trying
trial for cross-examination.35 Inasmuch as Armi and her sister were not presented before the Court of Appeals
the case. For, the rule is well-settled, that jurisdiction, once acquired continues until termination of the case.
to affirm the veracity of their affidavits, the same are considered hearsay and without probative value.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem, an action against a thing and not against a person.  The
Ei incumbit probotio qui dicit, non qui negat. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. 36 Armi’s claim
decision on the petition binds not only the parties thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is
that private respondent is aware of her present address is anchored on the assertion of a live-in relationship
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for
and support to her son. Since the evidence presented by Armi is not sufficient to prove the purported
its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought
cohabitation and support, it follows that private respondent’s knowledge of Armi’s address was likewise not
to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and
proven. Thus, private respondent could not have deliberately concealed from the court that which was not
vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it. 30
shown to be known to him. The Court of Appeals therefore correctly dismissed the petition for annulment of
Furthermore, extrinsic fraud, which was private respondent’s alleged concealment of Armi’s present address, judgment on the ground of failure to establish extrinsic fraud.
was not proven. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party outside
The proper remedy of a party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of Appeals in an action to annul a judgment
of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by
of a Regional Trial Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
fraud or deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Here, Armi contended that private respondent is
Procedure, where only questions of law may be raised. The resort of petitioner to the instant civil action
aware of her present address because they lived together as husband and wife in the condominium unit from
for certiorari under Rule 65 is therefore erroneous. The special civil action of certiorari will not be allowed as a
1982 to 1988 and because private respondent continued to give support to their son until 1998. To prove her
substitute for failure to timely file a petition for review under Rule 45, which should be instituted within 15
claim, she presented (1) private respondent’s title over the condominium unit; (2) receipts allegedly issued to
days37 from receipt of the assailed decision or resolution. The wrong choice of remedy thus provides another
private respondent for payment of homeowner’s or association dues; (2) a photocopy of a January 14, 1991
reason to dismiss this petition.
deed of sale of the subject unit in favor of Armi; and (3) the subsequent title issued to the latter. However,
these documents only tend to prove private respondent’s previous ownership of the unit and the subsequent Finally, petitioner failed to establish the merits of her petition to annul the trial court’s decision. In an action
transfer thereof to Armi, but not the claimed live-in relationship of the parties. Neither does the sale prove for annulment of judgment, the petitioner must convince the court that something may indeed be achieved
that the conveyance of the unit was part of private respondent’s support to petitioner minor. Indeed, intimate should the assailed decision be annulled.39 Under Article 17640 of the Family Code as amended by Republic Act
relationships and family relations cannot be inferred from what appears to be an ordinary business (RA) No. 9255, which took effect on March 19, 2004, illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
transaction. mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the father’s surname.
In Wang v. Cebu Civil Registrar,41 it was held that an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the
Although the January 14, 1991 deed of sale 31 stated that Armi resides at 1175 L. Guerrero St., Ermita, Manila,
father, bears only a given name and his mother’s surname. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
the same is not sufficient to prove that private respondent has knowledge of Armi’s address because the
identifies him as such. It is only when said child is recognized that he may use his father’s surname, reflecting
former objected to the offer of the deed for being a mere photocopy. 32 The counsel for petitioners even
his status as an acknowledged illegitimate child.
admitted that they do not have the original of the deed and that per certification of the Clerk of Court, the
Notary Public who notarized the deed of sale did not submit a copy of the notarized document as required by In the present case, it is clear from the allegations of Armi that petitioner minor is an illegitimate child because
she was never married to private respondent. Considering that the latter strongly asserts that he is not the
13
father of petitioner minor, the latter is therefore an unrecognized illegitimate child. As such, he must bear the
surname of his mother.
In sum, the substantive and procedural aspects of the instant controversy do not warrant the annulment of
the trial court’s decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The February 27, 2004 decision and the May 14, 2004 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61883 are AFFIRMED.
PLATON AND LIBRADA CERUILA, Petitioners,vs.ROSILYN DELANTAR, represented by her guardian,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT, Respondent.
Petitioners-spouses Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila (Ceruilas) filed an action with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 97-818932, for the annulment and cancellation of the birth
certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Rosilyn), the child-victim in the rape case involving Romeo
Jaloslos.1 The RTC granted the Ceruilas’ petition in its decision dated April 11, 1997 2 which was nullified,
however, by the Court of Appeals (CA) on June 10, 1999. 3 The CA denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.4 Hence the present petition.
The antecedents are as follows: Sometime in 1996, Rosilyn complained against her father, Simplicio Delantar
(Simplicio) for child abuse, particularly prostitution. Simplicio was incarcerated at the Pasay City Jail starting
August 22, 1996 which prompted the filing of a petition for involuntary commitment of Rosilyn in favor of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), as the whereabouts of the mother, Librada Ceruila,
was unknown. The petition was granted by the RTC of Pasay City, Branch 119 on November 9, 1996 and
Simplicio’s motion to vacate said judgment was denied by said court on January 20, 1997. 5
On February 3, 1997, the Ceruilas filed a petition before the RTC of Manila, entitled "IN THE MATTER OF
CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR," praying
that the birth certificate of Rosilyn be canceled and declared null and void for the reasons that said birth
certificate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and
it falsified all material entries therein, as follows:
a. The name of her mother which should not be petitioner Librada A. Telin;
b. The signature of informant referring to ‘Librada T. Delantar’ being a forgery;
c. The name of Simplicio Delantar as the biological father, considering that, as already mentioned, he is merely
the foster father and co-guardian in fact of Maria Rosilyn and the name of the natural father in (sic) unknown;
d. The date of marriage of the supposed parents, since the parents reflected in said certificate were (sic)
actually full blood brother and sister and therefore marriage between the two is virtually impossible;
e. The status of Maria Rosilyn as a legitimate child as the same (sic) is actually not legitimate;
14
f. The date of actual birth of Marial (sic) Rosilyn, since the known father merely made it appear that she was
born at the time the informations for the birth certificate were supplied by him to the civil registrar or (sic)
proper recording;
g. The name of the physician who allegedly attended at the time of birth of Maria Rosilyn, being a fictitious ‘Dr.
Santos’.6
On February 7, 1997, the RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing on March 19, 1997 and directed the
publication of said order once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. The
Order also stated that any person who is interested in the petition may interpose his/her comment or
opposition thereto on or before the scheduled hearing. 7
Summons was sent to the Civil Register of Manila. 8 However, no representative appeared during the scheduled
hearing.9
On April 11, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition of the Ceruilas as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. DECLARING the certificate of live birth of the Minor Maria
Rosilyn Telin Delantar as registered under the Local Civil Registry No. 85-27325 of the office of the City Civil
Registrar of Manila as null and void ab initio: and
2. ORDERING the City Civil Registrar of Manila and the National Statistics Office, Manila, to expunge from their
respective marriage registers the entry of the birth of said minor and such other documents pertaining
thereto, if any.
The RTC explained in its Decision thus: During the initial trial, the petition was read aloud in open court to find
out if there is any opposition thereto. There being none, the petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Goering G.C.
Paderanga, then established the jurisdictional requirements (Exhibits "A" to "E"). 11 Thereafter, petitioner
husband Platon Ceruila was placed on the stand as the lone witness for the petitioner and after he completed
his testimony, Atty. Paderanga formally offered his evidence and rested his case.
The evidence on record reveals the following: On May 11, 1985, a child was born at the Dr. Jose Fabella
Memorial Hospital in Sta. Cruz, Manila. The name of the child was entered in her birth certificate as Maria
Rosilyn Telin Delantar (Exhibit "I"). In the said birth certificate the name of the child’s mother appear as
Librada A. Telin (Entry No. 6) while that of her father as Simplicio R. Delantar (Entry No. 9). The birth certificate
likewise shows that the parents of the child, Simplicio R. Delantar and Librada A. Telin, were married on
February 14, 1977 in Manila (Entry No. 12). Likewise, in Entry No. 21 of the same document, it is made to
appear that the mother of the child was 27 years old when the child was born and that she was attended in
her delivery thereof by Dr. Santos (Entry No. 13). The birth certificate was signed by one Librada T. delos
Santos as the informant and mother of the child with her given address as 2165 P. Burgos St., Pasay City (Entry
No. 14). This is the very certificate of live birth that is being seriously impugned by the herein petitioners.
In support of their petition, the petitioners submitted the baptismal certificates of Simplicio Delantar (Exhibit
"J") and Librada Delantar (Exhibit "K") to prove that they are full blood brother and sister and could not have
been possible for them to have sired Rosilyn (sic). In the said baptismal certificates, the names of the parents
of Simplicio and Librada are similarly entered as Juan Delantar and Carila Telen (Exhibit "J-1" and "K-1"). The
Court is inclined to concur with the observation of the petitioner that it is highly unlikely that the alleged
parents of Rosilyn would commit an incestuous act and proclaim to the whole world that they are the parents
of the herein minor. The court has also observed that in the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar, it is
entered therein that she was born on January 8, 1940 in Tubod, Manglanilla, Cebu (Exhibit "K-2"). Such being
the case, then Librada must have been 45 years of age at the time of the birth of Rosilyn in stark contrast to
her age appearing in Entry No. 27 (sic) of the birth certificate of the latter which shows that Librada was 27
years old at the time of her delivery. The presentation of the baptismal certificate of Librada Delantar as
secondary evidence of her birth certificate was resorted to after the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Minglanilla, Cebu gave a certification to the effect that the records of birth on file with the office for the period
January, 1940 to April, 1945 were all destroyed by WORLD WAR II (Exhibit "L"). And going for the jugular, so to
speak, the signature of the person named Librada T. delos Santos in the birth certificate (Exhibit "I") purporting
to be that of the petitioner wife and the signature of the latter appearing in the verification of the petitioner
(sic) (Exhibit "A-6") are so strikingly dissimilar that they could not have but proceeded from two different
hands. For it does not require the trained eye of an expert calligrapher to discern such discrepancy in the
writing style.
In fine, there being an abundance of evidence to support the petitioner’s claim that the birth certificate is
indeed a falsified document, the Court is left with no other alternative but to grant the relief prayed for in the
petition. To let the birth certificate reamin (sic) as it is would adversely affect the rights and interests of the
herein petitioners.12
On July 15, 1997, Rosilyn, represented by her legal guardian, the DSWD, filed, with the CA, a petition for the
annulment of judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth certificate. 13 She claimed that she
and her guardian were not notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned about the same
only from the news on May 16, 1997.14 She argued that the RTC decision was issued without jurisdiction and in
violation of her right to due process; that the Judge did not have authority to declare her to be illegitimate;
and that mere correction of entries, not cancellation of the entire certificate, is the appropriate remedy. 15
Rosilyn further argued that: granting, without admitting that Librada is not her mother, still it was erroneous
to cancel or annul her entire birth certificate; Librada is not an interested party concerning the issue of
whether Simplicio is the father, the date of actual birth, and the name of the physician who attended to the
birth;16 Librada’s allegations are also contradicted by (a) the "Records Based on Cord Dressing Room Book …
dated April 13-May 29, 1985," issued by Emelita H. Avinante, Head of the Medical Records Section and
Admitting Unit of the Fabella Hospital, which is attached to the petition for annulment as Annex "E" and which
states that Maria Rosilyn Delantar was born on May 11, 1985 at the Fabella Hospital and that her parents are
Librada Telin and Simplicio Delantar; 17 and (b) the admission of Simplicio in his Motion to Vacate Judgment 18 in
15
Sp. Proc. No. 96-41919 regarding the custody of Rosilyn, which is attached to the petition to annul as Annex "F,"
where he stated that he, as the rightful parent of Rosilyn, should not be deprived of his parental authority. 20
On June 10, 1999, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING NULL and VOID the decision of the respondent Regional Trial Court
dated April 11, 1997 in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893.
The CA reasoned that: As shown in the caption of the petition in Special Proceedings No. 97-81893 entitled "In
the Matter of Cancellation and Annulment of the Birth Certificate of Maria Rosilyn Telin Delantar", herein
petitioner Rosilyn Delantar represented by her legal guardian, DSWD, was not made a party-respondent
therein,…contrary to the mandatory provision of Section 3 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court …
In the said Special Proceeding No. 97-81893, petitioners therein, Platon Ceruila and Librada D. Ceruila, sought
not only a cancellation or correction of an entry in the birth certificate of Rosilyn Telin Delantar but in effect
sought to annul, cancel or expunge from the Civil Register the subject birth certificate. With more reasons,
therefore, that all parties, particularly Rosilyn Telin Delantar, or thru her legal guardian, the DSWD, whose
birth certificate was sought to be annulled or cancelled from the Civil Register must not only be notified but
must be made a party in the said petition.
Petitioner and her guardian are undoubtedly persons who have interest which would be affected by the
petition for the obvious reason that it is the entry of her birth which is being sought to be annulled and
cancelled.
In a similar case, the Supreme Court ruled that corrections of substantial entries in the certificate other than
mere clerical errors, should be passed upon in an appropriate adversary proceedings with all the persons
interested are made parties therein… Republic vs. Valencia (141 SCRA 462; 468-469; 470-474).
The proceedings undertaken in said Special Proceedings No. 97-81893 is indeed wanting of the required notice
to all the parties having claim or interest which would be affected thereby, and of the adversarial proceedings,
as disclosed in the decision dated April 11, 1997
With the foregoing disquisitions, We find that the decision dated April 11, 1997 null and void for want of
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner Rosilyn Delantar and the DSWD as her legal guardian and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected by the said decision. Also, the said decision
dated April 11, 1997 is considered null and void for lack of due process there being no adversarial proceedings
(was) conducted by the public respondent Regional Trial Court.
And, even if the same judgment had already become final and executory, and had in fact been executed, as in
the instant case, still the execution thereof produces no legal effects. 22
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. 23 Hence, the present petition raising the quo annullable; petitioners sought to establish Librada Ceruila’s status, i.e., whether or not she is the mother
following issues: of respondent, thus, the action falls within the ambit of Sec. 3(c), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court; 30 petitioners did
not allege that they are bringing the suit to enforce or protect their right or to prevent or redress a wrong, for
I.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
their case to be categorized as an ordinary civil action; Art. 5 of the Civil Code which is being invoked by
AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DECLARING NULL AND VOID THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE
petitioners is a general provision, while entries of record of birth in the civil register are governed by Republic
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA BRANCH 38 DATED APRIL 11, 1997 IN SPEC. PROCEEDING NO. 97-81893
Act No. 3753 (Civil Registry Law) as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 651; since the law provides for a
ENTITLED: IN THE MATTER OF CANCELLATION AND ANNULMENT OF THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE OF MARIA
remedy when an entry in a record found in the civil registry is erroneous or falsified, petitioners cannot, by
ROSILYN TELIN DELANTAR
their mere allegation, transport their case from the realm of the rules on special proceedings for the
II.WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED ITS PEREMPTORY correction of entry to that of an ordinary civil case for annulment of a falsified document; in Republic vs.
POWER TO DECLARE THE SUBJECT BIRTH CERTIFICATE NULL AND VOID AB INITIO. 24 Valencia,31 it was held that the parties who must be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation
or correction of an entry in the civil register are the civil registrar and all persons who have or who are claiming
As to the first issue, petitioners argue that: since the falsification of the entries in the birth certificate of interests who would be affected thereby; respondent, being a person whose interests would be adversely
Rosilyn renders the same void ab initio, the case should be liberally construed as an ordinary civil action for affected by the petition, is an indispensable party to the case; publication cannot be substituted for notice;
declaration of nullity of falsified documents based on Article 5 of the Civil Code 25 and Section 15, Rule 6 of the respondent cannot be declared in default since she was not properly notified. 32
Rules of Court26 and not as a special proceeding; petitioners were only constrained to utilize the provisions of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court on the Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry since Article 5 of Anent the second issue, respondent contends that the CA has no authority to rule on the merits of the case
the Civil Code provides no procedure for the nullification of void documents which happens to be a birth since in a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, its authority is limited to
certificate in this case; since the present case involves an ordinary civil action, the cases relied upon by the CA ruling on whether or not the petitioner was denied due process of law; that if the CA were to rule on the
which are applicable only to special proceedings should not be applied herein; the civil registrar, which is an merits of the case, it would have deprived respondent of due process; and that in any case, respondent’s
indispensable party, was duly served summons by mail; respondent, meanwhile, is not an indispensable party record of birth is not void as Librada was only able to prove that she is not the mother of respondent. 33
and granting that she is, she was deemed duly impleaded as her name was clearly stated in the caption of the
Preliminarily, this Court notes that while the petition states that it is one for review on  certiorari, it claimed at
case; respondent’s location could not be determined as she was reported to have ran away from the custody
the same time that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, which is
of Simplicio, thus the publication of the petition and the order of the RTC setting the case for hearing once a
properly a ground for a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and not for a petition for review on
week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation should be considered substantial
certiorari under Rule 45. Considering however the substance of the issues raised herein, we shall treat the
notice and the requirements of due process deemed substantially complied with; there was no adversarial
present petition, as it claims, to be a petition for review on certiorari.34
proceeding in court because the parties were declared in general default thus, just like an ordinary civil case,
the court should receive evidence ex parte.27 Is the petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Rosilyn an ordinary civil action or a
special proceeding? Considering that the petition, based on its allegations, does not question the fact of birth
As to the second issue, petitioners claim that: the CA should have exercised its peremptory power to declare
of Rosilyn, all matters assailing the truthfulness of any entry in the birth certificate properly, including the date
the birth certificate of Rosilyn as null and void ab initio  following the doctrine that where an instrument is
of birth, fall under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court which governs cancellation or correction of entries in the
void ab initio for being contrary to law, no amount of technicalities could correct its inherent nullity;
Civil Registry. Thus, the petition filed by the Ceruilas, alleging material entries in the certificate as having been
otherwise, there will be multiplicity of actions as the parties will have to file cases anew to annul respondent’s
falsified, is properly considered as a special proceeding pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 1 and Rule 108 of the
birth certificate.28
Rules of Court.
They then pray that the CA decision dated June 10, 1999 be reversed and that the RTC judgment dated April
Did the Ceruilas comply with the requirements of Rule 108? We answer in the negative.
11, 1997 be reinstated.29
Sec. 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that:
Anent the first issue, the Solicitor General, for the respondent, contends that: since the petitioners chose to
file a petition under Rule 108 they cannot in the present action turn around and claim that their case is not a
special proceeding; in any case, due process was not complied with rendering the proceedings a
16
SEC. 3. Parties. --- When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar It does not take much to deduce the real motive of petitioners in seeking the cancellation of Rosilyn’s birth
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the certificate and in not making her, her guardian, the DSWD, and the Republic of the Philippines, through the
proceeding. Solicitor General, parties to the petition. Rosilyn was involved in the rape case against Romeo Jalosjos, where
her father, as appearing in the birth certificate, was said to have pimped her into prostitution. In the criminal
Indeed, not only the civil registrar but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
case, the defense contended that the birth certificate of Rosilyn should not have been considered by the trial
by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties
court to prove Rosilyn’s age and thus find basis for statutory rape, as said birth certificate has been cancelled
thereto.35 As enunciated in Republic vs. Benemerito,36 unless all possible indispensable parties were duly
by the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, in the special proceeding antecedent to this petition. Their efforts in this
notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the
regard, however, were thwarted when the CA overturned Branch 38’s decision, and the Court, in G.R. Nos.
rules.37
132875-7642 considered other evidence as proof of Rosilyn’s age at the time of the commission of the crime.
Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of Rosilyn’s birth certificate than
There is also no merit in the contention of petitioners that because of the false entries in the birth certificate
Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake.
of Rosilyn, the same is void ab initio, hence should be nullified under Art. 5 of the Civil Code, or should be
Petitioners claim that even though Rosilyn was never made a party to the proceeding, it is enough that her nullified by the CA in exercise of its peremptory power to declare null and void the said certificate.
name was included in the caption of the petition. Such reasoning is without merit.
The function of a petition for annulment of judgment, under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, is not to replace the
38 
As we pronounced in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic where the mother sought changes in the entries of her two trial court’s decision sought to be annulled. The action under Sections 1, 2 and 7 of said Rule, to wit:
children’s birth certificates:
Section. 1. Coverage. --- This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
…since only the Office of the Solicitor General was notified through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which the ordinary remedies of new trial,
representing the Republic of the Philippines as the only respondent, the proceedings taken, which is summary appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
in nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. Aside from the Office petitioner.
of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not
Sec. 2. Grounds for annulment. --- The annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any,  as
of jurisdiction.
their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be affected by the
change should be notified or represented . . .. 39 (Emphasis supplied) Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or could have been availed of, in a motion for
new trial or petition for relief.
In the present case, only the Civil Registrar of Manila was served summons, who, however, did not participate
in the proceedings. This alone is clearly not sufficient to comply with the requirements laid down by the rules. Sec. 7. Effect of judgment. --- A judgment of annulment shall set aside the questioned judgment or final order
or resolution and render the same null and void, without prejudice to the original action being refiled in the
Petitioners further claim that the lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by the publication of the order of the
proper court. However, where the judgment or final order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic
trial court setting the case for hearing for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation.
fraud, the court may on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new trial had been
We do not agree. Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but granted therein.
to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process. 40 This is but proper, to afford the person
is merely for the annulment of the RTC Decision on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, nothing
concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses.
more. The Rules do not allow the CA to resolve the merits of the petition for the amendment and cancellation
Indeed, there were instances when we ruled that even though an interested party was not impleaded in the of the birth certificate of Rosilyn or to substitute its own findings thereon.
petition, such defect was cured by compliance with Sec. 4, Rule 108 on publication. In said cases, however,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY, RESPONDENT.
earnest efforts were made by the petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 41
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Court of Appeals
Such is not the case at bar. Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings seeking the cancellation
(CA)1 Decision2 dated February 18, 2011 and Resolution 3 dated July 27, 2011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN. The
of her birth certificate. Neither did petitioners make any effort to summon the Solicitor General.
17
assailed decision dismissed the appeal filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines and, consequently,
affirmed in toto the June 28, 2004 Order 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Gingoog City in Special
Proceedings No. 230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by
respondent Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy; while the assailed resolution denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On March 8, 2004, respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live
Birth.5 Impleaded as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. She alleged that she was born on
February 8, 1952 and is the illegitimate daughter of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay 6 Her Certificate of Live
Birth7 shows that her full name is "Anita Sy" when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as
"Norma S. Lugsanay." She further claimed that her school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
Board of Medicine Certificate, 8 and passport9 bear the name "Norma S. Lugsanay." She also alleged that she is
an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to follow the surname of her
mother.10 She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her siblings bear the
surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos. 11
Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly
granted.12 However, the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition
before the RTC.
On May 13, 2004, the RTC issued an Order 13 finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance and
setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the City of Gingoog and the Province of Misamis Oriental at least once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks at the expense of respondent, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutor’s Office for their information and guidance. 14 Pursuant to
the RTC Order, respondent complied with the publication requirement.
On June 28, 2004, the RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
GINGOOG CITY, or any person acting in his behalf is directed and ordered to effect the correction or change of
the entries in the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner’s name and citizenship so that the entries would be:
a) As to petitioner’s name :
First Name : NORMA
Middle Name : SY
18
Last Name : LUGSANAY
b) As to petitioner’s nationality/citizenship :
: FILIPINO
The RTC concluded that respondent’s petition would neither prejudice the government nor any third party. It
also held that the names "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and "Anita Sy" refer to one and the same person, especially
since the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City has effected the correction. Considering that respondent has
continuously used and has been known since childhood as "Norma Sy Lugsanay" and as a Filipino citizen, the
RTC granted the petition to avoid confusion. 16
On February 18, 2011, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC Order. The CA held that respondent’s failure to implead
other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the
Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutor’s Office. 17 As to whether the petition is a collateral attack
on respondent’s filiation, the CA ruled in favor of respondent, considering that her parents were not legally
married and that her siblings’ birth certificates uniformly state that their surname is Lugsanay and their
citizenship is Filipino.18 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated July 27, 2011.
Hence, the present petition on the sole ground that the petition is dismissible for failure to implead
indispensable parties.
Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in
the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e)
judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation
of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and What is meant by "appropriate adversary proceeding?" Black’s Law Dictionary defines "adversary proceeding"
place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in as follows:
the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of which the party
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose Excludes an adoption proceeding.22
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court’s conclusion in Republic v. Kho, 23 Alba v. Court of
date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
Appeals,24 and Barco v. Court of Appeals, 25 that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by the
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceeding is brought may make orders expediting publication of the notice of hearing pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. In Republic v.
the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties Kho,26 petitioner therein appealed the RTC decision granting the petition for correction of entries despite
pending such proceedings. respondents’ failure to implead the minor’s mother as an indispensable party. The Court, however, did not
strictly apply the provisions of Rule 108, because it opined that it was highly improbable that the mother was
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her children’s birth certificates especially since the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the
notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with them. 27
civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record. 19
In Alba v. Court of Appeals, 28 the Court found nothing wrong with the trial court’s decision granting the
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to
petition for correction of entries filed by respondent although the proceedings was not actually known by
her first name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has
petitioner. In that case, petitioner’s mother and guardian was impleaded in the petition for correction of
been known for since childhood, including her legal documents such as passport and school and professional
entries, and notices were sent to her address appearing in the subject birth certificate. However, the notice
records. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay"
was returned unserved, because apparently she no longer lived there. Thus, when she allegedly learned of the
instead of "Sy" and citizenship of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese." The changes, however, are obviously not
granting of the petition, she sought the annulment of judgment which the Court denied. Considering that the
mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which
petition for correction of entries is a proceeding in rem, the Court held that acquisition of jurisdiction over the
is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her
person of the petitioner is, therefore, not required and the absence of personal service was cured by the trial
status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects
court’s compliance with Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. 29
her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,30 the Court addressed the question of whether the court acquired jurisdiction
It has been settled in a number of cases starting with Republic v. Valencia 20 that even substantial errors in a
over petitioner and all other indispensable parties to the petition for correction of entries despite the failure to
civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail
implead them in said case. While recognizing that petitioner was indeed an indispensable party, the failure to
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. 21 The pronouncement of the Court in that case is
implead her was cured by compliance with Section 4 of Rule 108 which requires notice by publication. In so
illuminating:
ruling, the Court pointed out that the petitioner in a petition for correction cannot be presumed to be aware
It is undoubtedly true that if the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. It emphasized that the
harmless and innocuous nature, but one involving nationality or citizenship, which is indisputably substantial petitioner therein exerted earnest effort to comply with the provisions of Rule 108. Thus, the publication of
as well as controverted, affirmative relief cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. However, it is the notice of hearing was considered to have cured the failure to implead indispensable parties.
also true that a right in law may be enforced and a wrong may be remedied as long as the appropriate remedy
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the
is used. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and
petition below. This, notwithstanding, the RTC granted her petition and allowed the correction sought by
the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate
respondent, which decision was affirmed in toto by the CA.
adversary proceeding. x x x
We do not agree with the RTC and the CA.

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This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with the issue involved in this case. Aside from Kho, Alba Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a
and Barco, the Court has addressed the same in Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo, 31 Ceruila v. Delantar,32 and legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic.33 first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from "Chinese" to
"Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her
In Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo,34 claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent therein
parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections
filed a petition to change his name from "Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo," the name appearing in
respondent wanted to make.
his birth certificate to "Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng." The notice setting the petition for
hearing was published and there being no opposition thereto, the trial court issued an order of general default The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was
and eventually granted respondent’s petition deleting the entry on the date and place of marriage of parties; served upon the State will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. 37 A reading of Sections 4 and 5,
correcting his surname from "Magpayo" to "Coseteng"; deleting the entry "Coseteng" for middle name; and Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential
deleting the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for his father. The Republic of the Philippines, oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not
through the OSG, assailed the RTC decision on the grounds that the corrections made on respondent’s birth named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties. 38 Summons must,
certificate had the effect of changing the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and must only be effected therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the
through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Court nullified the RTC decision for respondent’s failure to requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his
comply strictly with the procedure laid down in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Aside from the wrong remedy interest if he so chooses.39
availed of by respondent as he filed a petition for Change of Name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
assuming that he filed a petition under Rule 108 which is the appropriate remedy, the petition still failed
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, earnest efforts were made by
because of improper venue and failure to implead the Civil Registrar of Makati City and all affected parties as
petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties. 40 Such failure was likewise excused where the
respondents in the case.
interested parties themselves initiated the corrections proceedings; 41 when there is no actual or presumptive
In Ceruila v. Delantar,35 the Ceruilas filed a petition for the cancellation and annulment of the birth certificate awareness of the existence of the interested parties; 42 or when a party is inadvertently left out. 43
of respondent on the ground that the same was made as an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and,
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the
therefore, invalid and spurious, and it falsified all material entries therein. The RTC issued an order setting the
civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
case for hearing with a directive that the same be published and that any person who is interested in the
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the
petition may interpose his comment or opposition on or before the scheduled hearing. Summons was likewise
Rules of Court is mandated.44 If the entries in the civil register could be corrected or changed through mere
sent to the Civil Register of Manila. After which, the trial court granted the petition and nullified respondent’s
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action wherein all parties who may be affected by the
birth certificate. Few months after, respondent filed a petition for the annulment of judgment claiming that
entries are notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief would be set open, the consequence of
she and her guardian were not notified of the petition and the trial court’s decision, hence, the latter was
which might be detrimental and far reaching. 45
issued without jurisdiction and in violation of her right to due process. The Court annulled the trial court’s
decision for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 108, especially the non-impleading of respondent WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated
herself whose birth certificate was nullified.1âwphi1 February 18, 2011 and Resolution dated July 27, 20011 in CA-G.R. CV No. 00238-MIN, are SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the June 28, 2004 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, in Spl. Proc. No.
In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,36 petitioner filed a petition for the correction of entries in the birth certificates of
230-2004 granting the Petition for Correction of Entry of Certificate of Live Birth filed by respondent Dr. Norma
her children, specifically to change her name from Beatriz V. Labayu/Beatriz Labayo to Emperatriz Labayo, her
S. Lugsanay Uy, is NULLIFIED.
civil status from "married" to "single," and the date and place of marriage from "1953-Bulan" to "No
marriage." The Court modified the trial court’s decision by nullifying the portion thereof which directs the
change of petitioner’s civil status as well as the filiation of her child, because it was the OSG only that was
made respondent and the proceedings taken was summary in nature which is short of what is required in
cases where substantial alterations are sought.

20