Pimentel v Joint Committee of Congress

GR No. 163783, 22 June 2004.

FACTS: Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. filed a petition for prohibition to declare the
existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine the authenticity and due
execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections null and
void, following the adjournment of Congress sine die (without a fixed date of
resumption) on 11 June 2004. Pimentel agrued that said adjournment terminated the
existence of Congress, and consequently, terminated all pending matters and
proceedings.

ISSUE: WON the adjournment of Congress results in the termination of the Joint
Committee as well.

HELD: NO.
Under Sec. 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, the Senate shall
convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the
votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the
elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII.
Sec. 15, Art. VI does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual
legislative sessions, and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next
regular session, subject to the President's power to call for a special session at any
time.
Final adjournment of regular session concludes the legislative functions of Congress,
but not its non-legislative functions, among them being the National Board of
Canvassers. In fact, Sec. 4, Art. VII provides that Congress shall convene for such
canvass, and cannot adjourn sine die until it has completed canvassing and proclaimed
the President and Vice-President.
 ATTY. ROMULO MACALINTAL V. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
23 November 2010

Facts:
 Petitioner questions the constitution of the PET as an illegal and unauthorized
progeny of Sec 4, Art VII of the Consti. Petitioner claims that there should be no
separate body since the Consti only mandates that the SC be the sole judge of
all contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of P or VP. (He said
that considering the Rules of the PET provide for a separate seal, separate staff,
separate confidential employees, membership, it is separate from the SC).
 Further, petitioner claims that in Buac v. COMELEC, the SC held that the PET
exercises quasi-judicial power. Thus, it is unconstitutional for members of the SC
to be designated to the PET (since it is an agency performing quasi-judicial
functions).

Issue: WON creation of the PET is unconstitutional

Held: No

Ruling:
 Petitioner appeared as counsel for PGMA in the election protest filed by FPJ
before the PET in 2004. Judicial inquiry requires that the constitutional question
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity. Petitioner is unmistakably estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had
ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004.
 “Apparently, petitioner’s concept of this adjunct of judicial power is very
restrictive. Fortunately, thanks in no part to petitioner’s opinion, we are guided by
wellsettled principles of constitutional construction” - sassy
 Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be
read with other related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel
provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
 Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme Court’s constitutional mandate to
act as sole judge of election contests involving our country’s highest public
officials, and its rulemaking authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it
includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.
 The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an “awesome” task, includes the means necessary to carry it
into effect under the doctrine of necessary implication.
 A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of
authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the
 method by which the Supreme Court exercises this authority is not specified in
the provision, the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the Supreme
Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding presidential
and vicepresidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of
the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional
provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court
to “promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
 The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to
the full authority conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the
House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which the SC has affirmed
on numerous occasions.
 The PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution,
is to be an institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

 Petitioner maintains that the constitution does not provide for the creation of the
PET

Issue: WON creation of PET is unconstitutional

Held: Still, NO.

Ruling:

 The PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. The explicit
reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was
merely statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word,
mandating the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Suffice
it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the
specific wording required by petitioner in order for him to accept the
constitutionality of the PET.
 Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary.
And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to
decide presidential and vicepresidential elections contests includes the means
necessary to carry it into effect.
 CLINTON V. JONES
27 May 1997

Facts:
 Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was
an Arkansas state employee, she suffered several "abhorrent" sexual advances
from then Arkansas Governor Clinton. Jones claimed that her continued rejection
of Clinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors.
 Following a District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to
the suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit
dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his
immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him.
 While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the judge ordered the
stay of any trial in the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial but reversed the trial deferment ruling
since it would be a "functional equivalent" to an unlawful grant of temporary
presidential immunity.

Issue: WON the case should be dismissed on the ground of presidential immunity
Held: No.

 The principal rationale for affording Presidents immunity from damages actions
based on their official acts is to enable them to perform their designated functions
effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability,
provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. Moreover, immunities
for acts clearly within official capacity are grounded in the nature of the function
performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.

 In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does not grant a
sitting President immunity from civil litigation except under highly unusual
circumstances. After noting the great respect and dignity owed to the Executive
office, the Court held that neither separation of powers nor the need for
confidentiality of high-level information can justify an unqualified Presidential
immunity from judicial process. While the independence of our government's
branches must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any control over
one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the procedural burdens which
Article III jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and resources of the
Chief Executive.
Sources: Oyez.org and Justicia
Rubrico vs Macapagal-Arroyo
Facts:
 Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men
belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the
Philippine Air Force Field Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas.
 During her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy Rubrico
Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp. Arsenio
Gomez and that there were also armed men following them.
 The petitioners prayed that a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual
respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of
the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an
information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender
of the offended party.
 It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce documents
submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
 The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the
material inculpatory averments against them.
 Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be sued during
her incumbency.
 Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
President, et al.
 By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the
case .
 Petitioners first take issue on the Presidents purported lack of immunity from suit
during her term of office. The 1987 Constitution, so they claim, has removed
such immunity heretofore enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Immunity is still applicable
Held: YES.
 The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of
government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution.
 Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.
 And lest it be overlooked, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what
specific presidential act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners
protected rights.
 This brings us to the correctness of the assailed dismissal of the petition with
respect to Gen. Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Razon, P/Supt. Roquero, P/Insp. Gomez,
and the OMB.
o None of the four individual respondents immediately referred to above has
been implicated as being connected to, let alone as being behind, the
alleged abduction and harassment of petitioner Lourdes. Their names
were not even mentioned in Lourdes Sinumpaang Salaysay
 As for the issue of the Writ of Amparo (baka lang intanong niya)
 According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms, means
the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members
of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars
or domestic conflict.
 In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity.
 The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,
foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the
atrocities committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of
control over them.
 As then formulated, command responsibility is an omission mode of individual
criminal liability, whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed
by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators
 If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings,
it should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is
accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial
measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered
by the writ of amparo.
 As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not be pursued to fix
criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a
prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
issuances, if there be any.
 Petitioners, as the CA has declared, have not adduced substantial evidence
pointing to government involvement in the disappearance of Lourdes.
o To a concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual
perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed formally
or informally formed part of either the military or the police chain of
command.
o Hence the Writ of Amparo is denied
Funa v. Ermita

Facts
1. President GMA appointed respondent Maria Bautista as USEC of the DOTC
(cabinet office). When the MARINA Administrator Vicente Suazo resigned,
Bautista was desigated as OIC of the MARINA in concurrent capacity as DOTC
USEC.
2. Petitioner Funa filed a Special Civil Action for C/P/M under Rule 65 claiming that
such designation of Bautista is unconstitutional. During the pendency of the
proceedings, Bautista was appointed as Admin of the MARINA and has since
assumed office. She has also relinquished her position as USEC
3. Funa buttressed his arguments on the following grounds:
a. Article VII, Section 13 of the Consti provides that the President, VP, the
members of the cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not hold
any other office or employment during their tenure. An exception is when
the Constitution so provides (as when the concurrent position is held in ex
officio capacity)
b. The Admin Code does not provide ex officio roles to USEC of the DOTC.
c. A temporary designation may circumvent the prohibition insofar as it does
not prescribe a maximum duration.
d. The post of DOTC USEC and Marina administrator are incompatible since
the recommendations of the MARINA are subject to the evaluation and
review of the USEC for Marine Transport. A concurrence of such positions
eliminates the counter-checking powers and functions of both offices.
e. Despite being moot and academic, the case warrants a review since it is
capable of repetition and evading review
4. The respondents argue that:
a. No Judicial Inquiry exists as no case or controversy. (Moot and Academic)
b. No Standing as Tax payer
c. Constitutional. Mere designation as Marina is pending appointment of
permanent administrator. She did not receive emoluments

Issue: Whether an undersecretary may hold a concurrent office, even if temporary,

under the 1987 Constitution
Held: No, She may not.
Ratio
1. Judicial review requirements are present. As to standing, tax payers/concerned
citizens may have standing when
a. Case involves constitutional issues
b. For Taxpayers: Illegal disbursement of funds or tax measure is
unconstitutional
c. For Concerned Citizens: Transcendental importance.
2. Legal and constitutional issues may still be decided upon despite being moot and
academic due to superevening events
a. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.
b. An exception would be when the case involved is capable of repetition and
evading review
3. Under the Consti, USECs are subject to stricter prohibitions (Section 13, Art VII).
Further, Article IX-B Section 7 provides that unless otherwise allowed by law or
the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall holdy any other
office.
4. The Court cites its decision in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, the
foregoing provisons of the Consti impose a stricter prohibition on those
enumerated. (Why? Because MARTIAL LAW > Marcos Cronies)
Pimentel v Ermita
GR No. 164978, 13 October 2005.

FACTS: Congress commenced its regular session on 26 July 2004. Commission on

Appointments was constituted on 25 August 2004.
Between these two dates, PGMA appointed various people as acting secretaries of
executive departments (DA, DFA, DOJ, etc.). They took their oaths and assumed office
as acting secretaries.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004. The day after, PGMA issued ad interim
appointments to the same people she appointed as acting secretaries.
Several Senators filed a petition to have the appointments as acting secretaries
declared Unconstitutional, as they were made without the consent of the Commission
on Appointments while Congress was in session.

ISSUE: WON the appointments in acting capacity are Unconstitutional for not having
passed through the Commission on Appointments.

HELD: NO.
(note on standing: only Senators who were also members of the CoA were deemed to
have standing, since the appointments did not impair any power vested in Congress)
The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the legislature may not
interfere with the exercise of this power unless the Constitution expressly allows it to
interfere. However, the Commission on Appointments, while composed of members of
Congress, is independent from Congress, as it exercises a power that is executive, not
legislative in nature.
The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-
gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office.
In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the
office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of
her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great
trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session.
Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to
the office must necessarily have the President’s confidence; by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a
person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be
the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting
appointee will also be the permanent appointee.
Ad interim appointments v. appointments made in an acting capacity:
Ad interim Acting capacity
Made only while Congress is in recess May be made any time there is a vacancy
Submitted to Commission on Not submitted
Appointments
Cannot exceed 1 year
Aguinaldo vs Aquino
Facts:
 Basically clustering of nominees was declared unconstitutional by the SC prior to
this case. Eh ang Kulit.
 On the merits of the case, the JBC asserts that in submitting six short lists for six
vacancies, it was only acting in accordance with the clear and unambiguous
mandate of Article VIII, Section 93 of the 1987 Constitution for the JBC to submit
a list for every vacancy.
 Considering its independence as a constitutional body, the JBC has the
discretion and wisdom to perform its mandate in any manner as long as it is
consistent with the Constitution.
 According to the JBC, its new practice of "clustering," in fact, is more in accord
with the purpose of the JBC to rid the appointment process to the Judiciary from
political pressure as the President has to choose only from the nominees for one
particular vacancy.
 Otherwise, the President can choose whom he pleases, and thereby completely
disregard the purpose for the creation of the JBC.
 The JBC clarifies that it numbered the vacancies, not to influence the order of
precedence, but for practical reasons
 The JBC posits that clustering is a matter of legal and operational necessity for
the JBC and the only safe standard operating procedure for making short lists. It
presents different scenarios which demonstrate the need for clustering, viz.,
o (a) There are two different sets of applicants for the vacancies;
o (b) There is a change in the JBC composition during the interval in the
deliberations on the vacancies as the House of Representatives and the
Senate alternately occupy the ex officio seat for the Legislature;
o (c) The applicant informs the JBC of his/her preference for assignment in
the Cebu Station or Cagayan de Oro Station of the Court of Appeals
because of the location or the desire to avoid mingling with certain
personalities;
o (d) The multiple vacancies in newly-opened first and second level trial
courts; and
 o (e) The dockets to be inherited in the appellate court are overwhelming so
the JBC chooses nominees for those particular posts with more years of
service as against those near retirement.
 It is also the asseveration of the JBC that it did not encroach on the President's
power to appoint members of the Judiciary.
 The JBC alleges that its individual Members gave several reasons why there was
an apparent indication of seniority assignments in the six short lists for the six
vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, particularly:
o (a) The JBC can best perform its job by indicating who are stronger
candidates by giving higher priority to those in the lower-numbered list;
o (b) The indication could head off the confusion encountered in Re:
Seniority Among the Four Most Recent Appointments to the Position of
Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals;8 and
o (c) The numbering of the lists from 16th to 21st had nothing to do with
seniority in the Sandiganbayan, but was only an ordinal designation of the
cluster to which the candidates were included.
Issue: Whether or not the Ponente should inhibit herself from this case
Whether or not the clustering of nominees impaired the President’s power to appoint
Held: NO. YES.
 There is no legal or factual basis for the ponente to inhibit herself from the instant
case.
o There is no ground for the mandatory inhibition of the ponente from the
case at bar.
o The ponente is also not privy to any proceeding in which the JBC
discussed and decided to adopt the unprecedented method of clustering
the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice into six separate short lists, one for every vacancy.
o The ponente does not know when, how, and why the JBC adopted the
clustering method of nomination for appellate courts and even the
Supreme Court.
 It is evident that prior to the meeting on October 26, 2015, the JBC had already
reached an agreement on the procedure it would follow in voting for nominees,
 In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be
considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved
with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of their partiality will not
suffice. It cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred oaths of
office of magistrates, requiring them to administer justice fairly and equitably
 Hence, the Court will no longer belabor the issue that only three JBC Members
signed the Motion for Intervention and Motion for Reconsideration and only four
JBC Members signed the Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, as well as
 the fact that Chief Justice Sereno, as Chairperson of the JBC, did not sign the
three Motions.
 Second issue
o The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by
the JBC impaired the President's power to appoint members of the
Judiciary and to determine the seniority of the newly-appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
o the Court ruled that the clustering impinged upon the President's
appointing power in the following ways:
 The President's option for every vacancy was limited to the five to
seven nominees in each cluster.
 Once the President had appointed a nominee from one cluster,
then he was proscribed from considering the other nominees in the
same cluster for the other vacancies.
 All the nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for
appointment to any of the vacant Associate Justice positions in the
Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why one nominee
should be considered for appointment to the position assigned to
one specific cluster only.
 Correspondingly, the nominees' chance for appointment was
restricted to the consideration of the one cluster in which they were
included, even though they applied and were found to be qualified
for all the vacancies.
 Moreover, by designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the
JBC established the seniority or order of preference of the new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, a power which the law vests
in the President
o In addition, clustering of nominees can be used to favor or prejudice a
candidate when in fact the mandate of JBC is to accord everyone a fair
and equal opportunity.
o Also, there is no objective criteria, standards or guidelines for the
clustering of nominees by JBC.
o Clustering of nominees was done before in 2015 but it was not challenged
in Courts, doesn’t make it legal though.
 The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the
simultaneous vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new positions of
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental to
its ruling that President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in making his
appointments to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts.
 G.R. No. 139554 July 21, 2006
Armita B. Rufino vs. Baltazar N. Endriga
Facts:
On 25 June 1966, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Executive Order No. 30
(EO 30) creating the Cultural Center of the Philippines as a trust governed by a Board of
Trustees of seven members to preserve and promote Philippine culture. On 5 October
1972, or soon after the declaration of Martial Law, President Marcos issued PD 15, the
CCP's charter, which converted the CCP under EO 30 into a non-municipal public
corporation free from the "pressure or influence of politics." PD 15 increased the
members of CCP's Board from seven to nine trustees. Later, Executive Order No. 1058,
issued on 10 October 1985, increased further the trustees to 11. After the People Power
Revolution in 1986, then President Corazon C. Aquino asked for the courtesy
resignations of the then incumbent CCP trustees and appointed new trustees to the
Board.

Petitioners, led by Baltazar N. Endriga (the Endriga group), were appointed members of
the board of trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) by President Fidel
V. Ramos in 1995, with the qualification that their appointments would extend only until
December 31, 1998. On December 22, 1998, then President Joseph Estrada advised
petitioners that they were being replaced by seven new appointees to the CCP board,
led by Armita B. Rufino (the Rufino group).

Having been dislodged from the CCP, Endriga filed quo warranto proceedings
questioning the President’s authority to appoint new members in the CCP board. It was
alleged that under Section 6(b)[1] of Presidential Decree No. 15, vacancies in the board
“shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the trustees held at the next regular
meeting x x x.” The Endriga group claimed that it was only when the board was
entirely vacant that the President of the Philippines may fill the vacancies, in
consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP.
The members of the group believed that since only one seat was vacant, President
Estrada could not appoint a new board. They averred that presidential appointment was
unjustified, since the CCP board still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory
power to fill any vacancy in the board by election.

On May 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the quo warranto Petition. It
declared the Endriga group lawfully entitled to hold office and ousted respondents from
the CCP board. The CA held that Section 6(b) of Presidential Decree (PD) 15 had
clearly vested in the remaining members of the board the power to elect new trustees. It
ruled that the President could exercise the power to appoint only when the board was
entirely vacant. In its appeal before this Court, the Rufino group asserted that Section
6(b) of PD 15, which authorized the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees, should
be declared unconstitutional. The provision was allegedly repugnant to Section 16 of
Article VII of the Constitution, which allowed the appointment only of “officers lower in
rank” than the appointing power.
Issue:
The lone issue was whether Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was unconstitutional in the
light of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
Held: Unconstitutional
At the outset, the Court recognized the occurrence of a supervening event that could
have rendered the case moot – the resignation of the Rufino group and the appointment
of new CCP trustees by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The Court, however,
deemed it best to pass upon the merits of the case, in order to prevent a repeat of this
regrettable controversy and to protect the CCP from being periodically wracked by
politics
The clear and categorical language of Section 6 (b) of PD 15 states that vacancies in
the CCP board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. It is only when
the board becomes entirely vacant that the vacancies shall be filled by the President of
the Philippines, acting in consultation with the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus,
Section 6 (b) empowers the remaining trustees of the board to fill the vacancies by
electing their fellow trustees.
Simply put, this provision authorizes the appointing officer to appoint an officer who will
be equal in rank to the former. In its Decision, the Court held that the power of
appointment granted in Section 6 (b) of PD 15 transgressed Section 16 of Article VII of
the Constitution.
It explained that the power to appoint – vested by Section 16 in the President; or the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards – was restricted only to
officers lower in rank. This constitutional provision clearly excluded a situation in which
the appointing officers appointed an officer who would be equal to them in rank.
This latter situation, however, was present in the CCP, whose trustees were appointing
new co-trustees who would be equal in rank to the former. Thus, Section 6 (b and c) of
PD 15 was found to be unconstitutional, insofar as it violated the constitutional mandate
that the head of the board may be authorized to appoint lower-ranking officers only.

ARTURO DE CASTRO V. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

17 March 2010

J. Bersamin
Case on: Midnight appointment of a Chief Justice

Facts:
 Chief Justice Puno’s retirement occurred just seven days before the 2010
presidential elections. This gave rise to numerous legal dilemmas and the
institution of several petitions:
- Certiorari and Mandamus (De Castro and Peralta) praying that the JBC be
compelled to submit the list of 3 nominees for the position
- Prohibition (Soriano) to prevent the JBC from conducting its selection and
nomination
- Mandamus (PHILCONSA) to compel JBC to submit its list of nominees to the
president
- AM No 10-2-5-SC (Mendoza) seeks guidance from the SC on WON prohibition
on midnight appointments under the Consti applies to appointments in the
judiciary
- There were several intervenors who submitted that Sec 15, Art VII makes no
distinction between the kinds of appointment made by the president
  Under Sec 4(1) in relation to Sec 9, Art VIII the “vacancy shall be filled within 90
days from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least 3 nominees prepared by
the JBC.”
 Pursuant to these provisions, the JBC began the process of selection. Although it
had begun such process, it has not yet decided on WON it should submit the list
of nominees for the position.
 OSG’s position = president may appoint and JBC was only performing its
functions under the Consti

Issue: WON the incumbent president can appoint the successor of CJ Puno upon his
retirement
Held: Yes.

Ruling:
 The SC abandoned its 1998 ruling in In Re Appointments of Valenzuela and
Vallarta as Judges of RTC (Valenzuela). There the SC held that the prohibition
under Sec 15, Art VII applies to judicial appointees.
 The prohibition against presidential appointments under Sec 15, Art VII does not
extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have
ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
 The reference to the records of the Constitutional Commission did not advance
or support the result in Valenzuela. Far to the contrary, the records disclosed the
express intent of the framers to enshrine in the Constitution, “a command [to the
President] to fill up any vacancy therein within 90 days from its occurrence,”
which even Valenzuela conceded. The exchanges during deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission further show that the filling of a vacancy in the
Supreme Court within the 90day period was a true mandate for the President.
 The usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution of the word shall—an
imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced—should not be
disregarded. Section 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make
an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. This cannot be defeated by mere judicial
interpretation in Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed
because it was “couched in stronger negative language. Valenzuela was weak,
because it relied on interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather
than on the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
 Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII,
the Court has no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the
prohibition to appointments made in the Executive Department. If midnight
appointments were made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing
Chief Executive in the last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert
 the policies of the incoming President or for partisanship, the appointments to the
Judiciary made after the establishment of JBC would not be suffering from such
defects because of the JBC’s prior processing of candidates.
 The intervention of the JBC eliminates the danger that appointments to the
Judiciary can be made for the purpose of buying votes in a coming presidential
election, or of satisfying partisan considerations.
 To hold like the Court did in Valenzuela that Section 15 extends to appointments
to the Judiciary further undermines the intent of the Constitution of ensuring the
independence of the Judicial Department from the Executive and Legislative
Departments.
 The express reference in Sections 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution to
a Chief Justice abhors the idea that the framers contemplated an Acting Chief
Justice to head the membership of the Supreme Court—otherwise, they would
have simply written so in the Constitution. The framers intended the position of
Chief Justice to be permanent, not one to be occupied in an acting or temporary
capacity. It ought to be remembered that Section 12 of the Judiciary Act of 1948
was enacted because the Chief Justice appointed under the 1935 Constitution
was subject to the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, and the
confirmation process might take longer than expected. IN SHORT: Court deemed
it better to have a permanent CJ appointed by the president days before the
president’s term vs. having an Associate Justice acting as the sitting CJ.

J Brion:

 Agreed that the president can appoint the CJ and members of the SC 2 months
before presidential elections up to the end of the president’s term but disagreed
with the conclusion that the authority to appoint extends to the whole judiciary.
 Section 15 on its face disallows any appointment in clear negative terms (shall
not make) without specifying the appointments covered by the prohibition. From
this literal reading springs the argument that no exception is provided (except the
exception found in Section 15 itself) so that even the Judiciary is covered by the
ban on appointments. On the other hand, Section 4(1) is likewise very clear and
categorical in its terms: any vacancy in the Court shall be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence. In the way of Section 15, Section 4(1) is also clear and
categorical and provides no exception; the appointment refers solely to the
Members of the Supreme Court and does not mention any period that would
interrupt, hold or postpone the 90day requirement. Section 9 may offer more
flexibility in its application as the mandate for the President is to issue
appointments within 90 days from submission of the list, without specifying when
the submission should be made.
 It appears clear that In Re: Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A.
Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B. Vallarta as Judges of the Regional Trial Court of
Branch 62, Bago City, and of Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, Respectively, A.M.
No. 98501SC, November 9, 1998 (Valenzuela), 298 SCRA 408 (1998), should be
 read and appreciated for what it is—a ruling made on the basis of the Court’s
supervision over judicial personnel that upholds the election ban as against the
appointment of lower court judges appointed pursuant to the period provided by
Section 9 of Article VIII.
 The reasons the former Chief Justice cited in Valenzuela justify the application of
the Section 15, Article VII as against the rule on appointment of lower court
judges under Section 9, Article VIII—Section 9 does not impose a hard and fast
rule on the period to be observed, apparently because the urgency of the
appointment may not be as great as in the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court.

Garafil v. Office of the President

Midnight Appointment Case

Facts:
1. The case involved four consolidated petitions. In the petitions, the petitioners
were individuals appointed in various government agencies (OSG, NPS, CDA,
NCIP, SBMA).
2. The parties were appointed by President GMA prior to the conduct of the May
2010 elections. This is notwithstanding the ban on midnight appointments under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution.
a. Rule: No appointments two months immediately before the next
presidential appointments except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or
endanger public safety.
b. For the May 2010 elections, the cut-off for appointment was March 10,
2010. Appointments made after March 10 unless those falling under the
exceptions would be unconstitutional

Petitioner-Appointee Date of Appointment How terminated

 Velicaria-Garafil (OSG) March 5 (Appointment Notified by OSG
papers), March 22 (Oath),
April 6 (Assumption)
Venturaza (National Feb. 23 (Appointment Notified by Fax to
Prosecution Service) Papers), March 15 (Oath Secretary De Lima
and Assumption)
Villanueva (Cooperative March 3 (Appointment), OP withheld salaries
Development Authority) April 13 (Oath) and revoked by
Paquito Ochoa
Rosquita (NCIP) March 5 (Appointment OP withheld salaries
papers), Mar. 18 (Oath) and revoked by
Paquito Ochoa
Tamondong March 1 (Appointement Removed from BOD
paper), March 22 and July of SBMA
6 (oath, sumigurado siya)

3. President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 2 on July 30. EO No. 2 recalled,
withdrew, and revoked appointments issued by PGMA (see above) which
violated Midnight appointments.
4. The petitioners were terminated. Hence, petitioners filed their respective petitions
for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition.
Issue: Whether appointments were unconstitutional, hence invalid, as provided under
Article VII, Section 15 of the Consti
Held: Yes, they are.
Ratio:
1. The Court held that none of the petitioners have shown that their appointment
papers and transmittal letters have been issued and released before the ban.
The dates of receipt by the Malacanang Records Office are the only reliable
evidence of actual transmittal. (essentially, the date of appointment is the date
when the records were transmitted to the MRO) => Due process kaya hindi date
of appointment.
Demigillo v TIDCORP
GR No. 168613, 5 March 2013.

FACTS: Trade and Investment Development Corporation of the Phils. (TIDCORP) was
reorganized pursuant to RA 8494. As a result, Rosario Manalang-Demigillo was
appointed as Senior VP and assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services Department
(LCSD).
After seeking an opinion with the OGCC and receiving a positive response, TIDCORP
Board of Directors passed a resolution reorganizing TIDCORP again, abolishing the
LCSD and reassigning Demigillo to the Remedial and Credit Management Support
Sector (RCMSS) while keeping her rank as SVP. Demigillo challenged the resolution
before TIDCORP, alleging illegal removal from her former position (she also brought
this issue to the CSC, which raised an issue of potential forum-shopping, but TIDCORP
denied her appeal so OK na).
TIDCORP President later informed Demigillo that she received a poor performance
rating for constantly obstructing the implementation of the reorganization, as well as
several Civil Service rules. Demigillo consistently challenged this rating, but she failed,
and she was dropped from the rolls.
CSC: reorganization was valid, however Demigillo was demoted due to being placed in
a smaller department with reduced functions, and the dropping did not comply with
Revised Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions Memorandum
Circular No. 40, s. 1998.
CA: TIDCORP Directors are alter egos of the President, thus vested with power to
reorganize, Demigillo was demoted and invalidly dropped.

ISSUE: (more important issue for syllabus) WON TIDCORP reorganization is valid on
the basis of TIDCORP Directors being alter egos of the President.

HELD: NO.
Doctrine of qualified political agency (aka alter ego doctrine) does not apply to
TIDCORP because its Directors were appointed ex officio by law, not by the President.
Thus, when the Board of Directors effected the 2002 reorganization, they were acting as
TIDCORP Directors, not as alter egos of the President.
2002 reorganization was valid for being done in accordance with authority expressly
granted by RA 8494, which amended PD 1080, the law creating TIDCORP.
Furthermore, SC found that the reorganization was not arbitrary, having been
formulated on the basis of lengthy consultations and coordination with the offices which
would be affected. Thus, there is no legal and practical basis to reinstate Demigillo to
her former position as SVP in the LCSD. This, along with the records indicating her
permanent appointment only to that of SVP, also means that her reassignment was not
a diminution in rank, because she was still SVP when she was reassigned to the
RCMSS.

ISSUE: WON Demigillo was validly dropped from the rolls.

HELD: YES.
Requisites:
(1) the official or employee was rated poor in performance for one evaluation period;
(2) the official or employee was notified in writing of the status of her performance not
later than the 4th month of the rating period with sufficient warning that failure to
improve her performance within the remaining period of the semester shall warrant her
separation from the service (SC applied period by analogy to mean that the report must
be made not later than halfway through the rating period, which was also adequate time
to prepare an explanation--see next requisite); and
(3) such notice contained adequate information that would enable her to prepare an
explanation (due process whee).
Demigillo was given almost 4 months to improve her performance before she was
dropped from the rolls.

G.R. No. 168056 September 1, 2005

Abakada Guro Party-list et. al vs. Executive Secretary Ermita
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform
Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining
government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari
and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6:
“That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
of the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or (ii) National
government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1½%)”
Petitioners allege that the grant of standby authority to the President to increase
the VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because
such delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods
and services which can’t be included within the purview of tariffs under the exemption
delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise
to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods.
Petitioners further alleged that delegating to the President the legislative power to tax is
contrary to republicanism. They insist that accountability, responsibility and
transparency should dictate the actions of Congress and they should not pass to the
President the decision to impose taxes. They also argue that the law also effectively
nullified the President’s power of control, which includes the authority to set aside and
nullify the acts of her subordinates like the Secretary of Finance, by mandating the fixing
of the tax rate by the President upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT
rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of
Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power?
Held:
The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly,
or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be
delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall
take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of
its exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies

For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its
boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increased rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation
of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition.
It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the
President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is used
in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory order. Its
use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of
discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon
the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which
cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate
when the specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence
of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP
of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage
of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1½%. If either of these two instances has
occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such
information to the President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or
even her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to
determine and declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The
Secretary of Finance becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is
determined and implemented, considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather
data and information and has a much broader perspective to properly evaluate them.
His function is to gather and collate statistical data and other pertinent information and
verify if any of the two conditions laid out by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes
what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go
forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the
power to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
LOUIS “BAROK” BIRAOGO V. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
7 December 2010

Case on: Constitutionality of EO No. 1 creating the PTC

J Mendoza

Facts:
 These are two consolidated petitions questioning the validity of President
Aquino’s EO No. 1 dated 30 July 2010 entitled “Creating the Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010”
- Biraogo Petition – assails the constitutionality of the EO for being violative of
the legislative power of Congress as it usurps the constitutional authority of
the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
Biragao argues that the PTC is a public office and not merely an adjunct
body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the president may
create such public office, he must be empowered by the Consti, a statute or
 an authorization vested in him by law. He adds that the Admin Code (Sec
31) cannot be used as a basis for the creation of the PTC since the Admin
Code merely allows reorganization, transfer, merger, abolition.
- Lagman, et al. Petition – incumbent members of the House of Rep assailing
the EO on the same ground ^
 The PTC was a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with
the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-
level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its
finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and Ombudsman.
 To accomplish its task, the PTC had all the powers of an investigative body
under the Admin Code. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, resolve or settle. All it can do is to gather and assess evidence of
graft and corruption and make its recommendations.
 OSG’s Comment: EO No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create
a public office because the President’s executive power and power of control
necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed + There is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress. OSG further claimed that the president
has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive
department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control and by virtue
of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under
existing statutes.
 On the argument that the PTC duplicates the functions of the Ombudsman, OSG
argued that the PTC is a mere fact-finding body.

Issue: WON EO No. 1 is unconstitutional

Held: YES. It is unconstitutional, not because of usurpation of power but because of the
violation of the equal protection clause under the Consti.

Issue: WON the president’s power of control includes the power to create offices
Held: No. However, SC explained that the basis for the creation of the PTC = inherent
duty of the president to faithfully execute the laws

Ruling:
 The creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control.
Control is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is
entirely different from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in
the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from
 Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
 The Court declines to recognize Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1416 as a
justification for the President to create a public office. P.D. No. 1416 was a
delegation to then President Marcos of the authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the national government including the power to create
offices and transfer appropriations for the transition to a parliamentary form of
government.
 The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) finds justification under
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President the duty
to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. That the authority of the President
to conduct investigations and to create bodies to execute this power is not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is
bereft of such authority. The allocation of power in the three principal branches of
government is a grant of all powers inherent in them.
 The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry
into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
 There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power to appropriate
funds where there is only allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated.
 Power to investigate: to inquire into, to obtain information; Power to Adjudicate:
to settle, to resolve, to decide. No usurpation of legislative function because the
PTC is no a quasi-judicial body and has no power to adjudicate.
 The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) will not supplant the Ombudsman or the
Department of Justice (DOJ) or erode their respective powers—if at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices;
The Ombudsman’s power to investigate under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770 is
not exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies.
 The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. Not
to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which
the equal protection clause cannot sanction—the Arroyo administration is but just
a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations, not a class of its
own.
Almario vs Executive Secretary
Facts:
 The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and
jointly administer the National Artists Award.
 There were three deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final
deliberation, a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde,
Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
 They submitted this recommendation to the President.
 According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of
the President to the Committee on Honors.
 Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly received nominations from
various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private
respondents.
 Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring
Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
 Hence, the petition.
 All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely
abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and
selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own
choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of
discretion with regards to the violation of the right to equal protection
 RULING: Yes.
 It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be
nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while
respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and
respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.
 Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they
were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP
and conferred the Order of National Artists.
 The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa
and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny.
 No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has
been shown that would justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established
procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position.
 In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal
protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this
case.
 Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the
President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and
the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject
to the President’s discretion.
 Nevertheless, the President’s discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered,
nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless.
 Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases
but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, "discretion is not
unconfined and vagrant" but "canalized within banks that keep it from
overflowing.
 The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws.
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws
by the President:
 The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists
should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant
laws.
 The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the
President, not a separate grant of power
 It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that
the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.
 This is precisely why the law provides that "administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
or the Constitution.
 While the Court invalidates today the proclamation of respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists, such action should
not be taken as a pronouncement on whether they are worthy to be conferred
that honor.
 Only the President, upon the advise of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, may
determine that.
 There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution87 when
the former President gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno
 The former President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and
observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the
selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists
proscribed her from having a free and uninhibited hand in the conferment of the
said award.
 The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and
the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno.
 The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said respondents was
therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
 The Court simply declares that, as the former President committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009, the
said proclamations are invalid.
 However, nothing in this Decision should be read as a disqualification on the part
of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno to be considered
for the honor of National Artist in the future, subject to compliance with the laws,
rules and regulations governing said award.

Risos-Vidal v COMELEC
GR No. 206666, 21 January 2015.

Sandiganbayan convicted Joseph Estrada for plunder on 12 September 2007. However,

PGMA extended pardon to Estrada a month later. Said pardon provided that "He is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights." Estrada later filed a CoC for the
Presidency, which earned 3 oppositions before the COMELEC. Said oppositions were
all denied on the ground that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a
sitting president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former
President Arroyo restored the former’s right to vote and be voted for a public office.
However, Estrada did not win.
Estrada ran again, this time for Mayor of Manila. Alicia Risos-Vidal filed a petition for
disqualification on the basis that his conviction for plunder sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification, that the LGC disqualifies those
sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or 1+ year of
imprisonment, within 2 years after serving sentence, and that the Omnibus Election
Code disqualifies those sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection,
rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than
eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty.
COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of proof to overturn the pronouncement that
the pardon restored Estrada's right to seek public office.
Risos-Vidal went up to the SC. While the case was pending, Estrada won the mayor
seat.
Risos-Vidal argued that the pardon was conditional, as embodied in “WHEREAS,
Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position
or office”, and that Estrada violated such condition when he ran.

ISSUE: WON Estrada is still qualified to run for office.

HELD: YES.
Estrada's pardon was absolute; the wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
President's power to pardon cannot be limited by legislative action, and the Consti only
prohibits pardon in impeachment cases, cases where is not yet a final conviction, and
election law violations without favorable recommendation from COMELEC.
ConCom records showed intent to not impair President's pardoning power by
Congressional acts when it rejected a proposal to provide exception for graft and
corruption offenses to be provided by Congress through law.
Verba legis: the presidential pardon expressly restored Estrada to his civil and political
rights.
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code should be construed in a way that will
give full effect to the executive clemency granted by the President, instead of indulging
in an overly strict interpretation that may serve to impair or diminish the import of the
pardon which emanated from the Office of the President and duly signed by the Chief
Executive himself/herself.
In this jurisdiction, the right to seek public elective office is recognized by law as falling
under the whole gamut of civil and political rights.
Estrada's disqualification under the LGC and the Omnibus Election Code was removed
upon his acceptance of the absolute pardon.
The whereas clause did not make the pardon conditional, as it did not explicitly impose
a condition or limitation, considering the unqualified use of the term “civil and political
rights” as being restored.

PROF. RANDOLF DAVID, ET. AL. V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

3 May 2006

Case on: Presidential Proclamation 1017 and General Order No. 5 issued by PGMA
declaring a state of national emergency

Facts:
 On 24 February 2006, PGMA issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency. On the same day, she issued GO No. 5 implementing PP1017.
Bases: Conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the NPA
and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
 the president, escape of members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the
Oakwood Mutiny, plans for bombings and attacks during the Philippine Military
Academy Alumni Homecoming, bombing of telecommunication towers and cell
sites in Bulacan and Bataan, directive of Communist Party of the Philippines to
hold mass protests in Manila.
 Immediately after the issuance of PP 1017, PGMA announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20 th anniv of EDSA People Power I and
revoked the permits to hold rallies. Presidential Chief of Staff Defensor
announced that warrantless arrests and take-over of facilities, including media,
can already be implemented.
 Undeterred by the announcements, several rallies and public assemblies were
held. All of which were dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police (complete w/
water cannons, tear gas, fiber glass shields)
 During the dispersal police arrested Petitioner David (without a warrant) and
Ronald Llamas (president of Akbayan).
 The Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) then raided the Daily
Tribune and Malaya (pro-opposition papers) and confiscated news stories,
documents, pictures and mock-ups.
 Police arrested Congressman Crispin Beltran (warrant was dated 1985). Beltran,
however, is not a party to the petition. When members of Kilusang Mayo Uno
tried to visit Beltran, they were dispersed by the police. Two of them were
detained.
 Several other personalities from the opposition were arrested without warrants.
 A week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after petitions
have been filed questioning its constitutionality, PGMA lifted PP1017 and issued
Proclamation No. 1021.
 Grounds for the petitions questioning the constitutionality of PP 1017 and GO No.
5 are as follows:
- Encroaches on emergency power of congress
- It is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law
- Violates freedom of the press, speech, and of assembly

Issue: WON SC can review the factual bases of PP 1017 – Yes

 Petitioners maintain that PP 1017 has no factual basis. Hence, it was not
“necessary” for President Arroyo to issue such Proclamation.
 History Lesson: The issue of whether the Court may review the factual bases of the
President’s exercise of his Commanderin Chief power has reached its distilled point
—from the indulgent days of Barcelon v. Baker and Montenegro v. Castañeda to
the volatile era of Lansang v. Garcia, Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, and GarciaPadilla v.
Enrile. The tugofwar always cuts across the line defining “political questions,”
 particularly those questions “in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government.” Barcelon and
Montenegro were in unison in declaring that the authority to decide whether an
exigency has arisen belongs to the President and his decision is final and
conclusive on the courts.
 Lansang took the opposite view. There, the members of the Court were unanimous
in the conviction that the Court has the authority to inquire into the existence of
factual bases in order to determine their constitutional sufficiency. From the
principle of separation of powers, it shifted the focus to the system of checks
and balances, “under which the President is supreme, only if and when he acts
within the sphere allotted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to
determine whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department,
which in this respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme.”
 In 1973, the unanimous Court of Lansang was divided in Aquino v. Enrile. There, the
Court was almost evenly divided on the issue of whether the validity of the
imposition of Martial Law is a political or justiciable question. Then came Garcia
Padilla v. Enrile which greatly diluted Lansang. It declared that there is a need to re -
examine the latter case, ratiocinating that “in times of war or national emergency,
the President must be given absolute control for the very life of the nation and
the government is in great peril. The President, it intoned, is answerable only
to his conscience, the People, and God.”
 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora —a recent case most pertinent to
these cases at bar—echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court
considered the President’s “callingout” power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom, it stressed that “this does not prevent an examination of whether
such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether
it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.”
 As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang
adopted the test that “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not
that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act arbitrarily.”
Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
 Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the callingout power, by
issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.

Issue: WON PP 1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional – partly.

CONSTITUTIONAL

- Constitutes a call by the president to the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless

violence
- Declares a national emergency

UNCONSTITUTIONAL
 - Commands AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence
- Commands AFP to enforce decrees promulgated by the president
- Authorizes president to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without prior legislation
- GO No. 5 – acts of terrorism was not defined. Hence, warrantless arrests of
David and Llamas, KMU members are unconstitutional

Held:

On decrees:
 A reading of PP 1017 operative clause shows that it was lifted from Former
President Marcos’ Proclamation No. 1081; We all know that it was PP 1081
which granted President Marcos legislative powers. PGMA did not have those
powers.
 President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to Executive Orders, Administrative
Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circulars, and
General or Special Orders—she cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by
Former President Marcos under PP 1081. Thus, PP 1017 is unconstitutional
insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.”

On taking of privately-owned PU:

 President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national

emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment but the exercise
of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, is a different matter. Generally, Congress
is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23
(2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President.
 When Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it
refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may
exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Here, there was no
delegation of such power. While the President alone can declare a state of
national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over
privatelyowned public utility or business affected with public interest.
Gudani v. Sunga
Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition

Facts:
1. Petitioners were high-ranking officers of the AFP (Marines) assigned in Baguio
City (PMA).
2. Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear
before the senate committee on national defense. This was due to the conduct of
the 2004 Presidential Elections in light of the “Hello Garci” incident.
3. The AFP directed the petitioners to attend the hearing and they travelled to
Manila under their approved travel requests. However, President Arroyo issued a
 message stating that No AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional
or senate hearing without her approval.
a. Respondent Senga tried to communicate this message to the petitioners
but such attempts were futile.
b. Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which enjoins officials from the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her approval
4. The petitioners testified. The resulted in them being directed by respondent to
appear before the Office of the Provost Marshal General (na-Court Marshall sila)
5. The petitioners filed the current action.
a. The EO 464 constituted as a gag-order in violation of their constitutional
rights

Issue: Whether the President may enjoin members of the military to testify before
congressional inquiries, notwithstanding the constitutional rights involved.

Held: Yes, she may.

Ratio:
1. The Court held that the petitioners were not called to task for violation EO 464
but due to violation of the direct order of respondent, General Senga, not to
appear before the Senate Committee.
2. The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent
before appearing in Congress pertains not to executive control but based on
the commander-in-chief powers of the President.
3. As to the so-called “gag order”, the Court held that the power of the President as
Commander-in-Chief is crucial in the democratic way of life, exhibiting civilian
supremacy over the military and the stability of the representative system of
government.
a. The Congress determines Military Appropriations and the power to declare
the existence of a state of war. It is also empowered to revoke a
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
b. The President (Chief Executive) shall be the commander-in-chief of all
armed forces. This expressly provides that the President has absolute
authority over persons and actions of the members of the armed forces.
i. Certain liberties may be circumscribed by rules of military discipline
to ensure the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its during
under the law. (Kapunan v. De Villa)
4. However the court has further held that the petitioners may challenge the act of
preventing them to testify by filing a case before the courts. (it was not the
question posed in this case so the Court refused to rule on this.)
Kulayan v Tan

FACTS: While inspecting a water and sanitation project in the provincial jail, 3 members
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (one Swiss, one Italian, one
Filipino) were kidnapped in Patikul, Sulu by the Abu Sayyaf (ASG). ICRC and PNP
organized a task force which included the Sulu Crisis Management Committee, with
Sulu Provincial Governor Abdusakur Mahail Tan at its head. Tan organized and
deployed the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), an armed group, through Memoranda of
Understanding between the Sulu LGU, the AFP, and the PNP, owing to the
extraordinary situation, for the rescue of the hostages.
Tan later issued Proclamation 1-09 declaring a state of emergency in Sulu, invoking the
Human Security Act's provisions on terrorism and the Sec. 465 of the LGC which allows
the Provincial Governor to carry out emergency measures during man-made and
natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder and lawless violence. The proclamation also ordered checkpoints,
curfew, search and seizure, etc. Suspected ASG supporters were also arrested and
detained.
Jamir Kulayan et al., residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the petition for certiorari and
prohibition, arguing Proclamation was issued with grave abuse of discretion because
only the President had authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers.

ISSUE: WON Tan had authority to issue Proclamation 1-09.

HELD: NO.
(procedural: OK lang kasi transcendental importance because the case involves
restrictive custody)
Executive power, according to the Consti, is granted only to the President and no one
else. The Constitution calls for a single, not plural, Executive.
Consequence of "One President" Constitutional precept: there are certain acts which
can only be performed by the President as Head of State, such as the calling-out
powers (emergency powers require authorization by Congress), power to suspend writ
of habeas corpus, and power to declare martial law (subject to SC review of factual
basis).
While the President is a civilian, the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is at all
times supreme over the military.
Calling-out power cannot be revoked or reviewed, making it different from martial law or
suspension of habeas corpus.
Local chief executives such as provincial governors only exercise operational
supervision over the police, and control only over day-to-day operations.
Provincial governors do not possess the same calling-out powers as the President;
even in localized areas, it is still the President who exercises calling-out powers.
Sec. 465 of the LGC only allows for emergency measures from local chief executives
during man-made and natural disasters and calamities; a kidnapping is neither a
disaster nor a calamity.
The organization of the CEF was without authority; the Constitution provides for only
one police force (Sec. 24, Art. XVIII) under which local police agencies are maintained;
the CEF is an unrecognized armed group, akin to a private citizen army.

PHILIP SIGFRID FORTUN, ET AL V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

20 March 2012

Facts:
 In 2009, after the Ampatuan Massacre, PGMA issued PP 1946 to declare a state
of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City.
  She then issued PP 1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao (except in identified areas of MILF)
 Two days after the issuance of PP 1959 (or Dec 6, 2009), PGMA submitted her
report to Congress in accordance with Sec 18, Art VII of the Consti which
requires the president to submit within 48 hours from proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus to submit to
Congress a report in person or in writing of her action.
 In her report, PGMA said that she acted based on her finding that lawlessmen
have taken up arms in Maguindanao and have risen against the government.
 Three days after the submission of the report (or Dec 9), Congress convened to
review the validity of PGMA’s action. But before Congress could act, PGMA
issued PP1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao.
 Petitioners question the constitutionality of PP 1959. However, the SC said that
any review of its constitutionality is the equivalent of beating a dead horse (lol)

Issue: WON the SC can review the factual basis of the proclamation
Held: Yes, but only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Consti
through review of the proclamation/suspension

Ruling:
 Under the 1987 Constitution the President and the Congress act in tandem in
exercising the power to proclaim martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a sense
jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension,
only the Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the
situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
 Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the
power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to
exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only
when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through
such review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The
constitutional validity of the President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
 Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review.
The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable
controversy
 Further, since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they
have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not take over the
operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao.
 Justice Carpio points out in his dissenting opinion the finding of the RTC of
Quezon City that no probable cause exist that the accused before it committed
rebellion in Maguindanao since the prosecution failed to establish the elements
of the crime. But the Court cannot use such finding as basis for striking down the
President’s proclamation and suspension. For, firstly, the Court did not delegate
and could not delegate to the RTC of Quezon City its power to determine the
factual basis for the presidential proclamation and suspension. Secondly, there is
no showing that the RTC of Quezon City passed upon the same evidence that
the President, as CommanderinChief of the Armed Forces, had in her
possession when she issued the proclamation and suspension.
 Notably, under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the Court has only
30 days from the filing of an appropriate proceeding to review the sufficiency of
the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
 More than two years have passed since petitioners filed the present actions to
annul Proclamation 1959. When the Court did not decide it then, it actually opted
for a default as was its duty, the question having become moot and academic.
 Justice Carpio points out that should the Court regard the powers of the
President and Congress respecting the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as sequential or joint, it
would be impossible for the Court to exercise its power of review within the 30
days given it.
 But those 30 days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to
fulfill its duty without preempting congressional action. Section 18, Article VII,
requires the President to report his actions to Congress, in person or in writing,
within 48 hours of such proclamation or suspension. In turn, the Congress is
required to convene without need of a call within 24 hours following the
President’s proclamation or suspension. Clearly, the Constitution calls for quick
action on the part of the Congress. Whatever form that action takes, therefore,
should give the Court sufficient time to fulfill its own mandate to review the factual
basis of the proclamation or suspension within 30 days of its issuance.
 If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty respecting the
proclamation or suspension within the short time expected of it, then the Court
can step in, hear the petitions challenging the President’s action, and ascertain if
it has a factual basis. If the Court finds none, then it can annul the proclamation
or the suspension. But what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves
inadequate? Justice Carpio himself offers the answer in his dissent: that 30day
period does not operate to divest this Court of its jurisdiction over the case. The
settled rule is that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost until the case has been
terminated.
Consolidated petitions dismissed, MOOT AND ACADEMIC.

Lagman vs Medialdea
Facts:
 Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial
law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.
  In accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President, on
May 25, 2017, submitted to Congress a written Report on the factual basis of
Proclamation No. 216.
 The Report pointed out that for decades, Mindanao has been plagued with
rebellion and lawless violence which only escalated and worsened with the
passing of time.
 On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his Report, the Maute terrorist group
took over a hospital in Marawi City; established several checkpoints within the
city; burned down certain government and private facilities and inflicted
casualties on the part of Government forces; and started flying the flag of the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby indicating a
removal of allegiance from the Philippine Government and their capability to
deprive the duly constituted authorities – the President, foremost – of their
powers and prerogatives.
 The Report also highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City; the role it plays
in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a whole; and the possible tragic
repercussions once it falls under the control of the lawless groups.
 After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate declared that it
found “no compelling reason to revoke Proclamation 216.
 The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group petitioned the
Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of President Duterte’s Proclamation
of martial law.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitions are the “appropriate proceeding” covered by paragraph 3,
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution sufficient to invoke the mode of review
required by the Court;
[2] A. Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his
appreciation of facts? B. Is the President required to obtain the favorable
recommendation thereon bf the Secretary of National Defense? C. Is the President is
required to take into account only the situation at the time of the proclamation, even if
subsequent events prove the situation to have not been accurately reported?
[3] Is the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or
separately;
Whether or not there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; A. What are the parameters
for review? B. Who has the burden of proof? C. What is the threshold of evidence?
Whether or not the exercise of the power of judicial review by this Court involves the
calibration of graduated powers granted the President as Commander-in-Chief?
Whether or not Proclamation No. 216 of 23 May 2017 may be considered, vague and
thus null and void: a. with its inclusion of “other rebel groups;” or b. since it has no
guidelines specifying its actual operational parameters within the entire Mindanao
region;
Whether or not the armed hostilities mentioned in Proclamation No. 216 and in the
Report of the President to Congress are sufficient bases: a. for the existence of actual
rebellion; or b. for a declaration of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao region;
Whether or not terrorism or acts attributable to terrorism are equivalent to actual
rebellion and the requirements of public safety sufficient to declare martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
Whether or not nullifying Proclamation No. 216 of23 May 2017 will: A. have the effect of
recalling Proclamation No. 55 s. 2016; or B. also nullify the acts of the President in
calling out the armed forces to quell lawless violence in Marawi and other parts of the
Mindanao region.
RULING:
 1. The Court agrees that the jurisdiction of this Court under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII is sui generis. It is a special and specific jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court different from those enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article
VIII. The phrase “in an appropriate proceeding” appearing on the third paragraph
of Section 18, Article VII refers to any action initiated by a citizen for the purpose
of questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the exercise of the Chief
Executive’s emergency powers, as in these cases. It could be denominated as a
complaint, a petition, or a matter to be resolved by the Court.
 2. a.) In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or
the suspension, the Court should look into the full complement or totality of the
factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect
absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation and in the written
Report as the President could not be expected to verify the accuracy and veracity
of all facts reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require him
otherwise would impede the process of his decision-making.
 b.) The recommendation of the Defense Secretary is not a condition for the
declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution shows that
the President’s power to declare martial law is not subject to any condition except
for the requirements of actual invasion or rebellion and that public safety requires
it. Besides, it would be contrary to common sense if the decision of the President
 is made dependent on the recommendation of his mere alter ego. Only on the
President can exercise of the powers of the Commander-in-Chief.
 c.) As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare
martial law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject
to the revocation of Congress and the review of this Court. Since the exercise of
these powers is a judgment call of the President, the determination of this Court
as to whether there is sufficient factual basis for the exercise of such, must be
based only on facts or information known by or available to the President at the
time he made the declaration or suspension which facts or information are found
in the proclamation as well as the written Report submitted by him to Congress.
These may be based on the situation existing at the time the declaration was
made or past events. As to how far the past events should be from the present
depends on the President.
 3. The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress.
 The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack sufficient factual basis. On
the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. The power to review by the
Court and the power to revoke by Congress are not only totally different but
likewise independent from each other although concededly, they have the same
trajectory, which is, the nullification of the presidential proclamation.
 4. The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows:
l) actual rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two
requirements must concur; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to
believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion.
 The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in
determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring
martial law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and
most expedient standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence
or non-existence of rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or
suspension of the writ. To require him to satisfy a higher standard of proof would
restrict the exercise of his emergency powers.
 5. The judicial power to review the sufficiency of factual basis of the declaration
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not extend to the calibration of the President’s decision of which among his
graduated powers he will avail of in a given situation. To do so would be
tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an
infringement on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the
President.
 6. a.) Inclusion of “other rebel groups ” does not make Proclamation No. 216
vague. The term “other rebel groups” in Proclamation No. 216 is not at all vague
when viewed in the context of the words that accompany it. Verily, the text of
Proclamation No. 216 refers to “other rebel groups” found in Proclamation No.
55, which it cited by way of reference in its Whereas clauses.
 b.) Lack of guidelines/operational parameters does not make Proclamation No.
216 vague. Operational guidelines will serve only as mere tools for the
implementation of the proclamation.
 There is no need for the Court to determine the constitutionality of the
implementing and/or operational guidelines, general orders, arrest orders and
other orders issued after the proclamation for being irrelevant to its review. Any
act committed under the said orders in violation of the Constitution and the laws
should be resolved in a separate proceeding. Finally, there is a risk that if the
Court wades into these areas, it would be deemed as trespassing into the sphere
that is reserved exclusively for Congress in the exercise of its power to revoke.
 7. There is sufficient factual basis for the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. By a review of the facts available to him
that there was an armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was to
remove from the allegiance to the Philippine Government a portion of its territory
and to deprive the Chief Executive of any of his power and prerogatives, leading
the President to believe that there was probable cause that the crime of rebellion
was and is being committed and that public safety requires the imposition of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
 After all, what the President needs to satisfy is only the standard of probable
cause for a valid declaration of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
 8. Terrorism neither negates nor absorbs rebellion. Rebellion may be subsumed
under the crime of terrorism, which has a broader scope covering a wide range of
predicate crimes. In fact, rebellion is only one of the various means by which
terrorism can be committed.
 Meanwhile, public safety requires the declaration of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao. For a declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus to be valid, there must be concurrence of 1.) actual
rebellion or invasion and 2.) the public safety requirement.
 In his report, the President noted that the acts of violence perpetrated by the
ASG and the Maute Group were directed not only against government forces or
establishment but likewise against civilians and their properties. There were
bomb threats, road blockades, burning of schools and churches, hostages and
killings of civilians, forced entry of young male Muslims to the group, there were
hampering of medical services and delivery of basic services, reinforcement of
government troops, among others. These particular scenarios convinced the
President that the atrocities had already escalated to a level that risked public
 safety and thus impelled him to declare martial law and suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
 9. a.) The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare
martial law and the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
nullification of Proclamation No. 216 will not affect Proclamation No. 55.
 The President may exercise the power to call out the Armed Forces
independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and to declare martial law. Even so, the Court’s review of the President’s
declaration of martial law and his calling out the Armed Forces necessarily
entails separate proceedings instituted for that particular purpose.
 b.) Neither would the nullification of Proclamation No. 216 result in the
nullification of the acts of the President done pursuant thereto. Under the
operative fact doctrine,” the unconstitutional statute is recognized as an
“operative fact” before it is declared unconstitutional.
 Verily, the Court upholds the validity of the declaration of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao
region. The Court FINDS sufficient factual bases for the issuance of
Proclamation No. 216 and DECLARES it as CONSTITUTIONAL. Accordingly,
the consolidated Petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
Padilla v Congress

FACTS: Armed attacks, violence, etc. against civilians and authorities (by Maute and
Abu Sayyaf) prompted Proclamation 216 from PDuterte, declaring martial law and
suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus in Mindanao.
Senate Resolution 49 (to not revoke Proclamation 216) passed vote.
PS Resolution 390 (to convene) voted against.
Padilla et al. filed petitions assailing failure of Congress to convene jointly and
deliberate on Proclamation 216, mandamus to compel Congress to convene. Argument
was that Congress convening was a duty which could be compelled by mandamus;
response was there was no mandatory duty to "vote jointly", Constitutional right to
information was not absolute, what was required was the voting re: whether to revoke
and only if Congress wanted to revoke.

ISSUE: WON Congress can be compelled to convene.

HELD: NO.
(Procedural: SC can rule on interpretation of Consti, SC can rule when political question
still involves legality and not wisdom, citizen standing + transcendental importance = OK
judicial review)
Congress is not mandated to convene in joint session except to vote jointly to revoke
the President's declaration/suspension.
Checks and balances: report to Congress, Congress' power to revoke or extend,
judiciary power to review factual basis for such proclamation.
4 provisions re: martial law and suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus:
- Within 48h report to Congress
- Congress (vote jointly) may revoke
- Upon initiative of President, Congress (voting jointly) MAY extend
- Congress, if not in session, shall convene without need of call within 24h
Verba legis: Congress "may" = permissive, discretionary
Voting jointly =/= joint session
There was no obligation on the part of the Congress herein to convene in joint session
as the provision on revocation under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution did
not even come into operation in light of the resolutions, separately adopted by the two
Houses of the Congress in accordance with their respective rules of procedure,
expressing support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216.
The Court highlights the particular circumstance herein that both Houses of Congress
already separately expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation No. 216, so
revocation was not even a possibility and the provision on revocation under Article VII,
Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to vote jointly in a joint
session never came into operation. It will be a completely different scenario if either of
the Senate or the House of Representatives, or if both Houses of the Congress,
resolve/s to revoke the President's proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in which case, Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987
Constitution shall apply and the Congress must convene in joint session to vote jointly
on the revocation of the proclamation and/or suspension.
Joint session only required if both houses' opinions are opposing.
2nd paragraph requirement only applies when Congress is not in session.
Congress cannot be ordered to hold public session, especially when the subject
involves national security, intelligence information, military tactics, etc.
Akbayan v Aquino

FACTS: Several NGOs, members of Congress, citizens, and taxpayers filed a petition
for prohibition and mandamus to compel various parties to the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA), a bilateral free trade agreement, to submit
the full text thereof, including the offers made by each of the parties during the
negotiation process.
The final text of the JPEPA was made public later on, but several of the petitioners also
asked to see the initial drafts as well.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners could compel the disclosure of the full text--including drafts
and offers--of the JPEPA.

HELD: NO.
(Most of the issue was mooted by the disclosure of the final version of the JPEPA, but
petitioners also wanted the offers, so tuloy lang.)
Grounds of petitioners: right to information on matters of public concern; right to
participation in social, political, and economic decision-making.
Diplomatic negotiations are privileged in character; confidentiality is essential in
diplomacy, as delegates from other countries may inform you of their troubles with even
other countries, etc.
While the final text of the JPEPA will eventually be published, the offers should remain
privileged, as the disclosure of these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to
deal not only with Japan but with other countries in future negotiations.
Ruling that the Philippines' offers should be open to the public would discourage future
negotiators from expressing their opinions frankly during future negotiations, also
considering that negotiators often have to grant concessions in certain areas in order to
obtain more favorable terms in others of greater national interest.
Re: PMPF v Manglapus (similar case but about a Military Bases Agreement) comments:
an agreement need not concern national security in order to be privileged; there are
many forms of privilege, and not all need to concern national security ("informer's
privilege" for whistleblowers, presidential communications privilege for purposes of
decision-making, deliberative process privilege, diplomatic negotiations privilege); the
privileged character of diplomatic negotiations extends beyond citizens' demands for
information, also covering legislative investigations.
Such privilege, however, is merely presumptive, and may be disclosed upon showing of
sufficient public interest (required, for example, for proper administration of justice or for
fulfilling the responsibilities of an institution); no such need was shown, however. Also,
the people can still exercise their right to participate in the decision-making process by
criticizing the final version made public.
Under Sec. 21 of Art. VII of the Consti, the President has the sole authority to negotiate
and enter into treaties and international agreements; Senate can only concur.
 G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010
Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary Romulo
Facts:
Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked
villages and systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. As
a result of the actions of their Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their
lives in misery, having endured physical injuries, pain and disability, and mental
emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the
Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a
claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment
of the “comfort women stations in the Philippines.
However, said officials declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims for compensation have already been fully satisfied by Japan’s
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners also
argued that the comfort women system constituted a crime against humanity, sexual
slavery, and torture. They alleged that the prohibition against these international crimes
is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is possible, as such, the Philippine
government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for crimes against
humanity.
Issue:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing
petitioner’s claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
Held:
No. The question whether the government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches.
In this case, the Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause
would be inimical to our country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations
with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region. For the Court
to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the
foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that
judgment has been constitutionally committed.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to
bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able
to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. Even then, it is not
the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own rights. The
State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be granted, to
what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.
The Court fully agrees that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally
reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law.
However, it does not automatically imply that the Philippines is under a non-derogable
obligation to prosecute international crimes. Absent the consent of the states, an
applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council, there is no non-
derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Even the invocation of jus
cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951,
petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese army
violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the
duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has
attained the status of jus cogens.

Note: In the 2014 Resolution, the MR was denied. SC stated:

Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of foreign
relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim against the
Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment of the
Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the wisdom of the
conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department. Accordingly, we cannot direct
the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari or injunction, to conduct our
foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
 RENE SAGUISAG, ET AL V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA, ET AL
12 January 2016

Facts:
 Consolidated petitions question the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the PH and the US.
 Petitioners claim that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they entered into the EDCA with
the US because it allowed the entry of military troops in the PH without Senate
concurrence as required by Art XIII, Sec 25.

Issue: WON the EDCA is constitutional

Held: Yes. It is an executive agreement and not a treaty, hence no requirement for
Senate concurrence. Further, a treaty is required only for the initial entry of military
troops, not the subsequent entry after initial entry has been allowed by a treaty. Here,
the initial entry was allowed through the Visiting Forces Agreement.

Ruling:
SC explained the powers and duties of the president under the Consti:
 Protect the territory and the citizens (under the Admin Code – the president must
oversee, ensure, and reinforce our defensive capabilities against external and
internal threats). Remember that the prime duty of the government is to serve
and protect the people.
 Power and duty to conduct foreign relations. The role of the President in foreign
affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief Executive must give
paramount importance to the sovereignty of the nation, the integrity of its
territory, its interest, and the right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-
determination.
 In specific provisions, the president’s power is also limited or at least shared
(conduct of war, obtaining foreign loans, entering into treaties and international
agreements). Focus of the case: entering into treaties and international
agreements.
 The Senate has a role in ensuring that treaties or international agreements the
President enters into, as contemplated in Section 21 of Article VII of the
Constitution, obtain the approval of twothirds of its members.
 There was a long discussion on US military presence in the PH – from Military
Bases Agreement to Mutual Defense Treaty to the Visiting Forces Agreement.
  The VFA has laid down the regulatory mechanism for the treatment of U.S.
military and civilian personnel visiting the country. The Philippines and the U.S.
also entered into a second counterpart agreement (VFA II), which in turn
regulated the treatment of Philippine military and civilian personnel visiting the
U.S. The PH senate concurred in the first VFA.
 EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and conduct activities
within certain “Agreed Locations” in the country. It was not transmitted to the
Senate.
 After eight rounds of negotiations, the Secretary of National Defense and the
U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines signed the agreement on 28 April 2014.
President Benigno S. Aquino III ratified EDCA on 6 June 2014.

Main discussion on Constitutionality of the EDCA:

 The plain meaning of the Constitution prohibits the entry of foreign military bases,
troops or facilities, except by way of a treaty concurred in by the Senate — a
clear limi tation on the President’s dual role as defender of the State and as sole
authority in foreign relations.
 Under the principles of constitutional construction, of paramount consideration is
the plain meaning of the language expressed in the Constitution, or the verba
legis rule.
 Applying said rule of construction, it is evident that the constitutional restriction
refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the
limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to
the Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty.
 The power of the President to enter into binding executive agreements without
Senate concurrence is already wellestablished in this jurisdiction.
 Executive agreements are defined as international agreements embodying
adjustments of detail carrying out well established national policies and traditions
and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature.
 Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate
concurrence because of the legal mandate with which they are concluded.
Executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of
existing policies, rules, laws, or agreements. They are concluded (1) to adjust the
details of a treaty; (2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the
Legislature; or (3) in the exercise of the President’s independent powers under
the Constitution. The raison d’être of executive agreements hinges on prior
constitutional or legislative authorizations.
 No court can tell the President to desist from choosing an executive agreement
over a treaty to embody an international agreement, unless the case falls
squarely within Article VIII, Section 25.

RESOLUTION OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

 Petitioners have littered their motion with alleged facts on U.S. practices,
ineffective provisions, or even absent provisions to bolster their position that
EDCA is invalid. In this way, petitioners essentially ask this Court to replace the
prerogative of the political branches and rescind the EDCA because it not a good
deal for the Philippines. Unfortunately, the Court's only concern is the legality of
EDCA and not its wisdom or folly. Their remedy clearly belongs to the executive
or legislative branches of government.
 In the context of recent developments (promulgation of PCA Award – China v.
PH), the President is bound to defend the EEZ of the Philippines and ensure its
vast maritime wealth for the exclusive enjoyment of Filipinos. In this light, he is
obligated to equip himself with all resources within his power to command.
 Saturnino C. Ocampo, et al. vs. Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez, et al.,
G.R. Nos. 225973, 225984, 226097, 226116, 226120 & 226294,
November 8, 2016
 Facts:
 During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate
Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte
won the May 9, 2016 elections. On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N.
Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R.
Visaya regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng Mga Bayani.
 On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to
the Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the
Court.
 Issues:
 1) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed
grave abuse of discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum and
directive in compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to implement
his election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the
LNMB? NO.
 2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and
directive violated the Constitution, and domestic and international laws? NO.
 3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the
Marcoses and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos
regime have nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to
interment at the LNMB? NO
 4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains
of former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement
with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and
procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the
Philippines? NO
 Procedural issue and ruling summary: (TL;DR.)
 1. The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not
a justiciable controversy outside the ambit of Judicial Review.
 2. Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus because they failed to show that they have suffered
or will suffer direct and personal injury as a result of the interment of Marcos at
the LNMB. Taxpayer argument is without basis. Burial would have no effect on
political or economic life nor threaten any Constitutional right.
 3. Petitioners violated the exhaustion of administrative remedies. Contrary to
their claim of lack of plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, petitioners should be faulted for failing to seek reconsideration of the
assailed memorandum and directive before the Secretary of National Defense. If
petitioners would still be dissatisfied with the decision of the Secretary, they
could elevate the matter before the Office of the President which has control and
supervision over the Department of National Defense (DND).
 4. While direct resort to the Court through petitions for the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are allowed under exceptional cases, which
are lacking in this case, petitioners cannot simply brush aside the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts that requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC is not just a trier of facts, but can also
resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to
issue restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
 Substantial Issues Held:
 The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with
the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.
 While the Constitution is a product of our collective history as a people, its
entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to just about
anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos
burial at the LNMB.
 Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution is not a self-executing provision
considering that a law should be passed by the Congress to clearly define and
effectuate the principle embodied therein. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted
the Code of Conduct on Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
the Ombudsman Act of 1989, Plunder Act, and Anti-Red Tape Act of 2007. To
complement these statutes, the Executive Branch has issued various orders,
memoranda, and instructions relative to the norms of behavior/code of
conduct/ethical standards of officials and employees; workflow charts/public
transactions; rules and policies on gifts and benefits; whistle blowing and
reporting; and client feedback program
 Petitioners' reliance on Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV and Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII of the
Constitution is also misplaced. Sec. 3(2) of Art. XIV refers to the constitutional
duty of educational institutions in teaching the values of patriotism and
nationalism and respect for human rights, while Sec. 26 of Art. XVIII is a
transitory provision on sequestration or freeze orders in relation to the recovery
of Marcos' ill-gotten wealth. Clearly, with respect to these provisions, there is no
direct or indirect prohibition to Marcos' interment at the LNMB.
 The second sentence of Sec. 17 of Art. VII is likewise not violated by public
respondents. Being the Chief Executive, the President represents the
government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials
and employees of his or her department. Under the Faithful Execution Clause,
the President has the power to take "necessary and proper steps" to carry into
execution the law. The mandate is self-executory by virtue of its being inherently
executive in nature and is intimately related to the other executive functions. It is
 best construed as an imposed obligation, not a separate grant of power. The
provision simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle
that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.
 There is no violation of RA 289.
 Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their
supposition that the LNMB and the National Pantheon are one and the same.
This is not at all unexpected because the LNMB is distinct and separate from the
burial place envisioned in R.A. No 289. The parcel of land subject matter of
President Quirino's Proclamation No. 431, which was later on revoked by
President Magsaysay's Proclamation No. 42, is different from that covered by
Marcos' Proclamation No. 208. The National Pantheon does not exist at present.
To date, the Congress has deemed it wise not to appropriate any funds for its
construction or the creation of the Board on National Pantheon. This is indicative
of the legislative will not to pursue, at the moment, the establishment of a
singular interment place for the mortal remains of all Presidents of the
Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
 No violation of RA 10639 .
 The Court cannot subscribe to petitioners' logic that the beneficial provisions of
R.A. No. 10368 are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos' burial
at the LNMB. It would be undue to extend the law beyond what it actually
contemplates. With its victim-oriented perspective, our legislators could have
easily inserted a provision specifically proscribing Marcos' interment at the LNMB
as "reparation" for the Human Rights Violations Victims (HRVVs). The law is
silent and should remain to be so. This Court cannot read into the law what is
simply not there. It is irregular, if not unconstitutional, for the Supreme Court to
presume the legislative will by supplying material details into the law. That would
be tantamount to judicial legislation.
 There is no violation of International Human Rights Laws.
 The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President
Duterte, acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB.
Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already
engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present
generation of Filipinos.
 Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights
Victims' Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial Commission in the
memorialization of HRVV s, the National Historical Commission of the Philippines
(NHCP), formerly known as the National Historical Institute (NHJ), is mandated to
act as the primary government agency responsible for history and is authorized
to determine all factual matters relating to official Philippine history.
 The President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done
whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal
bias.
 The LNMB was not expressly included in the national shrines enumerated in PD
105
 P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. Despite the fact that P.D. No. 208
predated P.D. No. 105, the LNMB was not expressly included in the national
 shrines enumerated in the latter. The proposition that the LNMB is implicitly
covered in the catchall phrase "and others which may be proclaimed in the future
as National Shrines" is erroneous because: (1) As stated, Marcos issued P.D.
No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105; (2) Following the canon of statutory construction
known as ejusdem generis, 138 the LNMB is not a site "of the birth, exile,
imprisonment, detention or death of great and eminent leaders of the nation,";
and (3) Since its establishment, the LNMB has been a military shrine under the
jurisdiction of the PVAO.
 Assuming that P.D. No. 105 is applicable, the descriptive words "sacred and
hallowed" refer to the LNMB as a place and not to each and every mortal
remains interred therein. Hence, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not
diminish said cemetery as a revered and respected ground. Neither does it
negate the presumed individual or collective "heroism" of the men and women
buried or will be buried therein. The "nation's esteem and reverence for her war
dead, " as originally contemplated by President Magsaysay in issuing
Proclamation No. 86, still stands unaffected. That being said, the interment of
Marcos, therefore, does not constitute a violation of the physical, historical, and
cultural integrity of the LNMB as a national military shrine.
 The LNMB is considered as a national shrine for military memorials. The PVAO,
which is empowered to administer, develop, and maintain military shrines, is
under the supervision and control of the DND. The DND, in tum, is under the
Office of the President.
 The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a
self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992
Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to
have the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the
incumbent President, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political
agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies
which he considers, based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom,
will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
 Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve
for public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public
domain and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public
purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present,
there is no law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the
LNMB is located from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents.
The allotment of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President
and Commander-in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military
personnel, a veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his
contributions or simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement.
The disbursement of public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is
granted to compensate him for valuable public services rendered.
 AFP Regulations G 161-375 must be sustained.
 Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-
in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a
veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and
corrupt practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-
Chief, but we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other
positions he held or the awards he received. In this sense, We agree with the
proposition that Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person.
While he was not all good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human
who erred like us.
 Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-375. He was neither convicted
by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.
 Likewise, Marcos was honorably discharged from military service. PVAO
expressly recognized him as a retired veteran pursuant to R.A. No. 6948, as
amended. Petitioners have not shown that he was dishonorably discharged from
military service under APP Circular 17, Series of 1987 (Administrative Discharge
Prior to Expiration of Term of Enlistment) for violating Articles 94, 95 and 97 of
the Articles of War. The NHCP study is incomplete with respect to his entire
military career as it failed to cite and include the official records of the AFP.
Hence, it cannot be conveniently claimed that Marcos' ouster from the presidency
during the EDSA Revolution is tantamount to his dishonorable separation,
reversion or discharge from the military service. The fact that the President is the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP under the 1987 Constitution only enshrines the
principle of supremacy of civilian authority over the military