G.R. No.

L-430             July 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO M. ABAD (alias PAQUITO), defendant-appellant.

Alejo Labrador for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for appellee.

PERFECTO, J.:

In a decision penned by Judge Angel S. Gamboa, concurred in by Judges Jose Bernabe and Emilio Rilloraza, all
of them of the People's Court, accused Francisco Abad was found guilty of the complex crime of treason with
homicide and sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P15,000, to indemnify the heirs of Osias Salvador in the
amount of P2,000, and to pay costs.

The information charges appellant of the crime of treason as defined and penalized under article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code by giving aid and comfort to the Empire of Japan and the Japanese Imperial Forces during
the period comprised between December 24, 1943, and September 26, 1944, as follows:

1. That on or about the 24th day of December, 1943, in the municipality and province aforesaid, Francisco
Abad (alias Paquito) the accused herein, serving as an informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then
and there, join participate in a raid conducted by about fifteen Japanese soldiers of the Military Police at
the house of Magno Ibarra, and did then and there apprehended the said Magno Ibarra, charging him of
possession of a revolver which had been previously surrendered by Magno Ibarra to the Japanese that
Magno Ibarra still had the revolver, the latter was confined in the Japanese garrison.

2. That on or about March 11, 1944, in the same municipality and province aforesaid, the said Francisco
Abad (alias Paquito), as such informer of the Japanese Army, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably, for more than two months, of one Mr. Francisco, whose first name is still unknown, for having
remarked that the Americans would soon return many places in the Philippines had already been retaken.

3. That on or about September 28, 1944, in the municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the herein
accused, as such informer of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably force, coerce, and compel Osias Salvador and his two brothers Epifanio Salvador and Liberto
Salvador to go, as they did to go to the Japanese garrison where the said Osias Salvador and his two
brothers, at the instance of the herein accused in his presence, were tortured as guerrilla suspects, and
although Epifanio and Liberto Salvador managed later to escape from imprisonment, the said Osias
Salvador was unable to do so and died from the tortures and injuries inflicted upon him.

4. That on or about November 12, 1844 and on the occasion of a stage show held in the said municipality
of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the herein accused, taking advantage of his connection and influence as
informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously hand over
one Francisco Donato to the Japanese soldiers who slapped and kicked the said Francisco Donato, for
an incident in which the accused was entirely to blame in that the said accused annoyed Flora Esteban,
wife of Francisco Donato, by throwing sugar cane butts at her.

The lower court found the accused guilty on the first three counts.

Nine errors are assigned in appellant's brief.

The first question raised by appellant is that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty on the first count,
notwithstanding the fact only one witness testified to the overt act alleged therein.

Two witnesses were called by the prosecution to prove the first count, Magno Ibarra and his wife, Isabel. The
latter testified that when appellant, accompanied by his brother and Japanese soldiers, went to their home,
demanding the surrender of a revolver of her husband, the husband was out supervising the harvest of their
palay, and the latter happened to learn of the incident by information from the wife. Magno could not, therefore,
corroborate his wife as to the latter's testimony concerning appellant's coming to their house.

The testimony of Magno Ibarra as to what happened to him in the garrison, where he was told by appellant to
produce his revolver, is not corroborated by his wife nor by anybody else.

The Solicitor General advances the theory that where the overt act is simple, continuous and composite, made up
of, or proved by several circumstances, and passing through stages, it is not necessary that there should be two
witnesses to each circumstance at each stage. The theory is not well taken. The two-witness rule must be
adhered to as to each and everyone of all the external manifestations of the overt act in issue. Appellant's going
to the Ibarra house, in search of the revolver, is a single overt act, distinct and independent from appellant's overt
act in requiring Magno Ibarra, when the latter went to the garrison, to produce his revolver. Although both overt
acts are inter-related. it would be too much to strain the imagination if they should be identified as a single act or
even as different manifestations, phases, or stage of the same overt act. The searching of the revolver in the
Ibarra house is one thing and the requiring to produce the revolver in the garrison, another. Although both acts
may logically be presumed to have answered the same purpose, that of confiscating Ibarra's revolver, the
singleness of purpose is not enough to make one of two acts.

The lower court erred consequently in not pronouncing that the first count of the information was not proven.

Whether accused caused the arrest and incarceration of Fausto Francisco, as alleged in the second count of the
information, is the next question raised in appellant's brief.

In the afternoon of March 10, 1944, while conversing with a group of about ten persons, Francisco, who had just
arrived from Manila, stated that the Americans were coming nearer to the Philippines and, on noticing a Japanese
plane flying over them, added that in the very near future they will see American planes flying over the
Philippines. The accused was among those present in the group. Jose Tamurrada and Adriano Reyes were also
among them. At night of the same day Francisco attended the dance held in the auditorium of Palimbo, Camiling,
on the occasion of the barrio fiesta. A group of Japanese soldiers, accompanied by appellant and his brother
Mariano, arrived. Appellant pointed at Francisco saying, "That is the man;" whereupon, Francisco was arrested
and was imprisoned for almost two and a half months, during which time he was subjected to torture and made to
undergo hard labor for being an American propagandist. These facts were testified by several witnesses for the
prosecution.

Appellant, who has resorted to an alibi as defense, made an almost exhaustive analysis of the declarations of the
witnesses for the prosecution in a forceful effort to discredit them. A careful reading of said declarations leads us
to the conclusion that they deserved credibility and by them it was proved beyond all reasonable doubt that
appellant was present in the group which in the afternoon heard Fausto Francisco make statements in favor of
the Americans and that he caused the arrest of Francisco in the auditorium by appointing him to the Japanese
soldiers who arrived with him at the place.

Among the arguments in appellant's brief relating to the second count in question, the one in which appellant
alleges that no one has ever heard that, after the afternoon statements of Fausto Francisco, appellant went to the
Japanese garrison and informed the Japanese soldiers thereof, appears to be stronger. In fact, there is no
evidence as to what the appellant did during the time intervening between when appellant heard Francisco's
afternoon statements and when appellant went at night to the auditorium to have Francisco arrested by the
Japanese soldiers accompanying him and his brother Mariano. But the natural relationship between the two
incidents makes unnecessary any evidence as to appellant's conduct and actions during the intervening period.
Besides, it is not alleged in the information that it was appellant who denounced Francisco to the Japanese for
the afternoon statements in question, and even if we should disregard any connection between the afternoon
incident in which appellant heard Francisco's statements and the incident in which Francisco was arrested, and,
furthermore, even if we go to the extent of disregarding completely the first incident, the fact that appellant caused
the arrest of Francisco at the auditorium night dance, by pointing him as the man sought for to the Japanese
soldiers who accompanied him and his brother Mariano, in itself alone is sufficient to find him guilty of adherence
to the Japanese enemies and of giving them aid in the attainment of their was purposes, among them the
suppression of American or anti-Japanese propaganda.

Upon this our conclusion, appellant's insistence that there were well-known Japanese spies, instead of him, who
must have given the tip to the Japanese as to Francisco's statements, is of no consequence.

The next question raised by appellant is the third count of the information upon which the appellant's brief dealt in
three assignment of errors, 3, 4, and 5.

Liberato Salvador testified that in 1944 he was a member of Major Ramsey's Guerrilla, which he joined on March
5, 1942, he having been formerly in the Recruiting Division of the Philippine Army. On September 28, 1944, he
went to Camiling with his brother Osias to find out the strength of the Japanese garrison stationed there, and to
said effect "we brought along with us five gallons of coconut oil just pretending to sell it in the public market in
order that we cannot be detected by the spies of our enemy, the Japanese." Then they saw the accused "who
was about five meters away from us." Felix Abad asked for a ride back to Mangatarem. While Osias was talking
with Felix, the accused "winked his eye and then, immediately, Magdalera drew his revolver and pointed at me.
He winked with a motion indicating that I was to be captures. My brother Osias approached me. We were asked
to raise our hands." Because Liberato protested that he was not making any trouble and at first did not raise his
hands, Magdalera said: "No you are a member of the guerrillas, you are fighting against the Japanese." Then
Epifanio Salvador approached his brother Liberato and told him: "Raise your hands because he is a spy of the
Japanese," referring to Cristoper Magdalera. Then Felix Abad suggested to Magdalera that the Salvador brothers
be brought to the Japanese garrison, 25 meters away from the market. The incident took place at about 3 o'clock
in the afternoon. At the garrison "we were tied up against the wall of the building. At about 6 o'clock in the
afternoon were given water to drink (about five or six gallons) and maltreated. They hung me and tied in the wrist
with the rope around my neck. They hung me with my toes barely touching the floor. Then they boxed me and
beat me with a baseball bat until I was unconscious. I did not regain consciousness until they stuck a lighted
cigarette in my face at about 8 o'clock already in the evening."
When he regained consciousness, he heard his brothers shouting for help and groaning. Witness was about six
meters away from them, but he has not seen them being tortured because "we were brought again to the porch
and tied our neck in the same way they tied us before, with our hands tied at the back. At about 4 o'clock in the
morning of the 29th, my brother Epifanio Salvador, who was sitting side by side with Osias Salvador, who was
sitting side by side with Osias Salvador, was able to untie his rope and then, all of a sudden Epifanio left us. The
sentry who was just sitting in front of us with a rifle at fixed bayonet was sleeping. When the sentry was
awakened he asked: "`Where is your brother Epifanio Salvador?' I answered the sentry: `I do not know.' Then, at
first he was planning to release us to look for our brother Epifanio. We consented to be released, but the sentry
changed his mind and got another big rope with which he whipped us again right and left. Then they went to our
house, the house of Epifanio, and looked for him. And when they were not able to locate him they got my sister-
in-law Inocencia Manson de Salvador and she was also questioned as to where was my brother Epifanio, and
tied up her hands as they have done to us. After that, Osias Salvador and myself were brought to the room just
behind the one we were tied up and they got an electric wire and tied us again, but putting on a bench and the
bench was too short that the legs of my brother Osias was on top. We were tied and then rolled with the wire from
my head up to the head of my brother, aside from tying us from neck to leg. We talked, my brother and I, to
escape if we can. After ten minutes, a Japanese entered the garrison and he had a bamboo with which whenever
we asked for water and food they beat us. They question us: `Where is the machine gun you are hiding? You are
hiding six machine guns and automatic rifles; where are the rifles and revolvers? Where are the Americans now?'
That was done to us many times. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon one of the Japanese came to us and cut our
hair and said: `Kayo dalawa patay mamayang gabi.' We answered: `Ngayon na.' The Japanese said: `No,
tonight.' Then in my struggle to remove the rope around my leg I was able to untie it without my knowledge. One
of the Japanese entered to find out what we were doing, but he did not inspect me and left again. Although my
hands were bleeding, with my courage to live still I grabbed the electric wire and cut it trough continuously doing
this (witness showing the act of twisting something with his fingers), and unbound myself. When the sentry
entered, I allowed the electric wire to be placed as it was. Then it was 6 o'clock (on September 29) from the bells
of the church. My brother Osias said: `I can not escape, I am weak. My face is bleeding. I cannot walk. If you are
untied, the thing for you is to live, if you can run for your life. Never mind for me. If I am dead, never mind. Now
we are fighting our common enemy, the Japanese. I want you to find out what will be the result of this war.' Then
he kicked me, because I was untied already up to the knee. I tried to remove the rope at his back, but he said:
'No, I can not run.' And he shouted: 'You better run for your life.' Then I saw one Japanese that heard that, and I
jumped outside and when I fell to the ground I saw another Japanese watching and shouting words that I can not
understand. I just ran. Between the municipal building and the street there was a barbed wire fence and jumped it
over and then passed to the rear of the municipal building, passing between the house of Mr. Javier and the
Treasurer's and then to the bank of the river. I passed under the bamboo groves and I went to the house of my
friend (Gregorio Javier) and I was able to go up and then fell down weak." Osias was the commanding officer of
the guerrilla unit in which Liberato was a second lieutenant and Epifanio, a volunteer without grade. Since then
Liberato did not see Osias any more, but he was able to locate Epifanio in Bayambang, Pangasinan.

The testimony of Liberato Salvador was substantially corroborated by Epifanio Salvador on all what happened
from the afternoon of September 28,1944, when they were arrested in the market place up to about 4 o'clock in
the morning of September 29, when Epifanio was able to untie himself and escape from the Japanese garrison,
passing in front of a sleeping sentry two meters away from where the Salvador brothers were tied.

Augusto Antonio testified that the accused told him that Osias Salvador was killed, bayoneted by a Japanese
soldier, behind the elementary school building, near the closet, where the corpse was later buried. The
information was given by the accuse in 1945 when the Japanese were still ruling.

Appellant endeavors to discredit Liberato and Epifanio Salvador's testimonies by trying to show the improbability
for Liberato to have seen the accused making signs to Cristoper Magdalera for their arrest on the basis of the
relative positions of witness and appellant and that Epifanio "apparently" was away and came near the place
where Liberato was being arrested only after Magdalera for their arrest on the basis of the relative positions of
witness and appellant and that Epifanio "apparently" was away and came near the place where Liberato was
being arrested only after Magdalera had pointed his pistol at his back.

The fact that, while he was going southwest, he had seen the accused in the northeast making the sign to
Magdalera, is satisfactorily explained by Liberato by saying that "because a man wanted to by the Japanese
begins to observe everything," and he had to observe "because I knew they were making signs," and at that time
the accused was "in the left side," and with respect to Epifanio, appellant's surmise that he was "apparently away"
appears to without basis if it is recalled that it was Epifanio who advised Liberato to hold up his hands, when
Liberato was refusing to do it, by saying, in allusion to Magdalera, "he is a Japanese spy."

Appellant maintains also that it must have been Felix Abad whom the witnesses for the prosecution saw winking
his eyes at Magdalera for the latter to arrest the Salvador brothers and not Francisco Abad. But the theory cannot
be maintained upon the positive and unequivocal testimonies of Liberto and Epifanio pointing the accused as the
one who made the sign. Appellant's insistence to put the blame on Felix Abad, by trying to show that it was he
and not the accused who made the sign, even if accepted, will not relieve appellant of all responsibility, because,
according to the witnesses for the prosecution, he went along with his brothers Mariano and Felix and Cristoper
Magdalera in bringing the Salvador brothers to the Japanese garrison where they were delivered by the accused
himself, and it was Francisco Abad who told the Japanese "that we were guerrillas."
In the sixth assignment of error appellant complains that the lower court admitted evidence of supposed
treasonable acts of appellant but which are not specifically alleged in any of the counts of the information.

Appellant points specifically to the testimony of Agustin de la Cruz, to the effect that in the moth of October, 1944,
at around 11 o'clock, while witness and others were around a gambling table, appellant came unnoticed with six
Japanese soldiers and demanded of those in the gathering the information of the whereabouts of Lt. Riparip and
Sgt. Juan Asuncion, both of the guerrilla army, and that sometime in November, 1944, on the occasion of the
shooting of Eustaquio Domingo, the accused was in the Japanese garrison while the Japanese soldiers
proceeded to the site of the shooting, gathered all the males found thereabouts, bringing one of them, Benjamin
Aremajo, to the garrison to be later dragged to the plaza where he was beaten up, facts which were declared
proven by the lower court.

The assignment is well taken as the above facts are not alleged in any of the four counts of the information. The
fact that accused is described therein as an informer is not enough, because the description is a conclusion made
by the author of the information based on the facts specifically alleged in the four counts. The information alleged
that the accused "adhered to and served as an informer of the enemy, . . . giving them aid and comfort in the
following manner, to wit:", — and then follow the four counts.

Furthermore, even if the word "informer" in the information should justify the admission of the evidence in
question, the lower court erred in finding the facts proved when the testimony of Agustin de la Cruz about them
has not been corroborated by any other witness, thus violating the two-witness rule in treason cases.

Appellant assigned as the seventh error of the trial court in finding him as an informer "on mere assertions of
witnesses to that effect without supporting treasonable acts and in making findings of fact not supported by any
evidence at all" and makes the complaint, specifically, in relation with the following pronouncement in the
appealed decision:

. . . The accused acted and served as an informer and spy for and in the aid of the Japanese army in
Camiling, directing his espionage activities or detecting and gathering informations about the activities of
members of the guerilla organizations, of persons maintaining or providing for the support thereof and of
persons possessing firearms or in any other manner connected with the underground resistance
movements against the Japanese and spying on the movements of those persons who cherish the return
to the Philippines of the Americans, . . .. Proofs adduced by the prosecution of the fact that the accused
had been acting as an informer and spy for and in the aid of the Japanese are highly convincing. One
after another the various witnesses for the prosecution has pointed his accusing finger at the accused to
have been an informer and spy of the Japanese army. . . .

The pronouncement appears to be based on the testimonies of Publio Dumaual, Rafael Guillermo, and Agustin
de la Cruz, each one of whom testified about facts not alleged in any of the counts of the information, and their
testimonies on said facts appear not to be corroborated by another witness, as required by the two-witness rule.
The assignment of error is well taken.

Appellant complains in his eight assignment of error that the court failed to take into account two mitigating
circumstances: the fact that the Abad family was persecuted by guerrillas, the persecution ending in the killing of
Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad, father and brother, respectively, of the accused, and, appellant's age.

On September 26, 1942, a group of around thirty guerrillas took the Abad family to the barrio of Ketegan. On
October 17, Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad were brought to the schoolhouse, and from that time on they were
never seen alive again. On January, 1943, the family was released minus the above mentioned two members,
and they proceeded to Camiling where Mariano Abad, the eldest son, was living, as explained by his widowed
mother, "to whom I could look after the support inasmuch as he is my living eldest son. He was with the Japs
because that was the last resort for him to do inasmuch as if he did not do that he would have been killed by the
guerrillas."

These facts cannot be considered to mitigate appellant's guilt as they are not of a similar nature or analogous to
those mentioned in article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant's age can be considered. He was born on October 20, 1924, and when he committed the acts alleged
in counts two and three, the latter on September 28, 1944, he was not yet 20 years old. The fact that his eldest
brother, Mariano, was the liaison officer of the Japanese and another elder brother, Felix, was also in the service
of the Japanese, coupled by the fact that, as stated by his widowed mother, the accused had to depend on
Mariano for his support, the same as the other members of the family, are circumstances from which, in view of
appellant's immature age, did not allow him the freedom of initiative and action which should be expected of a
person who is aware of the full consequences and responsibility for his acts. The circumstances of this case
justify crediting appellant with a mitigating circumstance of similar nature to that of number 2 of article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Although we hold appellant as one of those responsible for the arrest of the Salvador brothers, we do not agree
with the lower court in finding him responsible also for the death of Osias Salvador, as according to the evidence,
it was the escape of Epifanio, and later the escape of Liberato, which must have enraged the Japanese to the
extent of killing Osias Salvador, who, were not so weak, had the same chance as his brothers to escape. If his
brothers did not escape, there is no ground to presume that Osias would have been killed by the Japanese if we
take into consideration that, after almost two and a half months of confinement, the Japanese allowed Fausto
Francisco to be released. There is absolutely no evidence that appellant was present or had anything to do with
the killing of Osias Salvador.

Upon the conclusion we arrived at, it is not necessary to deal with the ninth assignment of error in appellant's
brief.

Finding the accused guilty of the crime of treason as punished by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code with the
attendance of one mitigating circumstance, as provided in number 2 of article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, with
the modification of the lower court's decision, we sentence him to 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion
temporal and to pay a fine of P5,000 and the costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

PARAS, J.:

I reserve my vote. The decision in the Laurel case is not as yet final.

Separate Opinions

BRIONES, M., disidente:

Creo que el apelante debe ser absuelt, por duda razonable. Parecia pesar una maldicion sobre la familia del
acusado: perseguidos por los guerilleros, algunos de sus miembros perecieron en manos de estos. El cargo mas
grave contra el acusado es el relacionado con la muerte de Osias Salvador. Pues bien; me parece que las
pruebas acerca de este cargo no justifican la condena.
G.R. No. 118075 September 5, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No.
532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June 1993,
while armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by means of
violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical injuries on
Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon, Cebu, and seized
their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice.1

The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose Macven
Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.2 Of the duo only
Emiliano Catantan appealed.

In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy as the facts proved
only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy under PD No. 532.

The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil brothers
Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of Tabogon, Cebu.
Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. One of them, later identified as the accused Emiliano Catantan,
bearded the pump boat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on
the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to "dapa."3 Then Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the
pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced him to lie down at the bottom of the boat, covered
him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left
behind the other pumpboat which the accused had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was
visibly tied.

Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they were now off-course but
Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and Juan Jr. was directed
to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed; he was threatened with bodily
harm instead.

Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the open sea the engine stalled
again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his legs were tied to
the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.

As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and the
Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning this,
Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat cautioning them however not to move or say anything.

On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once aboard he ordered the
operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to beg-off by saying that he
would still pull up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and said, "You choose between the
two, or I will kill you."5 Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed and Ursal hopped in from the other
pumpboat and joined Catantan.

But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part of the pumpboat of the
Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he landed on the water
headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the two swam together clinging to their boat. Fortunately
another pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.

Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away
of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine
waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter
provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par. (b), of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for
transport of passengers and cargo from one place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds
and types of vessels or boats used in fishing (emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any person
who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing something not prohibited by
law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong."

Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there be an attack on or
seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing boat of the Pilapil
brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only when they were already on
board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some other place. Appellant also insists that he
and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter
of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so they
could leave the Pilapils behind in their boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion
and not piracy.

We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in Art. 286
of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be true that Eugene
and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination, such compulsion was
obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the victims, shows that the
appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct testimony of Eugene is significant
and enlightening —

Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of
Tabogon at that time, was there anything unusual that happened?

A: Yes.

Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?

A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the

passengers of that pumpboat boarded our pumpboat.

Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in
that pumpboat?

A: Four.

Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how
did they do that?

A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the

pumpboat (emphasis supplied).

Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?

A: Only one.

Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?

A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (emphasis

supplied).

Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?

x x x           x x x          x x x

A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (emphasis supplied).

COURT:

Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?

A: He aimed the revolver on me.

TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:

Q: What else did he do?

A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.

 Q: What did he do with his revolver?

A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.

Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?

A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.

Q: To what place did he order you to go?

A: To Daan Tabogon. 6

To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore the fact that
a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them and boarded their
pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa"
or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye,
after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to take them to Daan Tabogon.

The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of another pumpboat with four
passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were impelled to submit in
complete surrender to the marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the other pumpboat he had full control
of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them to submission. Hence the issuance of PD No.
532 designed to avert situations like the case at bar and discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus
we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of the decree —

Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing
acts of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants
who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the
nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people;

Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which
are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
and,

Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts
of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all
obstacle to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.

The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They brave the
natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful harvest. It is on these
small fishermen that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their livelihood would be to deprive
them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to
the "economic, social, educational and community progress of the people." Had it not been for the chance
passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering
outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.

While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their boat, proof
of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal abandoned the Pilapils only
because their pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to another pumpboat that would take them
back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new" pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by
the police soon after the Pilapils reported the matter to the local authorities.

The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot exculpate
him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused Ursal seized
through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in Philippine waters.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction of accused-appellant
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and sentencing him
accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 112235 November 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market
when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun at the
policeman's right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot
the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter's gun, the man and his companions
boarded a tricycle and fled.1

The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from
Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal shot. Armenta
identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his
first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.

Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and
other parts of the body.2 On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as hypovolemic
shock.3

As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information
charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, at
Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already
charged in Crim. Case No. 5931 before RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities
are at present unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another for a common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one
SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple
gunshot wounds causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The
dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused ELIAS
LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-
accused who are still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua with all the accessories provided by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus
Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to pay the said
widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos,
representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on
the part of the said accused.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision finding him
guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.

Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that
he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he asseverates that Armenta, a
police informer, identified him as a member of the New People's Army. Additionally, he contends that because the
killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of subversive ends,"4 (said killing) should have been deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he
did not fire the fatal shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have
been charged merely as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135
of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of prison mayor by the lower
court.

Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor General avers that
the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself had conclusively
proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends."5 Moreover,
the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial court
had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision
mayor as appellant contends, but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic
Act
No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found
guilty as participants in a rebellion.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion.

Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the
following manner:

[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any
part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or
the Legislature wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.6

The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government.7 By its very nature,
rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined
a priori within predetermined bounds.8 One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts
committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire a political character.
This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez,9 thus:

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such
common crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the
intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands
or any part thereof," then it becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being
part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.

Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color by
being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the
crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the act
was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind
which the accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes,10 this court stressed that:

Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's) knowledge and since moreover this
is an affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could
easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the
resistance movement.

From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both
purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting, the crime
of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private
purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be separately punishable
as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime rebellion.11

Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime — alleging rebellion
in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty — could benefit from the law's relatively benign attitude towards
political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v.
Amin,12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829,13 for
allegedly harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator's knowledge that
Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the prosecution's contention, that rebellion and
violation of P.D 1829 could be tried separately14 (on the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal
Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was being charged, though punishable
under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related to the acts for which
he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in
favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a
separate prosecution for rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:
 The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the theory of
absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under
special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.15

Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile vs. Amin further underscored that:

[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he
harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former
associate, the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or
social motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the
crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere membership in an
organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.

The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad, Jr.,16 to the instant case is striking. Two
witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias "Commander Brando," a known hitman
of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan, a military
informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was merely charged
with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because political motive was neither alleged nor proved.

As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political motive lies on the
accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information.17 It must be established by clear and satisfactory
evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:

That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or defense that the
accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of
appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being an informer, and his suspicion that he was one
such, is neither sufficient or adequate to establish that the motivation for the killing was political,
considering appellant's obvious interest in testifying to that effect.18

Similarly, in People v. Buco,19 the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to establish that the reason for
the killing of their victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced by the defense therein simply
showed that appellant Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill municipal
mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise showed that Calma was induced by an acquaintance,
a civilian, to order the killing on account of private differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court
attributed no political motive for the killing, though committed by known members of the Hukbalahap movement.20

People v. Dasig21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the Court held that "the act of
killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere component or ingredient
of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court however noted that the accused, who
was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership with the NPA but also executed an extrajudicial
confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to which even the Solicitor
General, in his brief therein was in agreement. The Solicitor General's brief in Dasig which this Court favorably
quoted, noted that:

[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with the objective of
overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the
killing of Pfc. Manatad was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of
the NPA.22

By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at bench. He states that
accused-appellant's belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only insubstantial but also self
serving23 an averment to which, given a thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we fully agree. He
states:

[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA, clearly overcame the burden of
proving motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for the killing of the victim was
the fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left a letter
card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow his example. It is
entirely different in the case at bar where the evidence for the appellant merely contains self-
serving assertions and denials not substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the
killing of victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.24

In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession to having
participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:

Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?

 A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a
certain alias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched
me and told me to go with them, so I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand
gun and same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me board on said
jeepney. (sic)

Q Please continue.

A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on

said jeep, so we walk towards Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is
raining, when the rain stopped we continue walking by using the road near the
bakery. (sic)

Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q. 7 you used the road
near the bakery where did you proceed?

A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at
more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in
Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO NA YADI AN TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place
towards the poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead of a small store, my three
(3) companions continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting
white T-shirt and a khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said policeman
is nearly approaching me, ALWIN shot the said policeman in front of the small
store, when the said policeman fell on the asphalted road, ALWIN took the service
firearm of the said policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my two
(2) companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill wherein
there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun that was handed to
me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)

Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?

A I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is
JESUS LUCILO. (sic)

Q What is your participation in the group?

A Look-out sir.

Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)

A No more sir.25

It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever mention that he was a
member of the New People's Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that the
killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the information filed against
appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA
in the death of SPO3 Lucilo.26 Even prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his
sworn statement of October 19, 1992.27

As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as
an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed through upon prosecution
eyewitness Armenta's testimony on cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a member of the NPA.
Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an
NPA member.28 The logical result, of course, was that the trial court did not give any weight and credence to said
testimony. The trial court, after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness' testimony while
upholding the rest of it.29 While disbelieving the portion of Armenta's testimony on appellant's alleged membership
in the NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the crime was
committed.30 Such narration is even corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the gun
wielder, by the testimony of the appellant himself.

In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a matter of
defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon the prodding
of alias Alwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the organization's
goals.31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended our organization,"32 without,
however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had been a member of the NPA for five
months before the shooting incident.33

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's contentions are couched in terms so general and non-
specific34 that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made towards the
achievement of the NPA's subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never alleged to be an
informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA. Against appellant's attempts to shade
his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on record leaves the impression that appellant's
bare allegations of membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him.
It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the
furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating the imposable penalty
when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr.,
Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:

The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or irresponsible
or deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings
and acts of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated
despite the best efforts that the Government authorities are exerting, although it may be true that
the insurrectionist groups of the right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of
the state. The need for more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be
gainsaid.35

In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo,
we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder.36 It is of no moment that a
single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that the testimony of one witness, if credible
and positive, is sufficient to convict.37 Against appellant's claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony
of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the
accused.38 Moreover, neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of
motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and
satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.39 In the case at bench, the strength of the
prosecution's case was furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant's admission in open court that he and the
eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against each other.40

Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and
without warning of any kind.41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is murder under
Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial
court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all the accessories provided by law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the
accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116488            May 31, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AARON FLORES @ "RONITO", SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ "SULPING" and EDGAR VILLERAN y
MAGBANUA, accused-appellants.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade detailed at Barangay Tabu, Ilog,
Negros Occidental, and three (3) members of the local Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under
his supervision, namely, Aaron Flores alias "Ronito", Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega alias "Sulping" and Edgar Villeran
y Magbanua, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, with
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The information charged as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of Ilog, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with high powered firearms conspiring, confederating and helping one another, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap, detain and
keep under guard one SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO from Km 117, Hda. Shangrella (sic), Brgy. Tabu,
of the above-named municipality, and bring the latter to their detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under restraint
and against his will, without proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victim of his civil liberty since
then up to the present.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

All the four accused pleaded "Not Guilty" when arraigned. Trial ensued and, based on the testimonial evidence
presented, the trial court found the following antecedent facts to be undisputed.

On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer at the store owned by Terry
Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental. Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio
Silpao and Edgar Villeran were at the same store drinking beer. Sayam joined the four accused at their table.
Sometime later, all the accused and the victim left the store and walked towards the direction of the military
detachment headquarters. After the accused left the store with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot
followed by rapid firing coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.2 That was the last time
Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts of Sayam's mother and relatives, he has not been found.

It was the prosecution's contention that on that fateful evening, all four accused hatched a conspiracy to kidnap
the victim and thereafter detain him at the detachment headquarters. They allegedly succeeded in their plot and,
the prosecution avers, to this day the accused have not released Samson Sayam. All the accused, however,
vehemently denied committing the acts charged.

The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a
conspiracy among the four accused. More specifically, the prosecution failed to show an apparent common
design by and among the accused to kidnap and detain Samson Sayam against his will. Thus, the trial court
proceeded to determine the individual liabilities of the four accused based on the degree of their participation in
the commission of the offense charged.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence that Samson Sayam was seen being forcibly dragged
out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the detachment headquarters by accused Aaron Flores,
Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran. Since Samson Sayam had not been seen nor heard from since then, the trial
court held that the three accused were responsible for the former's disappearance.

As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store ahead of the three (3) co-accused and,
thus, had nothing to do with the disappearance of Samson Sayam. Notably, none of the prosecution witnesses
specifically or categorically mentioned Tampioc as among those who actively participated in bringing Samson
Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike his co-accused who are natives of the place of the incident, Wennie
Tampioc was newly assigned as Detachment Commander and did not know Samson Sayam, such that no ill-
motive was attributed to him by the trial court. Likewise, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Nelson Golez,
on the one hand, and that of Carlos Manlangit, on the other hand, conflict as to the kind of firearm allegedly
carried by Tampioc. While Golez stated that he was armed with an Armalite rifle,3 Manlangit testified that Tampioc
was armed with a short firearm.4

More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc as one of the perpetrators of the crime was
doubtful, because notwithstanding the fact that Nelson Golez knew Wennie Tampioc even before September 29,
1992,5 the original complaint filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial court of Ilog Candoni, dated October 21, 1992,
which was based on the affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit, did not mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the
respondents. The said affidavits merely mentioned an "unidentified member of the 7th IB, Philippine Army,
assigned at Brgy. Tabu, detachment." At the time of the execution of the affidavits, the witnesses could have
known that Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant, and that he was a commander of the detachment. Finally, the
straightforward and emphatic manner in which Wennie Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial court's mind.6

On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the dispositive of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron Flores, Edgar Villeran and
Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and are each sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and there being no proof that Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered to
pay him jointly and severally, or in the alternative, his heirs the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos
as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of this suit.

The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted accused ordered confined
pending appeal if they so file an appeal, in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated
January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED.7

Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant Sulpecio Silpao raised the following errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SULPECIO SILPAO OF THE

CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, UNDER ARTICLE 267, REVISED
PENAL CODE.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO,
AS AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN
THE EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND RESPONSIBLE FOR SAMSON SAYAM'S
DISAPPEARANCE.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran interposed a joint appeal based on the
sole error that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON FLORES AND EDGAR
VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS
ILLEGAL DETENTION BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the trial court, we find that accused-appellants
should be acquitted of the offense charged against them.

The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The elements of the offense are:

1. That the offender is a private individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty.

3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.

4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present:

(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;

(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;

(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or
threats to kill him are made; or

(d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer.8

Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Detention, since the first element of the said crime is that the offender must be a private individual. In the case at
bar, accused-appellants were members of the local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was committed.
The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of complementing the operations
of the regular force formations in a locality.9 It was composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain
peace and order in their localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security. As such, they were
provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or order detention of individuals.10

The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused-appellants of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the appellants are not private individuals, but public officers. As such,
the Solicitor General submits that, under the facts alleged, accused-appellants can only be liable for the crime of
Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized in Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution maintains
that inasmuch as all the other elements of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal information filed
against the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of said crime.

Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a
person.11 Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, the question that remains to be resolved is
whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained by
accused-appellants.

As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag,12 it was held that in the crime of illegal or arbitrary detention, it is
essential that there is actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended party. The deprivation of
liberty must be proved,13 just as the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty must also be
established by indubitable proof.14 In the more recent case of People v. Fajardo,15 this Court reiterated the ruling
in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., there must be uncontroverted proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, as
well as actual confinement or restriction.

Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any manner detaining and
depriving him of his liberty.16 A careful review of the records of the instant case shows no evidence sufficient to
prove that Samson Sayam was detained arbitrarily by accused-appellants. While the prosecution witnesses
testified that accused-appellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam toward the direction of the detachment
headquarters, there is no shred of evidence that he was actually confined there or anywhere else. The fact that
Samson Sayam has not been seen or heard from since he was last seen with accused-appellants does not prove
that he was detained and deprived of his liberty. The prosecution, however, argues that Samson Sayam was
deprived of his liberty when accused-appellants forced him to go with them when they left the store of Jerry
Cabrillos and brought him to the detachment headquarters.

We assayed the testimonies of the prosecution's main witnesses, namely, Carlito Manlangit and his son Jerry
Manlangit. Carlito Manlangit's testimony was offered to prove that Samson Sayam was forcibly taken from the
store and that the latter tried his best to free himself from his abductors. And yet, all that Carlito testified to was
that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the street alone from the store of a certain Moleng; that the four accused,
who were armed, followed Sayam and asked for his residence certificate; that the four accused apprehended
Samson Sayam and brought him to the detachment headquarters; and that he went home after he saw Samson
Sayam talking to the accused.17

It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangit's testimony failed to prove the stated purpose thereof, i.e., that
Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the detachment headquarters. To be sure, the witness did not state that
Samson Sayam was pulled, dragged, or coerced to go with accused-appellants. Neither did he say that Samson
Sayam was taken at gunpoint. There is also no relevant testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam tried his best
to free himself from the clutches of accused-appellants. For if that were the truth, the reactions of Carlito
Manlangit do not conform to human experience. If he really witnessed Samson Sayam being apprehended,
forcibly taken, and trying to free himself, it cannot be logically explained why Carlito Manlangit just went
home,18 instead of doing anything to help Samson Sayam. He admitted that he did not immediately report the
incident to the authorities.19 More telling is the absence of testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam was being
taken to the detachment headquarters against his will, that he was protesting his apprehension, or that he was
asking for help, considering that there were other people within hearing and seeing distance. Most damaging is
Carlito Manlangit's statement that he did not see Samson Sayam in the detachment headquarters with any or all
of the accused.20 In fine, Carlito Manlangit's testimony failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained
or deprived of his liberty.

Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the prosecution. According to him, he and Samson Sayam went
to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29, 1992. At around six in the evening, while on
their way home, they passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he saw the four accused
drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to show his residence certificate and
barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in
Hacienda Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his
father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified that he heard
gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.21

The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of arbitrary detention. Neither
does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito, for they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry
Manlangit did not see any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson Sayam. He did not even see if
accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate and barangay clearance of Samson Sayam.
The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay evidence,22 which has no probative value.23 In summary, Jerry
Manlangit's testimony failed to establish that accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.

The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who identified the four accused as the persons
with Samson Sayam, drinking inside the store of Terry Cabrillos. He also stated that following a heated argument,
the accused and Samson Sayam left the store and went towards the direction of the detachment headquarters.
He said that the accused were "holding and pulling" Samson Sayam "towards the road." Ten minutes later,
Nelson Golez heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing.24

On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier statement that the accused and Samson
Sayam were engaged in a heated argument. Rather, he said he did not hear them arguing as they were leaving
the store. Although Nelson Golez attested that Samson Sayam was protesting while the accused were dragging
him, he did not do anything to help Samson Sayam, who happened to be his cousin.25

Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golez's testimony. First of all, he was unsure of his
assertion that there was an argument. The mere fact that Samson Sayam was being dragged towards the road
does not constitute arbitrary detention. There is no showing that Samson Sayam was completely deprived of his
liberty such that he could not free himself from the grip of the accused, if he was indeed being held against his
will. The incident transpired in a public place, where there were people milling about, many of whom were his
friends. It is puzzling that Samson Sayam did not cry out for help. Nobody bothered to report the incident, if
indeed it happened, to the barangay authorities. No one else came forward to corroborate the testimony of
Nelson Golez.

The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on material points, even as the prosecution
failed to substantiate by direct or corroborative evidence the bare testimony of Nelson Golez.

It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the accused may be convicted of a crime, his guilt
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Although the findings of fact made by trial courts are generally not
disturbed on appeal, if there are substantial facts which were overlooked but which may alter the results of the
case in favor of the accused, such facts should be taken into account by the appellate court.26 And where it
appears that the trial court erred in the appreciation of the evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual findings
of the trial court may be reversed.27

After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonial evidence on the scale of
creditworthiness and materiality, this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a
conviction. Again, the fact of detention, whether illegal or arbitrary, was not clearly established by credible
evidence. There was no showing that Samson Sayam was locked up, restrained of his freedom, or prevented
from communicating with anyone. Likewise, there was no proof that there was actual intent on the part of
accused-appellants to arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It is necessary that there must be a
purposeful or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or with force, because taking
coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary detention.28

The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though circumstantial, sufficiently establishes the
guilt of the accused-appellants. It cites the following circumstances:

1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, accused-appellants, together with their
companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow CAFGU Sulpecio Silpao, were seen with Samson at the store
of Terry Cabrillos. Accused-appellants were having a drinking spree. Later, they were seen engaged in a
heated argument.

2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-appellants by holding and pulling
him towards the road. From another angle, another prosecution witness saw accused-appellants on the
road arresting Samson.

3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of Brgy. Tabu.

4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the detachment followed by
rapid firing.

5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard from.29

As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not established by clear and convincing
evidence. And even if these acts were proven to be true, the combination of all these circumstances would still
not be able to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To our mind, the totality of these circumstantial
evidence do not constitute an unbroken chain pointing to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-
appellants are guilty of the crime charged.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused-appellants are guilty, and inconsistent with the possibility that they are
innocent.30 Thus:

SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:

a) There is more than one circumstance;

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.31

The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete sequence leads to no
other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused.32 It is admitted that Samson Sayam was seen
drinking with accused-appellants on that fateful night. However, the circumstances that there was a heated
argument among them, and that the accused-appellants held and pulled Samson Sayam to the road and brought
him towards the direction of the detachment headquarters was not sufficiently proven by material or relevant
testimony.

Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no relevancy to the case. Even if it
were, it cannot be concluded that the gunshots came from the direction of the detachment headquarters. The
witnesses who testified that they heard the gunshots were at least half a kilometer away from the center of the
barangay, while the detachment headquarters itself was also some distance from the barangay. At night,
especially in the rural areas when all is quiet, loud sounds such as gunshots reverberate and would seem to
come from every direction. An ordinary person a kilometer away cannot, with certainty, point to the exact location
where the gunshots would be coming from. That would otherwise be attributing expertise on such matters to the
prosecution witnesses.

That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis for the trial court to render
judgment convicting the accused-appellants. In fact, it has no bearing in this case because it is not one of the
elements of the crime of arbitrary detention. Consequently, only one relevant circumstance was proved, i.e., that
accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Samson Sayam. However, said circumstance does not
necessarily prove that they feloniously abducted him, then arbitrarily detained him.33

Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a result of accused-appellants' alleged
criminal acts and intentions is insufficient to convict them. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the required
quantum of evidence.34 An uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient for conviction when
the evidence itself is in serious doubt.35 The prosecution was not able to prove a possible motive why accused-
appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam. In sum, there is no unbroken chain of circumstances leading
to the conclusion that accused-appellants are guilty. Since the pieces of circumstantial evidence do not fulfill the
test of moral certainty that is sufficient to support a judgment or conviction, the Court must acquit the accused.36

In the recent case of People v. Comesario,37 we had occasion to rule that:

Accused-appellant's conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence. To validly invoke
circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain of
events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others as
the author of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is purely circumstantial that there should be an
even greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot depend on the
weakness of the defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt
of the accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved. In the case at bar, the pieces
of testimonial evidence relied on by the prosecution and the trial court to support a conviction have failed to
overcome the constitutional precept of the presumed innocence of accused-appellants. Among other grounds,
not only is there a lot of room for reasonable doubt in regard to their guilt, there is a virtual dearth of convincing
evidence to prove that a crime had been committed.

There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the prosecution bears the onus to distinctly and
indubitably prove that a crime had been committed by accused-appellants.38 It is incumbent upon the prosecution
to establish its case with that degree of proof which leads to no other conclusion but conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits for it cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.39 Clearly, the prosecution in this case has failed to
prove the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. In similar cases, this Court has often and
consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict an innocent one.40

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants are ACQUITTED.
Unless being held or detained for some lawful reason, accused-appellants are ORDERED RELEASED
immediately. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice, of the
date and time when accused-appellants are released pursuant to this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 153524-25            January 31, 2005

RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C.
CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2
ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B.
CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO
PAREL, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the Ombudsman in its finding of lack
of probable cause made during preliminary investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of
non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave
abuse of discretion on their part.

Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,1 contend precisely that the public respondents herein – officers
of the Office of the Ombudsman – gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against private respondents
herein, members of the Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur.

From the respective pleadings2 of the parties, the following facts appear to be indubitable:

1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the 14 May 2001
Elections3 ), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition;

2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a crime which carries
with it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries
the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6] years);

3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .
22 cal. revolver with ammunition;

4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was
at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police officers to have a
standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;

5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day), petitioners were
brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a
"Joint-Affidavit" against them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the
arresting officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and
there at about 6:00 p.m. the "Joint-Affidavit" was filed and docketed;

6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was released upon
the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista
was brought back and continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner
Soria’s detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;

7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought before the MTC of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista
posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;

8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner Bista’s arrest for
alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an
information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S,
was filed against petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00
in the afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article
261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;

9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N
and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
 10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-
affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents.

11. After considering the parties’ respective submissions, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered the first
assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the
Revised Penal Code for lack of merit; and

12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of
merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:

Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in
the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of:
twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.

In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his
request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.

It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested without warrant are
punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed
with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for
which petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he
could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been filed with the proper
judicial authorities.

The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36 periods. With respect
specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that public respondents
gravely erred in construing Article 1254 as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of
the periods prescribed within which public officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial
authorities as the law never makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear and
unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any attempts at interpretation.5 Public
respondents, on the other hand, relied on the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,6 and Sayo v. Chief of Police of
Manila7 and on commentaries8 of jurists to bolster their position that Sundays, holidays and election days are
excluded in the computation of the periods provided in Article 125,9 hence, the arresting officers delivered
petitioners well within the allowable time.

In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain that
the filing of the information in court against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The
information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001 but the orders for his release were issued by the Regional Trial
Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on law
and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period fixed by law, the arresting officer must
release the detainee lest he be charged with violation of Article 125.10 Public respondents countered that the duty
of the arresting officers ended upon the filing of the informations with the proper judicial authorities following the
rulings in Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military ,11 and People v. Acosta.12

From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public respondents did not abuse
their discretion in dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint against private respondents.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.1awphi1.nét The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by
law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion or hostility.13

No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public respondents. Their disposition of
petitioners’ complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured
out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated thus:

As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned, based on
applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation
of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it
being a "no-office day." (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the
complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were
filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at
4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the
respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of.14

Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,15 that —

. . . The arresting officer’s duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within 18
hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not released. From the time of petitioner’s arrest
at 12:00 o’clock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for murder
actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.

But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was declared an official
holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an
easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to
have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of
commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those officers and employees
could very well compound the fiscal’s difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from
declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first office day
following arrest.

And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila16 --

. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than
six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and
other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the
investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.

As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has already been filed in Court,
public respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:

In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not
prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint
against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant
of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post
bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending
criminal case requiring his continuous detention.

The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC Resolution No. 3328
were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001
(Annexes "G" and "I", Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention only on June 8,
2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes "J" and "K", Complaint-Affidavit). Was
there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The
answer is in the negative. The complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of justice within the
thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining officers is deemed
complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon
the judicial authority (People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).17

The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,18 wherein we ordained that
–

. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is
satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and,
upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the
MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very
purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree
with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period
prescribed in said Article.

All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice but to defer to the Office of
the Ombudsman’s determination that the facts on hand do not make out a case for violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code.l^vvphi1.net

As we have underscored in numerous decisions --

We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical
considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a
wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial
intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a preliminary
investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the
accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to
order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the
Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions
of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the
same way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
by a private complainant.19 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194367               June 15, 2011

MARK CLEMENTE y MARTINEZ @ EMMANUEL DINO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
seeking to reverse the March 29, 2010 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied petitioner's appeal
and affirmed the November 3, 2008 Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 7, convicting
petitioner of illegal possession and use of false bank notes under Article 1683 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
as amended. Also assailed is the CA Resolution dated October 14, 20104 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Article 168 of the RPC under an Information5 which
reads:

That on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to use, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control
twenty[-]four (24) pcs. [of] P500.00 bill with Markings ["] IIB-1" to "IIB-24", respectively and specifically
enumerated, to wit:

SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT

PX626388 1 P500.00 CC077337 1 ₱500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
BB020523 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
PX626388 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00
PX626388 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
UU710062 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00

Which are false and falsified.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

The version of the prosecution and the defense, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:6

The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: Jail Officer 1 (JO1) Michael Michelle Passilan, the
Investigator of the Manila City Jail; JO1 Domingo David, Jr.; and Loida Marcega Cruz, the Assistant Manager of
the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

[Their testimonies established the following:]

Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On August 7, 2007, at around 3:30 pm, an informant in the person
of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The informant narrated
that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle of soft drink from the Manila
City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however, recognized the bill as a fake and refused to accept the same.
Consequently, JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant, proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise
inspection. Pursuant to their agreement, the informant entered the cubicle first and found appellant therein, lying
in bed. The informant returned to appellant the latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and
announced a surprise inspection. JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back
pocket. Inside the wallet were twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit.
They confiscated the same and marked them sequentially with "IIB-2" to "II-B24". They likewise marked the
P500.00 bill that was returned by informant to appellant with "IIB-1". Appellant was consequently arrested and
brought out of his cell into the office of the Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of the Manila City jail for
interrogation.

Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant were turned over to the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting Assistant Manager Loida
Marcega Cruz of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and found the following bills as counterfeit, viz: one
(1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6) P500.00 bills with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9)
P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five (5) P500.00 bills with Serial Number PX626388; one (1)
P500.00 bill with Serial Number UU710062; and two (2) P500.00 bills with Serial Number WW164152.

For the defense, appellant was the lone witness presented on the stand.

Appellant simply raised the defense of frame-up. He testified that in the afternoon of August 5, 2007, he was
inside his room located at Dorm 1 of the Manila City Jail. At around 3:00 pm, JO1 Michael Passilan entered
appellant's room while JO1 Domingo David, Jr. posted himself outside. Without any warning, JO1 Passilan
frisked appellant and confiscated his wallet containing one (1) P1,000.00 bill. JO1s David and Passilan left
immediately thereafter. Appellant was left with no other choice but to follow them in order to get back his wallet.
Appellant followed the jail officers to the Intelligence Office of the Manila City Jail where he saw JO1 Passilan
place the P500.00 bills inside the confiscated black wallet. Appellant was then told that the P500.00 bills were
counterfeit and that he was being charged with illegal possession and use thereof. Appellant also added that JO1
Passilan bore a grudge against him. This was because appellant refused to extend a loan [to] JO1 Passilan
because the latter cannot offer any collateral therefor. Since then, JO1 Passilan treated him severely, threatening
him and, at times, putting him in isolation.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC gave
credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding that the counterfeit money were discovered in petitioner's
possession during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the counterfeit money were planted to
incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of pieces involved.7 The RTC also did not find that
the jail officers were motivated by improper motive in arresting petitioner,8 and applied in their favor the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties considering the absence of contrary evidence. As to
petitioner’s defense of frame-up, the RTC held that the purported frame-up allegedly staged by JO1 Passilan
would not affect the prosecution's evidence since the testimony of JO1 David could stand by itself. The RTC
likewise found that it was strange that petitioner did not remonstrate despite the fact that he was allegedly being
framed.9

As to the elements of the crime, the RTC held that the fact that the ₱500.00 bills found in petitioner’s possession
were forgeries was confirmed by the certification issued by the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, which was testified into by Acting Assistant Manager Loida A. Cruz.10 The RTC also ruled that petitioner
knew the bills were counterfeit as shown by his conduct during the surprise search and his possession of the bills.
As to the element of intention to use the false bank notes, the RTC ruled that the fact that petitioner intended to
use the bills was confirmed by the information received by the jail officers from another inmate.11

Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment. Petitioner argued that the evidence used against
him was obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Petitioner
also argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt because of the non-
presentation of the informant-inmate, Francis dela Cruz, who could have corroborated the testimonies of the jail
officers.

Unconvinced, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. The RTC, however, only ruled that there
was no violation of petitioner’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures because the
seizure was done pursuant to a valid arrest for violation of Article 168 of the RPC. The trial court pointed out that
prior to the search, a crime was committed and the criminal responsibility pointed to petitioner.12

On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner contended that one of the elements of the crime which is intent to use
the counterfeit bills was not established because the informant Francis dela Cruz did not take the witness stand.13

The CA, however, found the appeal unmeritorious and denied petitioner’s appeal.14 The appellate court found that
the fact the petitioner was caught in possession of twenty-four (24) pieces of fake ₱500.00 bills already casts
doubt on his allegation that he was merely framed by the jail guards. The CA agreed with the RTC that even
without the testimony of JO1 Passilan, the testimony of JO1 David was already sufficient to establish petitioner’s
guilt since petitioner did not impute any ill motive on the latter except to point out that JO1 David was JO1
Passilan’s friend.151avvphi1

Regarding the element of intent to use, the CA found that there are several circumstances which, if taken
together, lead to the logical conclusion that petitioner intended to use the counterfeit bills in his possession. The
CA pointed out that jail officers were informed by inmate Francis dela Cruz that he received a fake ₱500.00 bill
from petitioner who told him to buy soft drinks from the Manila City jail bakery. After Francis dela Cruz identified
petitioner as the person who gave him the fake money, the jail officers conducted a surprise inspection. Said
inspection yielded twenty-three (23) pieces of counterfeit ₱500.00 bills inside petitioner's black wallet, which was
taken from his back pocket. The CA further held that the non-presentation of Francis dela Cruz would not affect
the prosecution's case because even without his testimony, petitioner’s intent to use the counterfeit bills was
established. The CA added that the matter of which witnesses to present is a matter best left to the discretion of
the prosecution.16

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in
the assailed Resolution dated October 14, 2010.17 Hence, the present appeal.

Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE COUNTERFEIT BILLS SINCE THEY
WERE DERIVED FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.18

The petition is meritorious.

Generally, the trial court’s findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court has overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if
properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The exception applies when it is established that the trial
court has ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if
considered, will change the outcome of the case.19

Here, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA had overlooked certain substantial facts of value to warrant a
reversal of its factual assessments. While petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be
buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence, said defense must be given credence in this
case as the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.

Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. — Unless
the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall
knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in
this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles. [Emphasis
supplied.]

The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or
other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit
not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said
instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or
falsified instruments.20 As held in People v. Digoro, 21 possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without
anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the
possession must be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes.221avvphi1

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he intended to use
the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake ₱500.00 bill to buy soft
drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only informed by Francis dela Cruz
that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail bakery using a fake ₱500.00 bill. In short,
the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the ₱500.00
bill.23 Their account, however, is hearsay and not based on the personal knowledge.24

This Court, of course, is not unaware of its rulings that the matter of presentation of prosecution witnesses is not
for the accused or, except in a limited sense, for the trial court to dictate. Discretion belongs to the city or
provincial prosecutor as to how the prosecution should present its case.25 However, in this case, the non-
presentation of the informant as witness weakens the prosecution's evidence since he was the only one who had
knowledge of the act which manifested petitioner's intent to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every
opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its witness, if in fact such person existed, but it did not present him.
Hence, the trial court did not have before it evidence of an essential element of the crime. The twenty-three (23)
pieces of counterfeit bills allegedly seized on petitioner is not sufficient to show intent, which is a state of mind, for
there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 29, 2010 and
Resolution dated October 14, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32365 are REVERSED and SET-
ASIDE. Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of Illegal
possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

With costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178652               December 8, 2010

SPOUSES REVELO VILLAMAR and CORAZON PENULIAR- VILLAMAR, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The petition challenges the 27 June
2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29524. The Court of Appeals affirmed with
modification the 11 August 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 40,
Dagupan City, in Criminal Case No. 2005-0172-D, affirming the 8 February 2005 Decision4 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 1, Dagupan City, in Criminal Case No. 42907.

On 20 April 1967, Elena Manantan (Elena) sold a parcel of land to her nine children: Cornelia Penuliar (Cornelia),
Simplicio Penuliar (Simplicio), Modesta Flores (Modesta), Eulalia Penuliar (Eulalia), Hermogenes Penuliar
(Hermogenes), Lucia Penuliar (Lucia), Pedro Penuliar (Pedro), Felipe Penuliar (Felipe), and Jose Penuliar (Jose).
On 6 June 1983, Cornelia Eulalia, Hermogenes, Lucia, Pedro, and Jose sold their share to Simplicio. Modesta
and Felipe did not sell their share.

On 7 September 1989, Simplicio sold his total share to his daughter, petitioner Corazon Penuliar-Villamar
(Corazon). Corazon is married to petitioner Revelo Villamar (Revelo). Corazon and Revelo possessed and
registered with the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a signed and notarized deed of
sale dated 23 November 1989. Notary Public Quirico Bachar notarized the deed. In the deed, it was made to
appear that all of Elena’s children, including Modesta and Felipe, sold the property to the spouses. The
signatures of Modesta, Hermogenes, and Lucia were forged. Corazon and Revelo alleged that "employees of the
Assessor’s Office" committed the falsification.

In 1999, Modesta discovered the 23 November 1989 deed of sale. In an information5 dated 7 September 2000,
Second Assistant City Prosecutor Regulus V. Reyes charged Corazon and Revelo with falsification of public
document.

In its 8 February 2005 Decision, the MTCC found Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
falsification of public document. The MTCC sentenced the spouses to an indeterminate penalty of four months
and one day arresto mayor as minimum to three years, six months and 20 days prision correccional as maximum,
and to pay Modesta ₱20,000 moral damages. The MTCC held that:

There is no question that the signature of the private complainant in the Deed of Sale, dated November 23, 1989
was falsified. In fact, even the accused admitted that indeed private complainant Modesta Penuliar Flores was not
one of the vendors in the said document. But the accused maintain that they could not be held guilty of the crime
charged because they were not the ones who falsified the document as it was prepared by somebody in the
Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan without their knowledge. The accused insisted that
when they went to the said office to register the Deed of Sale marked Exhibit 2, they were asked to leave it, and
when they returned to get their document, they were given another document particularly Exhibit A which is the
reason why they were charged with falsification because it appears in the said document that private complainant
Modesta Penuliar Flores was one of the signatories when, in fact, she was not. In other words, the accused
maintain that they could not be held liable for falsification of public document because criminal intent was lacking.
But if the accused acted in good faith, why did they not immediately inform the private complainant about the
matter. Moreover, they should not have received the falsified document from the Assessor’s Office knowing that it
was not the document that was given to their office for registration. The actuation and the behavior of the
accused negate their claim of innocence. It is very unusual that they entrusted such very important document to
somebody whose name they don’t even know. Furthermore, why did the accused waited [sic] for the advice of the
Brgy. Captain of their place to settle their problem with the private complainant. Their silence work [sic] against
them as it goes against the principle that the first impulse of an innocent was [sic] when accused of wrongdoing is
to express his innocence at the first opportune time. Besides, other than the self-serving testimonies of the
accused, no other evidence was presented by them to substantiate their pretense of innocence. They should
have presented the person from the Assessor’s Office who gave them Exhibit A to corroborate their claim if
indeed they have no hand in its falsification. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that the person who stood to
benefit by the falsification of a public document and was in possession of it is presumed to be the material author
of the falsification. Hence, the defense of good faith of the accused is not acceptable as it is not supported by
clear and convincing evidence.

All told, the prosecution has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of innocence accorded the accused who, on
their part, have dismally failed to substantiate their pretense of innocence.6

Corazon and Revelo appealed to the RTC. In its 11 August 2005 Decision, the RTC found Corazon and Revelo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public document. The RTC held that:
After a careful review of the decision appealed from, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the court a-
quo as the same is duly supported by evidence.

The prosecutor’s evidence has duly proved that the signature of the private complainant in the Deed of Sale
dated November 23, 1989 was falsified. Even the accused admitted that indeed private complainant Modesta
Penuliar Flores was not one of the vendors in the said document.

The accused, while admitting that private complainant Modesta Penuliar Flores was not one of the vendors in the
said document, they maintained that they could not be held guilty of the crime charged because they were not the
ones who falsified the document as it was prepared by somebody in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of
Lingayen, Pangasinan without their knowledge, and put up the defense of good faith.

As correctly held by the Court a-quo, the actuation and behavior of the accused in not immediately informing the
complainant about the inclusion of her name in the subject Deed of Sale as one of the vendors therein negate
their claim of innocence.

The Court is in consonance with the ruling of the court a-quo that the person who stood to benefit by the
falsification of a public document and was in possession of it is presumed to be the material author of the
falsification.

As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Manansala (105 Phil. 1253), it is an established rule that
when a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the presumption or
inference is justified that such person is the forger.7

Corazon and Revelo appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its 27 June 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals found
Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public document. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the MTCC’s and RTC’s decisions by adding one day to the maximum penalty. The
Court of Appeals held that:

Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 shall be imposed upon:

"1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in
any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document; and

x x x           x x x          x x x"

On the other hand, Article 171 of the same Code provides:

"Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister. — The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

"1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

x x x           x x x          x x x"

From the foregoing, the elements of the crime of falsification under paragraph 1 of Article 172 are: (i) that the
offender is a private individual; (ii) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171; and
(iii) that the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document. All these elements are
present in the instant case.

It is not disputed that Modesta’s signature in the questioned Deed of Sale was forged. Indeed, petitioner-spouses
admitted that Modesta and Felipe never participated in the sale of the property subject of the Deed of Sale in their
favor. They argue, however, that they were not the authors of the falsification, claiming that the employees of the
Assessor’s Office of Lingayen, Pangasinan were the ones who falsified the document. They maintain that the
deed of sale they submitted to the Assessor’s Office did not include Modesta as one of the vendors but when they
returned to said Office after one month, the employees therein gave them the questioned document which
included Modesta as one of the vendors. We are not convinced.

That petitioners were the authors and/or masterminds of the falsification is presumed from the fact that they
actually benefited from it. In Maliwat vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore
guilty of falsification. "If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it, taking
advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification."
In the instant case, petitioners failed miserably to rebut the above presumption. Clearly, they were the ones who
benefited from the falsified document, the same having been executed in their favor. To emphasize, they were
the ones who caused the registration of the deed of sale and were the ones who received the falsified document
from the Assessor’s Office. Their bare-faced assertion that the employees of the Assessor’s Office committed the
falsification is flimsy and unsupported by evidence.

In the first place, a comparison of the September 7, 1989 Deed of Sale allegedly submitted by petitioners to the
Assessor’s Office and the falsified November 23, 1989 Deed of Sale returned to them by the said Office reveals
that the two documents are totally different from each other, both in the print or font of the contents and the
location of the names of the signatories. We cannot, therefore, see how the employees could have inserted the
names of Modesta and Felipe in the questioned document, much less falsified their signatures, without anyone
noticing it. What is taxing to the mind is: Why would the employees include the names of Modesta and Felipe and
falsify their signatures, and what could they gain therefrom?8

Hence, the present petition. Corazon and Revelo raise as issue that:

The facts of the case x x x is [sic] that petitioners were innocent of the existence of the falsified document on the
ground that what was submitted to the Office of the Assessos [sic], Lingayen, Pangasinan to be the basis of the
petitioners’ ownership was a genuine document which truly did not include the share of the private complainant,
now the private respondent. What was in the mind of the perpetrators employees of the Assessor’s Office whom
petitioners sought assistance for the transfer of the document in their favor was beyond their control as they were
never informed beforehand of the execution of the questioned document.9

The petition is unmeritorious.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only questions of
law which must be distinctly set forth." In Pagsibigan v. People,10 the Court held that:

A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law. Questions of fact are
not reviewable. A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A
question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.1avvphi1

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative
value of the evidence. The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law is on a certain set of
facts. Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of fact.11

Whether Corazon and Revelo "were innocent of the existence of the falsified document" is a question of fact. It is
not reviewable.

The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the Court. The exceptions to this rule are (1) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculation; (3) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and
its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7) when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed
facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (8) when the facts set forth by the
petitioner are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on
the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.12 Corazon and Revelo did not show that
any of these circumstances is present.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 27 June 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29524.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 179003               January 9, 2013

ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and CAROLINA T ANJUTCO, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 195816

ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
JULIE O. CUA, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Antonio L. Tan, Jr.
(Tan) and docketed as:

(1) G.R. No. 179003 which assails the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision1 dated February 6, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated July 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346, entitled Yoshitsugu Matsuura & Carolina
Tanjutco v. Hon. Raul Gonzales, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Justice and
Antonio L. Tan, Jr.; and

(2) G.R. No. 195816 which assails the CA’s Decision3 dated August 17, 2010 and Resolution4 dated
February 23, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263, entitled Julie O. Cua v. Antonio L. Tan, Jr., Hon. Raul M.
Gonzales, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice and Hon. Ernesto L. Pineda, in his
capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Justice.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City a Complaint-
Affidavit5 charging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura), Atty. Carolina Tanjutco (Tanjutco) and Atty.
Julie Cua (Cua) of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), allegedly committed as follows:

2. On or about the period from 21 December 1996 to 09 January 1997, Mr. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA,
Ms. HIROKO MATSUURA and Mr. RUBEN JACINTO have had stolen company’s properties and my
personal belongings which were kept "under lock and key". Among those stolen was my pre-signed
DEED OF TRUST, whose date and number of shares, and the item witness were all in BLANK. As a
result, Criminal Case No. 98-040 for Qualified Theft was filed against Mr. & Ms. Matsuura and Mr. Jacinto,
and now pending before the Regional Trial Court (of Makati City) Branch 132;

3. In the said "blank" Deed of Trust, the entries as to the number of shares and the date of the instrument
were then inserted, that is, 28,500 as shares and 20th day of January, and the signatures of Hiroko
Matsuura and Lani C. Camba appeared in the item WITNESS, all without my participation whatsoever, or
without my consent and authority. A copy of the "filled in" Deed of Trust is attached as Annex "A" and
made part hereof;

4. Sometime on 19 June 1997, the said Deed of Trust, was made to be notarized by JULIE O. CUA, a
Notary Public for and in the City of Makati, and entered in her Notarial Register as Doc[.] No. 2; Page No.
1; Book No. 1 and Series of 1997, WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT I HAVE NEVER APPEARED,
SIGNED OR TOOK [sic] MY OATH BEFORE THE SAID NOTARY PUBLIC AND ON THE SAID DATE
OF NOTARIZATION because the document (Deed of Trust) was stolen as earlier stated, and the relation
between us (Mr. and Ms. Matsuura, or Mr. Jacinto, and the undersigned) had become hostile and
irreconcilable. A copy of the notarized Deed of Trust is attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof.

5. Both documents (Annexes "A" and "B") were/are in the possessions of Mr. Matsuura and/or his lawyer,
CAROLINA TANJUTCO, who used these false documents in the cases involving us;

6. Without prejudice to the filing of other charges in the proper venues, I am executing this affidavit for the
purpose of charging Mr. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and ATTY. CAROLINA TANJUTCO for violation of
Art. 172 (2) in relation to Art. 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code with regard to Annex "A", and likewise
charging MR. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and ATTYS. CAROLINA TANJUTCO and JULIE O. CUA for
violation of Art. 172 (1) in relation to Art. 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, when through their concerted
actions they FALSELY made it appeared [sic] that the undersigned had participated in notarization of the
 Deed of Trust (Annex "B") on 19 June 1997, and in both instances causing prejudice and damages to the
undersigned.6

The respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits.

Matsuura vehemently denied Tan’s charges. He countered that the filing of the complaint was merely a scheme
resorted to by Tan following their dispute in TF Ventures, Inc., and after he had obtained a favorable resolution in
a complaint for estafa against Tan. Matsuura further explained that the transfer of the shareholdings covered by
the subject Deed of Trust7 was a result of Tan’s offer to compromise the intra-corporate dispute. He insisted that it
was Tan who caused the notarization of the deed, as this was a condition for Matsuura’s acceptance of the
compromise.8

For her defense, Tanjutco argued that Tan’s admission of having pre-signed the subject deed only proved that he
had willingly assigned his shares in TF Ventures, Inc. to Matsuura. She also argued that Tan failed to present any
proof of her participation in the deed’s falsification, and explained that she had not yet known Matsuura at the
time of the supposed notarization.9

For her part, Cua narrated that on June 19, 1997, a group that included a person who represented himself as
Antonio Tan, Jr. approached her law office for the notarization of the subject deed. Tan presented his community
tax certificate (CTC) as indicated in the subject deed of trust, then was sworn in by Cua as a notary public. Cua
claimed to have conducted her duty in utmost good faith, with duplicate copies of the notarized deed reported to
the Clerk of Court of Makati City. She denied having any business or interest whatsoever with the law offices of
Tanjutco.10

The Ruling of the City Prosecutor

On July 13, 1998, the OCP issued a Resolution11 dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint against
Matsuura and Tanjutco. It considered the fact that Tan had voluntarily signed the subject deed, and further noted
that "whether or not the same document is notarized, the deed has the effect of a binding contract between the
parties. The element of damage has not been sufficiently shown."12

The complaint against Cua was also dismissed. For the OCP, Tan failed to overturn the presumption of regularity
attached to the notary public’s performance of her official duty. Any irregularity attending the execution of the
deed of trust required more than mere denial from Tan.13

Tan’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a petition for review14 with the Department of
Justice (DOJ).

The Ruling of the Secretary of Justice

On April 4, 2003, then Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong issued a resolution15 denying the petition. He
ruled that no evidence was presented to show that the date, the number of shares and the witnesses’ signatures
appearing on the subject deed were merely inserted therein by the respondents. Tan’s bare averments were
insufficient to show the actual participation of the respondents in the alleged falsification.

Undaunted, Tan filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma.
Merceditas N. Gutierrez in a Resolution16 dated July 1, 2004. In finding probable cause to indict the respondents
for the crime of falsification, the DOJ noted that a copy of the deed of trust attached by Matsuura and Tanjutco to
Matsuura’s Answer dated October 30, 1997 in an intra-corporate dispute before the SEC was not yet notarized.
Furthermore, the print and font of the deed’s entries on its covered shares and date remarkably differed from the
other portions of the document. The Secretary then held:

It would appear that the subject deed of trust was indeed never notarized. If the said document was purportedly
notarized on June 19, 1997, the same notarized copy should have been presented by respondent Matsuura. After
all, his Answer filed before the SEC was made with the assistance of respondent Atty. Tanjutco. There being
none, it may be concluded that the notarization of the subject deed of trust was indeed made under doubtful
circumstances.17

The Secretary also held that Cua should have been alerted by the variance in the deed’s print styles, and the fact
that the document was presented for notarization almost five months from the date of its purported execution. The
dispositive portion of the Secretary’s resolution then reads:

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 189 (Series of 2003) is
hereby SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is directed to file an information against respondents
Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina Tanjutco for violation of Art. 172 (2) in relation to Art. 171 (6), RPC; and
another information for violation of Art. 171 (2), RPC against respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura, Atty. Carolina
Tanjutco and Atty. Julie Cua.

SO ORDERED.18
The respondents moved for reconsideration. On April 4, 2005, then DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda,
signing on behalf of the Secretary of Justice, issued a resolution19 affirming the presence of probable cause
against Matsuura and Tanjutco, but ordering the exclusion of Cua from the filing of information. He ruled that Cua
had exercised due diligence as a notary public by requiring from the person who appeared before her a proof of
his identification. The resolution’s decretal portion provides:

Premises considered, the Resolution dated July 1, 2004 is hereby MODIFIED accordingly. The City Prosecutor of
Makati City is directed to move for the exclusion of respondent Julie Cua from the information for violation of Art.
171 (2), Revised Penal Code, if any has been filed, and to report the action taken within ten (10) days from
receipt hereof. The motion for reconsideration filed by respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina
Tanjutco is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.20

At this point, Matsuura and Tanjutco filed with the CA the petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
89346. The DOJ’s review of its resolution on Cua’s case continued with Tan’s filing of a motion for partial
reconsideration. Finding merit in the motion, the DOJ again reversed itself and issued on December 12, 2005 a
Resolution21 with dispositive portion that reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for partial reconsideration is GRANTED and resolution dated
April 4, 2005 is SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby directed to include Atty. Julie O. Cua in
the information for violation of Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code filed against respondents Yoshitsugu
Matsuura and Atty. Carolina Tanjutco and report to this Office the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.

SO ORDERED.22

Cua’s motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting her to file with the CA the petition for certiorari docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 95263.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA granted both petitions questioning the Secretary of Justice’s resolutions.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 89346, the CA held that given the elements of the crime, the actual participation of
respondents Matsuura and Tanjutco was not sufficiently alleged, and the element of damage was not sufficiently
shown. The dispositive portion of its Decision23 dated February 6, 2007 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the DOJ dated April 4, 2005
and July 1, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the City Prosecutor, Makati City dated July 13, 1998 in I.S.
No. 98-C-15857-58 affirmed by the DOJ through Secretary Datumanong on April 4, 2003 STANDS.

SO ORDERED.24

Tan’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

In CA-G.R. SP No. 95263, the CA held that Tan also failed to discharge the burden of proving probable cause
against Cua. For the appellate court, there was nothing on record that was sufficient to overcome the
presumption of regularity ascribed to both the subject deed as a public document and to Cua’s discharge of her
official functions as a notary public. The dispositive portion of its Decision25 dated August 17, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated 12
December 2005 and 8 May 2006 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
dated 4 April 2003 affirming the findings of the City Prosecutor is hereby UPHELD.

SO ORDERED.26

Tan’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution27 dated February 23, 2011.

The Present Petitions

Unsatisfied, Tan separately filed with this Court two petitions for review. G.R. No. 179003 assails the CA’s
disposition of Matsuura and Tanjutco’s petition, while G.R. No. 195816 assails the CA’s decision in the petition
filed by Cua. From these petitions are two main issues for this Court’s resolution:

(a) whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions filed before it, assuming the role
of a reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice; and
 (b) whether or not the CA erred in upholding the finding of the OCP that there exists no probable cause to
indict Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua for the crime of falsification.

This Court’s Ruling

We emphasize that on February 13, 2012, this Court had already issued in G.R. No. 195816 a
resolution28 denying the petition, on the following bases:

Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision dated 17 August 2010 and Resolution dated 23 February 2011 of the Court of Appeals, Manila, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 95263, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for raising substantially factual issues and for failure
to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment to warrant the exercise of this Court’s
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.29

(Underscoring supplied, emphasis in the original)

Thus, the only pending incident in G.R. No. 195816 is Tan’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of his
petition. In his motion, Tan reiterates the arguments he presented in the petition, yet argues for the first time that
the CA erred in granting Cua’s motion for an additional period of thirty (30) days within which to file her petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 95263. This allegedly violated the provisions of A.M. 00-2-03-SC that amended Section 4, Rule
6530 of the Rules of Court.

Tan also moved to consolidate G.R. No. 1958156 with G.R. No. 179003, which motion was allowed by the Court.

Before ruling on the main issues, we address Tan’s argument that the CA erred in granting Cua’s motion for
extension of time to file her petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263.

In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals,31 we emphasized that the Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed
despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are
mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that the strict and rigid application of rules which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.
It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties
a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave
injustice to the parties.32 Thus, we allowed the petition in Vallejo to proceed even if it was filed almost four (4)
months beyond the prescribed reglementary period under the rules.

Pursuant to the foregoing doctrine, in the interest of substantial justice, and given the merit that was ascribed by
the CA to Cua’s petition, we sustain the appellate court’s ruling on Cua’s motion for extension of time to file her
petition for certiorari.

Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.

On the first main issue, the petitioner contends that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the petitions for
certiorari filed before it because criminal proceedings shall not be restrained once probable cause has been
determined and the corresponding information has been filed in courts. Citing jurisprudence, Tan argues that the
institution of a criminal action in court depends upon the sound discretion of the prosecutor.

The Court remains mindful of the established principle that the determination of probable cause is essentially an
executive function that is lodged with the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice. However, equally settled
is the rule that courts retain the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations, although in a
mere few exceptional cases showing grave abuse of discretion.

Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution covers the courts’ power to determine
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by any
branch or instrumentality of the government in the discharge of its functions. Although policy considerations call
for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors’ findings, courts should not shirk from exercising their
power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutors’ findings are supported by the
facts or by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that are exercising
their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies.
Indeed, the exercise of the courts’ review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are
prosecuted and, on the other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless prosecution.33

We then ruled in Tan v. Ballena34 that while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this does not
preclude courts from intervening and exercising our own powers of review with respect to the DOJ’s findings. In
the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency
of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the CA may take cognizance of the case via a
petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.35
Based on the grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the CA, the appellate court’s exercise of its
power to review was also the proper and most prudent course to take after the Secretary had successively issued
several resolutions with varying findings of fact and conclusions of law on the existence of probable cause, even
contrary to the own findings of the OCP that conducted the preliminary investigation. Although by itself, such
circumstance was not indicative of grave abuse of discretion, there was a clear issue on the Secretary of Justice’s
appreciation of facts, which commanded a review by the court to determine if grave abuse of discretion attended
the discharge of his functions.

There is no probable cause for falsification against Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua.

The Court agrees with the CA that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when the latter
ruled in favor of Tan, in his complaint against the respondents. Again, while the courts generally accord respect
upon the prosecutor’s or the DOJ’s discretion in the determination of probable cause in preliminary investigations,
the courts may, as an exception, set aside the prosecutor’s or DOJ’s conclusions to prevent the misuse of the
strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice.36

We emphasize the nature, purpose and amount of evidence that is required to support a finding of probable
cause in preliminary investigations. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been
defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the
belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged
was guilty of the crime for which he is to be prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the
accused.37

While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with
care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of
freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged
offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.38

G.R. No. 179003

The Court affirms the CA’s finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice in reversing
the rulings of the OCP that favored Matsuura and Tanjutco.

In the Resolutions dated July 1, 2004 and April 4, 2005, the Secretary of Justice directed the filing in court of two
informations against Matsuura and Tanjutco: one information for the crime of falsification under Article 172 (2), in
relation to Article 171 (6) of the RPC, and another information for a violation of Article 171 (2) of the RPC. These
penal provisions read:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. – The penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking
advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

xxxx

(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate.

xxxx

(6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.

xxxx

Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. – The penalty of prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000

pesos shall be imposed upon:

xxxx

(2) Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any private
document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

xxxx
In the first information, the charge was under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), for the alleged insertions
in the deed of trust on its number of covered shares, its date and the witnesses to the instrument’s execution. In
Garcia v. Court of Appeals,39 we identified the elements of falsification under Article 171 (6) of the RPC, to wit:

(1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document;

(2) that it was made on a genuine document;

(3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and

(4) that the changes made the document speak something false.40

When these are committed by a private individual on a private document, the violation would fall under paragraph
2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in addition to the aforesaid elements, independent evidence of
damage or intention to cause the same to a third person.41

Logically, affidavits and evidence presented during a preliminary investigation must at least show these elements
of the crime and the particular participation of each of the respondents in its commission. Otherwise, there would
be no basis for a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the persons being charged are
probably guilty thereof. Probable cause can only find support in facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonable mind to believe that the person being charged warrants a prosecution. Upon the Court’s review, we
affirm the ruling that Tan had failed to adequately show during the preliminary investigation all the
aforementioned elements of the offense.

Petitioner Tan was not able to establish when and how the alleged unauthorized insertions in the subject
document were effected, and that Matsuura and Tanjutco should be held liable therefor. To warrant an indictment
for falsification, it is necessary to show during the preliminary investigation that the persons to be charged are
responsible for the acts that define the crime. Contrary to this, however, there were no sufficient allegations and
evidence presented on the specific acts attributed to Matsuura and Tanjutco that would show their respective
actual participation in the alleged alteration or intercalation. Tan’s broad statement that the deed was falsified
after it was stolen by Matsuura merits no consideration in finding probable cause, especially after the following
findings of the OCP in his Resolution dated July 13, 1998:

Any alleged irregularity attending the execution of such a voluntary Deed requires more than mere denial.
Criminal Case [No. 98-040 (I.S. No. 97-20720) concerning Qualified Theft of Condominium Certificate of Title,
pre-signed checks and other personal belongings of complainant herein petitioner, has already been
recommended for dismissal by the Department of Justice on May 25, 1998, directing the withdrawal of the
information in the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 98-040. In said recommendation, the principal subject matter is the
alleged loss of condominium titles, and it appears that after the implementation of the search warrant, only titles
and the pre-signed checks were not recovered. There is no mention of a missing Deed of Trust as claimed by
complainant.42

Tan also sought to support his falsification charge by the alleged intercalations on the covered number of shares
and date of the deed, asking the OCP and Secretary of Justice to take notice that the print, font style and size of
these entries differed from the other portions of the document. However, it is not unusual, as it is as a common
practice, for parties to prepare and print instruments or contractual agreements with specific details that are yet to
be filled up upon the deed’s execution. We are bound to believe that such was the situation in Tan’s case, i.e.,
the document had blanks when printed but was already complete in details at the time Tan signed it to give effect
thereto, especially with the legal presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. Otherwise, Tan
would not have voluntarily affixed his signature in the subject deed. In Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,43 we ruled:

Under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns. Hence, the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first informing himself of
its contents and consequences. Said presumption acquires greater force in the case at bar where not only one
document but several documents were executed at different times and at different places by the herein
respondent guarantors and sureties.44 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)

While the presumption can be disputed by sufficient evidence, Tan failed in this respect. We even find no merit in
his claim that the incomplete document was merely intended to convince Japanese friends of Matsuura to extend
credit to TF Ventures, Inc., as he failed to establish any connection between the deed of trust and the credit
sought.

It is then the Court’s view that the petitioner had voluntarily executed the subject Deed of Trust, with the intention
of giving effect thereto. Even granting that there were insertions in the deed after it was signed by the petitioner,
no sufficient allegation indicates that the alleged insertions had changed the meaning of the document, or that
their details differed from those intended by the petitioner at the time that he signed it. The petitioner’s bare
allegation that "the change was without his consent and authority"45 does not equate with the necessary
allegation that the insertions were false or had changed the intended meaning of the document. Again, a violation
of Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), of the RPC requires, as one of its elements, that "the alteration or
intercalation has changed the meaning of the document.46

Neither was there sufficient evidence to support the element of damage that was purportedly suffered by Tan by
reason of the alleged falsification. As correctly observed by the OCP:

By his voluntary act of signing the Deed of Trust in favor of Matsuura, it can be safely inferred that the document
speaks for itself. Whether or not the same document is notarized, the Deed has the effect of a binding contract
between the parties. The element of damage has not been sufficiently shown.47

The Court emphasizes that the element of damage is crucial in the charge because the Secretary of Justice
directed the filing of the first information for an alleged falsification of a private document.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the Secretary of Justice’s finding of probable cause against Matsuura and
Tanjutco was based solely on surmises and conjectures, wholly unsupported by legal and factual bases. The CA
then correctly nullified, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the resolutions that were assailed before it.
There is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic
manner in the exercise of his judgment, as when the assailed order is bereft of any factual and legal justification.48

True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the
determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be
more than mere suspicion. And while probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a
need to examine the evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accused’s constitutional right
to liberty and the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary
expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.
It is, therefore, imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going
through a trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
accused.49

The Secretary of Justice’s directive upon the prosecutor to file the second information against Matsuura and
Tanjutco also lacked basis. It was premised on an alleged violation of Article 171(2) of the RPC, by making it
appear that Tan participated in an act or proceeding when as he claimed, he did not in fact so participate. The
elements of this crime are as follows:

(1) that the offender is a public officer, employee or notary public;

(2) that he takes advantage of his official position;

(3) that he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that a person or persons have participated in any
act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.50

Since Matsuura and Tanjutco are both private individuals, they can be indicted for the offense only if it is shown
that they conspired with Cua, as a notary public, in the commission thereof.

Contrary to this requirement, however, the Secretary of Justice ordered in its Resolution dated April 4, 2005 the
filing of the second information against Matsuura and Tanjutco, notwithstanding the order in the same resolution
to exclude Cua in the case. Such ruling evidently amounts to a grave abuse of discretion because as correctly
held by the CA:

Article 171, RPC refers to falsification committed by a public officer, employee, notary or ecclesiastical minister
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document, in this case, by causing it to appear that
persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. Herein petitioners
herein respondents Matsuura and Tanjutco, not being included in said enumeration cannot, on their own, be held
liable for aforesaid violation. They can be held liable therefor only in conspiracy with one who is a public officer,
employee, notary or ecclesiastical minister who, taking advantage of his official position, falsified a document. On
account of the exclusion of Atty. Julie Cua from said charge, herein petitioners cannot be held liable for the
charge. It is settled that there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the
law or jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal
bias. x x x.51 (Emphasis ours)

The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of Justice to include Cua in the information, following a separate
motion for reconsideration by Tan and, we emphasize, only after CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 had already been filed,
was inconsequential to the grave abuse of discretion already committed by the Secretary of Justice in its final
disposition of the case against Matsuura and Tanjutco. The CA was tasked in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 to
determine the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions, in light of the rulings, findings and
the bases used by the Secretary. In addition, even the CA later declared in CA-G.R. SP No. 96263 that the
Secretary of Justice’s order to pursue the case against Cua amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 195816

We now rule on the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s denial of the petition docketed as G.R.
No. 195816. After review, the Court affirms its earlier denial of the petition, given Tan’s failure to show any
reversible error committed by the CA. As correctly held by the appellate court, no probable cause was established
to support a falsification case against Cua.

We are bound to adhere to the presumption of regularity in Cua’s performance of her official duty, and to the
presumption of regularity that is attached to the subject deed of trust as a public document. As held by the OCP,
even "[t]he records of the Notarial Division of the Clerk of Court, Makati City faithfully reflects the duplicate copy
of the subject Deed of Trust ‘made and entered on June 19, 1997 executed by Antonio L. Tan, Jr.’, as certified by
Atty. Corazon Cecilia Pineda."52 It needed more than a bare denial from Tan to overthrow these presumptions.
Adequate supporting evidence should have been presented to support his assertions.

Tan’s denial that he personally appeared before Cua on June 19, 1997 deserved no weight in the determination
of probable cause. He failed to present any plausible explanation as to why it was impossible for him to be at the
notary public’s office on said date. Neither did he deny that the CTC indicated in the deed’s jurat as evidence of
identity actually belonged to him. The mere circumstance that his relationship with Matsuura was already strained
at the time of the deed’s notarization miserably failed to substantiate the claim that he could not have appeared
before Cua. Matsuura had precisely explained that the transfer of the shares of stock was part of an attempt to
compromise a dispute that existed between them. In addition, we have explained that the alleged theft of the
document by Matsuura was sufficiently rebutted during the preliminary investigation.1âwphi1

On the basis of the foregoing, the reasonable probability of the respondents’ participation in the commission of
the crime of falsification was not sufficiently established during the preliminary investigation. Even the failure of
Matsuura and Tanjutco to attach a notarized copy of the deed to their pleading filed with the SEC fails to support
a finding of probable cause. On the contrary, the circumstance that an unnotarized copy of the deed was
submitted to the SEC weakens the argument that the alleged falsification and wrongful notarization was resorted
to by the respondents to suit their interests. It showed that the respondents believed in the value of

the deed to their case even if it was not notarized. We then affirm the CA’s ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 96263 that
the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, by gross misapprehension of facts, when it ordered
the filing of the information against Cua. Although Tan assails the CA’s grant of the petition on such basis,
jurisprudence provides that grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to palpable errors of jurisdiction; or to
violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It also refers to cases in which, for various reasons,
there has been a gross misapprehension of facts.53

WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:

(1) In G.R. No. 179003, the petition for review is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated February
6, 2007 and Resolution dated July 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 are AFFIRMED.

(2) In G.R. No. 195816, petitioner Tan's motion for reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 [ GR Nos. 174730-37, Feb 09, 2011 ]

ROSALIO S. GALEOS v. PEOPLE +

DECISION

657 Phil. 500

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The consolidated petitions at bar seek to reverse and set aside the Decision[1] promulgated on August 18, 2005
by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioners Paulino S. Ong (Ong) of eight counts and Rosalio S. Galeos 
(Galeos) of four counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

The facts are as follows:

Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16, 1986.  He was
elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and served as such until 1998.[2]

On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for the
positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the Municipal
Engineer.[3]  Prior to their permanent appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual employees of the municipal
government.

In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year 1993, Galeos answered "No"
to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or of
affinity to anyone working in the government?" while Rivera indicated "n/a" on the space for the list of the names
of relatives referred to in the said query.[4] The boxes for "Yes" and "No" to the said query were left in blank by
Galeos in his 1994 and 1995 SALN.[5]  Rivera in his 1995 SALN answered "No" to the question on relatives in
government.[6]   In their 1996 SALN, both Galeos and Rivera also did not fill up the boxes indicating their answers
to the same query.[7]  Ong's signature appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who administered the
oath when Galeos and Rivera executed the foregoing documents.

In a letter-certification dated June 1, 1994 addressed to Ms. Benita O. Santos, Regional Director, Civil Service
Commission (CSC), Regional Office 7, Cebu City, it was attested that:

This is to certify that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, all restrictions/requirements relative to creation of positions, hiring and issuance of appointments, Section
325 on the limitations for personal services in the total/supplemental appropriation of a local government unit;
salary rates; abolition and creation of positions, etc.; Section 76, organizational structure and staffing
pattern; Section 79 on nepotism; Section 80, posting of vacancy and personnel selection board; Section 81 on
compensation, etc. have been duly complied with in the issuance of this appointment.

This is to certify further that the faithful observance of these restrictions/requirements was made in
accordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Commission before the appointment was submitted
for review and action.[8] (Emphasis supplied.)

The above certification was signed by Ong and HR Officer-Designate Editha C. Garcia.

On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, Cebu filed a letter-complaint[9] before the
Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-Visayas against Ong (then incumbent Vice-Mayor of Naga), Galeos and Rivera
for dishonesty, nepotism, violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of falsification of public documents.

On August 11, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of OIC-Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas that criminal charges be filed against Ong, Galeos and Rivera for falsification of public documents
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in connection with the Certification dated June 1,
1994 issued by Ong and the false statements in the 1993, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Rivera and the 1993, 1994,
1995 and 1996 SALN of Galeos.[10]

On August 16, 2000, the following Informations[11] were filed against the petitioners:
Criminal Case No. 26181

That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused,
public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the
Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to
falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Rosalio
S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear
therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making
untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very well k[n]ew that they are
related with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth
degree of consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of
accused Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26182

That on or about the 15th day of February 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused,
public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer,
Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of
Relatives In the Government Service as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear
therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the
government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as
accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to
accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera's wife being the
sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26183

That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused,
public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the
Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to
falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Rosalio
S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear
therein that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making false
statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are related
with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino
S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26184

That on or about the 1st day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused,
public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer,
Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of
Relatives In The Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear
therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the
government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as
accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to
accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera's wife being the
sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26185

That on or about the 5th day of February 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera] accused,
public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer,
Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of
Relatives In The Government Service, [a]s of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear
therein that he has no relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the
government, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as
accused very well knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to
accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera's wife being
the sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW.  (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26186

That on or about the 3rd day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public
officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal
Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving
and confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of
Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of
Relatives In the Government Services, as of December 31, 1994, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and
subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they
are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements
in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each
other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong, within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino
S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW.  (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26187

That on or about the 11th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos] accused,
public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the
Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving and confederating, together and mutually helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to
falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and
Identification of Relatives In the Government Service, as of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Rosalio S.
Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein
that they are not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are related
with each other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino
S. Ong.

CONTRARY TO LAW.   (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26188

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the
Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate
intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document,
consisting of a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of
the  Civil Service Commission (CSC)-Region VII, Cebu City dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval
of an appointment, certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance  of the requirement/restriction
provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, as Construction
and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact as accused very well knew that the appointment
of Rosalio S. Galeos was nepotic being made in violation of the  Civil Service Rules and Laws on
Nepotism, as Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused within the fourth degree of consanguinity, since the
mother of Rosalio S. Galeos is the sister of the mother of accused, which Certification caused the approval
of the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, to the detriment of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.  (Emphasis supplied.)

Criminal Case No. 26189

That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public officer, being the former Mayor of the
Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate
intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document,
consisting of a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region VII, Cebu City, dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval
of an appointment, certifying therein that there was a faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction
provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, a Plumber I of
the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of
facts, when in truth and in fact as accused very well knew that the appointment of Federico T. Rivera was
nepotic being made in violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as Federico T. Rivera is
related to accused within the fourth degree of affinity, since the mother of Federico T. Rivera's wife is the
sister of the mother of accused, which certification caused the approval of the appointment of Federico T.
Rivera, to the detriment of public interest.

CONTRARY TO LAW.  (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted to the court a quo, the accused made the following admissions: (1)
Ong was the Municipal Mayor of Cebu at all times relevant to these cases; (2) Ong is related to Galeos, within the
fourth degree of consanguinity as his mother is the sister of Galeos' mother, and to Rivera within the fourth
degree of affinity as his mother is the sister of the mother of Rivera's wife; and (3) Galeos and Rivera were
employed as Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Municipal Government of
Naga, Cebu at all times relevant to these cases.  Ong likewise admitted the genuineness and due execution of
the documentary exhibits presented by the prosecutor (copies of SALNs and Certification dated June 1, 1994)
except for Exhibit "H" (Certification dated June 1, 1994 offered by the prosecution as "allegedly supporting the
appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos"[12]).[13]

As lone witness for the prosecution, Esperidion R. Canoneo testified that he has been a resident of Pangdan,
Naga, Cebu since 1930 and claimed to be friends with Ong, Galeos and Rivera. He knows the mother of Galeos,
Pining Suarez or Peñaranda Suarez. But when the prosecutor mentioned "Bining Suarez," Canoneo stated that
Bining Suarez is the mother of Galeos and that Bining Suarez is the same person as "Bernardita Suarez."  Ong is
related to Galeos because Ong's mother, Conchita Suarez, and Galeos' mother, Bernardita Suarez, are sisters.
As to Rivera, his wife Kensiana,[14] is the daughter of Mercedes Suarez who is also a sister of Conchita Suarez.
He knew the Suarez sisters because they were the neighbors of his grandmother whom he frequently visited
when he was still studying.[15]

Both Galeos and Rivera testified that they only provided the entries in their SALN but did not personally fill up the
forms as these were already filled up by "people in the municipal hall" when they signed them.

Galeos, when shown his 1993 SALN,[16] confirmed his signature thereon. When he was asked if he understood
the question  "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity
to anyone working in the government?" he answered in the negative. He claimed that the "X" mark corresponding
to the answer "No" to said question, as well as the other entries in his SALN, were already filled up when he
signed it. When shown his SALN for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996, Galeos reiterated that they were already
filled up and he was only made to sign them by an employee of the municipal hall whom he only remembers by
face. He also admitted that he carefully read the documents and all the entries therein were explained to him
before he affixed his signature on the document. However, when asked whether he understands the term "fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity" stated in the SALNs, he answered in the negative.[17]

Rivera testified that he was not aware that his wife was a close relative of the Municipal Mayor because when he
asked her, the latter told him that Ong was a distant relative of hers.  Rivera added that it was not Ong who first
appointed him as a casual employee but Ong's predecessor, Mayor Vicente Mendiola.[18]

On the part of Ong, he testified that at the time he was serving as Municipal Mayor of Naga, he did not know that
he and Galeos are relatives, as in fact there are several persons with the surname "Galeos" in the municipality. 
He signed Galeos' 1993 SALN when it was presented to him by Galeos at his office.  There were many of them
who brought such documents and he would administer their oaths on what were written on their SALN, among
them were Galeos and Rivera.  He came to know of the defect in the employment of Galeos when the case was
filed by his "political enemy" in the Ombudsman just after he was elected Vice-Mayor in 1998.  As to Rivera, Ong
claimed that he knows him as a casual employee of the previous administration.  As successor of the former
mayor, he had to re-appoint these casual employees and he delegated this matter to his subordinates.   He
maintained that his family was not very close to their other relatives because when he was not yet Mayor, he was
doing business in Cebu and Manila. When queried by the court if he had known his relatives while he was
campaigning considering that in the provinces even relatives within the 6th and 7th degree are still regarded as
close relatives especially among politicians, Ong insisted that his style of campaigning was based only on his
performance of duties and that he did not go from house to house.  Ong admitted that he had been a resident of
Naga, Cebu since birth.  He could no longer recall those SALN of most of the employees whose oaths he had
administered.  He admitted that he was the one who appointed Galeos and Rivera to their permanent positions
and signed their official appointment (Civil Service Form No. 33) but he was not aware at that time that he was
related to them.  It was only after the filing of the case that he came to know the wife of Rivera. As to the
qualifications of these appointees, he no longer inquired about it and their appointments were no longer
submitted to the Selection Board. When the appointment forms for Galeos and Rivera were brought to his office,
the accompanying documents were attached thereto. Ong, however, admitted that before the permanent
appointment is approved by the CSC, he issues a certification to the effect that all requirements of law and the
CSC have been complied with.[19]

On August 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision convicting Ong, Galeos and Rivera,
as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the following:

In Criminal Case No. 26181, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to
each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26182, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to
each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26183, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to
each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26184, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to
each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26185, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T. Rivera
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to
each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26186, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to
each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26187, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, are hereby sentenced to
each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1)
DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

In Criminal Case No. 26188, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong NOT GUILTY for
Violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and

In Criminal Case No. 26189, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Correccional  medium
as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum
penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).

SO ORDERED.[20]

In its Resolution[21] dated August 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration of Ong and
Galeos.  However, in view of the death of Rivera on August 22, 2003 before the promulgation of the decision, the
cases (Criminal Case Nos. 26182, 26184 and 26185) against him were dismissed.

In G.R. Nos. 174730-37, Galeos contends that the Sandiganbayan erred when:

1) . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL

STATEMENTS IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

2) . . . IT DID NOT CONSIDER PETITIONER'S VALID DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH AND LACK OF INTENT TO
COMMIT THE CRIMES IMPUTED.

3) . . . IT GAVE FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION.
[22]

In support of his assigned errors, Galeos argues that he did not make untruthful or false statements in his SALN
since a "statement" requires a positive averment and thus silence or non-disclosure cannot be considered one.
And even if they are considered statements, Galeos contends that they were not made in a "narration of facts"
and the least they could be considered are "conclusions of law." He also argues that the prosecution failed to
adduce any evidence to support the finding that he was aware of their relationship at the time of the execution of
the SALN. With the presence of good faith, Galeos avers that the fourth element of the crime - the perversion of
truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person - is missing. He also
faults the Sandiganbayan for its heavy reliance on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution's sole witness
despite the fact that there are aspects in his testimony that do not inspire belief.

On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 174845-52, Ong argues that the Sandiganbayan erred when:

(a)

. . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS

IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

(b)

IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 26181-26187, [IT HELD] THAT A PERSON MERELY ADMINISTERING THE OATH
IN A DOCUMENT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION BY MAKING UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS
IN A NARRATION OF FACTS.

(c)

. . . IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26189, ... IT INFER[R]ED, DESPITE THE  COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY
RELEVANT AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT "I" (OR PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT
"8") REFERS TO OR SUPPORTS THE APPOINTMENT OF FEDERICO T. RIVERA.[23]

Ong similarly argues that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements containing a narration of
facts and that there was no wrongful intent of injuring a third person at the time of the execution of the
documents. He contends that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely administering the oath in a
document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer administering the oath to certify the truthfulness
and/or veracity of the contents of the document. Neither can he be made liable for falsification regarding the
letter-certification he issued since there was no evidence adduced that it was made to support Rivera's
appointment.

In the Joint Memorandum filed by the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the
Sandiganbayan, it was pointed out that Galeos categorically admitted during his testimony that before affixing his
signature on the subject SALN, he carefully read its contents and the entries therein have been explained to him. 
Moreover, the admission made by Ong during the pre-trial under the joint stipulation of facts indicated no
qualification at all that he became aware of his relationship with Galeos and Rivera only after the execution of the
subject documents. The defense of lack of knowledge of a particular fact in issue, being a state of mind and
therefore self-serving, it can be legally assumed that the admission of that particular fact without qualification
reckons from the time the imputed act, to which the particular fact relates, was committed.  As to mistaken
reliance on the testimony of prosecution witness, the analysis and findings in the assailed decision do not show
that such testimony was even taken into consideration in arriving at the conviction of petitioners.[24]

With respect to Ong's liability as conspirator in the execution of the SALN containing untruthful statements, the
Special Prosecutor argues that as a general rule, it is not the duty of the administering officer to ascertain the
truth of the statements found in a document.  The reason for this is that the administering officer has no way of
knowing if the facts stated therein are indeed truthful.  However, when the facts laid out in the document directly
involves the administering officer, then he has an opportunity to know of their truth or falsity.  When an
administering officer nevertheless administers the oath despite the false contents of the document, which
are known to him to be false, he is liable, not because he violated his duty as an administering officer, but
because he participated in the falsification of a document.[25]

After a thorough review, we find the petitions unmeritorious.

Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, which states:

Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. -- The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who,
taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)

The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:

(a)  the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c)  the facts narrated by him are absolutely false.[26]

In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken
advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is
considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or
otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which
he falsifies.[27]  Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the
idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of a public document, what is
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.[28]

Falsification of Public Document

by making untruthful statements
concerning relatives in the
government service

All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been established by
the prosecution.

Petitioners argue that the statements "they are not related within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity" and "that Section 79 of the Local Government Code has been complied with in the issuance of the
appointments" are not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law, as both require the application of the rules on
relationship under the law of succession.  Thus, they cite People v. Tugbang[29] where it was held that "a
statement expressing an erroneous conclusion of law cannot be considered a falsification." Likewise, in People v.
Yanza,[30] it was held that when defendant certified that she was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a
conclusion of law, which turned out to be incorrect or erroneous; hence, she may not be declared guilty of
falsification because the law violated pertains to narration of facts.

We disagree.

A conclusion of law is a determination by a judge or ruling authority regarding the law that applies in a particular
case. It is opposed to a finding of fact, which interprets the factual circumstances to which the law is to be
applied.[31]   A narration of facts is merely an account or description of the particulars of an event or occurrence.[32] 
We have held that a certification by accused officials in the Statement of Time Elapsed and Work Accomplished
qualifies as a narration of facts as contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as it consisted
not only of figures and numbers but also words were used therein giving an account of the status of the flood
control project.[33]

In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does not call for an application of law in
a particular set of facts.  On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil Code simply explain the concept of
proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral lines in relation to the rules on succession.   The
question of whether or not persons are related to each other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree
is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth
or falsity, and thus do not amount to expression of opinion.  When a government employee is required to disclose
his relatives in the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts
contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.  Further, it bears to stress that the
untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the employee's eligibility for the position but pertains
rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.

Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the government
service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein as in fact he was
related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he and Ong being
first cousins (their mothers are sisters).   As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for
the answer to the similar query.  In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong,[34] it was held that one is guilty of falsification in the
accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if he withholds material facts which would have
affected the approval of his appointment and/or promotion to a government position.   By withholding information
on his relative/s in the government service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering
that the disclosure of such relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of
his permanent appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:

No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related within the fourth civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing power or recommending authority.

Section 7 (e), Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, Executive Order No. 292  otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, provides that the CSC shall disapprove the appointment of a person who "has been
issued such appointment in violation of existing Civil Service Law, rules and regulations." Among the prohibited
appointments enumerated in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993 are appointments in the LGUs of
persons who are related to the appointing or recommending authority within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity.[35]

The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40, series of
1998 dated December 14, 1998) contain a similar prohibition under Rule XIII, Section 9:

SEC. 9. No appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or any branch or instrumentality
thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charters shall be made in favor of a
relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the bureau or office or of the person
exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the word "relative" and the members of the family referred to are those related
within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.

In the local government career service, the prohibition extends to the relatives of the appointing or
recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
xxxx

The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and reemployment
regardless of status including casuals and contractuals except consultants. (Emphasis supplied.)

The second element is likewise present. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of
the truth of the facts narrated.[36] Permanent employees employed by local government units are required to file
the following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN); (b) lists of relatives within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service; (c) financial and business interests; and (d)
personal data sheets as required by law.[37] A similar requirement is imposed by Section 8 (B) of Republic Act No.
6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, thus:

(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives [38].  - It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to identify
and disclose to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the form, manner
and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.

Section 11 of the same law penalizes the violation of the above provision, either with imprisonment or fine, and, in
the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.  Such violation if proven
in a proper administrative proceeding shall also be sufficient cause for removal or dismissal of a public official or
employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos' negative answer reflected in his SALN is absolutely false. 
During the trial, both Ong and Galeos admitted the fact that they are first cousins but denied having knowledge of
such relationship at the time the subject documents were executed.  The Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their
defense of being unaware that they are related within the fourth degree of consanguinity.  Given the Filipino
cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended family ties, it was unlikely for Galeos who had been working
for several years in the municipal government, not to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a
prominent public figure having ran and won in the local elections four times (three terms as Mayor and as Vice-
Mayor in the 1998 elections), after serving as OIC Mayor of the same municipality in 1986 until 1988.

The same thing can be said of Ong, whose unbelievable claim that he had no knowledge that a first cousin
(Galeos) was working in the municipal government and appointed by him to a permanent position during his
incumbency, was correctly disregarded by the Sandiganbayan. It was simply unthinkable that as a resident of
Naga, Cebu since birth and a politician at that, he was all the time unaware that he himself appointed to
permanent positions the son of his mother's sister (Galeos) and the husband of his first cousin (Rivera).   Indeed,
the reality of local politics and Filipino culture renders his defense of good faith (lack of knowledge of their
relationship) unavailing.  Despite his knowledge of the falsity of the statement in the subject SALN, Ong still
administered the oath to Galeos and Rivera who made the false statement under oath.  The Sandiganbayan thus
did not err in finding that Ong connived with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have
no relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity in the government service.

Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime,[39] as it can be
inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to
commit a crime.[40] In this case, Ong administered the oaths to Galeos and Rivera in the subject SALN not just
once, but three times, a clear manifestation that he concurred with the making of the untruthful statement therein
concerning relatives in the government service.

Falsification by making
untruthful statements
in the Certification re:
compliance with the
prohibition on nepotism

As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the certification
recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos' appointment although he admitted only the authenticity and due
execution of Exhibit "I".   Since Ong was duty bound to observe the prohibition on nepotistic appointments, his
certification stating compliance with Section 79[41] of R.A. No. 7160 constitutes a solemn affirmation of the fact
that the appointee is not related to him within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.  Having executed
the certification despite his knowledge that he and Rivera were related to each other within the fourth degree of
affinity, as in fact Rivera was his cousin-in-law because the mother of Rivera's wife is the sister of Ong's mother,
Ong was guilty of falsification of public document by making untruthful statement in a narration of facts. He also
took advantage of his official position as the appointing authority who, under the Civil Service rules, is required to
issue such certification.

The importance of the certification submitted to the CSC by the proper appointing authority in the local
government unit, regarding compliance with the prohibition against nepotism under R.A. No. 7160 cannot be
overemphasized.  Under Section 67, Book V, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code of 1987, a head of office or
appointing official who issues an appointment or employs any person in violation of Civil Service Law and Rules
or who commits fraud, deceit or intentional misrepresentation of material facts concerning other civil service
matters, or anyone who violates, refuses or neglects to comply with any of such provisions or rules, may be held
criminally liable.  In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,[42] we held that mere issuance of appointment in favor
of a relative within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity is sufficient to constitute a violation of the law. 
Although herein petitioners were prosecuted for the criminal offense of falsification of public document, it
becomes obvious that the requirement of disclosure of relationship to the appointing power in the local
government units simply aims to ensure strict enforcement of the prohibition against nepotism.

Relevant then is our pronouncement in Dacoycoy:

Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel.  In Debulgado, we
stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also strongly indicates that the
prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one." "The Court was unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of
the prohibition which is textually very broad and comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of
corruption that must be nipped in the bud or abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in
an earlier case "what we need now is not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the `outstanding' civil servants,
but also to plug the hidden gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with
existing legal procedures in order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the
law."[43] (Emphasis supplied.)

The prosecution having established with moral certainty the guilt of petitioners for falsification of public documents
under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, we find no legal ground to reverse petitioners'
conviction.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED.  The Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case Nos. 26181-26187 and 26189 is AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169364               September 18, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as Michelangelo painted, or Beethoven
composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep streets so well that all the hosts of Heaven and
Earth will pause to say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his job well.

– Martin Luther King, Jr.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order1 of Branch 11, Davao City Regional Trial
Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and declaring paragraph
2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.

Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article 202
(2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Davao City. The Informations, read:

That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and loitered
around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and
justifiable purpose.2

Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are vagrants:

1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;

2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible means of support;

3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who
habitually associate with prostitutes;

4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found
loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable
purpose;

5. Prostitutes.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by arresto menor or a
fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the
court.

Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to Quash3 on the
ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.

In an Order4 dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed respondents anew to
file their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that the law on vagrancy was
enacted pursuant to the State’s police power and justified by the Latin maxim "salus populi est suprem(a) lex,"
which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number, thus:

Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An authority on police power,
Professor Freund describes laconically police power "as the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property." (Citations omitted). In fact the person’s acts and acquisitions are
hemmed in by the police power of the state. The justification found in the Latin maxim, salus populi est supreme
(sic) lex" (the god of the people is the Supreme Law). This calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the
interests of the greater number.In the case at bar the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA
with Annex "A" lucidly shows that there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants
and prostitutes proliferate in the place where the two accused (among other women) were wandering and in the
wee hours of night and soliciting male customer. Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to
prove its case. Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must be given their day in
Court: the prosecution proof of the crime, and the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of the
accused in the indictment can’t be categorized as a crime.5

The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was
stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be frequented by
vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to
prove the crime, and the defense to rebut the evidence.1avvphi1

Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City,6 directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the definition of the crime of
vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators,
since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful
acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under the Constitution
because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable
classification.

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the Court’s ruling in Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan,7 the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases and not to penal
statutes. It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents
failed to overcome this presumption.

On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition, the dispositive portion
of which reads:

WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Paragraph 2
of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo,
dated April 28, 2004, denying the petitioners’ Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is ordered to
dismiss the subject criminal cases against the petitioners pending before it.

SO ORDERED.8

In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is vague and it violated the equal
protection clause. It held that the "void for vagueness" doctrine is equally applicable in testing the validity of penal
statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,9 where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, the trial court ruled:

The U.S. Supreme Court’s justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy Ordinance are equally
applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.

Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being "found loitering about public or semi-public
buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support"
offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to who should be arrested and who should not.

Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these times of recession when
there are many who are "without visible means of support" not by reason of choice but by force of circumstance
as borne out by the high unemployment rate in the entire country.

To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason than the fact that he
cannot find gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to injury.10

On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the trial court
declared:

The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs afoul of the equal
protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable classification between those covered by the law
and those who are not.
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts upon one
individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending.

Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code
offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no visible means of
support by force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper
subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.11

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING

UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE12

Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,13 the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have
special application to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that
respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the
standards set out by the Courts; and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public
welfare in the exercise of its police power.

On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process
and the equal protection of the laws; that the due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free
speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional and void on its face; and that
the presumption of constitutionality was adequately overthrown.

The Court finds for petitioner.

The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the
sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature may even
forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been
abridged.14 However, in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature must inform
the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable
rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to avoid.15 This requirement has come to be known as the void-
for-vagueness doctrine which states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application,
violates the first essential of due process of law."16

In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,17 the Court recognized the application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine
to criminal statutes in appropriate cases. The Court therein held:

At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the
purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge.
An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to
Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 – the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An
expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to
the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.18

The first statute punishing vagrancy – Act No. 519 – was modeled after American vagrancy statutes and passed
by the Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this country up to
December 31, 1931 did not contain a provision on vagrancy.19 While historically an Anglo-American concept of
crime prevention, the law on vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the
Revised Penal Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:

ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. – The following are vagrants:

1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;

2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible means of support;

3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps and those who
habitually associate with prostitutes;

4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found
loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable
purpose;
 5. Prostitutes.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine
not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the
court.

In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found loitering
about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without
visible means of support. This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which
defined "vagrant" as "every person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping
or straying through the country without visible means of support." The second clause was essentially retained
with the modification that the places under which the offense might be committed is now expressed in general
terms – public or semi-public places.

The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support mainly from the U.S.
Supreme Court’s opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville20 case, which in essence declares:

Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are entitled to be
informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.

Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of the offending conduct.
See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445;
United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities,
where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332
U. S. 1.

The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and not alerted to the regulatory
schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding of their meaning and impact if
they read them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a
specific intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v.
United States, supra.

The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards, are normally innocent.
"Nightwalking" is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v.
State, 202 So.2d at 855, only the "habitual" wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, "common night walkers."
We know, however, from experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-
inducing relaxation will result.

Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that "loafing" was a national virtue in his
Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville.

xxxx

Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay.
The qualification "without any lawful purpose or object" may be a trap for innocent acts. Persons "neglecting all
lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold
or served" would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.

Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers may be
"casing" a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family matter, and normally of no concern
to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes.

The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them. They are
not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been, in part,
responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These
amenities have dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to
defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating silence.

xxxx

Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, those convicted may be
punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority:
"The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before the magistrates in
vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of conduct and
the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to
have no other immediate solution." Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.

xxxx

Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack of notice given a potential
offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville police. Caleb
Foote, an early student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as offering "punishment by analogy."
Such crimes, though long common in Russia, are not compatible with our constitutional system.

xxxx

A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where liquor is sold, or who
are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become future criminals is too precarious
for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in
the bud -- is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police.
Of course, they are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality
and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped
that even-handed administration of the law is not possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as
majorities, to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together.21

The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance "fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute;" and 2) it encourages
or promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory law enforcement.

The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this case, fails
to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because under our legal
system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.22 This principle is of Spanish origin, and
we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is
merely a traditional rule that admits of exceptions.23

Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific provisions thereof,
which are not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance Code § 257) provided, as follows:

Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common gamblers, persons who use
juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets,
traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and
brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object, habitual
loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons
able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and,
upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.

Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because such activities or
habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing,
habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of
wives or minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are specific
acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) – "any person found loitering about
public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible
means of support" – from the Jacksonville ordinance, would be "persons wandering or strolling around from place
to place without any lawful purpose or object." But these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified
by "without visible means of support" while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering or strolling "without
any lawful purpose or object," which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a "trap for innocent acts."

Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.24 Thus, as with any other
act or offense, the requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority
that may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2).
The fear exhibited by the respondents, echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of
the police to make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirement of probable cause,
which is one less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility.25

Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of punishment,
for, absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds of suspicion are
reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the peace officers making the
arrest.26

The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers
and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against
unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful
arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly cut off from that domestic security
which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.27

As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting previous surveillance
operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable cause requirement
under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not moved by respondents’ trepidation that Article 202 (2) could
have been a source of police abuse in their case.

Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the constitutionality of
Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the streets and parks become
dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing "watch-your-car" boys, petty thieves and robbers,
pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go beyond decency and morality,
if not basic humanity. The streets and parks have become the training ground for petty offenders who graduate
into hardened and battle-scarred criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking
people being robbed, swindled, harassed or mauled – if not killed – by the scourge of the streets. Blue collar
workers are robbed straight from withdrawing hard-earned money from the ATMs (automated teller machines);
students are held up for having to use and thus exhibit publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are
mauled by thrill-seeking gangs; innocent passers-by are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men walking the
streets; fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and harassed, if not abducted, raped and then killed; robbers,
thieves, pickpockets and snatchers case streets and parks for possible victims; the old are swindled of their life
savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester and panhandle
pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law-abiding drivers and citizens at risk of running
them over. All these happen on the streets and in public places, day or night.

The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them each day, or else we can never
say that we have performed our task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid the streets of the scourge of
humanity, and restore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in them.

This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws were crafted
to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society. These laws may be
traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated with the struggle to
improve the citizens’ quality of life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution.28 Civilly, they are covered by the
"abuse of rights" doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human Relations, to
the end, in part, that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.29 This provision is, together
with the succeeding articles on human relations, intended to embody certain basic principles "that are to be
observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order."30

In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal disorder and breaches
of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of the property, resort
to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their claims.31 Any private person may abate a
public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which
constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury.32

Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts – from public indecencies and immoralities, to
public nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts punished are made illegal by their offensiveness to society’s
basic sensibilities and their adverse effect on the quality of life of the people of society. For example, the issuance
or making of a bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order that must be
abated.33 As a matter of public policy, the failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a
trust receipt or to return said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal
sanctions.34 Thus, public nuisances must be abated because they have the effect of interfering with the
comfortable enjoyment of life or property by members of a community.

Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor or unemployed,
but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and
apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or to
engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order crime
which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly society finds
unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the
safety and well-being of members of the community.

Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should train its eye on
their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives difficulties. Red light districts
abound, gangs work the streets in the wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in
the trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-abiding citizens late at night and urinate on otherwise decent
corners of our streets. Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd our national parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes wait
for customers by the roadside all around the metropolis, some even venture in bars and restaurants. Drug-crazed
men loiter around dark avenues waiting to pounce on helpless citizens. Dangerous groups wander around,
casing homes and establishments for their next hit. The streets must be made safe once more. Though a man’s
house is his castle,35 outside on the streets, the king is fair game.

The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.

Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid
and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court must
approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and
every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.36 The policy of our courts is to avoid
ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on
the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the
other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has
been carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally
enacted.37

It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power
vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The
power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public
safety, public morals, and the general welfare.38 As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must
therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City in
Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus continue.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186137               June 26, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DATU NOT ABDUL, Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Datu Not Abdul (appellant) brings this Notice of Appeal1 dated 4 August 2008 before the Supreme Court,
assailing the Decision2 dated 14 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02783 for being
contrary to facts, law, and jurisprudence. The said CA Decision affirmed the Decision3 dated 5 March 2007 of the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 24621-R finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

The sole issue before us is whether the prosecution sufficiently established compliance with the chain-of-custody
rule.

The facts according to the prosecution are as follows:

On 25 June 2005, Police Officer 2 Daniel E. Akia (PO2 Akia) of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency-
Cordillera Administrative Region (PDEA-CAR) received a telephone call from an informant reporting the illegal
drug activities of appellant. Acting on this information, PO2 Akia met with the informant and brought her to the
PDEA office for an interview, in the course of which she disclosed that appellant would be coming from Agoo, La
Union to meet her between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. of that day. Losing no time, Police Senior Inspector Paul
John A. Mencio (P S/Insp. Mencio), together with Senior Police Officer 4 Marquez K. Madlon (SPO4 Madlon) and
Police Officer 2 Erwin M. Garcia (PO2 Garcia), planned and prepared for a buy-bust operation that was to take
place in the afternoon of that day. The team agreed that PO2 Akia would pose as the buyer and bring with him
two pieces of ₱500-peso bills and some fake money. They also agreed that the signal for the other police officers
to arrest appellant was when PO2 Akia grabbed him.4

The police officers, together with the informant, then proceeded to San Vicente, Baguio City. Upon arriving there,
SPO4 Madlon and PO2 Garcia hid, while PO2 Akia and the informant stood along the sidewalk. After twenty
minutes, appellant arrived on board a taxi. The informant touched PO2 Akia’s back to let him know that the
passenger of the cab was their target. Appellant got out of the taxi and approached the informant, who introduced
the police officer as her friend. PO2 Akia asked appellant how much shabu the latter brought, and appellant
replied that he had shabu worth ₱6,500. Appellant pulled out of his pocket a medium-sized, transparent, heat-
sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance and handed it to PO2 Akia, who subsequently
handed the buy-bust money to the former. Appellant started to count it, but soon realized that he was being paid
with fake money. PO2 Akia immediately grabbed him and announced that the former was a PDEA agent. Upon
seeing the signal, SPO4 Madlon and PO2 Garcia hurried to the scene and assisted PO2 Akia in arresting
appellant. Afterwards, the police officers brought him to the PDEA office, where the operation was documented
and the arrest report and the Affidavits of the arresting officers were prepared. Also, an inventory of the item
seized from appellant was made in the presence of representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
media, and the barangay council. PO2 Akia allegedly marked the plastic sachet with the initials "MKM, DEA,
EMG" and Exhibit "A."5

The plastic sachet was then forwarded to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office Cordillera Administrative
Region for analysis. The forensic analyst, PO2 Juliet Valentin Albon (PO2 Albon), examined the substance inside
the sachet. She issued a chemistry report numbered D-057-05 which found that the plastic sachet with markings
"A, MKM, DEA, EMG" contained 1.85 grams of a white crystalline substance; and that a qualitative examination
gave a positive result for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.6

Thus, an Information was filed on 30 June 2005, which reads:

That on or about the 25th day of June, 2005, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, and /or
distribute to PO1 Daniel E. Akia, Jr., a member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, based at Melvin
Jones, Harrison Road, Baguio City, who passed as buyer, one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu," a dangerous drug, weighing 1.85
grams for an agreed amount of ₱6,500.00, without any lawful authority in violation of the aforecited provision of
law.7

Appellant entered a plea of "not guilty" during his arraignment, after which trial on the merits ensued.8

During the pretrial conference, both parties admitted that a forensic chemist had examined the substance
allegedly confiscated from respondent, that it was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, and that
the forensic chemist prepared a report thereon.9

The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO2 Akia, PO2 Garcia, and SPO4 Madlon.10 It also offered in
evidence the money used during the buy-bust operation, the dangerous drug allegedly recovered, and the
chemistry report on the dangerous drug retrieved from respondent.11 On the other hand, the defense presented
the testimonies of appellant and Norma Abdul, his aunt.12

Through the testimonies of appellant and his aunt, the defense alleged that the former was a victim of a frame-
up.13 It contended that appellant was a native of Cotabato City who went to visit his uncle in La Union. After
spending a few weeks in that place, he visited Baguio City with a friend. There, he was apprehended by three
men, who brought him to the PDEA office where he was forced to admit that he was engaged in selling shabu. He
kept denying the accusation, but the police officers continued to keep him in custody. When his aunt visited him,
she told him that the police officers were demanding ₱20,000 for his release. However, she was able to give them
only ₱5,000. As a result, appellant was not discharged and, instead, a criminal case was filed against him.14

The RTC held that the straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witness, PO2 Akia, clearly established the
identity of appellant as the seller, the object being shabu, and the consideration of ₱6,500. Also established were
the delivery of the illegal drug and the payment for it.15 Furthermore, the trial court ruled that there was a
presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the PDEA officers, because there was no reason for
them to impute such a serious charge to the accused.16 Hence, it found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000, as well as the
costs of suit.17

Aggrieved, appellant, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal18 dated 16 March 2007, citing errors of fact and
law in the RTC Decision.

In his Brief19 dated 16 November 2007, appellant argued that the RTC failed to take into account the glaring
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the three police officers.20 He said that PO2 Akia and PO2 Garcia testified
that there were only three members of the buy-bust operation team.21 However, SPO4 Madlon asserted that it
had four members.22 Further, PO2 Akia testified that he handed the drugs over to SPO4 Madlon after the arrest of
appellant.23 According to PO2 Akia, SPO4 Madlon kept the evidence from the time of the arrest to the time
appellant was brought to the office.24 On the other hand, SPO4 Madlon testified that the drugs were turned over
by PO2 Akia to their team leader P S/Insp. Mencio.25 Appellant also asserted that the buy-bust operation team
failed to follow the guidelines for drug operations, as SPO4 Madlon testified that he did not place any markings on
the plastic sachet of shabu at the place where the arrest took place, but only marked it at the office. Also, the
testimonies of PO2 Akia and PO2 Garcia were silent as to when and where the marking of the shabu took place.
This omission, according to appellant, cast grave doubt on the identity of the subject specimen allegedly
recovered from him, which may not have been the same one presented in evidence.26

To rebut the arguments of appellant, the state, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), presented its
Appellee’s Brief.27 It argued that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with respect to minor details and
collateral matters do not affect the substance or weight thereof.28 Also, appellant is not allowed to question, for
the first time on appeal, the admissibility of evidence on the ground of a violation of the rule on the chain of
custody.29

The CA, citing considerable parts of the RTC’s Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), affirmed the RTC’s
finding that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the elements of an illegal sale of dangerous
drugs.30 It considered the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant as trivial matters that had no bearing on the
crime charged.31 It likewise found that appellant had failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence to support his
defense of frame-up.32 Lastly, it held that he could not raise on appeal the issue of noncompliance with the chain-
of-custody rule if he had failed to do so before the trial court.33

Undeterred, appellant filed before this Court his Notice of Appeal, dated 04 August 2008.

In a Resolution dated 04 March 2009, the Court required the parties to file their supplemental briefs, if they so
desired.34

Appellant filed a Supplemental Brief35 dated 21 May 2009, in which he reiterated the failure of the prosecution to
show compliance with the rule on the chain of custody as required by Republic Act No. 9165 and its Implementing
Rules and Regulations. On the other hand, appellee manifested that all the issues raised had already been
discussed in its Brief before the CA and, hence, would no longer file any supplemental brief.36

THE COURT’S RULING

Although we recognize and laud the CA’s thorough discussion, the records of the case point to significant lapses
in the chain of custody of the confiscated sachet. These evidentiary gaps cast reasonable doubt on the identity of
the corpus delicti that would compel us to acquit appellant.

DISCUSSION

Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments should be brought to the attention of the trial court, as these
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.37 An exception to this rule arises when there is plain error.38 An
instance of plain error is overlooking, misapprehending, or misapplying facts of weight and substance that, if
properly appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion. This case falls under this exception because the CA,
in appreciating the facts, erred in affirming the RTC’s ruling that there was compliance with the rule on the chain
of custody.

The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the corpus delicti presented in court is
shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved from the accused or from the crime scene.39 This rule,
when applied to drug cases, requires a more stringent application, because the corpus delicti – the narcotic
substance  is not readily identifiable and must be subjected to scientific analysis to determine its composition
and nature.40 Malillin v. People41 explains this rigorous standard when it comes to the chain of custody of narcotic
substances:

xxx the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it was offered into evidence, in such a
way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken
to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same. (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, every link in the chain of custody must not show any possibility of tampering, alteration or
substitution.42 However, it is accepted that a perfect chain is not the standard.43 Nonetheless, two crucial links
must be complied with. First, the seized illegal drug must be marked in the presence of the accused and
immediately upon confiscation. This marking must be supported by details on how, when, and where the marking
was done, as well as the witnesses to the marking. Second, the turnover of the seized drugs at every stage –
from confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station, conveyance to the chemistry lab, and
presentation to the court  must be shown and substantiated.44

The records are replete with instances of noncompliance with the foregoing.

The time and place of the marking

was never established.

Although the item confiscated from appellant had undoubtedly been marked, no evidence was presented to
adequately indicate when, where, and how it was marked.

The testimony of PO2 Akia never established when he marked the plastic sachet and who witnessed his act. His
statements as to its marking are limited to the following:

Q Anyway, you said that you were handed a medium sized sachet, did you place any marking on this sachet?

A Yes, sir my initial.

Q And what would those initial be?

A DEA and Exhibit A, sir.

Q I am showing you Exhibit A, a sachet of shabu with marking DEA, MKM, ENG, are these the same markings
that you placed?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what does MKM stands for?

A Marquez K. Madlon, sir.

Q How about ENG?

WITNESS

A Erwin N. Garcia, sir.

PROS. CATRAL:

Q And DEA?

A My initial, sir.45

Not only was SPO4 Madlon’s testimony deficient in the same way as that of PO2 Akia’s; the former also averred
that he was unaware of when the other police officers marked the item, viz:

WITNESS:

A I remember it was Akia who gave me for marking, Sir.

ATTY. AWISAN:

Q You did not place any marking at the shabu at the place of the arrest?

A I don’t know to my co-arresting officers but it was in our office where I put my initials, Sir.

Q So the shabu was marked at your office and the initials of the arresting were placed on that shabu?

A I don’t know with my co-officers but for me it was in our office,

Sir.46

With respect to PO2 Garcia, he never articulated that he had marked the plastic sachet, even if his initials "EMG"
were on it. Neither did he corroborate his colleagues’ testimonies about the marking of the plastic sachet.47

It was unclear who had custody of

the drug after PO2 Akia confiscated

it from appellant.

PO2 Akia said that he was the one who received the plastic sachet filled with white crystalline substance from
appellant. However, the statements of PO2 Akia, PO2 Garcia, and SPO4 Madlon vary as to whom the plastic
sachet was given after its confiscation from appellant.

PO2 Akia mentioned that he gave the plastic sachet to SPO4 Madlon, to wit:

Q Anyway, you said that you were handed a medium sized sachet, did you place any marking on this sachet?

A Yes, sir my initial.

Q And what would those initial be?

A DEA and Exhibit A, sir.

Q I am showing you Exhibit A, a sachet of shabu with marking DEA, MKM, ENG, are these the same markings
that you placed?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what does MKM stands for?

A Marquez K. Madlon, sir.

Q How about ENG?

WITNESS

A Erwin N. Garcia, sir.

PROS. CATRAL:

Q And DEA?

A My initial, sir.

Q And this was the same item the accused handed to you in exchange with the buy bust money and the boodle
money?

A Yes, sir.

Q And at what point in time did you hand this to Officer Madlon?

A After Officer Garcia has placed him under arrest and Officer Garcia has stated his constitutional rights, sir.

Q And that was conducted in the area?

A Yes, sir48

This testimony was supported by that of PO2 Garcia, as follows:

Q How about the drugs subject of this case?

A It was also turned over to SPO4 Madlon, Sir.

PROS. CATRAL:

Q So it was SPO4 Madlon who kept the evidence from that point up to the time you brought the accused to your
office?

A Yes, Sir.

Q For proper documentation and dispensation of this case?

A Yes, Sir.49

Yet, SPO4 Madlon, the person to whom PO2 Akia had allegedly handed the plastic sachet, refuted this testimony
on the witness stand:

Q How about the alleged shabu which the accused sold to Akia who held those items in custody?

A I remember it was immediately turned over by Akia to our team leader, Sir.

Q But you said that only you and officer Garcia who went to their place?

A Together with our team leader PSI Mencio, Sir.

Q And Akia gave the shabu to PSI Mencio also at the place of arrest?

A Yes, Sir.

ATTY. AWISAN:

Q And, of course, you saw Akia gave that item to PSI Mencio

A Yes, Sir.

Q And what did PSI Mencio do with the shabu which was allegedly sold to Akia by the accused?

A He held it and after effecting the arrest...I don’t know because after the arrest of the suspect I went immediately
to Station 8 to inform the operation, Sir.
Q Where did PSI Mencio bring the shabu which was allegedly handed to him by Akia?

A I did not see it particularly when Akia gave this shabu to PSI Mencio, however, after arriving at our office when I
asked the evidence that was the time Akia informed me that the shabu was in the possession of our team leader,
Sir.

xxxx

Q So from the place of arrest at San Vicente Barangay you never saw the shabu subject of this case again, is it
not?

A Just after the arrest of the suspect I saw in the possession of Akia, however just after the arrest I went to
coordinate the operation at Station 8, Sir.

Q So you never saw the shabu at your office?

A During the inventory and it was brought for marking, Sir.

Q Who brought out the shabu?

A Akia, Sir.

Q Not Mencio?

WITNESS:

A I remember it was Akia who gave me for marking, Sir.50

Furthermore, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest51 executed by PO2 Garcia and SPO4 Madlon asserts that the poseur-
buyer PO2 Akia had turned the plastic sachet over to the team leader, PSI Mencio. The pertinent part of the
affidavit reads:

7. The Poseur-Buyer surrendered the medium size, transparent plastic sachet containing suspected dangerous
drug (shabu) to the Team Leader.

xxxx

9. Confiscated dangerous drugs were labeled and was submitted at the Crime Laboratory Service, Camp Baco
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for chemical analysis.52 x x x.

This inconsistency, contrary to the CA’s ruling, is not a trivial matter that is irrelevant to the crime.1âwphi1 The
assertion of PO2 Akia that he gave the plastic sachet to SPO4 Madlon and the latter’s denial of this assertion
shows that they failed to secure the integrity of the plastic sachet and its contents after confiscating it from
appellant. This failure opens up the possibility of corruption or alteration of the confiscated item.

Moreover, the prosecution failed to show and substantiate the identity of the person who carried the plastic
sachet from the location of the buy-bust operation to the police station, who kept it before it was transmitted to the
laboratory, who received it after the examination, and who stored it until it was brought to court.

Evidentiary gaps in the chain of

custody of the confiscated plastic
sachet cast reasonable doubt on its
integrity.

All the foregoing facts show that there were substantial evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody of the plastic
sachet. Hence, these facts put into question the reliability and evidentiary value of the contents of the alleged
confiscated plastic sachet from appellant – if indeed it was the same as the one brought to the laboratory for
examination, found positive for shabu, and then presented before the RTC. It was a grave error for the CA to rule
that there was an unbroken chain of custody simply because the plastic sachet had been marked, inventoried,
sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive for shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the
confiscated item throughout the entire process had never been established. It is of no moment either that
appellant stipulated the existence of Chemistry Report No. D-057-05, as this report did not amount to an
admission of the identity of the contents of the plastic sachet. Instead, it merely proved the existence and
authenticity of the request for a laboratory examination, and its result had no bearing on the required chain of
custody from the time of seizure of the plastic sachet.53

As we have held in People v. Sanchez,54 "it is fatal for the prosecution to fail to prove that the specimen submitted
for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused."
We take this opportunity to remind all courts what we have elucidated in People v. Tan:55

x x x "By the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady
characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets or
hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of
abuse is great." Thus, the courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent
person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. Needless to state, the lower court
should have exercised the utmost diligence and prudence in deliberating upon accused-appellants’ guilt. It should
have given more serious consideration to the pros and cons of the evidence offered by both the defense and the
State and many loose ends should have been settled by the trial court in determining the merits of the present
case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 14 July 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is being
confined for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to
this Court within five (5) days from his receipt of this Decision, the action he has taken.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 231989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ROMY LIM y MIRANDA, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

On appeal is the February 23, 2017 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-MIN,
which affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision2 of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro
City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y
Miranda (Lim) guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In an Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), committed as follows:

That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drugs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and
knowingly have in his possession, custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram,
accused well-knowing that the substance recovered from his possession is a dangerous drug.

Contrary to, and in violation of, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.3

On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres), was also indicted for illegal sale
of shabu, committed as follows:

That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, without being authorized by law to sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous
drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell and/or offer for sale, and give away to
a PDEA Agent acting as poseur-buyer One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing
Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a total weight of 0.02 gram,
accused knowing the same to be a dangerous drug, in consideration of Five Hundred Pesos (Php500.00)
consisting of one piece five hundred peso bill, with Serial No. FZ386932, which was previously marked and
recorded for the purpose of the buy-bust operation.

Contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.4

In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty. 5 They were detained in the city jail during the joint trial of
the cases.6

The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, 101 Nestle Carin, 102 Vincent Orcales, and
Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity Caceres. Aside from both accused, Rubenia Gorres testified for the
defense.

Version of the Prosecution

Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at Regional Office X of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a certain
"Romy" has been engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, they
were directed by their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust operation. During the
briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IO1 Carin were assigned as the team leader, the arresting officer/back-
up/evidence custodian, and the poseur-buyer, respectively. The team prepared a ₱500.00 bill as buy-bust money
(with its serial number entered in the PDEA blotter), the Coordination Form for the nearest police station, and
other related documents.

Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office about15 minutes before 10:00 p.m. and arrived in the
target area at 10:00 p.m., more or less. IOI Carin and the CI alighted froin the vehicle near the comer leading to
the house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan and the other team members disembarked a few meters after and
positioned themselves in the area to observe. IOI Carin and the CI turned at the comer and stopped in front of a
house. The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nong Romy." Gorres came out and invited them to enter.
Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the television. When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as
a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one inside the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as
instructed. After he came out, he handed a small medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-sealed
transparent plastic of shabu and gave it to IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.

After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan, which was the pre-arranged
signal. The latter, with the rest of the team members, immediately rushed to Lim's house. When they arrived, IO1
Carin and the CI were standing near the door. They then entered the house because the gate was opened. IO1
Orellan declared that they were PDEA agents and informed Lim and Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their
arrest for selling dangerous drug. They were ordered to put their hands on their heads and to squat on the floor.
IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda rights to them. Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both. When
he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was found, but something was bulging in his pocket. IO1 Orellan ordered him
to pull it out. Inside the pocket were the buy-bust money and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4
inches in size. They could see that it contained a plastic sachet of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon
or illegal drug was seized.

IO1 Orellan took into custody the ₱500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance, and a
disposable lighter. 101 Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in the house,
IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. Despite exerting efforts to secure the attendance of the
representative from the media and barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the inventory-taking.

The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in possession of the
seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused and prepared the letters requesting for the laboratory
examination on the drug evidence and for the drug test on the arrested suspects as well as the documents for the
filing of the case. Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the confiscated items. It was not signed by
Lim and Gorres. Also, there was no signature of an elected public official and the representatives of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures of both accused and the evidence seized
were taken.

The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens to Regional Crime
Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the sachets of shabu from the regional office to the crime
lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer 2 (P02) Bajas7 personally received the letter-
requests and the two pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. PSI
Caceres got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and conducted screening and confirmatory tests on them. Based
on her examination, only Lim was found positive for the presence of shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry
Report No. DTCRIM-I96 and I97-2010. With respect to the two sachets of white crystalline substance, both were
found to be positive of shabu after a chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings
were reflected in Chemistry Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on the
cellophane containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them to the evidence custodian. As to the
buy-bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's office during the inquest.

Version of the Defense

Around 10:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Lim and Gorres were in their house in Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro
City. Lim was sleeping in the bedroom, while Gorres was watching the television. When the latter heard that
somebody jumped over their gate, he stood up to verify. Before he could reach the door, however, it was already
forced opened by the repeated pulling and kicking of men in civilian clothing. They entered the house, pointed
their firearms at him, instructed him to keep still, boxed his chest, slapped his ears, and handcuffed him. They
inquired on where the shabu was, but he invoked his innocence. When they asked the whereabouts of "Romy,"
he answered that he was sleeping inside the bedroom. So the men went there and kicked the door open. Lim
was then surprised as a gun was pointed at his head. He questioned them on what was it all about, but he was
told to keep quiet. The men let him and Gorres sit on a bench. Lim was apprised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter,
the two were brought to the PDEA Regional Office and the crime laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim
admitted, albeit without the assistance of a counsel, ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he was
afraid that the police would imprison him. Like Gorres, he was not involved in drugs at the time of his arrest.
Unlike him, however, he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents but was acquitted in the case. Both Lim
and Gorres acknowledged that they did not have any quarrel with the PDEA agents and that neither do they have
grudges against them or vice-versa.

Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in Pita, Pasil, Kauswagan the
night when the arrests were made. The following day, she returned home and noticed that the door was opened
and its lock was destroyed. She took pictures of the damage and offered the same as exhibits for the defense,
which the court admitted as part of her testimony.

RTC Ruling

After trial, the R TC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted Gorres
for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator. The fallo of the September 24, 2013 Decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:

1. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1073, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section
11, Article II of R.A. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve [12]
years and one [1] day to thirteen [13] years, and to pay a Fine in the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
[P300,000.00] without subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of Fine;

2. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found GUILTY of violating Section
5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay the
Fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00].

3. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ELDIE GORRES y NAVE is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Warden of the BJMP
having custody of ELDIE GORRES y Nave, is hereby directed to immediately release him from detention unless
he is being charged of other crimes which will justify his continued incarceration. 8

With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight of evidence favors the
positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over the feeble and uncorroborated denial of Lim. As to the sale of shabu, it
ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the identity of the buyer, the seller, the money paid to the seller,
and the delivery of the shabu. The testimony of IO1 Carin was viewed as simple, straightforward and without any
hesitation or prevarication as she detailed in a credible manner the buy-bust transaction that occurred. Between
the two conflicting versions that are poles apart, the RTC found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence and
no reason to disbelieve in the absence of an iota of malice, ill-will, revenge or resentment preceding and
pervading the arrest of Lim. On the chain of custody of evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the
PDEA operatives were able to preserve the integrity and probative value of the seized items.

In so far as Gorres is concerned, the R TC opined that the evidence presented were not strong enough to support
the claim that there was conspiracy between him and Lim because it was insufficiently shown that he knew what
the box contained. It also noted Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM 196 & 197-2010, which indicated that Gorres was
"NEGATIVE" of the presence of any illicit drug based on his urine sample.

CA Ruling

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It agreed with the finding of the trial court that the prosecution
adequately established all the elements of illegal sale of a dangerous drug as the collective evidence presented
during the trial showed that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted. Likewise, all the elements of illegal
possession of a dangerous drug was proven. Lim resorted to denial and could not present any proof or
justification that he was fully authorized by law to possess the same. The CA was unconvinced with his
contention that the prosecution failed to prove the identity and integrity of the seized prohibited drugs. For the
appellate court, it was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs were
not compromised. The witnesses for the prosecution were able to testify on every link in the chain of custody,
establishing the crucial link in the chain from the time the seized items were first discovered until they were
brought for examination and offered in evidence in court. Anent Lim's defense of denial and frame-up, the CA did
not appreciate the same due to lack of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by an
improper motive. Instead the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was applied.

Before Us, both Lim and the People manifested that they would no longer file a Supplemental Brief, taking into
account the thorough and substantial discussions of the issues in their respective appeal briefs before the
CA.9 Essentially, Lim maintains that the case records are bereft of evidence showing that the buy-bust team
followed the procedure mandated in Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

Our Ruling

The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and Lim should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.

At the time of the commission of the crimes, the law applicable is R.A. No. 9165. 10 Section 1(b) of Dangerous
Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements the law, defines chain of custody as -

the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of
dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the
forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody
of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court
as evidence, and the final disposition. 11

The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated prior to its
admission into evidence. 12 To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence admissible, the proponent
needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the evidence is what the party claims it to
be. 13 In other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution must offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact
could reasonably believe that an item still is what the government claims it to be. 14 Specifically in the
prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established federal evidentiary rule in the United States is that when the
evidence is not readily identifiable and is susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a
more stringent foundation entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it
improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered
with. 15 This was adopted in Mallillin v. People, 16 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of
custody of seized items should be established:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to
be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it
is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item
and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 17

Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the illegal drug by the investigating
officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and ( 4) the turnover and submission of the illegal drug
from the forensic chemist to the court. 18

Seizure and marking of the illegal

drug as well as the turnover by the
apprehending officer to the
investigating officer

Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:

Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources
of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]19

Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
R.A. No. 9165 mandates:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DO.T), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. 20

On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it
essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, with an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.

In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator Grace
Poe admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the
integrity of the evidence acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said section resulted in the
ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing drug addiction and also, in the conflicting
decisions of the courts."21 Specifically, she cited that "compliance with the rule on witnesses during the physical
inventory is difficult. For one, media representatives are not always available in all comers of the Philippines,
especially in more remote areas. For another, there were instances where elected barangay officials themselves
were involved in the punishable acts apprehended."22 In addition, "[t]he requirement that inventory is required to
be done in police station is also very limiting. Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where
accused persons were apprehended."23

Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in drug-
related cases due to the varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, there is a need for "certain adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing law" and "ensure
[its] standard implementation."24 In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he noted:

Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local and
international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have the resources and the capability to mount a
counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a) impracticable for law
enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the proper inventory and photograph
of seized illegal drugs.

xxxx

Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize this in 2002
where the safety of the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the inventory and photography
of seized illegal drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself are threatened by an
immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The place where the seized drugs may be
inventoried and photographed has to include a location where the seized drugs as well as the persons who are
required to be present during the inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.

It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to be
conducted either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending law
enforcers. The proposal will provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a safe
location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly conducted,
thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is
invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to
amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media people or
representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these witnesses should not automatically invalidate
the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a public local elected official also is sometimes impossible
especially if the elected official is afraid or scared.25

We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the place of
arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses
required by law or of the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme danger such as retaliatory action
of those who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault.26 The present case is not one of
those.

Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the ₱500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance,
and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim. While in
the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he immediately conducted the
marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu.27 To ensure that .they were not interchanged, he
separately marked the item sold by Lim to 101 Carin and the one that he recovered from his possession upon
body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI 10-19-10, respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature.28
Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and the media to
witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. 29 In fact, their signatures do not appear in the
Inventory Receipt.

The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro: 30

The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for noncompliance with the procedure laid down in
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a
way that during the trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations
from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and
must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It should take note that the rules require that
the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their
sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. Strict
adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly
susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.31

It must be alleged and proved that the -presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and
photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:

(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during
the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of
the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved
in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media
representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary
detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential
assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the
offenders could escape.32

Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos33 requires:

It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items
inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to
secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court
held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives
enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an
explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual
serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for noncompliance.
These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from
the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to
prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full
well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such,
police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince
the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given
circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 34

In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at the crime scene
because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's house.35 102 Orcales
similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that it was late in the evening and
there were no available media representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact them.36 He
admitted that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior to their operation as they might
leak the confidential information.37 We are of the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there was no
genuine and sufficient attempt to comply with the law.

The testimony of team-leader IO2 Orcales negates any effort on the part of the buy-bust team to secure the
presence of a barangay official during the operation:

ATTY. DEMECILLO:

xx xx

Q x x x Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a barangay official to witness
the operation?

A There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation, Sir.
Q Why?

A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our information. 38

The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ). While the arresting officer, IO1 Orellan, stated in his Affidavit that they only tried to
coordinate with the barangay officials and the media, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to show
that they tried to contact a DOJ representative.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of an earnest effort to coordinate
with and secure presence of the required witnesses. They also failed to explain why the buy-bust team felt
"unsafe" in waiting for the representatives in Lim's house, considering that the team is composed of at least ten
(10) members, and the two accused were the only persons in the house.

It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of Section 21(1) of R.A. No.
9165, as amended, and its IRR may be excused as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated items are properly preserved applies not just on arrest and/or seizure by reason of a legitimate buy-
bust operation but also on those lawfully made in air or sea port, detention cell or national penitentiary,
checkpoint, moving vehicle, local or international package/parcel/mail, or those by virtue of a consented search,
stop and frisk (Terry search), search incident to a lawful arrest, or application of plain view doctrine where time is
of the essence and the arrest and/or seizure is/are not planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.

To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs are typically made
without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative thereto, Sections 1 (A.1.10) of the Chain of
Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations directs:

A. I. I 0. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the requirements of Section 2I (1) of R.A.
No. 9I65, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the apprehending/seizing
officers, as well as the steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items.
Certification or record of coordination for operating units other than the PDEA pursuant to Section 86 (a) and (b),
Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9I65 shall be presented.39

While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been practiced in most cases
elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket any
orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a mandatory
policy:

1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance with the
requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.

2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the justification or
explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized/ confiscated i terns.

3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits, the
investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for
further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.

4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion to either
refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause
in accordance with Section 5,40 Rule 112, Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC
No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de
Oro City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda
guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and
is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another cause. Let
an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, B.E. Dujali,
Davao del Norte, for immediate implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within
five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice, as well as to the
Head/Chief of the National Prosecution Service, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Attorney's Office,
the Philippine National Police, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. Likewise, the Office of the Court
Administrator is DIRECTED to DISSEMINATE copies of this Decision to all trial courts, including the Court of
Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 222559, June 06, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JENNIFER GA-A Y CORONADO, Accused,

AQUILA "PAYAT" ADOBAR, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is an Appeal1 filed pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the Decision2 dated July 31,
2015 (assailed Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Twenty-Second (22nd) Division (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
01192-MIN. The assailed Decision affirmed in toto the Judgment3 dated July 25, 2013 rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 (trial court), in Criminal Case (CC) No. 2011-485, which found
accused-appellant Aquila4 "Payat" Adobar (Adobar) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5,
Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165,5 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002."6

The accusatory portion of the Information7 filed on June 1, 2011 against Adobar reads:

That on or about May 9, 2011[,] at about 11:00 in the morning, more or less, at 32nd Street, Ramonal Village,
[Barangay] Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to sell, trade, dispense and give away any dangerous
drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and illegally sell, trade, dispense and give away to another one (1)
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance, to PDEA Agent Naomie Siglos,
who acted as poseur-buyer, which after a confirmatory test conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory, said sachet
is found positive of the presence of 0.03 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug commonly
known as shabu, in consideration of Five Hundred pesos (Php500.00) with Serial No. MR443620 which is
recorded as marked money in a buy bust operation.

Contrary to and in Violation of Section 5 Article II of R.A. 9165.8

Adobar's co-accused, Jennifer Ga-a y Coronado (Ga-a), was charged on May 12, 2011 in two (2) other separate
Informations for violation of Sections 119 and 1510, respectively, both of Article II of RA 9165. On September 27,
2011, she pleaded not guilty11 to both offenses charged and trial as against her commenced.

Meanwhile, Adobar remained at large until he was apprehended via an alias warrant of arrest12 on February 13,
2012.13 Upon his arraignment on April 2, 2012, Adobar entered a plea of "not guilty."14

As the cases against both accused arose out of the same incident, the parties adopted in the present case
(Criminal Case No. 2011-485) the testimonies of the witnesses already called to the stand in Criminal Case Nos.
2011-422 to 423 prior to Adobar's arrest. Thereafter, joint trial on the three (3) cases continued as to the
remaining witnesses for both prosecution and defense.15

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution:

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Agents 1) IO1
Naomie Siglos (IO1 Siglos); 2) IO3 Alex Tablate (IO3 Tablate); 3) IO1 Nestle Carin (IO1 Carin); 4) Police Chief
Inspector (PCI) Erma Salvacion - Sampaga (PCI Sampaga); and 5) Punong Barangay Dometilo Acenas, Jr.
(Punong Barangay Acenas).16

The prosecution dispensed with the testimony of PCI Sampaga, the forensic chemist,17 after the defense
stipulated on certain matters.18

The prosecution made the following narration of facts:

On May 9, 2011, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, a team of PDEA Regional Office X agents, Cagayan de
Oro City (collectively, buy-bust team), organized a buy-bust operation against Adobar and his live-in partner
based on information from a Confidential Informant (CI), who came to said office that morning, and from the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) National Drug Information System watchlist of drug personalities which
included Adobar.19 In the meeting, assignments were made as follows: IO1 Siglos as poseur-buyer, IO3 Tablate
as apprehending and investigating officer and the rest of the agents as back-up. IO1 Siglos was given a buy-bust
money of one (1) piece of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) bill.20

After the briefing, the buy-bust team proceeded to the residence of Adobar at 32nd St., Ramonal Village,
Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City in two (2) unmarked service vehicles.21 Upon arrival, at about 11:00 o'clock
in the morning, they parked the vehicles about 20 to 30 meters away from Adobar's residence. IO1 Siglos and the
CI alighted and walked towards Adobar's house, outside of which a man, identified by the CI as Adobar, was
standing.

The CI introduced IO1 Siglos to Adobar as a friend who was interested to buy shabu (subject drugs). Adobar
asked IO1 Siglos how much worth of shabu she wanted to buy and the latter answered P500.00, while handing
the buy-bust money to Adobar. Upon receipt of the money, Adobar excused himself to get the "item" inside the
house. In less than a minute,22 Adobar came back and handed to IO1 Siglos one heat-sealed transparent sachet
containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.23 After examining the sachet, IO1 Siglos rubbed
the back of her head, signaling her colleagues to respond to the scene.

Upon seeing the signal, IO3 Tablate, who earlier positioned himself about ten (10) meters away from the group of
IO1 Siglos24 and who witnessed the exchange between IO1 Siglos and Adobar,25 alerted the rest of the
team.26 The team responded and rushed towards Adobar, with IO3 Tablate shouting "dapa, dapa[,]
PDEA!"27 Adobar ran inside his house and locked the front door behind him.28 The buy-bust team forced open the
door, cleared the ground floor then proceeded to the second floor where they found a small window through
which they suspected Adobar to have escaped.29 The buy-bust money was not recovered.

In another room on the same floor,30 IO3 Tablate found Ga-a. Near her were seventeen (17) pieces of transparent
sachets containing suspected shabu together with other drug paraphernalia on top of a table.31 Upon inquiry, Ga-
a introduced herself as Mecaella, the live-in partner of Adobar, and claimed that the shabu on the table were from
Adobar.32

Meanwhile, IO1 Siglos held custody of the subject drugs seized from Adobar until the same was turned over to
IO3 Tablate for marking by the latter.

After "clearing" Adobar's house, IO3 Tablate called for Camaman-an Punong Barangay Acenas, media
representative Rondie Cabrejas of Magnum Radyo33 (media representative) and an unidentified representative
from the Department of Justice (DOJ).34 Thereafter, the sachets of suspected shabu, including the subject drugs,
were marked35 with IO3 Tablate's initials, "AMT."36 After the marking, IO3 Tablate proceeded with the inventory of
the seized items (including the subject drugs) on the table where the seventeen (17) sachets were found,37 and
prepared the Inventory of Seized Items/Confiscated Non-Drugs (Inventory)38 in the presence of Ga-
a.39 Photographs40 of the seized drugs, the room where they were found and the accomplishment of the Inventory
were then taken.41 It appears from the prosecution's submissions that among the three (3) witnesses summoned,
only Punong Barangay Acenas and the media representative arrived at Adobar's house and witnessed42 and
signed the Inventory.43

The buy-bust team and Ga-a proceeded to the PDEA RO-10, with IO3 Tablate in possession of all seized items,
including the subject drugs.44 Upon arrival, IO3 Tablate prepared a request for the examination of the seized
items with the Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10 (crime lab)45 and personally delivered said items thereto.46

Version of the Defense

The defense called to the stand accused-appellant Adobar and accused Ga-a who narrated the following
pertinent facts:

In the morning of May 9, 2011, Ga-a was alone cooking her lunch inside the house of Adobar where she was a
tenant when she heard a loud pounding on the door.47 Suddenly, about ten (10) armed persons entered the
house. After introducing themselves as PDEA agents,48 they proceeded to search the house49 and destroyed Ga-
a's belongings50 while looking for a certain "Payat."51 Ga-a was likewise bodily searched by a woman.52 She was
then invited to go to the PDEA office and as they were about to leave, the agents called for a barangay
official.53 Ga-a claimed that the evidence presented by the prosecution were "planted" by the PDEA agents.54

Adobar, on the other hand, testified that on May 9, 2011, he went to Opol at 5:00 o'clock in the morning to buy
fish for vending.55 He then took the same to Abellanosa St., Cagayan de Oro City where he stayed until he went
home at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, when the fish were sold out.56 When he arrived at his house, he
noticed that the door was destroyed and the belongings inside were disarranged.57 He was likewise informed by
the neighbors that Ga-a was arrested by PDEA agents58 but he did not think to report the incident to the police as
he was unschooled.59 On February 12, 2012, he was arrested while selling fish under the bridge in Abellanosa
St.60
The Ruling of the trial court

In the Judgment dated July 25, 2013, the trial court found Adobar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged and imposed upon him the penalty of Life Imprisonment with a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).

In a two-paragraph discussion, the trial court held that under the circumstances, there was probable cause to
arrest Adobar. As between his and the prosecution's conflicting versions of facts, the latter's was more believable.
No discussion was made on the compliance by the PDEA team with the required procedures under relevant laws,
rules and regulations particularly, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, albeit such was raised as an issue by the
defense.61

On the other hand, the trial court acquitted accused Ga-a in both Criminal Case Nos. 2011-422 and 2011-423,
holding that the PDEA agents had no probable cause to search and arrest her. Moreover, the urine sample taken
from Ga-a and the results of the chemical examination made thereon showing the same positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride are inadmissible in evidence, being fruits of the poisonous tree.62

The fallo of the trial court Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 2011-422 and 2011-423, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, JENNIFER C. GAA is hereby ACQUITTED of the offenses charged.
The Warden of the BJMP having custody of JENNIFER C. GAA is hereby directed to immediately release
her from detention unless she is accused of other crimes which will justify her continued incarceration.

2. In Criminal Case No. 2011-485, accused AQUILO ADOBAR a.k.a. "Payat" is GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 as
charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and to
pay the Fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00], without subsidiary penalty in
case of non-payment of fine.

Let the penalty imposed on accused Adobar be a lesson and an example to all who have the criminal propensity,
inclination and proclivity to commit the same forbidden act that crime does not pay, and that the pecuniary gain
and benefit, as well as the perverse psychological well being which one can derive from selling or manufacturing
or trading drugs, or other illegal substance, or from using, or possessing, or just committing any other acts
penalized under Republic Act 9165, cannot compensate for the penalty which one will suffer if ever he is
prosecuted and penalized to the full extent of the law.

SO ORDERED.63 (Emphasis in the original)

Adobar appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal.64 He filed his Brief65 dated January 3, 2014, while the People,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Brief66 dated April 28, 2014. In a Resolution67 dated
June 18, 2014, the CA considered Adobar to have waived his right to file a Reply Brief.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the trial court Judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 25,2013 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.68
The CA held that the prosecution adequately proved all the elements of the crime. It held that the prosecution
sufficiently established all the links in the chain of custody as to remove doubt on the integrity of the subject
drugs.

Anent the alleged failure of the PDEA agents to comply with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 as the media and
DOJ representatives, respectively, were not presented to testify on the Inventory which they supposedly
witnessed, the CA held that this lapse did not render the subject drugs seized inadmissible because the
prosecution had duly shown that its integrity and evidentiary value were preserved. According to the CA,
substantial adherence - not strict adherence - to the requirements of Section 21 suffices and the same was
satisfied by the PDEA agents.

Hence, this recourse.

In lieu of filing supplemental briefs, Adobar and the People filed separate Manifestations dated July 4, 201669 and
June 16, 2016,70 respectively, foregoing their right to file supplemental briefs as they have exhausted their
arguments in their respective Briefs filed before the CA.

Issue

The main question thrown to the Court for resolution is whether or not accused-appellant Adobar is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of sale of illegal drugs as defined and punished under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.
 The Court's Ruling

The Appeal has merit.

Adobar is charged with selling 0.03 gram of dangerous illegal drugs, in particular, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride colloquially known as shabu. At the outset, RA 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002, being the law in place at the time of the commission of the offense and being
more favorable to the accused than its successor, RA 10640,71 shall apply in this case.

Section 3(ii), Article I of RA 9165 defines "selling" as any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or controlled
precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other consideration. In the context of a buy-bust
operation, its elements are 1) that the transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer;
and 2) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is presented in court as evidence of the corpus
delicti.72

Anent the latter element, proof beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced in establishing the corpus delicti - the
body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug.73 It is important that the State establish with moral
certainty the integrity and identity of the illicit drugs sold as the same as those examined in the laboratory and
subsequently presented in court as evidence.74 This rigorous requirement, known under RA 9165 as the chain of
custody,75 performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.76

In turn, Section 21 of RA 9165 is a critical means to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody77 by
providing for the procedures to be followed in the seizure, custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Section 21 of RA 9165 provides:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources
of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative
examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic
laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided,
That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and
essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory
examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be
examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the
completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours; (Emphasis
supplied and italics in the original)
Filling in the details as to where the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items should be made is
Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 (IRR) which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the
physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is
served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; xxx (Emphasis supplied)
The same likewise provides for a saving clause in case of noncompliance with the requirements of RA 9165 and
the IRR, thus:
xxx Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under Justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (Emphasis
supplied)
The foregoing is echoed in Section 2(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,
to wit:
a. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of dangerous drugs or controlled chemical or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment shall immediately, after the seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of:

(i) the person from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her representative or counsel;

(ii) a representative from the media;

(iii) a representative from the Department of Justice; and,

(iv) any elected public official;

who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory report covering the drugs/equipment and who shall be given
a copy thereof; Provided that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of seizure without warrant; Provided further that non-compliance with these
requirement under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team xxx.
In sum, the applicable law mandates the following to be observed as regards the time, witnesses and proof of
inventory in the custody of seized dangerous illegal drugs:

1. The initial custody requirements must be done immediately after seizure or confiscation;

2. The physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of:

a. the accused or his representative or counsel;

b. a representative from the media;

c. a representative from the DOJ; and

d. any elected public official.

3. The conduct of the physical inventory and photograph shall be done at the:
a. place where the search warrant is served; or

b. at the nearest police station; or

c. nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in

case of warrantless seizure.

In People v. Dela Cruz,78 it was explained that compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by
Section 21 ensures the integrity of confiscated drugs and related paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the
nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items seized;
third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the
relation of the substances or items seized to the personls alleged to have been in possession of or peddling
them.

Compliance with the requirements forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence
in any manner. Non compliance, on the other hand, is tantamount to failure in establishing the identity of corpus
delicti, an essential element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, thus, engendering the acquittal of
an accused.79

However, the law allows such non-compliance in exceptional cases where the following requisites are present:
(1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance; and (2) the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team.80 In these
exceptional cases, the seizures and custody over the confiscated items shall not be rendered void and invalid.

Against the foregoing legal backdrop, the Court had exhaustively studied the records and is of the considered
view that the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti are compromised.

The buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, particularly as to the
presence of the three (3) witnesses immediately after seizure and confiscation of the illegal drugs.

In no uncertain words, Section 21 requires the apprehending team to "immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph [the seized illegal drugs] in the presence of the accused xxx or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ) and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof."

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and photographing of
the drugs must be at the place of apprehension and/or seizure. If this is not practicable, it may be done as
soon as the apprehending team reaches the nearest police station or nearest office.81
In all of these cases, the photographing and inventory are required to be done in the presence of any elected
public official and a representative from the media and the DOJ who shall be required to sign an
inventory and given copies thereof. By the same intent of the law behind the mandate that the initial custody
requirements be done "immediately after seizure and confiscation," the aforesaid witnesses must already be
physically present at the time of apprehension and seizure - a requirement that can easily be complied with by the
buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its very nature, a planned activity. Simply put, the
buy-bust team had enough time and opportunity to bring with them these witnesses.

In other words, while the physical inventory and photographing is allowed to be done "at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizure,"
this does not dispense with the requirement of having the DOJ and media representative and the elected public
official to be physically present at the time of and at or near the place of apprehension and seizure so that
they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing of the seized drugs "immediately after
seizure and confiscation."82

The reason is simple, it is at the time of arrest or at the time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" that the
presence of the three (3) witnesses is most needed. It is their presence at that point that would insulate
against the police practice of planting evidence.83 In People v. Mendoza,84 the Court ruled:
xxx Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected public
official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or contamination
of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation
of the sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the
trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. xxx85 (Italics in the original)
In the present case, none of these three (3) witnesses under Section 21 were present at the time the
subject drugs were allegedly confiscated from Adobar. Upon the other hand, only two (2) of the three (3)
were summoned by the team and were actually present during the physical inventory and photographing
of the seized items.

The testimony of Punong Barangay Acenas, which was, in fact, offered by the prosecution for the sole purpose of
proving that he was present during the inventory and that he signed the inventory receipt,86 supports the
conclusion that he arrived only after the subject drugs were already confiscated, thus:
[ATTORNEY ECHANO:]
Q But, you will admit that [when] the PDEA went inside the house, you were not present?
A When I arrived at the area, all the agents were already in the second floor of the house.
Q When did you receive the call from the PDEA agents?
A Immediately after the arrest [of Ga-a] and seizure.
Q How many minutes did it take you before you arrived?
A About 15 minutes from our residence, Sir.
xxxx
[TRIAL COURT:]
Q In other words, Captain Acenas, when you arrived there, the accused [Ga-a] was already arrested?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q The items were already on top of the aparador?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Was the Inventory already prepared ready for your signature or the Inventory was prepared when you were
there already?
A When I arrived, they started the Inventory, Your Honor.87 (Emphasis supplied)
To recall the prosecution's narrative, Ga-a was arrested after the buy-bust was made against Adobar, i.e., after
the subject drugs were taken from him by IO1 Siglos. Clearly, Punong Barangay Acenas was summoned only
sometime after the attempted arrest of Adobar and the alleged confiscation of the subject drugs from his person.
According to Punong Barangay Acenas, he arrived at the scene about fifteen (15) minutes from such call, when
the agents were already settled on the second floor of Adobar's home, ready for inventory. This is confirmed by
IO3 Tablate who testified that he phoned in the witnesses only after "clearing" the alleged crime scene, thus:
[PROSECUTOR VICENTE:]
xxxx
Q What did you do with the drugs on the table?
A After clearing, before I actually made the markings[,] we called up the barangay captain or one of the
 members of the team, the barangay captain, member from the media and also the representative
from the DOJ and upon their arrival it was the time when I actually made the markings to the
evidence.
xxxx
Q And then what else after marking, labelling the sachets of shabu and the paraphernalia, what happened
next, Mr. Witness?
A After the inventory was signed by the witnesses, upon arrival of (sic) the office after the booking I also
prepared a request for the crime lab and then I myself was the one who delivered the evidence to the crime
lab.88 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, while IO3 Tablate testified that all three (3) insulating witnesses came, observed and signed the
inventory, this testimony is contradicted by the records which reveal that only the signatures of Punong Barangay
Acenas and the media representative actually appear on the inventory document.89 In this regard it should also be
noted that only Punong Barangay Acenas was presented in court to testify.

Other than the above quoted testimony of IO3 Tablate, no sign of the presence of the DOJ representative
appears on record. In fact, the Affidavit90 dated May 10, 2011 of IO3 Tablate belies the presence of a DOJ
Representative even during the inventory, thus:
I, INTELLIGENCE OFFICER-3 ALEX M. TABLATE, xxx do hereby depose and say:

xxxx

That during the inventory of the seized items/evidence recovered, which I, IO-3 TABLATE myself conducted in
the very table itself where said items were found in plain view in the 2nd floor of the house of the suspects, the
same were witnessed by the Barangay Captain himself of Brgy. Camaman-an and by a representative
from the media through Magnum Radio.91 (Additional emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, the three (3) insulating witnesses must be present at the time of seizure of the drugs such that they
must be at or near the intended place of arrest so they can be ready to witness the inventory and photographing
of the seized items "immediately after seizure and confiscation." These witnesses must sign the inventory and be
given copies thereof. In the present case, from the evidence of the prosecution itself, none of the
witnesses were present during the seizure and confiscation of the subject drugs. Moreover, only two (2) of
them - the punong barangay and the media representative - witnessed the photographing and signed the
inventory.

On this note, considering that at the point of seizure, i.e., the first link in the "chain of custody," irregularities were
already attendant, it becomes futile to prove the the rest of the links in the chain. Simply put, since "planting" of
the drugs was already made possible at the point of seizure because of the absence of all three (3) insulating
witnesses, proving the chain after such point merely proves the chain of custody of planted drugs.

Adobar's flight serves as a waiver of his right to be present during the initial custody requirements of Section 21
of RA 9165, but does not excuse compliance by the buy-bust team with the presence of the three (3) insulating
witnesses therein.

Apart from the three (3) insulating witnesses, Section 21 requires that the physical inventory and photographing
of the seized drugs by the apprehending team immediately after confiscation and seizure be likewise made in the
presence of, "the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel."92

The question arises: what if the person from whom the drugs were seized escaped? This obtains in the present
case. From the prosecution's narration, Adobar successfully evaded arrest despite the efforts of the buybust team
to apprehend him.93 He remained at large until his subsequent apprehension on February 13, 2012 via an alias
warrant of arrest.

If the story of the prosecution is to be believed, the escape of accused Adobar serves as a waiver of his right to
be present during the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs allegedly seized from him. The
prosecution cannot be burdened by the accused's escape provided that reasonable efforts were made to
apprehend him, as what appears in the present case. The buy-bust team cannot be reasonably expected to
secure the presence of the accused's representative or counsel at the time of confiscation and during the buy-
bust operation, considering the clandestine nature of such operations. In the same vein, after such escape, it
should be difficult, if not impossible, for the buy-bust team to find a counsel or representative for the accused
before the initial custody requirements which Section 21 mandates to be performed "immediately after" the
confiscation.

As such, the prosecution is excused from complying with the requirement of Section 21 as to the presence of the
accused during the initial custody requirements, i.e., physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs.
However, it is not excused as to the presence of the three (3) insulating witnesses, i.e., the DOJ and media
representative and elected public official. The buy-bust team must still secure the presence of these insulating
witnesses, and the prosecution must still prove such presence, not only during the inventory and photographing
but likewise at the time of and at or near the intended place of confiscation and seizure of the subject drugs.
In the same vein, the buy-bust team need not secure the presence of the accused during the marking of the
seized drugs as his escape serves as a waiver of his right to witness the same. As will be extensively discussed
below, although Section 21 is silent as to the matter of marking of seized drugs, jurisprudence94 teaches that
consistency with the chain of custody rule requires the same to be done in the presence of the accused.

The prosecution failed to trigger the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165. Its noncompliance with Section 21
cannot be excused; the identity of the corpus delicti is not established.

To be sure, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21 is required as a rule.95 The
exception to this rule is found in the saving clause under Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of RA 916596 which
requires the following: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict
compliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.97

If these two (2) requisites are present and the saving clause is successfully triggered, the confiscated items shall
not be rendered void and invalid. This allows the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti despite
failure of the apprehending team to physically inventory and photograph the drugs at the place of arrest and/or to
have the DOJ and media representative and elected public official witness the same.

On the first element, it has been emphasized that the prosecution must first recognize any lapses on the part of
the apprehending officers and thereafter explain the cited justifiable grounds.98 Moreover, the justifiable
explanation given must be credible.99 Breaches of the procedure contained in Section 21 committed by the police
officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.100

Hence, to successfully trigger the saving clause, the prosecution must satisfy its two-pronged
requirement: first, acknowledge and credibly justify the non-compliance, and second, show that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were properly preserved. The Court held in Valencia v.
People:101
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 is
not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case, the prosecution must still prove that (a) there is a justifiable ground
for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved.
Further, the non-compliance with the procedures must be justified by the State's agents themselves. The
arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply with the procedures laid down under
Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the procedure was not followed and prove that the reason
provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may
or may not be disregarded by the arresting officers at their own convenience.102
In this case, the prosecution did not acknowledge the lapses, much less offer a credible and justifiable ground for
the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with Section 21. No explanation was advanced as to why none of the
insulating witnesses was present at the time of seizure and confiscation of the subject illegal drugs. Neither do
the records show any justification as to why no DOJ representative was secured to witness the photographing
and physical inventory of the seized drugs. Worse, the prosecution did not even concede such lapses. The
affidavit of IO3 Tablate shows the indifference of the prosecution on its failure to comply with Section 21, thus:
That IO-1 SIGLOS turned over to me, IO-3 TABLATE the one (1) piece of heat-sealed transparent sachet
containing white crystalline substance also suspected to be shabu, which was the subject of the buybust earlier
transacted.

That during the inventory of the seized items/evidence recovered, which I, IO-3 TABLATE myself conducted in
the very table itself where said items were found in plain view in the 2nd floor of the house of the suspects, the
same were witnessed by the Barangay Captain himself of Brgy. Camaman-an and by a representative from the
media through Magnum Radio.

That at the PDEA Regional Office-10, the arrested female suspect formally identified herself as Jennifer C. Ga-a,
22 years old, single and a resident of Ramonal Village, Brgy. Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City while the other
suspect who was able to elude arrest despite earnest effort to apprehend him was formally identified as Aquilo
Adobar, 48 years old, married and a resident of the same barangay. The latter suspect is a targetlisted
personality as per PDEA National Drugs Information System (NDIS).103 (Emphasis in the original)
Hence, considering the prosecution neither acknowledged nor explained its noncompliance with Section 21, the
first prong was not satisfied, thus leading to the inevitable conclusion that the saving clause was not triggered.
Accordingly, there is no point anymore in determining if the second prong had been satisfied - i.e., proving the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs.

To be sure, from the records, outside the non-compliance with Section 21, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized illegal drugs are heavily tainted. The second prong, even if the Court allows proof of such despite
failure to prove the first prong, seems difficult if not impossible to establish in light of the serious irregularities in
the transfer of custody of the seized illegal drugs.

Proving the second prong of the saving clause - the integrity of the seized illegal drugs - despite non-compliance
with Section 21 requires establishing the four links in the chain of custody: First, the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of
the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.104

In the present case, there was failure to mark the seized illegal drugs immediately after confiscation due to the
palpable gap between the confiscation of the drugs to its subsequent marking which the prosecution utterly failed
to explain.

Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items
after they have been seized. In People v. Beran,105 the Court held that while the matter of marking of the seized
illegal drugs in warrantless seizures is not expressly specified in Section 21, consistency with the chain of
custody rule requires that such marking should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator
and (2) immediately upon confiscation, to wit:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of
the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension is the same
evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather
than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized
items-to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in
evidence-should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon
confiscation. This step initiates the process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted
searches, and of protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of
evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or theft. xxx106 (Emphasis in the original)
It is vital that the seized contrabands are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will
use the markings as reference. The Court has held:
Crucial in proving [the] chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial
link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband[s] are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating[,] switching, "planting," or contamination of
evidence.

Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities to
immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti and
suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the doctrinal fallback of every
drug-related prosecution.107 (Additional emphasis supplied)
In the present case, a considerable period of time intervened between the confiscation of the subject drugs and
its subsequent marking - which was unaccounted for by the prosecution. This gaping hiatus is brought about by
the failure of the poseur buyer, IO1 Siglos, to credibly account for her whereabouts and the handling of the
subject drugs from the time she confiscated the same from Adobar to the time she turned it over to IO3 Tablate
for marking. The marked inconsistencies in her testimonies taken on April 23, 2012 and November 6, 2012 fail
the test of credibility.

On April 23, 2012, IO1 Siglos testified that when her colleagues responded to the scene, she inspected the area
with them and then, without much delay, followed IO3 Tablate upstairs for the marking, thus:
[PROSECUTOR VICENTE:]
xxxx
Q And then after you made that pre-arranged signal of rubbing your back head, what happened?
A After a few minutes[,] the back up team rushed up.
Q What happened next?
A And then when they arrived we checked the area and then after we checked the area I followed
them and then I went up stairs to give the buy-bust evidence to the arresting officer, Sir.
xxxx
Q You said that after you touched your head the arresting officer arrived, and then Tablate went upstairs?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How many minutes after Tablate went upstairs, how many minutes you followed Tablate?
A About 3-4 minutes, Sir.108 (Emphasis supplied)
This is in contrast to her testimony on November 6, 2012 where she stated under oath that when the back-up
team arrived, she proceeded to the team's service vehicle, about 10-15 meters away, and therein waited for a
considerable time while the back-up team chased after Adobar and searched the premises. She only went back
to the house and handed the subject drugs to IO3 Tablate when it was time for the physical inventory, thus:
[PROSECUTOR VICENTE:]
 xxxx
Q After you rubbed the back part of your head, what happened next?
A I noticed that the operatives rushed up to the area, Sir.
xxxx
Q So[,] when the operatives arrived, what did Aquillo (sic) Adobar do?
A He went upstairs, Sir.
Q He run?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And he was chased by the operatives?
A Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q What did you do?
A I went outside going to our service vehicle, Sir.
Q How far was the service vehicle parked from the house?
A More or less 10-15 meters, Sir.
xxxx
Q Why you did not go with them when they chased the accused?
A Because my tasked (sic) is only a [poseur] buyer, Sir.
Q You said that the accused handed to you the sachet of shabu, what did you do with it?
A I handed to the arresting officer, IO3 Tablate during the inventory, Sir.
Q But you said you went to the vehicle?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You waited there?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And then, when did your team conduct an inventory?
A After the searched (sic), Sir.
Q So[,] after you went to the vehicle, you went back to the house?
A Yes, Sir.109 (Emphasis supplied)
The significance of this contradiction in IO1 Siglos' testimony cannot be overemphasized. Being the first
custodian in the chain and having held onto the then unmarked seized drugs for a considerable lapse of time, IO1
Siglos must clearly and convincingly account for her handling and care of the subject drugs before turning them
over to IO3 Tablate for marking. In this, she failed, thus, effectively creating an obvious but unexplained break in
the chain. Hence, assuming that the illegal drugs which went into the chain are actually the same drugs seized
from Adobar's person, i.e., assuming the same were not planted at the point of seizure, there remains that great
possibility of switching while the same were in IO1 Siglos' custody.

The foregoing conflicting narrations, seemingly trivial when viewed in isolation, cast very serious doubts on the
veracity of the prosecution's overall narrative when juxtaposed against the procedural lapses of the buybust team
and its abject failure to justify said lapses.

Courts must be extra vigilant in trying drugs cases.

Unfortunately, the CA and the trial court glossed over these obvious irregularities which attended the present buy-
bust operation and the resulting confiscation of the subject drugs.

The CA, while seemingly recognizing the lapses in observing Section 21,110 simply dismissed the same "because
it was shown by the prosecution that the integrity and evidentiary value of the specimens were properly preserved
by the buy-bust team."111 In other words, the CA excused the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with Section
21 on the basis of the second prong of the saving clause (that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject
drugs are established) but ignoring altogether the first prong (absence of justifiable reasons for the
procedural lapses). The CA justifies its decision to excuse this nonobservance of Section 21 by ruling that only
substantial adherence thereto is required.112

This position taken by the CA is mistaken. To reiterate, the procedure enshrined in Section 21 is a matter of
substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.113 Substantive law requires
strict observance of these procedural safeguards.114 Courts, in resolving drugs cases must keep in mind this
mandate and the peculiar nature of buy-bust operations being susceptible to police abuse as discussed by the
Court, thus:
xxx a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law.
It is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. In People v. Tan,
this Court itself recognized that by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment
procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of
heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably
shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. xxx115 (Italics in the original)
For this, the Court has instructed lower courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying drugs cases "lest an innocent
person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses."116 The presumption that regular duty
was performed by the arresting officers simply cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence granted to the
accused by the Constitution. It is thus incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the accused is indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.117

At this point, it is well to emphasize that this case involves a meager 0.03 gram of shabu. Courts must employ
heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in evaluating cases
involving miniscule amounts of drugs as they can be readily planted and tampered with.118 Consistent with this,
in People v. Segundo119 involving the same amount of drugs as the case at hand (0.03 gram), the Court
emphasized the extra caution that law enforcers must observe in preserving the integrity of small amounts of
seized drugs, thus:
To sum, "[l]aw enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the chain of
custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia." Thus, "[t]his is especially true when only a
miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused."

Although the miniscule quantity of confiscated illicit drugs is solely by itself not a reason for acquittal, this instance
accentuates the importance of conformity to Section 21 that the law enforcers in this case miserably failed to do
so. If initially there were already significant lapses on the marking, inventory, and photographing of the alleged
seized items, a doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti concomittantly exists. xxx120 (Emphasis supplied)
Adobar's defense of denial is concededly weak and uncorroborated. This weakness, however, does not add
strength to the prosecution's case as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight. Well-
entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the
defense but on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution.121

Based on the foregoing and following the Court's precedents as discussed above, the Court is constrained to
reverse Adobar's conviction.

The prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime due to the serious lapses in observing Section 21 of
RA 9165 and the concomitant failure to trigger the saving clause. Anent the latter point, the prosecution utterly
failed to acknowledge and credibly justify its procedural lapses and was unable to prove the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs. Adobar's innocence, as presumed and protected by the Constitution, must
stand in light of the reasonable doubt on his guilt.

To conclude, the Court issues anew a reminder: The prosecution arm of the government has the duty to prove,
beyond reasonable doubt, each and every element of the crime charged. In illegal drugs cases, this includes
proving faithful compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, being fundamental to establishing the element of corpus
delicti. In the course of proving such compliance before the trial courts, prosecutors must have the
initiative to not only acknowledge, but also justify, any perceived deviations from the procedural
requirements of Section 21.122

As no less than the liberty of an accused is at stake, appellate courts, this Court included, must, in turn,
sift the records to determine if, indeed, the apprehending team observed Section 21 and if not, if the
same is justified under the circumstances. This, regardless if issues thereon were ever raised or threshed out
in the lower court/s, consistent with the doctrine that appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for
review and the appellate court must correct errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or
not.123 If, from such full examination of the records, there appears unjustified failure to comply with Section 21, it
becomes the appellate court's bounded duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.124

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 31, 2015 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01192-
MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Aquila "Payat" Adobar is hereby ACQUITTED for failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from
detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court, within five (5) days
from receipt of this Decision, the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished to the Director General of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for his information.

SO ORDERED.