Hybrid warfare

For over 60 years, nuclear weapons have deterred a major conflict between

nuclear-armed states, and, because of the global revulsion against the use of

nuclear weapons, the nuclear powers have been also unable to realise offensive

objectives through nuclear coercion, even against non-nuclear weapon states. Thus,

most conflicts are in the form of conventional military interventions against

smaller or weaker states, sub-conventional (guerrilla or irregular) conflicts or

‘hybrid warfare’.

Western analysts have termed the comprehensive approach employed by Russia in

Ukraine (encompassing narrative control, cyberattacks, use of anonymous militias

and irregular forces, clandestine supplies and diplomatic support) as “hybrid

warfare”. The Russians refer to it as the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ (after the Russian

military chief). This form of warfare is also called: asymmetrical, non-

conventional, gray zone conflict, ‘new generation warfare’, ‘whole of government’

approach and so on. It is emerging as the preferred modality in today’s contests

between the great powers.

Often, hybrid war may not be a war at all. The objective may not be to secure an

adversary’s immediate defeat, but to erode its morale; isolate it; ‘soften’ it up
before a conflict; deflect it from pursuing unacceptable military or political

objectives; disrupt its communications, command and control and/or important

infrastructure; impose economic pain to secure adherence to political demands;

delegitimise an adversary’s government; compromise its leaders.

The objective may not be to secure an adversary’s immediate defeat, but to erode

its morale.

The toolbox of instruments that can be used to wage such ‘hybrid’ warfare is

rapidly expanding and becoming more sophisticated: eg autonomous weapons,

advanced cyber programmes, social media, data mining, algorithms and artificial

intelligence (AI), etc. By 2020, the ‘internet of things’ will reportedly connect 30

billion devices. Power will rest with the people who control these devices.

Technology is progressively blurring the distinction between hybrid and

conventional warfare and increasing the incentives, opportunities and compulsions

for the preemptive or ‘first-use’ of offensive action by adversaries eg to knock out

an enemy’s command and control through a cyber strike. Given the complexities of

defence and offence in such complex conflict, it will become increasingly difficult

to prevent the escalation of hybrid wars to the conventional and even the nuclear

level.
Pakistan was the target of hybrid or indirect ‘war’ in 1971. New Delhi’s hybrid

strategy (promotion of Mujib’s six-point plan, the genocide and refugees narrative,

training the Mukti Bahini, the Indo-Soviet ‘Friendship Treaty’) all laid the ground

for the coup de grâce of Indian military intervention in East Pakistan.

Since then, Pakistan has been the target of multiple ‘hybrid’ campaigns.

Exaggerated proliferation concerns and coercive diplomacy were utilised to hold

back Pakistan’s nuclear and missile programmes. The legitimacy of the Kashmiri

freedom struggle was eroded by its projection as terrorism including through false-

flag operations, infiltration of militant Kashmiri groups and concerted propaganda.

The onus for America’s colossal military and political failure in Afghanistan was

ascribed to alleged Afghan Taliban ‘safe havens’ in Pakistan. The Pakistan Army

and the ISI remain a special focus of propaganda and fake news.

Today, the hybrid war against Pakistan is focused on Balochistan, the former Fata

region, Gilgit-Baltistan and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.

Pakistan has developed credible capabilities to deter nuclear and conventional

aggression. However, it remains very vulnerable to hybrid warfare. Pakistan’s

adversaries enjoy considerable prowess in IT, cyber, media projection and

narrative construction, including ‘fake news’, subversion and sabotage, and

sponsorship of terrorism, including ‘false-flag’ operations.

The main modality of this ‘indirect war’ against Pakistan is the media, including

social media. Very few Indian media personalities enjoy the ‘freedom’ to be

critical of their country or their current government. Meanwhile, Pakistan print and

electronic media speaks with many voices. There is little space for pro-Pakistani

narratives in the Western media. An army of Indian trolls has been recruited to

malign Pakistan on the internet.

There are numerous other ‘agents of influence’ who are used to develop and

project an anti-Pakistan narrative. Many foreign funded and directed non-

governmental organisations have been ubiquitous in developing negative critiques

about Pakistan within Pakistan. Some among our local elite are co-opted by these

organisations through jobs, travel and other perks. No wonder there has been such

a hue and cry about the long overdue diligence conducted recently by the

government and the Foreign Office on these organisations.

The hybrid campaign incorporates some ethnic and religious groups. Foreign

sponsorship of the Balochistan Liberation Army and the Tehreek-i-Taliban

Pakistan is well established. Some others need to be subjected to close scrutiny.

Any foreign funding of any Pakistani organisation ought to be declared and

officially approved. Receipt of undeclared foreign payments should be a crime.

This is an international norm. (Surely, the Financial Action Task Force will

approve.)

Pakistan’s agencies must be equipped with the most advanced surveillance and

data collection techniques to detect future Jadhevs or Osamas and neutralise any

‘black ops’, ‘false-flag’ or infiltration operations planned by enemy agencies.

Pakistan must possess the cyber capability to defend its crucial command-and-

control systems and its industrial and transport infrastructure against enemy attack.

But to deter such attack, Pakistan must also have the capability for offensive cyber

action.

The technologies for waging a “comprehensive” conflict and “new generation

warfare” are being actively developed by every significant State. Pakistan cannot

afford to be left behind. To acquire credible capacity to defend against and repel

hybrid wars, Pakistan will need to make dedicated efforts, comparable to those

deployed to develop its nuclear and missile programmes.

However, there are certain elements of such warfare (cyberattacks, autonomous

weapons, false-flag operations) which pose the threat of systemic and global

disruption, destabilisation and military escalation. Pakistan and other responsible

nations should take an initiative in relevant international forums to secure a global

ban or restrictions on such dangerous elements of hybrid warfare.