J.K. CHAUDHURI V. R.K.

DATTA GUPTA
AND ORS. AIR 1958 SC 722,
BY DEBMITA MONDAL

BA LLB 5TH SEMESTER

ROLL – 883016
KIIT LAW SCHOOL
 J.K. CHAUDHURI V. R.K. DATTA GUPTA AND ORS. AIR 1958 SC 722,
[1959] 1 SCR 455

Hon'ble Judges:
A.K. Sarkar, J.L. Kapur and Bhagwati, JJ.

Appellant

J. K. Chaudhuri for and on behalf of the Governing Body of Guru Charan College, Silchar .

Respondent 1

R. K. Datta Gupta. ( Principal of Guru Charan College Silchar)

Respondent 2

The Executive Council of the Gauhati University

Respondent 3

The committee framed by the executive council of the University.

FACTS
This is an appeal by special leave brought by J. K. Chaudhuri for and on behalf of the Governing
Body of Guru Charan College, Silchar (which will be referred to in this judgment as the college)
against a judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature in Assam dated June 13, 1956,
dismissing the appellant's petition under Art. 226.

In 1937, respondent No. 1 was appointed Professor of Mathematics in the college. Later in 1947
he was appointed as the Vice-Principal and as the Principal in 1950. However, due to certain
representations made to the Governing Body against respondent No. 1, a committee was
appointed by the Governing Body to enquire into the allegations. This committee after several
sittings, made a report of prime facie case. It is according to this report that the governing body
placed respondent number 1 under suspension and called upon him to answer the charge within
15 days.

However failing to answer the charge within 15 days, respondent number 1 had to give an
explanation to the governing body. Such an explanation was considered and he was again called
upon. The Governing Body held a meeting on November 1, 1953, and found him guilty of moral
turpitude and dishonesty and also gross negligence of duty, inefficiency and insubordination.
Thus based on these charges the respondent number 1 was dismissed as principal and Professor
of Mathematics of the college.

Respondent No. 1 filed a suit in the Court of Munsif Sadar, Silchar, challenging the legality of
the proceedings of the committee appointed by the Governing Body and decision taken by it on
November 30, 1953. He prayed for a temporary injunction restraining the Governing Body from
appointing another Principal. This suit was transferred to the Court of the Subordinate Judge
U.A.D., at Silchar and was not decided till this case reached the Supreme Court of India.

Further, the respondent visited the Vice-Chancellor of the Gauhati University and prayed that the
Governing Body be directed not to fill up the post of Principal. Therefore respondent No. 2
(which was the executive council of the university) appointed under para. 3(h) of the Statutes
framed under section 21(g) of the Gauhati University Act (Assam XVI of 1947) a committee
(respondent No. 3) consisting of the Vice-Chancellor, the Director of Public Instruction and the
legal remembrancer of the State of Assam. This committee which was appointed to report on the
correctness of the action taken by the governing body made a report to respondent No. 2 on
March 30, 1955 that no reasonable ground justifying the dismissal of Shri R. K. Datta Gupta
from the post of the Principal.

On April 20, 1955, based on this report, respondent No. 2 passed a resolution directing the
governing body put back respondent number 1 as the principal before 31st July, 1955. Against
this order the Governing Body of the college filed a petition under Art. 226 in the High Court of
Assam but the petition were dismissed on June 13, 1956.

ISSUES
In the High Court of Assam the appellant challenged the power of the University to interfere
with the decision of the Governing Body of the college removing respondent No. 1 both from
Principal ship and from Professorship of Mathematics,

However in the Supreme Court of India the arguments were confined to the former only. The
case debated on whether the University could interfere in the dismissal of principal by the
Governing Body of College. It raised the question as to the nature and extent of the jurisdiction
of the Executive Council of the University of Gauhati in regard to disciplinary action taken by
the Governing Body of the College against its principal, i.e. respondent No. 1.

ARGUMENT

The principal argument was on the ground that the respondent No. 1 whether he acts in two
different capacities while being the administrative head of the College and a teacher solely
engaged in imparting instructions. The two categories, it was submitted, were distinct and were
dealt with in the Act and the Statute made separately i.e. the Act contemplates their discharging
different functions.
To support this contention, various provisions of the Act and the Statutes made under the Act
were referred to.

PROVISIONS UNDER THE ACT

Firstly, separate definitions have been provided under the act for “principal” and “teacher”.
While section 2(h) of the act defines principal as the head of a College, and includes where there
is no Principal, the person for the time being duly appointed to act as Principal, and, in the
absence of the Principal, a Vice-Principal duly appointed as such, in section 2(k) “teacher”
includes professors, Readers, Lecturers and other person imparting instructions in the University
or in any College or Hall.

Secondly, section 9 of the act talks about three classes of members in the constitution of the court
– the Ex-Officio members, Life Members and Other Members. While the principal falls under
class I and are mentioned in sub-section (vii), teachers come under the heading 'Other Members'
enumerated in class III.

Thirdly, distinction between principals and teachers are furthered in the act in the constitution of
the Executive Council contained in section 12 where Principals who are in class I and professors
of the University who are in class II are given representation in the council but teachers are not
included.

Thus one can make out whenever the provisions of the Act mention the word a 'Principal' or a
'Teacher' two distinct entities are indicated and one is not to be included in the other.

PROVISION UNDER THE STATUTES

Firstly, the different clauses of the statute, framed under section 21 (g) of the act, maintained the
distinction between the words “principal” and “teacher” by interpreting the word “principal” in a
restricted sense. The governing body of each college is not maintained by university (clause 1 of
statue) but its constitution includes principal and vice principal as ex-officio members and two
representatives of teaching staff which shows a principal is different from the teaching staff
(clause 2 (A)) .

Secondly, while clause 2(c) of the statute nominates the principal as secretary of governing
body , clauses 3 (a) (b ) (c) (d) deals with payment, appointment , probation, etc.. Of the
teachers. However clause 3(e) talks of increment to pay scale of employees. Thus the word
'employee' here must necessarily refer to a teacher because it provides for increments according
to pay scales and the withholding of increments for unsatisfactory work of an employee dealt
with in the first four sub-clauses which in terms apply to a teacher.

Thirdly, clause 3(f) of the statute talks of period of service and furthers that the service of a
permanent employee cannot be terminated in course of an academic session except on reasonable
grounds like moral turpitude, proved incapacity and inefficiency. And if terminated by governing
body , it must be reported to executive council. The use of the phrase 'academic session' indicates
that the 'Permanent employee' must be a person connected with teaching for otherwise it lacks
meaning.

Fourthly, clause 3 sub-clause (g)(IV) provides for the procedure for an enquiry where a teacher is
dismissed, suspended or reduced in pay. In such a case clause 3 (g)(v) reserves the power of the
Executive Council of the University to enquire into causes of dismissal of a teacher whether on
its own motion or on an appeal by the teacher - "All cases of dismissal, suspension, or any other
serious grievance of the teaching staff will be considered by a Committee of the following
members".

Consequently , it was argued that there was a distinction between principal and teacher under
Gauhati University Act, 1947 and the Statutes in Section 21(g) of the Act.

JUDGEMENT
DECISION IN HIGH COURT

Deka J. was of the opinion that as respondent No. 1 held two capacities - that of the Principal
and membership of the teaching staff. Thus his restoration to both the offices could be made by
Respondent No. 2 because the two capacities could not be separated.

Sarjoo Parshad C.J. gave a wide interpretation to the phrase 'permanent employee' used in the
Statutes so as to include a Principal as well as a college teacher.

DECISION IN THE SUPREME COURT

In the Supreme Court , A.K. Sarkar, J.L. Kapur and Bhagwati, JJ. Unanimously held that
section 21(g) of the Gauhati University Act, 1947 shows the separate capacities of the principal
and the Teacher. So the jurisdiction of respondent No. 2 to interfere in the actions taken by the
Governing Body arises only in the case of a teacher. However such a jurisdiction cannot be
extended to a case, where the same person holds these two offices because as there is no
provision in the Act or the Statutes giving the university such power to interfere. Consequently
so far as Respondent No. 2 interfered with the action taken by the Governing Body against
respondent No. 1 in his capacity as the principal of the college it acted without jurisdiction. So
the part of the order of respondent No. 2 and the judgment of the High Court to that extent
cannot be sustained and must be set aside as respondent No. 2 there acted in excess of
jurisdiction.

RELIEF

The appeal was allowed and Supreme Court modified the High court’s order. The order of
restoration of respondent No. 1 by the University to the post of Principal must be set aside.
Further Supreme Court ordered parties to be their own costs in Supreme court as well as High
Court as the special leave was directed against judgment of High Court on regard to both office
of principal and teacher of respondent 2 but it was confined to principal in Supreme Court.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In the High Court, Justice Dekha was in error in holding that the offices of the principal and the
teacher are inseparable in case of respondent no 1. The two capacities are distinct with separate
functions and therefore were separately been dealt with in the Act and the Statutes under the Act.

While Chief Justice Sarjoo Parshad’ wide interpretation was in contrary to the interpretation that
can stem out of the clauses of the statute. Clause 3 (h) of the statute clearly refers to grievances
that a member of teaching staff will have in his capacity as a teacher . Thus Parshad J.’s attempt
to coincide the grievances of respondent 1 acting in capacity of principal within his grievances
in capacity as a teacher is impossible and hence the judgment stands erroneous.

Clause 3 taken as a whole clearly deals with the conditions of service of a teacher, compensation
to be paid to him and the procedure to be followed in cases of disciplinary action taken against
him. Thus Clause 3(g)(v) of the Statutes empowered the council to interfere only with the action
taken by the governing body of the college against a teacher and not against principal. Hence I
think the respondent 2 interfered in actions taken by the appellant, and hence ordered restoration
of respondent no. 1 to his former post as principal , respondent 2 exercised excess of
jurisdiction.

Excess of jurisdiction is a form of abuse of discretion. When discretionary power is conferred on

any administrative authority it is expected that such authority will be exercised according to law.
It’s agreeable when Markose said in “Judicial control of administrative action in India” that
‘when the mode of exercising of valid power is improper or unreasonable, there is an abuse of
discretion.’1 Thus if a mother(the legislature) gives her daughter (the statutory authority) the key
to her treasure box and allows the daughter to wear a pearl necklace, the daughter cannot use the
key and access a diamond necklace.

Abuse of discretionary power can be on various grounds like acting without jurisdiction, in
excess jurisdiction, action itself is arbitrary or is mala fide or unreasonable or is done with
improper or collateral object.2Excess of jurisdiction refers to cases where authority has
jurisdiction but it exceeds its permitted limits 3 and thus the action itself becomes ultra virus. This
case is a perfect illustrative of excess jurisdiction because the executive council (respondent 2)
had jurisdiction only in cases of suspension, dismissal of teachers. But it exceeded its jurisdiction

1
Justice C. K. Thakker(Takwani) & Mrs. M.C. Thakker, Lectures on administrative law, Eastern book company,
Lucknow p. 298
2
Ibid.
3
Dr . I. P. Massey, Administrative law, Eastern book company, Lucknow p. 405
and tried to acquire such jurisdiction even in cases of dismissal or suspension of principal of
college.

Other examples can be those were authority is empowered to grant medical benefits to
employees, but such grant is made to their families also by the authority. 4 Likewise, local
authority empowered to operate tramways cannot also carry on bus service. 5 The question
whether the authority has acted within limits of law depends on facts and circumstances and is to
be decided by court keeping in view the provisions of the act and the power conferred on
authority.6

4
C.E.S Corporation v. Workers’ Union, AIR 1959 SC 1191.
5
London County Council v. Attorney General (1902) AC 165
6
Supra note 1, p.300