G.R. No. 180884 - Executive Summary (Talento vs. Escalada, et al.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1

“Emerlinda S. Talento, in her capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of Bataan vs. Hon.
Remigio M. Escalada, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 3 and
Petron Corporation”, Supreme Court, Third Division, G. R. No. 180884.

Introduction

1. In the Decision dated 27 June 2008, as reiterated in the Resolution dated 8 September 2008 dismissing
the 1st Motion for Reconsideration (“MR”) in the above-captioned, the SC set forth the ruling that taxpayers
can defer payments of real estate tax by simply filing 1) an appeal with the Local Board of Assessment
Appeals and 2) a Petition for Prohibition with the Regional Trial Court and by posting a surety bond.

2. This ruling has extremely serious implications, not only to the LGUs of Bataan, but all over the country. It
practically amended, through judicial legislation, the expressed provisions of the Local Government Code
(“LGC”) of 1991 that a taxpayer cannot defer and must first pay to the LGU the real estate tax due before
any appeal can be entertained.

3. Thus, LGUs will no longer receive cash payments from real estate tax collections as they fall due but
merely surety bonds, which have no immediate use to LGUs. One-half of the proceeds of RPT accrues to
the general funds of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, while the other half accrues to the
Special Education Fund of their Local School Boards. With such erroneous ruling, LGUs and ultimately the
people are bound to suffer, particularly the children from poor families who go to public schools.

Summary of the Relevant Facts:

(1) On 18 June 2007, Petron received from the Provincial Assessor’s Office of Bataan a notice of revised
assessment for deficiency real property tax for Petron’s machineries and equipment in Lamao,
Limay, Bataan in the amount of PhP1,731,025,403.06 due from 1994 up to the 2nd quarter of 2007.

(2) On 17 August 2007, Petron filed a petition with the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA)
contesting the revised assessment.

(3) On 22 August 2007, Petron received from Petitioner (the Provincial Treasurer of Bataan) a final notice
of delinquent real property tax with warning that the subject properties would be levied and auctioned
should Petron fail to settle the revised assessment.

(4) Petron wrote a letter to Petitioner stating that in view of the pendency of the appeal with the LBAA, any
action on the subject properties would be premature. Petitioner replied that only payment by Petron under
protest shall bar the collection of the taxes due, pursuant to Sections 231 and 252 of the Local Government
Code.

(5) Subsequently a Warrant of Levy was issued against machinery and equipment of Petron.

(6) Petron filed with the LBAA on 24 September 2007 an urgent motion to lift final notice of delinquent real
property tax and Warrant of Levy.

(7) On 3 October 2007, Petron received a notice of sale of its properties scheduled on 17 October 2007.

(8) Petron subsequently merely withdrew its motion to lift final notice of delinquency and Warrant of Levy
with the LBAA on 8 October 2007. On the same date, Petron filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan
the present case (Civil Case No. 8801) against Petitioner for prohibition with prayer for issuance of
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. (NOTE: To avoid questions of forum shopping, what
Petron should have done was to first withdraw its appeal entirely from the LBAA and then file the Petition
for Prohibition with the RTC.)
(9) Civil Case No. 8801 was filed by Petron with the RTC while its petition with the LBAA was still pending.
Subsequently, the LBAA dismissed Petron’s petition on the ground of forum shopping.

(10) On 15 October 2007, the RTC issued a TRO for 20 days enjoining Petitioner from proceeding with the
public auction of Petron’s properties.

(11) Petitioner filed an urgent motion for the immediate dissolution of the TRO as well as motion to dismiss
Petron’s petition for prohibition.

(12) On 5 November 2007, the RTC issued the Order granting Petron’s petition for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction subject to Petron’s posting of a PhP 444,967,503.52 bond in addition to its
previously posted surety bond of PhP1,286,057,899.54.

(13) In view of the urgent nature of the case and the patently illegal order of the RTC, which was Order was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, Petitioner no longer filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated 5 November 2007.

(14) On 4 January 2008, Petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (G.R.
No. 180884) with the Supreme Court, as an exception to the rule on hierarchy of courts, to annul and set
aside the Order of the RTC dated 5 November 2007 to permanently enjoin the RTC from further proceeding
with Civil Case No. 8801.

(15) All of the foregoing actions of the Petitioner were consistent with law, particularly with the Local
Government Code, contrary to Petron’s allegations.

Issue raised in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus:

Whether or not the RTC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
causing the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction that effectively renders nugatory the express
provisions of Sections 252 and 231 of the Local Government Code.

Summary of The Supreme Court’s Decision dated 27 June 2008:

In the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 27 June 2008, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
regarding the above-stated Petition for Certiorari (G.R. No. 180884), it was held that the question posed in
the Petition, i.e., whether the collection of taxes may be suspended by reason of filing of an appeal and
posting of a surety bond, is a question of law.

The Decision stated that Petitioner resorted to an erroneous remedy when she filed a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, when the proper mode should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 45.

Under Rule 45, the period to file a Petition for Review is 15 days from receipt of the Order appealed from.
The Decision stated that the present Petition was filed beyond the said 15 day period as it was filed 43
days late.

The Decision further stated that, even on the assumption that a petition under Rule 65 is the proper
remedy, the present petition is still dismissable. It was noted that Petitioner did not file a Motion for
Reconsideration with the RTC prior to the filing of the present Petition with the Supreme Court.

The Decision likewise stated that Petitioner disregarded the hierarchy of courts, and that the present
Petition should have been filed with the Court of Appeals instead of directly filing the same to the Supreme
Court.

The Decision went on to state that the RTC correctly granted Petron’s petition for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction based on Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.
It was stated that there was urgency and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of injunction
considering that what is being enjoined is the sale by public auction of 1.7 Billion Pesos worth of Petron’s
properties which are vital to Petron’s operations.

The Decision also stated in essence that Petron had a clear and unmistakable right to refuse or to withhold
in abeyance the payment of the taxes. Citing the grounds used by Petron in contesting the revised
assessment, the Decision stated that the resolution of the said issues would have a direct bearing on the
assessment made by Petitioner, and that it is necessary that the issues must be first passed upon before
the properties of respondent is sold at public auction.

Courses of Action Taken by Petitioner in light of the said Decision Supreme Court dated 27 June 2008:

Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 27 June 2008.
This Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Supreme Court in a minute resolution dated 8
September 2008.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Refer the Case to the Court en Banc. This is due to the fact that the Decision
dated 27 June 2008 has in effect abandoned established jurisprudence that Rule 65 is the remedy for
interlocutory orders such as the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the ruling in Manila Electric
Company vs. Barlis (G.R. No. 114231, 18 May 2001) that the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain a
Petition for Prohibition absent petitioner’s payment, under protest, of the tax assessed. This motion was
likewise denied in the said resolution dated 8 September 2008.

Comments on the Decision of the Supreme Court dated 27 June 2008.

Re: On the finding in the Decision dated 27 June 2008 that Petitioner resorted to an erroneous remedy
when she filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, when the proper mode should have been a Petition
for Review under Rule 45.

COMMENT:

The Order of the RTC granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by Petron was an  interlocutory
order. Hence, Petitioner may validly file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to question the legality of
such order of the RTC.

In the 7 August 2007 Supreme Court Decision entitled “United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank)
vs. Hon. Judge Reynaldo Rios, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, and
Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation”, G.R. No. 171532, it was confirmed that a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65, and not Rule 45, is the proper remedy for interlocutory orders.

In the Supreme Court Decision dated 5 August 2003 which was penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago herself, entitled “Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Severino Listana, Jr.”, G. R. 152611, the
Supreme Court specifically provided that “an order granting a writ of preliminary injunction is an
interlocutory order”. Being an interlocutory order, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is a
proper remedy.

In light of the established jurisprudence on the matter, it is extremely surprising why the subject Decision
dated 27 June 2008 ruled that Petitioner availed of the wrong remedy under Rule 65. The said Decision
runs counter to and in effect abandons prevailing jurisprudence that interlocutory orders, such as an order
granting a writ of preliminary injunction, may be questioned in a higher court by way of Certiorari under
Rule 65.

Re: On the finding that the Petition is fatally defective due to Petitioner’s failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC’s Order dated 5 November 2007.
COMMENT:

While it may be true that the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for
the filing of a petition for certiorari, such rule nevertheless is subject to recognized exceptions. The Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus filed by Petitioner specifically alleged that it falls within such
recognized exceptions to the general rule. As such, it was pointed out in the said Petition that resort to the
Supreme Court without filing of a motion for reconsideration was dictated by considerations of urgency, and
that the issues raised are purely legal in nature.

In the case of Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education, G.R. No. 139371, cited
in Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the recognized exceptions to the general rule are: (a) the issues
raised are purely legal in nature; (b) public interest is involved; (c) extreme urgency is obvious; (d) special
circumstances that warrant immediate or more direct action. The case involves the collection of taxes due
the local government unit in the amount of 1.7 Billion Pesos and the writ of preliminary injunction has
deprived the local government unit the right to immediately collect such real property taxes to the detriment
of its constituents. Not only was there urgency involved, but public interest was likewise a principal
consideration.

In view of the foregoing reasons, the Decision should have allowed the Petition to fall under the exception
to the general rule on the requirement of a motion for reconsideration.

Re: On the finding that Petitioner disregarded the rule on hierarchy of courts.

COMMENT:

The Decision dated 27 June 2008 likewise faulted Petitioner for filing the Petition directly to the Supreme
Court instead of having the same filed with the Court of Appeals. Again, such rule on hierarchy of courts is
subject to certain exceptions. The present Petition is one such exception.

There are compelling reasons to file the Petition directly to the Supreme Court. The case has far reaching
implications on the right of local government units to collect real property taxes that it can use for public
services and to finance the cost of public education. The resolution of the issue of whether or not a trial
court can prohibit a local government unit to collect real property taxes, despite provisions in the Local
Government Code favoring such power of the local government units, will affect not only the Province of
Bataan, but all local government units in the country as well. It will have significant importance on the
finances and economic viability of all local government units.

Re: On the finding that the RTC correctly granted Petron’s petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

COMMENT:

The Decision declared that there was urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of
injunction considering that what is being enjoined is the sale by public auction of the properties of Petron
amounting to 1.7 Billion Pesos, which properties are vital to Petron’s operation.

However, there is no urgent and paramount necessity on the part of Petron. Even assuming that the
properties are sold by the Province of Bataan by public auction, under Section 261 of the Local
Government Code, Petron has the right to redeem the properties within one (1) year from the date of the
sale. During such one (1) year period, Petron shall have possession of the subject properties and Petron
shall be entitled to the income and other fruits thereof. In light of this, Petron’s operations will not be
immediately affected. As such, there is no urgent and paramount necessity for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction.

The Decision in essence also declared that Petron has a clear and unmistakable right to refuse or hold in
abeyance the payment of the taxes. In support of this, the Decision cited the grounds relied upon by Petron
in contesting the revised assessment. The Decision then stated that the resolution of the grounds raised by
Petron would have a direct bearing on the assessment made by Petitioner and that it is necessary that the
issues must first be passed upon before the properties of respondent is sold at public auction.

It should be noted however that the RTC, in its Order dated 5 November 2007, in justifying the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction, used as basis the provisions of Section 267 of the Local Government
Code. Section 267 provides that:

“SEC. 267. Action Assailing Validity of Tax Sale. - No court shall entertain any action assailing the
validity of any sale at public auction of real property or rights therein under this Title until the taxpayer
shall have deposited with the court the amount for which the real property was sold, together with
interest of two percent (2%) per month from the date of sale to the time of the institution of the action.
The amount so deposited shall be paid to the purchaser at the auction sale if the deed is declared
invalid but it shall be returned to the depositor if the action fails. Neither shall any court declare a sale
at public auction invalid by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings unless the
substantive rights of the delinquent owner of the real property or the person having legal interest
therein have been impaired.

The above-quoted Section 267 specifically applies to a case where the property has already been sold at
public auction due to delinquency for real property tax. It does not apply in the present case where the
property has not yet been sold. It was patently erroneous for the RTC to use Section 267 as legal basis for
granting the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Petron. Such act of the RTC amounts to excess of
jurisdiction as the RTC overstepped its lawful authority. There was likewise grave abuse of discretion as
such patently erroneous use by the RTC of Section 267 as basis is capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic in manner, and is in effect equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

The patently erroneous reliance by the RTC on Section 267 of the Local Government Code is one
indication that there was no clear and unmistakable right in favor of Petron. Despite this, the Decision dated
27 June 2008 still validated the writ of preliminary injunction granted by the RTC to Petron.

On the other hand, Sections 252 and 231 of the Local Government Code gives the clear and unmistakable
right to Petitioner to collect the real property taxes due. Under Section 252, no protest shall be entertained
unless the taxpayer first pays the tax. Under Section 231, appeal on assessments of real property shall in
no case suspend the collection of the corresponding realty taxes on property.

In Manila Electric Company vs. Barlis, G.R. No. 114231, 18 May 2001, the Supreme Court, interpreting a
provision in the previous Real Property Tax Code which similar to Section 252 of the Local Govt. Code,
held that the “trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain a Petition for Prohibition absent petitioner’s payment,
under protest of the tax assessed as required by Section 64 of the RPTC. It is our view that this ruling is still
valid despite the passage of the Local Government Code as the reason behind the law remains the same.
In view of this ruling, the RTC had no authority to grant the writ of preliminary injunction in favor of Petron.
This is another basis for stating that Petron had no clear and unmistakable right.

Even assuming that there is doubt in the interpretation of Sections 252 and 231 of the Local Government
Code, such doubt should have been resolved in favor of the LGU. Section 5 (a), Chapter 1, Title 1 of the
Local Government Code provides that in the interpretation of the provisions of the same, any provision on a
power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the local government unit. If further
provides that any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of
the local government unit concerned. This was no longer taken into consideration in the Decision.

The amount of deficiency real estate tax due Petron was in fact arrived at following data supplied by Petron
itself. Such data consisting of annual acquisition costs of machineries can be seen from the printed copies
of the electronic email of one Arvin Frank C. Daquiog of the Government Reports and Compliance
Controllers Department of Petron and the attached computation/data send on 20 March 2007 to the Bataan
Provincial Assessor. (Annexes “A-MR” and “B-MR” of Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration) The said
data from Petron itself show that the Sworn Statement of the True Value of the Real Properties previously
submitted by Petron was grossly understated. In light of this, it is an error to rule that Petron had a clear
and unmistakable right to hold in abeyance the payment of real property tax.

Re: On the issue of forum shopping committed by Petron, which was not discussed and was not ruled upon
in the Decision of the Supreme Court.

COMMENT:

The Petition of Petron with the RTC (Case No. 8801) was filed while Petron’s Petition with the LBAA is
pending. The case with the RTC and the LBAA filed by Petron involved an identity of parties, identity of
rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, and a decision on one case will amount to res adjudicata. Petron was
therefore guilty of forum shopping.

The issue of forum shopping was squarely raised by Petitioner in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus. On account of such forum shopping, the RTC should have dismissed the complaint of Petron
entirely. Instead, the RTC even issued the subject writ of preliminary injuction.

The LBAA has in fact dismissed the Petition of Petron on account of such forum shopping committed by
Petron.

However, the Decision dated 27 June 2008 never mentioned anything about this issue of forum shopping.

Per the ruling of the Supreme Court in City Government of Quezon City vs. Bayan Telecommunications,
Inc., G.R. No. 162015, 6 March 2006, the proper procedure is to first withdraw the appeal from the LBAA
and then file the Petition for Prohibition with the RTC. However, Petron did not comply with this and instead
maintained the LBAA case while it filed the RTC case in violation of the rule against forum shopping and
multiplicity of suits based on a single cause of action.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 180884 : June 27, 2008]

EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, in her capacity as the Provincial Treasurer of the Province of

Bataan, Petitioner, v. HON. REMIGIO M. ESCALADA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 3, and PETRON CORPORATION, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the November 5,
2007 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court of Bataan, Branch 3, in Civil Case No. 8801, granting the
petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed by private respondent Petron
Corporation (Petron) thereby enjoining petitioner Emerlinda S. Talento, Provincial Treasurer of
Bataan, and her representatives from proceeding with the public auction of Petron's machineries
and pieces of equipment during the pendency of the latter's appeal from the revised assessment
of its properties.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On June 18, 2007, Petron received from the Provincial Assessor's Office of Bataan a notice of
revised assessment over its machineries and pieces of equipment in Lamao, Limay, Bataan.
Petron was given a period of 60 days within which to file an appeal with the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals (LBAA).2 Based on said revised assessment, petitioner Provincial Treasurer of
Bataan issued a notice informing Petron that as of June 30, 2007, its total liability is
P1,731,025,403.06,3 representing deficiency real property tax due from 1994 up to the first and
second quarters of 2007.

On August 17, 2007, Petron filed a petition4 with the LBAA (docketed as LBAA Case No. 2007-01)
contesting the revised assessment on the grounds that the subject assessment pertained to
properties that have been previously declared; and that the assessment covered periods of more
than 10 years which is not allowed under the Local Government Code (LGC). According to Petron,
the possible valid assessment pursuant to Section 222 of the LGC could only be for the years
1997 to 2006. Petron further contended that the fair market value or replacement cost used by
petitioner included items which should be properly excluded; that prompt payment of discounts
were not considered in determining the fair market value; and that the subject assessment should
take effect a year after or on January 1, 2008. In the same petition, Petron sought the approval of
a surety bond in the amount of P1,286,057,899.54.5

On August 22, 2007, Petron received from petitioner a final notice of delinquent real property tax
with a warning that the subject properties would be levied and auctioned should Petron fail to
settle the revised assessment due.6

Consequently, Petron sent a letter7 to petitioner stating that in view of the pendency of its
appeal8 with the LBAA, any action by the Treasurer's Office on the subject properties would be
premature. However, petitioner replied that only Petron's payment under protest shall bar the
collection of the realty taxes due,9 pursuant to Sections 231 and 252 of the LGC.

With the issuance of a Warrant of Levy10 against its machineries and pieces of equipment, Petron
filed on September 24, 2007, an urgent motion to lift the final notice of delinquent real property
tax and warrant of levy with the LBAA. It argued that the issuance of the notice and warrant is
premature because an appeal has been filed with the LBAA, where it posted a surety bond in the
amount of P1,286,057,899.54.11

On October 3, 2007, Petron received a notice of sale of its properties scheduled on October 17,
2007.12 Consequently, on October 8, 2007, Petron withdrew its motion to lift the final notice of
delinquent real property tax and warrant of levy with the LBAA.13 On even date, Petron filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Bataan the instant case (docketed as Civil Case No. 8801) for
prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction.14

On October 15, 2007, the trial court issued a TRO for 20 days enjoining petitioner from
proceeding with the public auction of Petron's properties.15 Petitioner thereafter filed an urgent
motion for the immediate dissolution of the TRO, followed by a motion to dismiss Petron's petition
for prohibition.

On November 5, 2007, the trial court issued the assailed Order granting Petron's petition for
issuance of writ of preliminary injunction, subject to Petron's posting of a P444,967,503.52 bond
in addition to its previously posted surety bond of P1,286,057,899.54, to complete the total
amount equivalent to the revised assessment of P1,731,025,403.06. The trial court held that in
scheduling the sale of the properties despite the pendency of Petron's appeal and posting of the
surety bond with the LBAA, petitioner deprived Petron of the right to appeal. The dispositive
portion thereof, reads:

WHEREFORE, the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by plaintiff is hereby GRANTED and
ISSUED, enjoining defendant Treasurer, her agents, representatives, or anybody acting in her
behalf from proceeding with the scheduled public auction of plaintiff's real properties, or any
disposition thereof, pending the determination of the merits of the main action, to be effective
upon posting by plaintiff to the Court of an injunction bond in the amount of Four Hundred Forty
Four Million Nine Hundred Sixty Seven Thousand Five Hundred Three and 52/100 Pesos
(P444,967,503.52) and the approval thereof by the Court.

Defendant's Urgent Motion for the Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order
dated October 23, 2007 is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.16

From the said Order of the trial court, petitioner went directly to this Court via the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The question posed in this petition, i.e., whether the collection of taxes may be suspended by
reason of the filing of an appeal and posting of a surety bond, is undoubtedly a pure question of
law. Section 2(c) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 2. Modes of Appeal. -

(c) Appeal by certiorari . - In all cases when only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. (Emphasis supplied) cralawlibrary

Thus, petitioner resorted to the erroneous remedy when she filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, when the proper mode should have been a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45. Moreover, under Section 2, Rule 45 of the same Rules, the period to file a Petition for Review
is 15 days from notice of the order appealed from. In the instant case, petitioner received the
questioned order of the trial court on November 6, 2007, hence, she had only up to November 21,
2007 to file the petition. However, the same was filed only on January 4, 2008, or 43 days late.
Consequently, petitioner's failure to file an appeal within the reglementary period rendered the
order of the trial court final and executory.

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is mandatory.
Failure to conform to the rules regarding appeal will render the judgment final and executory and
beyond the power of the Court's review. Jurisprudence mandates that when a decision becomes
final and executory, it becomes valid and binding upon the parties and their successors in interest.
Such decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may
have been.17

Petitioner's resort to a petition under Rule 65 is obviously a play to make up for the loss of the
right to file an appeal via a petition under Rule 45. However, a special civil action under Rule 65
can not cure petitioner's failure to timely file a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for
the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 45, especially if such loss or
lapse was occasioned by one's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies.18

Moreover, even if we assume that a petition under Rule 65 is the proper remedy, the petition is
still dismissible.

We note that no motion for reconsideration of the November 5, 2007 order of the trial court was
filed prior to the filing of the instant petition. The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration
is a sine qua non condition for the filing of a Petition for Certiorari. The purpose is to grant the
public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the
re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. Petitioner's failure to file a
motion for reconsideration deprived the trial court of the opportunity to rectify an error
unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly imputed. Besides, a motion for
reconsideration under the present circumstances is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy to the
adverse judgment of the trial court.19

Petitioner also blatantly disregarded the rule on hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court,
Regional Trial Courts, and the Court of Appeals have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. Recourse
should have been made first with the Court of Appeals and not directly to this Court.20

True, litigation is not a game of technicalities. It is equally true, however, that every case must be
presented in accordance with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.21 The failure therefore of petitioner to comply with the settled procedural
rules justifies the dismissal of the present petition.

Finally, we find that the trial court correctly granted respondent's petition for issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Section 3, Rule 58, of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted
by the court when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the acts complained of, or in the
performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, or agency or a person is doing, threatening, or attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

The requisites for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction are: (1) the existence of a clear
and unmistakable right that must be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for
the writ to prevent serious damage.22

The urgency and paramount necessity for the issuance of a writ of injunction becomes relevant in
the instant case considering that what is being enjoined is the sale by public auction of the
properties of Petron amounting to at least P1.7 billion and which properties are vital to its
business operations. If at all, the repercussions and far-reaching implications of the sale of these
properties on the operations of Petron merit the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in its
favor.

We are not unaware of the doctrine that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, without which
it can not properly perform its functions; and that appeal shall not suspend the collection of realty
taxes. However, there is an exception to the foregoing rule, i.e., where the taxpayer has shown a
clear and unmistakable right to refuse or to hold in abeyance the payment of taxes. In the instant
case, we note that respondent contested the revised assessment on the following grounds: that
the subject assessment pertained to properties that have been previously declared; that the
assessment covered periods of more than 10 years which is not allowed under the LGC; that the
fair market value or replacement cost used by petitioner included items which should be properly
excluded; that prompt payment of discounts were not considered in determining the fair market
value; and that the subject assessment should take effect a year after or on January 1, 2008. To
our mind, the resolution of these issues would have a direct bearing on the assessment made by
petitioner. Hence, it is necessary that the issues must first be passed upon before the properties
of respondent is sold in public auction.

In addition to the fact that the issues raised by the respondent would have a direct impact on the
validity of the assessment made by the petitioner, we also note that respondent has posted a
surety bond equivalent to the amount of the assessment due. The Rules of Procedure of the LBAA,
particularly Section 7, Rule V thereof, provides:

Section 7. Effect of Appeal on Collection of Taxes. - An appeal shall not suspend the collection of
the corresponding realty taxes on the real property subject of the appeal as assessed by the
Provincial, City or Municipal Assessor, without prejudice to the subsequent adjustment depending
upon the outcome of the appeal. An appeal may be entertained but the hearing thereof shall be
deferred until the corresponding taxes due on the real property subject of the appeal shall have
been paid under protest or the petitioner shall have given a surety bond, subject to the following
conditions:

(1) the amount of the bond must not be less than the total realty taxes and penalties due as
assessed by the assessor nor more than double said amount;

(2) the bond must be accompanied by a certification from the Insurance Commissioner (a) that
the surety is duly authorized to issue such bond; (a) that the surety bond is approved by and
registered with said Commission; and (c) that the amount covered by the surety bond is within
the writing capacity of the surety company; and cralawlibrary

(3) the amount of the bond in excess of the surety company's writing capacity, if any, must be
covered by Reinsurance Binder, in which case, a certification to this effect must likewise
accompany the surety bond.

Corollarily, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9282,23 which amended Republic Act No. 1125 (The Law
Creating the Court of Tax Appeals) provides:

Section 11. Who may Appeal; Mode of Appeal; Effect of Appeal; -

xxx
No appeal taken to the Court of Appeals from the Collector of Internal Revenue x x x shall
suspend the payment, levy, distraint, and/or sale of any property for the satisfaction of his tax
liability as provided by existing law. Provided, however, That when in the opinion of the
Court the collection by the aforementioned government agencies may jeopardize the interest of
the Government and/or the taxpayer the Court at any stage of the processing may suspend the
collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed or to file a surety bond
for not more than double the amount with the Court.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

*
 In lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura.

1
 Rollo, pp. 49-63. Penned by Judge Remigio M. Escalada, Jr.

2
 Id. at 203-204.

3
 Id. at 205-226.

4
 Id. at 228-250.

5
 Id. at 248 and 254-255.

6
 Id. at 265.

7
 Id. at 288-289. Dated September 12, 2007.

8
 Incidentally, Petron's appeal in LBAA Case No. 2007-01 was dismissed on December 10, 2007 on
the ground of forum shopping (Rollo, pp. 436-440). On January 17, 2008, Petron appealed to the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals. (Rollo, p. 468)

9
 Id. at 291-292.

10
 Id. at 339-340.

11
 Id. at 293-297.

12
 Id. at 348.

13
 Id. at 349-351.

14
 The Complaint was subsequently amended. (Rollo, pp. 64-80)

15
 Rollo, pp. 352-361.

16
 Id. at 63.

17
 Lapu-Lapu Development and Housing Corporation v. Group Management Corporation, G.R. No.
141407, September 9, 2002, 388 SCRA 493, 506-507.

18
 Chua v. Santos, G.R. No. 132467, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 365, 374.
19
 Serra v. Heirs of Primitivo Hernaez, G.R. No. 142913, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 120, 127.

20
 Zamboanga Barter Goods Retailers Association, Inc. v. Lobregat, G.R. No. 145466, July 7,
2004, 433 SCRA 624, 628-629.

21
 Mindanao Savings and Loan Association, Inc. v. Vda. De Flores, G.R. No. 142022, September 7,
2005, 469 SCRA 416, 423.

22
 Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118249, February 14, 2003,
397 SCRA 348, 359.

23
 An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), Elevating its Rank to the
Level of a Collegiate Court with Special Jurisdiction and Enlarging its Membership, Amending for
the Purpose Certain Sections of Republic Act No. 1125, as mended, otherwise known as the Law
Creating the Court of Tax Appeals, and for other purposes.