Philosophy CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY Group Topics

Philosophy CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY Group topics
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY:
the law has inherent social biases. Proponents of CLT believe that the law supports the interests of those
who create the law.
CLT states that the law supports a power dynamic which favors the historically privileged and
disadvantages the historically underprivileged. CLT finds that the wealthy and the powerful use the law
as an instrument for oppression in order to maintain their place in hierarchy.
The law has been the means to enshrine and coercively impose the wishes of the dominant group or
institutions. The ruling classes are the same ones who make the law, and execute the law. Governments
are of the ruling people, by the ruling people, and for the ruling people. Since the law servers the status
quo, revolutions and uprising are necessary.
CLT aims for a “deconstruction” of the law and uses the “hermeneutics of suspicion” to advance
marginalized causes. CLT theorists call for radical changes in the law and in the structure of society itself.
Unger has called this radical project "institutional reconstruction." Many in the CLT want to overturn the
hierarchical structures of domination in modern society, and many of them have focused on the law as a
tool in achieving this goal. The law, CLT claims, has played a key role in maintaining that hierarchy by
impeding efforts at social change.
III. APPLICATION OF CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE
A. G.R. NO. 225973, NOVEMBER 08, 2016: OCAMPO ET AL. V. ENRIQUEZ
FACTS:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo
Duterte announced that he would allow the burial of former President Ferdinand Marcos at
the Libingan Ng Mga Bayani. He then won the said election. On August 7, 2016, public
respondent Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to the
public respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines regarding the
interment of Marcos at the LNMB. On August 9, 2016, respondent AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto
Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General regarding the
funeral honors and service for Marcos.
Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the following were filed by petitions for certiorari
and prohibition by human rights advocates, human rights victims, members of the Bar and
human rights lawyers, members of the legislature, former Chairperson of the Commission of
Human Rights, former Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, former Chairperson of the
Regional Human Rights Commission, and concerned Filipino citizens and taxpayers.
ISSUES:
Procedural
1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at

the LNMB poses a justiciable controversy
2. Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions
3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines or exhaustion of administrative remedies

and hierarchy of courts
Substantive
1. Whether the respondents Secretary of National Defense and AFP Rear Admiral
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
2. Whether the Issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and
directive violate the Constitution, domestic and international laws
3. Whether historical facts, laws enacted over ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and
their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have
nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB
4. Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of
former President Marcos at the LMNB after they entered into an agreement with the
Government as to the conditions by which his remains shall be brought back and
interred in the Philippines
RULING:
The Court ruled that the petitions must be dismissed.
Procedural Grounds
First, the Court agrees with the OSG that the decision of President Duterte to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable
controversy. The President exercised his powers under the Constitution and the Executive
Order No. 292 also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. His intention was to promote
national healing and forgiveness.
Second, locus standi requires that a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy. Petitioners, who filed their respective petitions, in their capacities as citizens,
human rights violations victims, legislators, members of the Bar and taxpayers, have no
legal standing to file such petitions because they failed to show a direct and personal injury
as a result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB.
Third, on the basis of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners should be faulted

for failing to seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the
Secretary of National Defense. If petitioners were still dissatisfied, they could elevate the
matter before the Office of the President which has control and supervision over the
Department of National Defense.
Lastly, petitioners cannot brush aside the doctrine of hierarchy of courts that requires such
petitions to be filed first with the proper Regional Trial Court, which can resolve questions of
law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over such petitions and has the
power to issue a restraining order and injunction when proven necessary.
Substantive Grounds
First, the President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence. Consistent with President Duterte’s mandate under
Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution, the burial of Marcos at the LNMB does not contravene
R.A. No.289, R.A. 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by the petitioners.
R.A. No. 289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as the burial place of the
mortal remains of all the Presidents of the Philippines, national heroes, and patriots.
Petitioners miserably failed to provide legal and historical bases as to their supposition that
the LNMB and the National Pantheon are the same. Even if the Court treats R.A. No. 289 as
relevant to this issue, the burial at the LNMB does not confer upon Marcos the status of
“hero”.
R.A. No. 10368 is an act providing for reparation and recognition of victims of human rights
violations during the Marcos regime, documentation of said violations, appropriating funds
therefor. This Court cannot subscribe to petitioners’ logic that the beneficial provisions of
the act are not exclusive as it includes the prohibition on Marcos’ burial at the LNMB.
On international human rights laws, petitioners argue that the burial will violate the rights of
the HRVVs to “full” and “effective” reparation, under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. Contrary to the postulation, the country’s history will not be easily changed
by a single resolve of President Duterte, acting through the public respondents, to bury
Marcos at the LNMB.
Second, the President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
National Shrines refer to sites or structures hallowed and revered for their history or
association as declared by the NHCP. Military memorials and battle monuments declared as
national shrines, which have been under the administration, maintenance and development
of the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office of the DND. These are excluded from the jurisdiction
of the NHCP.
Contrary to the dissent, P.D. No. 105 does not apply to the LNMB. As stated, Marcos issued
P.D. No. 208 prior to P.D. No. 105. Based on the canon of statutory construction, ejusdem
generis, the LNMB is not a site “of the birth, exile, imprisonment, detention or death of
great and eminent leaders of the nation.” Also, since its establishment, the LNMB has been
a military shrine under the jurisdiction of the PVAO.
As to AFP Regulations on the LNMB, aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos
possessed none of the disqualification stated in AFP Regulations G 161-375. He was neither
convicted by final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.
In addition, the variety of cases mentioned by petitioners, which were decided with finality
by courts here and abroad, have no bearing in this case since they are merely civil in
nature; hence, cannot and do not establish moral turpitude.
In summary, there is no clear or legal basis of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. At bar, President Duterte, through the public respondents, acted
within the bounds of the law and jurisprudence. The petitions are dismissed and the Status
Quo Ante Order is lifted.
Application of Critical Legal Theory
In this case, the application of Critical Legal Theory is demonstrated through the
indeterminacy of legal doctrine. Critical Legal Theory shows how a set of legal principles
may result to competing or contradictory results. 1 It is said that critical legal theory
questions the laws assumptions and becomes a means to for the dominant group or
institutions to serve their own self-interests.2
1
Critical Legal Studies Movement. (n.d.). Retrieved from The Bridge:
https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/CriticalTheory/critical2.htm
2
Nicolo F. Bernardo and Oscar B. Bernardo, Philawsophia: Philosophy and Theory of Philippine Law., p. 69
This could easily be observed in the differing opinions of the justices of the Supreme Court.
There were several dissenting and separate concurring opinions attached to the En Banc
decision of the Court.
An example of this is one of the procedural grounds wherein the Court decided that the
decision of President Duterte to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a
political question that is not a justiciable controversy. Referring to the dissenting opinion of
former Chief Justice Sereno, the former magistrate points out that if the Court shies away
from addressing the principal question of whether a decision to bury the former President
would contradict the anti Martial Law and human rights underpinnings, it would weaken its
role as the protector of the constitutional liberties of our people.
Based on this comparison, it is seen how the determination whether the decision of the
President is a political question or a justiciable controversy displays the indeterminacy of a
legal doctrine. Two members of the same Court can have differing or contradicting opinions
of the same issue.
Another application of Critical Legal Theory can be observed when legal analysis and legal
culture bewilder those who lack proper and sufficient understanding of the law. It is then
used to make legal results and decisions seem legitimate. 3
A close study of the substantial grounds shows how the arguments of the OSG and
consequentially, the decision of the Court distinctly separate the burial of Marcos at the
LNMB with its implications on the subjects of heroism, national shrines, and human rights
violations. The decision stands firm that there is no express prohibition against the burial of
Marcos at the LNMB. There was a disregard on the possible historical and psychological
analyses of the case, which would give due merit to the petitions at hand.
An additional facet of Critical Legal Theory is how a previously disfavored social vision can
be argued based on legal and political practices, which can then make this vision part of a
legal strategy.
A previously disfavored social vision is the acceptance or approval of anything that would
favor or give an advantage to Marcos, his legacy, and his family. Historical and educational
institutions maintains a long-standing view regarding former president Marcos. When
President Duterte presented an entirely new vision of healing and forgiveness, the use of
legal doctrine aided the acceptance of this shift in perspective and mindset.
It is undeniable that there exist biases in politics and in law. The challenge is to remain
vigilant with the judgments and values used in the interpreting the law and safeguard the
real conditions of the people.
B. G.R. No. 237428, MAY 11, 2018: REPUBLIC VS. SERENO
FACTS:
The Republic seeks to oust Sereno from her position as Chief Justice on the ground
that the she failed to show that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable
qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3), 67 Article VIII of the
Constitution. Republic contends that the respondent failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of
filing the complete SALNs, which her integrity remains unproven.
3
Critical Legal Studies Movement. (n.d.). Retrieved from The Bridge:
https://cyber.harvard.edu/bridge/CriticalTheory/critical2.htm
Thus, the Republic contends that respondent's failure to submit her SALNs as
required by the JBC disqualifies her, at the outset, from being a candidate for the position of
Chief Justice. Since Sereno lacks the requirement of having SALNs, she has not proven her
integrity, which is a requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that
since respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she
has no right to hold office and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.
On the other hand, the respondents maintain that, on the strength of Section 2
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and the cases of Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan,
Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-
Affidavit for Disbarment Against Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the Chief Justice
may be ousted from office only by impeachment. Thus, the respondent contends that the
use of the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution
does not signify that Members of the Supreme Court may be removed through modes other
than impeachment.
According to respondent, the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to
create an exclusive category of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment
and not otherwise. It is likewise the argument of respondent that since a petition for quo
warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result to a problem because a judge of
lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and administrative
supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections
6 and 11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the Supreme Court disciplinary
and administrative power over all courts and the personnel thereof.
She theorizes that if a Member of the Supreme Court can be ousted through quo
warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress' "check" on the Supreme Court through
impeachment would be rendered inutile.
MAIN CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT:
The respondent contends that the supposed failed to file the required SALNs
allegedly took place for several years from 1986 to 2006, thus, the “cause of ouster” existed
even before the respondent was appointed as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012. Therefore,
as early as her appointment, the Republic, through the OSG, already had a cause of action
to seek her ouster.
Even assuming that the one-year prescriptive period may be counted from the
Republic's discovery of the disqualification, the petition would still be barred since the
Republic would have made such a discovery through U.P., 28 considering that the U.P.
HRDO is required to submit a list of employees who failed to file their SALNs.
Respondent claims that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs
because as a public officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was
regular. According to respondent, the Republic failed to overcome this presumption as the
documents relied upon by it, i.e., certifications from the U.P. HRDO and the Ombudsman, do
not categorically state that respondent failed to file her SALNs.
On the contrary, respondent points out that the U.P. HRDO had certified that she had
been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges as of June 1, 2006 and that
there was no pending administrative charge against her. It is likewise the contention of
respondent that public officers without pay or those who do not receive compensation are
not required to file a SALN.
Thus, respondent argues that for the periods that she was on official Decision G.R.
No. 237428 leave without pay, she was actually not required to file any SALN for the
inclusive years. She adds that to require the submission of SALNs as an absolute
requirement is to expand the qualifications provided for under the Constitution. However the
respondent represents that she continues to recover and retrieve her missing SALNs and
will present them before the Senate sitting as the Impeachment Tribunal and not to this
Court considering her objections to the latter's exercise of jurisdiction. Respondent also
stresses that the failure to file SALNs or to submit the same to the JBC has no bearing on
one's integrity. And that it is within the jurisdiction of the JBC to determine if CJ Sereno is fit
as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and not for the courts to determine.
However, Republic later on filed a reply negating all the contention of CJ Sereno
stating that the proper remedy for such case is only through a quo warranto petition only
and not impeachment. They also stated that it is the court and not the JBC who has
jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant is legally occupying a public position, which goes into the
questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally qualified and has
complete legal title to the office.
DECISION OF THE COURT:
Quo warranto and impeachment are not mutually exclusive remedies and may even
proceed simultaneously. The existence of other remedies against the usurper does not
prevent the State from commencing a quo warranto proceeding.
It is apparent that although the concept of impeachment has undergone various

modifications to suit different jurisdictions and government forms, the consensus seems to
be that it is essentially a political process meant to justify the violation of the public's trust.
Impeachment is a process initiated by the government, or some branch thereof, against a
person who has somehow handed the government or the community. The process,
moreover, is adversarial in nature and resembles, to that extent, a judicial trial.
Respondent anchors her position that she can be removed from office only by
impeachment on the Court's ruling in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Fernan, In Re
Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Marcos etal v. Borra. It should be stressed, however, that
none of these cases concerned the validity of an impeachable officer's appointment
authority to hold that a quo warranto action can never be filed against an impeachable
officer. In issuing such pronouncement, the Court is presumed to have been aware of its
power to issue writs of quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. Even the PET
Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo
warranto to question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom
are impeachable officers. Following respondent's theory that an impeachable officer can be
removed only through impeachment means that a President or Vice President against whom
an election protest has been filed can demand for the 30 dismissal of the protest on the
ground that it can potentially cause his/her removal from office through a mode other than
by impeachment. To sustain respondent's position is to render election protests under the
PET Rules nugatory. The Constitution could not have intended such absurdity since fraud
and irregularities in elections cannot be tolerated, and the will of the people as reflected in
their votes must be determined and respected. The Court could not, therefore, have
unintentionally reduced its own judicial power by prohibiting quo warranto proceedings
against impeachable officers.
Further, the PET Rules provide that any registered voter who has voted in the
election concerned within ten days after the proclamation of the winner may file a petition
for quo warranto, contesting the election of the President or Vice-President on the ground of
ineligibility or betrayal to the Republic of the Philippines. Despite disloyalty to the Republic
being a crime against public order defined and penalized under the penal code, and thus
may also be treated as other high crimes, constituting an impeachable offense, quo
warranto as a remedy to remove the erring President or Vice President is nevertheless made
expressly available.
This would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto
petition against an impeachable officer. In the cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and
Estrada v. Macapagal Arroyo, 164 the Court assumed jurisdiction over the quo warranto
petition filed against respondent therein who, at the time of the filing of the petition, had
taken an oath and assumed the Office of the President. Petitioner therein prayed for
judgment confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity. In
fact, in the said cases, there was not even a claim that respondent therein was disqualified
from holding office and accordingly challenged respondent's status as dejure 14th President
of the Republic. By entertaining the quo warranto petition, the Court in fact determined
whether then President Estrada has put an end to his official status by his alleged act of
resignation.
The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not exclude a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers. The provision reads: Section 2. The President,
the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All 31 other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is

plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of
the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. The provision uses the permissive term
"may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion and cannot be construed as
having a mandatory effect. We have consistently held that the term “may” is indicative of a
mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity is vested with
a right or faculty that he has the option to exercise. An option to remove by impeachment
admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.
The essence of quo warranto is to protect the body politic from the usurpation of
public office and to ensure that government authority is entrusted only to qualified
individuals. Reason therefore dictates that quo warranto should be an available remedy to
question the legality of appointments especially of impeachable officers considering that
they occupy some of the highest-ranking offices in the land and are capable of exercising
vast power and influence on matters of law and policy.
The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally
occupying a public position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally
appointed was legally qualified and has complete legal title to the office. In other words,
while impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or
her office, quo warranto involves matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the
position to begin with. Given the nature and effect of an action for quo warranto, such
remedy is ineffective to determine whether or not an official has committed misconduct in
office nor is it the proper legal vehicle to evaluate the person's performance in the office. An
action for quo warranto does not try a person's culpability of an impeachment offense,
neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability.
While on the issue of the filing of the SALN it is mentioned in the decision of the
court that it is a constitutional requirement, and the transgression of which may, in the
wisdom of the impeachment court, be interpreted as constituting culpable violation ·of the
Constitution. But then, respondent, unlike the President, the Vice-President, Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, apart from having to comply with the
Constitutional SALN requirement, also answers to the unique Constitutional qualification of
having to 32 be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence
qualifications not expressly required by the fundamental law for the other impeachable
officers.
Respondent's failure to file her SALNs and to submit the same to the JBC goes into
the very qualification of integrity. In other words, when a Member of the Supreme Court
transgresses the SALN requirement prior to his or her appointment as such, he or she
commits a violation of the Constitution and denies his or her qualification to hold the office.
It is not therefore accurate to place Members of the Supreme Court, such as · respondent,
on absolutely equal plane as that of the other impeachable officers, when more stringent
and burdensome requirements for qualification and holding of office are expressly placed
upon them.
The fact remains that the Republic raised an issue as to respondent's eligibility to
occupy the position of Chief Justice, an obviously legal question, which can be resolved
through review of jurisprudence and pertinent laws. Logic, common sense, reason,
practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an
unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached.
IN CONNECTION TO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY:
According to Robert Unger’s concept, “total understanding is never possible, only

total criticism.” One can conclude that in his statement and applying such in the case of
Republic vs. Sereno, that there will always be a decision that not every citizen of the
Philippines or any person, who would either agree or disagree or see the same as those with
the view of the Judges and Justice who decided on the matter but that is irrelevant to the
case and it may also be of least importance for the Justices and even to lawmakers
themselves. Whether it is the law in itself, or the nature of how a decision has been decided,
internal issues within the Judiciary, etc. people cannot put a blind eye on it.
In the case of Republic vs. Sereno, there were negative comments and different
opinions, even on the very start of the trial and then after it was decided, still, there were
people who were not in favor of the decision of ousting the Former Chief Justice Sereno.
There will always be questions for there are different opinions and interpretation on the
matter. But these are mere opinions that for those who decided on the matter, they know
better, and they think they know better than any other person who does. All that those who
rendered the decision gave 33 importance is their own preferences.
This is the nature of Critical Legal Theory; there exist biases and politics even in the
law. There are instances that one cannot avoid biases and politics in the aspect of law, it
cannot be denied in the case for the are loopholes that even those of little knowledge or
those who do not have any idea on how the law works, that there exist a lot of questionable
things that occurred from the very start up to the time when the decision was rendered. But
one cannot conclude that such is the right decision, or wrong decision because even when
after the decision was released to the public there were endless questioning going on.
Robert Unger’s concept of Critical Legal Theory is relevant and evident in the case of
Republic vs. Sereno. There exists so many arguments, opinions, interpretations of the law,
and even biases. That here, there exist some form of oppression, power play and giving
favor to those who are privileged. Former Chief Justice Sereno, has in good faith, as stated
in her arguments that she has validly complied with the requirements, and that the question
with regards to failing to provide for the SALNs while teaching in UP, is even prior to her
being appointed as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Despite many claims, and
evidences to prove her innocence, she was found guilty.
One of Unger’s studies on Critical Legal Theory he also mentioned that, “we do not
attend to theoretical strain and inconsistency because we believe falsely that, when these
aspects of thought are encountered, we can step outside the theory wherein the conflict
resides and assess it from some “neutral” or “objective” point of view.” But if we have seen
to the theory–relative core of knowledge and understanding, we recognize that this is
impossible. Any assessment of theoretical conflict must itself be theoretical; there is no
theory-independent realm for us to enter.
In other words, this fact becomes what it is for us because of the way we categorize
it. How we classify it depends on the categories available to us in the language we speak, or
in the theory we use, and on our ability to replace the source of categories at our disposal.
In whatever way we view the play of tradition and conscious purpose in the manipulation of
the categories, there is no direct appeal to reality, for reality is put together by the mind.” It
can be inferred that in the instant case, there were various questions of law and even
lawmakers and justices were questioned of whether or not a certain remedy is to be applied
or whether there is an ambiguous language of the law, which hinders people from further
understanding and reaching somehow the correct decision.
In this case, there were questions of whether or not the right remedy to oust Former
Chief Justice Sereno is only through a Quo Warranto or only through Impeachment, there
are two available remedies but only one is to be applied in the case, thus the nature of
Critical Legal Theory sets in. Some decisions and methods, or even when it comes to the
application of the law itself, our justices and judges, have different set of ideas, same with
the Former Chief Justice Sereno, she also has a different idea on the law which is seen on
her contentions and her arguments, and also with the situation she is faced with. But in the
case, it has mention and is evident that there can be changes because of the changing of
times, norms, ideas, interpretation of those entrusted with applying and coming up with a
decision. There are also instances that it can be applied before, but it cannot be applied in
the coming days or even now, it is indeterminate. It highly depends on those who make the
decision and their interpretation of the law and even on their own biases, as well as it
depends on the time.
To sum it up, there were rules that can be interpreted whether may it be in
accordance with the language of law or whether it be on the understanding of the one
entrusted with the interpretation of what it means is that these questions may depend on
how a certain group of people or person understands such application of law or the
language of the law itself. It depends on their preferences and how they would want a
decision to be held, it depends on their own ideas and not always on what is said by law.
But what is actually meant by Unger, in connection with the case of Republic vs. Sereno and
applying Critical Legal Theory is that, one is not really sure of whether one has reached a
correct decision. There will still be various questions and criticisms up to this day, because
there exists different opinions, understandings, interpretations and application of the law
which may be later on understood and one can conclude that, one cannot really reach a
correct decision whether it be in the aspect of law, or in life in itself especially when there
exists some form of biases and politics sets in to the picture. That their own preferences
must prevail, thus this is one of the nature of Critical Legal Theory.
C. G.R no. 101083; July 20, 1993: Oposa vs. Factoran
Facts:
The 44 petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a corporation engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. A complaint was instituted as a taxpayers class suit and
alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and
entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the
country's virgin tropical rainforests." And was filed for themselves and others who are
equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they
"represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." And prayed that defendant,
Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to:
 (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

 (2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber license agreements."
PETITIONER’S GENERAL ALLEGATION:
The Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million
(30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which
varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; These rainforests contain
a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful
ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per
cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential,
industrial, commercial and other uses; The distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as
water shortages, massive erosion and consequential loss of soil fertility, endangering and
extinction of the country’s flora and fauna, disturbance and dislocation of cultural
communities, flooding of lowlands, etc. Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and
detrimental consequences of continued deforestation are so capable of unquestionable
demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice.
SPECIFIED CAUSE OF ACTION:
Public records reveal that defendant's predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million
hectares for commercial logging purposes.At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about
200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included — the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this
ensuing decade, if not earlier.
The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minors' generation and to generations yet
unborn are evident and incontrovertible. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA
holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs — especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may
never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
Moreover, they have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country. On the other hand, Factoran's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy
which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
 (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
 (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
 (c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to
a life of dignity and well-being'. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977).
Furthermore, his continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to —
 a. effect 'a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth'

and 'make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic).' (Section 1, Article
XII of the Constitution);
 b. 'protect the nation's marine wealth.' (Section 2, ibid);
 c. 'conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic).'
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
 d. 'protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.' (Section 16,
Article II, id.)
And such act of the defendant is contrary to the highest law of humankind—the natural law
—and violative of plaintiff’s right to self-preservation and perpetuation. There is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth.
FACTORAN’S MOTION TO DISMISS:
Alleged that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and that he issue raised by
the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive
branches of Government.
RTC JUDGE OF MAKATI:
Granted the motion to dismiss and sustained the claim that the complaint states no
cause of action and raises a political question. Moreover, the RTC of Makati ruled that the
granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
PLAINTIFF’S INSTANT SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI
Ask the Supreme Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that
the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Moreover the
petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as
it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on:
 Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),

 Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
 Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy),
 Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law.
 Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation, per Section
4 of E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
And anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment
clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when public interest so
requires. The RTC of Makati aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the
state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a
valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging
should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly
addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert
that the petitioners' recourse is not to file an action in court, but to lobby before Congress
for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally. As to the matter of the cancellation
of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due
process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time — usually
for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated
the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations Petitioners' proposition to
have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative
of the requirements of due process.
ISSUES/RATIO:
1. W/N PETITIONER MINORS HAVE STANDING – YES.

The Supreme Court find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of
their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to
sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of
nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. Such rhythm and harmony
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. Needless to
say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
2. W/N THE RESPONDENT JUDGE’S ORDER WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION– YES.
The Court do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to
allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history,
is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides: "SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature." This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter.Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. The right to a balanced and healthful
ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. The
said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of
the country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would
be irreversibly disrupted. Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution
concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources,
then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4
of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
"shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management,
development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of
all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of
the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos."
o Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

 "SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of
the different segments of the population to the development and use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but
for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization;
development and conservation of our natural resources."
o This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987 (DENR Mandate):
 "SEC. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural

Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
 (2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of
carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise
the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources."
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of
the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The
former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and
improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable
harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." Thus, the right of
the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear
as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
And such denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain
that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof
requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. After a careful examination of
the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE OF ACTION, to
be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
RELATION TO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY
Humans are stewards of God’s creation and by this every individuals are called to
take good care of all that He created and if he harms it, he harms himself and the future of
his children. With this, numerous individuals becomes an advocate for the protection of the
natural environment from destruction, disintegration and pollution. 4 In connection to the
unending growth of environmentalist series of environmental laws were enforced
internationally; including Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Climate Change. And in fact, the Philippines
come up with laws ensuring environmental justice such as The Philippine Environmental
Policy and The Philippine Environmental Code which are enforced through the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources. Moreover, the Supreme Court of the Philippines
generate attention and acclaim all over the archipelago and was hailed as “the first
environmental decision based squarely on principles of intergenerational equity.” 5
In the case of Oposa v. Factoran the Supreme Court stated that the basis of the
minors represented by their parents and the unborn generations focused on the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology. The Constitution provides that “the state shall protect and
advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature.”6 Moreover, the Court pointed out that the decrees issued
4
5
Paul A. Barresi, Beyond Fairness to Future Generations: An Intragenerational Alternative to Intergenerational
Equity in the International Environmental Arena, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 59, 82 (1997)
6
The Philippine Constitution, Article II, Section 16. (1987)
prior to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, such as the Philippine Environmental Policy
and the Philippine Environmental Code already paid attention to the environmental rights of
the present and future generations. 7 These laws render the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources the responsibility to enforce the laws for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos. The Secretary of DENR, Factoran’s claim that the granting of
timber license agreement does not impair the environment rights of the petitioner is
contrary to the duty of the DENR to ensure the preservation of the environment for all the
generation even the succeeding ones.
The case defined the role of the Courts in the enforcement of environmental rights
due to the influence of a large number of environmental activists who shape the content,
force and application of law which greatly reflects the essence or purpose of the Critical
Legal Theory. Specifically, the Supreme Court of the Philippines have taken its place in the
spectrum of enforcing the social right of both the present and future generation to a
balanced and healthful ecology and equitable sharing of the environment. The 44 minor
petitioners including the unborn generation, greatly affects the ruling of the Supreme Court
with regard to the application of environmental laws in connection with their social rights
since all of them inhibits ecological consciousness and oneness with nature which generates
a greater impact on how the Supreme Court will rule.
D. G.R. NO. 207969, AUGUST 6, 2019: MAYNILAD VS. THE SECRETARY OF THE
DENR
THE CASE: Challenged in these Petitions for Review on Certiorari are separate rulings of the
Court of Appeals. These adjudications uniformly affirmed the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources (SENR), finding petitioners MWSS, MAYNILAD and MANILA WATER, liable
for violation of and noncompliance with Section 8 of the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9275, or the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (Clean Water Act).
SECTION 8. Domestic Sewage Collection, Treatment and

Disposal - Within five (5) years following the effectivity of
this Act, the Agency vested to provide water supply and
sewerage facilities and/or concessionaires in Metro Manila
and other highly urbanized cities (HUCs) as defined in
Republic Act No. 7160, in coordination with LGUs, shall be
required to connect the existing sewage line found in all
subdivisions, condominiums, commercial centers, hotels,
sports and recreational facilities, hospitals, market places,
public buildings, industrial complex and other similar
establishments including households to available sewerage
system. Provided, That the said connection shall be subject
to sewerage services charge/fees in accordance with
existing laws, rules or regulations unless the sources had
already utilized their own sewerage system: Provided,
further, That all sources of sewage and septage shall
comply with the requirements herein.
In areas not considered as HUCs, the DPWH in coordination

with the Department, DOH and other concerned agencies,
shall employ septage or combined sewerage-septage
management system.
7
Minors Oposa, supra note 1, at 807.
For the purpose of this section, the DOH, coordination with

other government agencies, shall formulate guidelines and
standards for the collection, treatment and disposal of
sewage including guidelines for the establishment and
operation of centralized sewage treatment system.
FACTS:
On ApriI 2, 2009, the Regional Office of the DENR Environmental Management Bureau-
Region III (EMB-RIII) filed a complaint before the DENR's Pollution Adjudication Board
(PAB) charging MWSS and its concessionaires, MAYNILAD and MANILA WATER, with failure
to provide, install, operate, and maintain adequate Wastewater Treatment Facilities
(WWTFs) for sewerage system resulting in the degraded quality and beneficial use of the
receiving bodies of water leading to Manila Bay, and which has directly forestalled the
DENR's mandate to implement the operational plan for the rehabilitation and restoration of
Manila Bay and its river tributaries.
ACTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DENR
Prompted by the said complaints, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
(SENR) issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) which determined petitioners' violation of Section
8 of the Clean Water Act, in that they have not provided, installed, or maintained sufficient
WWTFs and sewerage connections satisfactory enough in quantity to meet the standards
and objectives of the law, notwithstanding court orders and the lapse of the five-year period
provided by the Clean Water Act.
RESPONSE OF THE PETITIONERS TO THE SECRETARY OF DENR
Petitioners submitted their respective answers to the charges.
MWSS led the defense and averred that they were compliant with the law. MWSS insists it
did not violate the law. It argues, in essence, that its obligation under Section 8 of the Clean
Water Act has yet to accrue given the lack of required coordination and cooperation by the
lead and implementing agencies under Section 7 of the law and non-compliance by the
DPWH, DENR and LGUs with Sections 7 of the Clean Water Act, specifically the preparation
and establishment of a national program on sewerage and septage management.
MAYNILAD mainly anchors its arguments on SC ruling in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of

Manila Bay which ultimately ordered MWSS to construct the necessary WWTFs in the areas
of Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite with a deadline for completion of the construction.
MANILA WATER asserted the supremacy of the Concession Agreements executed with
MWSS containing service targets for water supply, sewerage, and sanitation within specific
milestone periods spread over the twenty-five year concession period. It maintains that it
was deprived of due process of law when the DENR Secretary imposed a fine without a valid
complaint or charge, and that these were imposed without the requisite recommendation
from the PAB.
THE RULING OF THE SENR
The SENR ruled that the Clean Water Act, specifically, the provisions on the five-year period
to connect the existing sewage lines, is mandatory, and the refusal of petitioners' customers
to connect to a sewage line is irrelevant to Section 8 of the law. The SENR further stated
that petitioners' failure to provide a centralized sewerage system and connect all sewage
lines is a continuing unmitigated environmental pollution resulting in the release and
discharge of untreated water into various water areas and Manila Bay. Citing the Supreme
Court ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Concerned Residents
of Manila Bay, strict compliance with the Clean Water Act is a necessary given, and the five-
year periodic review stipulated in the Agreements between petitioners should have
considered and factored in the requirements of the Clean Water Act.
Thus, upon recommendation of the PAB, the SENR found MWSS, Maynilad, and Manila
Water liable for violation of the Clean Water Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR).
Petitioners filed separate petitions for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the
Court of Appeals questioning these Orders of the SENR.
THE RULINGS OF THE CA
IN MAYNILAD’S PETITION
The Court of Appeals dismissed Maynilad' s petition. It rejected petitioners' invocation of the
ruling of the Supreme Court in MMDA v. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay which, Maynilad
asserts, supersedes the five-year compliance period set by the Clean Water Act for
petitioners to connect all the existing sewage line found in the whole of Metro Manila and
other Highly Urbanized Cities (HUCs) as defined in the Local Government Code of 1991. The
Court of Appeals further held that the invoked item in the body of the MMDA case relating to
petitioners' obligations in the clean-up of Manila Bay, simply sets different deadlines: one
for submission by Maynilad and Manila Water of their plans and projects for the construction
of WWTFs in certain areas in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite, and another for the actual
construction and completion thereof.
IN MANILA WATER’S PETITION
The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed Manila Water's petition. It held that the compliance
period under the Clean Water Act is separate from the compliance periods provided in the
Agreement between MWSS and Manila Water. In the same vein, it also ruled that the DPWH
need not first formulate a National Sewerage and Septage Management Program (NSSMP)
before Manila Water can be compelled to comply with Section 8 of the Clean Water Act.
IN METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM
The petition of MWSS before the Court of Appeals met the similar fate of dismissal. It
preliminarily dealt with the incorrect remedy of MWSS when it resorted to Rule 43 in
questioning the Orders of the SENR. The Orders were issued not by the PAB, but by the
SENR pursuant to Section 28 of the Clean Water Act. As such, the remedy of MWSS
therefrom is an appeal to the Office of the President and not a Rule 43 petition to the Court
of Appeals. The court a quo also noted that the MWSS failed to exhaust administrative
remedies which renders its petition dismissible.
Respondents' Arguments through the Office of the Solicitor General
Through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondents refute petitioners' uniform
assertion that they did not violate Section 8 of the Clean Water Act. The OSG points out
petitioners' liability for violation of the Clean Water Act in failing to provide a centralized
sewerage system under Section 8 thereof, which is distinct from the obligations of various
government agencies under the same law. Respondents disagree with petitioners'
contention that the conditions contained in Section 7 of the Clean Water Act are conditions
precedent for the implementation of Section 8 thereof. They defend that the Order of the
SENR finding petitioners liable for violation of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act were based
on substantial evidence, and that the SENR Order imposing a fine on petitioners for violation
of Section 8 of the Clean Water Act was based on a valid complaint or charge. Specific to
the Court of Appeals's dismissal of Maynilad's appeal, respondents also assert that the
assailed Orders of the SENR had already attained finality.
ISSUES WITH RULING:
1. Procedural : Whether the Orders of the SENR dated October 7 and December 2, 2009
did not comply with the requirements under Section 28 of the Clean Water Act &
Whether petitioners were deprived of procedural due process when the Secretary of the
DENR imposed a fine on them for violation of the Clean Water Act.
RULING:
The SENR 's Orders are appealable to the Office of the President.
In arguing that the SENR violated petitioners' right to due process in imposing a fine without
a valid complaint or charge and without recommendation from the PAB, petitioners
inadvertently highlight the gravity of their procedural mistake, i.e., the filing of a petition for
review under Rule 43 to the appellate court to question the Orders of the SENR.
The PAB is a separate office under the Department proper, and is chaired by the Secretary
of the Department. In general, the PAB has exclusive jurisdiction over the adjudication of
pollution cases, and all other matters related thereto, including the imposition of
administrative sanctions. The P AB also exercises specific jurisdiction over certain
environmental laws, including the Clean Water Act.
However, the Orders of the SENR are different from the issuances of the PAB. Section 28 of
the Clean Water Act and its IRR specifically bestows upon the Secretary of the DENR, upon
recommendation of the PAB, in cases of commission of prohibited acts under and violations
of the Clean Water Act, the power to impose fines, order the closure, suspension of
development or construction, or cessation of operations, or, where appropriate
disconnection of water supply.
The herein assailed Orders dated October 7 and December 2, 2009 were not issued by the
PAB but by the SENR. Thus, we affirm the appellate court's holding that the appropriate
remedy from the Orders of the SENR is an appeal to the Office of the President.
Consequently, petitioners prematurely filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals
and failed to exhaust administrative remedies. These erroneous procedural steps effectively
rendered petitioners' appeals dismissible, resulting in the finality of the Orders of the SENR.
POWERS OF THE PAB (POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD)
The role of the PAB in the imposition of fines for violation of Section 28 of the Clean Water
Act is restricted to a recommendation of penalty. The execution of punitive power
thereunder remains with the SENR. This, however, should not be taken to mean that the
recommendatory role of the P AB is dispensable. Its technical expertise in pollution cases

such as the one at hand remains crucial, and this expertise, the SENR definitely did not
disregard. Despite the lack of actual or formal recommendation of liability given by the PAB
against petitioners, the technical conference was conducted by the PAB, and the findings
during the said conference and upon deliberation on the pleadings of the parties were
produced by the PAB. The latter body, referred to as the Board by the SENR, had
determined petitioners' liabilities on the basis of its own lengthy disquisitions, as noted by
the SENR in its Order dated October 7, 2009.
R.A. 9275 is mala prohibita as opposed to mala in se. It has already been cited by the
Supreme Court that violation of environmental laws, are mala prohibita xxx. It is sufficient
that the acts complained of were proven (and in this instance admitted), and no amount of
justification will clear it of any violation. Section 8 of R.A. 9275 itself makes it mandatory for
any sewage and septage to comply with the said rule. Persons in violation of such
mandatory provision may be held accountable in accordance with Section 28 of the said law.
It should further be noted that the five (5)-year period was made to provide sufficient time
to comply with the interconnection of all water supply and sewerage facilities. The continued
failure of providing a centralized sewerage system in compliance with the said law means
that several sewage line continues to dump and release untreated sewerage within their
vicinities -resulting in unmitigated environmental pollution. The fact of the matter is that,
because of the failure to completely centralized the sewerage system and comply with
Section 8 of the law, untreated water are continuously being dumped within existing water
areas and the Manila Bay, resulting in the continued pollution of the said water areas.
As regards the argument of the respondents that the MWSS entered into a Concessionaire
Agreement with Manila Water and Maynilad prior to the CWA and therefore they believed
that subsequent law should not impair existing agreements, the Board took note that the
parties review the provisions of the CA every five (5) years. If this is the case and if there is
indeed intention on the part of the parties to comply with the law, the parties should have
made the schedule in the CA consistent with the requirement of the said law.
2. Substantive: Whether petitioners violated Section 8 of the Clean Water Act & Whether
the ruling in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay supersedes the five-year
compliance period stated in Section 8 of the Clean Water Act and extended petitioners'
compliance therewith until the year 2037.
RULING :
Violation of the Clean Water Act by petitioners
Water Management as a Public Trust. This Court introduces the Public Trust Doctrine.
The Public Trust Doctrine, speaks of an imposed duty upon the State and its representative
of continuing supervision over the taking and use of appropriated water. The "doctrine
further holds that certain natural resources belong to all and cannot be privately owned or
controlled because of their inherent importance to each individual and society as a whole. A
clear declaration of public ownership, the doctrine reaffirms the superiority of public rights
over private rights for critical resources. It impresses upon states the affirmative duties of a
trustee to manage these natural resources for the benefit of present and future generations
and embodies key principles of environmental protection: stewardship, communal
responsibility, and sustainability."
In this framework, a relationship is formed -"the State is the trustee,

which manages specific natural resources -the trust principal -for the trust
principal -for the benefit of the current and future generations -the
beneficiaries ."
Via legislative act of police power, the enactment of the Clean Water Act thrusts the
obligation onto the water concessionaires to provide for a proper sewerage and septage
system that complies with environmental and health standards to protect present and future
generations. The magnitude of this law is highlighted by the trust relationship among the
State, concessionaires, and water users, which must reflect a universal intangible
agreement that water is an ecological resource that needs to be protected for the welfare of
the citizens. In essence, "[t]he public trust doctrine is based on the notion that private
individuals cannot fully own trust resources but can only hold them subject to a servitude on
behalf of the public." "States can accomplish this goal more efficiently through statutory
regulation" which was essentially done through the legislation of the Clean Water Act, and
the urgency ·and significance of which is now fortified by the courts under the Public Trust
Doctrine as clamored for by the circumstances of this case.
The Clean Water Act or "An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Water Quality
Management and For Other Purposes," Senator Robert Jaworski in his sponsorship speech of
Senate Bill No. 2115, the precursor of R.A. No. 9275:
Water pollution is a particularly costly problem in densely populated urban

areas such as Metro Manila. Ninety percent of our drinking water comes
from underground sources. But these sources are threatened by depletion
and contamination, particularly from non-existence of sewerage systems
or faulty sewerage systems that seep into underground water sources.
Fresh water sources near many cities have become so severely
contaminated that more distant sources have to be explored at high costs.
Although sophisticated purification methods to clean polluted rivers exist,
such methods are expensive and complicated. Meanwhile, the cost of
unsafe water is also high. We must remember and realize that in
developing countries like the Philippines, an estimated 80% of all illnesses
are waterborne.
It was hoped that the passage of the Clean Water Act would serve as the
remedial tool in the integration and proper definition of the State's policies
on water management and conservation.
The Clean Water Act requires water utility companies to provide for sewerage and septage
management services within five years of the law's passage. This sewerage or septage
management services requirement is the bone of contention in these cases.
Section 8 of the Clean Water Act
What is clear is that the obligation in Section 8 is demandable at once, upon effectivity of
the law, to be performed within a given period.
Despite the clear wording of the law, petitioners remain insistent that they did not violate
Section 8 of the Clean Water Act and thus should not have been fined by the SENR. Their
arguments are triptych: (1) Section 7 of the Clean Water Act is a condition precedent to
petitioners' full compliance to Section 8 thereof; (2) the Agreements executed by MWSS
with the concessionaires, Maynilad and Manila Water, are controlling in the latter's
performance of their obligations; and (3) petitioners are exempted from complying with the
five-year period in Section 8 because of the ruling in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of
Manila Bay.
We disagree with petitioners.
1. Section 7 is not a condition precedent to compliance with Section 8
SECTION 7. National Sewerage and Septage

Management Program. - The Department of Public Works
and Highways (DPWH), through its relevant attached
agencies, in coordination with the Department, local
government units (LGUs) and other concerned agencies,
shall, as soon as possible, but in no case exceeding a period
of twelve (12) months from the affectivity of this Act,
prepare a national program on sewerage and septage
management in connection with Section 8 hereof.
Such program shall include a priority listing of sewerage,

septage and combined sewerage-septage projects for LGUs
based on population density and growth, degradation of
water resources, topography, geology, vegetation,
program/projects for the rehabilitation of existing facilities
and such other factors that the Secretary may deem
relevant to the protection of water quality. On the basis of
such national listing, the national government may allot, on
an annual basis, funds for the construction and
rehabilitation of required facilities.
Each LGU shall appropriate the necessary land, including the

required rights-of-way/road access to the land for the
construction of the sewage and/or septage treatment
facilities.
Each LGU may raise funds to subsidize necessary expenses

for the operation and maintenance of sewerage treatment
or septage facility servicing their area of jurisdiction through
local property taxes and enforcement of a service fee
system.
Clearly, Section 7 is not worded as a condition precedent of Section 8 of the Clean Water
Act. What jumps out of the two provisions is that both provide for different and
disconnected compliance periods reckoned from the effectivity of the Clean Water Act. If
Section 7 is indeed a condition precedent of the obligation in Section 8, the law should have
reckoned the enforcement of the obligation in Section 8 from the time the obligation in
Section 7 has been fulfilled.
In all, nothing in Sections 7 and 8 of the Clean Water Act or its IRR states or, at the very
least, implies that the former is a condition precedent of the latter. From the foregoing, it is
apparent that the obligation imposed on petitioners by Section 8 to connect the existing
sewerage lines is mandatory and unconditional. After the expiration of the five-year
compliance period, the obligatory force of Section 8 becomes immediate and can be
enforced against petitioners without subordination to the happening of a future and

uncertain event.
Thus, the terms of Section 8 are absolute.
Maynilad and Manila Water did not comply with Section 8
Given that a decade has already passed following the effectivity of the Clean Water Act,
both MAYNILAD & MANILA WATER’S compliance to Section 8 at this current year do not
even reach 20% sewerage coverage.
Indeed, petitioners have fully and faithfully complied with the proviso in Section 8, only in
the aspect that they are authorized under the Service Obligations under the Agreements to
impose sewerage services charges and fees for the connection of the existing sewage line to
the available sewerage system. They seem to forget, however, that receipt of these fees
entailed the legal duty of actually and completely installing the already long-delayed
sewerage connections.
Maynilad and Manila Water still found space in their private contract to prolong compliance
thereto for fifteen more years. This Court cannot accept their highlighted justifications
therefor. As earlier pointed out, the completion of the septage and sewerage connections
have already been lagging for fifteen years past the effectivity of the Clean Water Act. There
is no one else to blame but petitioners' neglect. The public has already suffered because of
this delay, and no further extensions could possibly be accommodated without inflicting
additional disadvantage to the already aggrieved.
Thus being stated, this Court, also laboring under the Public Trust Doctrine, construes the
MOA between MWSS and Maynilad and the MOA between MWSS and Manila Water as a
complicit acknowledgment of their obstinate defiance of their mandate under the Clean
Water Act. Agreeing among themselves for a 15-year extension will not cancel their long-
running liability under Section 8 of the Clean Water Act, in relation to Section 28 under the
same law. A private contract cannot promote business convenience to the unwarranted
disadvantage of public welfare and trust.
With all said, petitioners' assertion that the Agreements take primacy over a special law
such as the Clean Water Act is decimated. It is thus established that Section 8 of the Clean
Water Act demands unconditional compliance, and petitioners were utterly remiss in that
duty.
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay did not repeal Section 8 of the Clean
Water Act
Petitioners are unrelenting and now contend that this very same Court effectively extended
the five-year compliance period for connection of the sewage line to the available sewerage
system because of our ruling in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.
Petitioners' contention misleads.
MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay declared the role and responsibility of the
MWSS, among other government agencies, in the long- standing and increasingly dire
sanitary conditions of Manila Bay. In the said case, the Court ruled, inter alia, that "[a]s
mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and
Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time," and that it shall "submit to the Court a
quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken xxx".
Section 8 requires petitioners or "the agency vested to provide water supply and sewerage
facilities and/or concessionaires in Metro Manila and other highly urbanized cities (HUCs) as
defined in Republic Act No. 7160, in coordination with LGUs, to connect the existing sewage
line found in all subdivisions, condominiums, commercial centers, hotels, sports and
recreational facilities, hospitals, market places, public buildings, industrial complex and
other similar establishments including households to available sewerage system xxx" within
five (5) years from effectivity of the Clean Water Act or from May 6, 2004. The meat of this
case is the fact of delay by petitioners in complying with the mandate under Section 8,
whereas the matter involved in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay is the urgency
of rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
The Court in MMDA was simply exercising its constitutional power and duty to interpret the
law and resolve an actual case or controversy. While judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law or the Constitution form part of the legal system of the Philippines, the
Court does not dabble in judicial legislation and is without power to amend or repeal Section
8 of the Clean Water Act.
The Liability of Petitioners
Petitioners insist that the appellate courts erred in affirming the Orders of the SENR as
these were not based on substantial evidence. We, however, do not find reason to deviate
from the findings of the administrative agencies, as affirmed by the appellate courts. These
were also given full credence by the PAB and the SENR. We quote with approval apportion
of the SENR's pronouncement in its Order dated October 7, 2009:
It should further be noted that the five (5)-year period was made to provide sufficient time
to comply with the interconnection of all water supply and sewerage facilities. The continued
failure of providing a centralized sewerage system in compliance with the said law means
that several sewage [lines continue] to dump and release untreated sewerage within their
vicinities -resulting in unmitigated environmental pollution.
Manila Water failed to present any evidence to substantiate its claim that it had offered to
connect the existing sewage lines but the customers refused the same. It should be pointed
out that in cases where the customers refused to connect sewage lines to the available
sewerage system Manila Water is not precluded from enlisting the help of the DENR which,
in turn, may request LGUs or other appropriate agencies to sanction these persons pursuant
to Section 8.5 of the IRR. xxx Manila Water failed to present any proof that there are indeed
sewage lines which were already rendered useless. In sum, Manila Water justifications have
no probative value because it miserably failed to present concrete and credible proof to
substantiate the same. Verily, bare allegations which are not supported by any evidence,
documentary or otherwise, are not equivalent to proof under our rules. Ergo, the DENR-PAB
correctly declared that Manila Water's justifications are insufficient considering that no proof
or evidence was presented to support the same.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.
E. G.R. NO. 119976, SEPTEMBER 18, 1995: IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND CIRILO ROY MONTEJO
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte on March 8, 1995, providing the following
information on item no. 8: “Residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election: seven months”.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of
the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional
requirement for residency of one year. On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since
childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. On the same day, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that the Certificate was filed out of time.
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a
vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for
Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of
Candidacy. The Second Division decided that the Certificate of Candidacy cannot be
admitted and the respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of
the Constitution.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional
seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her
proclamation, petitioner sought relief from the Court.
ISSUES:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte
for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner
outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under
Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive

jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
RULING:
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion
in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. There is
a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence
to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile.
Petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space
provided for the residency qualification requirement. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7
and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile —
coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa
obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified.
In the matter of the petitioner’s domicile, an individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places. Although petitioner held various
residences for different purposes during the last four decades, none of these purposes
unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
On the jurisdictional issue, the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear
and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the
elections.
The COMELEC's questioned Resolutions are SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is directed to
order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Application of Critical Legal Theory
In this case, the indeterminacy of legal doctrine is one of the ways that Critical Legal Theory
is applied. Critical Legal Theory demonstrates how a set of legal principles may result to
competing or contradictory results. A key principle of critical legal theory is that the law has
been used to forcefully impose the desires of a dominant group or institution. 8 In this
particular situation, the dominant group or institution is the power and influence of the
former First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos.
The Court ascertained whether or not the terms “residence” and “domicile” are synonymous
to each other. As it was said in the ruling of the Court, “While the COMELEC seems to be in
agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is
synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the
concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election.” Since there is no express statement
that in interpreting the laws, “residence” and “domicile” are synonymous, the Court
determined the meaning of both terms.
The way the Court has identified the proper meaning of the words “residence” and
“domicile” was favorable to the petitioner. The desire of the petitioner to be qualified to be a
candidate and eventually emerge victorious in the election was aided by the interpretation
of the law in this case.
According to Matt McManus, in his article, “In Defence of Critical Legal Theory: A Reply to
Andrew Kelman”, he described that critical legal theorists and their followers believed that
“all law is about power, seek to use the legal system to redistribute power to those groups
they feel have been traditionally marginalised in society.” 9 Carefully scrutinizing the political
8
9
McManus, M. (2018, April 14). In Defence of Critical Legal Theory: A Reply to Andrew Kelman. Retrieved from
Quillette: https://quillette.com/2018/04/14/defence-critical-legal-theory-reply-andrew-kelman/
and social circumstances of the case, it was the post-EDSA revolution period wherein
democracy was still slowly being restored in our country. It could be presumed that the
decision of the Court highly favored the desires of a certainly powerful and influential
political character in our nation’s history.
On the other hand, the author of the previously mentioned article also cites Dworkin for a
deeper understanding on how the Courts, more specifically the judges, decide on the
indeterminacy of the law. Despite the background and the personal convictions of the
judges, law is a “law is a deeply moral enterprise aimed at ‘integrity.’ Interpreted correctly,
it would establish a more just society for all.”10
IV. IMPORTANCE OF CLT
Critical Legal Theory as a method of formulating answers to legal issues given to the
judiciary is somehow intricate, nevertheless entails the betterment of the society. And
individuals as members of society, needs to work out ways in which the collective can live
amicably and harmoniously with the existence of legitimate law. 11Therefore, it primarily
encourage individual to come up with their own way of looking into the legal norms, legal
institution or legal culture which will then shape, restrain and challenge power in doing
politics.
The Critical Legal Theory gives a huge sense of importance on the constitutional
mandate of “equality among equals”. It simply vests upon the members of the same class in
the society who is recognized as the most powerful groups of individuals the participation of
shaping the content, force and application of law. These individuals tends to enjoy greater
access to lawmakers, courts and quality legal counsel, because they can devote more
resources to legal representation and the can afford to make systematic and strategic use of
the legal system over extended periods of time. 12
However it must be recognized that just like fashion which tends to change every
year, the critical legal theory will appear to be different in every new context. Since CLT
recognize how different aspects of law become newly salient or refigured in different
circumstances, and how the seemingly timeless verities of one historical period are
conditioned by the assumptions and expectations of time. If a critical legal theory of law
looks different today than it appeared thirty years ago, it is because the world itself looks
different.13
10
Ibid.
11
Ian Carlo D. Benitez, An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy: A Critique of Critical Legal Studies’ Claim of Legal
Indeterminancy. Talsik Volume Iv, Issue no. 1, p.18.
12
Jack M. Balkin, Critical Legal Theory of Today, Francis Jay Mootz ed., On Philosophy in American Law, Cambridge
University Press, 2009.
13
Id at 7.

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CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY:

III. APPLICATION OF CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY IN PHILIPPINE JURISPRUDENCE

A. G.R. NO. 225973, NOVEMBER 08, 2016: OCAMPO ET AL. V. ENRIQUEZ

1. Whether President Duterte’s determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at

3. Whether petitioners violated the doctrines or exhaustion of administrative remedies

The Court ruled that the petitions must be dismissed.

Third, on the basis of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners should be faulted

Application of Critical Legal Theory

B. G.R. No. 237428, MAY 11, 2018: REPUBLIC VS. SERENO

MAIN CONTENTION OF RESPONDENT:

DECISION OF THE COURT:

It is apparent that although the concept of impeachment has undergone various

It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is

IN CONNECTION TO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY:

According to Robert Unger’s concept, “total understanding is never possible, only

C. G.R no. 101083; July 20, 1993: Oposa vs. Factoran

 (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

PETITIONER’S GENERAL ALLEGATION:

SPECIFIED CAUSE OF ACTION:

 a. effect 'a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth'

FACTORAN’S MOTION TO DISMISS:

RTC JUDGE OF MAKATI:

PLAINTIFF’S INSTANT SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI

 Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),

1. W/N PETITIONER MINORS HAVE STANDING – YES.

o Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

 "SEC. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural

RELATION TO CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY

SECTION 8. Domestic Sewage Collection, Treatment and

In areas not considered as HUCs, the DPWH in coordination

For the purpose of this section, the DOH, coordination with

ACTION OF THE SECRETARY OF DENR

RESPONSE OF THE PETITIONERS TO THE SECRETARY OF DENR

Petitioners submitted their respective answers to the charges.

MAYNILAD mainly anchors its arguments on SC ruling in MMDA v. Concerned Residents of

THE RULING OF THE SENR

THE RULINGS OF THE CA

IN MANILA WATER’S PETITION

IN METROPOLITAN WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE SYSTEM

Respondents' Arguments through the Office of the Solicitor General

ISSUES WITH RULING:

POWERS OF THE PAB (POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD)

recommendatory role of the P AB is dispensable. Its technical expertise in pollution cases

Violation of the Clean Water Act by petitioners

In this framework, a relationship is formed -"the State is the trustee,

Water pollution is a particularly costly problem in densely populated urban

Section 8 of the Clean Water Act

We disagree with petitioners.

1. Section 7 is not a condition precedent to compliance with Section 8

SECTION 7. National Sewerage and Septage

Such program shall include a priority listing of sewerage,

Each LGU shall appropriate the necessary land, including the

Each LGU may raise funds to subsidize necessary expenses

enforced against petitioners without subordination to the happening of a future and

Thus, the terms of Section 8 are absolute.

Maynilad and Manila Water did not comply with Section 8

Petitioners' contention misleads.

The Liability of Petitioners

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.

E. G.R. NO. 119976, SEPTEMBER 18, 1995: IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS.

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications