JERICHO P.

RAPIZ

1. PEOPLE VS SITON
G.R. No. 169364              
September 18, 2009

FACTS: That on or about November 14, 2003, Respondents Evangeline Siton and
Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code for wandering and loitering around San Pedro St and Legaspi St
Davao City without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable
purpose. Instead of filing their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed
separate Motions to Quash3 on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for
being vague and overbroad. Respondents also filed an original petition for certiorari
and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,6directly challenging the
constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of
vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary
identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage
persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed
that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution
because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an
arbitrary and unreasonable classification. RTC granted the petition and declared
Article 202 (2) of RPC unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo.

Topic: Constitutionality of ART. 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC committed reversible error in declaring Article 202 (2)
unconstitutional?

RULING: Yes, the RTC committed reversible error in declaring Article 202 (2)
unconstitutional. The Legislature is vested with the power to define crimes and
prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the
sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power.
The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and
lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged. However, in
exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must
inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he
may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty
to avoid.

Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a
constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must approach it with grave
care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid
and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality. The
policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that
the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable showing to the contrary. 
2. PEOPLE VS BON
G.R. No. 166401            
October 30, 2006

FACTS: Alfredo Bon, unlce of AAA and BBB was charged for rape for raping AAA
and BBB on different occasions. AAA testified that she was raped by her uncle in
1994 when she was only 6 years old when she and her uncle was left in the house
where they shared with her grandmother. Three years after, in 1997 she was again
raped when she was only 9 years old. She was again raped when she was 11 years
old in 1999. In the following year, she was again raped the fourth time which she
cried in pain and allegedly her uncle stopped. It was only in June 12, 2020 that she
revealed her ordeal to her mother CCC.

BBB testified that her uncle started raping her in 1997 when she was only 10 years
old under threat It was only on June 14, 2000 that she told her mother CCC about the
raping incidents.
Medical certificate of BBB states that her vagina admits 2 fingers without resistance
and found to have some lacerations. This could have been caused by sexual activity.
AAA medical certificate states that hymen was still intact, probably because it was
elastic.
Alfredo Bon, the accused offered alibi as defense. He was convicted with 8 counts of
rape in RTC which meted 8 death sentences. CA however reduced two convictions
to attempted rape for lack of evidence that it was consummated.

FIRST TOPIC: Defense of claim of Alibi.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not appellant’s defense of alibi will prosper?

RULING 1: His defense for alibi failed because it was inherently weak as it was a
negative defense. His alibi defense was limited to one rape incident and he did not
present any defense for the other 7 rape incidents.

SECOND TOPIC: Stages of acts of Execution

ISSUE 2: Whether or not downgrading the two crimes from consummated rape to
attempted rape was justified.

RULING 2: Yes, it was justified. There is an attempt to commit rape when the
offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all
acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In one of those rape incidents,
record shows that the penis of the accused did not touch the labia pudendum of the
victim which was also supported with the victim’s testimony. In the crime of rape,
penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to
be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his
sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his
own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.
3. PEOPLE VS CAPUNO
G.R. No. 185715              
January 19, 2011

FACTS: Erlinda Capuno was allegedly apprehended while in the act of selling
dangerous drugs know as metamphetamine hydrochloride in a heated sealed plastic
in a buy bust operation conducted by police authorities Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jose
Gordon Antonio and PO1 Fortunato Jiro III. When the so-called buying was staged,
Erlinda was apprehended and was informed of her constitutional rights. Mark money
was recovered and the heated sealed plastic believe to be containing the illegal
drugs was sent to PNP crime laboratory for evaluation.
Defense version was different. The day she was allegedly caught selling dangerous
drug in a buy bust operation, she was in her house together with her 15 year old
daughter. According to her, she allowed the policemen to search her house because
she believed she has nothing to hide. Her daughter’s testimony was different. The
policemen just roam around their house.
She was convicted in the lower court guilty of section 5 of RA9165 for selling
dangerous drugs. She appealed that the prosecution failed to prove that the chain of
custody was unbroken.

TOPIC: RA 9165; Chain of Custody

ISSUE: Whether or not, conviction was proper?

RULING: The conviction was not proper because the chain of custody was not
proven unbroken. In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1)
the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the
delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that
the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has
actually been committed, as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.
To remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug,
evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same
illegal drug actually recovered from the appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for
possession or for drug pushing under R.A. No. 9165 fails.

The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section
21, paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:

1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.

This procedure, however, was not shown to have been complied with by the
members of the buy-bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had
extended reasonable efforts to comply with the said statutory requirement in handling
the evidence.
4. PEOPLE VS VALDEZ
GR NO 216007-09
December 8, 2015

FACTS: The case stemmed from the Joint Affidavit[3] executed by Sheila S.
Velmonte-Portal and Mylene T. Romero, both State Auditors of the Commission on
Audit Region VI in Pavia, Iloilo, who conducted a post-audit of the disbursement
vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod
City Government.
Among the subjects thereof were the reimbursements of expenses of private
respondent Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former mayor of Bacolod City,
particularly:
Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the official
receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to
claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the total amount of P279,150.00
instead of only P4,843.25;... thus, an aggregate overclaim of P274,306.75.
The Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO), Office of the
Ombudsman - Visayas received the joint affidavit, which was thereafter resolved
adverse to Valdez.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four of which (SB-14-CRM-0317
to 0320) were for Violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the
remaining half (SB-14-CRM-0321 to 0324) were for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification... of Official/Public Documents under
Articles 217[5] and 171,[6] in relation to Article 48[7] of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). All the cases were raffled before public respondent.
Since the Ombudsman recommended "no bail" in SB-14-CRM-0321, 0322, and
0324, Valdez, who is still at-large, caused the filing of a Motion to Set Aside No Bail
Recommendation and to Fix the Amount of Bail.
She argued that the three cases are bailable as a... matter of right because no
aggravating or modifying circumstance was alleged; the maximum of the
indeterminate sentence shall be taken from the medium period that ranged from 18
years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years; and applying Article 48 of the RPC, the
imposable penalty is
20 years, which is the maximum of the medium period.
Petitioner countered in its Comment/Opposition[9] that the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISL) is inapplicable as the attending circumstances are immaterial because the
charge constituting the complex crime have the corresponding penalty of reclusion...
perpetua.
Since the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail is discretionary. Instead of
a motion to fix bail, a summary hearing to determine if the evidence of guilt is strong
is, therefore, necessary conformably with Section 13, Article III of the 1987
Constitution and Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter before Us to
resolve the lone issue of whether an accused indicted for the complex crime of
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is entitled to
bail as a matter of right.
FIRST TOPIC: Penalty for Complex Crimes; Applicability of Indeterminate Sentence
Law
ISSUE: whether an accused indicted for the complex crime of Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of
Official/Public Documents involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is entitled to
bail as a matter of right.
RULING: The controversy is, in fact, not one of first impression. Mañalac, Jr. v.
People[14] already resolved that an accused charged with Malversation of Public
Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents where the amount involved
exceeds P22,000.00 is not entitled to bail as a matter of right because it has an
actual imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In Mañalac, Jr., the defendants argued that they should be allowed to post bail since
reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense but merely describes
the penalty actually imposed on account of the fraud involved. It was also posited
that Article 48... of the RPC applies "only after the accused has been convicted in a
full-blown trial such that the court is mandated to impose the penalty of the most
serious crime," and that the reason for the imposition of the penalty of the most
serious offense is "only for the purpose of... determining the correct penalty upon the
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law."
This Court, through the Third Division, however, denied the petition and resolved in
the affirmative the issue of whether the constitutional right to bail of an accused is
restricted in... cases whose imposable penalty ranges from reclusion temporal
maximum to reclusion perpetua.
To recall, the amounts involved in Pantaleon, Jr. were manifestly in excess of
P22,000.00. We opined that the Sandiganbayan correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and that the ISL is inapplicable since it is an indivisible penalty.
The rulings in Pantaleon, Jr. and analogous cases are in keeping with the provisions
of the RPC. Specifically, Article 48 of which states that in complex crimes, "the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period."
Thus, in Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents,
the prescribed penalties for malversation and falsification should be taken into
account.
Under the RPC, the penalty for malversation of public funds or property if the amount
involved exceeds
P22,000.00 shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua,
aside from perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the
funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
On the other hand, the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00
shall be imposed for falsification committed by a public officer.
Considering that malversation is the more serious offense, the imposable penalty for
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents if the
amount involved exceeds P22,000.00 is reclusion perpetua, it being the maximum
period of the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of bail application, however, the ruling in Mañalac, Jr. should be
revisited on the ground that Pantaleon, Jr. (as well as Conwi, Jr., Enfermo, Pajaro, et
al., and Zafra) was disposed in the context of a judgment of conviction rendered by
the... lower court and affirmed on appeal by this Court.
As will be shown below, the appropriate rule is to grant bail as a matter of right to an
accused who is charged with a complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru
Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an... amount that exceeds
P22,000.00.
The pivotal question is: How should We construe the term "punishable" under the
provisions above-quoted?
In Our mind, the term "punishable" should refer to prescribed, not imposable, penalty.
The October 10, 2014 Resolution of public respondent is spot on had it not confused
imposable penalty with prescribed penalty.
Nonetheless, reading through the text of the assailed Resolution reveals that the anti-
graft court actually meant... prescribed penalty whenever it referred to imposable
penalty.
Therefore, in essence, the ruling is correct. Respondent court held:
If the complex crime of Malversation thru Falsification be imposed in its maximum
period, there is no doubt that, in case of conviction, the penalty to be imposed is
reclusion perpetua. The cases, however, are still at their inception. Criminal...
proceedings are yet to ensue. This is not the proper time, therefore, to call for the
application of the penalty contemplated under Article 48 by imposing the same in its
maximum period.
For purposes of determining whether a person can be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, it is the imposable penalty prescribed by law for the crime charged which
should be considered and, not the penalty to be actually imposed.
5.REPUBLIC VS EUGENIO JR
G.R. No. 174629            
February 14, 2008

FACTS: Under the authority granted by the Resolution, the AMLC filed an application
to inquire into or examine the deposits or investments of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson
and Cheng Yong before the RTC of Makati, Branch 138, presided by Judge (now
Court of Appeals Justice) Sixto Marella, Jr. The application was docketed as AMLC
No. 05-005. The Makati RTC heard the testimony of the Deputy Director of the
AMLC, Richard David C. Funk II, and received the documentary evidence of the
AMLC. Thereafter, on 4 July 2005, the Makati RTC rendered an Order (Makati RTC
bank inquiry order) granting the AMLC the authority to inquire and examine the
subject bank accounts of Alvarez, Trinidad, Liongson and Cheng Yong, the trial court
being satisfied that there existed p]robable cause [to] believe that the deposits in
various bank accounts, details of which appear in paragraph 1 of the Application, are
related to the offense of violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act now the
subject of criminal prosecution before the Sandiganbayan as attested to by the
Informations, Exhibits C, D, E, F, and G Pursuant to the Makati RTC bank inquiry
order, the CIS proceeded to inquire and examine the deposits, investments and
related web accounts of the four.

Meanwhile, the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, Dennis Villa-
Ignacio, wrote a letter dated 2 November 2005, requesting the AMLC to investigate
the accounts of Alvarez, PIATCO, and several other entities involved in the nullified
contract. The letter adverted to probable cause to believe that the bank accounts
were used in the commission of unlawful activities that were committed a in relation
to the criminal cases then pending before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the letter
was a memorandum on why the investigation of the [accounts] is necessary in the
prosecution of the above criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan. In response to
the letter of the Special Prosecutor, the AMLC promulgated on 9 December 2005
Resolution No. 121 Series of 2005,[ which authorized the executive director of the
AMLC to inquire into and examine the accounts named in the letter, including one
maintained by Alvarez with DBS Bank and two other accounts in the name of Cheng
Yong with Metrobank. The Resolution characterized the memorandum attached to
the Special Prosecutors letter as extensively justifying the existence of probable
cause that the bank accounts of the persons and entities mentioned in the letter are
related to the unlawful activity of violation of Sections 3(g) and 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, as amended.

TOPIC: Violation of Special Law; Bank Secrecy Law

ISSUE: Whether or not the bank accounts of respondents can be examined.

RULING: Any exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality must be specifically

legislated. Section 2 of the Bank Secrecy Act itself prescribes exceptions whereby
these bank accounts may be examined by any person, government official, bureau or
offial; namely when: (1) upon written permission of the depositor; (2) in cases of
impeachment; (3) the examination of bank accounts is upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials; and (4) the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation. Section 8 of R.A. Act No.
3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, has been recognized by this Court as
constituting an additional exception to the rule of absolute confidentiality, and there
have been other similar recognitions as well.
The AMLA also provides exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act. Under Section 11, the
AMLC may inquire into a bank account upon order of any competent court in cases
of violation of the AMLA, it having been established that there is probable cause that
the deposits or investments are related to unlawful activities as defined in Section 3(i)
of the law, or a money laundering offense under Section 4 thereof. Further, in
instances where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related
to kidnapping for ransom, certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002,hijacking and other violations under R.A. No. 6235, destructive arson and
murder, then there is no need for the AMLC to obtain a court order before it could
inquire into such accounts. It cannot be successfully argued the proceedings relating
to the bank inquiry order under Section 11 of the AMLA is a litigation encompassed in
one of the exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act which is when money deposited or
invested is the subject matter of the litigation. The orientation of the bank inquiry
order is simply to serve as a provisional relief or remedy. As earlier stated, the
application for such does not entail a full-blown trial. Nevertheless, just because the
AMLA establishes additional exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Act it does not mean
that the later law has dispensed with the general principle established in the older law
that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines x x x are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature. Indeed, by force of statute, all bank deposits are absolutely confidential, and
that nature is unaltered even by the legislated exceptions referred to above.

6. CALIMUTAN VS. PEOPLE

GR No. 152133
February 9, 2006

Facts:

On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness
Sañano, together with two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar
in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim
Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to go home to their respective houses, but
along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Michael
Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the
latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a
previous night. Thus, upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him.
While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim
Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big as a
man’s fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back.
When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back.
Witness Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and
attempted to pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down
another stone he was already holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan to just go home. Witness Sañano accompanied victim Cantre to the
latter’s house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of
his back hit by the stone. They arrived at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00 noon,
and witness Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen.

Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident
involving petitioner Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of
stomachache, and was unable to eat. By nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately
feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and his entire body felt
numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no vehicle.
At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his
son with a piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to
eat a little, but he also later vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he
complained of backache and stomachache, and shortly thereafter, he died.9
Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the
Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination
Report10 and Certification of Death,11 issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that
the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected
food poisoning. However, upon the findings of the Medico-legal of NBI, Dr. Mendez,
he found that the cause of death Cantre was traumatic injury of the abdomen. He
explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was
massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen.
The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone.
Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to
death by petitioner Calimutan.

RTC ruled that Calimutan is guilty of Homicide. CA affirmed RTC decision.

Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports,
with dissimilar findings on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted
reasonable doubt as to the liability of petitioner Calimutan for the said death.

Topic 1: Criminal Law; Culpable Felony - Reckless Imprudence

Issue 1: Whether or not Calimutan is guilty of Murder

Ruling 1:

No, Petitioner Calimutan is not guilty of Murder but of Reckless Imprudence

resulting to Homicide.

Petitioner Calimutan is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of

reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of
reckless imprudence – Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without
malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of
inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of
intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.

It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness
Sañano, on the one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the
other, was a chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to different
destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Sañano were on their way home from a
drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and his helper
Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on
record suggests that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre and
Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise an existing animosity between
the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan.

In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution

and the defense, it was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly
punched Bulalacao, the helper and companion of petitioner Calimutan, when they
met on the road. The attack of the victim Cantre was swift and unprovoked, which
spurred petitioner Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this Court dismisses
the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does
take into account that the victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26
years of age and with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao,
the boy he attacked, who was only 15 years old and stood at about five feet. Even
with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner
Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the victim
Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre.
The stone was readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the
incident took place on a road. That he threw the stone at the back of the victim
Cantre does not automatically imply treachery on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it
is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the stone rashly and
impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the victim
Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner
Calimutan, the latter also desisted from any other act of violence against the victim
Cantre.

The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few
minutes. It was a very brief scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly have
the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take. With this in
mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration made by the Court of Appeals that
petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a retaliatory act. It was
evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and unprovoked attack
by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run away from
the victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who,
under the pressure of the circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible.

The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the
victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the
victim Cantre. What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to
drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his
helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in built
than the victim Cantre.

Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he

threw the stone at the victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of
precaution. He failed to consider that a stone the size of a man’s fist could inflict
substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his own strength, perhaps
unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with such
force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten
meters.

Topic 2: Civil Law: Proximate Cause

Issue 2: Whether or not the throwing incident was the proximate cause of Cantre's
death

Ruling: Yes

The prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of
the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate
cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.

The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and
Belen Cantre, had adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04 February
1996 to 05 February 1996. Between the two of them, the said witnesses accounted
for the whereabouts, actions, and physical condition of the victim Cantre during the
said period. Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao, the victim
Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by the
stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously
complained of backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated,
until finally, he died. Other than being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no
other instance when the victim Cantre may have been hit by another blunt instrument
which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.

Topic 3: Remedial Law; Suppression of Evidence

Issue 3:
Whether or not the non-presentation of Dr. Uanday before the RTC despite
being included in its list of witnesses amounts to a willful suppression of evidence

Ruling 3: No

This Court has ruled that the non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would
not constitute suppression of evidence and would not be fatal to the prosecution's
case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were not presented in
court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the
adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the
suppression is not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely
corroborative or cumulative; (3) the evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and
(4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege. Moreover, if the accused believed
that the failure to present the other witnesses was because their testimonies would
be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance, by
compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.

It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday
before the RTC, perhaps believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence
to merit the conviction of petitioner Calimutan even without her testimony. There was
nothing, however, preventing the defense from calling on, or even compelling, with
the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court as its witness if it truly
believed that her testimony would be adverse to the case presented by the
prosecution.

7.) Quinto vs. Andres

GR 155791
March 16, 2005

Facts:
 At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a
Grade 4 elementary school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also
about eleven years old, were at Barangay San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw
respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage
culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the
drainage culvert.1 Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he
opted to remain seated in a grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the
drainage system.

Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and
Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a
meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep.3 After a while,
respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the drainage system and
left4 without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside,
and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent
Andres laid the boy’s lifeless body down in the grassy area.5 Shocked at the sudden
turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene.6 For his part, respondent Andres went to
the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson’s mother, and informed her that her son
had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent Andres
followed her. Wilson's death was caused by Asphyxia by drowning.

Topic 1: Civil liability

Issue No. 1:
Whether or not the extinction of respondent's criminal liability carries with it the
extinction of their civil liability

Ruling No.1 :

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from
where the civil liability may arise does not exist.

Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and
logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended.24 "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary
course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The
felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate
cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would
not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor.

Topic 2: Preponderance of Evidence

Issue No. 2:

Whether or not preponderant evidence exists to hold respondents civilly liable

for the death of Wilson Quinto
Ruling No. 2:

In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the
prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the
civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action
against the respondents for damages. It bears stressing that the prosecution relied
solely on the collective testimonies of Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr.
Aguda.

It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious

crimes for no reason at all. However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the
deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was
perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to
adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased
before or after the latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner
testified that respondent Andres used to go to their house and play with her son
before the latter’s death.

8.) People of the Philippines vs. Galvez

GR 157221
March 30, 2007

Facts:

At around 11 o'clock in the evening of July 27, 1991, Danilo Perez, Rosalio
Enojarda, Noel Cugal, Ricardo Francisco and Wilfredo Rellios, took a break from
making copra to eat leftover dinner inside the copra kiln in the farm of Perez in
Matarling, Lantawan, Basilan. When Enojarda stood up from the circle where they
were eating to drink water, shots rang out and Enojarda fell to the ground shouting
"Dan ya tupa comigo" (Dan, I am hit). The rest of the group took cover, crawling to
different directions. After the attack, Rellios reported the incident to the barangay
captain and they brought Enojarda's dead body to his family.
On May 28, 1992, an Information was filed against Cesar Galvez (Galvez), a member
of the Philippine National Police (PNP) for Murder.

The prosecution presented evidence showing that: after Enojarda fell, the rest of
the group took cover and Rellios while in a crawling position, saw Galvez about 5
meters away holding an armalite rifle and firing at their direction; Rellios also saw that
Galvez had companions but did not recognize them as well as the firearms they
carried because they were approximately nine meters away;5 Perez, also crawled
and hid in the bushes about 5 meters away; when the firing stopped, one of the
attackers passed by about two meters from where Perez was hiding and because the
moon was bright, he recognized Galvez, his cousin, who was wearing a fatigue
uniform and armed with an armalite rifle; he also saw that Galvez had three armed
companions but did not recognize them nor the firearms they were carrying because
they were about nine meters from Galvez.

Galvez put up denial and alibi as his defenses. He testified that he was staying
at his father-in-law's house on July 27, 1991 and drank tuba at around 10:30 p.m. at
a nearby store. He went home and slept with his wife soon after. RTC convicted
Galvez of Murder based on conspiracy since Galvez was seen by two witnesses at
the scene of the crime carrying a firearm together with his unidentified armed
companions. CA affirmed RTC decision.

Topic 1: Remedial law; Circumstantial Evidence

Issue No. 1:

Whether or not Galvez is guilty of Murder

Ruling No. 1:

The prosecution witnesses never actually saw Galvez shoot the victim. While
this Court does not ordinarily interfere with the findings of the lower courts on the
trustworthiness of witnesses, when there appears on the records, however, facts and
circumstances of real weight which might have been overlooked or misapprehended,
this Court cannot shirk from its duty to render the law and apply justice.

Based on the testimonies, the following circumstances appear to have been

established: (1) at around 11 p.m., Enojarda, Rellios, Perez, and their two
companions were eating merienda near the copra kiln when they were sprayed with
gunfire; (2) Enojarda was fatally hit and fell on the ground; (3) Rellios, Perez and their
two companions ducked and crawled to seek cover; (4) about five minutes after the
first burst of gunfire, Galvez, armed with an M16 armalite rifle, was seen firing at
Rellios, Perez and their two companions as well as in the direction of the copra kiln;
and (5) about 20 to 25 minutes after the first burst of gunfire, Galvez was again seen
clad in fatigue uniform and carrying an M16 armalite rifle along with three armed
companions, after which, their group left the scene of the crime.
However, these circumstances are not sufficient to establish the guilt of Galvez
beyond reasonable doubt.
 It is well to emphasize the four basic guidelines that must be observed in
assaying the probative value of circumstantial evidence:
x x x (a) It should be acted upon with caution; (b) All the essential facts must be
consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (c) The facts must exclude every other theory
but that of guilt of the accused; and, (d) The facts must establish with certainty the
guilt of the accused as to convince beyond reasonable doubt that he was the
perpetrator of the offense. The peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the series
of events pointing to the commission of a felony is appreciated not singly but
collectively. The guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one (1)
particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which when put together reveals
a convincing picture pointing to the conclusion that the accused is the author of the
crime. as well as the doctrines enunciated by the Court that the prosecution must
establish beyond reasonable doubt every circumstance essential to the guilt of the
accused; and that every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the
accused must be duly taken into account.

The "incriminating circumstances" enumerated above are mainly based on the

testimonies of prosecution witnesses Perez and Rellios. A perusal of said testimonies
reveals, however, other circumstances that should be appreciated in favor of Galvez,
to wit:
(a) Both Perez and Rellios testified that they saw Galvez with three other armed
companions minutes after Enojarda was shot but they did not testify that they saw
him in the vicinity before the shooting of Enojarda.
(b) Perez testified that only one shot hit Enojarda.
(c) Perez testified that he did not see Galvez shoot at Enojarda and that he merely
assumed that Galvez was the one who shot the victim when the latter passed by
him.48 Rellios testified that he only presumed that Galvez shot at Enojarda.
(d) Perez testified that he had no misunderstanding with Galvez and that he does not
know any motive why Enojarda was killed.

In considering both favorable and "incriminating" circumstances for or against

Galvez, the following must always be borne in mind: that the Information charged
Galvez as the sole perpetrator of the crime of Murder; that the three other armed
men were not included as John Does; and that there was no allegation of conspiracy
in the Information.

Moreover, the fact that Galvez was seen minutes after Enojarda was shot does
not sufficiently establish that Galvez was the one who shot Enojarda. There is no
evidence that Galvez was seen or was together with the three other armed men
when Enojarda was hit. There is a missing link that precludes the Court from
concluding that it was Galvez who shot Enojarda. It cannot be said therefore that
there was positive identification of Galvez through circumstantial evidence.

There could not be any doubt that the facts, as established by the circumstantial
evidence, failed to exclude the possibility that another person shot Enojarda. There
were three other armed men, any one of whom could be the culprit.

Topic 2: Remedial law; Offer of Compromise

Issue No. 2:

Whether or not the act of Galvez's ofer to the victim’s wife to settle the case is a
tacit admission of guilt

Ruling No. 2: No
 Galvez's supposed offer of compromise was not formally offered and admitted as
evidence during the trial. The victim's widow or any prosecution witness did not
testify on any offer of compromise made by Galvez. We have held that when the
evidence on the alleged offer of compromise is amorphous, the same shall not
benefit the prosecution in its case against the accused.

The Court also recognizes that there may be instances when an offer of
compromise will not amount to an admission of guilt. Thus, in People v. Godoy, the
Court pronounced that:

'In criminal cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence

against the party making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the
bases of the right to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect
the public interest, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the
penal action. It has long been held, however, that in such cases the accused is
permitted to show that the offer was not made under a consciousness of guilt, but
merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other reason which
would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was not in truth an
admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would
ordinarily ensue therefrom. (Emphasis supplied).

As the alleged offer of compromise was not presented in court, it was not shown
that Galvez indeed made such an offer under the consciousness of guilt. Galvez was
not given the opportunity to explain that it was given for some other reason that
would justify a claim that it was not an admission of guilt or an attempt to avoid its
legal consequences.

Topic 3: Criminal Law; Conspiracy

Issue No. 3:

Whether or not Galvez is criminally liable based on conspiracy

Ruling No. 3: No.

Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an accused may be

held liable for the acts of his co-accused. In the absence of any averment of
conspiracy in the information, an accused can only be made liable for the acts
committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility is individual and not
collective.

As explained in People v. Tampis,

The rule is that conspiracy must be alleged, not merely inferred, in the
information. Absence of a particular statement in the accusatory portion of the charge
sheet concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy renders the indictment
insufficient to hold one accused liable for the individual acts of his co-accused. Thus,
each of them would be held accountable only for their respective participation in the
commission of the offense.

The rationale for this rule has long been settled. In People v. Quitlong, the Court
explained:
 Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence
of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to bear and respond to all its grave legal
consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when the
charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural
requirements. Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates
that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal offense without due process of
law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Since conspiracy was not alleged in the Information in this case, it is imperative
that the prosecution prove Galvez's direct participation in the killing of the victim.
This, the prosecution failed to do.

Topic 4: Remedial law; Ballistic Examination

Issue No. 4:

Whether or not the negative reult of the ballistic examination may be used as
circumstantial evidence

Ruling No.4: No.

It is the prosecution which has the burden of showing that Galvez used a firearm
other than the one issued to him and that such firearm, which Galvez used, was the
one that killed the victim. It is not for Galvez to prove the opposite of the possibility
adverted to by the prosecution as it is the prosecution which must prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt and not for him to prove his innocence.

Thus, while it is true that the negative results of the paraffin and ballistic tests do
not conclusively prove that Galvez did not shoot the victim, the same negative results
cannot be used as circumstantial evidence against Galvez to prove that he shot
Enojarda. To do otherwise would violate the basic precepts of criminal law which
presumes the innocence of the accused. Every circumstance favoring an accused's
innocence must be duly taken into account, the proof against him must survive the
test of reason, and the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment.

9. ) VELASCO vs. PEOPLE

GR 166479
February 28, 2006

Facts:

On April 19, 1998 7:30 am: Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his
owner type jeep in front of his house when a motorized tricycle stopped near him.
Rodolfo C. Velasco dashed out of the tricycle, approached the complainant and fired
at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. Velasco missed his first shot but the
second one hit the complainant at the upper arm, causing him to stumble on the
ground. But, Frederick stood up and ran, while Velasco fired 6 more but missed.

After being reported as wearing a vest or a “chaleco”, the police, composed of

SPO4 Romulo Villamil, PO3 Rolando Alvendo, and SPO1 Soliven pursued and
caught Velasco who was on board a motorized tricycle to the highway going to
Barangay Banaoang in Calasiao town with a firearm protruding from the waistline

Velasco’s Alibi: April 18, 1998, he spent the night at a friend’s house in Lingayen,
Pangasinan and between 6:00-7:00am, he left Lingayen riding in the Volkswagen car
of Berting Soriano then alighted at the corner of Banaoang diversion road to ride a
tricycle where he heard a jeep behind him blowing its horn and when he looked back
he saw three men on board pointing their guns at him.

RTC ruled that Velasco is guilty of attempted murder appreciating treachery in

the commission of the crime sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4)
years of prision correccional, as minimum to Eight (8) years and One (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum and to pay P2,696 as actual damages. CA Affirmed RTC
Velasco filed a petition for certiorari and contended that he had no motive to
harm, much less kill, the victim for he was total stranger and since the identity of the
assailant is in doubt, motive becomes important and his alibi gains weight and value
and that the testimony of Armando Maramba is not credible, he being a relative of the
victim

Topic 1: Attempted Felony

ISSUE 1 :
Whether or not Velasco is guilty of attempted murder

Ruling 1: YES. petition is DENIED

It was not physically impossible for Velasco to be at the crime scene when the
crime was committed since it only takes a 10-minute ride from the place where he
allegedly alighted from the car of one Berting Soriano to the crime scene

Even without a ballistic report, the positive identification by prosecution

witnesses is more than sufficient to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

It must be stressed that motive is a state of (one’s) mind which others cannot
discern. It is not an element of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved. In
fact, lack of motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction. It is judicial
knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all. Even in
the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not essential
to convict when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit. Motive assumes
significance only where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was.

Since petitioner has been positively identified the lack of motive is no longer of
consequence. Relationship could strengthen the witnesses’ credibility, for it is
unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the actual
culprit.

The fact that the shooting occurred in broad daylight does not render its
commission impossible. The fact that petitioner was a navy man, a protector of the
people, does not mean that he is innocent of the crime charged or that he is
incapable of doing it.

The suddenness of the shooting and the fact that he was unarmed left private
complainant with no option but to run for his life. – treachery
 Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts of
execution as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own
desistance, petitioner committed an attempted felony. Petitioner already commenced
his attack with a manifest intent to kill by shooting private complainant seven times,
but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes independent of his
will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Private complainant sustained a
wound on the left arm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is that
where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime
is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution
that would have brought about death

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being no aggravating or

mitigating circumstances, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed should be within
the range of prision correccional, and the maximum of the penalty to be imposed
should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium period.
RTC acquitted Petitioner.

Topic 2: Remedial Law; Defenses of Denial and Alibi

Issue No. 2:
Whether or not the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Petitioner invoking the
defenses of Denial and Alibi

Ruling No. 2 : No

In the case at bar, the testimonies of private complainant Frederick Maramba

and Armando Maramba were given credence and full probative weight and credence
by the trial court in the identification of petitioner as the assailant. Private complainant
saw petitioner alight from the tricycle of Armando Maramba before he successively
shot at him at a distance of about four meters while chasing him for 25 to 30
meters. Armando Maramba witnessed the shooting because he was the driver of the
tricycle in which petitioner rode in going to the house of private complainant and in
leaving the crime scene. After the shooting incident, private complainant went to the
City Jail and identified petitioner as the person who shot him. At the Dagupan City
Police Station, Armando Maramba pointed to petitioner as the assailant not because
he saw a man wearing a chaleco, but because it was he whom he saw shoot the
private complainant.

Petitioner interposes the defenses of denial and alibi. He denies participation in

the crime claiming that he was aboard a tricycle on his way to Calasiao, Pangasinan,
when policemen arrested him and brought him to the Dagupan Police Station. On the
other hand, the victim himself identified petitioner as his attacker which statement
was corroborated by Armando Maramba.

To be believed, denial must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability.

Otherwise, it is purely self-serving and without merit. Settled is the rule that the
defense of alibi is inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations of
truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Greater weight is given to the
categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the
accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime. There being no
strong and credible evidence adduced to overcome the testimonies of private
complainant and Armando Maramba pointing to him as the culprit, no weight can be
given petitioner’s denial.
 Petitioner’s defense of alibi likewise fails. As against positive identification by
prosecution witnesses, the accused’s alibi is worthless. Having been identified by two
credible witnesses, petitioner cannot escape liability. Moreover, for alibi to prosper, it
must be proven that during the commission of the crime, the accused was in another
place and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. Courts
view the defense of alibi with suspicion and caution not only because it is inherently
weak and unreliable, but also it can be fabricated easily. As found by the trial court, it
was not physically impossible for petitioner to be at the crime scene when the crime
was committed since it only takes a ten-minute ride from the place where he
allegedly alighted from the car of one Berting Soriano to the crime scene. We have
held that:

Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the
time of the commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there
be no mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good
defense. But to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the
defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically impossible for the
person charged with the crime to be at the locus criminis at the time of its
commission, the reason being that no person can be in two places at the same time.
The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the
least possibility of accused’s presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold
water.

Topic No. 3: Remedial Law; Suppression of Evidence

Issue No. 3:

Whether or not there was a suppression of evidence when the prosecution did
not place on the witness stand Barangay Captain Dacasain and when it failed to
present a ballistic report on the seven empty shells

Ruling No. 3: No

As to the non-presentation of Barangay Captain Dacasin, the same does not

constitute suppression of evidence. Barangay Captain Dacasin was not an
eyewitness to the shooting incident contrary to the claim of petitioner. Although he
was the one who reported the incident to the police station, he was merely informed
by Armando Maramba that the person who shot private complainant wore a
"chaleko" or vest.34 Thus, not being an eyewitness, his testimony, even if taken,
would have nothing to do with the identification of the assailant. If he really wanted to
have Barangay Captain Dacasin take the witness stand, he could have asked the
trial court for a subpoena ad testificandum. This, he did not do.

As regards the failure of the police to present a ballistic report on the seven
spent shells recovered from the crime scene, the same does not constitute
suppression of evidence. A ballistic report serves only as a guide for the courts in
considering the ultimate facts of the case. It would be indispensable if there are no
credible eyewitnesses to the crime inasmuch as it is corroborative in nature. The
presentation of weapons or the slugs and bullets used and ballistic examination are
not prerequisites for conviction. The corpus delicti and the positive identification of
accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime are more than enough to sustain
his conviction. Even without a ballistic report, the positive identification by
prosecution witnesses is more than sufficient to prove accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. 38 In the instant case, since the identity of the assailant has been
sufficiently established, a ballistic report on the slugs can be dispensed with in
proving petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Topic 4: Remedial Law; Testimony by a a blood relationship

Issue No. 4:

Whether or not the testimony of prosecution witness Armando Maramamba

should not be given weight on the ground of relationship

Ruling 4: No.

The blood relationship of Armando Maramba and private complainant would not
render the former’s testimony unworthy of belief. On the contrary, relationship could
strengthen the witnesses’ credibility, for it is unnatural for an aggrieved relative to
falsely accuse someone other than the actual culprit. Their natural interest in
securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating a person other
than the true offender. It is settled that where there is no evidence and nothing to
indicate that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit. The weight of the testimony of witnesses is not
impaired nor in anyway affected by their relationship to the victim when there is no
showing of improper motive on their part. Jurisprudence likewise holds that if an
accused had really nothing to do with a crime, it would be against the natural order of
events and of human nature, and against the presumption of good faith, that a
prosecution witness would falsely testify against him.45 In the case before us, aside
from petitioner’s claim that he was framed-up, there is nothing in the records that
shows that Armando Maramba had ulterior motives in testifying against him.
Necessarily, the testimony of Armando Maramba must be given full credit.

10.) People vs. Babor

GR 215319
October 21, 2005

Facts:

In an Information3 dated 14 April 2005, accused-appellant was charged with

Murder, the accusatory portion of which reads as follows:

"That at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of January 25, 2005 at Sitio
M[o]logpolog, Barangay Nalundan, Bindoy, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and treachery, and then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and hack many times one Bartolome Amahit with the use
of long bolo "pinuti" with which the accused was then armed. On the version of the
Prosecution.
 Accused-appellant Apolonio a.k.a. "Julito" Babor denied killing his father-in-law
and testified as to what happened on the night of 25 January 2005. According to him,
he and his wife, Marife, went to the house of his parents-in-law to spend the night
there as the following day they will go to Abaca to sell a carabao. At about 10:00
o'clock in the evening while they were sleeping, he woke up because somebody was
trying to open the door. With that, he went near the door but then he was hacked.
Upon being hit, and without waking up his wife and parents-in-law, he jumped out of
the window. While he was running, somebody stoned him twice hitting his head and
buttocks but he did not shout for help because he was already injured. Because it
was very dark, he went inside the sugarcane field and hid until about 6:00 o'clock in
the morning that he came out of the field, (sic) While walking, he met one of his
uncles, who assisted him to go to Cabcaban and from there he was brought to the
hospital for treatment. At the hospital, his father visited him but he was not informed
of what befell his father-in-law until he was discharged and his father brought him to
jail. In jail, he was informed by the police officers that his father-in-law was killed and
he was the suspect. RTC convicted accused. CA affirmed.

Topic: Criminal law; Elements of a Crime

Issue:
Whether the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

The elements of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him;
(3) the killing was with the attendance of any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (4) the killing
constitutes neither parricide nor infanticide.

We are convinced that Marife was able to identify accused-appellant and see the
incident that occurred on January 25, 2005 because the room where the killing took
place was illuminated by a kerosene lamp.10 The testimony of Marife, indicating
where accused-appellant hacked the victim, was consistent with the post-mortem
examination results11 indicative of the location of the fatal wounds numbered 3, 4
and 5 at the head and face of the victim.12 Also, we point out that the RTC found that
Marife had no motive to falsely testify against her husband.13 Based on the
foregoing, we agree with the lower courts that the testimony of Marife was sufficient
to establish that accused-appellant killed Bartolome.

With respect to the presence of treachery in the killing of Bartolome, which is a

qualifying circumstance necessary for a murder conviction, paragraph 16 of Article 14
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, defines treachery as the direct employment
of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. In order for treachery to be
properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by
him.

In this case, accused-appellant killed the victim with a bolo at night time and
while he was sleeping. Clearly, he was not in a position to defend himself. Also, it is
evident that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately waited for the victim to
sleep, returned to the house late at night and armed himself with a bolo to ensure the
success of his atrocious act. Thus, we affirm the finding that treachery attended the
killing of Bartolome.
11. LEE vs. CA
G.R. No. 145498
FACTS:
On October 4, 1993, an Information was filed against petitioner Dr. Benjamin F. Lee
and a certain Cesar Al. Bautista, for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, which reads:

That on or about the 24th day of July 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring together, confederating with, and mutually helping each other,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to
Rogelio G. Bergado to apply on account or for value United Coconut Planters Bank
Check No. 168341 dated July 24, 1993 payable to the order of Rogelio G. Bergado in
the amount of P980,000.00, Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at
the time of issue they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented
for payment was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed
and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said
Rogelio G. Bergado the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full
payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
For the defense, petitioner testified that: it is Bautista who is the sole owner of Unlad;
he knew Bautista and became his "compadre" because of Bautista's wife who was
his employee; he does not know anything about the check issued by Bautista in favor
of Bergado nor did he receive any amount from Bergado or any other person; he
agreed to open an account with Bautista in 1988 because Bautista promised to give
him 5% interest from the proceeds of loans that will be made in favor of other people
from said account; before July of 1989, Bautista also asked him to sign several
checks in exchange for 2.5% interest a month from the proceeds of loan to be made
in favor of other people; after July 1989, he terminated his accommodation
arrangement with Bautista after learning that Bautista was also giving 5% interest to
other investors without any accommodation agreement; he asked for the checks he
previously signed but Bautista refused to return them saying that he did not have
them anymore; and inspite of these, he continued investing in Bautista's business in
the amount of more than P500,000.00.16
To bolster his claim, petitioner presented: an affidavit executed by Bautista dated
May 31, 1993 stating that Bautista is the sole proprietor of Unlad and that any
business transaction entered into by Unlad shall be Bautista's personal
responsibility;18 an affidavit executed by Bautista on June 4, 1990, stating that
petitioner is no longer connected with Unlad and that petitioner should not be held
liable regarding any transaction entered into by Unlad after July 1989 since petitioner
is no longer a signatory;19 a business permit issued by the Municipality of Calapan
certifying that Bautista has been granted a permit to operate a "general
merchandise";20 a certification from the Department of Trade and Industry, Oriental
Mindoro Provincial Office stating that Unlad is registered in the name of Cesar
Bautista and/or Placer Bautista;21 orders of attachment issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Oriental Mindoro on the properties of Bautista and petitioner;22 and checks
issued by Bautista in favor of petitioner and his wife Amelia Lee.23

TOPIC: JURISDICTION

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC, which tried and convicted petitioner, has jurisdiction over
the case; (2) whether petitioner had actual knowledge of the sufficiency or
insufficiency of funds handled by his co-accused; (3) whether the private
complainant, at the time of issuance, had knowledge that the check had no sufficient
funds; and (4) whether the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
1. Yes
As clearly provided by Sec. 32 (2) of B.P. Blg. 129, to wit:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. - - -Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of
not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand
pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory
or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated
thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereof: Provided, however,
That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty
thousand pesos.
The Information in this case was filed on October 4, 1993.
On March 25, 1994, Republic Act No. 7691 took effect and amended Sec. 32 (2) of
B.P. Blg. 129 to read as follows:
Sec. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Criminal Cases. - - - Except in cases falling within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall exercise: as a general rule the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is to
be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Where a
court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its
jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new
legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The
exception to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the
effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where
a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be
applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of a statute.
A perusal of R.A. No. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions apply only to civil
cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage. Neither from an express proviso
nor by implication can it be understood as having retroactive application to criminal
cases pending or decided by the Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity At the
time the case against the appellant was commenced by the filing of the information
on July 3, 1991, the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offense charged.
2. Yes
It is a hornbook doctrine that unless the affiant himself takes the witness stand to
affirm the averments in his affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded from the judicial
proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay.42 The trial court and the Court of Appeals
were correct in considering the same as hearsay evidence and in not giving probative
weight to such affidavits.
Moreover, petitioner had admitted that he continued investing in Unlad until April
1994. Hence, he now cannot claim that he has completely severed his ties with
Bautista as of 1989. With nothing but his bare assertions, which are ambiguous at
best, petitioner has failed to rebut the prima facie presumption laid down by the
statute and established by the prosecution.
Petitioner's insistence that since he is not an owner of Unlad, he could not have had
any knowledge as to the insufficiency of funds is devoid of merit. As clarified in Lao v.
Court of Appeals,43 the very case petitioner is invoking, the doctrine that a mere
employee tasked to sign checks in blanks may not be deemed to have knowledge of
the insufficiency of funds applies only to corporate checks and not to personal
checks.44 In this case, what is involved is a personal and not a corporate check.
Worth mentioning also is the fact that in the Lao case, the notice of dishonor was
never personally received by petitioner, thus the prima facie presumption of
knowledge of insufficiency of funds never arose. Here, as correctly found by the
RTC, petitioner was duly notified of the dishonor of the subject check as shown by
Exh. "C,"45 a letter, specifically mentioning that the subject check was dishonored for
reason "Account Closed," with the corresponding registry return receipt showing that
petitioner received the notice on August 16, 1993 which petitioner did not impugn.
3. No,
We have held that knowledge of the payee that the drawer did not have sufficient
funds with the drawee bank at the time the check was issued is immaterial as deceit
is not an essential element of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22.50 This is because the
gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check, hence, malice and intent in
the issuance thereof are inconsequential.51
In Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals 52 the Court held that there is no violation of B.P. Blg.
22, if complainant was actually told by the drawer that he has no sufficient funds in
the bank.53 In the present case, since there is no evidence that a categorical
statement was given to private complainant when the subject check was issued to
him, the above ruling cannot apply.
4. Yes,
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean absolute certainty. Suffice it to say
the law requires only moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in a prejudiced mind.54
After reviewing the entire records of this case, we find that there is no reason to
depart from the trial court's judgment of conviction. The weight and quantum of
evidence needed to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt were met
and established by the prosecution and correctly affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
However, in view of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified
by Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, establishing a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22; and the recommendation of
the Solicitor General in its Comment that the policy laid down in Vaca v. Court of
Appeals, 55 and Lim v. People,56 of redeeming valuable human material and
preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness, be
considered in favor of petitioner who is not shown to be a habitual delinquent or a
recidivist,57 we find that the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals should be
modified by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only a fine of
P200,000.00.

An appeal in a criminal case throws the entire case for review and it becomes our
duty to correct any error, as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether
assigned as an error or not.58 Considering that the civil aspect of the case is
deemed instituted with the criminal case and considering that the trial court and the
Court of Appeals failed to award, in their respective judgments, the interest on the
amount due to private complainant, it is incumbent upon us to correct the patent error
of the lower courts. Private complainant is entitled to a 12% legal interest per annum
from the date of finality of judgment.59

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: The sentence of imprisonment is deleted. Instead, petitioner is
ordered to pay a fine of P200,000.00, subject to subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency pursuant to Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code; and petitioner is
ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P980,000.00 with 12% legal
interest per annum from the date of finality of herein judgment.
12. TERESITA ALCANTARA VERGARA v. PEOPLE
GR NO. 160328
2005-02-04

Facts:
This petition for review assails the March 28, 2003 decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals and its September 30, 2003 resolution[2] in CA-G.R. CR No. 25799, which
affirmed in toto the June 10,... 1992 decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 132, in Criminal Case No. 91-2267, finding petitioner Teresita Alcantara
Vergara guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP
22).

The facts show that on June 13, 1988, Livelihood Corporation (LIVECOR) granted
Perpetual Garments Corporation (PERPETUAL) a continuing credit line in the
amount of P750,000.00.[4] The parties agreed that for each availment from the line,
PERPETUAL would... execute a promissory note and issue postdated checks
corresponding to the amount of the loan. Petitioner, in her capacity as Vice President
and General Manager of PERPETUAL, signed the credit agreement and all the
postdated checks.

One of the checks issued and signed by petitioner was Check No. 019972 for
P150,000.00. When deposited on December 15, 1988, the check was dishonored for
insuffiency of funds.[5] On the same month, LIVECOR verbally informed petitioner of
the dishonor of the... check.
On April 1, 1991, LIVECOR charged petitioner with violation of BP 22.
Although petitioner made cash and check payments after the dishonor, the same...
were treated by LIVECOR as continuing payments of the outstanding loan
As of February 29, 1992, PERPETUAL's... total outstanding loan is P610,656.95.
Petitioner averred that she cannot be charged with violation of BP 22 because she
replaced Check No. 019972 on May 25, 1989, with 6 checks, each for P25,000.00 or
for the total amount of P150,000.00.[8] She claimed that from the time of dishonor up
to March
1992, PERPETUAL paid LIVECOR P542,000.00 thus covering the full amount of
the dishonored check
On June 10, 1992, the trial court rendered decision finding petitioner guilty of
violating BP 22.
the accused is hereby sentenced to pay a fine of P200,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Dissatisfied, both LIVECOR and petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On March 28, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the consolidated appeals and
affirmed the trial court's decision in all respects.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied
Hence, the instant petition.

Topic: Equipoise Rule, Review of Facts on Appeal (Exception)

Issues:
The issue for resolution in this petition for review is whether petitioner should be
convicted of violation of BP 22.

Ruling:
It is settled that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight, even
finality on appeal, except when it has failed to appreciate certain facts and
circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result of the
case. This exception is... present here.
Accordingly, this Court has held that the elements of the crime are as follows:
The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value.
The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.
The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment.[15]
To hold petitioner liable for violation of BP 22, it is not enough that she issued the
check that was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds. It must also be
shown beyond reasonable doubt that she knew of the insufficiency of funds at the
time the check was issued.
Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and
issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee because of
insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the... check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such
insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof
the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of
such check within five (5) banking days after... receiving notice that such check has
not been paid by the drawee.
In other words, the prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the
law also provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the
amount of the check or makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking days
after receiving notice... that such check has not been paid by the drawee." Verily, BP
22 gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and
thus avert prosecution.
Going through the records of this case, we find that it was not clearly established
when the notice of dishonor was served on petitioner
To our mind, the above testimonies do not categorically prove exactly when petitioner
received the notice of dishonor. Hence, there was no way of determining when the 5-
day period prescribed in Section 2 of BP 22 would start and end.

In Danao v. Court of Appeals,[20] we held that:

… if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the
presumption or prima facie evidence provided in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 cannot
arise, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day... period.

In the present case, no proof of receipt by petitioner of any notice of non-payment of

the checks was ever presented during the trial.

Obviously, in the instant case, there is no way of determining when the 5-day period
prescribed in Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end. Thus, the presumption or
prima facie evidence of knowledge by the petitioner of the insufficiency of funds or
credit at the... times she issued the checks did not arise.
The presumption that the issuer has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is
brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received notice of
dishonor and that within 5 banking days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the
amount of the check or to... make arrangement for its payment.[23] The prosecution
is burdened to prove these acts that give rise to the prima facie presumption.
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or
there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the
burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the
inculpatory facts and... circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and
does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly... stated, the needed quantum of
proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.
In the case at bar, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor
of petitioner considering that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving
the evidentiary facts that would establish the prima facie presumption of knowledge
of the... insufficiency of funds. In criminal cases, the prosecution's cases must rise
and fall on the strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness of the defense.

In Magno v. Court of Appeals,[27] it was held that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the
Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system
and the legitimate public checking account user. It was not intended to shelter or
favor... nor encourage users of the system to enrich themselves through the
manipulation and circumvention of the noble purpose and objectives of the law.
Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law affirms that the
primary function of punishment is the... protection of the society against actual and
potential wrong doers.
In the case at bar, petitioner could hardly be classified as a menace against whom
the society should be protected. The records show that from December 1988 when
petitioner was informed of the dishonor, to the filing of the information on April 1,
1991, she paid P423,354.00 to
LIVECOR.[28] Although petitioner has not yet fully paid the loan, it cannot be denied
that the previous payments fully covered the value of the dishonored check. It would
be unjust to penalize her for the issuance of said check which has been satisfied 2...
years prior to the filing of the criminal charge against her.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of
the Court of Appeals dated March 28, 2003 in CA-G.R. CR No. 25799 which affirmed
in toto the June 10, 1992 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 132,
in
Criminal Case No. 91-2267, and its September 30, 2003 resolution denying
reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Teresita Alcantara Vergara is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. No pronouncement as to... costs.

Principles:
It is settled that factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight, even
finality on appeal, except when it has failed to appreciate certain facts and
circumstances which, if taken into account, would materially affect the result of the
case. This exception is... present
here.

Criminal Law
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or
there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the
burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the
inculpatory facts and... circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and
does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly... stated, the needed quantum of
proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.
13. ROSALINDA S. KHITRI & FERNANDO S. KHITRI v. PEOPLE
GR No. 210192
2016-07-04

Facts:
Rosalinda is Fernando's mother. In their joint Counter-Affidavit, they admitted that
they received the amount of Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00) from
Spouses Hiroshi (Hiroshi) and Belen (Belen) Fukami (collectively, the private
complainants). However, the petitioners claimed that the money they received was
the private complainants' contribution in their joint venture to construct and operate a
garments factory. The petitioners further alleged that they had substantially complied
with their obligation by constructing a two-door studio-type apartment in their lot in
Cainta, Rizal, half of which was to be devoted for the operation of the garments
factory.

Topic: Mala In Se (Evil Intent)

Issues:
(1) whether the evidence submitted is sufficient to establish guilt of the petitioners...
beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:
However, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the RTC, which convicted the
petitioners of estafa as the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime
charged.Under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa with
abuse of confidence are as follows: that the money, goods or other personal property
is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; that
there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender,
or denial on his part of such receipt; that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and that there is demand by the offended party
to the offender.]In the case at bar, the presence of the first and last elements is
undisputed. The petitioners received money in trust or for administration to build a
factory in Cainta, and that the private complainants, through counsel, demanded the
return of their P400,000.00 via letters dated December 13, 1999 and January 25,
2000, which were received on December 28, 1999, and January 5, 2000,
respectively. However, the elements of misappropriation and prejudice were not
sufficiently established.The essence of estafa committed with abuse of confidence is
the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
entity to whom a return should be made. The words "convert" and "misappropriate"
connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or
of devoting it to a pmpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate
for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also
every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.]Here, Rosalinda
received P400,000.000 for the purpose of constructing a garments factory inside the
Monte Vista Park Subdivision, Cainta, Rizal. True to their agreement, she caused the
erection of a two-door studio-type apartment, one of which would serve as the
garments factory. The private complainants however posit that the structure was not
in compliance with their agreed plan. Nonetheless, the purpose of the money had
been complied with by the petitioners, albeit modified. The Court believes that the
ends sought to be achieved by the money have not been rendered illusory by the
modification. In fact, after the construction, the private complainants sent five sewing
machines for use in the garments factory, but these were subsequently pulled out
after two weeks for repairs."Not to be overlooked is that this felony falls under the
category of mala in se offenses that require the attendance of criminal intent. Evil
intent must unite with an unlawful act for it to be a felony. Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea."The element of intent - on which the Court shall focus - is described as
the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to the
purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds. It does not refer
to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the
act. While motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result,
intent is the "purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. On the other
hand, the term "felonious" means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding
from an evil heart or purpose. With these elements taken together, the requirement of
intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and
malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional
felony requires the existence of dolus malus - that the act or omission be done
"willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice aforethought."
The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea — a crime is not committed if
the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of
the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt.]In the instant petition, the records do not show that the
prosecution was able to prove the existence of malicious intent when the petitioners
used the money they received to construct two-door studio-type apartments, one of
which would serve as the garments factory. To reiterate, the purpose of the money
was achieved. Furthermore, the factual precedents of the case do not sufficiently
warrant conviction for the crime of estafa, much less deserve deprivation of liberty. At
best, the petitioners could be held liable for damages for violating the tenor of their
agreement. Ultimately, the amount of P400,000.00 given to the petitioners could
hardly be considered as the damage sustained by the private complainants.
Damage, as an element of estafa, may consist in: (1) the offended party being
deprived of his money or property as a result of the defraudation; (2) disturbance in
property right; or (3) temporary prejudice. In this case, the amount was voluntarily
given pursuant to a joint venture agreement for the construction of a garments
factory, and with which the petitioners complied. Absent the element of
misappropriation, the private complainants could not have been deprived of their
money through defraudation. Moreover, the allegation of lost profits, which could
have arisen from the aborted joint venture, is conjectural in nature and could barely
be contemplated as prejudice suffered.
14. AMADO ALVARADO GARCIA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR 171951

FACTS:
Amado Garcia and Fidel Foz Jr., had a drinking spree in the morning of September
1999 that lasted the until the evening of that day. Because of the blaring noise of the
videoke machine that the two were enjoying, Manuel Chy, told the group to quiet
down. Two days after, the met again on a wedding and again, Chy told the two to
stop singing. On the next day, the two, now with a friend, decided to have a drinking
session and later moved to Punta.
On their way to Punta, they saw Chy. The petitioner suddenly assaulted Chy and
struck him on the lower part of his head with a bottle. When Chy found a way to
escape, he rushed to his home and phoned his wife and told her to call the police.
When they arrived, they found Chy unconcsious and later pronounced dead on
arrival at the hospital
The petitioner was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. The petitioner
contended that he should only be charged with slight physical injuries as his assault
on Chy was not he cause of his death.

Topic: Article 4 of RPC

ISSUE:

Whether or not Garcia is liable for Manuel Chy’s death

RULING:

YES. It can be reasonably inferred from the foregoing statements that the
emotional strain from the beating aggravated Chy’s delicate constitution and led to
his death. The inevitable conclusion then surfaces that the myocardial infarction
suffered by the victim was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony
that petitioner had intended to commit.
The essential requisites for the application of this Article 4 of the RPC are: (a) the
intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the
unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts.
Hence, the fact that Chy was previously afflicted with a heart ailment does not alter
petitioner’s liability for his death. a person committing a felony is responsible for all
the natural and logical consequences resulting from it although the unlawful act
performed is different from the one he intended.
15. EMMA T. JACINTO vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR162540

FACTS:
Petitioner Jacinto was an employee of Megafoam International, received a check
amounting to Pho 10, 000 as payment of Baby Aquino to her purchase to Megafoam.
However, instead of delivering it to Megafoam, she deposited it to her account. The
check was later discovered to be unfunded. Both RTC and CA ruled that the
petitioner was guilty of qualified theft. Petitioner filed a petition for review of certiorari
to SC.

Topic: Impossible Crime

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is correctly convicted for the crime of Qualified Theft.

RULING:
NO. Petitioner is guilty of committing an impossible crime of theft only. ,

The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an
offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3)
that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was
either inadequate or ineffectual.

Petitioner’s evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the
check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were
it not for the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value
thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous
circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time,
that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by
petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually
dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said
dishonored check.

Petition granted. Decision is MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found

GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs.

Doctrine: The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would
be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent;
and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed
was either inadequate or ineffectual
16. Yapyuco vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 120744-46

Facts:

The accused-petitioners were members of the Integrated National Police

(INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, barangay captains of
Quebiawan and De, Carmen members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or
civilian volunteer officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and
Telebastagan. They allegedly received information concerning a reported presence
of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. It was so unfortunate that the Tamaraw
jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn to which the accused all
await. Believing that the victims were the armed NPA members, the accused opened
fire to the passengers of the said Tamaraw. Such shooting incident on April 5,
1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga caused the death of
Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). The accused
were all charged with murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder.
Upon conviction, Yapyuco disputed that he cannot be exonerated since he
responded to the scene in fulfillment of his duty as a member of the police force and
he invoked mistake of fact as caused by his co-accused in the belief that the victims
are members of the NPA.

TOPIC 1: Mistake of fact

Issue 1:
Whether the principle of Mistake of Fact is applicable in the instant case.

Ruling: No, the principle of Mistake of fact is not applicable. In the context of criminal
law, a mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have
justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a
reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the
intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged
requires proof of only general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the
defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any other
person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest
and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability
required to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute
prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. In the present case, he relied
merely on the statement of his co-accused therefore it cannot be invoked

TOPIC 2: Justifying circumstance

Issue 2:
Whether the petitioner can be award with the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of
duty or lawful exercise of a right or office.

Ruling: No, he cannot be awarded of the justifying circumstance. The said justifying
circumstance rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the performance of his duty
or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the offense
committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office. In the present case, their duty is supposed to
be the validation of the information that they received and not to immediately fire at
the victims. Bloodless arrest can even be achieved when they have validated the
information. Failing to meet the requisites, the petitioner cannot be award of the
justifying circumstance.
17. People vs Gervero
G.R. No. 206725

Facts:
In an Information, dated 27 March 1992, the accused were charged with multiple
murder. At around 6:30 p.m. of 25 November 1991, at Barangay Milan, Lemery,
Iloilo, Roda was at the house of Barangay Civilian Volunteer Organization(CVO)
Commander Hernando. After eating and while Roda was waiting for transportation
bound for her residence at Ajuy, Hernando, CVO members Jose and Benito came
out of Hernando's house. Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU)
officers Bañes, Castigador, and their two companions, who were carrying firearms,
approached Hernando and asked him for money. When Hernando gave them
P20.00, Bañes remarked, "Is that the only amount you can give when you just
received money from your wife?" Castigador took the money and said, "You just
watch out." When the CAFGU officers left, Roda informed Hernando of Castigador's
remark, which Hernando dismissed. Thereafter, Hernando, Jose, and Benito went
back to Hernando's house and prepared to go to the wake of CVO member
Saturnino's wife.
At around eight o'clock in the evening, while Delia was inside their house at
Barangay Milan, Lemery, Iloilo, her husband Jose, together with Hernando and
Benito, passed by. Delia peeped through the window, called Jose's attention, and
told him not to stay long at the wake. With the area being illuminated by a light bulb,
Delia saw the three walk along the national road and cross towards the rice field. A
few minutes later, Isaac, Jose's younger brother and also a CVO member, passed by
Delia's house together with Roda. Isaac shouted to call the attention of Hernando,
who was then already in the middle of the rice field. Roda, Delia, and Isaac could
hear the three CVOs laughing while they were traversing the rice field.
Suddenly, Delia, Roda, and Isaac heard a burst of gunfire from where Hernando,
Jose, and Benito were walking. Jose, who was then wearing a pair of white pants, fell
first. Delia heard someone shout, "This is Hernando, a CVO!" and someone replied,
"Birahi na!" ("Shoot now!"). Delia, from her window, also saw Hernando attempting to
turn back but was also gunned down. She also witnessed the group of armed men
approach the three CVOs whom they fired upon at close range.
When they heard the gunfire, Isaac dropped to the ground and ran back to his house;
Roda took cover among the rice paddies, looked at the direction of the gunshots, and
saw persons with long firearms. When Roda reached Hernando's house, she saw
Hernando's son Ronnie and told him that his father was shot but warned him not to
go out as he might also be harmed. Delia and Isaac heard men pass by their houses
thereafter. Isaac recognized some of the gunmen to be his friends and positively
identified the accused as the armed men he saw.
Later that same night, Pilar Basulgan, wife of Brgy. Capt. Balinas, summoned Isaac.
Together with Delia and Ronnie, Isaac went to the house of Brgy. Capt. Balinas.
There they saw the accused who had already told Brgy. Capt. Balinas that they made
a mistake in shooting Hernando, Jose, and Benito because they thought that the
three were members of the New People's Army (NPA). Isaac asserted that
misapprehension was impossible because the CAFGU officers personally knew the
victims and the voices of the three CVO members were recognizable. Brgy. Capt.
Balinas asked if the victims were able to shoot back, but the accused answered in
the negative. Thereafter, Isaac, Delia and Ronnie proceeded to the crime scene and
saw Hernando, Jose, and Benito lifeless on the ground.
The RTC found the accused guilty of murder. The CA affirmed the conviction of the
accused but modified the amount of damages awarded. Hence, Gervero (deceased),
Castigador, Solomon, and Eduardo (accused-appellants) appealed to the SC.
TOPIC 1: Mistake of Fact

ISSUE 1:
I. Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating the defense of mistake of fact.

RULING:

Mistake of fact finds no application in this case

As early as in the case of People v. Oanis and Galanta, the Court has ruled that
mistake of fact applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
carelessness.
In Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, the Court has laid down the requisites for such
defense to prosper, to wit: (a) that the mistake be honest and reasonable; (b) that it
be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required to commit the crime
or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an
element of the offense.
In this case, not all the requisites are complied with. First, there was no reason for
the accused not to recognize the victims because they were traversing an open area
which was illuminated not only by moonlight, but also by a light bulb. In addition, the
witnesses testified that the victims were conversing and laughing loudly. It must be
borne in mind that it was not the first time that the accused had seen the victims.
Second, when Jose fell down, Hernando identified himself. However, instead of
verifying the identities of the victims, the accused continued to fire at them. Third,
when the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies. At that point, they
could no longer claim that they didn't recognize the victims; and still not contented,
they sprayed them with bullets such that Jose suffered 14 gunshot wounds,
Hernando 16 gunshot wounds, and Benito 20 gunshot wounds. Fourth, contrary to
their testimonies during trial to the effect that the victims were the first to fire their
weapons, Brgy. Capt. Balinas testified that when he asked the accused whether the
victims had fired at them, the accused answered him in the negative. Fifth, the
accused would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the safe word "Amoy"
which must be uttered in response to "Simoy" in order to easily determine whether
they were members of the NPA. However, the victims could not have known the safe
words as accused Gervero himself stated in his testimony that only he and his co-
accused were present when their commanding officer briefed them about the safe
words to be used in their operation. All these circumstances negate accused-
appellants' claim of mistake of fact and point instead to a concerted action to
eliminate the victims.

TOPIC 2: Aggravating circumstance - treachery

ISSUE 2:

II. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the aggravating circumstance of
treachery qualified the killing to murder.

RULING:

Accused-appellants are guilty of murder qualified by treachery

Generally, the elements of murder are: 1) That a person was killed; 2) That the
accused killed him; 3) That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and 4) That the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.
That Hernando, Jose, and Benito died and that the killing is neither parricide nor
infanticide have already been established by the trial and appellate courts. What
remains to be resolved is the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
In order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be appreciated, the following
requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of
execution would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory
acts of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted by the offender. "The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or
escape."
The witnesses were all consistent in declaring that accused-appellants suddenly fired
at the three unsuspecting victims who never had a chance to mount a defense. The
victims, who were on their way to attend a wake and happily conversing with one
another, were caught off guard when all of a sudden, they were met with multiple
gunshots. In such a rapid motion, accused-appellants shot the victims, affording the
latter no opportunity to defend themselves or fight back. Without any doubt, the
manner of execution was deliberately adopted by the accused who were all armed
with heavily powered firearms. They positioned themselves in what they termed as
"ambush position," at a distance where their victims could not easily see them,
thereby ensuring that they hit and terminate their targets.
18. Corpuz vs People
G.R. No. 180016

FACTS:

Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with

an obligation to sell the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the
same if not sold, after the expiration of 30 days. The period expired without Corpuz
remitting anything to Tangcoy. When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised
that he will pay, but to no avail. Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of
confidence against Corpuz. Corpuz argued as follows: proof submitted by Tangcoy
(receipt) is inadmissible forbeing a mere photocopy; information was
defective because the date whenthe jewelry should be returned and the date
when crime occurred is different from the onetestified to by Tangcoy; fourth element
of estafa or demand is not proved; sole testimonyof Tangcoy is not sufficient for
conviction.

TOPIC 1: Admissibility of evidence

Issue 1:

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best
evidencerule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?

Ruling: Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely
objection toevidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall
be considered as waived.Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the
said evidence at the time it wasidentified, marked and testified upon in court by
Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise anobjection in his Comment to the prosecution’s
formal offer of evidence and even admittedhaving signed the said receipt.

TOPIC: Elements of crime

Issue 2: Is the date of occurrence of time material in estafa cases with abuse of
confidence?

Ruling 2. No. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence under Article315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the
appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime.
Hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of theo ccurrence of the crime,
as reflected in the Information, do not make the latter fatally defective. Further, the
following satisfies the sufficiency of information:

1. The designation of the offense by the statute;

2. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
3. The name of the offended party; and
4. The approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the
offense was committed. The 4th element is satisfied. Even though the information
indicates that the time of offense was committed “on or about the 5th of July 1991,”
such is not fatal to the prosecution’s cause considering that Section 11 of the same
Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense.
TOPIC: Elements of crime
Issue 3: What is the form of demand required in estafa with abuse of confidence?

Ruling: The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows:(a) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to
make delivery of, or to return the same;(b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt;(c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and(d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. Demand need
not even be formal; it may be verbal. The specific word “demand” need not even be
used to show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a
mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be
tantamount to a demand. In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally
inquired about the money entrusted to the accused, the query was tantamount to a
demand

TOPIC: Credibility of witnesses

Issue 4: May a sole witness be considered credible?

Ruling: Yes. Note first that settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of
witnesses, SC gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on
the witness stand, an opportunity denied thea ppellate courts, which merely rely on
the records of the case. The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and
binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence, especially when such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is
established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for
in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed
not numbered.
19. Valenzuela vs People
G.R. No. 180016

Facts:

On May 19, 1994, at around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside
the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North
EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his post at
the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an
identification card with the mark “Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU),” hauling a push
cart with cases of detergent of the well-known “Tide” brand . Petitioner unloaded
these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner then
returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more
cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the
open parking space.

Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and
directed it towards the parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded
the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle . All these acts
were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open
parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner
and Calderon reacted by fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his
fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at
the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered . The filched items seized from the
duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three
(3) additional cases of detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of P12,090.00.

In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft , petitioner cites two
decisions rendered many years ago by the Court of Appeals: People vs. Diño and
People vs. Flores. Both decisions elicit the interest of the Court, as they modified trial
court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu
that bears similarity to the present case. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his
appeal to the Court of Appeals, yet the appellate court did not expressly consider the
import of the rulings when it affirmed the conviction.

TOPIC: Consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft only (NO, GUILTY OF
CONSUMMATED THEFT)

HELD: No, the petitioner is guilty of consummated theft. Article 6 defines those three
stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. A felony is
consummated “when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present.” It is frustrated “when the offender performs all the acts
of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.” Finally, it is attempted “when the offender commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance.”
Court has long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: 1) that there be taking of personal property;
2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the taking be done with intent to gain;
4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and 5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things.

So long as the “descriptive” circumstances that qualify the taking are present,
including animo lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that
is the taking of personal property of another establishes, at least, that the
transgression went beyond the attempted stage. As applied to the present case, the
moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and
loaded them in the pushcart, such seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed
without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons nor force upon things,
and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner
forfeited the extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have
afforded him.

Now, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is

necessary to inquire as to how exactly is the felony of theft “produced .” Parsing
through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent
answer provided in the language of the law — that theft is already “produced” upon
the “taking of personal property of another without the latter’s consent.”

For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the

frustrated stage, the question is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There
would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft is produced when there is
deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed
from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender,
once having committed all the acts of execution for theft , is able or unable to freely
dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already
ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice
Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that “in theft or robbery the crime is
consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to
appropriate the same , although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated.”

The Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was
completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired physical possession of the
stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he was able to drop
these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab .

Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or impliedly allows that the
“free disposition of the items stolen” is in any way determinative of whether the crime
of theft has been produced. The Court thus concludes that under the Revised Penal
Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. That it has taken all these years for the
Court to recognize that there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal
Code, does not detract from the correctness of this conclusion. It will take
considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft
may be recognized.
20. PEOPLE vs BUTONES
G.R. No. 152589 & 152758

Facts: Before us is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused-appellant

of our Decision dated 24 October 2003 in G.R. No. 152589 and No. 152758. In said
decision, we modified the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61,
Gumaca, Quezon, in Crim. Case No. 6636-G finding accused-appellant guilty of rape
under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and instead, we
adjudged him guilty only of attempted rape. We, however, upheld the ruling of the
court a quo with regard to Crim. Case No. 6637-G finding accused-appellant guilty of
incestuous rape of a minor under Art. 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act No. 8353 and for this, we sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the
ultimate penalty of death.

TOPIC: Consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies

Issue: Whether or not the accused committed attempted rape or acts of

lasciviousness.

Held: After a thorough review and evaluation of the records of this case, we find no
sufficient basis to modify our earlier decision convicting accused-appellant of
attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 6636-G.There is an attempt to commit rape when
the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform
all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Upon the other hand, Article
366 of the Revised Penal Code states: “(a)ny person who shall commit any act of
lasciviousness upon the other person of either sex, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.” As
explained by an eminent author of criminal law, rape and acts of lasciviousness have
the same nature. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the two. In
rape, there is the intent to lie with a woman whereas this element is absent in acts of
lasciviousness. In this case, the series of appalling events which took place on the
night of 18 March 1998 inside the humble home of private complainant and of
accused-appellant, establish beyond doubt that the latter intended to ravish his very
own flesh and blood. As vividly narrated by private complainant before the trial court,
accused-appellant, taking advantage of the cover of darkness and of the absence of
his wife, removed her (private complainant’s) clothing and thereafter placed himself
on top of her. Accused-appellant, who was similarly naked as private complainant,
then proceeded to kiss the latter and he likewise touched her breasts until finally, he
rendered private complainant unconscious by boxing her in the stomach. These
dastardly acts of accused-appellant constitute “the first or some subsequent step in a
direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are
made.” Far from being mere obscenity or lewdness, they are indisputably overt acts
executed in order to consummate the crime of rape against the person of private
complainant.
21. GARY FANTASTICO AND ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners, v. ELPIDIO
MALICSE, SR. AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
Elpidio Malicse, Sr. was outside the house of his sister Isabelita Iguiron, when all of a
sudden, he heard Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio
confronted Isabelita but she also cursed him, which prompted the former to slap the
latter. On that occasion, Elpidio was under the influence of alcohol. Elpidio was
eventually persuaded to go home but Elpidio went back to Isabelita’s house to offer
reconciliation.
Elpidio saw Isabelita's son, Titus Iguiron and her son-in-law Gary Fantastico and
asked the two where he can find their parents. Titus and Gary responded, "putang
ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas ka, punyeta ka." In his anger with the response of
Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open. Thereafter, Salvador Iquiron hit Elpidio
as he entered the house of the latter. Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head
with a tomahawk axe when the latter was about to go out of the house. Elpidio tried
to defend himself but was unable to take the tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio
walked away from Titus but Gary, still armed with the tomahawk axe and Salvador,
with his arnis, including Titus, chased him.
Moreover, Roland Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head
with a lead pipe which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his
assailants to stop, but to no avail. Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs, legs
and knees using the rattan stick. Thereafter, a certain "Mang Gil" tried to break them
off. Elpidio then pretended to be dead and it was then that concerned neighbors
rushed him to the hospital. Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in
relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron,
Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor
Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando
Villanueva.
The trial court, in a Decision, acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy
Ballesteros but found Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. Petitioners contended that the information
filed against them was defective because it does not state all the elements of the
crime charged. They also claimed that the prosecution was not able to prove the
presence of treachery or another qualifying circumstance.

TOPIC: Elements of a Crime

ISSUE : Whether or not all the elements of attempted murder are present in this
case.

HELD : A close reading of the Information shows that all the elements of attempted
murder are present.

A portion of the Information states that xxx but the said accused did not perform all
the acts of the execution which should have produced the crime of murder, as a
consequence, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance,
that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily
mortal.

From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is clear that all the elements of
the crime of attempted murder has been included.

The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to
commit a felony, thus:

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony

directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which would
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. The essential elements of attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;

3. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other
than his spontaneous desistance.

The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements, namely:

(1) That there be external acts;

(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.

The Court in People v. Lizada elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act,
thus:

An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation,
which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without
being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.
22. BENJAMIN P. MARTINEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

FACTS:

Dean Dongui-is and his wife Freda, filed a complaint for damages against the
spouses Benjamin and Lilibeth Martinez, alleging that petitioner Benjamin, a suitor of
Elvisa Basallo, had been peddling false reports that Dean and Elvisa had illicit
relations.

For her part, Elvisa also filed a complaint against the spouses Martinez, alleging that
on several occasions, petitioner accused her of having an illicit affair with Dean.

One day, when Dean went to the Tubao Credit Cooperative (TCC) office to pick up
the dividend certificate of his wife, petitioner, armed with a bolo, suddenly emerged
from behind a parked vehicle and stabbed Dean.

Dean sustained two stab wounds in the anterior chest, left, and a lacerated wound in
the right elbow, forearm and was immediately brought to the hospital.

Consequently, a criminal complaint for frustrated murder was filed against petitioner.

Maintaining his innocence, petitioner claimed that he had merely acted in self-
defense when Dean insulted him, spat on his face and assaulted him with fist blows.
Petitioner argues that should he be convicted of any crime, it should be of less
serious physical injuries only, absence the element of intent to kill. He advances the
argument that the single wound suffered by the victim was not life threatening.

However, the court rejected petitioner’s defense of self-defense and rendered

judgment convicting petitioner of frustrated homicide.

TOPIC: Self-defense

ISSUE 1: Whether or not petitioner acted in self-defense.

HELD 1: No, petitioner failed to prove his plea of self-defense by clear and
convincing evidence.

Like alibi, petitioner’s claim of self-defense is weak. It is also settled that self-defense
is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. Such a plea is both a confession and
avoidance. The burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove the confluence
of the essential elements for the defense as provided in Article 11, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code:

(1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.

The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of that of the prosecution because even if the evidence of the prosecution is weak,
the same can no longer be disbelieved. The accused cannot escape conviction if he
fails to prove the essential elements of complete self-defense.

Petitioner failed to discharge his burden.

First. Petitioner failed to surrender himself to the responding authorities who

arrived at the situs criminis, as well as the bolo he used in stabbing the victim.
One who acted in self-defense is expected to surrender, not only himself, but
also the weapon he used to kill or inflict physical injuries on the victim.57

Second. The victim sustained three stab wounds on different parts of his
body. Two were fatal stab wounds at his left chest. The presence of a large
number of wounds on the part of the victim, their nature and location disprove
self-defense and instead indicate a determined effort to kill the victim.58

Third. Petitioner testified that he was punched by the victim. However, there is
not a scintilla of evidence to show that petitioner suffered even a scratch as a
result of the alleged fist blows.

Topic 2: Frustrated Felony

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the petitioner be convicted for frustrated homicide.

HELD 2: Yes, petitioner is guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to
Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the
acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.

The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:

1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;

2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;

3. But the felony is not produced;

4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.72

A crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which
should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the
subjective phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime is complete.
Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did
all that is necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime was not
consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the
offender. In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of
execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of
the victim barring medical intervention or attendance.73
23. LEONIDAS EPIFANIO Y LAZARO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

While Crisaldo Alberto and his cousin, Allan Perez, were walking to their respective
homes, Allan walked ahead of Crisaldo at a distance of about 3 meters. Suddenly,
Crisaldo felt the piercing thrust of a bladed weapon on his back, which caused him to
cry out in pain. He made a quick turnaround and saw his attacker, petitioner
Leonidas Epifanio, Petitioner stabbed Crisaldo again but only hit the latter's left arm.
When Allan heard Crisaldo's outcry, he rushed to Crisaldo's side which caused
petitioner to run away. Crisaldo was then brought to the hospital where he stayed for
three weeks to recuperate from his wounds.

Subsequently, petitioner was charged with Frustrated Murder. Petitioner's defense

consisted mainly of denial. Thus, the RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, which was
affirmed by the CA.

Petitioner does not seek the reversal of his conviction but only that it be for the lesser
offense of attempted murder. He contends that there is no evidence that the injuries
sustained by Crisaldo were life-threatening or would have caused his death had it not
been for timely medical intervention since the medical certificate only stated that the
healing time of the wounds sustained by Crisaldo was "15-30 days barring
complication", with no notation or testimony of the attending physician that any of the
injuries was life-threatening.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that the crime is
frustrated murder since petitioner performed "all the acts of execution"; that the three-
week length of stay in the hospital of Crisaldo is not determinative of whether or not
the wounds are fatal.

TOPIC: Frustrated Felony

ISSUE: Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner for the crime of frustrated murder
was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

The SC held in the negative.

It must be stressed that it is not the gravity of the wounds alone which determines
whether a felony is attempted or frustrated, but whether the assailant had passed the
subjective phase in the commission of the offense.

The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that portion of the acts
constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the
crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should result
in the consummated crime. Thereafter, the phase is objective.

In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase in the
commission of the crime. The offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of
the acts of execution which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that
point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.

On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts
of execution which should result in the consummation of the crime. The offender has
passed the subjective phase in the commission of the crime. Subjectively, the crime
is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective
phase. He did all that was necessary to consummate the crime; however, the crime
is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of
the offender.

In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if
the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim
barring medical intervention or attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on another
but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries,
if the offender had no intention to kill the victim; or frustrated or attempted homicide
or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim.

Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of
weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds
inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words
uttered by the offender at the time the injuries were inflicted by him on the victim.

In the present case, the intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond
reasonable doubt through the unwavering testimony of Crisaldo on the manner of
execution of the attack as well as the number of wounds he sustained. The
treacherous manner in which petitioner perpetrated the crime is shown not only by
the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim but also by the
deliberate manner in which the assault was perpetrated.

Nonetheless, petitioner failed to perform all the acts of execution, because Allan
came to the aid of Crisaldo and petitioner was forced to scamper away. He did not
voluntarily desist from stabbing Crisaldo, but he had to stop stabbing when Allan
rushed to help Crisaldo and recognized petitioner. Thus, the subjective phase of the
crime had not been completed.

It is well-settled that where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound
would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful.
Hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused and the crime
committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated, murder.
24. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
FERDINAND PASCUAL y BAUTISTA, Appellant.

FACTS:

One evening, Adelaida Pascual was on the way home aboard a passenger jeepney
driven by her husband, Manuel Perlaoan. As she and her young granddaughter were
alighting from the jeepney, Adelaida heard 2 successive gunshots. Thereafter,she
got a glimpse of her husband lying face down on the steering wheel. She heard
another gunshot and immediately took cover embracing her granddaughter. She felt
that she had also been hit by gunfire.

A few seconds later, Adelaida stood up and saw Ferdinand Pascual walking away
carrying a gun about two (2) feet long. She was then approximately seven (7) meters
away from Pascual, whom she recognized because of the light coming from the
jeepney’s headlights and a street post. She cried out to her son, shouting that her
husband was shot by Pascual. She was thereafter taken to the hospital.

Consequently, Ferdinand Pascual was charged with Frustrated Murder and Murder.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals rendered judgment finding Pascual
guilty of Attempted Murder.

TOPIC: Frustrated Felony

ISSUE : Whether or not the accused should be convicted for frustrated murder based
on the first Information.

HELD :

The SC held in the negative.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals had already determined Pascual’s
criminal liability only for Attempted Murder. His conviction of Attempted Murder
effectively operates as an acquittal from the graver offense of Frustrated Murder.

The doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not life
threatening, the accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would
have brought about death, the crime committed is only attempted murder. 

In this case, the wound inflicted on Adelaida was not the kind which could have
caused her death as, in fact, she was confined at the hospital for only one (1) day.
Pascual was thus properly convicted only of Attempted Murder.
25. EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s

regular customers in his pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued by
Adronico.

Sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the
Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB
Check No. 284744, post dated to July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico.

Between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the
amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July
22, 1990 issued by Adronico. The three checks bounced upon presentment for the
reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT.

When the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands,
he filed a criminal complaint against them. While admitting that the checks issued by
Adronico bounced because there was no sufficient deposit or the account was
closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued only to guarantee
the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when
they mature and that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no
participation in the issuance thereof.

The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner. 

TOPIC: Violation of BP 22

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three
checks that bounced but her co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be
held liable for violations of BP 22 as conspirator.

HELD:

The SC held in the negative.

Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.” To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual
commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.

In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any
overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of
overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first
check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence
with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and
mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy.
Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the
commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose
26. ANTONIO TAN, DANILO DOMINGO and ROBERT LIM vs. AMELITO
BALLENA et al
G.R. No. 168111
July 4, 2008

FACTS:
Petitioners Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo and Robert Lim were officers of Footjoy
Industrial Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
manufacturing shoes and other kinds of footwear, prior to the cessation of its
operations sometime in February 2001.
Respondent Amelito Ballena and one hundred thirty-nine (139) other employees of
Footjoy, filed a Joint Complaint-Affidavit before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Bulacan against the company and petitioners Tan and Domingo in their capacities
as owner/president and administrative officer, respectively.
They alleged that the company did not regularly report the respondent employees for
membership at the Social Security System (SSS) and that it likewise failed to remit
their SSS contributions and payment for their SSS loans, which were already
deducted from their wages.
According to respondents, these acts violated Sections 9, 10, 22 and 24, paragraph
(b) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by Republic Act No. 8282; as well as
Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f), and (h) thereof, in relation to Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners blamed the economic distress that beset their company for their failure to
timely pay and update the monthly SSS contributions of the employees. Petitioners
thereafter underlined their good faith and lack of criminal culpability when they
acknowledged their fault and demonstrated their willingness to pay their obligations
by executing a memorandum of agreement with the SSS on 10 April 2001.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution, which found
probable cause to charge Footjoy, Antonio Tan, and Danilo Domingo with violations
of Sections 9, 10 and 24, paragraph (b) in relation to Section 28, paragraphs (e), (f)
and (h) of the Social Security Law. The Provincial Prosecutor filed two informations
against petitioners Tan, Domingo and Lim in the RTC of Bulacan.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ, alleging, inter alia, that the
Assistant Prosecutor committed grave and manifest error when he found probable
cause to charge them with the alleged offenses.
The DOJ resolved to grant the petition for review. The Provincial Prosecutor of
Bulacan was directed to cause the withdrawal of the informations for violation of the
Social Security Law earlier filed against respondents Antonio Tan, Danilo Domingo,
and Robert Lim and to report the action thereon within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the DOJ resolution, but
the same was denied.
Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Only two employees signed the original Petition's verification and certification of non-
forum shopping and the same was filed one day beyond the period allowed by the
rules. The appellate court initially resolved to dismiss the original petition precisely for
these reasons in a Resolution dated 29 November 2002. When asked to reconsider,
the appellate court ordered the filing of an amended petition in order to include all the
original complainants. An amended petition was then filed in compliance with the said
order, but only one hundred eighty (180) of the two hundred forty (240) original
complainants signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. The
Court of Appeals then granted the motion for reconsideration and resolved to
reinstate the petition. Thereafter, the assailed decision that upheld the filing of the
informations against the petitioners was issued.

TOPIC 1: Procedural Issue – Filed beyond the reglementary period

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS
ERROR AND ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE
TO THE RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT
THAT IT WAS FILED OUT [OF] TIME.
RULING: NO
The reglementary period within which a Petition for Certiorari must be filed is
provided for under the first paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65, to wit:
The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial
is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of
the motion.
This Court finds no fault in the assailed actions of the Court of Appeals.
It is a well-settled principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. In deciding a case, the appellate court has the discretion
whether or not to dismiss the same, which discretion must be exercised soundly and
in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account the
circumstances of the case. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain
the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave
injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while
actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.
The Court cannot fault the act of the Court of Appeals in ordering submission of an
amended petition and the reinstatement of the same despite the original petition's
late filing, considering the obvious merits of the case.

TOPIC 2: Procedural Issue – Verification and Certification of non-forum shopping

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRIEVOUS
ERROR WHEN IT GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE RESPONDENTS' PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO (2) SIGNATORIES
THEREAT WERE NOT ABLE TO SHOW THAT THEY WERE DULY AUTHORIZED
BY THE OTHER PETITIONERS TO FILE THE PETITION ON THEIR BEHALF.
RULING: NO
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it gave due course to the
amended petition despite the signing of the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping of only some, and not all, of the original complainants.
Under justifiable circumstances, we have already allowed the relaxation of the
requirements of verification and certification so that the ends of justice may be better
served. Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in
the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith; while the purpose of the
aforesaid certification is to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping.
In the present case, the circumstances squarely involve a verification that was not
signed by all the petitioners therein. Thus, we see no reason why we should not
uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals in reinstating the petition despite the said
formal defect.
On the requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping, the well-settled rule is
that all the petitioners must sign the certification of non-forum shopping. The rule,
however, admits of an exception and that is when the petitioners show reasonable
cause for failure to personally sign the certification. The petitioners must be able to
convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the
administration of justice.
In the case at bar, counsel for the respondents disclosed that most of the
respondents who were the original complainants have since sought employment in
the neighboring towns of Bulacan, Pampanga and Angeles City. Only the one
hundred eighty (180) signatories were then available to sign the amended Petition for
Certiorari and the accompanying verification and certification of non-forum shopping.
Considering the total number of respondents in this case and the elapsed period of
almost two years since the filing of the Joint Complaint Affidavit on 19 March 2001
and the filing of the amended petition on 13 March 2003, we hold that the instant
case sufficiently falls under the exception to the aforesaid rule. Thus, the Court of
Appeals cannot be said to have erred in overlooking the above procedural error.

TOPIC 3: Probable cause

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR WHEN IT REVERSED THE RESOLUTION OF THE DOJ WHICH FOUND
OUT THAT THE PETITIONERS COULD NOT BE INDICTED FOR ANY VIOLATION
OF THE SSS LAW FOR WANT OF PROBABLE CAUSE.

RULING: NO
Probable cause is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted.
The determination of probable cause is a function that belongs to the public
prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes cognizable by the RTC are concerned, and
notwithstanding that it involves an adjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains,
by law, to said executive officer, the public prosecutor.
The findings of the prosecutor with respect to the existence or non-existence of
probable cause is subject to the power of review by the DOJ.
In deciding the respondents' Petition for Certiorari, the Court of Appeals ruled that the
DOJ committed palpable mistake in reversing the Final Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor and, in so doing, acted with grave abuse of discretion.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we agree with the Court of Appeals'
findings that there was indeed probable cause to indict petitioners for the offenses
charged.
In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties'
evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief that
an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Certainly, it does not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence
beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the person. Only prima
facie evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to
establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or
defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. Therefore,
matters of evidence are more appropriately presented and heard during the trial.

TOPIC 4: Mala in se, Mala prohibita

ISSUE: Whether good faith and lack of criminal intent can be a defense for the
offense charged
RULING: NO
On the part of the petitioners, they have not denied their fault in not remitting the SSS
contributions and loan payments of the respondents in violation of Section 28,
paragraphs (e), (f) and (h) of the SSS Law. Instead, petitioners interposed the
defenses of lack of criminal intent and good faith, as their failure to remit was brought
about by alleged economic difficulties, and they have already agreed to settle their
obligations with the SSS through a memorandum of agreement to pay in
installments.
As held by the Court of Appeals, the claims of good faith and absence of criminal
intent for the petitioners' acknowledged non-remittance of the respondents'
contributions deserve scant consideration. The violations charged in this case pertain
to the SSS Law, which is a special law. As such, it belongs to a class of offenses
known as mala prohibita.
The law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se;
and acts which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them,
called acts mala prohibita. This distinction is important with reference to the intent
with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in
se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law been
violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
Thus, the petitioners' admission in the instant case of their violations of the provisions
of the SSS Law is more than enough to establish the existence of probable cause to
prosecute them for the same.
27. G.R. No. 157171             March 14, 2006

ARSENIA B. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents

FACTS: Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., who ran in the 1995 senatorial elections filed in the
RTC of Alaminos a compalint charging Herminio R. Romero, Renato R. Viray, Rachel
Palisoc and Francisca de Vera, and petitioner Arsenia Garcia, with violation of
Section 27(b), for unlawfully decreasing the votes received by Pimentel, Jr. from six
thousand nine hundred ninety-eight votes, as clearly disclosed in the total number of
votes in the one hundred fifty-nine precincts of the Statement of Votes by Precincts of
said municipality, to one thousand nine hundred twenty-one votes as reflected in the
Statement of Votes by Precincts and Certificate of Canvass with a difference of five
thousand seventy-seven votes.

The RTC acquitted all the accused for insufficiency of evidence, except for Arsenia B.
Garcia who was convicted and pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime defined under Republic Act 6646, Section 27 (b) for decreasing the votes of
Senator Pimentel in the total of 5,034 and in relation to BP Blg. 881, considering that
this finding is a violation of Election Offense, she is thus sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS as maximum, but applying the INDETERMINATE
SENTENCE LAW, the minimum penalty is the next degree lower which is SIX (6)
MONTHS; however, Arsenia B. Garcia is not entitled to probation; further, she is
sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and she is also deprived of
her right of suffrage. The bail bond posted by her is ordered cancelled, and the
Provincial Warden is ordered to commit her person to the Bureau of Correctional
Institution for Women, at Metro Manila, until further orders from the court.

Garcia appealed before the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the
RTC Decision, increasing the minimum penalty imposed by the trial court from six (6)
months to one (1) year.

The Court of Appeals likewise denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
appeal.

FIRST TOPIC: Mala In Se or Mala Prohibita

ISSUE:

Whether Or Not violation of Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646 is classified
under mala in se and not mala prohibita.

RULING:

YES.

Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) are mala in se. For otherwise, even
errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable.
Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of
time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent
of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally
increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently
immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another.

Generally, mala in se felonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code.
When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se,
even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be
clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the criminal acts are
not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are
forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated.
Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public
policy.

SECOND TOPIC: Criminal Intent

ISSUE:

Whether Or Not criminal intent exists.

RULING:

YES.

Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act
which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes
good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.

Records show that neither the correctness of the number of votes entered in the
Statement of Votes (SOV) for each precinct, nor of the number of votes entered as
subtotals of votes received in the precincts listed in SOV Nos. 008417 to 008422 was
raised as an issue. At first glance, however, there is a noticeable discrepancy in the
addition of the subtotals to arrive at the grand total of votes received by each
candidate for all 159 precincts in SOV No. 008423. 15The grand total of the votes for
private complainant, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, was only 1,921 instead of 6,921, or
5,000 votes less than the number of votes private complainant actually received. This
error is also evident in the Certificate of Canvass (COC) No. 436156 signed by
petitioner, Viray and Romero.

During trial of this case, Garcia admitted that she was indeed the one who
announced the figure of 1,921, which was subsequently entered by then accused
Viray in his capacity as secretary of the board. Garcia likewise admitted that she was
the one who prepared the COC, though it was not her duty. To our mind, preparing
the COC even if it was not her task, manifests an intention to perpetuate the
erroneous entry in the COC.

Neither can this Court accept Garcia’s explanation that the Board of Canvassers had
no idea how the SOV and the COC reflected that private complainant had only 1,921
votes instead of 6,921 votes. As chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvassers,
Garcia’s concern was to assure accurate, correct and authentic entry of the votes.
Her failure to exercise maximum efficiency and fidelity to her trust deserves not only
censure but also the concomitant sanctions as a matter of criminal responsibility
pursuant to the dictates of the law.
The fact that the number of votes deducted from the actual votes received by private
complainant, Sen. Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. was not added to any senatorial candidate
does not relieve Garcia of liability under Section 27(b) of Rep. Act No. 6646. The
mere decreasing of the votes received by a candidate in an election is already
punishable under the said provision.

THIRD TOPIC: Factual Findings

ISSUE:

Whether Or Not the factual conclusions of the appellate court is final and conclusive .

RULING:

YES.

At this point, we see no valid reason to disturb the factual conclusions of the
appellate court. The Court has consistently held that factual findings of the trial court,
as well as of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed
on appeal, particularly where the findings of both the trial court and the appellate
court on the matter coincide.

Public policy dictates that extraordinary diligence should be exercised by the

members of the board of canvassers in canvassing the results of the elections. Any
error on their part would result in the disenfranchisement of the voters. The
Certificate of Canvass for senatorial candidates and its supporting statements of
votes prepared by the municipal board of canvassers are sensitive election
documents whose entries must be thoroughly scrutinized.

In our review, the votes in the SOV should total 6,998.

As between the grand total of votes alleged to have been received by private
complainant of 6,921 votes and statement of his actual votes received of 6,998 is a
difference of 77 votes. The discrepancy may be validly attributed to mistake or error
due to fatigue. However, a decrease of 5,000 votes as reflected in the Statement of
Votes and Certificate of Canvass is substantial, it cannot be allowed to remain on
record unchallenged, especially when the error results from the mere transfer of
totals from one document to another.
28. G.R. No. 175222               July 27, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RAMON QUIAOIT, JR., Accused-Appellant.

FACTS: At around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of 12 April 2004, the Tarlac PNP
received a report from a confidential informant that someone was selling shabu at the
Golden Miles, a videoke bar located in Barangay San Roque, Tarlac City. Acting on
said information, a team was immediately organized by PNP Provincial Director Rudy
Gamido Lacadin to conduct a surveillance in order to verify the information and
perform a buy-bust operation.

Shortly thereafter, the team went to Golden Miles where they initially observed the
movements of appellant Ramon Quiaoit, Jr who was with the confidential informant at
that time. Later, the informant introduced PO1 Baquiran to Quiaoit and the two
negotiated the sale of shabu. According to PO1 Baquiran’s testimony, Quiaoit
handed to him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in front of The
Golden Miles’ comfort room which was located at the back of said establishment. In
return, he gave Quiaoit a marked ₱500.00 bill. As soon as the exchange between
appellant and PO1 Baquiran took place, the latter gave his companions the pre-
arranged signal by scratching his head. PO2 Dueñas and PO1 Cabradilla moved in
to arrest Quiaoit. The plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was later
marked RID 1 by PO2 Dueñas.

On their way back to Camp Makabulos, the informant allegedly told the buy-bust
team, through a text message, that Quiaoit still had in his possession illegal drugs
other than that which he had sold to PO1 Baquiran. Thus, upon reaching the camp,
they frisked Quiaoit and this yielded six more plastic sachets, the contents of which
were similar to those earlier bought by PO1 Baquiran.

All seven pieces of the plastic sachets were then forwarded to the Provincial Crime
Laboratory for examination.

Expectedly, Quiaoit presented a disparate narration of the incident:

After trial, the court a quo found Quiaoit guilty as charged. The prosecution having
established the guilt of the Quiaoit beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation
of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, and is sentenced to undergo a prison term of life
imprisonment, to pay a fine of Php500,000.00 and to pay the cost.

Quiaoit filed a Notice of Appeal which was denied by the Court of Appeals.

Aggrieved, appellant is now before us assailing the above-mentioned Decision of the

Court of Appeals.

FIRST TOPIC: Instigation and Entrapment

ISSUE:

Whether Or Not there is difference between instigation and entrapment.

RULING:

YES.

The demarcation line distinguishing "instigation" from "entrapment" is clearly drawn.

In the case of People v. Quintana, we explained the distinction between the two, to
wit –

There is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation, for while in the latter
case the instigator practically induces the will be accused into the commission of the
offense and himself becomes a co-principal, in entrapment ways and means are
resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker in the execution
of his criminal plan.

Instigation and inducement must be distinguished from entrapment. The general rule
is that instigation and inducement to commit a crime, for the purpose of filing criminal
charges, is to be condemned as immoral, while entrapment, which is the employment
of means and ways for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker, is
sanctioned and permissible. And the reason is obvious. Under the first instance, no
crime has been committed, and to induce one to commit it makes of the instigator a
co-criminal. Under the last instance, the crime has already been committed and all
that is done is to entrap and capture the law breaker.20

SECOND TOPIC: Absolutory Circumstance of Instigation

ISSUE: Whether Or Not the trial court gravely erred in not taking into consideration
the absolutory circumstance of instigation .

RULING:

NO.

In the case at bar, we find appellant’s claim of instigation to be baseless. To recall

Quiaoit’s version of the story, PO1 Baquiran approached him that night inquiring
about Medrano, the alleged object of the buy-bust operation. PO1 Baquiran then
gave him a ₱500.00 bill to be used for purchasing shabu from Medrano; but PO1
Baquiran had an additional instruction for Quiaoit which was to bring along Medrano
to Golden Miles. While Quiaoit was able to talk with Medrano, he was unable to
convince the latter to accompany him back to Golden Miles. Such being the case, we
fail to see anymore reason for him to still buy shabu considering that he knew fully
well that he would be unable to fully abide by PO1 Baquiran’s instructions.
Furthermore, we scrutinized the records of this case and failed to discern any "force"
that was exerted upon him by PO1 Baquiran. In fact, nowhere in Quiaoit’s testimony
did he aver that PO1 Baquiran insisted that he buy shabu from Medrano. We note
that after Quiaoit had initially refused to take part in the buy-bust operation that night,
PO1 Baquiran merely told him that "they needed August Medrano" and nothing more.

To our mind, such innocuous statement on the part of PO1 Baquiran is inadequate to
lead to the conclusion that appellant was "forced" by the police to procure shabu.
Moreover, Quiaoit himself admitted that he was all alone when he went to see
Medrano at the latter’s house, far from the prying eyes and the perceived influence of
PO1 Baquiran. Clearly, at that point, he could have easily desisted from buying
shabu from Medrano and chosen instead to go back to Golden Miles empty handed
for he already knew before he bought the illegal drug that Medrano could not
accompany him back to the said videoke bar. The fact that he persisted in buying
shabu despite the absence of PO1 Baquiran betrays his contention that said police
officer "forced" him to purchase shabu.

In challenging the existence of a legitimate buy-bust operation, appellant casts

questionable, if not improper, motive on the part of the police officers. Unfortunately
for appellant, jurisprudence instructs us that in cases involving the sale of illegal
drugs, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they
are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary.22 Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for
the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were
not so moved and their testimony, therefore, is entitled to full faith and credit. 23 In this
case, the records are bereft of any indication which even remotely suggests ill motive
on the part of the police officers. The following observation of the Court of Appeals is
indeed appropriate, thus:

In this case, the policemen categorically identified Quiaoit as the one subject of the
"buy-bust" operation who agreed to sell to PO1 Baquiran a sachet of "shabu" in front
of the restroom of Golden Miles Beerhouse after he was being introduced by the
informant. As police officers, PO1 Baquiran and PO2 Dueñas had in their favor the
presumption of regularity of performance of duty. Furthermore, the defense failed to
present any evidence to show that the police officers were improperly motivated to
bear false witness against Quiaoit. While Quiaoit claimed that he was a former asset
of the police and he knew the police officers who arrested him, yet, he did not impute
any ill-motive as to why the police officers would implicate him to drug pushing. This
fact bolsters the police officers’ claim that Quiaoit was, indeed, arrested in a buy-bust
operation.

THIRD TOPIC: Frame – Up

ISSUE:

Whether Or Not the trial court gravely erred in disregarding Quiaoit’s defense of
being framed – up.

RULING:

NO.

Quiaoit’s claim that he was just being framed-up by the arresting officers does not
inspire belief.

Quiaoit failed to show any motive why the policemen would implicate him in a crime
for illegal possession of prohibited drugs. It is the settled rule that where there is
nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives, his/her positive
and categorical declarations on the witness stand made under solemn oath, should
be given full faith and credence. (People vs. Dela Torre, 373 SCRA 104).

Moreover, there is nothing in the record that the police officers were trying to extort
money from Quiaoit during his apprehension up to the time he was brought to the
police station. If Quiaoit was really a victim of frame-up, then he should have filed an
administrative or criminal case against these policemen. But he did not. Hence, his
defense of frame-up must fail.
FOURTH TOPIC: Defense of Denial

ISSUE:

Whether Or Not Quiaoit’s defense of denial be given credence in this case.

RULING:

NO.

Quiaoit’s defense of denial is a weak defense. Unless substantiated by clear and

convincing proof, it is self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law (People v.
Hampton, 395 SCRA 156). It cannot prevail over the positive identification by PO1
Baquiran that it was Quiaoit who sold to him a sachet of "shabu" in the early morning
of April 13, 2004 at Golden Miles Beerhouse.

Neither can we give credence to appellant’s contention that the existence of a valid
buy-bust operation was betrayed by the inadequate training of the members of the
team for, it must be stated here, there is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust
operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of
effective means to apprehend drug dealers.

FIFTH TOPIC: GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

ISSUE:

Whether Or Not the prosecution failed to establish Quiaoit’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt by its failure to properly identify the sachet of shabu which he sold to PO1
Baquiran .

RULING:

NO.

In order to successfully prove the existence of the illegal sale of regulated or

prohibited drugs, the prosecution must be able to establish the following elements of
the crime: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration;
and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

It is clear from PO1 Baquiran’s declaration that, contrary to Quiaoit’s assertion, the
packet of shabu sold to PO1 Baquiran by Quiaoit’s during the buy-bust operation was
properly identified and marked as RID 1 by PO2 Dueñas even before the police
frisked appellant for more illegal drugs. With PO1 Baquiran’s testimony, there can no
longer be any basis for vacillation with respect to the identity of the object which he,
acting as poseur buyer, obtained from Quiaoit’s. And, as the laboratory examination
would later confirm, the contents of the sachet bearing the mark RID 1 was positive
for shabu.

All told, as the illegal sale of drugs had been established beyond reasonable doubt,
this Court is constrained to uphold Quiaoit’s conviction.

In the case of People v. Mala, we held that what is material is the proof that the
transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the
corpus delicti. It bears emphasizing that neither the law nor jurisprudence requires
the presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation, for the only
elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof that the illicit transaction took
place, coupled with the presentation in court of the illicit drug as evidence.
29. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANILO JOCSON y BAUTISTA,  G.R. No.
169875, December 18, 2007 

FACTS: 
On the evening of August 7, 2002, an informant reported a person referred to by the
alias "Manong," who was allegedly selling shabu at the vicinity of B.M.B.A., 2nd Ave.,
East Caloocan City. With this information, Police Chief Senior Inspector formed a
team to conduct a buy-bust operation. That same night, the team proceeded to the
reported area. The informant, upon seeing "Manong," approached the latter and
introduced Delos Santos as a customer. Delos Santos then told "Manong,"
"Pare, pabili ng piso," and handed him the marked 100-peso bill with serial number
UM856594. Upon receipt of the marked money, "Manong" took out from his pocket
and handed Delos Santos a plastic sachet containing white crystalline granules.
Delos Santos then scratched his left ear, signaling a positive bust. SPO3 Rodrigo
Antonio responded to the signal and came to the aid of Delos Santos. They frisked
"Manong" and found four more plastic sachets of white crystalline granules on his
body. They also recovered the marked money from "Manong." They then brought
"Manong" to the police station for investigation. It was only then that the police
learned that "Manong" is Danilo Jocson, herein accused-appellant. SPO1 Delos
Santos and SPO3 Antonio also turned over to Police Investigator Ferdinand Moran
the plastic sachets and the marked money recovered from "Manong" upon arriving at
the police station.  
Accused-appellant Jocson was charged with violations of Sections 5 and 11, Art. II of
R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, in two
separate Informations. 
The two criminal cases against accused-appellant were consolidated, and trial
ensued. 
Accused-appellant Jocson denied the accusations against him. In his testimony,
accused-appellant denied selling shabu to the police poseur-buyer or possessing
more quantities of shabu. He alleged that the charges against him were
fabricated. Eleven-year old April Jane Buenaobra, niece of accused-appellant,
corroborated the latter’s testimony.  
On April 8, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City convicted the accused-
appellant.  
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It also denied
accused-appellant’s motion for reconsideration. 
ISSUE NO. 1: 
Whether the testimony of the accused’s niece should be given credit? 
RULING OF ISSUE NO. 1: 
No. 
The testimony of his 11-year old niece cannot exculpate accused-appellant from the
crimes charged against him. On cross-examination, April Jane admitted that her
grandmother impressed on her that her uncle was arrested by the police even when
he had done nothing wrong. As observed by the trial court, April Jane appeared to be
a rehearsed witness. Further, being a close kin of accused-appellant, her credibility is
highly suspect.  
ISSUE NO. 2: 
Whether the accused guilty has been proven beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged? 
RULING OF ISSUE NO. 2: 
Yes. 
The testimony of SPO1 Delos Santos was spontaneous, straightforward and
categorical. Further, SPO3 Antonio, back-up security of SPO1 Delos Santos,
corroborated the latter’s testimony on its material points.  
On the other hand, the court find no reason to believe the denials and self-serving
allegation of accused-appellant that his arrest was concocted out of thin air by the
police officers. No evidence was presented to show any antagonism between
him and the police officers to explain why the police officers allegedly picked
on him. Settled is the rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are
presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is
evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police officers or
deviation from the regular performance of their duties. 7 None was presented in the
instant case. 
The findings and conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are
entitled to great respect because the trial courts have the advantage of observing the
demeanor of witnesses as they testify.  
In the instant case, the police arrested accused-appellant in a buy-bust operation. A
buy-bust operation is one form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an
effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of an
offense.10 Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken with due
regard for constitutional and legal safeguards.11 Where the criminal intent originates
in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact that a
person, acting as a decoy for the state, or that public officials furnished the accused
an opportunity for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the
commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him,
there is permissible entrapment and the accused must be convicted.12 What the law
forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise
innocent person into a criminal career.13 Where the criminal intent originates in the
mind of the state decoy, such as an undercover agent, and the accused is lured into
the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation,
as we call it in our jurisprudence, and no conviction may be had. 14 In instigation, the
instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the
offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the peace officer resorts
to ways and means to trap and capture the lawbreaker in the execution of the latter’s
criminal plan. Instigation is illegal and contrary to public policy. Entrapment is not.15 
Having established that the illegal sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the
seller, the prosecution likewise presented the dangerous drug, i.e., the corpus delicti,
as evidence in court. The illegal substance sold, including the four other
sachets recovered from the pocket of accused-appellant, was offered as evidence
during the trial and properly identified by the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution
also accounted for the chain of custody of the subject substances.  
 
30. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DELIA BAYANI y BOTANES, G.R. No.
179150, June 17, 2008 
FACTS: 
On 3 March 2003, a confidential informant arrived at Police Station
3, Quirino Highway, Barangay Talipapa, Quezon City, where he was on duty,
and reported to the Drug Enforcement Unit that appellant was illegally trading drugs
along Trinidad Street, Barangay Gulod, Novaliches, Quezon City. Chief
Superintendent formed a team composed to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team
took with them "boodle" money with two (2) pieces of genuine one-hundred-peso bills
on top as buy-bust money. 
At around 10:30 in the morning of the same day, PO3 Bernardo and the informant
went in front of the appellant’s house, while the other police officers positioned
themselves within viewing distance. The appellant was standing in front of her house.
As they approached her, the informant introduced Bernardo to her as a buyer.
Witness testified that he told appellant that he wanted to buy ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) worth of shabu, and the appellant nodded her head. Thereafter, she
handed him two sachets containing a crystalline substance which was suspected to
be shabu. Witness, in turn, gave the boodle money, after which he grabbed the
appellant’s right hand, apprehended her, and identified himself as a police officer. 
In a Decision dated 16 July 2004, the RTC decreed that the accused was guilty
without reasonable doubt since the fact of the illegal sale of a dangerous
drug, methylamphetamine hydrochloride, was sufficiently and indisputably
established by the prosecution.  
The appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00310. Raising only one assignment of error, appellant faulted the RTC’s
finding of guilt for being based on a buy-bust transaction instigated by the arresting
officers.  
ISSUE NO. 1: 
Whether or not PO3 Bernardo’s act of approaching the appellant to buy shabu during
a buy-bust operation amounted to instigation. 
RULING OF ISSUE NO. 1: 
No. Such contention lacks basis and is contrary to jurisprudence. 
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the
employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a
lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce,
instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would
otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the
accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the
criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her
conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will
have to be acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has
been said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent," while entrapment is a "trap
for the unwary criminal." 
As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a
valid means of arresting violators of Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of
apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation,
the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or
prodding him to commit the offense. 
A police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation,
or what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not
render invalid the buy-bust operations.  
(People v. Doria enumerated the instances when this Court recognized instigation as
a valid defense, and an instance when it was not applicable: 
 In United Sates v. Phelps, we acquitted the accused from the offense of
smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel,
actually induced him to commit the crime in order to persecute him. Smith, the
BIR agent, testified that Phelps’ apprehension came after he overheard
Phelps in a saloon say that he like smoking opium on some occasions.
Smith’s testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that
it was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for
an opium den where both of them could smoke this drug. The conduct of the
BIR agent was condemned as "most reprehensible." In People v. Abella, we
acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives after examining the
testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant.
The police officer offered "a tempting price, x x x a very high one" causing the
accused to sell the explosives. We found there was inducement, "direct,
persistent and effective" by the police officer and that outside of his testimony,
there was no evidence sufficient to convict the accused. In People
v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, [W]e convicted the accused after finding that
there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We
stated that the Customs secret serviceman smoothed the way for the
introduction of opium from Hong Kong to Cebu after the accused had already
planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the
apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely
entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of
Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the
arrest of the surreptitious importers. ) 

In the present case, PO3 Bernardo testified that appellant stood in front of her house
and was in possession of drugs readily available for anyone who would buy them.
PO3 Bernardo did not even have to employ any act of instigation or inducement,
such as repeated requests for the sale of prohibited drugs or offers of exorbitant
prices. 
The essential elements for the prosecution for illegal sale of shabu were
established:  
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration; and  
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.  
In short, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller
of the marked money, as relayed by PO3 Bernardo, successfully consummated the
buy-bust transaction. 
ISSUE NO. 2: 
Whether or not the testimony of confidential informant is necessary to prosecute the
accused. 
RULING OF ISSUE NO. 2: 
No. 
Contrary to the appellant’s claim, the prevailing doctrine is that additional
corroborating testimony of the confidential informant is not essential to a
successful prosecution. Intelligence agents are not often called to testify in court in
order to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable service to the police. Once
known, they may even be the object of revenge by criminals they implicate.  
31. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MERLIE DUMANGAY y SALE

Facts:

At 7 o’clock in the evening of November 29, 2002, an informant reported to the office
of MADAC Cluster 3 that a certain Merlie, later identified as appellant, was engaged
in selling shabu at the corner of Don Pedro and Enriquez Sts., Barangay Poblacion,
Makati City. Acting on the report, MADAC Cluster Head, Barangay Chairman Vic Del
Prado, formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation with Barbosa as the poseur-
buyer. Del Prado also coordinated with the Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU) of the
Makati City Police Station.
Thereafter, Del Prado, DEU operative PO1 Jaime Laura, and other MADAC
members proceeded to the place where Merlie was reportedly selling shabu. They
found Merlie in front of her house at 5649 Don Pedro corner Enriquez St., Barangay
Poblacion, Makati City; and with the informant, Barbosa approached Merlie. The
informant introduced Barbosa as a buyer of shabu, while the other members of the
team watched from strategic positions. Merlie then asked Barbosa how much he
would buy. Barbosa said, "dalawang daang piso lang," then handed Merlie the two
100-peso marked money. In exchange, Merlie gave him a small plastic sachet of a
white crystalline substance. After Barbosa pretended to examine it, he gave the pre-
arranged signal to the other members of the team and they arrested Merlie. Barbosa
found the marked money and two more plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance in Merlie’s possession and informed Merlie the cause of her arrest and
apprised her of her constitutional rights.

Thereafter, Merlie was brought to the DEU of the Makati City Police Station. The
three plastic sachets were sent to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for
examination. The laboratory report confirmed that the sachets contained
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Each sachet weighed 0.01 gram.
The defense presented Merlie as its sole witness. Merlie denied the allegations of the
prosecution. She testified that at the time of the alleged buy-bust operation, she was
already sleeping at home with her daughter when a man awakened her. She said
that there were two men who searched the house. According to her, although no
illegal item was found, she was still forced to board a vehicle and was taken to the
Sta. Cruz Barangay Hall. There, a certain Minyang had taken her to a comfort room
and told her to strip, but nothing illegal was found on her person. She also said that
no uniformed policemen accompanied the arresting team and that Barbosa was not
among the men who arrested her. She did not file any complaint against the people
who arrested her because she had no relative to help her.
On October 29, 2003, the trial court found the evidence of the prosecution sufficient
to prove Merlie’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt and rendered a decision of
conviction.

Topic: Entrapment

Issue:
Was the arrest as a consequence of entrapment valid?

Held:
Yes. The elements of illegal sale of shabu are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the
seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale transpired,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body
or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has been actually
committed. It has two elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain
event; and (2) some person’s criminal responsibility for the act.
Barbosa, PO1 Jaime Laura, MADAC members Romeo Lazaro and Marvin Cruz,in
the sworn Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng Pag-aresto, recounted the details of the buy-
bust operation. They stated therein that acting on confidential information, a team
composed of MADAC and DEU agents proceeded to the place where Merlie was
allegedly selling shabu. The informant made the introductions and the transaction
took place. Barbosa handed the marked money to Merlie while the latter handed him
one plastic sachet of shabu. Thereafter, Merlie was immediately arrested and upon
her arrest, Barbosa found two plastic sachets in her right hand.
The laboratory examination of the crystalline substance confiscated from Merlie and
forwarded to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory yielded positive of
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
In short, the prosecution clearly and positively established that Merlie agreed to sell
shabu to the poseur-buyer and that the sale was consummated. Moreover, Barbosa
identified the three plastic sachets of shabu and the marked money in court.
The inconsistencies alluded to by the appellant in the testimony of Barbosa are
inconsequential and minor to adversely affect his credibility. The inconsistencies do
not detract from the fact that Barbosa positively identified her in open court. What is
essential is that the prosecution witness positively identified the appellant as the one
who sold the shabu to the poseur-buyer. There is also nothing on record that
sufficiently casts doubt on the credibility of the prosecution witness. More so, the lack
of prior surveillance does not cast doubt on Barbosa’s credibility. A prior surveillance
is not necessary especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their
informant during entrapment, as in this case. Contrary to appellant’s contention, the
informant was present during the entrapment.
A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment legally employed by peace officers as
an effective way of apprehending drug dealers in the act of committing an offense.
Such police operation has judicial sanction as long as it is carried out with due regard
to constitutional and legal safeguards. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-
buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate
the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. Unless
there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were
inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their
testimony on the operation deserves faith and credit.
32. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs SANNY CABACABA y GAYOSO

Facts:
On October 18, 2002, according to PO2 Jaime Ocampo’s testimony, his superior
formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation at No. 138 Ermin Garcia Street,
Barangay Rodriguez, Cubao, Quezon City after an informant had reported that
appellant Sanny Cabacaba had been selling drugs at said address. PO2 Ocampo
was designated as poseur buyer, with PO2 Jerry Sanchez and PO1 Glyn Fallorin as
back-up. As poseur buyer, he was given one ₱200 bill with Serial Number D977936
and a ₱100 bill with Serial Number DF747795. Both bills were recorded in their pre-
operation logbook. He marked said bills with his initials "JO."
The police team and the informant left the police station and arrived at Ermin Garcia
Street at 7:00 p.m. According to PO2 Ocampo, he and the informant proceeded to a
house at 138 Ermin Garcia Street. They asked the appellant to sell to
them shabu worth ₱300. Appellant then handed over two sachets of shabu to PO2
Ocampo who then gave appellant the marked money. PO2 Ocampo examined the
contents of the two sachets. After determining that they contained shabu, he tapped
the shoulder of appellant. This was a signal to his two companions on the look-out
that the sale of shabu had just been consummated.
As his men rushed to the place of the transaction, PO2 Ocampo got hold of
appellant. The latter was able to break free from him and run into the house in front
of which the sale took place.
The police ran after appellant who was then collared by PO2 Ocampo inside the
house. Two persons sitting on a sofa were searched like appellant. The search on
one of them, who was identified as Elena Blancha, yielded a sachet of shabu. The
other male person yielded no contraband. In the body search conducted on
appellant, the police recovered both the ₱200 and ₱100 bills earlier received by him
from PO2 Ocampo. PO2 Ocampo testified that the accused and Elena were live-in
partners.
In his defense, appellant testified that on October 18, 2002 at 7:00 p.m. he was
attending the birthday party of the daughter of his neighbor, Elena Blancha. At
around 9:30 p.m., five armed men entered Elena’s house and searched four persons
including appellant and Elena. Nothing was found in their possession. After a while,
however, a police officer waived a plastic sachet he said he found on top of a TV set.
The armed persons then brought all four of them to the Araneta Center Police Block
5 in handcuffs.
According to appellant, the police asked each of them to give ₱10,000 in exchange
for their release. Afterwards, only appellant was detained. Appellant testified that he
believed that his companions had given the police some cash.
Another witness for the defense, Conrado de Guzman, testified that on October 18,
2002 at around 6:00 p.m., he was walking along an alley of Ermin Garcia Street,
when he met four policemen armed with armalites walking toward him. He stepped
aside to give way to them. After two had passed him, however, the two others
returned and grabbed him. Those persons brought him to the house of his neighbor,
Elena Blancha. He saw the police officers searching the house. He also saw four
persons inside that house, including Elena Blancha and the appellant, both of whom
were residents of the house. He did not know the identity of the other two. Later on, a
police officer cried, "Ito na ang hinahanap natin!" All five of them were brought
afterwards to the police station where each one of them was interrogated inside an
investigation room. After an hour, according to de Guzman, he was released

Topic: Entrapment

Issues:
(1) Was there a valid arrest on the accused? and (2) Was the accused’s guilt proven
beyond reasonable doubt?

Held:
The Court has already ruled repeatedly that a buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting
violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. An arrest made after entrapment does not
require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to
Rule 113, Section 5(a), of the Rules of Court.
On the second issue, appellant argues that the evidence relied upon by the
prosecution falls short of the quantum of proof required for a conviction. Although the
testimony of a police officer should ordinarily be accorded full faith and credence, still
it cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused
enjoys. Appellee for its part, maintains that the elements of violation of Section 5,
Article II of Rep. Act No. 9165 has been proven.
Important in a prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs is proof that the
transaction or sale actually took place and the presentation in court of the corpus
delicti, which has two elements: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event and (2)
a person’s criminal responsibility for the act.24 Here, the prosecution has adequately
shown that an illegal sale of drugs took place between the police and the appellant in
a valid entrapment scheme. The prosecution actually presented during the trial of the
case, the illegal substance and the payment seized from the appellant’s possession.
In a prosecution for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
usually a case becomes a contest of credibility between the accused and the police,
the witnesses and their testimonies. Generally this Court relies upon the assessment
by the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct or
demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The factual findings by the trial
court are accorded respect, even finality, absent any showing that certain facts of
weight and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misapplied.
In the prosecution of the offense for illegal sale of prohibited drugs, what is essential
is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation
in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. It suffices to show that the accused is in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug;
that such possession is not authorized by law; and that the accused has freely and
consciously possessed the prohibited drug. Possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to
convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.
Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain away the absence
of knowledge or animus possidendi. This, the accused herein, under the
circumstances heretofore related, miserably failed to do.
33. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAFAEL STA. MARIA y INDON

Facts:
On or about the 29th day of November, 2002, the accused, without authority of law
and legal justification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell,
trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting
of one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methylampetamine
hydrochloride weighing 0.041 gram.
On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli
Pacheco, Chief of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group of the Bulacan Provincial
Office based at Camp Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan received an intelligence report
about the illegal drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael,
Bulacan of a certain "Fael," who later turned out to be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria.
P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed a surveillance team to look for a police asset to
negotiate a drug deal with appellant. In the morning of November 29, 2002, the
surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp. Pacheco that a confidential asset found
by the team had already negotiated a drug deal for the purchase of ₱200 worth of
shabu from appellant at the latter’s house at No. 123 Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig,
San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening of November 29, 2002.
The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Enrique
Rullan as team leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided with two (2)
marked ₱100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the appointed time and place, PO1 Ventura
and the confidential informant proceeded to appellant’s house and knocked at the
door. Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant introduced to him
PO1 Ventura as a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later handed the two (2) marked
₱100-bills to appellant who, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. Thereupon,
PO1 Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter, which was the pre-arranged signal to the
other members of the buy-bust team that the sale was consummated. Appellant was
arrested and the two marked ₱100-bills recovered from him. Also arrested on that
occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who was allegedly sniffing shabu inside
appellant’s house and from whom drug paraphernalia were recovered. Upon
laboratory examination of the item bought from appellant, the same yielded positive
for methylampetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram.
The defense gave an entirely different account of what allegedly transpired prior to
and at the time of appellant’s arrest on that evening of November 29,
2002.1awphi1.net
Appellant testified that on November 29, 2002, he was at home with a certain Zedric
dela Cruz who was allegedly offering him a cellphone for sale and collecting payment
on a loan of his wife. At that time, his wife was out of the house to pay their electric
bill. While waiting for his wife, he and Zedric watched television when they heard the
barking of dogs. Immediately, three (3) men suddenly barged into the house and
announced that they were police officers while three other men stayed outside the
house. The police officers frisked him and Zedric and searched the house. He tried to
complain about what they were doing but the police officers got mad and accused
him of selling shabu. He replied that he does not know anything about drugs.
Afterwards, he and Zedric were brought out of the house and handcuffed. While on
board the police vehicle, the police officers warned them to cooperate. The police
officers also asked him to be their asset and when he said that he does not know
anything about it, they told him that they could file a case against him. The police
officers also offered to buy drugs from him but he refused the offer because he
knows that it is only a plan for them to arrest him.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him because his guilt was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He maintains that instigation, not entrapment,
preceded his arrest. He also faults the appellate court in not finding that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of
Republic Act No. 9165.

Topic: Entrapment – Instigation

Issue:
Was the arrest valid?

Held:
In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a
lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically
induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a
co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The
idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law
enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who
adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not
exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does.
Here, the mere fact that the agreement between appellant and the police informant
for the purchase and sale of illegal drugs was made on November 27, 2002, while
the buy-bust operation was conducted on November 29, 2002, is of no moment.
Without more, it does not prove that said informant instigated appellant into
committing the offense. If at all, the earlier agreement and the subsequent actual sale
suggest that appellant was habitually dealing in illegal drugs.
It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were
purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy
solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning
complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially
is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one habitually committed, and
the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.
As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police
merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence
report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it
by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no
showing that the informant induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. In
this case, apart from appellant’s self-serving declaration that he was instigated into
committing the offense, he did not present any other evidence to prove the same.
34. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ARNOLD T APERE y POLPOL

Facts:
At around 7:30 p.m. on September 2, 2002, elements of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) arrested Tapere for selling shabu to a poseur buyer
during a buy-bust operation conducted against him in Purok San Antonio, Iligan City.
Prior to the buy-bust operation, Tapere was already included in the PDEA’s drug
watch list as a drug pusher based on the frequent complaints made against him by
residents of Purok San Antonio, Iligan City. It appears that SPO2 Diosdado Cabahug
of the PDEA, a neighbor, had warned Tapere to stop his illegal activities, but he
apparently ignored the warning and continued to sell shabu in that locality. Such
continuing activity on the part of Tapere was the subject of the report of PDEA
informant Gabriel Salgado.
In order to determine the veracity of the report of Salgado, PDEA agents conducted
an investigation and surveillance of the activities of Tapere on August 30, August 31,
and September 1, 2002, during which a test buy confirmed the veracity of the report.
With the positive result of the test buy, the agents decided to conduct a buy-bust
operation against Tapere on September 2, 2002. Consonant with their standard
procedure, the agents first secured a certification from the Office of the City
Prosecutor regarding the buy-bust money to be used during the buy-bust operation.
They presented to City Prosecutor II Roberto Z. Albulario, Jr. of Iligan City the
₱100.00 bill bearing serial number YU859011 for that purpose,3 and said public
prosecutor then issued the certification to the effect that the bill was identical to the
xerox copy previously made of the bill Armed with the certification, the agents went
back to their office and held a pre-operation briefing. In attendance at that briefing
were Team Leader SPO2 Edgardo Englatiera, SPO3 Jaime Bastatas, SPO2 George
Salo, SPO2 Cabahug, PO1 Amado Margaja and Salgado. The team instructed
Salgado to act as the poseur buyer, and gave to him the ₱100.00 bill earlier certified
by the public prosecutor.
At 7:10 p.m. of September 2, 2002, the team proceeded on board the jeep of SPO2
Cabahug to Alcuizar Avenue in San Antonio, Iligan City where Tapere engaged in
drug pushing. They stopped at some distance from the target area, and walked the
rest of the way. They posted themselves within view of the target place, which was
on the left side of the road going towards Tipanoy, Iligan City and a few meters from
the Tubod Bridge. The first structure nearest the bridge on the left side of the road
going towards Tipanoy was a blacksmith shop, and next to the shop was a row of
stalls where fish, meat and other commodities were sold. The agents spotted Tapere
vending lanzones along that side of the road to Tipanoy, outside the row of stalls.
With each agent being strategically posted, Salgado was signalled to approach
Tapere according to the plan. Salgado went towards Tapere. The agents saw the two
conversing for a brief while before Salgado handed money to Tapere. In turn, Tapere
took a small heat-sealed plastic sachet from his pocket and gave it to Salgado. After
accepting the sachet, Salgado made the pre-arranged signal of scratching his head
to signify the consummation of the transaction. The agents rushed towards Tapere,
introduced themselves as PDEA agents, and placed him in custody. They searched
him and recovered the ₱100.00 bill from his right pocket. At that point, he voluntarily
produced three more sachets of shabu from his pocket and handed them to SPO2
Bastatas. The agents brought Tapere to the PDEA headquarters in Camp Cabili,
Tipanoy, Iligan City.
On the other hand, Tapere denied the accusation. He and his wife rendered their
own version of the incident that led to his arrest.
On September 2, 2002, at around 6:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., Tapere went to his usual
place in Tubod to vend lanzones near the fish stalls. His wife followed him there to
ask what she would prepare for their lunch. While he was there, Salgado, his
neighbor of four years whom he knew to be a drug user currently under
probation, and with whom in the past he had sniffed shabu in Salgado’s house,
approached and requested him to buy shabu for Salgado’s use. They talked beyond
the hearing distance of his wife. At first, he refused Salgado’s request, but he
ultimately agreed to do the errand, explaining: I don’t want him to be angry at me, I
don’t want trouble and besides he is my neighbor so whenever he requested me to
buy shabu I do it. With Salgado giving him the money, he asked his wife’s permission
to go downtown to do something. He rode on a jeepney to go to Saray, also in Iligan
City, where he bought a sachet of shabu. In the meantime, the wife was left to tend to
the sale of the lanzones. Salgado, whose name the wife did not then know, went to a
nearby small store.
When he returned after an hour, Tapere did not find Salgado in the stall but in a
nearby small store. He handed the shabu there. Salgado then immediately left.
Tapere went back to his stall after buying a bottle of Coca Cola at the store. Upon
returning to his stall, a multi-cab vehicle came to stop there and five men alighted,
two of whom he immediately recognized as "Sir Englatierra and Cabahug." The men,
all armed, surrounded him, pointing their .45 caliber pistols at him. They frisked him,
put handcuffs on him, and took him to the PDEA office. There, they produced a bill,
noted its serial number and confirmed that it was the bill used in the transaction.
They next brought him to the PNP Central Office in Iligan City where he was
detained. At about 10:00 p.m. that same night, his wife visited him in the jail and gave
him fresh clothes to replace his clothes wet from the rain. On the next day, he was
taken to the Office of the City Prosecutor and from there to the City Jail.

Topic: Entrapment – Instigation

Issue:
Whether Tapere’s apprehension was the product of an instigation, not entrapment;
and that he should consequently be acquitted because instigation was an absolutory
cause.

Held:
The appeal has no merit.
To establish the crime of illegal sale of shabu as defined and punished under Section
5,20 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the Prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the identity of the object
and the consideration of the sale; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and of the
payment for the thing. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs, like shabu, requires simply the consummation of the selling transaction, which
happens at the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. In short, the
Prosecution must show that the transaction or sale actually took place, and present
in court the thing sold as evidence of the corpus delicti.
The State conclusively established the concurrence of the foregoing elements of
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Firstly, the members of the buybust team identified
Tapere as the person with whom Salgado had contracted on the purchase of
the shabu. Secondly, the subject of the sale was one plastic sachet of shabu that the
PNP Crime Laboratory later on confirmed in due course to contain
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. It is of no consequence that
three other sachets of shabu recovered from Tapere’s possession at the time of his
arrest were also presented as evidence during the trial, or that the Prosecution failed
to specify which of the four sachets was the sachet involved in the transaction
between him and Salgado, because what is decisive is that one of the four sachets
was definitely the subject of the transaction between Tapere and the poseur buyer.
Thirdly, the consideration of the sale was ₱100.00, and the actual payment of that
amount through the ₱100.00 bill bearing serial number YU859011 covered by the
public prosecutor’s certification ensured the identification of it as the consideration.
And, fourthly, the Prosecution’s witnesses fully described the details of the
consummated sale of shabu between Tapere as seller and Salgado as buyer.
Tapere contends that his arrest resulted from an instigation, not from a legitimate
entrapment. He insists that poseur buyer Salgado, then acting as a covert PDEA
civilian agent or informant, a fact unknown to him, made him purchase the shabu for
Salgado. Hence, being instigated to sell the shabu, he was entitled to be acquitted
because the instigation was an absolutory cause.
Instigation takes place when a peace officer induces a person to commit a
crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not be committed. Hence, it is
exempting by reason of public policy; otherwise, the peace officer would be a co-
principal. It follows that the person instigating must not be a private person, because
he will be liable as a principal by inducement. On the other hand, entrapment
signifies the ways and means devised by a peace officer to entrap or apprehend a
person who has committed a crime. With or without the entrapment, the crime has
been committed already. Hence, entrapment is not mitigating. Although entrapment
is sanctioned by law, instigation is not.The difference between the two lies in the
origin of the criminal intent – in entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of
the criminal, but in instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime
and suggests it to the accused, who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.
In light of the foregoing differentiation between instigation and entrapment, the Court
rejects the contention of Tapere for its being contrary to the established facts.
Tapere was caught in flagrante delicto committing the illegal sale of shabu during the
buy-bust operation. In that operation, Salgado offered to buy from him a definite
quantity of shabu for ₱100.00. Even if, as he claims, he was unaware that Salgado
was then working as an undercover agent for the PDEA, he had no justification for
accepting the offer of Salgado to buy the shabu. His explanation that he could not
have refused Salgado's offer to buy for fear of displeasing the latter was implausible.
He did not show how Salgado could have influenced him at all into doing something
so blatantly illegal. What is clear to us, therefore, is that the decision to peddle
the shabu emanated from his own mind, such that he did not need much prodding
from Salgado or anyone else to engage in the sale of the shabu; hence, he was not
incited, induced, instigated or lured into committing an offense that he did not have
the intention of committing.
35. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES

Facts:
PI Barber of the PNP Guiuan Police Station directed SP03 De Dios to conduct a
surveillance on appellant after receiving several reports that she was peddling
prohibited drugs. Three weeks later, SP03 De Dios confirmed that appellant was
indeed engaged in illegal drug activities. PI Barber filed for and was issued a search
warrant. However, prior to implementing the search warrant, PI Barber decided to
conduct a "confirmatory test-buy" designating SP03 De Dios as poseur-buyer and
giving him ₱200.00 marked money for the operation.
On March 24, 2004, SP03 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded to the house of
appellant and asked her if they could buy shabu. The sale was consummated when
appellant took the marked money from SP03 De Dios after giving him a sachet
of shabu. SP03 De Dios immediately informed PI Barber by text message about the
successful "confirmatory test-buy". PI Barber and his team of police officers who
were positioned 100 meters away n1shed towards the house of appellant. He also
instructed SP03 De Dios and the civilian asset to summon the Barangay Chairman to
witness the search of the house. When he arrived together with a kagawad and a
media representative, SP03 Salamida read the search warrant to appellant.
During the search of the house, SP04 Bandoy found a tin foil under the mattress.
SP03 De Dios took it from SP04 Bandoy and gave it to SP03 Salamida who found
seven sachets of shabu inside, in addition to the four sachets of shabu found inside
the right pocket of the short pants of appellant. The search of the house also
revealed several drug paraphernalia. An inventory of seized items was prepared and
the same was signed by the Barangay Chairman, P02 Isip, SP04 Bandoy, and
appellant. The sachets of shabu were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA) then to the PNP Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination. The
results of the examination verified that the seized sachets contained shabu.
Appellant denied the charges against her. She claimed that on March 24, 2004,
somebody forcibly kicked the front door of her house and tried to break it open. When
she opened the door, PI Barber pushed her aside and told his companions to move
quickly. They went directly to her room; when P02 Isip emerged therefrom seconds
later, he was holding a substance that looked like tawas. SP03 De Dios and SP03
Salamida went in and out of her house. She maintained that the search warrant was
shown to her only after an hour and that the sachets of shabu were planted. She
argued that the police officers fabricated the charges against her since her family had
a quarrel with a police officer named Rizalina Cuantero regarding the fence
separating their houses.

Topic: Instigation – chain of custody of evidence

Issues:
1. Whether the "confirmatory test-buy" by the police officers was not valid since she
was induced by the' designated poseur buyer, SP03 De Dios, and the confidential
informant to sell the seized shabu?

2. Whether the chain of custody of evidence was not established?

Held:
1. There is no merit in this argument.
In inducement or instigation - the criminal intent originates in the mind of the
instigator and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him. The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into
the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. This is
distinguished from entrapment wherein ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of capturing the lawbreaker inflagrante delicto.
The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not prohibited by law. It
does not amount to instigation. As in this case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant
by the poseur buyer merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police
received an intelligence report that appellant habitually deals with shabu. They
designated a poseur buyer to confirm the report by engaging in a drug transaction
with appellant. There was no proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell
illegal drugs to him.

2. There is merit in this protestation.

The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the following elements: "(1) the identities of
the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery
of the thing sold and the payment therefor."On the other hand, the offense of illegal
possession of shabu has the following elements: "(l) the accused is in possession of
an item or an object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed said
drug." In the prosecution for illegal sale and possession of shabu, there must be
proof that these offenses were actually committed, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, conviction cannot be sustained if
there is a persistent doubt on the identity of said drug. The identity of the shabu must
be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of
possession or sale are present, the fact that the shabu illegally possessed and sold,
the same shabu offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the
same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and custody of
seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in
the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for
destruction." In People v. Havana,24 the Court expounded on the custodial chain
procedure in this wise:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that
the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to
the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been
no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.
While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is
almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is
not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or
when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard obtains in
case the evidence is susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and even
substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to
fungibility, alteration or tampering -without regard to whether the same is advertent or
otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule.
Thus, as a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must
be established:
first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court
In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized
items with their initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon
confiscation. While P02 Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in
the police station,28 no evidence was presented to show that the marking was
accomplished in the presence of appellant. Moreover, the author of the markings on
said items was never identified. None of the police officers admitted placing the
markings. There was therefore a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship
of the markings.
While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this
contemplates a case of warrantless searches and seizures. Here, the police officers
secured a search warrant prior to their operation. They therefore had sufficient time
and opportunity to prepare for its implementation. However, the police officers failed
to mark immediately the plastic sachets of shabu seized inside appellant's house in
spite of an Inventory of Property Seized that they prepared while still inside the said
house. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with the marking of evidence
immediately after confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain of custody.
36. CORONEL VS PEOPLE
GR NO 214536
March 13, 2017

FACTS: On May 19, 2010, a Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) team
meeting for the implementation of a search warrant covering a building at No. 1734
F. Muñoz Street, Tramo Street, Barangay 43, Zone 6, Pasay City was held. The
Special Enforcement Group Team Leader of the Metro Manila Regional Office -
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, IO2 Randy Paragasa (IO2 Paragasa),
designated IO2 Daniel Discaya (IO2 Discaya) as the seizing officer, and IO1 Jake
Edwin Million (IO1 Million) and IO1 Jayson Albao (IO1 Albao) as the arresting
officers. The team prepared the pre-operations report form, coordination form,
authority to operate, and inventory of seized property/items form.

The PDEA team coordinated with a team from the Philippine National Police -
Southern Police District in implementing the search warrant. They arrived at the
subject building at around 2:00 p.m., knocked on the door, and announced that they
had a search warrant. A PDEA agent shouted that somebody had jumped out the
window and the door was forced open with a battering ram. IO1 Million and IO1
Albao chased down those who jumped out the window.

Three (3) persons, identified as Olivarez, Erlinda Fetalino, and Benjie Guday, were
found inside the subject building. IO2 Discaya read to them the contents of the
search warrant.

Coronel, Permejo, and Villafuerte were apprehended after trying to escape out of the
window. They were brought back to the subject building, where the contents of the
search warrant was read to them.

Thereafter, Barangay Kagawad Oga Hernandez (Barangay Kagawad Hernandez),

Herald Santos (Santos), Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City Angel Marcos (Atty.
Marcos), and DZAR Sunshine Radio Reporter Jimmy Mendoza (Mendoza) arrived,
and the search was conducted in their presence.

During the search, the team recovered, among others, transparent plastic sachets,
aluminium foils, containers of white crystalline substance and white powdery residue,
disposable lighters, improvised plastic scoops, a total amount ofP580.00 in assorted
bills, and P165.00 in coins.

Coronel, Permejo, Villafuerte, and Olivarez were arrested and apprised of their
constitutional rights. The confiscated items were also inventoried, photographed, and
marked in their presence, as well as in the presence of the Barangay officials and the
Department of Justice and media representatives.

The arrested suspects were brought to the PDEA Headquarters for investigation and
mandatory drug testing, together with the seized objects, one of which was identified
as shabu. Coronel, Villafuerte, Permejo, and Olivarez tested positive for shabu.

TOPIC: Violation of Special Law; RA 9165

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution has established that the petitioner knowingly
visited the drug den (Violation to Section II).
RULING: No, the drug test results which was the basis of the prosecution to imply
that petitioners were aware of the nature of the place as a drug den before visiting it
despite that the drug tests were conducted right after their arrest is not justifiable and
insufficient.

The prosecution assumed that the petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug den
before their arrest, however there was no showing of evidence if how long petitioners
were at the alleged drug den or how long drugs had been in their system. There is no
basis to assume that the petitioners used drugs at the moment immediately before
arrest and thus, at the location of the arrest.

There was no attempt to show that the petitioners knew of the alleged drug den or
even that they used drugs in the premises. The petitioners were not found in
possession of any drugs. When petitioners were arrested , nobody found in the act of
using, selling or buying illegal drugs or packaging nor hiding nor transporting the
same. There were no acts alleged or evidence found which would tend to show a
familiarity with the nature of the place as a drug den.

Petitioners were acquitted for violation of section 7 of the RA 9165. They were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of section 15 Article II of RA 9165.
37. People vs. Glino
G.R. No.173793
December 04, 2007

FACTS: At around 7:20 p.m., On November 15, 1998, Spouses Domingo and
Virginia Boji hailed a passenger jeepney and sat on the two remaining vacant seats
on opposing rows of the jeepney. Moments later, the woman seated next to Virginia
alighted. Accused-appellant Conrado Glino took her place. He was reeking of liquor.
As the jeepney ran its normal route, Virginia noticed accused-appellant inching closer
to her. His head eventually found its way on Virginia's shoulder. Irked, Virginia sought
accused-appellant's attention and asked him to sit properly, citing adequate space.
Accused-appellant angrily replied, "Oh, kung ayaw mong may katabi, bumaba ka, at
magtaxi ka!" Virginia decided to ignore his snide remarks. After the heated verbal
tussle, accused-appellant and Baloes appeared to have calmed down, confining
themselves to whispering to one another. 
When the jeepney approached Casimiro Village, Baloes turned to the driver and told
him that he and Glino were about to alight. As the jeepney ground to a halt, Baloes
unexpectedly drew an improvised knife and stabbed Domingo in the chest. Accused-
appellant then unfolded a 29-inch Batangas knife and joined Baloes in stabbing
Domingo. Surprised and shocked at the sudden attack, Domingo failed to offer any
form of resistance to the duo's vicious assault. Virginia tried vainly to shield Domingo
from his assailants. She tightly embraced Domingo. Virginia's efforts, however, all
went for naught as accused- appellant Glino and Baloes were unrelenting. When the
senseless assault ceased, Virginia found herself bloodied from incised wounds in her
fingers.

Topic: Conspiracy
ISSUE 1. Whether or not Glino must have a lower penalty because it was Baloes
who stabbed Domingo?

RULING 1: No. Even assuming, for the nonce, that it was Baloes who inflicted the
fatal stab, accused- appellant cannot escape culpability. There is conspiracy when
two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime
and decide to commit it. Proof that accused acted in concert, each of them doing his
part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim will suffice to support a conviction. In
conspiracy, it matters not who among the accused actually killed the victim. The act
of one is the act of all; hence, it is not necessary that all the participants deliver the
fatal blow. Tersely put, each of the accused will be deemed equally guilty of the crime
committed. The acts of Glino and Baloes before, during and after the killing of
Domingo are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiment. 

Topic: Qualifying Circumstances

ISSUE 2: Whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of homicide and attempted

homicide only, not murder and attempted murder, due to the absence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery?

RULING 2: No. Treachery or alevosia’s presence is incontrovertible. The essence of

this qualifying circumstance is the sudden and unexpected attack by the assailant on
an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself. The
attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and
unable to retaliate. Concededly, Domingo was caught unaware that an attack was
forthcoming. Although he had a verbal exchange with accused-appellant and Baloes,
the assault was sudden, swift and unexpected. All of the passengers inside the
jeepney, including Domingo, thought all along that the tension had ceased and that
Glino and Baloes were about to alight. 
38.) Aquino vs. Paiste
GR 147782
June 25, 2008

Facts:

At about 9:00 o’clock in the morning of March 14, 1991, petitioner Juanita
Aquino, Elizabeth Garganta, and another woman identified only as "Adeling," went to
the house of respondent Teresita Paiste at 611 Peñalosa St., Tondo, Manila. The
children of respondent and petitioner were grade school classmates. After the usual
pleasantries, petitioner started to convince respondent to buy a gold bar owned by a
certain Arnold, an Igorot. After respondent was shown a sample of the gold bar, she
agreed to go with them to a pawnshop in Tondo to have it tested. She was told that it
was genuine. However, she told the three that she had no money.

Regardless, petitioner and Garganta went back to the house of respondent the
following day. The two convinced her to go with them to Angeles City, Pampanga to
meet Arnold and see the gold bar. They reached Angeles City around 2:30 p.m. and
met Arnold who showed them the gold bar. Arnold informed her that it was worth PhP
60,000. After respondent informed them again she had no money, petitioner
continued to press her that buying the gold bar would be good investment. The three
left and went home.

On March 16, 1991, petitioner, Garganta, and Adeling returned to the house of
respondent. Again, they failed to convince her to buy the gold bar.
On the next day, the three returned, this time they told respondent that the price was
reduced to PhP 10,000. She agreed to go with them to Angeles City to meet Arnold
once more. Arnold pretended to refuse the PhP 10,000 offer and insisted on PhP
50,000.
On petitioner’s insistence, on March 18, 1991, the two went to Angeles City and
bought the gold bar for PhP 50,000.

On March 19, 1991, respondent had the gold bar tested and she was informed
that it was fake. Respondent then proceeded to petitioner’s house to inform the latter
that the gold bar was fake. Petitioner replied that they had to see Garganta, and that
she had nothing to do with the transaction.

On March 27, 1991, respondent brought petitioner to the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI)-NCR in the presence of a certain Atty. Tolentino where petitioner
amicably promised respondent they would locate Garganta, and the document they
both signed would be disregarded should they locate Garganta.

RTC ruled that accused Aquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
estafa and found her to be in conspiracy with Gargabta, Adeling, and Arnold in
commiting the crime of estafa. CA affirmed.

Issue No. 1:
whether the amicable settlement executed in the NBI is admissible as evidence
Ruling No. 1:

Topic No. 1: Constitutional Law; Custodial investigation involves any questioning

initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that lend itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, that the rule begins to operate.10 Republic Act No. (RA) 743811 has
extended this constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not
been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning.12 Specifically,
Sec. 2 of RA 7438 provides that "custodial investigation shall include the practice of
issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he
is suspected to have committed x x x."

It is evident that when petitioner was brought by respondent before the NBI-NCR
on March 27, 1991 to be investigated, she was already under custodial investigation
and the constitutional guarantee for her rights under the Miranda Rule has set in.
Since she did not have a lawyer then, she was provided with one in the person of
Atty. Uy, which fact is undisputed.

However, it can be gleaned from the amicable agreement, as aptly pointed out
by the CA, that the custodial investigation on the inquiry or investigation for the crime
was either aborted or did not push through as the parties, petitioner, and respondent
agreed to amicably settle. Thus, the amicable settlement with a waiver of right to
counsel appended was executed with both parties affixing their signatures on it in the
presence of Atty. Uy and NBI agent Atty. Ely Tolentino.

Petitioner’s contention that her constitutional rights were breached and she
signed the document under duress falls flat for the following reasons:
First, it is undisputed that she was provided with counsel, in the person of Atty. Uy.
The presumption that Atty. Uy is a competent and independent counsel whose
interests are not adverse to petitioner has not been overturned. Petitioner has merely
posed before the CA and now this Court that Atty. Uy may not be an independent
and competent counsel.
Without any shred of evidence to bolster such claim, it cannot be entertained.

Second, petitioner made much of the fact that Atty. Uy was not presented as
witness by the prosecution and that what petitioner and Atty. Uy supposedly
conferred about was likewise not presented. Basic is the principle that consultation
and information between counsel and client is privileged communication and the
counsel may not divulge these without the consent of the client. Besides, a party in a
case has full discretion to choose whoever it wants as testimonial witnesses to
bolster its case. We cannot second guess the reason of the prosecution in not
presenting Atty. Uy’s testimony, more so on account of the counsel-client privileged
communication. Furthermore, petitioner could have asserted its right "to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses,"13 for which she could
have compelled Atty. Uy to testify. She did not.

Third, petitioner never raised any objection against Atty. Gordon Uy’s
appointment during the time she was in the NBI and thereafter, when she signed the
amicable settlement. As this Court aptly held in People v. Jerez, when "the accused
never raised any objection against the lawyer’s appointment during the course of the
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement
before the swearing officer"14 the accused is deemed to have engaged such lawyer.
Verily, in the instant case, petitioner is deemed to have engaged Atty. Uy when she
conferred with him and thereafter signed the amicable settlement with waiver of right
to counsel in his presence. We do not see how the answer of NBI agent Atty.
Tolentino upon cross-examination about the petitioner’s counsel in the NBI, could be
evasive when the NBI agent merely stated the fact that an independent counsel, Atty.
Uy, was provided petitioner.

Fourth, when petitioner engaged Atty. Uy as her lawyer, she undoubtedly

executed the amicable settlement. Verily, she was provided with an independent
counsel and such "right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as
would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth."15 An amicable
settlement is not and does not partake of the nature of an extrajudicial confession or
admission but is a contract between the parties within the parameters of their
mutually recognized and admitted rights and obligations. Thus, the presence of Atty.
Uy safeguarded petitioner’s rights even if the custodial investigation did not push
through and precluded any threat of violence, coercion, or intimidation.

Moreover, while we hold in this case that petitioner’s Miranda rights were not
violated, still we will not be remiss to reiterate what we held in People v. Malimit that
the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights render inadmissible "only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not
otherwise excluded by law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the
course of custodial investigation."16 An admission is an act, declaration or omission
of a party as to a relevant fact,17 while confession is a declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily
included therein.18

Fifth, even granting arguendo that the amicable settlement is in the nature of an

admission, the document petitioner signed would still be admissible since none of her
constitutional rights were violated. Petitioner’s allegations of threat, violence, and
intimidation remain but bare allegations. Allegations are not proof. Pertinently, this
Court ruled in People v. Calvo:

A confession is not rendered involuntary merely because defendant was told that
he should tell the truth or that it would be better for him to tell the truth. Stated
elsewise, telling the accused that it would be better for him to speak or tell the truth
does not furnish any inducement, or a sufficient inducement, to render objectionable
a confession thereby obtained, unless threats or promises are applied. These threats
or promises which the accused must successfully prove in order to make his
confession inadmissible, must take the form of violence, intimidation, a promise of
reward or leniency.

Issue No. 2: whether conspiracy has indeed been proven to convict petitioner of the
crime of estafa

Ruling No. 2: Yes

Topic No. 2: Criminal Law; Conspiracy is deemed to arise when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence of prior agreement to commit
the crime.20 In criminal law, where the quantum of evidence required is proof beyond
reasonable doubt, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy—it may be
deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated,
or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.

It is common design which is the essence of conspiracy—conspirators may act

separately or together, in different manners but always leading to the same unlawful
result. The character and effect of conspiracy are not to be adjudged by
dismembering it and viewing its separate parts but only by looking at it as a whole—
acts done to give effect to conspiracy may be, in fact, wholly innocent acts. Once
proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All the conspirators are answerable as
co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their participation.

To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be

shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.
Mere presence when the transaction was made does not necessarily lead to an
inference of concurrence with the criminal design to commit the crime of estafa. Even
knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one
as a party to a conspiracy because the rule is that neither joint nor simultaneous
action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.

In the instant case, the courts a quo unanimously held that conspiracy was duly
proven. As aptly observed by the CA, the records are replete with instances to show
that petitioner actively participated to defraud respondent. The following instances all
point to the conclusion that petitioner conspired with others to commit the crime:

First, petitioner was with her co-accused Garganta and Adeling when they went
to respondent’s house on March 14, 1991 to tell her of the existence of a gold bar,
showed her a sample, tried to convince respondent to buy one, and went to a
pawnshop in Tondo to have the sample gold bar tested.

Second, the following day, March 15, petitioner was again with her co-accused
when they went to Angeles City to view the gold bar in the residence of Arnold, and
participated in convincing respondent to raise PhP 50,000 for the purchase of the
gold bar, and if respondent did not have money, to find a buyer.

Third, on March 16, petitioner was again with her co-accused when they
returned to the house of respondent to ask if she had found a buyer. Since she had
not, they again pressed her to look for one.

Fourth, on March 17, she with her co-accused again accompanied respondent to
Angeles City and met with Arnold to convince him to accept PhP 10,000 as deposit,
but were refused.

Fifth, on March 18, respondent again pressed respondent to buy the gold bar
until the latter finally succumbed and paid PhP 50,000. Petitioner even re-counted
the cash payment, wrapped it in newspaper, and handed the money herself to
Arnold.

It is unquestionable that petitioner was not a passive observer in the five days
from March 14 to 18, 1991; she was an active participant in inducing respondent to
buy the gold bar. We find no cogent reason to alter the conclusions of the CA.
Indeed, the records bear out that conspiracy was duly proven by the coordinated
actions of petitioner and her companions.
 Clearly, petitioner’s contention that all she did was at the behest of either
Garganta or respondent is belied by the fact that she took part in all the phases of the
inducement right up to the purchase by respondent of the fake gold. If it was true that
she had no part in the transaction, why would she still accompany Garganta to visit
respondent on the 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th of March 1991? Moreover, with trips to
Pampanga made on the 15th, 17th, and 18th that take several hours, it is
unfathomable that petitioner was only doing a favor to either Garganta or respondent,
or to both.

Ineluctably, after having been introduced to respondent, Garganta could have

made the visits to respondent without tagging along petitioner. Yet, the facts clearly
show that respondent could not have been thereby induced without petitioner’s active
participation in encouraging respondent to buy the gold bar. Petitioner is the lynchpin
upon whom respondent’s interest was stoked, and ultimately to succumb to the lure
of gaining a fat profit by buying the gold bar.

Moreover, the fact that petitioner went back on the 18th with respondent to
Manila instead of staying in Pampanga does not preclude her active participation in
the conspiracy as shown by the foregoing narration. It would have been strange to
respondent if petitioner stayed in Pampanga after the transaction. Thus, petitioner
indeed took active part in the perpetration of estafa. And, petitioner has not shown
any convincing proof that she was not part of the transaction given the undisputed
factual milieu of the instant case.

Finally, it bears stressing that petitioner was the one who knows respondent.
She introduced respondent to the other accused.
39.) People vs. Malolot
GR 174063

Facts:

Three informations Criminal Case Nos. 98-627, for attempted murder; 98-628,

for frustrated murder; and 98-629, for murder were filed before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental against herein brother-appellants Edgardo Malolot
(Edgardo) and Elmer Malolot (Elmer). The victims in the cases are siblings and
minors all.

In an information, it was stated that On June 23, 1998, at about 6:30 o'clock [sic]
in the evening, at Barangay Himaya, El Salvador, Misamis Oriental which is within
the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill
and with treachery, conspiring, confederating with and mutually helping each other
and each armed with a bolo with which they previously provided themselves, did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and hack with
said bolos one Jovelyn Mabelin, 7 years old, thereby inflicting a wound on the right
scapular area of said victim. On the part of the Prosecution, it was contended that
Bernadette Mabelin (Bernadette) was in the kitchen of her house, her eight-year-old
daughter Juvy Mabelin (Juvy) and her playmate Teroy, appellant Elmer's son,
startled her, drawing her to whip the kids.

The whipping spawned a heated argument between appellant Elmer's wife

Myrna on one hand, and Bernadette and her husband Jerusalem Mabelin
(Jerusalem) on the other.

Getting wind of the incident, appellant Elmer accosted Jerusalem at the latter's
yard and threatened him, telling him, "Brad, this bolo which is yours, I will use this in
killing you," and almost simultaneously hacking Jerusalem's left forearm and fingers.
Jerusalem retaliated by hacking Elmer on the left cheek with a bolo. In the meantime,
Elmer's brother-co-appellant Edgardo repaired to the scene and boxed Jerusalem,
drawing the latter to hack Edgardo on the forehead.

Jerusalem thereafter went up his house and got a scythe. On his way back,
Delia Malolot (Delia), the aunt of appellants who had heard the commotion,
intercepted Jerusalem and brought him to the office of the barangay captain.

Edgardo later got a bolo from his house and on his return, seeing seven-year-old
Jovelyn Mabelin (Jovelyn), another daughter of Jerusalem and Bernadette who was,
together with her sister Juvy, fleeing the scene of the incident, boxed, kicked, and
hacked Jovelyn on the shoulder. As Edgardo's bolo fell, Jovelyn and Juvy hastily
entered the nearby house of Concepcion Abragan (Concepcion) who brought them
inside a room, covered them with a towel, and advised them to keep still.

Edgardo pursued Juvy and Jovelyn and tried to enter the house of Concepcion
but the door was locked. Concepcion then told Edgardo to pray, telling him that he
was being "possessed by a devil," to which Edgardo replied, "Since I was already
wounded I might as well kill a person." As Edgardo was trying to force his way inside
Concepcion's house, Elmer's wife arrived and told him to spare the little girls.

Elmer, his wife, and Edgardo thereafter proceeded to Bernadette's and

Jerusalem's house where Edgardo hacked the couple's four-year-old son Junbert
outside the doorway, hitting Junbert's right eye. Still incensed, Elmer and Edgardo
hacked Bernadette's 11-month-old son Jonathan who was by the rail of the doorway.

Elmer and Edgardo were later arrested as Jerusalem, Jovelyn, Junbert, and
Jonathan were brought to a hospital.

Seven-year-old Jovelyn sustained a wound on her right shoulder blade.

Eleven-month-old Jonathan died on arrival at the hospital. His death certificate

showed that his body bore an "incised wound 11 cm. from nasal-facial area to
zygomatic end with zygomatic bone fracture left [an] incised wound 11 cm. near
circumferential area left shoulder with completely cut humeral head," and that the
immediate cause of his death was "insanguination"or loss of blood.

The right eye of four-year-old Junbert was permanently damaged,[13] and the

doctor who treated him opined that he could have died were it not for the timely
medical assistance.

Elmer, denying all the accusations. RTC convicted Edgardo Malolot and Elmer
Malolot guilty of the attempted murder and Edgardo Malolot and Elmer Malolot guilty
of Frustrated Murder. CA affirmed RTC decision.

Topic : Conspiracy
Issue :

Whether or not the accused Edgardo Malolot is guilty of Attempted and

Frustrated Murder

As for appellants' denial of the existence of conspiracy, while the finding of

conspiracy with respect to the frustrated murder of Junbert is sustained, that with
respect to the attempted murder of Jovelyn is not.

Elmer did not participate in hacking Jovelyn. From Concepcion's testimony,

Elmer was in the same place where he happened to be when Edgardo boxed
Jerusalem. While Elmer did not restrain Edgardo, there is no sufficient evidence that
Elmer, by his presence, provided moral assistance to Edgardo as the latter hacked
Jovelyn.

Conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crime
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission without proof of cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not
enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.

To the Court, however, Edgardo's hacking of Junbert and the fatal hacking of

Jonathan were motivated by his and Elmer's common unlawful purpose. The
following circumstances indicate so:
1.Elmer entered Bernadette and Jerusalem's house, together with Edgardo, shortly
after the latter was frustrated from entering Concepcion's house where she hid
Jovelyn and Juvy;
2.Elmer's hacking of Jonathan was simultaneous to or immediately after Edgardo's
hacking of Junbert; and
3.Following the hacking of both Jonathan and Junbert, one of appellants remarked
that they had already taken their revenge.
On appellant's taking issue on the presence of treachery, the Court does not find
well-taken the following contention of Elmer and Edgardo:
[T]he prosecution failed to present evidence that the accused-appellants have
resolved to commit the crime prior to the moment of the commission of the crimes
charged. There was no proof that the consummation of the alleged crimes was the
result of meditation, calculation or reflection.

To sustain a finding of treachery, the means, method or form of attack must be

shown to have been deliberately adopted by the appellant.(Underscoring in original)
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.

When an adult illegally attacks a child, treachery exists even if the mode of
attack is not proved by the prosecution because a child of tender years could not be
expected to put up a defense, hence, is at the mercy of the assailant. That the
victims of the Attempted Murder, Frustrated Murder and Murder Jovelyn, Junbert and
Jonathan, respectively were minors at the time of the incident has been proven.

The allegation in each of the three informations of disregard of the age of the
victim cannot, however, be appreciated as an additional aggravating circumstance in
the commission of the crimes as the same is absorbed in the qualifying circumstance
of treachery. That leaves dwelling in the frustrated murder of Junbert and the murder
of Jonathan as the aggravating circumstance in the commission thereof.

In view of the enactment on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, however, the imposable penalty for the murder of
Jonathan is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
40.) Fernan, Jr. vs. People
GR 145927

Facts:

COA Regional Director solicited for the authentication and report on the sub-
allotment advises issued to highway engineering districts in Cebu particularly Cebu
City, Cebu 1st, Cebu 2nd and Mandaue City Highway Engineering Districts.
Apparently, the two sets of LAA's were received by districts. One set consists of
regular LAA's i authenticated and normally processed manner while the other set
consists of fake LAA's all of these were approved for the Finance Officer by Chief
Accountant Rolando Mangubat. Mangubat, however, had no authority to approve
them because he had already been detailed to the MPH Central Office. It was found
out that the practice of using fake LAA's had been going on for years.

Four of the accused hached an ingenious plan to siphon off large sums of money
from the government coffers using fake LAA's, vouchers and other documents to
conceal the traces.

The anti-graft court has found the case has merit and that Fernan Jr. and
Expedito Torrevilas along with the other accused guilty as co-pricipals in the crime of
Estafa through falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized in Articles
318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the RPC, and there being no modifying
circumstances, sentenced each of them to imprisonment and payment of the
penalties.

Topic 1: Right to be presumed innocent

Issue No. 1:
Whether or not The honorable Sandiganbayan totally ignored petitioners
constitutional right to be presumed innocent when it ruled that the burden of
convincing the hon. Court that the deliveries of the road materials attested to have
been received by them were not ghost deliveries rests with the accused and not with
the prosecution

Ruling No. 1: No.

Our Constitution unequivocally guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the

accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.22 This sacred task
unqualifiedly means proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.
Definitely, "reasonable doubt" is not mere guesswork whether or not the accused is
guilty, but such uncertainty that "a reasonable man may entertain after a fair review
and consideration of the evidence." Reasonable doubt is present when after the
entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences, leaves the minds of the
[judges] in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a
moral certainty, of the truth of the charge; a certainty that convinces and directs the
understanding, and satisfies the reason and judgment of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it. A thorough scrutiny of the records is imperative to determine
whether or not reasonable doubt exists as to the guilt of accused Fernan, Jr. and
Torrevillas.

Petitioners were charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
public documents as defined and penalized under Articles 318 and 171 in relation to
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
 As a result of petitioners' signatures in the tally sheets and/or delivery receipts,
reports of inspection, requests for supplies and materials, and other supporting
documents'which became the basis for payment to suppliers'public funds were
released via general vouchers and checks to the said suppliers despite the fact that
the latter did not make any deliveries in accordance with projects allegedly funded by
mostly fake LAAs.

The accusation that there were no actual deliveries of road construction and
maintenance materials in support of projects or otherwise funded by LAAs was
proven true by the testimonies of the various barangay captains and residents of the
barangay who were supposed to be benefited by the construction and repair
activities of the Cebu First Highway Engineering District.

Topic No. 2: Conspiracy

Issue No. 2:
The honorable sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners as co-conspirators
despite the prosecution's failure to specifically prove beyond reasonable doubt the
facts and circumstances that would implicate them as co-conspirators and justify their
conviction.

Ruling No. 2:

We find no reason to disturb the findings of the court a quo that all the essential
elements of the crime of estafa through falsification of public documents were
present. There is no question that petitioners, at the time of the commission of the
crime, were public officers'civil engineers'assigned to the MPH. Their signing of tally
sheets and related documents pertaining to the alleged deliveries of supplies for road
repair and construction constitutes intervention and/or taking advantage of their
official positions, especially considering that they had the duty to inspect the
purported deliveries and ascertain the veracity of the documents and the statements
contained in them.
The tally sheets bearing their signatures contained false recitals of material facts
which the petitioners had the duty to verify and confirm. These tally sheets were
attached as supporting documents to fake LAAs and subsequently became the
bases for the disbursement of public funds to the damage and prejudice of the
government. Indubitably, there exists not even an iota of doubt as to petitioners' guilt.
The essential elements of estafa through falsification of public documents are
present in the cases against petitioners, as follows:
1. Deceit: Petitioners Fernan, Jr. and Torrevillas made it appear that supplies for road
construction and maintenance were delivered by suppliers allegedly in furtherance of
alleged lawful projects when in fact said supplies were not delivered and no actual
asphalting or repair of road was implemented. In doing so, petitioners:
1.1. Were public officers or employees at the time of the commission of the offenses;
1.2. Took advantage of their official position as highway engineers; andcralawlibrary
1.3. Made untruthful statements in several narrations of fact.
2. Damage: The government disbursed PhP 146,000 in the case of Fernan, Jr. and
PhP 337,861.01 in the case of Torrevillas, as payments to various suppliers for the
delivery of non-existent supplies.

Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another.

After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.
Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had
acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved
that two or more persons aimed their acts towards the accomplishment of the same
unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent of each other, were in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an
accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be
intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.50
In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we categorized two (2) structures of multiple
conspiracies, namely: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there
is a single person or group (the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the "chain" conspiracy, usually involving
the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business
operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and
then retailer and consumer.51
We find that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the "wheel" conspiracy.
The 36 disparate persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the
government were controlled by a single hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief
Accountant), Delia Preagido (Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and
Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the separate "spokes" of the conspiracy.
Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel.
41.PEOPLE v. CA
GR 159261

FACTS:
The respondent, Galicia was charged with two cases for homicide for the death
of Thelmo and Ramon Abenir. The RTC found him guilty for the death of Ramon but
was acquitted for the death of Thelmo.
Thus, Galicia appealed to the CA where the court ruled that respondent, given the
facts must also
be acquitted for the other case. Now, the prosecution files the present petition for
review of the acquittal
of respondent Galicia.

Topic: Double Jeopardy

ISSUE: WON a review of the acquittal of Galicia constitute double jeopardy.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled, citing People v. Serrano, Sr. that, a verdict of
acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal,
even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense.
The finality-of-acquittal doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents
the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear
out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the
additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively
retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it
prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the
hope of securing a greater penalty.

A verdict of acquittal is immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such

acquittal, even in the appellate courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same
offense.
42. People vs Sandiganbayan

FACTS:
This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution of herein respondent
Sandiganbayan (Special Division) issued on March 6, 2003 in Criminal Case No.
26558, granting bail to private respondent Senator Jose Jinggoy Estrada (hereafter
Jinggoy for brevity). Jinggoy was among the respondents in the crime of Plunder filed
by the Office of the Ombudsman. Jinggoy filed with the Court an Urgent Motion
praying for early resolution of his Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian
Considerations. He reiterated his earlier plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail against
which the prosecution filed its comment and opposition. Bail hearings were then
conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their respective memoranda.
Petitioner suggests that Jinggoy is harboring a plan to escape, thus a flight risk. But
in a Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted Jinggoy’s Omnibus Application for Bail.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

TOPIC: Bail as a matter of right and Flight risk

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of bail in favor of Jinggoy proper on the ground that he is no
longer considered a flight risk?

RULING:
YES, the grant of bail is proper.
To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.

Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence
of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape is
great. Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than
four (4) years ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be
a flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court wrote in this regard:
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been
consistently respectful of the Court and its processes. He has not ominously shown,
by word or by deed, that he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his
continued incarceration. Bearing in mind his conduct, social standing and his other
personal circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this case seems remote if not
nil.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given his
election on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. The Court
takes stock of the fact that those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters
mindless of their reputation in the eyes of the people for as long as they can flee from
the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a reputation and a
respectable name to protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court,
to be sure, cannot accept any suggestion that someone who has a popular mandate
to serve as Senator is harboring any plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for
becoming a fugitive from justice.
43. BACABAC vs PEOPLE
GR 149372

FACTS: Hernani Quidato (the victim) was at a dance hall in the company of Eduardo
Selibio (Eduardo) and Melchor Selibio (Melchor). And so were Jonathan Bacabac
(Jonathan) and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel). Jonathan and Edzel left the dance hall.
Not long after, the victim and his companions also left and on their way home, they
encountered Jonathan and Edzel. It appears that the two groups then and there
figured in a misunderstanding. On his way home, Jesus Delfin Rosadio (Jesus), who
was also at the dance hall, noticed a commotion. He soon saw that Melchor was
"hugging" Edzel, and later "tying" Jonathan "with his hands." Still later, he saw the
victim hit Edzel with a "stick." Jesus left and proceeded to Edzel's residence to report
to his father what he had witnessed. In the meantime, Edzel and Jonathan managed
to flee. The victim and his companions thereafter headed for home in the course of
which they met Pat. Ricardo Bacabac (herein petitioner), together with Edzel and
Jonathan who are his nephews, and Edzel's father, Jose, his mother, and two sisters.
Petitioner and Jose were carrying M-16 armalites, while Jonathan and Edzel were
carrying a piece of wood and a revolver, respectively. Jesus thereupon pointed to the
victim and his companions as the ones who had manhandled Jonathan and Edzel.
The victim apologized, explaining that he and his companions mistook Jonathan and
Edzel for other persons. Petitioner, at that instant, fired his armalite into the air, while
Jose fired his armalite. Quidato died, Eduardo died 2 hours later and Jonathan was
also hit in the thigh. Trial court and CA convicted petitioner of 2 counts of murder.
Petitioner contends that he should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
immediate vindication of a grave offense.

TOPIC: Conspiracy

ISSUE 1. W/N there was conspiracy and treachery between Bacabac and Jose’s
company

RULING: 1. There was conspiracy because Bacabac’s failure to assist the victims
after the shooting reinforces the conspiracy between him and his co-accused to harm
the victims. That it was he who first officially reported the shooting to the police
station does not make him any less a conspirator.

A conspirator who wants to free himself from criminal liability usually performs
an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the felony while the commission of
the felony is in progress.He only reported the shooting after it had taken place and
voluntary surrender and non-flight do not conclusively prove innocence. Once
conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all even if not all actually hit and
killed the victim.

There was also treachery because victim and companions had no chance to defend
themselves. They were not armed, the attack was unexpected, and the victim already
surrendered.

TOPIC: Mitigating Circumstance

ISSUE 2: W/N the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication absolves him of

liability

RULING 2:
No. 2. Bacabac’s invocation of the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication
of a grave offense fails because for it to be credited, the act should be committed in
the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony, his
spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters,
or relatives by affinity within the same degree [RPC Article 13 (5)]

The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick (according
to Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to Edzel). By Edzel's own clarification, "he was
hit at his ear, not on his head" . Edzel is petitioner's nephew, hence, not a relative by
affinity "within the same degree"
44. PEOPLE vs TAN and AMAR
GR 176526

FACTS: Rogelio Cumla testified that he saw Charlie stab the victim on the chest
while Jemuel pinned his hands and held him immobile, Charlie Amar stabbed him on
the left side of the breast with a bladed weapon approximately 10 inches long.
Rogelio was able to identify the protagonists as he was only six meters away and the
place was illuminated by the moonlight. The incident happened a few meters from
the house of Mercedes Amar.

Mercedes Amar testified that her co-accused, Charlie Amar and Jemuel Tan, are her
son and nephew, respectively. She narrated that on the night of the incident, she was
at the feeder road to bolt their fence when she saw the victim talking with Eva Cumla
and Pedro Cumla some 10 meters away from their fence. She told them to go home.
She went back and saw Jessie who was wounded while another person whom she
did not recognize was running towards the hill.

Mercedes denied the allegations that she, together with her son Charlie and nephew
Jemuel, were responsible for the death of Jessie. On the contrary, she claimed that
they were the ones who rendered assistance to the wounded victim.

TOPIC: Conspiracy

ISSUE: WON Charlie Amar and Jemuel Tan guilty as principals by direct
participation for the crime of murder.

RULING:

There was conspiracy between the malefactors in the commission of the crime. Their
concerted efforts were performed with closeness and coordination indicating their
common purpose to inflict injury on the victim. For conspiracy to exist, the evidence
need not establish the actual agreement which shows the preconceived plan, motive,
interest or purpose in the commission of the crime. Proof of publicly observable
mutual agreement is not indispensable to establish conspiracy. Hence, there is
conspiracy where two of the accused held the victim's hands and the third stabbed
the victim from behind.9 Conspiracy may be implied from the concerted action of the
assailants in confronting the victim. In the instant case, the prosecution satisfactorily
established that Jemuel twisted and pinned Jessie's hands at the back, after which
Charlie delivered the fatal blow.
45. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BERNARD MAPALO, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

On February 12, 1994, a pre-Valentine dance was held in Sitio Baracbac, Brgy. Sta.
Cecilia in Aringay, La Union. In the early morning of February 13, 1994, at around
3:00 a.m., a fight erupted between Manuel Piamonte and the group of Lando
Mapalo, Jimmy Frigillana, and the appellant Bernardo Mapalo. With intent to kill and
being armed with lead pipe and bladed weapons and conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping each other, did then and there by means of treachery and with
evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strength, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on one Manuel
Piamonte by clubbing him with the said pipe from behind, hitting him on the right side
of the head and stabbing him several times with the said bladed weapons, and
thereby inflicting on the victim fatal injuries which were the direct and immediate
cause of his death. At the time when the appellant struck the victim with a lead pipe,
Jimmy Frigillana and Lando Mapalo standing in front of the victim, according to
Calixto Garcia, the lone eyewitness.

Consequently, appellant Bernardo Mapalo, together with Alejandro Fajardo, Jr.,

Jimmy Frigillana and Rolando Mapalo, was charged for the crime of MURDER. A
warrant of arrest was issued for the apprehension of the said accused but only
Alejandro Fajardo, Jr. was apprehended while the other two remain at large.
Alejandro Fajardo, Jr. filed a Demurrer to Evidence which was granted by the RTC,
on the ground that the prosecution did not present any evidence against him. Thus,
only accused Bernard Mapalo was eventually found guilty.

The RTC, in convicting the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, proceeded from a rationalization that there was conspiracy among appellant
and his co-accused. It also appreciated the attendance of abuse of superior strength
as a qualifying circumstance, on the basis that the perpetrators were armed with
bladed weapons and a lead pipe that were out of proportion to the unarmed
Piamonte.

However, the CA did not agree with the RTC. It convicted the appellant of frustrated
murder only. It found that the conspiracy was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It
ruled that the witness Garcia admitted to not being able to see the stabbing. He could
only attest to the clubbing of the victim by the appellant with a lead pipe. No proof
was shown as to the concerted action of the malefactors of their common design to
kill.

TOPIC 1: Conspiracy

ISSUE 1: Whether or not there is conspiracy in this case.

HELD 1: No, there is no conspiracy in this case.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a basis for conviction
must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty. Considering the far-reaching
consequences of criminal conspiracy, the same degree of proof necessary in
establishing the crime is required to support the attendance thereof, i.e., it must be
shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous actions is per se
sufficient proof of conspiracy.

For conspiracy to exist, the participants must agree to the commission of the felony
and decide to commit it, which agreement may be deduced from the mode and
manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from the acts that point to joint
purpose and design, concerted action and community of intent.

In this case, the prosecution was unable to show, either by direct or indirect
evidence, proof of the agreement among the appellant and his co-accused to warrant
conspiracy as a basis for appellant’s conviction. The sole eyewitness for the
prosecution was categorical and precise in declaring that he did not see the act of
stabbing Piamonte, nor the manner in which Piamonte was stabbed. No evidence
was even adduced to show implied conspiracy. Nothing has been shown that the
appellant and his co-accused were "aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment
of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. This
complete absence of evidence on the part of the prosecution to show the conduct of
the appellant and his co-accused, disclosing a common understanding among them
relative to the commission of the offense, is fatal to the prosecution.

TOPIC 2: Elements of a Crime

ISSUE 2: Whether or not the appellant be convicted for the crime of murder.

HELD 2:

Appellant Bernard Mapalo is acquitted of the charge of murder for lack of evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. He is found guilty of the crime of maltreatment.

No injury was shown to be attributable to the appellant. The principal and essential
element of attempted or frustrated homicide or murder is the assailant’s intent to take
the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved clearly and convincingly,
so as to exclude reasonable doubt thereof. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence
of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the
crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the
crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries
are inflicted by him on the victim.

In the case at bar, no motive on the part of appellant to kill Piamonte was shown
either prior or subsequent to the incident. Nor can such intent to kill be inferred from
his acts. It bears reiterating that no injury on the body of the deceased was attributed
to the appellant’s act of hitting the victim with a lead pipe.
46. GRACIANO SANTOS OLALIA, JR., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:

While Rommel Camacho was squatting along Burgos Street, trying to disentangle the
warped chain of the tribike he was driving, a tricycle driven by petitioner Graciano
Olalia, Jr, and which had as passengers, the accused Jeffrey and Pedro, came by
and stopped at the other side of the street. Jeffrey told Rommel to move the tribike to
the far side of the road but Rommel replied that the road was wide enough for the
tricycle to pass through. The three men on board the tricycle alighted. Jeffrey
together with Graciano and Pedro proceeded to the direction of Rommel and wiithout
warning, Jeffrey punched Rommel’s face. Graciano and Pedro joined in the
onslaught by punching the victim until he fell in the muddy canal at the side of the
road. Pedro continued the attack by kicking the victim several times. As Rommel was
trying to lift himself out of the canal, Pedro ordered Graciano and Jeffrey to kill the
victim. Jeffrey right away drew a knife and lunged the same at Rommel’s back
several times. Rommel tried to dodge the attack, but his effort did not totally spare
him from harm as he absorbed some wounds at his back and on the eyebrow.
Feeling helpless, Rommel raised his two hands and pleaded his attackers to stop. He
was nonetheless stabbed on the left side of his armpit and fell to the ground on his
butt. The three assailants boarded the tricycle and sped off. Rommel sustained 3
non-penetrating wounds at the back, near the left armpit and at the eyebrow and he
was confined in the hospital for 3 days.

Consequently, petitioner Graciano Santos Olalia, Jr., together with Jeffrey Poquiz
and Pedro Poquiz, were charged for the crime of frustrated murder.

The RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner and his co-accused acted in
conspiracy and guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder. The
Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the decision of the RTC.

TOPIC 1: Conspiracy

ISSUE 1: Whether or not petitioner and his companions acted in conspiracy with
each other in accomplishing their criminal acts.

HELD 1:

The SC held in the affirmative.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of a previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. Conspiracy may be deduced from the
acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, which
indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and
community of interest. It is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all the
accused manifested by their acts a common intent or desire to attack, so that the act
of one accused becomes the act of all.

In the case at bar, unity of design or objective can easily be drawn from the
concerted acts of the three assailants. Petitioner’s act of punching the victim
indubitably showed his desire to hurt him, which intent was also shared by Pedro and
Jeffrey. Moreover, his presence during the stabbing served no other purpose than to
ensure that no one else would come to the aid of the victim and thereby stop their
criminal design from being accomplished. He committed no act whatsoever to
indicate that he did not concur with the act of stabbing or killing the victim. Thus, their
conspiracy is evident, notwithstanding petitioner’s assertion that he did not participate
in the stabbing. Having shown that the three were in conspiracy through their
concerted acts, there is collective criminal responsibility, since "all the conspirators
are liable as principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation,
because the act of one is the act of all."

TOPIC 2: Frustrated Felony

ISSUE 2: Whether or not petitioner be convicted for the crime of frustrated murder.

HELD 2: No, petitioner and his companions must be convicted of attempted murder
and not frustrated murder because the wounds inflicted were non-penetrating or not
mortal wounds.

The rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his
death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the
acts of execution that would have brought about death. By commencing their criminal
design by overt acts but failing to perform all acts of execution as to produce the
felony by reason of some cause other than their own desistance, petitioner and his
cohorts committed an attempted felony.

In the instant case, the three assailants already commenced their attack with a
manifest intent to kill by punching Rommel countless times and when one of the
malefactors stabbed him, but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of
causes independent of his will, that is, the agility of the victim. Rommel sustained
three stab wounds which were characterized by the prosecution witness Dr. Mario
Ferdinand Garcia as non-penetrating or non-life-threatening wounds.
47. G.R. No. 173282 March 4, 2008
JOSE INGAL y SANTOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
A stabbing incident took place in the carinderia at around 9:00 p.m. of 2 March
1987. As a result of said stabbing incident, one Rolando Domingo, nicknamed Toto,
died from the fatal injuries he received. The incident transpired when Toto was eating
at said carinderia with his girlfriend, when all of a sudden, an assailant carrying a tres
cantos bladed weapon, stabbed him 4 times.
The said assailant was identified by prosecution’s witnesses as petitioner Jose
Ingal. Toto was rushed to the hospital where he eventually died due to the stab
wounds. The prosecution’s witnesses were composed of the carinderia owner who
signed her affidavit only after petitioner was caught behind bars. Another witness was
a customer of the said carinderia at the time the incident took place. The defense
assails the credibility of the witnesses and the petitioner’s defense is denial and alibi
that at the time of the said incident, he was working at that night.

TOPIC #1: Credibility of the Prosecution’s Eyewitnesses

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the court was correct in giving credence to the claims of
the eyewitnesses that Petitioner is the only suspect which is contrary to the
information gathered by the police investigator?

RULING #1:
Yes, the court was correct.
The Court held that the defense tries to destroy the credibility of Mmes. Bona and
Tan by arguing that their testimonies that petitioner was alone at the time when he
stabbed the victim was not consistent with the testimony of Sgt. Yang that there were
four suspects in the killing of the victim. There being statements that there were
allegedly four witnesses to the stabbing of victim does not diminish the credibility of
the two eyewitnesses. The two prosecution witnesses were one in saying it was
petitioner whom they saw stab the victim. This was very clear. The fact that they did
not see the other alleged accomplices in the execution of the crime does not detract
from the veracity of their testimony that petitioner stabbed the victim. Their failure to
mention the three other malefactors simply means that they did not see them when
the assault was made.

TOPIC #2: Credence of Eyewitnesses’ Testimony

ISSUE #2: Whether or not the court was correct in giving credence to the
testimony or statement made by the eyewitnesses more than 7 years after the
alleged crime?

RULING #2:
Yes, the court was correct.
We find the testimony of Mrs. Bona to be worthy of belief. The statement of the
defense that Mrs. Bona waited for seven years after divulging what she knew about
the stabbing incident is awry. After the incident, Mrs. Bona immediately gave her
statement to the police that petitioner was the one who stabbed the victim. It is not
true that she waited for seven years before revealing what she knew. What she did
not immediately give to the police was her written statement under oath, because she
was fearful that something bad might happen to her because the suspect was still at
large. She cannot be faulted for doing what she did. Fear of reprisal and the natural
reluctance of a witness to get involved in a criminal case are sufficient explanations
for a witness' delay in reporting a crime to the authorities. Initial reluctance to
volunteer information regarding a crime due to fear of reprisal is common enough
that it has been judicially declared as not affecting a witness' credibility.

TOPIC #3: Inconsistencies in the Testimony of the Eyewitness

ISSUE #3: Whether or not the court was correct in giving credence to the
testimony of the eyewitness when there are inconsistent claims in the Sinumpaang
Salaysay and her testimony?

RULING #3:

Yes, the court was correct.

We find these inconsistencies to be too trivial to diminish the credibility of these
two witnesses. From their testimonies in court, it is evident that they saw petitioner in
the police station when he was arrested. Whether they saw petitioner before, during
or after the preparation of their statements is of no moment because they have
clearly and unequivocally identified petitioner as the person who stabbed the victim.
Settled is the rule that inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses, for they erase the
suspicion of rehearsed testimony.

TOPIC #4: Quantum of Proof

ISSUE #4: Whether or not the court was correct in convicting the accused without
sufficient evidence to support said conviction?

RULING #4:
Yes, the court was correct.
We find the evidence of the prosecution to be more credible than that adduced by
petitioner. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great
weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is
obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment
and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court
to evaluate testimonial evidence properly.
The information alleged that petitioner, together with Ricardo Lidot and others
whose names are still unknown, conspired in killing Rolando Domingo. Article 8 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons
agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Once conspiracy is established, all
the conspirators are answerable as co-principals regardless of their degree of
participation, for in the contemplation of the law, the act of one becomes the act of
all, and it matters not who among the accused inflicted the fatal blow to the victim.
Without a doubt, the intention of petitioner was to kill the victim. This intention
was very clear when he treacherously attacked the victim when the latter was eating
at the carinderia. The number of times (four) petitioner stabbed the victim in the chest
area supports this conclusion. The intent to kill is shown by the weapon used by the
offender and the parts of the victim's body at which the weapon was aimed.
48. G.R. No. 185195 March 17, 2010
VIOLETA BAHILIDAD, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:
The case stems from a complaint filed by a "Concerned Citizen of Sarangani
Province" with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian,
Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the Office of the Vice-Governor, and a
certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for
their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants and donations
using funds of the provincial government, a special audit was conducted in Sarangani
province. The special audit team found that the said persons released financial
assistance to local development projects that do not exist, or grants to officials and
members of the said fictitious organizations composed mostly of government
personnel.
Included in the list of alleged fictitious associations that benefited from the financial
assistance given to certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), People’s
Organizations (POs), and Local Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress
(WIP), which received a check in the amount of ₱20,000.00, issued in the name of
herein petitioner Bahilidad, as the Treasurer thereof.

TOPIC #1: Conviction of the Crime

ISSUE #1: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan was correct in convicting the
petitioner?

RULING #1:

No, the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting the petitioner.

In the instant case, we find petitioner’s participation in the crime not adequately
proven with moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no
hand in the preparation, processing or disbursement of the check issued in her
name. A cursory look at the disbursement voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) reveals
the following signatures: signature of Board Member Teodorico Diaz certifying that
the cash advance is necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision;
signature of Provincial Accountant Camanay certifying to the completeness and
propriety of the supporting documents and to the liquidation of previous cash
advances; signature of Moises Magallona, Jr. over the name of Provincial Treasurer
Cesar M. Cagang certifying that cash is available; signature of Constantino, with the
initials of Zoleta adjacent to his name, certifying that the disbursement is approved
for payment, and with petitioner’s signature as the payee.

TOPIC #2: Conspiracy

ISSUE #2: Whether or not there was conspiracy?

RULING #2:
No, there was none.
There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy is not presumed.
Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must
be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by
direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during
and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence
must be strong enough to show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to
exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense.
Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the cohorts.
It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct
or indirect contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may
consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the
commission of the crime or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-
conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a
conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not
enough for purposes of conviction.

TOPIC #3: Guilt beyond Reasonable Doubt

ISSUE #3: Whether or not the petitioner’s conviction was proven beyond
reasonable doubt?

RULING #3:

No, the conviction was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately encashing the check,
insisting that she should have deposited the check first. Such insistence is
unacceptable. It defies logic. The check was issued in petitioner’s name and, as
payee, she had the authority to encash it. The Disbursement Voucher (No. 101-2002-
01-822) clearly states that she is the WIP treasurer, and the purpose of the voucher
is "to cash advance financial assistance from grants and donations for Winds
Malugon, Sarangani as per supporting papers hereto attached." Petitioner’s action
cannot, in itself, be considered as specious. There was no showing that petitioner
had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed in the processing and disbursement
of the check, or that the COA Rules required that the check had to be deposited in
the bank first, or that an evaluation report from the provincial agriculturist had to be
submitted. Evil intent must unite with the unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non
facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is
wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest and
real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility.
All told, there is reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s guilt. Where there is
reasonable doubt, an accused must be acquitted even though his innocence may not
have been fully established. When guilt is not proven with moral certainty,
exoneration must be granted as a matter of right.
 
49. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs JOHN CARLO SALGA and RUEL
"TAWING" NAMALATA

Facts:

On August 16, 2010, Namalata was arrested by the police and correspondingly
detained. When arraigned on September 6, 2010, Namalata, assisted by counsel de
parte, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge. On April 18, 2011, the pre-trial
conference with respect to Namalata was terminated.

On July 11, 2011, Salga surrendered to the police authorities. After Salga was placed
into custody, the criminal charge against him proceeded. Hence, on July 25, 2011,
Salga, assisted by counsel de officio from the Public Attorney's Office, entered a plea
of "not guilty". The pre-trial conference with respect to Salga was concluded on
August 3, 2011.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. During trial, the prosecution presented in
evidence the testimonies of Joan Camille Zulita, Juliano Bernas, Constancio Hinlo,
Jr., Dr. Broxil Macabinlar, Patrick Fillarca, Flora Sencil and Josefina Zulita. The
defense then presented the testimonies of Marcelo Abenaza, Keren Hope Vivares,
Celso Baol, Allan Cahoy, Ruel Namalata, Angelito Salga, Cesar Pabillan and John
Carlo Salga.

Joan Camille Zulita testified that on February 14, 2010, around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, she was watching television in their house at Barangay Damilag, Manolo
Fortich, Bukidnon, when she noticed that three persons entered their gate. The two
persons proceeded to the main door while the third one went to the garden where
their helper Catalina Arcega was tending to the plants. Joan was shocked and could
not move out of fear because the two persons who went towards her were armed.
One of the two persons aimed a gun at her and ordered her to keep quiet. Out of
fear, she maintained that she could not shout for help nor move as she didn't know
what to do. Afterwards, the man who told her to keep quiet and who was later
identified as appellant John Carlo Salga (Salga) asked her about the location of the
vault. She alleged that when she could not open the vault, Salga told her to get the
keys from her mother's room. She followed the robbers' order. While Salga was
pointing his gun at her and the second accused was choking her neck, she tried to
open the vault using the keys but failed to open it. Thus, she contended that Salga
and his companion brought the vault to the sala where they successfully opened it
and took all the money inside. At that time, when the robbers left her inside the
bedroom, she hurriedly hid under the bed. While hiding under the bed, she affirmed
that she heard a gunshot from outside. When she sensed that the armed men had
already left, she went out of her hiding place and went to the living room, where she
saw the vault already emptied of its content. The armed men took cash amounting to
₱34,000.00 from the vault and her Samsung E590 cellphone worth ₱6,000.00. She
declared that she immediately looked for her mother and saw the latter tending the
plants in the garden unaware of the robbery inside. She shouted that they had been
robbed which prompted her mother to run to her and embrace her. She and her
mother looked for their househelp Catalina Arcega, but failed to find the latter. Thus,
the two of them sought the help of their family driver who was then at Camp Phillips
Terminal. They also found her brother Jackel, who accompanied them to the police
station to report the incident. After which, accompanied by her mother and brother
Jackel, they went home. Upon arriving at their house, a search for Catalina Arcega
was again conducted, and it was her brother Jackel who found the househelp, who at
that time was already seriously wounded.
Josefina Zulita professed that on February 14, 2010 at around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, she was at the back of their house. She expressed that while she was
tending to her garden, she heard a gunshot. She saw her daughter Joan Camille,
who shouted that they had been robbed. She rushed to her daughter and embraced
the latter. Joan Camille appeared to be in a state of shock. She and Joan Camille
went to look for their househelp Catalina Arcega, but could not find the latter. Thus,
she and Joan Camille rode their van and went to search for their family driver who at
that time was at Camp Phillips Terminal. Josephine further stated that when they
found their driver and her son Jackel, they proceeded to the police station. When she
and her children went back to their house, Jackel found Catalina Arcega in the
garden, seriously injured with a wound on her head. Catalina Arcega was still
conscious when she was brought to a nearby hospital. However, she was not
operated on because the hospital demanded a downpayment before proceeding with
the surgery, thus, Arcega was brought to a public hospital in Cagayan de Oro City for
medical attention. Unfortunately, she died the following day.
Dr. Broxil Macabinlar averred that the proximate cause of Catalina Arcega's death
was the hacking of her head which resulted to a depressed skull fracture.
Constancio Hinlo, Jr. claimed that he is a civilian volunteer of Damilag, Manolo
Fortich. On February 14, 2010, he asserted that he was inside the office of the
Civilian Volunteer Organization when he and his fellow civilian volunteers received a
call informing them that the house of Josephine Zulita was robbed. He averred that
he responded to the call and walked towards Zulita's house. While on his way, he
saw a green motorcycle with three riders. He affirmed that he recognized the driver of
the motorcycle as appellant Ruel Namalata. He also recognized Salga, who was
riding at the back of Namalata with a black backpack. A third rider was at the back of
Salga, but he could not identify him. He disclosed that he knew Namalata and Salga
because they were his drinking buddies.
For Namalata, James Rio Namalata contended that on February 14, 2010, he was at
the house of his parents at PCH 2, San Miguel, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He
avowed that he and his family spent the day watching the boxing bout of Nonito
Donaire and Manuel Vargas, together with friends Marcelo Abenanza and Sherwin
Pumatong. He alleged that after the third round, he decided to go to the cockpit in
Libona, Bukidnon to bet on a cockfight. Thus, he borrowed his brother Namalata's
green Honda motorcycle. He further maintained that he left the cockpit at around
4:20 in the afternoon, and dropped by at Camp Phillips to buy "lechon manok" and
fruits. He arrived home at around 5:30 in the afternoon and found his brother
Namalata having a drinking session with their friend.
Armando Canete, an uncle of Namalata, declared that he saw James Rio Namalata
at the cockpit in Libona, Bukidnon and that the latter was driving a green motorcycle.
Appellant Ruel Namalata asserted that on February 14, 2010, at around 11:00
o'clock in the morning, he came home to his parents house at PCH 2, San Miguel,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon, after working as an assistant cook in his aunt's
"carenderia" at Crossing, Libona, Bukidnon. When he arrived home, he saw his
family and some friends watching the boxing bout of Donaire and Vargas in the
television. He allegedly joined them. After the fight, his brother James Rio decided to
go to a cockpit in Libona, Bukidnon and borrowed his green Honda motorcycle. He
insisted that he spent his afternoon tending to their cockfighting roosters. Later, he
averred that he had a drinking session with his friends. When his brother James Rio
arrived home at around 5:30 in the afternoon, the latter also joined him and his
friends. He maintained that on the said date, he never left the family home.
Marcelo Abenaza and Celso Baol, Jr. are friends of Namalata. They respectively
testified that Namalata stayed at home on February 14, 2010. Both defense
witnesses claimed that they had a drinking session with Namalata which started in
the afternoon and lasted until the evening of February 14, 2010.
For his defense, appellant Salga maintained that on February 14, 2010, he was living
with his paternal uncle Angelito Salga at Luyong Baybayon, Barangay Mintabon,
Talisayan, Misamis Oriental. At the time, he was allegedly working as a casual
laborer in a fish pond being constructed in Luyong Baybayon. As such, he declared
that on that fateful day, he worked from 7:00 o'clock in the morning until 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon. He insisted that he was nowhere near Damilag, Bukidnon on
February 14, 2010.
Appellant Salga's testimony was corroborated by Angelita Salga, his uncle, and
Cesar Pabillan, who both testified that on February 14, 2010, Salga was working at a
fish pond in Luyong Baybayon, Barangay Mintabon, Talisayan, Misamis Oriental.

Topic: Conspiracy

Issue:
Whether or not there was conspiracy between Ruel and John?

Held:
The declaration of the existence of the conspiracy among Ruel, John and the two
unidentified persons lacked firm factual foundation.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where the several accused were
shown to have acted in concert at the time of the commission of the offense, and
their acts indicated that they had the same purpose or common design and were
united in the execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. The State must show at
the very least that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and
coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to commit the felony. To be
held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, therefore, the accused must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the
conspiracy. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in
the actual commission of the crime itself, or of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. 
The findings of the lower courts on the existence of the conspiracy to be factually and
legally unwarranted. Joan, although present at the scene of the crime, never
identified Ruel as part of the group of robbers. In fact, no witness placed him at the
crime scene during the entire period of the robbery. If conspiracy is required to be
established, not by conjecture, but by positive and conclusive evidence, then it was
plainly speculative for the CA to count Ruel as the fourth member of the group of
robbers and even to name him as the robbers' lookout outside the house despite the
absence of evidence to that effect. On the contrary, the records bear out that only
Constancio saw Ruel, but such sighting of Ruel was after the robbery when he was
already driving the green motorcycle with John and another person on board. This
was not the overt act necessary to make Ruel a part of the conspiracy.
The community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one; and that
conspiracy transcends mere companionship. Hence, mere presence at the scene of
the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or
acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party
to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
Ruel's mere act of driving of the motorcycle with John and the unidentified person on
board did not amount to an overt act indicating his having conspired in committing
the robbery with homicide. Consequently, he was not John's co-conspirator. He must
be acquitted, for the evidence of the Prosecution to establish his guilt for the robbery
with homicide was truly insufficient.
50. ROGELIO SOPLENTE vs PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

A group consisting of Leyson, Notarte, Besinga, Gulle, Ewing Bayani, Ralowe

Velayo, Ebol Bayani, Reynaldo Jamerlan and Bond de Vera were drinking and
conversing in the early evening of 3 May 1988 which was the occasion of the fiesta at
Purok Sta. Cruz, San Pedro St., Lagao, General Santos City. They were at the store
of a certain Diola which was situated near the stage where the amateur singing
contest was to be held.
During the singing contest, which started at around ten o’clock in the evening (10:00
p.m.), Bebong Cambarijan approached Gulle to tell him that Rogelio and Nicanor
Soplente (the two accused) had asked him and Estoy Provido, who was tough
among the group. Without telling anybody except Leyson and Notarte about the
incident, Gulle went to the house of policeman Rudy Penequito to get help.
Penequito instructed Gulle to refrain from accosting the Soplente cousins to avoid
disturbing the singing contest. Penequito also approached Rogelio and Nicanor and
admonished them not to make trouble, but despite the intervention, Gulle, Notarte
and Leyson watched the Soplente cousins still. Gulle, along with Bebing Go, then
accosted the Soplente cousins and inquired where they came from. Nicanor politely
answered that they were staying with Susing Cafi. Since Gulle and the others knew
that Susing was a local resident, they were satisfied with the answer and they left the
Soplente cousins alone. Gulle however noticed that Nicanor smelled of liquor.
The group of Leyson and the Soplente cousins continued to watch the singing
contest being held nearby. Some of Leyson’s companions were barangay tanods and
volunteers, thus, they were equipped with canes while Leyson was armed with a
handgun.
While awaiting the announcement of winners at about twelve thirty in the early
morning (12:30 a.m.) of 4 May 1988, the group of Leyson repaired to a place away
from the stage to relieve themselves. Some of the spectators began dispersing at this
point. Notarte and Besinga were along one side of San Pedro St. while the others,
including Gulle, were on the left side. Suddenly, a commotion ensued as the
Soplente cousins passed by. Gulle, Besinga and Leyson offered the following
accounts of what had transpired then.
Gulle testified that he saw Notarte fall to the ground, which was followed by a gun
burst which he presumed came from Leyson’s handgun. He saw Leyson, by then
clearly wounded, chasing Rogelio. However, Gulle did not see the actual stabbing of
either Notarte or Leyson.
Besinga testified that he saw the commotion at a distance of about thirty (30) meters
while he was walking towards the group of Leyson at the right side of San Pedro St.
When he was barely three (3) meters away from them, he saw Rogelio and Leyson
approaching each other saying something unintelligible. Notarte was beside Leyson
at this juncture. Rogelio then stabbed Leyson, who drew a gun and fired in the air.
Besinga did not notice the others but his companions were nearby mingled with the
people going home.
Leyson, who survived the attack and sustained a wound on his left arm, claimed to
have been taken by surprise when the Soplente cousins suddenly attacked Notarte
and himself. The assault was so sudden and fast that while he was standing with
arms akimbo, he was stabbed by Rogelio. Leyson reacted by drawing his gun and
firing a shot in the air to prevent further attack. Notarte who was a little to the rear but
very near his right side was attacked by Nicanor at the same instant that Rogelio had
attacked his companion, Leyson. The assaults were done simultaneously with
lightning speed, with Rogelio concentrating on Leyson and Nicanor on Notarte.
Rogelio fled after the firing of the gun. (But Leyson did not testify whether Nicanor
had also taken flight.) Leyson tried to go after Rogelio used but since he was
bleeding profusely, a policeman assisted him in going to the Canda clinic for medical
treatment. He learned the next day that Notarte died as a result of the stabbing.
On the other hand, Rogelio admitted having stabbed both Leyson and Notarte, but
claimed that he did so in self-defense. The testimony of Rogelio and Nicanor
themselves were presented as well as that of their cousin Elena Cafi and store
owner, Joy Malig-on. Based on the findings of the lower court, the defense’s version
of the incident is condensed as follows:
The cousins, Rogelio and Nicanor, watched the amateur singing contest being held
near the Sta. Cruz Chapel at San Pedro St. which started at about nine thirty in the
evening (9:30 p.m.). They were standing only a few meters away from the group of
people who were drinking in the store of Diola. While engrossed with the singing
contest, they were approached by two (2) persons from the group of Leyson who
then tapped Nicanor’s shoulder. They insisted on bringing Nicanor along with them
so Nicanor called for Rogelio’s help. The latter immediately intervened to stop the
two from harassing Nicanor.
A few minutes after the incident, Nicanor went to the adjacent store of Malig-on and
"ordered orange." When Malig-on asked him what happened, Nicanor explained that
the strangers were provoking him by deliberately stepping on his feet. He claimed
however that the incident was nothing to him.
At about past eleven o’clock in the evening (11:00 p.m.), before the conclusion of the
amateur singing contest, Rogelio and Nicanor decided to go home. They related how
Nicanor was harassed near the stage of the amateur show to their cousin, Susing
and his wife, Bukay.
At past midnight, Bukay asked Rogelio and Nicanor to accompany her in looking for
her children who had watched the singing contest. They obliged but before they had
gone about three hundred (300) meters, Nicanor separated from them to buy
cigarettes from a nearby store. Rogelio and Bukay went onwards but at a distance of
about fifty (50) meters from the stage, Rogelio stopped and Bukay proceeded alone
to look for her children. A few minutes later, Bukay appeared with the children and
they all headed home.
While on the way home, Rogelio suddenly found himself surrounded by around ten
(10) persons led by Leyson. He shouted at Nicanor to run and the latter immediately
scampered away. Leyson drew his gun and fired at Rogelio but the latter was able to
parry it by tapping the base of Leyson’s hand holding the gun. Forthwith, Rogelio
stabbed Leyson once. As Notarte had started mauling Rogelio after Leyson had fired
his gun, Rogelio also stabbed Notarte. He stabbed both Leyson and Notarte to
protect himself from being killed by the group who were armed with canes and a lead
pipe aside from Leyson’s gun. Rogelio managed to escape after that and he sought
refuge in the house of Susing.
Before dawn, a policeman arrived at Susing’s house and Rogelio voluntarily gave
himself up. The knife he used was also turned over to the police. He was brought to
the police substation at Lagao. A few hours later, Nicanor was also picked up by the
police.

Topic: Justifying Circumstance: Self-defense

Issue:

Was Rogelio’s act justified due to self-defense?

Held:

There is merit in this contention.

At the commencement of the attack, Rogelio could not have been obliged to view
Notarte, or any other member of the posse for that matter, as a less menacing threat
than Leyson. These events occurred spontaneously in a matter of seconds or even
simultaneously. Rogelio bore no superhuman power to slow down time or to prevent
the events from unfolding at virtual warp speed, to be able to assess with measured
certainty the appropriate commensurate response due to each of his aggressors.
Even those schooled in the legal doctrines of self-defense would, under those dire
circumstances, be barely able to discern the legally defensible response and
immediately employ the same. Our laws on self-defense are supposed to
approximate the natural human responses to danger.
It would be wrong to compel Rogelio to have discerned the appropriate calibrated
response to Notarte’s kicking when he himself was staring at the evil eye of danger.
That would be a gargantuan demand even for the coolest under pressure. The Court
has been reasonable enough to recognize some unreason as justifiable in the law of
self-defense. As stated in the case of People v. Boholst-Caballero.

The law on self-defense embodied in any penal system in the civilized world finds
justification in man’s natural instinct to protect, repel and save his person or rights
from impending danger or peril; it is based on that impulse of self-preservation born
to man and part of his nature as a human being.39
The second element which is reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression was likewise present in the case at bar. The
knife Rogelio habitually carried was the only weapon he had in his person. It was but
logical that the knife would be the only thing he could use against his attackers since
the latter were collectively armed with canes and a handgun.
Anent the third element of self-defense, there was no evidence to show that Rogelio
had provoked Notarte into a fight. The lower court’s finding on this point is backed by
the evidence on record. As the lower court held, it is a fact that Rogelio had not done
anything to provoke the victim prior to or at the time of the fatal encounter.
All the elements of self-defense having been established through the uncontradicted
testimony of Rogelio, the reversal of the lower courts’ decision is in order. Under the
law, a person does not incur any criminal liability if the act committed is in defense of
his person; thus, Rogelio is entitled to an acquittal in this case.