ABS- CBN vs.
COMELEC
This is a petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC Resolution No. 98-1419 .
Petitioner asserts that respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining
order enjoining the petitioner or any other group from conducting exit polls during
the May 11 elections.
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the
May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with.
ISSUE: Is the “moot and academic” principle a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case?
RULING:
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to
the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of
expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic
feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with
elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that
could well crop up again in future elections.
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Paño, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it
"also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and
bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees."7 Since the
fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have
resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the
holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be
glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,8 when the issue involves the
principle of social justice or the protection of labor,9 when the decision or
resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,10 or when the need for relief is
extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21,
1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got
hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was
hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift
resolution in time or the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the
essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to
this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.
Gitlow v. New York
The Supreme Court previously held, in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), that
the Constitution's Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government, and that,
consequently, the federal courts could not stop the enforcement of state laws that
restricted the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Gitlow v. New York's partial
reversal of that precedent began a trend toward nearly complete reversal; the
Supreme Court now holds that almost every provision of the Bill of Rights applies to
both the federal government and the states. The Court upheld the state law
challenged in Gitlow v. New York, which made it a crime to advocate the duty, need,
or appropriateness of overthrowing government by force or violence. The Court's
ruling on the effects of the Fourteenth Amendment was incidental to the decision,
but nevertheless established an extremely significant precedent
As justification for its decision, the Supreme Court relied on the "due
process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment. This provision, contained in Section
One of the amendment, prohibits any state from depriving "any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Specifically, in its decision the
Court stated that "For present purposes we may and do assume that" the rights of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press were "among the fundamental
personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the states" (at 666). The Court would go on to use
this logic of incorporation much more purposefully in other cases, such as De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), to extend the reach of the Bill of Rights.
Constitutional scholars refer to this process as the "incorporation doctrine,"
meaning that the Supreme Court incorporates specific rights into the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Gitlow v. New York was also important for defining the scope of the First
Amendment's protection of free speech following the period of the "Red Scare," in
which Communists and Socialist Party members were routinely convicted for
violating the Espionage Act of 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918. Gitlow, a Socialist, had
been convicted of criminal anarchy after publishing a "Left Wing Manifesto." The
Court upheld his conviction on the basis that the government may suppress or
punish speech when it directly advocates the unlawful overthrowing of the
government.
The opinions in this case are notable for their attempt to define more clearly the
"clear and present danger" test that came out of Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919). The majority opinion written by Justice Edward Terry Sanford,
embracing the bad tendency test that came out from Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919), stated that a "State may punish utterances endangering the
foundations of government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means"
because such speech clearly "present[s] a sufficient danger to the public peace and
to the security of the State." According to Sanford, "a single revolutionary spark
may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and
destructive conflagration."
Facts of the Case:  convicted on a trumped up charge of robbery in band because they took each a few
Gitlow, a socialist, was arrested for distributing copies of a "left-wing manifesto"
that called for the establishment of socialism through strikes and class action of any
form. Gitlow was convicted under a state criminal anarchy law, which punished
advocating the overthrow of the government by force. At his trial, Gitlow argued
that since there was no resulting action flowing from the manifesto's publication,
the statute penalized utterences without propensity to incitement of concrete
action. The New York courts had decided that anyone who advocated the doctrine
of violent revolution violated the law.
Question: 
Does the New York law punishing the advocacy of overthrowing the government an
unconstitutional violation of the free speech clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion:  pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily
Threshold issue: Does the First Amendment apply to the states? Yes, by virtue of
the liberty protected by due process that no state shall deny (14th Amendment). On
the merits, a state may forbid both speech and publication if they have a tendency
to result in action dangerous to public security, even though such utterances create
no clear and present danger. The rationale of the majority has sometimes been
called the "dangerous tendency" test. The legislature may decide that an entire
class of speech is so dangerous that it should be prohibited. Those legislative
decisions will be upheld if not unreasonable, and the defendant will be punished
even if her speech created no danger at all.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES  vs.SALVADOR ALARCON, ET AL.
As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of first Instance of Pampanga
in criminal case No. 5733, The People of the Philippines vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al.,
convicting the accused therein — except one — of the crime of robbery committed
in band, a denunciatory letter, signed by Luis M. Taruc, was addressed to His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter found its way to
the herein respondent, Federico Mañgahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article
published by him in the issue of that paper of September 23, 1937. The
objectionable portion is inserted in the following petition of the provincial fiscal of
Pampanga, filed with the Court of First Instance of that province on September 29,
1937:
'Fifty-two (52) tenants in Floridablanca, Pampanga, have been charged and
cavans of palay for which they issued the corresponding receipts, from the bodega
in the hacienda where they are working. These tenants contend that they have the
right to take the palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the obligation to
give them rations of palay for their maintenance and their families to be paid later
with their share of their crop. But this is not all. When the convicted tenants
appealed the case and were released on bail pending their appeal, court and public
officials exerted pressure upon one of their bondsmen, as this bondsman informed
the tenants, to withdraw his bail for them, and the fifty-two tenants were arrested
again and put in jail.
The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well defined by the cases
adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending to
impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a
punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It must,
however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and
embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the publications should
be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in
the decision of a pending case. There is no pending case to speak of when and once
the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or
amend it.
In the case at bar, we have a concession that the letter complained of was
published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had decided the aforesaid
criminal case for robbery in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the
Court of Appeals. The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the
bond of the accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the
important consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify the
decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have
been influenced by the questioned publication.
If the publication of the questioned letter constitutes contempt of the Court of
Appeals, we take the view that in the interrelation of the different courts forming
our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or representative of
another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the
authority and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfer the proceedings
to the appellate court, and this last word becomes thereby charged with the
authority to deal with contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal.
The rule suggested, which has its origin at common law, is involved in some doubt
under modern English law and in the United States, "the weight of authority,
however, is clearly to the effect that comment upon concluded cases is unrestricted
under our constitutional guaranty of the liberty of the press."
Other considerations argue against our adoption of the suggested holding. As
stated, the rule imported into this jurisdiction is that "newspaper publications
tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts; that the rule is otherwise after the case is
ended.
In at least two instances, this Court has exercised the power to punish for
contempt "on the preservative and on the vindicative principle", “on the corrective
and not on the retaliatory idea of punishment". Contempt of court is in the nature
of a criminal offense and in considering the probable effects of the article alleged to
be contemptuous, every fair and reasonable inference consistent with the theory of
defendant's innocence will be indulged, and where a reasonable doubt in fact or in
law exists as to the guilt of one of constructive contempt for interfering with the
due administration of justice the doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he must
be acquitted.
The appealed order is hereby reversed, and the respondent acquitted, without
pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Pita vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the
Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-
Narcotics Group, Auxiliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the
Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers,
distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along
C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers
and members of various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and
later burned, was “Pinoy Playboy” magazines published and co-edited by Leo Pita.
On 7 December 1983, Pita filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the
writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as
superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin
and or restrain Bagatsing, Cabrera and their agents from confiscating his magazines
or from otherwise preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the
magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se
obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press. On 12 December 1983, Pita filed an Urgent
Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure,
confiscation and burning of plaintiffs “Pinoy Playboy” Magazines, pending hearing
on the petition for preliminary injunction in view of Mayor Bagatsing’s
pronouncement to continue the Anti-Smut Campaign. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order on 14 December 1983. On 5 January 1984, Pita filed his
Memorandum in support of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
raising the issue as to “whether or not the defendants, and or their agents can
without a court order confiscate or seize plaintiff’s magazine before any judicial
finding is made on whether said magazine is obscene or not.” The restraining order
lapsed on 3 January 1984, Pita filed an urgent motion for issuance of another
restraining order, which was opposed by Bagatsing on the ground that issuance of a
second restraining order would violate the Resolution of the Supreme Court dated
11 January 1983, providing for the Interim Rules Relative to the Implementation of
Batas Pambansa 129, which provides that a temporary restraining order shall be
effective only for 20 days from date of its issuance. On 11 January 1984, the trial
court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on 16 January 1984 “for the
parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication ‘Pinoy
Playboy Magazine’ alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and or burned by the
defendants, are obscence per se or not.” On 3 February 1984, the trial court
promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ of preliminary
injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. Likewise, the Appellate Court
dismissed the appeal, holding that the freedom of the press is not without restraint,
as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is
offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers
and sellers of obscene publications; and that the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures recognizes certain exceptions, as when there is consent to
the search or seizure, or search is an incident to an arrest, or is conducted in a
vehicle or movable structure. Pita filed the petition for review with the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether the Mayor can order the seizure of “obscene” materials as a result
of an anti-smut campaign.
Held: The Court is not convinced that Bagatsing and Cabrera have shown the
required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature for
which mandatory injunction had been sought below. First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography,
and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search
warrant. The fact that the former Mayor’s act was sanctioned by “police power” is
no license to seize property in disregard of due process. Presidential Decrees 960
and 969 are, arguably, police power measures, but they are not, by themselves,
authorities for high-handed acts. They do not exempt our law enforcers, in carrying
out the decree of the twin presidential issuances, from the commandments of the
Constitution, the right to due process of law and the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures, specifically. Significantly, the Decrees themselves lay down
procedures for implementation. It is basic that searches and seizures may be done
only through a judicial warrant, otherwise, they become unreasonable and subject
to challenge. The Court finds greater reason to reprobate the questioned raid, in
the complete absence of a warrant, valid or invalid. The fact that the present case
involves an obscenity rap makes it no different from Burgos vs. Chief of Staff AFP, a
political case, because speech is speech, whether political or “obscene.” Although
the Court is not ruling out warrantless searches, the search must have been an
incident to a lawful arrest, and the arrest must be on account of a crime committed.
Here, no party has been charged, nor are such charges being readied against any
party, under Article 201, as amended, of the Revised Penal Code. There is no
“accused” here to speak of, who ought to be “punished”. Further, to say that the
Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-smut campaign)
without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, “violation of penal laws”
has been committed, is to make the Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into
one. Thus, the court mae a resume, to wit: (1) The authorities must apply for the
issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in
order; (2) The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be
seized are “obscene”, and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive
enough to warrant State interference and action; (3) The judge must determine
whether or not the same are indeed “obscene:” the question is to be resolved on a
case-to-case basis and on His Honor’s sound discretion. (4) If, in the opinion of the
court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search warrant prayed for; (5) The
proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (6) Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether
or not the properties seized are indeed “obscene.” The Court states, however, that
“these do not foreclose, however, defenses under the Constitution or applicable
statutes, or remedies against abuse of official power under the Civil Code or the
Revised Penal code.
PITA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-SmutCampaign initiated by the
Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-
Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of
the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from
dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks,
magazines,publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,
pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the
University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor
Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations.
Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines
published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita.
Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of
Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and
their agents from confiscating plaintiff’s magazines or from preventing the sale or
circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational
magazine which is not per se obscene, and that thepublication is protected by the
Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed
an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy"
Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court
granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse
of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA. 
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the
petitioner.
Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to
protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as
indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of
obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures
here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial
purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the
Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of thematter charged
as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands apublication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of
men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided
by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The
government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to
justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not
possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography,
and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search
warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a
search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and
that;
1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized
are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to
warrant State interference and action;
2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judge’s sound
discretion;
J.B.L. Reyes vs Bagatsing
Facts : Petitioner retired Justice J.B.L Reyes on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition
sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally starting
from the Luneta Park (public park) to the gates of the United States Embassy. There
was an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to
free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be taken “to ensure a
peaceful march and rally.”
It turned out that the permit was denied by the respondent Mayor. Petitioner was
unaware of such denial as it was sent through an ordinary mail.
The reason of refusing the permit was due to “police intelligence reports which
strongly militate against the advisability of issuing such permit. To be more specific,
reference was made to “persistent intelligence reports affirming the plans of
subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people are expected to attend. Mayor
suggested, however, that a permit may be issued for the rally if it will be held in
Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed areas where the safety of the participants and
general public may be assured. The Mayor also posed the applicability of Ordinance
No.7925 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding and staging of rallies or
demonstration within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery in
this case the US Embassy. However, there was no proof that the US Embassy was
indeed 500 feet away.  rallies within a radius of five hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or
Issue : Whether or not the denial of permit to rally by the respondent Mayor is
valid.
Held : Even if it can be shown that such condition existed (500 feet away), it does
not follow that the respondent could legally act the way he did. Such denial can still
be challenged as to the constitutionality of the ordinance.
The Philippines is a signatory to the Vienna Convention which calls for the
protection of the premises of a diplomatic mission. But, the denial of permit to rally
in front of the US Embassy is only justified in the presence of clear and present
danger to life or property of the embassy. This is binding on the Philippines to take
appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against intrusion or
damage and prevent any disturbance of peace or impairment of its dignity. To the
extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted
principles of international law, it should be part of the law of the land. That being
the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or damage or
disturbance of peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity, there would be a
justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the
US Embassy - but there was none.
Respondent official was ordered to grant the permit.
Mandatory injunction prayed for is GRANTED. No cost.
REYES VS. BAGATSING
Facts: Petitioner sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march
and rally on October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the
Luneta to the gates of the United StatesEmbassy. Once there, and in an open space
of public property, a short program would be held. The march would be attended
by the local and foreign participants of such conference. That would be followed by
the handing over of a petition based on the resolution adopted at the closing
session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. There was likewise an assurance in the petition
that in the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the
necessary steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally.
However the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence
reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt
any assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to
attend. Respondent suggested that a permit may be issued if it is to be held at the
Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants
themselves and the general public may be ensured. An oral argument was heard
and the mandatory injunction was granted on the ground that there was no
showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that
could justify the denial of a permit. However Justice Aquino dissented that the rally
is violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of
chancery and for other purposes. Hence the Court resolves.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably
assemble violated.
Held: Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries
with it the implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It
is settled law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is
freedom of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the
permit, whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent
the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of
Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start. Time immemorial Luneta has
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions.
Such use of the public places has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.  The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to
With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and
even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that
respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit
sought could still be challenged.  agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition,
A summary of the application for permit for rally: The applicants for a permit to
hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such
application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public official concerned
to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to
its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal
or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. Notice is given to applicants for the denial.
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission
Facts:
-Civil Service Commission denied Valentin Legaspi’s (petitioner) request for
information on the civil service eligibilities of 2 people employed as sanitarians,
Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, in the Health Department in Cebu.
-Petitioner claims that his right to information is guaranteed by the Constitution
prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the
respondent Commission to disclose said information.
-the Solicitor General challenges the petitioner’s standing to sue upon the ground
that the latter does not possess any legal right to be informed of the civil services
eligibilities of the government employees concerned.
-SolGen further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the
Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.
Issue:
WON the petitioner has legal to access government records to validate the civil
service eligibilities of the Health Department employees.
Held:
Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligible for the position of
sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy
and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as
requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.
Ratio:
seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find
no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit.
In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973
Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its
government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable
regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the
information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be
discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be
made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of
the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of
agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance
may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public
concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information.
Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to
limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law
may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as
those affecting national security. It follows that, in every case, the availability of
access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public
interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the
constitutional guarantee. case of denial of access, the government agency has the
burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it
is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of
the guarantee.
Padcom Condominium Corporation vs. Ortigas Center Association
Facts: Padcom Condominium Corporation (PADCOM) owns and manages the Padilla
Office Condominium Building (PADCOM Building) located at Emerald Avenue,
Ortigas Center, Pasig City. The land on which the building stands was originally
acquired from the Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership (OCLP), by Tierra
Development Corporation (TDC) under a Deed of Sale dated 4 September 1974.
Among the terms and conditions in the deed of sale was the requirement that the
transferee and its successor-in-interest must become members of an association for
realty owners and long-term lessees in the area later known as the Ortigas Center.
Subsequently, the said lot, together with improvements thereon, was conveyed by
TDC in favor of PADCOM in a Deed of Transfer dated 25 February 1975. In 1982,
Ortigas Center Association, Inc. was organized to advance the interests and
promote the general welfare of the real estate owners and long-term lessees of lots
in the Ortigas Center. It sought the collection of membership dues in the amount of
P2,724.40 per month from PADCOM. The corporate books showed that PADCOM
owed the Association P639,961.47, representing membership dues, interests and
penalty charges from April 1983 to June 1993. The letters exchanged between the
parties through the years showed repeated demands for payment, requests for
extensions of payment, and even a settlement scheme proposed by PADCOM in
September 1990. In view of PADCOM's failure and refusal to pay its arrears in
monthly dues, including interests and penalties thereon, the Association filed a
complaint for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 264 (Civil Case No. 63801). The Association averred that purchasers of
lands within the Ortigas Center complex from OCLP are obligated under their
contracts of sale to become members of the Association, and that this obligation
was allegedly passed on to PADCOM when it bought the lot from TDC, its
predecessor-in-interest. In its answer, PADCOM contended that it is a non-stock,
non-profit association, and for it to become a special member of the Association, it
should first apply for and be accepted for membership by the latter's Board of
Directors; that no automatic membership was apparently contemplated in the
Association's By-laws. PADCOM added that it could not be compelled to become a
member without violating its right to freedom of association; and that since it was
not a member of the Association, it was not liable for membership dues, interests
and penalties. On 1 September 1997, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing
the complaint. The Association appealed the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-GR
CV 60099). In its decision of 30 June 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the trial court's decision, and entered a new one ordering PADCOM to pay the
Association (1) P639,961.47 as and for membership dues in arrears inclusive of
earned interests and penalties; and (2) P25,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; with
costs against PADCOM; on the ground that PADCOM automatically became a
member of the Association when the land was sold to TDC; and that the intent to
pass the obligation to prospective transferees was evident from the annotation of
the same clause at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title covering the lot. The
appellate court held that despite disavowal of membership, PADCOM's membership
in the Association was evident from these facts: (1) PADCOM was included in the
Association's list of bona fide members as of 30 March 1995; (2) Narciso Padilla,
PADCOM's President, was one of the Association's incorporators; and (3) having
received the demands for payment, PADCOM not only acknowledged them, but
asked for and was granted repeated extensions, and even proposed a scheme for
the settlement of its obligation. PADCOM filed the petition for review.
Issue: Whether PADCOM can be compelled to join the association pursuant to the
provision on automatic membership appearing as a condition in the Deed of Sale of
4 September 1974 and the annotation thereof on Transfer Certificate of Title
457308.
Held: When the land in question was bought by PADCOM's predecessor-in-interest,
TDC, from OCLP, the sale bound TDC to comply with panragraph (G) of the
covenants, conditions and restrictions of the Deed of Sale. It was agreed by the
parties that dues shall be collected from an automatic member and such fees or
assessments shall be a lien on the property. The stipulation was likewise annotated
at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title 457308 issued to TDC. When the latter
sold the lot to PADCOM on 25 February 1975, the Deed of Transfer expressly stated
that "for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the DEVELOPER, by these
presents, cedes, transfers and conveys unto the CORPORATION the above-
described parcel of land evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title 457308, as well as
the Common and Limited Common Areas of the Condominium project mentioned
and described in the Master Deed with Declaration of Restrictions, free from all
liens and encumbrances, except those already annotated at the back of said
Transfer Certificate of Title 457308." As the provision on automatic membership
was annotated in the Certificate of Title and made a condition in the Deed of
Transfer in favor of PADCOM; consequently, PADCOM is bound by and must comply
with the covenant. Moreover, Article 1311 of the Civil Code provides that contracts
take effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Since PADCOM is the
successor-in-interest of TDC, it follows that the stipulation on automatic
membership with the Association is also binding on the former. Further, as lot
owner, PADCOM is a regular member of the Association. No application for
membership is necessary. If at all, acceptance by the Board of Directors is a
ministerial function considering that PADCOM is deemed to be a regular member
upon the acquisition of the lot pursuant to the automatic membership clause
annotated in the Certificate of Title of the property and the Deed of Transfer.
Furthermore, the automatic membership clause is not a violation of its freedom of
association. PADCOM was never forced to join the association. It could have
avoided such membership by not buying the land from TDC. Nobody forced it to
buy the land when it bought the building with the annotation of the condition or
lien on the Certificate of Title thereof and accepted the Deed. PADCOM voluntarily
agreed to be bound by and respect the condition, and thus to join the Association.
Lastly, under the principle of estoppel, from the facts or circumstances it
enumerated in the appellate court's decision, PADCOM is barred from disclaiming
membership in the Association.