IENT V.

TULLET PREBON
G.R. No. 189158, January 11, 2017
Sereno, C.J:
FACTS:
Tradition Group, where petitoners herein are employed, and Tullett are competitors in
the inter-dealer broking business. On the Tradition Group's motive of expansion and
diversification
in Asia, petitioners lent and Schulze were tasked with the establishment Tradition Financial Serv
ices Philippines, Inc. However, Tullett, filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecution
Office of Makati City against the officers/employees of the Tradition Group for violation of
Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code which made them criminally liable under Section
144. Impleaded as respondents in the Complaint-Affidavit were petitioners lent and Schulze,
Jaime Villalon who was formerly President and Managing Director of Tullett, Mercedes Chuidian
who was formerly a member of Tullett's Board of Directors. Villalon and Chuidian were charged
with using their former positions in Tullett to sabotage said company by orchestrating the mass
resignation of its entire brokering staff in order for them to join Tradition Philippines which was
evident on their conduct of several meetings with the employees. According to Tullett,
petitioners lent and Schulze have conspired with Villalon and Chuidian in the latter's acts of
disloyalty against the company. Petitioners argued that there could be no violation of Sections
31 and 34 of the Corporation as these sections refer to corporate acts or corporate opportunity,
that Section 144 of the same Code cannot be applied to Sections 31 and 34 which already
contains the penalties or remedies for their violation; and conspiracy under the Revised Penal
Code cannot be applied to the Sections 31 and 34 of the Corporation Code. The city prosecutor
dismissed the criminal complaint however, on respondent’s appeal to the Department of Justice,
the dismissal was reversed finding the arguments of the respondent proper. CA affirmed the
decision of the DOJ secretary.
ISSUE:
: WoN Section 144 of the Corporation Code applies to Sections 31 and 34 of the same
code, thus, making it a penal offense so that conspiracy can be appreciated and the petitioners
can be impleaded?
RULING:
No, The Supreme Court said that there is no provision in the Corporation Code using
similarly emphatic language that evinces a categorical legislative intent to treat as a criminal
offense each and every violation of that law. Consequently, there is no compelling reason for
the Court to construe Section 144 as similarly employing the term “penalized” or “penalty” solely
in terms of criminal liability. The Corporation Code was intended as a regulatory measure, not
primarily as a penal statute. Sections 31 to 34 in particular were intended to impose exacting
standards of fidelity on corporate officers and directors but without unduly impeding them in the
discharge of their work with concerns of litigation. Considering the object and policy of the
Corporation Code to encourage the use of the corporate entity as a vehicle for economic
growth, we cannot espouse a strict construction of Sections 31 and 34 as penal offenses in
relation to Section 144 in the absence of unambiguous statutory language and legislative intent
to that effect.
 MINUCHER VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 142396, 2003 February 11
Vitug, J:
FACTS:
Sometime in May 1986, an information for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against
petitioner Khosrow Minucher with the RTC. The
criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation"
concluded by the Philippine police narcotic agent in
the house if Minucher where a quantity of heroin, a
prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The
narcotic agents were accompanied by private
respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time,
become one of the principal witnesses for the
prosecution. On January 1988, Presiding Judge
Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the accused.
Minucher filed Civil Case before the RTC for
damages on account of what he claimed to have
been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made
by Arthur Scalzo. In his defense, Scalzo asserted his
diplomatic immunity as evidenced by a Diplomatic
Note. He contended that it was recognized by the
US Government pursuant to the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations and the Philippine
government itself through its Executive Department
and DFA. The courts ruled in favor of Scalzo on the
ground that as a special agent of the US Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to
diplomatic immunity. Hence, the present recourse of
Minucher.
ISSUES:
1. Is Arthur Scalzo is entitled to diplomatic
immunity?
2. Is the Doctrine of State Immunity from
suit is applicable herein?
RULINGS:
1. Yes, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, to which the Philippines is a
signatory, grants him absolute immunity from
suit being an agent of the US Drugs
Enforcement Agency. However, the main
yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is
a diplomat entitled to immunity is the
determination of whether or not he performs
duties of diplomatic nature. The Vienna
Convention lists the classes of heads of
diplomatic missions to include (a)
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the
heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or inter
nuncios accredited to the head of states, and
(c) charges d' affairs accredited to the
ministers of foreign affairs. The Convention
defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of
missions or members of the diplomatic staff,
thus impliedly withholding the same
privileges from all others. Scalzo asserted
that he was an Assistant Attache of the US
diplomatic mission. Attaches assist a chief of
mission in his duties and are administratively
under him. These officials are not generally
regarded as members of the diplomatic
mission, nor did they normally designate as
having diplomatic rank.
2. Yes, it was sufficiently established that,
indeed, he worked for the USDEA. A foreign
agent, operating within a territory, can be
cloaked with immunity from suit but only as
long as it can be established that he is acting
within the directives of the sending state. The
consent of the host state is an indispensable
requirement of basic courtesy between the
two sovereigns. All told, Scalzo is entitled to
the defense of state immunity from suit.
 LIANG VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR no. 125865 January 28, 2000
Davide, Jr:

FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994,
for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was
charged with two counts of oral defamation, Petitioner was arrested and was eventually bailed.
The MeTC judge received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice
to the prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the
MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After
the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a
petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were filed in court.

ISSUE:
(1)  Is petitioner’s case covered with immunity from legal process with regard to Section 45 of
the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Gov’t?

RULING:
(1)   NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to
the communication from the DFA that the petitioner is covered by any immunity. It has no
binding effect in courts. The court needs to protect the right to due process not only of the
accused but also of the prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45 of the Agreement
is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts must be done in “official capacity”.
Hence, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official
duty.
 People v Tulin
GR NO. 111709 August 30, 2001
FACTS:
MT Tabangao, cargo vessel owned by PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, was
sailing near the coast of Mindoro loaded with barrels of kerosene, gasoline, and diesel oil with a
total value of 40.4M was suddenly boarded by seven fully armed pirates. The pirates detained
the crews and took control of the vessel, the PNOC logo were painted over with black and was
painted over with the name Galilee. The ship crew was forced to sail to Singapore and later
went back to Batangas, Philippines and remained at sea. Days later, it sailed back to Singapore
and later another vessel called the Navi Pride anchored beside it. Cheong San Hiong,
supervised the Navi’s crew and received the cargo on board MT Tabangao/Galilee. After the
transfer of goods were completed, MT Tabangao/Galilee sailed back to the Philippines and the
original crew members were released by the pirates and was ordered not to report to
authorities. However, the chief engineer reported the incident to the coast guard and thereafter
followed a series of arrests were effected and charged the accused of qualified piracy or
violation of PD 532.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused are guilty of qualified piracy.

RULING:

Yes, the accused are guilty of piracy. Art. 122 of the RPC (piracy in general and mutiny
in the high seas) provided that piracy must be committed in the high seas by any person not a
member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. It was amended by RA 7659, which
broadened the law to include offenses committed in Philippine waters. PD 532 on the other
hand, embraces any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said
vessel in the Philippine waters. Passenger or not, member of the complement or not, any
person is covered by the law. No conflict exists among the mentioned laws; they exist
harmoniously as separate laws. The attack on and the seizure of MT Tabangao and its cargo
were committed in Philippine waters, although the captive vessel was later brought by the
pirates to Singapore, where its cargo was offloaded, transferred and sold. Such transfer was
done under Hiong’s supervision. Although the disposition by the pirates of the vessel and its
cargo was not done in Philippine waters, it is still deemed part of the same act. Piracy falls
under Title 1 of Book 2 of the RPC. It is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law.
The same principle applies to the case, even if Hiong is charged with violation of a special penal
law, instead of the RPC. Regardless of the law penalizing piracy, it remains to be a
reprehensible crime against the whole world.
White Light Corp. v City of Manila
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
FACTS:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo
S. Lim signed into law Manila City
Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance
Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-
Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate
Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging
Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila” (the
Ordinance).” The ordinance sanctions any
person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for
less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms
more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation
(WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta.
Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation
(STDC), who own and operate several
hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a
motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that
the ordinance will affect their business
interests as operators. The respondents, in
turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and
void as it “strikes at the personal liberty of
the individual guaranteed and jealously
guarded by the Constitution.” Reference
was made to the provisions of the
Constitution encouraging private enterprises
and the incentive to needed investment, as
well as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation
that the illicit relationships the Ordinance
sought to dissuade could nonetheless be
consummated by simply paying for a 12-
hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents
asserted that the ordinance is a valid
exercise of police power pursuant to Section
458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code
which confers on cities the power to
regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension
houses, lodging houses and other similar
establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. Also, they contended that under
Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter,
they have the power to enact all ordinances
it may deem necessary and proper for the
sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience
and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is
unconstitutional and void since it violates
the right to privacy and freedom of
movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is unreasonable and
oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC
and affirmed the constitutionality of the
ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance
did not violate the right to privacy or the
freedom of movement, as it only penalizes
the owners or operators of establishments
that admit individuals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police
power is only constrained by having a lawful
object obtained through a lawful method.
The lawful objective of the ordinance is
satisfied since it aims to curb immoral
activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate.
Third, the adverse effect on the
establishments is justified by the well-being
of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the
SC.
ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid
exercise of police power of the State.
RULING:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be
considered as a valid exercise of police
power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not
only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr
ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operations
Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of
Manila. The common thread that runs
through those decisions and the case at bar
goes beyond the singularity of the localities
covered under the respective ordinances.
All three ordinances were enacted with a
view of regulating public morals including
particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as
the middle case, wherein there is no
wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the
services offered by these establishments
have been severely restricted. At its core,
this is another case about the extent to
which the State can intrude into and
regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well
established. A long line of decisions
including City of Manila has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
must not be partial or discriminatory; (4)
must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public
policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two
specific and distinct business practices,
namely wash rate admissions and renting
out a room more than twice a day. The ban
is evidently sought to be rooted in the police
power as conferred on local government
units by the Local Government Code
through such implements as the general
welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of
necessity of the State and its corresponding
right to protect itself and its people. Police
power has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to
minimize if not eliminate the use of the
covered establishments for illicit sex,
prostitution, drug use and alike. These
goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable
and certainly fall within the ambit of the
police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any
and all means for their achievement. Those
means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the
myopic view that an ordinance should be
analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the
petitioners at bar, then it would seem that
the only restraint imposed by the law that
they were capacitated to act upon is the
injury to property sustained by the
petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the
capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well
the constitutional rights of their patrons –
those persons who would be deprived of
availing short time access or wash-up rates
to the lodging establishments in question.
The rights at stake herein fell within the
same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty
as guaranteed by the Constitution was
defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the
right to exist and the right to be free from
arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from
physical restraint of the person of the
citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right
of man to enjoy the facilities with which he
has been endowed by his Creator, subject
only to such restraint as are necessary for
the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a
constitutional right must be recognized and
the invasion of it should be justified by a
compelling state interest. Jurisprudence
accorded recognition to the right to privacy
independently of its identification with
liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental
powers should stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the
citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful
uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a
product and the petitioners of lucrative
business ties in with another constitutional
requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance
as a police power measure. It must appear
that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular
class, require an interference with private
rights and the means must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must also be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of
the purpose less intrusive of private rights
can work. More importantly, a reasonable
relation must exist between the purposes of
the measure and the means employed for
its accomplishment, for even under the
guise of protecting the public interest,
personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be
arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites,
the police measure shall be struck down as
an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to
curtail is in fact already prohibited and could
in fact be diminished simply by applying
existing laws. Less intrusive measures such
as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes
and drug dealers through active police work
would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of
existing laws and regulations penalizing
prostitution and drug use. These measures
would have minimal intrusion on the
businesses of the petitioners and other
legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent
that the ordinance can easily be
circumvented by merely paying the whole
day rate without any hindrance to those
engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug
dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
“wash rates” from their clientele by charging
their customers a portion of the rent for
motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be
adversely affected only to the extent that
may fairly be required by the legitimate
demands of public interest or public welfare.
The State is a leviathan that must be
restrained from needlessly intruding into the
lives of its citizens. However well¬-
intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in
effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion
into the rights of the establishments as well
as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly
restrains the operation of the businesses of
the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient
justification. The ordinance rashly equates
wash rates and renting out a room more
than twice a day with immorality without
accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED, and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is
hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Garcia vs. J. Drilon
G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
FACTS:              but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
  Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition
before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262,
entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for
Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner
failed to faithfully comply with the conditions
set forth by the said TPO, private-
respondent filed another application for the
issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the
same when petitioner failed to comment on
why the TPO should not be modified.  After
the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment as it would be an “axercise in
futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and
TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of
the RA 9262 for violating the due process
and equal protection clauses, and the
validity of the modified TPO for being “an
unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement
of the TPO but however, denied the petition
for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the
trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial
court constituted collateral attack on said
law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the
petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the
earliest opportunity and that the petition
constitutes a collateral attack on the validity
of the law.
ISSUES:
WON the CA committed serious error in
failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the
equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in
not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the
law does violence to the policy of the state
to protect the family as a basic social
institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA
9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of
judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
RULINGS:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has
limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate
to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have
authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible time so that if not raised in
the pleadings, it may not be raised in the
trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may
not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court
ruled that all that is required of a valid
classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which
make for real differences; that it must be
germane to the purpose of the law; not
limited to existing conditions only; and apply
equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal
protection clause by favouring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due
process clause of the Constitution. The
essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte
cannot be impugned as violative of the right
to due process.
4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a
mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention
that by not allowing mediation, the law
violated the policy of the State to protect
and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution cannot be
sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it
ruled that the court shall not refer the case
or any issue thereof to a mediator. This is
so because violence is not a subject for
compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial
power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. 
The preliminary investigation conducted by
the prosecutor is an executive, not a
judicial, function.  The same holds true with
the issuance of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy.
Officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty
executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is
denied for lack of merit

Guingguing v People
G.R. No. 128959 September 30,2005
FACTS:
On Oct 13, 1991 Lim published a
paid advertisement at the Sunday post
edited and published by petitioner
Guingguing, containing the pictures of
arrests made and records of criminal cases
filed against Ciser Torralba who is a radio
broadcaster journalist. Torralba filed a
complaint against Lim and Guingguing
asserting that the paid advertisement was
libellous. Lim claimed that Torralba made
defamatory attacks against him and his
family over his radio programs, so he opted
for paid advertisements to answer his
attacks.
The RTC concluded that the publication was
indeed libellous. The CA affirmed RTC’s
decision and imposed penalties.
ISSUE:
Is the publication subject matter of the
instant case indeed libellous?
RULING:
Yes. Criminal libel is defined as a
public and malicious imputation of a crime,
or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or
any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory
of one who is dead.
Two major propositions in the
prosecution of defamatory remarks were
established: first, that libel against a public
person is a greater offense than one
directed against an ordinary man, and
second, that it is immaterial that the libel be
true. This Court has accepted the
proposition that the actual malice standard
governs the prosecution of criminal libel
cases concerning public figures.
As it has been established that
complainant was a public figure, it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove
actual malice on the part of Lim and
petitioner when the latter published the
article subject matter of the complaint. It
should thus proceed that if the statements
made against the public figure are
essentially true, then no conviction for libel
can be had.
From the foregoing, it is clear that
there was nothing untruthful about what was
published in the Sunday Post. The criminal
cases listed in the advertisement as
pending against the complainant had indeed
been filed.
To this end, the publication of the
subject advertisement by petitioner and Lim
cannot be deemed by this Court to have
been done with actual malice. Aside from
the fact that the information contained in
said publication was true, the intention to let
the public know the character of their radio
commentator can at best be subsumed
under the mantle of having been done with
good motives and for justifiable ends.
Estrada v. Escritor
AM No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court
interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las
Pinas City.  Alejandro Estrada, the
complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F.
Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253,
RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an
investigation of rumors that Escritor has
been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man
not her husband, and had eventually
begotten a son. According to the
complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary
for it will appear as if the court allows such
act.
Escritor is a member of the religious
sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society
where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious
beliefs.  After ten years of living together,
she executed on July 28, 1991 a
“Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which
was approved by the congregation.  Such
Wherefore, petition is GRANTED.
Decision of the RTC and CA is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.
declaration is effective when legal
impediments render it impossible for a
couple to legalize their union.  Gregorio,
Salazar, a member of the Jehovah’s
Witnesses since 1985 and has been a
presiding minister since 1991, testified and
explained the import of and procedures for
executing the declaration which was
completely executed by Escritor and
Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was
signed by three witnesses and recorded in
Watch Tower Central Office.       
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found
guilty of the administrative charge of "gross
and immoral conduct”
RULING:
NO. A look at the evidence that the
OSG has presented fails to demonstrate
"the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interests" which could limit or
override respondent’s fundamental right to
religious freedom. Neither did the
government exert any effort to show that the
means it seeks to achieve its legitimate
state objective is the least intrusive means.
In its Memorandum-In-Intervention,
the OSG contends that the State has a
compelling interest to override respondent’s
claimed religious belief and practice, in
order to protect marriage and the family as
basic social institutions. The Solicitor
General, quoting the Constitution and the
Family Code, argues that marriage and the
family are so crucial to the stability and
peace of the nation that the conjugal
arrangement embraced in the Declaration of
Pledging Faithfulness should not be
recognized or given effect, as "it is utterly
destructive of the avowed institutions of
marriage and the family for it reduces to a
mockery these legally exalted and socially
significant institutions which in their purity
demand respect and dignity."
Be that as it may, the free exercise
of religion is specifically articulated as one
of the fundamental rights in our Constitution.
It is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights
— "the most inalienable and sacred of
human rights," in the words of Jefferson.
Hence, it is not enough to contend that the
state’s interest is important, because our
Constitution itself holds the right to religious
freedom sacred. The State must articulate
in specific terms the state interest involved
in preventing the exemption, which must be
compelling, for only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests can limit
the fundamental right to religious freedom.
To rule otherwise would be to emasculate
the Free Exercise Clause as a source of
right by itself.
Thus, it is not the State’s broad
interest in "protecting the institutions of
marriage and the family," or even "in the
sound administration of justice" that must be
weighed against respondent’s claim, but the
State’s narrow interest in refusing to make
an exception for the cohabitation which
respondent’s faith finds moral. In other
words, the government must do more than
assert the objectives at risk if exemption is
given; it must precisely show how and to
what extent those objectives will be
undermined if exemptions are granted. This,
the Solicitor General failed to do.
As previously discussed, our
Constitution adheres to the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for
accommodation of religious exercises as
required by the Free Exercise Clause. Thus,
in arguing that respondent should be held
administratively liable as the arrangement
she had was "illegal per se because, by
universally recognized standards, it is
inherently or by its very nature bad,
improper, immoral and contrary to good
conscience," the Solicitor General failed to
appreciate that benevolent neutrality could
allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.
Finally, even assuming that the OSG
has proved a compelling state interest, it
has to further demonstrate that the state
has used the least intrusive means possible
so that the free exercise is not infringed any
more than necessary to achieve the
legitimate goal of the state, i.e., it has
chosen a way to achieve its legitimate state
end that imposes as little as possible on
religious liberties. Again, the Solicitor
General utterly failed to prove this element
of the test.
Thus, we find that in this particular
case and under these distinct
circumstances, respondent Escritor’s
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized
as she has made out a case for exemption
from the law based on her fundamental right
to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes
that state interests must be upheld in order
that freedoms - including religious freedom -
may be enjoyed. In the area of religious
exercise as a preferred freedom, however,
man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the state, and so the state
interest sought to be upheld must be so
compelling that its violation will erode the
very fabric of the state that will also protect
the freedom. In the absence of a showing
that such state interest exists, man must be
allowed to subscribe to the Infinite. IN VIEW
WHEREOF, the instant administrative
complaint is dismissed.

People v Echagaray
G.R. No. 117472 February 7,1997

FACTS:
Accused-apellant Leo Echegaray
was charged and convicted for the crime of
raping his ten-year old daughter. The crime
having been committed sometime in April,
1994, during which time Republic Act No.
7659, commonly known as the Death
Penalty Law, was already in effect,
accused-appellant was inevitably meted out
the supreme penalty of death. In appealing
the conviction, it raised the constitutionality
of the Death Penalty Law as being severe
and excessive, cruel and unusual in
violation of the constitution. He invokes the
ruling in Furman vs. Georgia wherein the
US Supreme Court categorically ruled that
death penalty is cruel and degrading. He
also argues that death is an excessive and
cruel punishment for a crime of rape
because there is no taking of life in rape. He
invokes the ruling in Coker vs. Georgia
which said that while rape deserves serious
punishment, it should not involve the taking
of human life. In rape, life is not over for the
victim. Death penalty should only be
imposed where the crime was murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Death Penalty is cruel and
unusual punishment.
RULING:
NO. The penalty is neither cruel,
unjust nor excessive. In the US case of
Kemmler, it was held that punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death. It implies there something inhuman,
barbarous, something more than the
extinguishment of life. It is degrading if it
involves public humiliation. The severity is
not sufficient, but must be disproportionate
to the crime committed. Excessiveness is
measured by 1) seriousness of the crime, 2)
policy of the legislative, 3) perversity of the
accused.
The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is
not so much the death penalty itself, but the
arbitrariness pervading the procedures by
which the death penalty was imposed by the
jury. It was nullified because the discretion
in which the statute vested in trial judges
and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and
without any parameters, guidelines, or
standards.
With regard to the case of Coker vs.
Georgia, the SC held that this case has no
bearing on Philippine experience and
culture. Such a premise is in fact an
ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive
justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a
tooth". But, the forfeiture of life simply
because life was taken, never was a
defining essence of the death penalty in the
context of our legal history and cultural
experience; rather, the death penalty is
imposed in heinous crimes because the
perpetrators thereof have committed
unforgivably execrable acts that have so
deeply dehumanized a person or criminal
acts with severely destructive effects, and
because they have so caused irreparable
and substantial injury to both their victim
and the society and a repetition of their acts
would pose actual threat to the safety of
individuals and the survival of government,
they must be permanently prevented from
doing so.
RA 7659 already sufficiently defined
what are heinous crimes – crimes punished
with death are those that are grievous,
odious, and hateful by reason of inherent
viciousness, atrocity and perversity, those
that are repugnant and outrageous to
common standards of norms and decency
and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society. They also include crimes which are
despicable because life is callously taken,
or the victim is treated as an animal or
dehumanized.
CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 180016 APRIL 29, 2014
FACTS:
Danilo Tangcoy, private complainant, and
Lito Corpuz, petitioner, met at the Admiral
Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime
in 1990.
Tangcoy was then engaged in the business
of lending money to casino players and,
upon hearing that Tangcoy had some
pieces of jewelry for sale, Corpuz
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the
same casino and offered to sell the said
pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Tangcoy agreed, and as a consequence, he
turned over to petitioner the following items:
an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's
bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and
another men's bracelet, with an aggregate
value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a
receipt of even date.
They both agreed that petitioner shall remit
the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold,
to return the same items, within a period of
60 days. The period expired without
petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale
or returning the pieces of jewelry. When
Tongcoy was able to meet petitioner, the
latter promised the former that he will pay
the value of the said items entrusted to him,
but to no avail.
A criminal complaint for estafa was filed
against Corpuz.
On the prosecution, it was established that
Tongcoy and Corpuz were collecting agents
of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the
financing business of extending loans to
Base employees. For every collection
made, they earn a commission. Petitioner
denied having transacted any business with
Tongcoy.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from
Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he
was made to sign a blank receipt. He
claimed that the same receipt was then
dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence
against him for the supposed agreement to
sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which he
did not even see.
RTC and CA – accused is guilty of estafa.
ISSUE:
WON the demand to return the subject the
subject jewelry, if unsold, or remit the
proceeds, if sold, is a valid demand under took place, failed to return the same pieces
one of the elements of Estafa under Art. 315 of jewelry within or after the agreed period
(1) (b) of the RPC? despite demand from the private
complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
RULING:
YES. Demand need not even be
formal; it may be verbal. The specific word
"demand" need not even be used to show
that it has indeed been made upon the
person charged, since even a mere query
as to the whereabouts of the money [in this
case, property], would be tantamount to a
demand. As expounded in Asejo v. People:
With regard to the necessity of demand, we
agree with the CA that demand under this
kind of estafa need not be formal or written.
The appellate court observed that the law is
silent with regard to the form of demand in
estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus: When the
law does not qualify, We should not qualify.
Should a written demand be necessary, the
law would have stated so. Otherwise, the
word "demand" should be interpreted in its
general meaning as to include both written
and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the
prosecution to present a written demand as
evidence is not fatal. In Tubb v. People,
where the complainant merely verbally
inquired about the money entrusted to the
accused, we held that the query was
tantamount to a demand, thus: x x x [T]he
law does not require a demand as a
condition precedent to the existence of the
crime of embezzlement. It so happens only
that failure to account, upon demand for
funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
The same way, however, be established by
other proof, such as that introduced in the
case at bar. In view of the foregoing and
based on the records, the prosecution was
able to prove the existence of all the
elements of the crime. Private complainant
gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust,
or on commission basis, as shown in the
receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation
to sell or return the same within sixty (60)
days, if unsold. There was misappropriation
when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds
of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale

People vs Ferrer
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972
FACTS:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for
violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion
Act was filed against the respondent
Feliciano Co, as he became an officer of the
Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to
overthrow the government.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the
Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 29170, another
criminal complaint was filed with before Nilo
Tayag and fiver others with subversion, as
they were tagged as officers of the
KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive
organization instigating and inciting the
people to organize and unite for the purpose
of overthrowing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Tayag also moved to quash the complaint
on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of
attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces
more than one subject not expressed in the
title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal
protection of the laws.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 1700 otherwise known as Anti-
Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
RULING: 
No, the Supreme Court said it is only when
a statute applies either to named individuals
or to easily ascertainable members of a
group in such a way as to inflict punishment
on them without a judicial trial does it
become a bill of attainder.
In this case, when the act is viewed in its
actual operation, it will be seen that it does
not specify the Communist Party of the
Philippines or the member thereof for the
purpose of punishment. What it does is
simple to declare the party to be an
organized conspiracy for the overthrow of
the Government for the purposes of the
prohibition.
The term "Communist Part of the
Philippines" issues solely for definitional
purposes. In fact the act applies not only to
the Communist Party of the Philippines but
also to "any organisation having the same
purpose and their successors." Its focus is
not on individuals but on conduct.
US v. Diaz Conde
G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922
FACTS:                
On 30 December 1915, Bartolome Oliveros
and Engracia Lianco borrowed P300 from
the defendants and by virtue of a contract,
the former obligated themselves with the
interest rate of 5% per month, payable
within the first 10 days of every month, and
the first payment shall be made on 10
January 1916.
Usury Law (Act. 2655) took effect on 01
May 1916, or four months subsequent to the
execution of said contract.
On 21 May 1921, a complaint was filed
against the defendants in violation of the
Usury Law. The Court of First Instance of
Manila found the defendants guilty and
sentenced them to pay a fine of P120 and in
case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment in accordance with the
provisions of law.
The appellants contend that:
The contract upon which the alleged
usurious interest was collected was
executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted;
At the time said contract was made
(December 30, 1915), there was no usury
law in force in the Philippine Islands;
Said Act No. 2655 did not become effective
until the 1st day of May, 1916, or four
months and a half after the contract in
question was executed;
Said law could have no retroactive effect or
operation;
Said law impairs the obligation of a contract;
All of said reasons the judgment imposed by
the lower court should be revoked; that the
complaint should be dismissed, and that
they should each be discharged from the
custody of the law.
The lower court opined that even though the
contract was established prior to the
passage of Act No. 2655, the defendants
still collected a usurious amount of interest
after the adoption of said law and therefore,
violated such law and must be punished in
accordance to Usury Law.
ISSUE:
W/N the defendants are guilty in violation of
Usury Law (Act. No. 2655).
RULING:
No. An ex post facto law is a law that makes
an action, done before the passage of the
law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal, and punishes such action. In the
present case, the defendants executed an
act which was legal before the Usury Law.
To make said law applicable to the
defendants’ previous act would render it an
ex post facto operation. Moreover, if a
contract is legal at its inception, it cannot be
rendered illegal by any subsequent
legislation. Also, no law shall be passed
impairing the obligation of contracts. If a law
is passed rendering the opposite effect, the
law is null and void with respect to Jones
Law.
Wherefore, all premises considered, the
higher court hereby decide that the acts
complained of the defendants did not
constitute a crime at the time they were
committed, and therefore the sentence of
the lower court should be, and is hereby,
revoked; and it is hereby ordered and
decreed that the complaint be dismissed
and that the defendants be discharged from
the custody of the law, with costs de oficio.
EN BANC
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENTINO
ABILONG, defendant-appellant
[G.R. No. L-1960. November 26, 1948.].
FACTS:
That on or about the 17th day of
September, 1947, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, Florentino Abilong, the
accused, being then a convict sentenced
and ordered to serve destierro during which
he should not enter any place within the
radius of 100 kilometers from the City of
Manila for attempted robbery, evaded the
service of said sentence by going beyond
the limits made against him and commit
vagrancy.
ISSUE:
Whether the lower court erred in imposing a
penalty on the accused under article 157 of
the Revised Penal Code, which does not
cover evasion of service of "destierro."
RULING:
It is clear that the word "imprisonment" used
in the English text is a wrong or erroneous
translation of the phrase "sufriendo
privacion de libertad" used in the Spanish
text. It is equally clear that although the
Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro
as not constituting imprisonment, it is a
deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the
sense that as in the present case, the
appellant by his sentence of destierro was
deprived of the liberty to enter the City of
Manila. Under the case of People vs.
Samonte, as quoted in the brief of the
Solicitor General that "it is clear that a
person under sentence of destierro is
suffering deprivation of his liberty and
escapes from the restrictions of the penalty
when he enters the prohibited area."
 FACTS:

In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo

was living on his farm in Camarines Sur w/ his
wife, Julia Agricola & their 5 children. From
there they transferred in the house of his half-
brother, Zacarias Formigones in the same
municipality to find employment as harvesters
of palay. After a month, Julia was sitting at the
head of the stairs of the house when
Abelardo, w/o previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the
house & stabbed his wife Julia, in the back,
the blade penetrating the right lung & causing
a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death.
Abelardo then took his dead wife & laid her on
the floor of the living room & then lay down
beside her. In this position, he was found by
the people who came in response to the
shouts made by his eldest daughter, Irene
Formigones.

The motive was admittedly that of jealousy

because according to his statement, he used
to have quarrels with his wife for reason that
he often saw her in the company of his
brother, Zacarias; that he suspected the 2
were maintaining illicit relations because he
noticed that his wife had become indifferent to
him. During the preliminary investigation, the
accused pleaded guilty. At the case in the
CFI, he also pleaded guilty but didn’t testify.
His counsel presented the testimony of 2
guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo
was confined to the effect that his conduct
was rather strange & that he behaved like an
insane person, at times he would remain
silent, walk around stark naked, refuse to take
a bath & wash his clothes etc… The appeal is
based merely on the theory that the appellant
is an IMBECILE & therefore exempt from
PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES
criminal liability under RPC A12.
G.R. No. L-3246 November 29, 1950

ISSUE: 
 WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the
time of the commission of the crime, thus
exempted from criminal liability
But 2 mitigating circumstances are present:
passion or obfuscation (having killed his wife
in a jealous rage) & feeblemindedness.

Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found

guilty of parricide & the lower court’s judgment
is hereby affirmed w/ the modification that
appellant will be credited with half of any
HELD:  preventive imprisonment he has undergone
(because of the 2 mitigating circumstances)

No. He is not an imbecile. According

Dr. Francisco Gomes, although he was
feebleminded, he is not an imbecile as he
could still distinguish between right & wrong &
even feel remorse. In order that a person
could be regarded as an imbecile w/in the
meaning of RPC A12 so as to be exempt from
criminal liability, he must be deprived
completely of reason or discernment &
freedom of will at the time of committing the
crime. (Note that definition is same as Ladonga vs. People of the Philippines
insanity)
G.R. No. 141066, Feb. 17, 2005 BP 22

As to the strange behavior of the accused FACTS: 

during his confinement, assuming it was not
feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be
attributed either to his being feebleminded or
eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition
produced by remorse at having killed his wife.
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy &
take violent measures to the extent of killing
his wife who he suspected of being unfaithful
to him, in the belief that in doing so, he was
vindicating his honor, could hardly be
regarded as an imbecile. WON the suspicions
were justified, is of little or no importance. The
fact is that he believed her faithless.
Furthermore, in his written statement, he
readily admitted that he killed his wife, & at the
trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate
said written statements, thus saving the
government all the trouble & expense of
catching him & securing his conviction.
Evangelina and Adronico Ladonga and
spouse, conspiring and knowing fully well
that they did not have sufficient funds
deposited with the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB), drew and issue UCPB Check
No. 284743 postdated July 7, 1990 in the
amount of P9,075.55), payable to Alfredo
Oculam, and thereafter, without informing
the latter that they did not have sufficient
funds deposited with the bank to cover up
the amount of the check, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously pass on,
indorse, give and deliver the said check to
Alfredo by way of rediscounting of the
aforementioned checks; however, upon
presentation of the check to the drawee
bank for encashment, the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account
of the accused had already been closed, to
the damage and prejudice of Alfredo.
The RTC rendered a joint decision finding
the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22.  future may be punishable under special
Adronico applied for probation which was
granted. On the other hand, petitioner
brought the case to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that the RTC erred in finding her
criminally liable for conspiring with her
husband as the principle of conspiracy is
inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a
special law; moreover, she is not a
signatory of the checks and had no
participation in the issuance thereof.
ISSUE:   proscribe the suppletory application of the
a.) Whether conspiracy is applicable in
violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, by
invoking art. 10 of RPC?
b.) Whether or not the cases cited by the
CA in affirming in toto the conviction of
petitioner as conspirator applying the
suppletory character of the RPC to special
laws like BP 22 is applicable?
RULING:   present case, the prosecution failed to
A.) YES.  Some provisions of the Revised
Penal Code, especially with the addition of
the second sentence in Article 10, are
applicable to special laws.  It submits
that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any
prohibition regarding the applicability in a
suppletory character of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code to it.
Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART.
10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of
this Code. – Offenses which are or in the
laws are not subject to the provisions of this
Code.  This Code shall be supplementary to
such laws, unless the latter should specially
provide the contrary.
The article is composed of two clauses. 
The first provides that offenses which in the
future are made punishable under special
laws are not subject to the provisions of the
RPC, while the second makes the RPC
supplementary to such laws
B.)  B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly
provisions of the RPC.  Thus, in the
absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg.
22, the general provisions of the RPC
which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. 
Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs.
People the Court applied suppletorily the
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment
under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22.
The suppletory application of the principle of
conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals
under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte.  For once
conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a
criminal design is shown, the act of one is
the act of all the conspirators, and the
precise extent or modality of participation of
each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.  BUT In the
prove that petitioner performed any overt
act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. 
Conspiracy must be established, not by
conjectures, but by positive and conclusive
evidence. Thus, Petitioner Evangeline
Ladonga is ACQUITTED of the charges
against her under B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of
the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.  No pronouncement as to
costs.

People vs. Martin Simon

G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994 Sale of
Prohibited Drugs

FACTS:
Accused Martin Simon was charged with a
violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic
Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) poseur-
buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing
a total of 3.8 grams, when subjected to
laboratory examination, were found positive
for marijuana.
Simon denied the accusation against him,
claiming that on the day of question, he was
picked up by the police at their house while
watching TV. He was told that he was a
pusher so he attempted to alight from the
jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When
they finally reached the camp, he was
ordered to sign some papers and, when he
refused, he was boxed in the stomach eight
or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then
compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to
him. He denied knowledge of the marked
money or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana
leaves, and insisted that the marked money
came from the pocket of Pejoro. Moreover,
the reason why he vomited blood was
because of the blows he suffered at the
hands of Pejoro.
Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident
physician of Romana Pangan District
Hospital, declared that she treated appellant
for three days due to abdominal pain, but
her examination revealed that the cause for
this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer.
She did not see any sign of slight or serious
external injury, abrasion or contusion on his
body.
Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty
of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty
thousand pesos and to pay the costs.
Simon then seek the reversal of the
judgement
ISSUE:
Was the conviction of Simon correct?
RULING:
To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited
drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established. To sell means to
give, whether for money or any other
material consideration. It must, therefore, be
established beyond doubt that appellant
actually sold and delivered two tea bags of
marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who
acted as the poseur-buyer, in exchange for
two twenty-peso bills.
After careful review, the Court held that
there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was
sold and there were 2 other tea bags of
marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should
be charged of selling for the 2 tea bags of
marijuana only.
However, there is an overlapping error in
the provisions on the penalty of reclusion
perpetua by reason of its dual imposition,
that is, as the maximum of the penalty
where the marijuana is less than 750 grams,
and also as the minimum of the penalty
where the marijuana involved is 750 grams
or more. The same error has been
committed with respect to the other
prohibited and regulated drugs provided in
said Section 20. To harmonize such
conflicting provisions in order to give effect
to the whole law, the court hereby hold that
the penalty to be imposed where the
quantity of the drugs involved is less than
the quantities stated in the first paragraph
shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion temporal, and
not reclusion perpetua. This is also
concordant with the fundamental rule in
criminal law that all doubts should be
construed in a manner favorable to the
accused.
The court held that Republic Act No. 6425,
as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659,
has unqualifiedly adopted the penalties
under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence with their technical
signification and effects. In fact, for
purposes of determining the maximum of
said sentence, the court have applied the
provisions of the amended Section 20 of
said law to arrive at prision correccional and
Article 64 of the Code to impose the same
in the medium period. Such offense,
although provided for in a special law, is
now in effect punished by and under the
Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to
determine the minimum, the court applied
first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which
directs that “in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by the Revised
Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the rules of said Code, and
the minimum which shall be within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed
by the Code for the offense.”
Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should
be begrudged the benefit of a minimum
sentence within the range of arresto
mayor, the penalty next lower to prision
correccional which is the maximum range
have fixed through the application of Articles
61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. For,
with fealty to the law, the court may set the
minimum sentence at 6 months of arresto
mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day
of prision correccional.