EDUARDO FELIPE v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON

4/13/2020 G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983 - EDUARDO FELIPE v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON<br /><br />205 Phil.
5 Phil. 537 : February 1983 - Ph…
Home Law Firm Law Library Laws Jurisprudence
February 1983 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court

Jurisprudence
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1983 > February 1983
Decisions > G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983 - EDUARDO FELIPE v.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON
205 Phil. 537:
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-60174. February 16, 1983.]
EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND VICENTE V. FELIPE,

Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON, NAMELY: GIMENA
ALMOSARA, SOFIA ALDON, SALVADOR ALDON, AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Romulo D. San Juan for Petitioner.
Gerundino Castillejo for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SALE; CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY WIFE WITHOUT

CONSENT OF HUSBAND, VOIDABLE; CASE AT BAR. — The husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. Subject to certain exceptions, the
husband can not alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife’s consent. And the wife can not bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except in cases
https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/1983februarydecisions.php?id=66 1/14
4/13/2020 G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983 - EDUARDO FELIPE v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON<br /><br />205 Phil. 537 : February 1983 - Ph…
provided by law. In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging
to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale
is not covered by the phrase "except in cases provided by law." Therefore,
the sale made by Gimena is a defective contract falling within the category
of a voidable one, as contracts entered by the wife without the consent of
the husband when such consent is required, are annullable at his instance
during the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction questioned.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO ANNUL; BY WHOM EXERCISED. — The voidable

contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only during
the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract.
Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its
annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the
contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate
right to the lands sold. The termination of the marriage and the dissolution
of the conjugal partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve
the situation of Gimena. What she could not do during the marriage, she
could not do thereafter. The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different.
After the death of Maximo they acquired the right to question the defective
contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father’s
share in the lands. The father’s share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their
share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the widow.
3. ID.; DESCRIPTION; ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION; NOT AVAILABLE IN

CASE OF POSSESSION IN BAD FAITH; CASE AT BAR. — We would like to
state further that petitioners herein could not have acquired ownership of
the lots by prescription in view of what we regard as their bad faith. This
bad faith is revealed by testimony to the effect that defendant-appellee
Vicente V. Felipe (son of appellees Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V. Felipe)
attempted in December 1970 to have Gimena Almosara sign a ready-made
document purporting to sell the disputed lots to the appellees. This actuation
clearly indicated that the appellees knew the lots did not still belong to
them, otherwise, why were they interested in a document of sale in their
favor? Now then, even if we were to consider appellees’ possession in bad
faith as a possession in the concept of owners, this possession at the earliest
started in 1951, hence, the period for extraordinary prescription (30 years)
had not lapsed when the present action was instituted on April 26, 1976.
AQUINO, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND

WIFE; SALE OF CONJUGAL REALTY BY THE HUSBAND WITHOUT WIFE’S
CONSENT, VOID. — As a rule, the husband cannot dispose of the conjugal
realty without the wife’s consent (Art. 166, Civil Code). Thus, a sale by the
husband of the conjugal realty without the wife’s consent was declared void.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL ASSETS BY WIFE WITHOUT

HUSBAND’S CONSENT, VOID. — With more reason, the wife cannot make
such a disposition without the husband’s consent since the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal assets. In the instant case, the Court of
Appeals did not err in voiding the wife’s sale of the conjugal land without the
husband’s consent.
3. ID.; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION; ACTION TO DECLARE A VOID CONTRACT

OF SALE DOES NOT PRESCRIBE. — As the sale is contrary to law, the action
to have it declared void or inexistent does not prescribe.
DECISION
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The spouses bought several
pieces of land sometime between 1948 and 1950. In 1960-62, the lands were
divided into three lots, 1370, 1371 and 1415 of the San Jacinto Public Land
Subdivision, San Jacinto, Masbate. chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
In 1951, Gimena Almosara sold the lots to the spouses Eduardo Felipe and
Hermogena V. Felipe. The sale was made without the consent of her husband,
Maximo.
On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena and
their children Sofia and Salvador Aldon, filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Masbate against the Felipes. The complaint which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 2372 alleged that the plaintiffs were the owners of Lots 1370, 1371
and 1415; that they had orally mortgaged the same to the defendants; and an
offer to redeem the mortgage had been refused so they filed the complaint in
order to recover the three parcels of land.
The defendants asserted that they had acquired the lots from the plaintiffs by
purchase and subsequent delivery to them. The trial court sustained the claim of
the defendants and rendered the following judgment: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a. declaring the defendants to be the lawful owners of the property subject of
the present litigation;
b. declaring the complaint in the present action to be without merit and is

therefore hereby ordered dismissed;
c. ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the amount of P2,000.00 as

reasonable attorney’s fees and to pay the costs of the suit." cralaw virtua1aw library
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which rendered the
following judgment: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and

SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby RENDERED, ordering the defendants-
appellees to surrender the lots in question as well as the plaintiffs’-appellants’
muniments of title thereof to said plaintiffs-appellants, to make an accounting of
the produce derived from the lands including expenses incurred since 1951, and
to solidarily turn over to the plaintiffs-appellants the NET monetary value of the
profits, after deducting the sum of P1,800.00. No attorney’s fees nor moral
damages are awarded for lack of any legal justification therefor. No costs." cralaw virtua1aw library
The ratio of the judgment is stated in the following paragraphs of the decision
penned by Justice Edgardo L. Paras with the concurrence of Justices Venicio
Escolin and Mariano A. Zosa: chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"One of the principal issues in the case involves the nature of the aforementioned
conveyance or transaction, with appellants claiming the same to be an oral
contract of mortgage or antichresis, the redemption of which could be done
anytime upon repayment of the P1,800.00 involved (incidentally the only thing
written about the transaction is the aforementioned receipt re the P1,800). Upon
the other hand, appellees claim that the transaction was one of sale, accordingly,
redemption was improper. The appellees claim that plaintiffs never conveyed the
property because of a loan or mortgage or antichresis and that what really
transpired was the execution of a contract of sale thru a private document
designated as a ‘Deed of Purchase and Sale’ (Exhibit 1), the execution having
been made by Gimena Almosara in favor of appellee Hermogena V. Felipe.
"After a study of this case, we have come to the conclusion that the appellants
are entitled to recover the ownership of the lots in question. We so hold because
although Exh. 1 concerning the sale made in 1951 of the disputed lots is, in Our
opinion, not a forgery the fact is that the sale made by Gimena Almosara is
invalid, having been executed without the needed consent of her husband, the
lots being conjugal. Appellees’ argument that this was an issue not raised in the
pleadings is baseless, considering the fact that the complaint alleges that the
parcels ‘were purchased by plaintiff Gimena Almosara and her late husband
Maximo Aldon’ (the lots having been purchased during the existence of the
marriage, the same are presumed conjugal) and inferentially, by force of law,
could not, be disposed of by a wife without her husband’s consent." cralaw virtua1aw library
The defendants are now the appellants in this petition for review. They invoke
several grounds in seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
One of the grounds is factual in nature; petitioners claim that "respondent Court
of Appeals has found as a fact that the ‘Deed of Purchase and Sale’ executed by
respondent Gimena Almosara is not a forgery and therefore its authenticity and
due execution is already beyond question." We cannot consider this ground
because as a rule only questions of law are reviewed in proceedings under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court subject to well-defined exceptions not present in the
instant case.
The legal ground which deserves attention is the legal effect of a sale of lands
belonging to the conjugal partnership made by the wife without the consent of
the husband. cralawnad
It is useful at this point to re-state some elementary rules: The husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, Civil Code.) Subject to
certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. (Art. 166, Idem.) And the
wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband’s consent, except
in cases provided by law. (Art. 172, Idem.).
In the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal
partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by
the phrase "except in cases provided by law." The Court of Appeals described the
sale as "invalid" — a term which is imprecise when used in relation to contracts
because the Civil Code uses specific names in designating defective contracts,
namely: rescissible (Arts. 1380 et seq.), voidable (Arts. 1390 et seq.),
unenforceable (Arts. 1403, et seq.), and void or inexistent (Arts. 1409 et seq.).
The sale made by Gimena is certainly a defective contract but of what category?
The answer: it is a voidable contract.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among the voidable contracts are"
[T]hose where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract."
(Par 1.) In the instant case Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the
contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband
alone but to both spouses.
The view that the contract made by Gimena is a voidable contract is supported by
the legal provision that contracts entered by the husband without the consent of
the wife when such consent is required, are annullable at her instance during the
marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned. (Art. 173, Civil
Code.).
Gimena’s contract is not rescissible for in such contract all the essential elements
are untainted but Gimena’s consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be
classified as unenforceable because it does not fit any of those described in Art.
1403 of the Civil Code. And finally, the contract cannot be void or inexistent
because it is not one of those mentioned in Art. 1409 of the Civil Code. By
process of elimination, it must perforce be a voidable contract.
The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only
during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the
contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for
its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the
contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right
to the lands sold.
The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
by the death of Maximo Aldon did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she
could not do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo they
acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them
of their hereditary rights in their father’s share in the lands. The father’s share is
one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third
(1/3) pertaining to the widow.
The petitioners have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only in
1976 when the respondents filed action to recover the lands. In the meantime,
Maximo Aldon died.
Two questions come to mind, namely: (1) Have the petitioners acquired the lands
by acquisitive prescription? (2) Is the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon
barred by the statute of limitations?
Anent the first question, We quote with approval the following statement of the
Court of Appeals: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"We would like to state further that appellees [petitioners herein] could not have
acquired ownership of the lots by prescription in view of what we regard as their
bad faith. This bad faith is revealed by testimony to the effect that defendant-
appellee Vicente V. Felipe (son of appellees Eduardo Felipe and Hermogena V.
Felipe) attempted in December 1970 to have Gimena Almosara sign a ready-
made document purporting to sell the disputed lots to the appellees. This
actuation clearly indicated that the appellees knew the lots did not still belong to
them, otherwise, why were they interested in a document of sale in their favor?
Again why did Vicente V. Felipe tell Gimena that the purpose of the document was
to obtain Gimena’s consent to the construction of an irrigation pump on the lots
in question? The only possible reason for purporting to obtain such consent is
that the appellees knew the lots were not theirs. Why was there an attempted
improvement (the irrigation tank) only in 1970? Why was the declaration of
property made only in 1974? Why were no attempts made to obtain the
husband’s signature, despite the fact that Gimena and Hermogena were close
relatives? All these indicate the bad faith of the appellees. Now then, even if we
were to consider appellees’ possession in bad faith as a possession in the concept
of owners, this possession at the earliest started in 1951, hence the period for
extraordinary prescription (30 years) had not yet lapsed when the present action
was instituted on April 26, 1976.
As to the second question, the children’s cause of action accrued from the death
of their father in 1959 and they had thirty (30) years to institute it (Art. 1141,
Civil Code.) They filed action in 1976 which is well within the period. chanrobles law library
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified. Judgment

is entered awarding to Sofia and Salvador Aldon their shares of the lands as
stated in the body of this decision; and the petitioners as possessors in bad faith
shall make an accounting of the fruits corresponding to the share aforementioned
from 1959 and solidarily pay their value to Sofia and Salvador Aldon; costs
against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, (Chairman), J., In the result.
Escolin J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I concur in the result. The issue is whether the wife’s sale in 1951 of an
unregistered sixteen-hectare conjugal land, without the consent of her husband
(he died in 1959), can be annulled in 1976 by the wife and her two children.
As a rule, the husband cannot dispose of the conjugal realty without the wife’s
consent (Art. 166, Civil Code). Thus, a sale by the husband of the conjugal realty
without the wife’s consent was declared void (Tolentino v. Cardenas, 123 Phil.
517; Villocino v. Doyon, L-19797, December 17, 1966, 18 SCRA 1094 and L-
28871, April 25, 1975, 63 SCRA 460; Reyes v. De Leon, L-22331, June 6,1967,
20 SCRA 369; Bucoy v. Paulino, L-25775, April 26, 1968, 23 SCRA 248; Tinitigan
v. Tinitigan, L-45418, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 619). chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
With more reason, the wife cannot make such a disposition without the husband’s
consent since the husband is the administrator of the conjugal assets.
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals did not err in voiding the wife’s sale of
the conjugal land without the husband’s consent. As that sale is contrary to law,
the action to have it declared void or inexistent does not prescribe.
Moreover, there are indications that the contract between the parties was an
antichresis, a transaction which is very common in rural areas.
Back to Home | Back to Main
Custom Search
Search
ChanRobles On-Line Bar

Review
February-1983 Jurisprudence
G.R. No. L-34105 February

4, 1983 - PEOPLE OF THE
PHIL. v. TIMOTEO CABURAL
205 Phil. 450

PHIL. v. GUILLERMO PORCARE
205 Phil. 469

14, 1983 - TOMAS VELASCO
v. ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS
205 Phil. 480


PHIL. v. LOPE TABIAN
205 Phil. 483

PHIL. v. AGUINALDO REANA
205 Phil. 494

PHIL. v. PASTOR PASCO
205 Phil. 506

14, 1983 - RICARDO ALZOSA
v. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
205 Phil. 521

PHIL. v. LEOPOLDO SALIENTE
205 Phil. 526
G.R. Nos. L-52781 and

53658 February 16, 1983 -
ANASTACIO C. GOMEZ v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ET AL.
205 Phil. 530

Meet You
Ad Meet,
Ad Get Closer
DateMyAge.com
Open

16, 1983 - EDUARDO FELIPE
v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON
205 Phil. 537

PHIL. v. RODOLFO DISNEY
205 Phil. 545

18, 1983 - CECIL DIGMAN v.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
205 Phil. 558
18, 1983 - MAXIMO G.
RODRIGUEZ v.
SANDIGANBAYAN
205 Phil. 567

18, 1983 - LWV
MANAGEMENT, INC. v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
205 Phil. 579
G.R. Nos. L-29479 & 29716

February 21, 1983 - CLARA E.
VDA. DE SAYMAN, ET AL. v.
COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
205 Phil. 581

21, 1983 - HEIRS OF PEDRO
GUMINPIN v. COURT OF
APPEALS
205 Phil. 590

21, 1983 - FRANCISCA
ALIMAGNO v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHIL.
205 Phil. 602

21, 1983 - SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEM v. COURT OF
APPEALS
205 Phil. 609

Meet You
Ad Meet,
Ad Get Closer
DateMyAge.com
Open

21, 1983 - JUAN DE LOS
SANTOS v. WORKMEN’S
COMPENSATION COMMISSION
205 Phil. 635

21, 1983 - MUNICIPALITY OF
SANTIAGO, ISABELA v.
COURT OF APPEALS
205 Phil. 638
G.R. Nos. L-55834-35

February 21, 1983 -
ALEJANDRO MONTANER v.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
205 Phil. 650

22, 1983 - ONOFRE D.
MANALAD v. JESUS DE VEGA
205 Phil. 653
G.R. No. L-61420-21

February 22, 1983 - JUAN
HERNANDEZ v. COURT OF
APPEALS
205 Phil. 659

22, 1983 - ROGELIO DE
JESUS v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHIL.
205 Phil. 663

23, 1983 - GENARO CUBAR v.
RAFEL T. MENDOZA

24, 1983 - MARCELINO
OCHOCO v. NATIONAL LABOR
205 Phil. 677

25, 1983 - ANDRES ABAN v.
MANUEL L. ENAGE
205 Phil. 681
A.M. No. 1094 February

28, 1983 - PETRA SANTOS v.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN, JR.
205 Phil. 702

28, 1983 - UNNO
COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISES,
INC. v. GENERAL MILLING
CORP.
205 Phil. 707

28, 1983 - CO CHIN LENG v.
CO CHIN TONG
205 Phil. 716

28, 1983 - PLARIDEL SURETY
& INSURANCE CO. v. ARTEX
DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.
205 Phil. 722

28, 1983 - EUSEBIO
BABANTO v. MARIANO A.
ZOSA
205 Phil. 728

PHIL. v. SERVILLANO
VELASQUEZ
205 Phil. 741

28, 1983 - FERTILE MINES,
INC v. FEVA MINING CORP.

28, 1983 - METROPOL
(BACOLOD) FINANCING &
INVESTMENT CORP. v.
SAMBOK MOTORS CO.
205 Phil. 758

28, 1983 - HERMENEGILDO R.
ROSALES v. PEREGRIN YBOA
205 Phil. 763

28, 1983 - AVENUE
ARRASTRE AND
STEVEDORING CORP. v.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
205 Phil. 770

28, 1983 - SPOUSES GEORGE
BARRAZA v. JOSE C. CAMPOS,
JR.
205 Phil. 773

28, 1983 - CRESENCIANO
LEONARDO v. COURT OF
APPEALS
205 Phil. 781

28, 1983 - HEIRS OF
ENRIQUE ZAMBALES v.
COURT OF APPEALS
28, 1983 - REYNALDO E.
FEGURIN v. NATIONAL LABOR
205 Phil. 801

PHIL. v. NAPOLEON BERNAT
205 Phil. 810

28, 1983 - DANIEL GUSTILO
v. COURT OF APPEALS
205 Phil. 818

28, 1983 - MINDANAO
PORTLAND CEMENT CORP. v.
COURT OF APPEALS
205 Phil. 821

28, 1983 - GOVERNMENT
SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
v. COURT OF APPEALS
205 Phil. 825
Copyright © 1995 - 2020 REDiaz

EDUARDO FELIPE v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

EDUARDO FELIPE v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

4/13/2020 G.R. No. L-60174 February 16, 1983 - EDUARDO FELIPE v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON<br /><br />205 Phil.

5 Phil. 537 : February 1983 - Ph…

Home Law Firm Law Library Laws Jurisprudence

February 1983 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

Philippine Supreme Court

205 Phil. 537:

[G.R. No. L-60174. February 16, 1983.]

EDUARDO FELIPE, HERMOGENA V. FELIPE AND VICENTE V. FELIPE,

Romulo D. San Juan for Petitioner.

Gerundino Castillejo for Private Respondent.

1. CIVIL LAW; SALE; CONTRACT ENTERED INTO BY WIFE WITHOUT

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO ANNUL; BY WHOM EXERCISED. — The voidable

3. ID.; DESCRIPTION; ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION; NOT AVAILABLE IN

AQUINO, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL ASSETS BY WIFE WITHOUT

3. ID.; PRESCRIPTION OF ACTION; ACTION TO DECLARE A VOID CONTRACT

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

b. declaring the complaint in the present action to be without merit and is

c. ordering the plaintiffs to pay to the defendants the amount of P2,000.00 as

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and

in cases provided by law. (Art. 172, Idem.).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified. Judgment

Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, (Chairman), J., In the result.

Escolin J., took no part.

AQUINO, J., concurring: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Back to Home | Back to Main

ChanRobles On-Line Bar

G.R. No. L-34105 February

205 Phil. 450

G.R. No. L-37235 February

205 Phil. 469

G.R. No. L-24153 February

205 Phil. 480

G.R. No. L-30917 February

205 Phil. 483

G.R. No. L-32106 February

205 Phil. 494

G.R. No. L-41909 February

205 Phil. 506

G.R. No. L-50296 February

205 Phil. 521

G.R. No. L-58183 February

205 Phil. 526

G.R. Nos. L-52781 and

205 Phil. 530

G.R. No. L-60174 February

205 Phil. 537

G.R. No. L-41336 February

205 Phil. 545

G.R. No. L-55988 February

205 Phil. 558

205 Phil. 567

G.R. No. L-62753 February

205 Phil. 579

G.R. Nos. L-29479 & 29716

205 Phil. 581

G.R. No. L-34220 February

205 Phil. 590

G.R. No. L-36458 February

205 Phil. 602

G.R. No. L-41299 February