ARTICLE VII - Executive Department
are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and
Sec.1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105
August 19, 1994
QUIASON, J.:
Facts:
                House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994
(GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by both houses of Congress on
December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to
propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them and to
realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as
prescribed by the Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the
President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared
the same to have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled “AN ACT
APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO
DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-
FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” (GAA of 1994). On the same
day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the
provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain
conditions, as follows:
1.        Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction
scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA.” And that
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
“appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic,
Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4,
Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987.
2.       Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the
creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds in the
appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s),
3.        Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road
maintenance.
4.       Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in
compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5.       The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for
the modernization of the AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use
of Fund,” which requires the prior approval of the Congress for the release
of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special
Provision No. 3 on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said
Modernization Fund “shall not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-
211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored personnel
carriers”
6.       New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the
AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds.
7.        Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court,
Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.
Issue:
                whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the
items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on
Page 1 of 114
Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights, (CHR),
(e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State
Universities and Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional; whether or not the
veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional
Held:
                The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a
part of the legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in
the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on those
questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal
Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292,
and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the court in Gonzales,
the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the
appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue
discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while
allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a
revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing
such practices as exceptions to the “one-fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618
for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and
Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Management’s Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item
for the DPWH is unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not
alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative
and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by
the AFP should strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the
National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an “appropriate”
provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation
item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot
be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the
AFP modernization program that the President must submit all purchases
of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an exercise of the
“congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the
proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto
as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand
can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being “inappropriate”
provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the
Modernization fund for payment of the trainer planes and armored
personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is violative
of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into
by the Government itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore
valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to
augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP
Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of Sections 25(5)
and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Page 2 of 114
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the
language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply that
Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the
spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in
1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the
proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief and there are existing laws on the creation of the
CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating
to appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the
NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis to complain when the President
said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue. Until
the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper
or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has
the power to take “necessary and proper steps” to carry into execution the
law. These steps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
Sec.1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
PUNO, J.:
HUBERT J. P. WEBB, VS. HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON
G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with
the Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert
Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother
Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their
home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila
on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of prosecutors headed
by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the
preliminary investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They
assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to the inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and
May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure followed by
the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later,
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them
without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They also
assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in
holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape
and homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely
abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
Page 3 of 114
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to
due process during their preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial
prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an
accused.
HELD:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given
all the opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption
that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of the courts and beyond executive and legislative interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department
of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our
laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power is the
right to prosecute their violators (See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule
119 for legal basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn statements of Jessica
Alfaro, the Court believes that these have been sufficiently explained and
there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to
distort the truth.

REASONS: With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the prejudicial publicity
that attended their preliminary investigation, the Court finds nothing in the
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that
when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A probable cause attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected the fairness and
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the
has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel,
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on
evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not gravely abuse their
discretion. In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has
been committed and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section 6
of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an information, the
Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the accused. Clearly the, our
laws repudiate the submission of petitioners that respondent judges should
have conducted “searching examination of witnesses” before issuing
warrants of arrest against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely ed the parties to adduce more evidence in their
behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.

Page 4 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,

Sec.1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
FERDINAND E. MARCOS vs. HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS
(177 SCRA 668) Case Digest
CORTES, J.:
Facts:
After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he and his
family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are asking the
court to order the respondents to issue their travel documents and enjoin
the implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the
Philippines. Petitioners contend under the provision of the Bill of Rights
that the President is without power to impair their liberty of abode because
only a court may do so “within the limits prescribed by law.” Nor,
according to the petitioners, may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so.
Issue:
Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from returning to
the Philippines?
Ruling:
The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to protect the
people, promote their welfare and advance national interest.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector of the
peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in
times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day problems of
maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times
when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their followers
to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their return at this
time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the
state and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking
preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though still nascent
they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct protection of the
people is the essence of the duty of the government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the petitioners at the
present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare prohibiting their return to the Philippines. The
petition is DISMISSED.
MR 178 SCRA 760 [1989] 
Sec.1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
EN BANC:
In its decision dated September 15,1989, the Court, by a vote of eight (8)
to seven (7), dismissed the petition, after finding that the President did not
act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the
return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and
under present circumstances pose a threat to national interest and welfare
Page 5 of 114
and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989,
former President Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii. In a statement,
President Aquino said:
In the interest of the safety of those who will take the death of Mr. Marcos
in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility of the
state and order of society, the remains of Ferdinand E. Marcos will not be
allowed to be brought to our country until such time as the government, be
it under this administration or the succeeding one, shall otherwise decide.
[Motion for Reconsideration, p. 1; Rollo, p, 443.]
On October 2, 1989, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners,
raising the following major arguments:
1. to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines is to deny them not only the inherent right of citizens to return
to their country of birth but also the protection of the Constitution and all
of the rights guaranteed to Filipinos under the Constitution;
2. the President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she
has, she had exercised it arbitrarily; and
3. there is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President
Marcos. Thus, petitioners prayed that the Court reconsider its decision,
order respondents to issue the necessary travel documents to enable Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Irene M. Araneta, Imee M.
Manotoc, Tommy Manotoc and Gregorio Araneta to return to the
Philippines, and enjoin respondents from implementing President Aquino's
decision to bar the return of the remains of Mr. Marcos, and the other
petitioners, to the Philippines.
Commenting on the motion for reconsideration, the Solicitor General
argued that the motion for reconsideration is moot and academic as to the
deceased Mr. Marcos. Moreover, he asserts that "the 'formal' rights being
invoked by the Marcoses under the label 'right to return', including the
label 'return of Marcos' remains, is in reality or substance a 'right' to
destabilize the country, a 'right' to hide the Marcoses' incessant shadowy
orchestrated efforts at destabilization." [Comment, p. 29.] Thus, he prays
that the Motion for Reconsideration be denied for lack of merit.
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
1. It must be emphasized that as in all motions for reconsideration, the
burden is upon the movants, petitioner herein, to show that there are
compelling reasons to reconsider the decision of the Court.
2. After a thorough consideration of the matters raised in the motion for
reconsideration, the Court is of the view that no compelling reasons have
been established by petitioners to warrant a reconsideration of the Court's
decision.
The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening
event, has not changed the factual scenario under which the Court's
decision was rendered. The threats to the government, to which the return
of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not
been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to
the destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs.
Marcos reinforced the basis for the decision to bar their return when she
called President Aquino "illegal," claiming that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs.
Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and declared that
the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world." [Comment, p.
1; Philippine Star, October 4, 1989.]
3. Contrary to petitioners' view, it cannot be denied that the President,
upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which
are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for
her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on
the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the

Page 6 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as
a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was
a limitation of specific power of the President, particularly those relating to
the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant
of executive power.
4. Among the duties of the President under the Constitution, in compliance
with his (or her) oath of office, is to protect and promote the interest and
welfare of the people. Her decision to bar the return of the Marcoses and
subsequently, the remains of Mr. Marcos at the present time and under
present circumstances is in compliance with this bounden duty. In the
absence of a clear showing that she had acted with arbitrariness or with
grave abuse of discretion in arriving at this decision, the Court will not
enjoin the implementation of this decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit."
Sec.1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
Laurel vs Garcia 187 SCRA 797 [1990]
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Facts:
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan
acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement
entered into with Japan
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the
Japanese government for national development projects are part of the
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property
and their suffering during World War II.
Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on
procurement and utilization of reparations and development loans. The
procurements are divided into those for use by the government sector...
and those for private parties in projects as the then National Economic
Council shall determine. Those intended for the private sector shall be
made available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%)
percent Filipino-owned entities... in national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under
the Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading "Government
Sector",... As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy... until
the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976when the
Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our
government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi... property has
remained undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former
Philippine Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property
the subject of a lease agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation
- which shall construct two (2)... buildings in Roppongi and one (1)
building in Nampeidai and renovate the present Philippine Chancery in
Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction would be the lease to
the foreign corporation of one (1) of the... buildings to be constructed in
Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai.
The other building in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine
Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all... the three leased
buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government. No
change of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to
Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the
lease period... and thereafter. However, the government has not acted
Page 7 of 114
favorably on this proposal which is pending approval and ratification
between the parties. Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino
created a committee to study the... disposition/utilization of Philippine
government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative
Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and
D.
Issues:
The petitioner in G. R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority
and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
Ruling:
Vice-President Laurel states that the Roppongi property is classified as one
of public dominion, and not of private ownership under Article 420 of the
Civil Code
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property
intended for public service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He
states that being one of public dominion, no ownership by any one can
attach to it, not even by the State.
The Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites for chancery,
diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and other improvements"... he
respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that
the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of
Japan where the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex... situs
which is used in determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition,
transfer and devolution of the title to a property.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce
of man. It cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective
ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the
satisfaction... of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The
purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of
appropriation.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property.
Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from
public use
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration on
the part... of the government to withdraw it from being such
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not
relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the
failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not...
abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of
government funds.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell",
does not have a provision in its text expressly authorizing the sale of the
four properties procured from Japan for the government sector. The
executive order does not... declare that the properties lost their public
character. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners
and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other... disposition.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people,
should be the ones to insist that in the sale of extremely valuable
government property, Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail.
The Japanese law -- its coverage... and effects, when enacted, and
exceptions to its provisions -- is not presented to the Court. It is simply
Page 8 of 114
asserted that the lex loci... rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without
stating what that law provides. It is assumed on faith that Japanese law
would allow the sale.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is
no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the respondent... officials to validly dispose of property
belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to
effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine law. The rule of... lex situs
does not apply.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property
is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the
respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given
to the Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who
died and suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the
suffering of... widows and orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred,
for the homes and other properties lost by countless Filipinos during the
war. The Tokyo properties are a monument to the bravery and sacrifice of
the Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the... monuments of
Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not expect economic or
financial benefits from them. But who would think of selling these
monuments? Filipino honor and national dignity dictate that we... keep
our properties in Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died
and suffered. Even if we should become paupers we should not think of
selling them. For it would be as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of
our... countrymen.
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much
because of the inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
so because of its symbolic value to all Filipinos - veterans and civilians
alike.
Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties will eventually be sold
is a policy determination where both the President and Congress must
concur.
Sec.1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
Djumantan vs Domingo 240 SCRA 746 [1995]
QUIASON, J.:
Facts:
Bernard Banez, the husband of Marina Cabael, went to Indonesia as a
contract worker.
On April 3, 1974, he embraced and was converted to Islam. On May 17,
1974, he married petitioner in accordance with Islamic rites. He returned
to the Philippines in January 1979. On January 13, 1979, petitioner and her
two children with Banez, (two-year old Marina and nine-month old
Nikulas) arrived in Manila as the "guests" of Banez. The latter made it
appear that he was just a friend of the family of petitioner and was merely
repaying the hospitality... extended to him during his stay in Indonesia.
When petitioner and her two children arrived at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport on January 13, 1979, Banez, together with Marina
Cabael, met them. Banez executed an "Affidavit of Guaranty and
Support," for his "guests," stating inter alia, that:
As "guests," petitioner and her two children lived in the house of Banez.
Page 9 of 114
Petitioner and her children were admitted to the Philippines as temporary
visitors under Section 9(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940.
In 1981, Marina Cabael discovered the true relationship of her husband
and petitioner. She filed a complaint for "concubinage" with the Municipal
Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan against the two. This case was,
however, dismissed for lack of merit. On March 25, 1982, the immigration
status of petitioner was changed from temporary visitor to that of
permanent resident under Section 13(a) of the same law. On April 14,
1982, petitioner was issued an alien certificate of registration. the Board of
Commissioners finds the second marriage of Bernardo Banes to
respondent Djumantan irregular and not in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines. We revoke the Section 13(a) visa previously granted to her
Issues:
whether the power to deport her has prescribed.
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed.
Ruling:
When public respondents revoked the permanent residence... visa issued to
petitioner, they, in effect, ordered her arrest and deportation as an
overstaying alien.
Principles:
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose
presence is deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and
unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country
(Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). This right is based on the fact... that since the
aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a
matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation
on the part of the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Sec.1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
Chavez vs PCGG GR 130716, December 9, 1998
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, as taxpayer, citizen and former
government official (SOLGEN) who initiated the prosecution of the
Marcoses and their cronies who committed unmitigated plunder of the
public treasury and the systematic subjugation of the countrys economy,
alleges that what impelled him to bring this action were several news
reports[2] bannered in a number of broadsheets sometime in September
1997. These news items referred to (1) the alleged discovery of billions of
dollars of Marcos assets deposited in various coded accounts in Swiss
banks; and (2) the reported execution of a compromise, between the
government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs, on how to split or
share these assets.
A provision in the compromise agreement provides:
xxx the FIRST PARTY shall determine which shall be ceded to the FIRST
PARTY, and which shall be assigned to/retained by the PRIVATE
PARTY. The assets of the PRIVATE PARTY shall be net of, and exempt
from, any form of taxes due the Republic of the Philippines. Xxx
Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any
negotiations and/or agreements pertaining to the latter's task of recovering
the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. The respondents argued that the action was
premature since he has not shown that he had asked the respondents to
disclose the negotiations and agreements before filing the case.
Page 10 of 114
Issue: [ Footnote * ] Together with No. 73-1834, Nixon, President of the United
States v. United States, also on certiorari before judgment to the same
Does the petitioner have the personality or legal standing to file the instant court.
petition? Case summary for United States v. Nixon:
Held:  President Nixon was served a subpoena duces tecum after white
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information house staff members were charged with conspiracy.
and access to government records, documents and papers- a right  Nixon claimed his presidential privilege shielded him from
guaranteed under section 7, article III of the Philippine Constitution. The produced the requested tapes and documents.
petitioner a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and because of  The district court found for the U.S. and Nixon appealed to the
the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to Supreme Court.
sustain petitioner's standing i.e  The Court held that the presidential communications privilege
(executive privilege) is not absolute and Nixon’s general interest
(1) ENFORCEMENT OF A LEGAL RIGHT in confidentiality cannot trump the judicial interest of justice in
(2) ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN receiving all relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding.
 United States v. Nixon Case Brief
we rule, that the petition at bar be allowed. Statement of the facts:
A special prosecutor served President Richard Nixon with a subpoena
duces tecum after certain white house staff members were federally
Executive Privilege charged with conspiracy to defraud the U.S. The court subpoenaed
documents and recordings related to meeting for which the president was
Sec.1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
present. In response to the subpoena’s, Nixon claimed the presidential
Philippines.
privilege and filed a motion to quash the subpoena. The district court
UNITED STATES v. NIXON, (418 U.S. 683 (1974)) denied the claim and issued a stay. While the case was in the jurisdiction
of the appellate court, the Nixon filed a writ of certiorari.
UNITED STATES v. NIXON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
ET AL. CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT TO THE UNITED Procedural History: Nixon appealed and filed a writ of certiorari to the
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA Supreme Court of the United States.
CIRCUIT. Rule of Law or Legal Principle Applied:
No. 73-1766. Presidential privilege of a general interest in confidentiality cannot trump
Argued July 8, 1974. judicial interest in the production of relevant evidence in a criminal trial.
Decided July 24, 1974. *

Page 11 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Issue and Holding:
Whether a President can assert an absolute privilege over confidential
communication in a criminal proceeding? No.
Judgment:
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the district court’s
decision to deny the President’s motion to quash the subpoena.
Reasoning:
The Court held that the presidential privilege is not absolute. The
presidential privilege for confidential communications that do not concern
the military, diplomacy or sensitive national security secrets may be
rebutted as a result of the constitutional requirement to produce all relevant
evidence in criminal cases. The Court stated that a general claim of
presidential privilege based on public interest in confidentiality will not
overcome the interest of justice in producing all evidence that is relevant.
Here, the President fails to base his claim of privilege on military,
diplomacy, or national security. The Court determined that the
confidentiality claim is a generalized presidential privilege and that type of
claim does not outweigh the interests of justice.
Significance:
This case outlined that the presidential privilege is not absolute in nature.
The privilege does not extend to confidential communications that
constitute relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding.
Executive Privilege
Sec.1 The executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines.
Almonte vs Vasquez 244 SCRA 286 [1095
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents
relating to Personal Service Funds yr. 1988 and all evidence for the whole
plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in
connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and
Perez denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB
office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They claim
privilege of an agency of the Government.
ISSUE: Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by
virtue of subpoena duces tecum to provide documents relating to personal
service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
RULING:
Yes. A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect
to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This
privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in
and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even
though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal
rights. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic
secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the
personnel of the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting
the national economy, such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage,
smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of
the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar
excuse can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.
Page 12 of 114
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in
his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N.
PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, “COMPANERA” PIA S. CAYETANO,
JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA “LOI” EJERCITO
ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON,
PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL,
SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS,
Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and
alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in
his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines,
Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
FACTS:
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole
issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation
with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter
North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech
of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the
North Rail Project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security likewise issued invitations to various officials of the AFP for
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on
September 28, 2005. The AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga
was also invited on that scheduled hearing but requested for its
postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his
utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are
currently attending to other urgent operational matters." Likewise, Senate
President Drilon received letters from Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
and the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation requesting for
the postponement or cancellation of the said scheduled hearing. On
September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance
of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and For Other Purposes," which, pursuant to Section 6
thereof, took effect immediately. During the scheduled date of the hearing
on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter to Senator Biazon,
Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security,
informing him that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary
of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before
any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval
from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the
President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the
Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28
September 2005. Despite the communications received from Executive
Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation pushed through. For
defying President Arroyo’s order barring military personnel from
testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan, who were among the officials who attended the
hearing, were relieved from their military posts and were made to face
court martial proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not E.O. 464 is constitutional.
Page 13 of 114
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the petitions are partly granted.
Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 are declared void while
Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, valid.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike
Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are
covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged
order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3,
the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend
on the department heads’ possession of any information which might be
covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-
à-vis  
Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the
required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section
22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour
wherein the appearance of department heads in the question hour is
discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot be applied to appearances of
department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound
in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in
such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either
by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the
privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to
which among them is being referred to by the executive. 
The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere
statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified
information between the President and the public officers covered by this
executive order."
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the
requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that
the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so,
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such
declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information
could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms
that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes
it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the
question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the
information that it has requested.
Section 2(b) and Section 3
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 provides that, once the head of office
determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is
presumed to bear the President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting
the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express
pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such
official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of
privilege by mere silence. The Court finds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize
the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which
case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of
the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The
privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the
highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President
may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even
less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the
authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Therefore, when an
official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded
reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the
possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to
provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to
consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege.
If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Page 14 of 114
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to
respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then
opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
Topic: Article VII. Section; Executive Privilege– Constitutional Law 1
Petitioner: Romulo L. Neri
Respondents: Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce, and Senate
Committee on National Defense and Security
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J 
Facts:
Petitioner Romulo Neri0.20, then Director General of the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), was invited by the
respondent Senate Committees to attend their joint investigation on the
alleged anomalies in the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project.
This project was contracted by the Philippine Government with the
Chinese firm Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), which
involved the amount of US$329,481,290. When he testified before the
Senate Committees, he disclosed that then Commission on
Elections Chairman Benjamin Abalos, brokering for ZTE, offered him
P200 million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo about
the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege.” In
particular, he refused to answer the questions on 1.) whether or not the
President followed up the NBN Project, 2.) whether or not she directed
him to prioritize it, and 3.) whether or not she directed him to approve it.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to
petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on 20 November 2007.
However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter dated 15
November to the Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri’s
testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked the
privilege on the ground that “the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s
Republic of China,” and given the confidential nature in which these
information were conveyed to the President, Neri “cannot provide the
Committee any further details of these conversations, without disclosing
the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.” Thus, on 20 November,
Neri did not appear before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri
requiring him to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt for
his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29
November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he
did not intend to snub the Senate hearing, and requested that if there be
new matters that were not yet taken up during his first appearance, he be
informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He added that his non-
appearance was upon the order of the President, and that his conversation
with her dealt with delicate and sensitive national
security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery
scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.
Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an
Order citing Neri in contempt and consequently ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears
and gives his testimony.
Neri filed the petition asking the Court to nullify both the Show Cause
Letter and the Contempt Order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and stressed that his
Page 15 of 114
refusal to answer the three questions was anchored on a valid claim
to executive privilege in accordance with the ruling in the landmark case
of Senate vs. Ermita (G.R. No. 169777, 20 April 2006). For its part, the
Senate Committees argued that they did not exceed their authority in
issuing the assailed orders because there is no valid justification for Neri’s
claim to executive privilege. In addition, they claimed that the refusal of
petitioner to answer the three questions violates the people’s right to public
information, and that the executive is using the concept of executive
privilege as a means to conceal the criminal act of bribery in the highest
levels of government.
Issue:
Whether or not the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer
were covered by executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the
respondent Senate Committees void.
Discussion:
Citing the case of United States vs. Nixon (418 U.S. 683), the Court laid
out the three elements needed to be complied with in order for the claim
to executive privilege to be valid. These are: 1.) the protected
communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power; 2.) it must be authored, solicited, and received by a
close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is
that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the President; and,
3.) it may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
information sought “likely contains important evidence,” and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive
privilege on the argument that the communications elicited by the three
questions “fall under conversation and correspondence between the
President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
decision-making process,” and that “the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
People’s Republic of China.” It is clear then that the basis of the claim is a
matter related to the quintessential and non-delegable presidential power
of diplomacy or foreign relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a close
advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner
Neri can be considered a close advisor, being a member of the President’s
Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling
need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority. Presidential communications are presumptive privilege and that
the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by
the branch seeking access to such conversations. In the present case,
respondent Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need for the
answers to the three questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21,
Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the
legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As ruled in Senate vs.
Ermita, “the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of
legislation.”
Neri’s refusal to answer based on the claim of executive privilege does not
violate the people’s right to information on matters of public concern
simply because Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution itself provides that this
right is “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
Held:
The divided Supreme Court (voting 9-6) was convinced that the three
questions are covered by presidential communications privilege, and that
this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive department,
Page 16 of 114
enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue
against him for not answering such questions.
The petition was granted. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing
petitioner in contempt of the Senate Committee and directing his arrest and
detention was nullified.
Neri vs. Senate
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified before the
Senate for 11 hours relating to the ZTE-NBN mess. However, when
probed further on what he and the President discussed about the NBN
Project, he refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In
particular, he refused to answer 3 questions:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve it
Unrelenting, the Senate Committees issued a Subpoena Ad
Testificandum to Neri, requiring him to appear and testify on
November 20, 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
requested the Senate Committees to dispense with Neri’s testimony on
the ground of executive privilege. In his letter, Ermita said “that the
information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as
well as economic relations with China.” Neri did not appear before the
Committees. As a result, the Senate issued an Order citing him in
contempt and ordered his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
covered by executive privilege?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. The Communications elicited by the 3 Questions are covered by
Executive Privilege. xxx “we are convinced that the communications
elicited by the questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege. First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an
executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the
President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The Senate contends that the grant of the executive privilege violates the
“Right of the people to information on matters of public concern”. Is the
senate correct?
ANSWER: No. While Congress is composed of representatives elected by
the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in
every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right
to information. The right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the people’s right
to public information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in
Senate v. Ermita: There are clear distinctions between the right of
Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the
right of people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the
demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right
Page 17 of 114
to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena
duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information
grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials.
These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen. (visit
fellester.blogspot.com)
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No.
151, revoking E.O. 464. Is there a recognized claim of executive
privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?
ANSWER: Yes. The revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish
our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings.
In Senate v. Ermita, the executive privilege should be invoked by the
President or through the Executive Secretary “by order of the
President.” Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the
principle of executive privilege, by order of the President?
ANSWER: Yes. The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive
Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of
privilege. There, he expressly states that “this Office is constrained to
invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.” Obviously, he is
referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough
compliance.
May the Congress require the executive to state the reasons for the claim
with particularity?
ANSWER: No. The Congress must not require the executive to state the
reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
respect to a coordinate and co-equal department. (Senate v. Ermita)
Is the contempt and arrest Order of Neri valid?
ANSWER: No. There being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the
issuance of the contempt Order suffers from constitutional infirmity. The
respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in
Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the “possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry,” along with “the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in
furtherance thereof.” The SC also find merit in the argument of the OSG
that respondent Committees violated Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the “duly
published rules of procedure.” The respondent Committees’ issuance of
the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must be pointed out
that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive
privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly
dismissed his explanation as “unsatisfactory” and simultaneously issued
the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and
detention. (Neri vs. Senate, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)
MAXIMO SOLIVEN v. RAMON MAKASIAR
G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988
Immunity from suit
● While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented
from instituting suit. The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to
the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the
holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf.
● Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a
criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the
Page 18 of 114
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is
that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-
affidavits if he is so minded.
● What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
PER CURIAM
Facts:
Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed
during a coup d' etat. The President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he
can't be sued because the President was immune from suit.
Pres. Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against
Beltran. Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential
immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit".
He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a
witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit,
as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury. Beltran also contends that he could
not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the
publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would
produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Issues: whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the
Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
through the filing of a complaint-affidavit
Does the presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to
file suit?
Held:
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity
from suit is to assure the exercise of Presidential duties and
functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the
Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all
of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention. 
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue
of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by
any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal
case in which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential
privilege as a defense to prevent the case from proceeding against such
accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President
from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the
protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction.
The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the
President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot be assumed and
imposed by any other person.
Page 19 of 114
Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 US 800 (1982) DECIDED Jun 24, 1982
Facts of the case
On November 13, 1968, A. Ernest Fitzgerald, a management analyst in the
Department of the Air Force, testified before the Subcommittee on
Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee of the U. S.
Congress regarding $2 billion in unexpected costs associated with the C5-
A transport plane along with its technical difficulties. In January 1970, he
was fired, and he believed his dismissal was in retaliation for his
testimony. Fitzgerald sued presidential aides Bryce Harlow and Alexander
Butterfield for civil damages and claimed they were involved in a
conspiracy that resulted in his wrongful dismissal. Both Harlow and
Butterfield claimed to have no knowledge of any conspiracy and asserted
that their actions surrounding this issue were undertaken in good faith.
Harlow and Butterfield moved for summary judgment, which the court
denied. The district court also found them ineligible for immunity. They
appealed the denial of immunity to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal without
issuing an opinion.
Issue: Are presidential aides entitled to immunity from civil suits?
Held:
Yes. Justice Lewis F. Powell delivered the opinion of the 8-1 majority.
The Court held that government officials are entitled to qualified immunity
but not absolute immunity. Absolute immunity is only available for
specific functions that require a total shield from liability. The Court held
that qualified immunity was necessary for the government officials to
carry out their jobs and that the courts could adequately determine whether
an action falls within the scope of qualified immunity based on whether
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
the official knew or should have known that his/her actions would violate
the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote that the
“knew or should have known” standard the majority established would
often require discovery to determine what a defendant actually knew. He
argued that the issues surrounding discovery of such evidence could be
handled by a trial judge pending any motion for summary judgment made
on the basis of qualified immunity. Justice Thurgood Marshall and Justice
Harry A. Blackmun joined in the concurrence.
Clinton v. Jones - 520 U.S. 681, 117 S. Ct. 1636 (1997)
RULE:
The district court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to
its power to control its own docket.
FACTS:
Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Paula Jones Corbin (Respondent),
filed a complaint containing four counts against the Petitioner, President
Clinton (Petitioner), alleging the Petitioner made unwanted sexual
advances towards her when he was the Governor of Arkansas.
Facts. The Respondent filed a complaint against the Petitioner alleging
that the Petitioner made unwanted sexual advances towards her when he
was the Governor of Arkansas. The Petitioner filed motions asking the
district court to dismiss the case on grounds of presidential immunity and
to prohibit the Respondent from re-filing the suit until after the end of his
presidency. The district court rejected the presidential immunity argument,
but held that no trial would take place until the Petitioner was no longer
president. Both parties appealed to the United States Supreme Court
(Supreme Court), which granted certiorari.
Page 20 of 114

Issue. Whether the President can be involved in a lawsuit during his
presidency for actions that occurred before the tenure of his presidency
and that were not related to official duties of the presidency?
Held. Affirmed.
The President of the United States can be involved in a lawsuit during his
tenure for actions not related to his official duties as President.
It was an abuse of discretion of the District Court to order a stay of this
lawsuit until after the President’s tenure. The District Court’s decision to
order a stay was premature and a lengthy and categorical stay takes no
account whatsoever of the Respondent’s interest in bringing the suit to
trial.
Concurrence. It is important to recognize that civil lawsuits could
significantly interfere with the public duties of an official. The concurring
judge believed that ordinary case-management principles were likely to
prove insufficient to deal with private civil lawsuits, unless supplemented
with a constitutionally based requirement that district courts schedule
proceedings so as to avoid significant interference with the President’s
ongoing discharge of his official responsibilities.
Discussion. A sitting President of The United States does not have
immunity from civil lawsuits based on the President’s private actions
unrelated to his public actions as President. The doctrine of separation of
powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the
President until he leaves office. The doctrine of separation of powers is
concerned with the allocation of official power among the three co-equal
branches of government.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
RICARDO T. GLORIA v. CA, GR No. 119903, 2000-08-15
Facts:
petitioner [private respondent herein] was appointed Schools Division
Superintendent, Division of City Schools, Quezon City, by the then
President Corazon C. Aquino.
respondent Secretary Gloria recommended to the President of the
Philippines that the petitioner be reassigned as Superintendent of the MIST
[Marikina Institute of Science and Technology], to fill up the vacuum
created by the retirement of its
Superintendent,... President approved the recommendation... copy of the
recommendation for petitioner's reassignment, as approved by the
President, was transmitted by Secretary Gloria to Director Rosas for
implementation.
On October 14, 1994, Director Rosas, informed the petitioner of his
reassignment, effective October 17, 1994.
Petitioner requested respondent Secretary Gloria to reconsider the
reassignment, but the latter denied the request. The petitioner prepared a
letter dated October 18, 1994 to the President of the Philippines, asking for
a reconsideration of his reassignment,... he subsequently changed his mind
and refrained from filing the letter... petitioner filed the instant petition.
Court of Appeals denied private respondent's prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).[3]
On November 22, 1994, it set aside its earlier resolution denying the
prayer for the issuance of a TRO; and thereafter, restrained the petitioners
"from implementing the re-assignment of the petitioner [private
respondent herein] from incumbent Schools Division Superintendent... of
Quezon City to Vocational Schools Superintendent of the Marikina
Institute of Science and Technology."... hereby declared to be violative of
Page 21 of 114
petitioner's right to security of tenure, and the respondents are hereby
prohibited from implementing the... same.
Petitioners are now before the Court seeking relief from the decision of the
appellate court,
Issues:
FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS BUT ACTUALLY QUESTIONING
AN ACT
OF THE PRESIDENT.
whether the reassignment of private respondent from School Division
Superintendent of Quezon City to Vocational School Superintendent of
MIST is violative of his security of tenure? Petitioners maintain that there
is no violation of... security of tenure involved.
Ruling:
Petitioners theorize that the present petition for prohibition is improper
because the same attacks an act of the President, in violation of the
doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
petition is directed against petitioners and not against the President. The
questioned acts are those of petitioners and not of the President.
Furthermore, presidential decisions may be questioned before the... courts
where there is grave abuse of discretion or that the President acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction.[
Private respondent has clearly averred that the petitioners acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or excess of
jurisdiction in reassigning the... private respondent in a way that infringed
upon his security of tenure. And petitioners themselves admitted that their
questioned act constituted a ministerial duty, such that they could be
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
subject to charges of insubordination if they did not comply with the
presidential order.
doctrine enunciated in Bentain vs. Court of Appeals[10] -- that "a
reassignment that is indefinite and results in a reduction in rank, status and
salary, is in effect, a constructive removal from the service"
After a careful study, the Court upholds the finding of the respondent court
that the reassignment of petitioner to MIST "appears to be indefinite".
there is nothing in the said Memorandum to show that the reassignment of
private respondent is temporary or would only last until a permanent
replacement is found as no period is specified or fixed; which fact...
evinces an intention on the part of petitioners to reassign private
respondent with no definite period or duration. Such feature of the
reassignment in question is definitely violative of the security of tenure of
the private respondent.
"Security of tenure is a fundamental and constitutionally guaranteed
feature of our civil service.
petition is hereby DENIED
JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)
G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
 Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
Page 22 of 114
  Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of
the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
 House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment
signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members
of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon
was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker
Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
 Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21
senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
 When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors
walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel
resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had
assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were
delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
 January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call
for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument
on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize
the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.  the provisions of the Constitution."
 January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared
inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together
with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we
wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo
Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.
 January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and
his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. 
 January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the
Presidency.
 February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting
any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may
be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President
is over and only if legally warranted." 
 February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding
the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to
 
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
 Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. 
Page 23 of 114

HELD:
 Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written.
It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.
 In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any
formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
 Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President.
 An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
 Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as
Acting President xxx.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
 What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that
the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress
has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
 In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still,
he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and Lourdes Constantino vs
Jose Cuisia
in his capacity as Governor of the Central Bank
Tinga j.;
Fact:
During the Corazon Aquino regime, her administration came up with a
scheme to reduce the country’s external debt. The solution resorted to was
to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate
the program for foreign debts, they are basically buyback programs and
bond-conversion programs. The spouses Renato Constantino, Jr. and
Lourdes Constantino, as a taxpayers, and in behalf of their minor children
who are Filipino citizens, together with FFDC (Freedom From Debt
Coalition) averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes were
onerous and they do not constitute the loan “contract” or “guarantee” 
contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. VII of the Constitution. And assuming that
the President has such power, unlike other powers which may be validly
delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly
reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President, hence, the
respondents herein, Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia et al, cannot incur
Page 24 of 114
debts for the Philippines nor such power can be delegated to them.
Constantino argued that the gravity by which the exercise of the power
will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must
exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence
of an entity specifically named by the Constitution, the Monetary Board,
reinforces the submission that not respondents but the President “alone and
personally” can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia
et al to stop acting pursuant to the said scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines can validly
delegate her debt power to the respondents.
HELD: Yes. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers
and that the President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of
this country with prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no
distinction whatsoever, and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is
irrelevant. On the other hand, the President can delegate this power to her
direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of
Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief
contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and
executing a strategy for managing the government’s debt is deep within
the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to
raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives,
and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President
were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power,
he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus
on a welter of time-consuming detailed activities, the propriety of
incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many
methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with
creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the
Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the
public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to
sign the documents.  This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which
the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the President’s
effectivity in running the government.  The act of the Cuisia et al are not
unconstitutional.
ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT / VICE PRESIDENT
ANSON-ROA vs. ARROYO –
“Incumbent Arroyo runs for President case” Senatorial candidates
Elisa Anson-Roa & Amina Rasul-Bernardo challenge her candidacy
& allege use of public funds for campaign. Consti: The President
shall not be eligible for RE-ELECTION. No person who has
succeeded the Pres. & has served for more than 4 yrs shall be
qualified for election to the same office anytime. Arroyo was not
elected as President & has not served for more than 4 yrs. Does not
have to resign & can run w/ all the concomitant powers & duties of
the Presidency. COMELEC has jurisdiction. Alleged use of funds is
question of fact, not of law.
Congress as National Board of Canvassers
Macalintal vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003
Suffrage, Overseas Absentee Voting
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he
has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in
seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a
lawyer.
Page 25 of 114
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter
must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
where he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding
an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in Caasi vs. Court of
Appeals to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a green card
holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his
domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does
not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature
should not be allowed to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution
on the right of suffrage by providing a condition thereon which in effect
amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to qualify a Filipino
abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not be granted
to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the
qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
 ISSUE:
Is RA 9189 [Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003], valid &
constitutional?
 RULING:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the
Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas
absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such
mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee
voting that necessarily presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the
Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country.
The petition was partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No.
9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
17. a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section
17.1, to wit: “subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee;”
18. b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: “only
upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;”
19. c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit:
“The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to
the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of
this Act for prior approval;” and
20. d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to
wit: “It shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission” of the
same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution
mandating the independence of constitutional commission, such as
COMELEC.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said
law continues to be in full force and effect.
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., petitioner,
JOSE CONCEPCION, JR., JOSE DE VENECIA, EDGARDO
J. ANGARA, DR. JAIME Z. GALVEZ-TAN, FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, FRISCO SAN JUAN, NORBERTO M. GONZALES,
HONESTO M. GUTIERREZ, ISLETA, AND JOSE A.
BERNAS, Petitioners-in-Intervention,
vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Facts:
Page 26 of 114
Comelec issued resolutions adopting an Automated Elections System being “unofficial”, any disbursement of public fund would be contrary to
including the assailed resolution, Resolution 6712, which provides for the the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the
electronic transmission of  advanced result of “unofficial” count. 2003 General Appropriations Act. 
Petitioners claimed that the resolution would allow the preemption and
The Omnibus Election Code in providing the powers and functions of the
usurpation of the exclusive power of Congress to canvass the votes for
Commission subjects the same to certain conditions with respect to the
President and Vice-President and would likewise encroach upon the
adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, to wit:
authority of NAMFREL, as the citizens’ accredited arm, to conduct the
(1)consideration of the area and available funds (2) notification to all
"unofficial" quick count as provided under pertinent election
political parties and candidates. The aforementioned conditions were
laws. Comelec contended that the resolution was promulgated in the
found to have not been substantially met.
exercise of its executive and administrative power "to ensure free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections” Comelec added that the issue is Resolution 6712 was null and void.
beyond judicial determination.
Issue:
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
Whether or not Comelec's promulgation of  Resolution 6712 was justified.
versus
Ruling:
JOINT COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS TO CANVASS THE
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
VOTES FOR PRESIDENT & VICE PRESIDENT IN THE
excess of jurisdiction in issuing Resolution 6712. The issue squarely fell
within the ambit of the expanded jurisdiction of the court. MAY 10 2004 ELECTIONS

Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution, further bolstered by RA 8436, Facts:

vest upon Congress the sole and exclusive authority to officially canvass
the votes for the elections of President and Vice-President. Section 27 of
Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in
Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, solely authorize NAMFREL, the duly-
accredited citizen’s arm to conduct the “unofficial counting of votes for
the national or local elections. The quick count under the guise of an
“unofficial” tabulation would not only be preemptive of the authority of
congress and NAMFREL, but would also be lacking constitutional and/or
statutory basis. Moreover, the assailed COMELEC resolution likewise
contravened the constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out
of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." It
By a petition for prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a
judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint
Committee of Congress to determine the authenticity and due execution of
the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for
Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates in the May 10 2004 elections
following the adjournment of Congress on June 11 2004.
The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any

Page 27 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress on Canvassing.
Issue:
Whether or not legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by
the rules of both Houses of Congress supports Pimentel’s arguments
against the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress
after the adjournment of Congress.
Held:
NO. Pimentel’s claim that his arguments are buttressed by “legislative
procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses
of Congress” is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the
Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member.
Moreover, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections
do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint
Committee. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of
Congress adjourned on 25 May 1992. Thereafter, on 22 June 1992, the
Eight Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of
Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph
Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice President, respectively.
CONG. RUY ELIAS C. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES [represented by Franklin Drilon, President of
the Senate], HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et
al., respondents.||| (Lopez v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163556
(Resolution), [June 8, 2004])
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Facts:
Before the Court is a Petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to
nullify Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress, dated May 28, 2004, creating a Joint Committee which shall
preliminarily canvass the votes of the candidates for President and Vice-
President during the May 10, 2004 elections.
At the outset, the Court stresses that it has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of this controversy, because the herein Petition contains sufficient
allegations claiming violations of the Constitution. Basic is the rule that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the initiatory pleading, like
the complaint or petition.
However, after careful deliberation on the merits of the Petition and the
Comments filed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, Speaker Jose C.
De Venecia and the Office of the Solicitor General, the
Court RESOLVES to DISMISS the Petition on the ground that it failed to
show that Congress gravely abused its discretion in creating such Joint
Committee.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution expressly empowers Congress
"to promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates."
In Arroyo v. De Venecia (277 SCRA 268, August 14, 1997), the Court
ruled that it had no power to review the internal proceedings of Congress,
unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution. Likewise, Santiago v.
Guingona, (298 SCRA 756, November 18, 1998) held that the Court —
under the doctrine of separation of powers — has "no authority to
interfere" in the "exclusive realm" of a co-equal branch, absent a showing
of grave abuse of discretion. The Court has no authority to restrict or limit
the exercise of congressional prerogatives granted by the Constitution.
The creation of the Joint Committee does not constitute grave abuse and
cannot be said to have deprived petitioner and the other members of
Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because under the very Rules
Page 28 of 114
under attack, the decisions and final report of the said Committee shall be
subject to the approval of the joint session of both Houses of Congress,
voting separately (See Sections 19, 23, 24 and 27 of the Rules).
Breaking Presidential or Vice Presidential Tie/ Controversies
ELECTION LAW: MIRIAM DEFENSOR–SANTIAGO versus
FIDEL RAMOS (253 SCRA 559)
MIRIAM DEFENSOR – SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS
(253 SCRA 559)
Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for presidency and lost in
the May 1992 election. In her Motion on the 16th day of August in the
year 1995, reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of the same
year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed that the revision in the
remaining precincts of the pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision
process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and required, instead, the
protestant and protestee to submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by Defensor-Santiago is moot and
academic by her election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and her
assumption of office as such on the 30th of June in the year 1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by Santiago has been
abandoned or considered withdrawn as a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of the duties and
functions thereof.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
The protestant abandoned her “determination to protest and pursue the
public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the
electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve public interest as it
would dissipate the aura of uncertainty as to the results of the 1992
presidential elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial political
stability of the nation during this period of national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the protestant to inform the
PET within 10 days if after the completion of the revision of the ballots
from her pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence. Since DS has not
informed the Tribunal of any such intention, such is a manifest indication
that she no longer intends to do so.
TECSON VS. COMELEC [424 SCRA 277; G.R. No. 161434; 3
Mar 2004]
Wednesday, February 18, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the
COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
hiscertificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a
natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino
citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother.
Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on
Page 29 of 114
two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain
Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly
only a year after the birth of respondent.
Issue: Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.
Held: It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not
the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino
citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his
putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84
years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in hiscertificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the
Omnibus Election Code.  He argues that where the correctness of the number of votes is the issue,
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Ronald Allan Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., protestant, vs. Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, protestee.
Facts: GMA was proclaimed by the congress as duly elected President of
the Philippines. Refusing to concede defeat, the second-placer in the
elections, FPJ, filed an election protest before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.  However, the protestant died in the course of his medical
treatment at St. Luke’s Hospital. Now, the widow of FPJ, Mrs. Jesusa
Sonora Poe submitted a manifestation with urgent petition/motion to
intervene as a substitute for deceased protestant FPJ.
Issue: Whether the widow may substitute/intervene for the protestant who
died during the pendency of the latter’s protest case.
Ruling: No. The court held in Vda. de De Mesa that while the right to a
public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election
protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the
protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority
to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution and intervention is
allowed but only by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the
party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, and the party
who is entitled to the avails of the suit.  Herein movant/intervenor, Mrs.
FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President.  Thus,
given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestant’s
widow is not a real party in interest to this election protest.
Legarda vs. De Castro
Facts:
Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). De Castro filed a motion for its
outright dismissal but the PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest.
De Castro filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the PET resolution.
Page 30 of 114
the best evidence are the ballots; that the process of correcting the manifest that is, errors in the process of different levels of transposition and addition
errors in the certificates of canvass or election returns is a function of the of votes. Revision of ballots in case of manifest errors, in these
canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had done their circumstances, might only cause unwarranted delay in the proceedings.
functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made; that
3. In the instant protest, protestant enumerated all the provinces,
since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to
municipalities and cities where she questions all the results in all the
determine the facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law
precincts therein. The protest here is sufficient in form and substantively,
based on the established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of
serious enough on its face to pose a challenge to protestee's title to his
canvassing election returns; that the averments contained in the protest are
office. The instant protest consists of alleged ultimate facts, not mere
mere conclusions of law which are inadequate to form a valid cause of
conclusions of law, that need to be proven in due time. 
action; and that the allegations are not supported by facts. He also
contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest errors on the Considering that we find the protest sufficient in form and substance, we
statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC).   must again stress that nothing as yet has been proved as to the veracity of
the allegations. The protest is only sufficient for the Tribunal to proceed
Issues:
and give the protestant the opportunity to prove her case pursuant to Rule
1. Can the PET correct the manifest errors in the SOV and COC? 61 of the PET Rules. Although said rule only pertains to revision of
ballots, nothing herein prevents the Tribunal from allowing or including
2. Is there a need to resort to revision of ballots?
the correction of manifest errors, pursuant to the Tribunals rule-making
3. Was the election protest sufficient in form and substance? power under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. (Legarda vs De
Castro, P.E.T. Case 0003, March 31, 2005)
Held: 
1. The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification Filling a Vacancy in the Presidency
of the President and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Included therein is the duty to
Estrada v. Desierto
correct manifest errors in the SOVs and COCs.  JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO (D)
2. We agree that the ballots are the best and most conclusive evidence in G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001
an election contest where the correctness of the number of votes of each
candidate is involved. However, we do not find any reason to resort to FACTS:
revision in the first part of the protest, considering that the protestant
 Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while
concedes the correctness of the ballot results, concerning the number of
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President.
votes obtained by both protestant and protestee, and reflected in the
election returns. Protestant merely seeks the correction of manifest errors,

Page 31 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
  Ilocos Sur Governor, Luis "Chavit" Singson, a longtime friend of
the petitioner, went on air and accused the petitioner, his family
and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.
 House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment
signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members
of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This caused
political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon
was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker
Villar was unseated by Representative Fuentebella.
 Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. 21
senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding.
 When by a vote of 11-10 the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the 2nd envelope which allegedly contained evidence
showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account
under the name "Jose Velarde." The public and private prosecutors
walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel
resigned as Senate President. By midnight, thousands had
assembled at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were
delivered against the petitioner and the 11 senators.
 January 18, 2001 saw the high velocity intensification of the call
for petitioner's resignation. A 10-km line of people holding lighted
candles formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument
on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize
the people's solidarity in demanding petitioner's resignation.  the provisions of the Constitution."
 January 19, 2001, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared
inevitable. Petitioner agreed to the holding of a snap election for
President where he would not be a candidate. Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together
with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
General Angelo Reyes declared that "on behalf of Your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we
wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to this
government.” A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo
Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.
 January 20, 2001 Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to
respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Petitioner and
his family hurriedly left Malacañang Palace. 
 January 22, 2001, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent
Arroyo immediately discharged the powers the duties of the
Presidency.
 February 5, 2001, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It
sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from "conducting
any further proceedings in any other criminal complaint that may
be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President
is over and only if legally warranted." 
 February 6, 2001, Thru another counsel, petitioner filed for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment "confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and
declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding
the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to
 
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the petitioner resigned as president.
 Whether or not petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while
respondent Arroyo is an Acting President. 
Page 32 of 114
 HELD:
 Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual
question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an
intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not government by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written.
It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is
clear, it must be given legal effect.
 In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any
formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacañang
Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner
resigned has to be determined from his act and omissions before,
during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence
bearing a material relevance on the issue.
 Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as
President.
 An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
 Whenever the President transmits to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers
and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as
Acting President xxx.
 What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both
houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress
has clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.
 In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still,
he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim
has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
Arroyo is the de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
Sec. 13 Prohibition against Holding Another Office or
Employment
Rafael vs. Embroidery & Apparel Control Board 21 SCRA 336
[1967]
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Facts: 
Petitioner, who was engaged in the manufacture of embroidery and apparel
products for the purpose of exportation, using imported raw materials and
doing business under the style "El Barato Alce Company", was authorized
by the Collector of Customs, pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and
Customs Code (RA 1937), to operate a manufacturing bonded warehouse.
By virtue of such authority petitioner imported raw materials exempt from
duty and proceeded to manufacture them into finished products for export
under the terms and conditions required and specified in the letter-
authority. Then RA 3137 was enacted which created a board, the Apparel
Control and Inspection Board with the representative from the Bureau of
Customs as Chairman and the representatives from the Central Bank, the
Department of Commerce and Industry, and the National Economic
Page 33 of 114
Council as members, each of them having been previously designated by
their respective department heads. Upon recommendation of the Philippine
Association of Embroidery and Apparel Exporters, Inc., the Department of
Finance named Quintin Santiago, association president, as the
representative from the private sector. However, another organization, the
Philippine Chamber of Embroidery and Apparel Producers, Inc., to which
petitioner was affiliated, questioned the choice of Santiago, apparently
because its own nominee to the Board had been rejected. Petitioner
subsequently applied for a license wherein he was required to assessment
fees. Hence this petition. Petitioner objected particularly to the Section
which imposed an assessment fee.
Issue: W/N RA 3137 is constitutional
Held: 
Yes, The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and
the conferring of authority or discretion as to the execution of the law
consists in that the former necessarily involves a discretion as to what the
law shall be, while in the latter the authority or discretion as to its
execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done, to the latter, no valid objection can be made. 
CLU vs Exec. Secretary 194 SCRA 317 [1991]
FERNAN, C.J.:p
FACTS: Consolidated petitions are being resolved jointly as both seek for
the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 (EO
No. 284) issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
EO No. 284 allows members of the Cabinet, their Undersecretaries and
Assistant Secretaries to hold other than their government positions in
addition to their primary positions.
Section 1: A Cabinet member, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two (2) positions in the
government and government corporations and receive corresponding
compensation thereof.
Section 2: If they hold more than the requisites of Section 1, they must
relinquish the excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is
next in rank but in no case shall any officer hold not more than two (2)
positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: At least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation
should either be a Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.
Petitioners are challenging EO No. 284's unconstitutionality as its
provisions are in direct contrast with Section 13, Article VII of the
Constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in government are those provided
in the Constitution namely: 1) the Vice President may be appointed as a
Cabinet member under Section 3(2) of Article VII; 2) The Secretary of
Justice is and ex-officio of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8, Article VIII.
Constitutional provisions:
Section 13, Article VII: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the
Cabinet and their Deputies or Assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided by the Constitution, hold any other office or employment during
their tenure. They shall not, directly or indirectly, during their tenure,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
Page 34 of 114
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.
Section 8, Article VIII: Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office
or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. 
ISSUE: Whether or not EO No. 284 is constitutional.
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative.
It has been held that in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any,
sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed.
The legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent
government officials from holding multiple positions in the government
for self enrichment which is a betrayal of public trust.
The provisions of EO No. 284 above-mentioned are in direct contradiction
to the express mandate provided by the Constitutional provisions (Sec 13,
Art VII and Sec 8, Art VIII). The Constitution, the fundamental law of the
land, shall reign supreme over any other statute. When there is conflict, it
shall be resolved in favor of the highest law of the land. Thus, the Court
held that EO No. 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. As a result, DENR
Secretary Fulgenio Factoran, Jr., DILF Secretary Luis Santos, DOH
Secretary Alfredo Bengzon and DBM Secretary Guillermo Carague are
ordered to immediately relinquish their offices and employment.  executory on August 19, 1991, declared Executive Order no. 284
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
WHEREFORE, subject to the qualifications stated, the petitions are
GRANTED. Executive Order No. 284 is hereby declared null and void and
is accordingly set aside.
Dela Cruz vs. COA GR 138489, November 27,2001
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Facts: 
The NHA resident auditor issued a notice of disallowance on Oct, 23, 1997
disallowing the payment to the petitioners, who are members of the board
of directors  of the national housaing authority (NHA), of their
representation allowances and per diems for the period from august 19,
1991 to Aug. 31, 1996 in total amount of P276,000.00. Such dis allowance
was pursuant to COA memorandum No 97-038 issued by COA, directing
all unit heads/auditors/team leaders of the national gov’t agencies and
GOCCs which have effected payment of any form of additional
compensation or remuneration to cabinet secretaries and others , in
violation of the rule on multiple positions to (a) immediately cause the
disallowance of such additional compesationor renumeration given and
recieved by the concerned officialsand (b) effect the refund of the same
from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc decisions time
of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the consolidated
cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary and Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines, Inc. et al. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et
al., promulgated en February 22, 1991, The COA Memorandum further
stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which became final and
Page 35 of 114
unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabin .members their declared and
assistants to hold other office in addition to their primary offices, and to
receive compensation therefor. the petitioners appealed from the Notice of
Disallowance to the COA, claiming that the aforementioned Supremce
Courr decisions applies only to the members of the Cabinet. their deputies
or assistants and does not cover other appointive officials with equivalent
rank or those lower than the  Assistant Secretary. They added that NHA
Directors are not Secretaries, undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries and
that they occupy positions lower than the position of the assistant
Secretary.on September 22, 1998, COA denied the appeal of the
petitioners.
Issues:
Whether or not petitioners are entitled to their representation allowances.
Held:
Presidential Decree no. 757 is the law “Creating the National Housing
Authority and dissolving the existing housing agencies, defining its powers
and functions, providing funds therefor, and for other purposes" Section 7
thereof provides that the persons mandated by the law to sit as members of
the NHA Board are the following: (1) the Secretary at Public Works
Transportation and Communications, {2) the Director General of the
National economic and development Authority, (3) the Secretary of
Finance, (4) the Secretary of labor (5) the Secretary of Industry, (6) the
Executive Secretary. and (7) the General manager of the NHA. While
petitioners are not among these officers, however, they are alternates of
said officers whose acts shalt be cehsidered the acts of their principals.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Bitonio vs. GOA 437 SCRA 277 [2004]
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Facts; Petitioner Bitonio was appointed Director IV of the Bureau of
Labor Relations in the DOLE. DOLE Acting Secretary Brilliantes
designated the Bitonio to be the DOLE representative to the Board of
Directors of PEZA. As representative of the Secretary of Labor to the
PEZA, Bitonio was receiving a per diem for every board meeting he
attended during the years 1995 to 1997. After a post audit of the PEZA's
disbursement transactions, the COA disallowed the payment of per diems
to the petitioner pursuant to the ruling in Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary where Executive Order No. 284 allowing government
officials to hold multiple positions in government was declared
unconstitutional. Thus, Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries, and their
Assistant Secretaries, are prohibited to hold other government offices or
positions in addition to their primary positions and to receive
compensation therefor, except in cases where the Constitution expressly
provides. Bitonio filed an MR but the COA denied the same. Thus, he
appealed to the SC.
The petitioner maintains that he is entitled to the payment of per diems, as
R.A. No. 7916 specifically and categorically provides for the payment of a
per diem for the attendance of the members of the Board of Directors at
board meetings of PEZA. The petitioner contends that this law is presumed
to be valid; unless and until the law is declared unconstitutional, it remains
in effect and binding for all intents and purposes. Neither can this law be
rendered nugatory on the basis of a mere memorandum circular COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 issued by the COA. The petitioner stresses that
R.A. No. 7916 is a statute more superior than an administrative directive
and the former cannot just be repealed or amended by the latter.
Page 36 of 114
He also posits that R.A. No. 7916 was enacted four (4) years after the case
of Civil Liberties Union was promulgated. It is, therefore, assumed that the
legislature, before enacting a law, was aware of the prior holdings of the
courts. Since the constitutionality or the validity of R.A. No. 7916 was
never challenged, the provision on the payment of per diems remains in
force notwithstanding the Civil Liberties Union case. Nonetheless, the
petitioner's position as Director IV is not included in the enumeration of
officials prohibited to receive additional compensation as clarified in the
Resolution of the Court dated August 1, 1991; thus, he is still entitled to
receive the per diems. 
Issue:
Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by
the petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings
as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Held:
1. Yes. The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as
member of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Export Processing
Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any compensation for this
additional office, because his services are already paid for and covered by
the compensation attached to his principal office. It follows that the
petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of the
Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any
compensation therefor. Otherwise, the representative would have a better
right than his principal, and the fact that the petitioner’s position as
Director IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is not
covered by the ruling in the Civil Liberties Union case is of no moment.
After all, the petitioner attended the board meetings by the authority given
to him by the Secretary of Labor to sit as his representative. If it were not
for such designation, the petitioner would not have been in the Board at
all.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
There is also no merit in the allegation that the legislature was certainly
aware of the parameters set by the Court when it enacted R.A. No. 7916,
four (4) years after the finality of the Civil Liberties Union case. The
payment of per diems was clearly an express grant in favor of the members
of the Board of Directors which the petitioner is entitled to receive.
It is a basic tenet that any legislative enactment must not be repugnant to
the highest law of the land which is the Constitution. No law can render
nugatory the Constitution because the Constitution is more superior to a
statute. If a law happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law,
courts of justice may step in to nullify its effectiveness. It is the task of the
Court to see to it that the law must conform to the Constitution.
The framers of R.A. No. 7916 must have realized the flaw in the law
which is the reason why the law was later amended by R.A. No. 8748.
Under the amended law, the members of the Board of Directors was
increased from 8 to 13, specifying therein that it is the undersecretaries of
the different Departments who should sit as board members of the PEZA.
The option of designating his representative to the Board by the different
Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise, the last paragraph as to the
payment of per diems to the members of the Board of Directors was also
deleted, considering that such stipulation was clearly in conflict with the
proscription set by the Constitution. 
Nat’l. Amnesty Com. vs COA 437 SCRA 655 [2004]
CORONA, J.
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency
created in 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation
No. 347. The NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty
applications. It is composed of 7 members: a Chairperson, three regular
members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice,
Page 37 of 114
National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio
members.
After personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio
members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were
paid honoraria. However, in 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia
disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives
pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.
Meanwhile, in 1999, the NAC passed Administrative Order No. 2 (the new
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Proclamation No. 347), which was
approved by then President Joseph Estrada. Section 1, Rule II thereof
provides that ex officio members may designate their representatives to the
Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems,
allowances, bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 2 in assailing before the COA
the rulings of the resident auditor and the National Government Audit
Office disallowing payment of honoraria to the ex officio members'
representatives, to no avail.
Issues:
1. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in
implementing COA Memorandum No. 97-038 without the required notice
and publication under Article 2 of the Civil Code
2. Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion  disallowing
the payment of honoraria on the ground of lack of authority of
representatives to attend the NAC meetings in behalf of the ex officio
members
3. Are the representatives de facto officers and as such are entitled to
allowances?
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Held:
1. No.  COA Memorandum No. 97-038 does not need, for validity and
effectivity, the publication required by Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.
We clarified this publication requirement in Taada vs. Tuvera:
[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning
the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties.
COA Memorandum No. 97-038 is merely an internal and interpretative
regulation or letter of instruction which does not need publication to be
effective and valid. It is not an implementing rule or regulation of a statute
but a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-
executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the
Page 38 of 114
Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and
assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and
receiving double compensation.
2. No. The COA is correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem,
honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to the NAC ex officio members'
official representatives.
The representatives in fact assumed their responsibilities not by virtue of a
new appointment but by mere designation from the ex officio members
who were themselves also designated as such.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and
designation. An appointment is the selection by the proper authority of an
individual who is to exercise the powers and functions of a given office; a
designation merely connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by
law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier
appointment.
Designation does not entail payment of additional benefits or grant upon
the person so designated the right to claim the salary attached to the
position. Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer
to receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee's right
to claim the salary attached thereto is a duly issued and approved
appointment to the position, and not a mere designation.
In Civil Liberties Union, we held that cabinet secretaries, including their
deputies and assistants, who hold positions in ex officio capacities, are
proscribed from receiving additional compensation because their services
are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to their
principal offices. Thus, in the attendance of the NAC meetings, the ex
officio members were not entitled to, and were in fact prohibited from,
collecting extra compensation, whether it was called per diem,
honorarium, allowance or some other euphemism. Such additional
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Furthermore, in de la Cruz vs. COA and Bitonio vs. COA, we upheld
COA's disallowance of the payment of honoraria and per diems to the
officers concerned who sat as ex officio members or alternates. The agent,
alternate or representative cannot have a better right than his principal, the
ex officio member. The laws, rules, prohibitions or restrictions that cover
the ex officio member apply with equal force to his representative. In
short, since the ex officio member is prohibited from receiving additional
compensation for a position held in an ex officio capacity, so is his
representative likewise restricted.
3.  No. The representatives cannot be considered de facto officers because
they were not appointed but were merely designated to act as such.
Furthermore, they are not entitled to something their own principals are
prohibited from receiving. 
Public Interest Group v. Elma, G. R. No. 138965, June 30, 2006
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Facts:
Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998.
Thereafter, during his tenure as PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the second
appointment, but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC.
Petitioner questions Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman
and CPLC. They contend that the appointments contravene Section 13,
Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding
incompatible offices.
Page 39 of 114
Elma alleged that the strict prohibition against holding multiple positions
provided under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution applies
only to heads of executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries; it does not cover other public officials given the rank of
Secretary, Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
He also claimed that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution that should be applied in his case. This provision, according
to him, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the
law allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the
primary functions of either position allows such concurrent appointment.
Since there exists a close relation between the two positions and there is no
incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position
would allow respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to both positions.
He further add that the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public
officials is an accepted practice.
Issues:
 Whether or not the PCGG Chairman concurrently hold the position of
CPLC?
Held:
No. The concurrent appointment to these offices is in violation of Section
7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, since these are
incompatible offices. An incompatibility exists between the positions of
the PCGG Chairman and the CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include
giving independent and impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads
of various executive departments and agencies and to review
investigations involving heads of executive departments and agencies, as
well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is, without question, an
agency under the Executive Department. Thus, the actions of the PCGG
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC. As CPLC, respondent
Elma will be required to give his legal opinion on his own actions as
PCGG Chairman and review any investigation conducted by the
Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve himself as PCGG
Chairman. In such cases, questions on his impartiality will inevitably be
raised. This is the situation that the law seeks to avoid in imposing the
prohibition against holding incompatible offices.
Other Prohibitions
Doromal vs Sandiganbayan 177 SCRA 354 [1989]
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
FACTS:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his
shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal
International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply
P61 million worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and
airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or
NMYC).
An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for
the said violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted.
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information
without the approval of the Ombudsman.
Page 40 of 114
The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special
Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain
powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without
authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the
“Tanodbayan”.
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through
the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of
which he is the President, and which company participated in the biddings
conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the
National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is
prohibited by law and the constitution.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it
was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new
information that was filed against him.
The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another
preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new
informations involve the same subject matter.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the
Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both
informations involve the same subject matter.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the
absence of preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition
was granted by the Supreme Court.
RATIO:
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal
as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged
with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by
Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained
a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the
President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies
or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly...
participate in any business.
(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial
one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects
the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law" provided by the Constitution.
Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation
conducted at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a
new preliminary investigation must be conducted.
(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no
preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea,
invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of
dismissing the information should conduct such investigation, order the
Page 41 of 114
fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The
Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the
Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in
abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such
investigation.
Sec. 14-16. Appointments
Limitations
In re Appointment of Valenzuela, 298 SCRA 408 (1998)
NARVASA, C.J.:
Facts:
Referred to the Court en banc are the appointments signed by the President
dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo Valenzuela and Hon. Placido
Vallarta as judges of the RTC of Bago City and Cabanatuan City,
respectively. These appointments appear prima facie, at least, to be
expressly prohibited by Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution. The said
constitutional provision prohibits the President from making any
appointments two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Issue:
 Whether or not, during the period of the ban on appointments imposed by
Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution, the President is nonetheless required
to fill vacancies in the judiciary, in view of Secs. 4 (1) and 9 of Art. VIII
Held: 
During the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution “two
months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term” the President is neither required to make appointments to
the courts nor allowed to do so; and that Secs. 4(1) and 9 of Art. VIII
simply mean that the President is required to fill vacancies in the courts
within the time frames provided therein unless prohibited by Sec. 15 of
Art. VII. This prohibition on appointments comes into effect once every 6
years.
The appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta were unquestionably made
during the period of the ban. They come within the operation of the
prohibition relating to appointments. While the filling of vacancies in the
judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this
case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments
during the period of the ban
Article 7, Sec 15: Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.
Page 42 of 114
De Castro vs. JBC
Ponente: BERSAMIN, J.:
G.R. No. 191002
April 20, 2010
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration on the March 17, 2010 decision of
the Court. The said decision directs the Judicial and Bar Council to
resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy
created by the compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by
May 17, 2010, and to prepare the short list of nominees and submit it to
the incumbent President. Movants argue that the disputed constitutional
provision, Art. VII, Sec. 15 and Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1), clearly intended the
ban on midnight appointments to cover the members of the Judiciary, and
they contended that the principle of stare decisis is controlling, and insisted
that the Court erred in disobeying or abandoning the Valenzuela ruling.
ISSUE (Section 4):
Did the Constitutional Commission extend to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Article VII?
RULING:
The Constitutional Commission did not extend to the Judiciary the ban on
presidential appointments during the period stated in Sec. 15, Art. VII. The
deliberations that the dissent of Justice Carpio Morales quoted from the
records of the Constitutional Commission did not concern either Sec. 15,
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Art. VII or Sec. 4(1), Art. VIII, but only Sec. 13, Art. VII, a provision on
nepotism. Election ban on appointments does not extend to the Supreme
Court. The Court upheld its March 17, 2010 decision ruling that the
prohibition under Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution against presidential
appointments immediately before the next presidential elections and up to
the end of the term of the outgoing president does not apply to vacancies in
the Supreme Court.
_______________________________________xxx__________________
_____________________
Article 7, Sec 15: Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to executive
positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service
or endanger public safety.
De la Rama v. Court of Appeals, GR. No. 131136, February 28,
2001.
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
Facts:
Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon,
petitioner Conrado L. de Rama wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the
Civil Service Commission (or CSC), seeking the recall of the
appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. Justifying his recall
request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were
“midnight” appointments of the former mayor, Ma. Evelyn S. Abeja, done
in violation of Article VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution. The CSC
denied petitioner’s request for the recall of the appointments of the
fourteen employees, for lack of merit. The CSC upheld the validity of the
Page 43 of 114
appointments on the ground that they had already been approved by the
Head of the CSC Field Office in Lucena City, and for petitioner’s failure
to present evidence that would warrant the revocation or recall of the said
appointments.
Issue: whether or not the recall made by petitioner is valid.
Ruling:
No. It is the CSC that is authorized to recall an appointment initially
approved, but only when such appointment and approval are proven to be
in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil service law and
regulations. Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations
of the Revised Administrative Code specifically provides that “an
appointment accepted by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by
the appointing authority and shall remain in force and in effect until
disapproved by the Commission.
Accordingly, the appointments of the private respondents may only be
recalled on the following grounds: (a) Non-compliance with the
procedures/criteria provided in the agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b)
Failure to pass through the agency’s Selection/Promotion Board; (c)
Violation of the existing collective agreement between management and
employees relative to promotion; or (d) Violation of other existing civil
service law, rules and regulations.
_______________________________________xxx__________________
_____________________
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
EO No. 37: “Abolishing of Court of Appeals”
Act No. 2705, Section 4: In addition to such sums as may have been
provided in the current Appropriation Act, there is hereby appropriated
out of any funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated,
such sums as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
Henceforth, appropriations to cover salaries of the legal staff as herein
provided shall be carried in the annual General Appropriations Act.
Government vs Springer 50 PHIL 259 [1927]
Ponente:
Facts:
This is an original action of quo warranto brought in the name of the
Government of the Philippine Islands against three directors of the
National Coal Company who were elected to their positions by the
legislative members of the committee created by Acts. Nos. 2705 and
2822. The purpose of the proceeding is to test the validity of the part of
section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822,
which provides that "The voting power of all such stock (in the National
Coal Company) owned by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall
be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the Governor-General,
the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by
the Philippine Congress. The law created it (Act No. 2822) provides that:
“The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee
Page 44 of 114
consisting of the Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O.
No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the Senate President and House
Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be
solely lodged in the Governor-General who is the head of the government
(President at that time was considered the head of state but does not
manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the
Senate President and the House Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate
President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and
the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and
four others as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto
proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against Springer et al
questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.
Issue:
Whether or nor EO no. 37 is invalid.
Rulings:
No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation
of powers. The Supreme Court emphasized that the legislature creates the
public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill
the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive.
The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It was
created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it,
through the Senate President and the House Speaker, to appoint members
of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The Supreme
Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the
legislature may appoint persons to fill public office. Such exception can be
found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not
weaken the executive branch.
_______________________________________xxx__________________
_____________________
Article VII, Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Bermudez vs. Executive Secretary G.R. No. 131429
Ponente: VITUG, J.
Page 45 of 114
Facts:
Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-
In-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee
of then Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of
Provincial Prosecutor. Quiaoit, on the other hand, would appear to have
had the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On 30 June 1997,
Quiaoit was appointed by President Ramos to the coveted office. Quiaoit
received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997,
took his oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997,
Quiaoit assumed office and immediately informed the President, as well as
the Secretary of Justice and the Civil Service Commission, of that
assumption. Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of Provincial
Prosecutor claiming that the original copy of Quiaoits appointment had not
yet been released by the Secretary of Justice.
On 17 September 1997, Bermudez and Quiaoit were summoned to Manila
by Justice Secretary Guingona. The three met at the Department of Justice
and, following the conference, Bermudez was ordered to wind up his cases
until 15 October 1997 and to turn-over the contested office to Quiaoit the
next day.
On the basis of the transmittal letter of Regional State Prosecutor de Leon,
Quiaoit, as directed, again so assumed office on 16 October 1997. On even
date, Bermudez was detailed at the Office of the Regional State
Prosecutor, Region III, in San Fernando, Pampanga.
Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground
that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice to the President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent
Conrado Quiaoit
Held: No.
The legislative intent is, of course, primordial. There is no hard-and-fast
rule in ascertaining whether the language in a statute should be considered
mandatory or directory, and the application of a ruling in one particular
instance may not necessarily be apt in another for each must be determined
on the basis of the specific law in issue and the peculiar circumstances
attendant to it. More often than not, the problem, in the final analysis, is
firmed up and addressed on a case-to-case basis. The nature, structure and
aim of the law itself is often resorted to in looking at the legislative intent.
Generally, it is said that if no consequential rights or liabilities depend on
it and no injury can result from ignoring it, and that the purpose of the
legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed
when substantially the same results can be obtained, then the statute should
be regarded merely as directory, rather than as mandatory, in character.
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power
has the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his
judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who
have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the
appointing power
Supreme Court, given the above disquisition, that the phrase upon
recommendation of the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III,
Book IV, of the RAC, should be interpreted, as it is normally so
understood, to be a mere advise, exhortation or endorsement, which is
essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the
party to whom it is made.
Page 46 of 114
______________________________________xxx___________________
____________________
EO 292
SEC. 16. Power of Appointment. — The President shall exercise the
power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution and
laws.
SEC. 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. — (1) The President
may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or
any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the
executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when: (a)
the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties
by reason of illness, absence or any other cause; or (b) there exists a
vacancy[.]
Pimentel vs Ermita
Ponente: Carpio, J.
Facts:
President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries
of their respective departments without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, while Congress is in their regular session.
Subsequently after the Congress had adjourned, President Arroyo issued
ad interim appointments to respondents as secretaries of the departments to
which they were previously appointed in an acting capacity.
Petitioners senators assailing the constitutionality of the appointments,
assert that “while Congress is in session, there can be no appointments,
whether regular or acting, to a vacant position of an office needing
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, without first having
obtained its consent.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Respondent secretaries maintain that the President can issue appointments
in an acting capacity to department secretaries without the consent of the
Commission on Appointments even while Congress is in session
Issue:
WON the President can issue appointments in an acting capacity to
department secretaries while Congress is in session.
Held:
Yes. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary
nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time
until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the
office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an
alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee
of her choice could assume office.
The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is
in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President,
the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s
confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department
secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her
choice even while Congress is in session.
Ad interim appointments and acting appointments are both effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are extended only during a
recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended any
time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad-interim appointments are submitted
to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting
appointments are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments.
Acting appointments are a way of temporarily filling important offices but,
if abused, they can also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Page 47 of 114
The absence of abuse is readily apparent from President Arroyo’s issuance
of ad interim appointments to respondents immediately upon the recess of
Congress, way before the lapse of one year.
_______________________________________xxx__________________
_____________________
Article VII, Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Sarmiento v Mison
Ponente: Padilla, J.
FACTS:
(1) Petitioners contend that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the
other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's
appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
(2) There are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint.
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of
contention.
ISSUE:Whether or not the President can appoint Mison without
submitting his nomination to the Commission on Appointments
Page 48 of 114
HELD:
Petition dismissed. President of the Philippines acted within her
constitutional authority and power in appointing respondent Salvador
Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is
thus entitled to exercise the full authority and functions of the office and to
receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
(1) By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions
expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
(2) It is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of
appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is
required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935
Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the
1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of
"heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
(3) In the 1987 Constitution, however, as already pointed out, the clear and
expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments
from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except
appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec.
16, Art. VII. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence
of Sec. 16, Article VII the word "alone" after the word "President" in
providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower-ranked
officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers whom he (the
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
president) may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in the
President, without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, in the second sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII
_____________________________________xxx____________________
___________________
Article VII, Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Bautista v. Salonga
Ponente: Padilla, J.
FACTS
Then President Corazon Aquino designated Bautista as the acting
chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Later she decided to make
the appointment permanent, but this time she forwarded the appointment
to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for confirmation. Bautista has
Page 49 of 114
completed her oath and started the discharge of her appointed duty. COA
later on sent her a letter requiring her to send information and documents
in connection with confirmation of her appointment. Bautista then wrote a
letter to the COA and explained that her position as chairwoman of CHR
does not require confirmation by COA as laid down in case of Sarmiento
vs Mison. pending the issue of Bautista’s appointment with the COA, Cory
designated Hesiquio Mallilin as the acting chairman of the CHR. COA
later sent a letter disapproving Bautista appointment due to her refusal to
submit herself to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
ISSUE
Whether or Not CA has constitutional authority to review President’s
apointment to Bautista as CHR Chairwoman.
RULING
NO.
Exercise of political options that finds no support in the Constitution
cannot be sustained. Even if the president voluntarily submit to COA an
appointment that under the Constitution solely belongs to her, still there
was no vacancy to which appointment could be made. By virtue of
Bautista’s appointment by President and Bautista’s acceptance thereof
made her a duly appointed chairwoman and she may only be removed for
a cause.
_______________________________________xxx__________________
_____________________
Article VII, Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Article XVIII Section 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by
appointment from a list of nominees by the respective sectors, the seats
reserved for sectoral representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article
VI of this Constitution.
QUINTOS-DELES VS COMMISSION ON
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Ponente: Bidin, J.
FACTS:
This is a special civic action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction
seeking to compel CoA to allow Quintos-Deles to perform and ischarege
her duties as HoR member representing Women's Sector and to restrain
respondents from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process.
Quintos-Deles ad three others were appointed Sectoral Representatives by
the President pursuant to Art. VII Sec 16 p.2 and Art. XVIII Sec. 7 of the
Constitution.
Page 50 of 114
ISSUE:
WoN the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives
to the HoR to be confirmed by the CoA.
RULING:
Yes. The seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section
5, Art. VI may be filled by appointment by the President by express
provision of Section 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that
sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives are among the
“other officers whose appointments are vested in the President in this
Constitution,” referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII
whose appointments are-subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments (Sarmiento v. Mison, supra).
Deles' appointment was made pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, p.2 which
gives the President ”the power to make appointments during the recess of
the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments
shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.” The records
show that Deles’ appointment was made on April 6, 1988 or while
Congress was in recess (March 26, 1988 to April 17, 1988); hence, the
reference to the said paragraph 2 of Section 16, Art. VII in the
appointment extended to her.
_______________________________________xxx__________________
_____________________
Article VII, Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Pobre v. Mendieta
Ponente: GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Facts.
When the term of the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
Chairman expired, petitioner Assoc. Commissioner Pobre was appointed
to succeed. Meanwhile, respondent Senior Assoc. Commissioner Mendieta
contested Pobre’s appointment in court averring that he is legally entitled
to succeed in office relying on PD 223 which provided the complicatedly
worded clause “xxx any vacancy in the [PRC] shall be filled for the
unexpired term only with the most senior of the Associate Commissioners
succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or
removal. xxx.” The lower court held for Mendieta, construing the
abovequoted portion of PD 223 to mean a “succession clause” which
thereby, in its opinion, gives Mendieta the valid claim.
Issue. May one succeed the PRC Chairman whose term has expired by
operation of law under PD 223?
Page 51 of 114
Held.
No. Sec 16, Art VII of the Constitution empowers the President to appoint
“those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint.” In this case, the
authorizing law is PD 223. The Court holds, contrary to the decision of the
lower court, that the succession clause operates only when there is an
“unexpired term” of the Chairman to be served. Otherwise, if the
Chairman’s term had expired or been fully served, the vacancy must be
filled by appointment of a new Chairman by the President. The
“succession-by-operation-of-law” theory is unacceptable for that would
deprive the President of his power to appoint a new PRC Commissioner
and Associate Commissioners under PD 223.165 Pobre’s appointment, not
having been found repugnant to PD 223, is thus valid.
_______________________________________xxx__________________
_____________________
Article VII, Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproved by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Flores vs Drilon
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS
Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic, challenge
the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for
the 1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard
Gordon) shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic
Authority.”
ISSUES
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of
Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance.
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective
official to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be
useless if no elective official may be appointed to another post.
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority
of the President.
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances
and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his
appointment.
Page 52 of 114
HELD
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective
official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed
by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official
shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso
directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of
Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of
SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to
prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his
appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constitutents.
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as
automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need of
appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the
intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the
post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso.
In any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may
be appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to
the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
(4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to
appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the
Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to
appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to
appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the
President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the
proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is
manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an
elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post
to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an
incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to
another public office.
(5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his
appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of
Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and
void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with
jurisprudence, is entitled to such benefits.
_______________________________________xxx__________________
_____________________
Appointment of Offcers “lower in rank” PAOLA
Calderon vs Carale 208 SCRA 254 [1992]
Petitioner: PETER JOHN D. CALDERON
Respondents: BARTOLOME CARALE, in his capacity as Chairman
of the National Labor Relations Commission EDNA BONTO PEREZ,
LOURDES C. JAVIER, ERNESTO G. LADRIDO III, MUSIB M.
BUAT, DOMINGO H. ZAPANTA, VICENTE S.E. VELOSO III,
IRENEO B. BERNARDO, IRENEA E. CENIZA, LEON G.
GONZAGA, JR., ROMEO B. PUTONG, ROGELIO I. RAYALA,
Page 53 of 114
RUSTICO L. DIOKNO, BERNABE S. BATUHAN and OSCAR N.
ABELLA, in their capacity as Commissioners of the National Labor
Relations Commission,
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management  ISSUE
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
Topic: Article VII sec 16:  confirmation by the COA of appointments
extended by the president to government officers
FACTS
only true of the first group enumerated in Section 16, but the word
nominate does not any more appear in the 2nd and 3rd sentences.
Therefore, the president's appointment pursuant to the 2nd and 3rd
sentences needs no confirmation.
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president
to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

This is a petition for prohibition which questions the constitutionality and RULING
legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the
NO.
Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that “Sec. 16.
Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715. Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint
employers sectors. The appointments stated that the appointees may
all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued
appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers
Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of
lower in rank in the President alone, in the courtsthe heads of departments,
assignment of the newly appointed commissioners.
agencies, commissions, or boards.”
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which
The second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the
amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by
government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law
expanding the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments
and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
without constitutional basis. 
In the case above, the NLRC Chairman and Commissioners fall within the
Respondent reiterates that if confirmation is required, the three (3) stage
second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
process of nomination, confirmation and appointment operates. This is
specifically under the "third groups" of appointees referred to in Mison, i.e.

Page 54 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the
officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose
appointments requires confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members
of the National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional
because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution by adding thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
Constitution, by imposing the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments on appointments which are otherwise entrusted only with
the President.
Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution was deliberately, not
unconsciously, intended by the framers of the 1987 Constitution to be a
departure from the system embodied in the 1935 Constitution where the
Commission on Appointments exercised the power of confirmation over
almost all presidential appointments, leading to many cases of abuse of
such power of confirmation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as
amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and
Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby
declared unconstitutional and of no legal force and effect.
Li-Sing vs NLRC 221 SCRA 680 [1993]
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Tarrosa vs Singson [1994]
G.R. No. 111243 May 25, 1994
Petitioner: JESUS ARMANDO A.R. TARROSA
Respondents: GABRIEL C. SINGSON and HON. SALVADOR
M. ENRIQUEZ III
Ponente:QUIASON, J.:
Topic: Article VII sec 16:  confirmation by the COA of appointments
extended by the president to government officers
Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner as a "taxpayer,"
questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of
the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. The petition seeks to enjoin respondent
Singson from the performance of his functions as such official until his
appointment is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments and
respondent Salvador M. Enriquez, Secretary of Budget and Management,
from disbursing public funds in payment of the salaries and emoluments of
respondent Singson.II. The said petition is in the nature of a quo warranto
proceeding as it seeks the ouster of respondent Singson and alleges that the
latter is unlawfully holding or exercising the powers of Governor of the
Bangko Sentral.
The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653,
which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority
of the Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Sec. 6. Composition of the Monetary Board. The powers and functions of
the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the Bangko Sentral Monetary
Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, composed of seven (7)
Page 55 of 114
members appointed by the President of the Philippines for a term of six (6)
years.
The seven (7) members are:
(a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman
of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head
of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by
the Commission on Appointments. Whenever the Governor is unable to
attend a meeting of the Board, he shall designate a Deputy Governor to act
as his alternate: Provided, That in such event, the Monetary Board shall
designate one of its members as acting Chairman . . . (Emphasis supplied).
ISSUE
Whether or not Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring the
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment of
the Governor of the Bangko Sentral
RULING
YES.
In the case above, Congress exceeded its legislative powers in requiring
the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the appointment
of the Governor of the Bangko Sentral. They contend that an appointment
to the said position is not among the appointments which have to be
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.
Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of
other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of
Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
Moreover, the Bangko Sentral has its own budget and accordingly, its
budgetary requirements are not subject to the provisions of the General
Appropriations Act. So there is no need to resolve the question of whether
the disbursement of public funds to pay the salaries and emoluments of
respondent Singson can be enjoined. Likewise, the Court refrains from
passing upon the constitutionality of Section 6, R.A. No. 7653 in deference
to the principle that bars a judicial inquiry into a constitutional question
unless the resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the
case.

Sec. 16.  Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that “The President WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of department, agencies,
commissions, or boards”

Page 56 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Manolo vs Sistoza 312 SCRA 239 [1999]
Petitioner: JESULITO A. MANALO, Petitioner, v.
Respondents:  PEDRO G. SISTOZA, REGINO ARO III, NICASIO MA.
CUSTODIO, GUILLERMO DOMONDON, RAYMUNDO L. LOGAN,
WILFREDO R. REOTUTAR, FELINO C. PACHECO, JR., RUBEN J.
CRUZ, GERONIMO B. VALDERRAMA, MERARDO G. ABAYA,
EVERLINO B. NARTATEZ, ENRIQUE T. BULAN, PEDRO J.
NAVARRO, DOMINADOR M. MANGUBAT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA
and HONORABLE SALVADOR M. ENRIQUEZ II In His Capacity as
Secretary of Budget and Management
Ponente: PURISIMA, J.:
Topic: Article VII sec 16:  confirmation by the COA of appointments
extended by the president to government officers
FACTS:
On March 10, 1992, the President of the Philippines, through then
Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon, promoted the fifteen (15)
respondent police officers herein, by appointing them to positions in the
Philippine National Police with the rank of Chief Superintendent to
Director. The said police officers took their oath of office and assumed
their respective positions without their names submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation. Thereafter, the
Department of Budget and Management, under the then Secretary
Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized disbursements for their salaries and
other emoluments.
Such appointment was done after the enactment of Republic Act 6975 on
December 13, 1990 which was signed into law by former President
Corazon C. Aquino. Pertinent provisions of the said Act read:
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Sec. 26. Powers, Functions and Term of Office of the PNP Chief. - The
command and direction of the PNP shall be vested in the Chief of the PNP
who shall have the power to direct and control tactical as well as strategic
movements, deployment, placement, utilization of the PNP or any of its
units and personal, including its equipment, facilities and other resources.
Such command and direction of the Chief of the PNP may be delegated to
subordinate officials with respect to the units under their respective
commands, in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the
Commission. The Chief of the PNP shal also have the power to issue
detailed implementing policies and instructions regarding personnel,
funds, properties, records, correspondence and such other matters as may
be necesary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties of the
Bureau. The Chief of the PNP shall be appointed by the President from
among the senior officers down to the rank of the chief superintendent,
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments:Provided,
That the Chief of the PNP shall serve a term of office not to exceed four
(4) years: Provided, further, That in times of war or other national
emergency declared by Congress, the President may extend such term of
office. 1 (underlining supplied).
On October 21, 1992, the petitioner brought before this Court this present
original petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the
constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments issued by
former President Corazon C. Aquino to the respondent senior officers of
the Philippine National Police who were promoted to the ranks of Chief
Superintendent and Director without their appointments submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation under Section 16, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution and Republic Act 6975 otherwise known as
the Local Government Act of 1990.
Page 57 of 114
Issue 
Whether or not the respondent officers are acting without or in excess of
their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in view of the failure to
secure the required confirmation of the Commission on Appointments as
required by the Constitution and the law
Ruling. No. 
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution states that “The President shall
nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments,
appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested
in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.”
In the case above, Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 is
unconstitutional. Said section empowers the Commission on
Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose
appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed. But the
unconstitutionality of the aforesaid sections notwithstanding, the rest of
Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that when provisions of law
declared void are severable from the main statute and the removal of the
unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity and enforceability
of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its voided
sections.  (DBM).
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition under consideration is
hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
                                                                                                                       
5. Soriano vs. Lista, GR 153881, March 24, 2004
Petitioner: ELPIDIO G. SORIANO III
Respondents: REUBEN S. LISTA, DOMINGO T. ESTERA,
ELPIDIO B. PADAMA, MIGUEL C. TABARES, ARTHUR N.
GOSINGAN, EFREN L. TADURAN, CESAR A. SARILE, DANILO
M. VILDA and HONORABLE EMILIA T. BONCODIN, in her
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management
Ponente: CORONA, J 
Facts
Public respondents were promoted to different ranks in the Philippine
Coast Guard (PCG) with  Reuben S. Lista as Vice Admiral,, Domingo T.
Estera as Rear Admiral, Miguel C. Tabares as Commodore, Arthur N.
Gosingan as Commodore, Efren L. Taduran as  Naval Captain, Cesar A.
Sarile as Naval Captain, Danilo M. Vilda as Naval Captain, and Elpidio B.
Padama as Commodore.
However, Elpidio G. Soriano, filed a petition for prohibition as member of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and as a taxpayer questioning the
constitutionality of the permanent appointments made by the President of
public respondents to different positions in the Philippine Coast Guard
without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments under the 1987
Constitution. The petition impleads Hon. Emilia T. Boncodin in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management
In the same vein, petitioner opines that there is no legal basis for the DBM
to allow the disbursement of the salaries and emoluments of respondent
officers of the PCG. Accordingly, he prays that respondent Secretary
Page 58 of 114
Boncodin be ordered to desist from allowing such disbursements until the
confirmation of their respective appointments by the CA.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent officers of the PCG committed  grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
RULING. NO.
It is clear from the foregoing provision of the Constitution that only
appointed officers from the rank of colonel or naval captain in the armed
forces require confirmation by the CA..Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution states that “ The President shall nominate and, with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law,
vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards.The President shall have the power to make appointments during
the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.”
In the case above, the PCG used to be administered and maintained as a
separate unit of the Philippine Navy under Section 4 of RA 5173. It was
subsequently placed under the direct supervision and control of the
Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) pursuant to
Section 4 of PD 601. Eventually, it was integrated into the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) as a major subordinate unit of the Philippine
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Navy under Section 54 of Chapter 8, Sub-title II, Title VIII, Book IV of
EO 292, as amended. 
However, on March 30, 1998, after the aforesaid changes in the charter of
the PCG, then President Fidel V. Ramos, in the exercise of his statutory
authority to reorganize the Office of the President, issued EO 475
transferring the PCG from the DND to the Office of the President. He later
on again transferred the PCG from the Office of the President to the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
Now that the PCG is under the DOTC and no longer part of the Philippine
Navy or the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the promotions and
appointments of respondent officers of the PCG, or any PCG officer from
the rank of captain and higher for that matter, do not require confirmation
by the CA.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
 
Pls note : The  Court finds petitioner to be without any legal personality
to file the instant petition. A private citizen is allowed to raise
constitutional questions only if he can show that he has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly
illegal conduct of the government, the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.  In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to clearly demonstrate
that he has personally suffered actual or threatened injury. It should be
emphasized that a party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality
of an act or statute must show "not only that the law or act is invalid, but
also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.
Page 59 of 114
 Recess or Ad-interim Appointments and Temporary Appointments
Sec. 17. Power of Control
6. Lacson-Magallanes vs Pano 21 SCRA 395 [1967]
Plaintiff-appellant: LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC.
Defendant- appellees:  JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his
capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. JUAN DE G. RODRIGUEZ, in
his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Ponente: SANCHEZ, J  of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Topic: Section 17 Article VII – President’s control on all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices
FACTS
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-
hectare pasture land situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan,
Province of Davao.On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and
interests to a portion (392.7569 hectares) of the above public land to
plaintiff.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially
released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural
land.
On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants applied for
the purchase of ninety hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales
application covering the entire released area. This was protested by Jose
Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment that they are actual
occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered
a decision on July 31, 1956, giving due course to the application of
plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose Paño and his
companions. A move to reconsider failed.
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on
appeal by Jose Paño for himself and his companions — held that the
appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b] y authority of the
President," decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director
Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that
appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for
their very existence, be allocated that portion on which they have made
improvements"; and (2) directed that the controverted land (northern
portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao,
with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of
convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the
corporation's right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this
portion." It may be well to state, at this point, that the decision just
mentioned, signed by the Executive Secretary, was planted upon the facts
as found in said decision.
Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First
Instance praying that judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the decision
of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has full force and
effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to
law and of no legal force and effect.
Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The precept
there is that decisions of the Director of Lands "as to questions of fact shall
be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Page 60 of 114
Resources. Plaintiff's trenchant claim is that this statute is controlling not
only upon courts but also upon the President.
Issue
Whether or not the decisions of the Director of Lands under Sec. 4 of
Commonwealth Act 141 as to questions of fact shall be conclusive when
approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
therefore controlling not only upon the courts but also upon the President
RULING. No.
Section 17 Article VII  of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that “
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”
In this case, appellant's claim that decisions of the Director of Lands under
Sec. 4 of Commonwealth Act 141 as to questions of fact shall be
conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and therefore controlling not only upon the courts but also upon
the President, is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of
constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments.
Thus it is that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the
power to appoint them, his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at
pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit, then, is his
authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his
department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President
cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
Moreover, when plaintiff underscored the fact that the Executive Secretary
is equal in rank to the other department heads, no higher than anyone of
them, he is insinuating that one department head, on the pretext that he is
an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude into the zone of action
allocated to another department secretary. This argument betrays lack of
appreciation of the fact that where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
acts "[b]y authority of the President," his decision is that of the President's.
Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The
assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only
the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not
authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action taken is "disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive,"  that remains the act of the Chief
Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed. No such disapproval or
reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.
For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed.
Costs against plaintiff. So ordered.
7. Ang-Angco vs Castillo  9 SCRA 619 [1963]
Petitioner: ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO 
Respondents: HON. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, ET AL.
Ponente: BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p
Topic:  power of control of the President
 
The Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. failed to secure the
necessary authority from the Central Bank to withdraw certain
commodities from the customs house which were imported without any
dollar allocation or remittance of foreign exchange so it  approached
Collector of Customs Isidro Ang-Angco in an attempt to secure from him
the immediate release of the concentrates.
At first, Ang-Angco, seeing perhaps that the importation did not carry any
release certificate from the Central Bank,  advised the counsel to try to
secure the necessary release certificate from the No-Dollar Import Office
that had jurisdiction over the case. However, after the  payment of the
Page 61 of 114
corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and taxes, he finally Whether or not the step taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even
authorized the release of the concentrates with the authority of the President, in taking direct action on the
administrative case of petitioner, without submitting the same to the
When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the
Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set aside.
release of the concentrates in question he immediately ordered their
seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the warehouse. RULING
Whereupon, he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of
YES.
Customs Ang-Angco charging him with having committed a grave neglect
of duty and observed a conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the The power of control of the President may extend to the power to
customs service. investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belonged to
the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not
Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of the President,
belonged to the classified service, for such can be justified under the
rendered a decision on the case on February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco
principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, but
"guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service", and
not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the classified
considering him resigned effective from the date of notice, with prejudice
service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in
to reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs.
line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress
Collector Ang-Angco filed before this Court the present petition for may by law vest the appointment of the interior officers, in the President
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a petition for the issuance of a alone, in the courts, or in the heads of department." With regard to those
preliminary mandatory injunction upon learning said decision from the officers whose appointments are vested on heads of department, Congress
newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President Carlos P. has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of
Garcia calling attention to the fact that the action taken by Secretary this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.
Castillo in removing him from office had the effect of depriving him of his
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately
statutory right to have his case originally decided by the Commissioner of
reinstated to his office as Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila,
Civil Service, as well as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service Board of
without prejudice of submitting his case to the Commissioner of Civil
Appeals, whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the
Service to be dealt with in accordance with law. No costs.
fact that such decision is in violation of the guaranty vouchsafed by the
Constitution to officers or employees in the civil service against removal  
or suspension except for cause in the manner provided by law. However,
the Court gave due course to the petition, but denied the request for
injunction. 8. Villaluz vs Zaldivar 15 SCRA 710 [1965]
ISSUE Petitioner: RUBEN A. VILLALUZ

Page 62 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Respondent:CALIXTO ZALDIVAR, ET AL
Ponente: BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
TOPIC:power of control of the President
In a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the President of the
Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman of the
Committee on Good Government of the House of Representatives, the
latter informed the former of the findings made by his Committee
concerning alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by
petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office which are summed up in the letter,
as follows: 
(1) malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the government; 
(2) failure to correct inadequate controls or intentional toleration of the
same, facilitating thereby the commission of graft and corruption; and  It is well settled that the power of control of the President may extend to
(3) negligence to remedy unsatisfactory accounting; that as a result of said
findings. 
Congressman Roces recommended the replacement of petitioner and of his
assistant chief Aurelio de Leon as well as the complete revamp of the
offices coming under the Motor Vehicles Office by the new chief who may
be appointed thereafter.
After the investigation said committee submitted its report to the President
of the Philippines who thereafter issued Administrative Order No. 332
decreeing the removal from office of petitioner; that as a result of
petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as
acting administrator.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles
Office with payment of back salaries in a petition filed before this Court
on April 1, 1964.He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office
on May 20, 1958 and two days thereafter his nomination was confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments; that on May 26, 1958 he took his oath
of office as such after having been informed of his nomination by then
Acting Assistant Executive Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner, being a presidential appointee can be
removed from office after due hearing the President of the Philippines
RULING
YES.
the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who
belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or
do not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the
principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint, but
not with regard to those officers or employees who belong, to the
classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised.
This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that the
"Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the head of departments".
In the case above, petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the
non-competitive or unclassified service of the government and is such he
can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing the
President of the Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove
is inherent in the power to appoint" as can be clearly implied from Section
5 of Republic Act No. 2260. 
Page 63 of 114
WHEREFORE, petition is denied. No costs.
9. NAMARCO vs Arca 29 SCRA 648 [1969]
Petitioners: NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION,
CORNELIO BALMACEDA, JOSE CALDERON, ANTONIO
ARAMBULO, PEDRO BALINGIT, CIPRIANO MALONZO and
ROSENDO TOMAS
Respondent: HON. FRANCISCO ARCA, Presiding Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch I and JUAN T. ARIVE
Ponente: CAPISTRANO, J.
TOPIC: Power of control of the President
 
Respondent Juan T. Arive was the Manager of the Traffic-Storage
Department of the NAMARCO was investigated by a committee for
violating Management Memorandum Order dated February 1, 1960,
directing "that the allocation and deliveries of merchandise imported under
the so-called Trade Assistance Program to its designated beneficiaries be
stopped;" and causing the improper release of shipments intended for
delivery upon full payment thereof by the Federation of United
NAMARCO Distributors (FUND), which were covered by certain
domestic letters of credit for the total sum of P361,053.85. After due
hearing, the investigating committee found Arive guilty of the charges but
left the imposition of the penalty to the discretion of the General Manager
and the Board of Directors.
Subsequently, the General Manager issued Administrative Order No. 137,
series of 1960, holding Arive guilty of the charges and dismissing him
from the service. On November 4. 1960, the Board of Directors adopted
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Resolution No. 584-60 dismissing Arive from the service effective as of
the date of his suspension, with prejudice to his reinstatement in the
NAMARCO and to all benefits to which he would otherwise have been
entitled.
On December 23, 1965, respondent Juan T. Arive filed a complaint (Civil
Case No. 63720) with the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
NAMARCO and the members of its Board of Directors for reinstatement
and damages but the court denied the same. Hence this action for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin respondent Judge Francisco Arca from enforcing his Order dated
January 12, 1966, directing petitioners to reinstate respondent Juan T.
Arive to his former position in the National Marketing Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as NAMARCO) and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction issued pursuant thereto on January 14, 1966.
Issue
Whether the President of the Philippines had authority to reverse the
decision of the Board of Directors of the NAMARCO and to order the
reinstatement of Juan T. Arive. Respondents maintain that he had
 Ruling
YES.
Section 10(1), Article VII, of the Constitution states that “The President
shall have control of all executive departments bureau or offices, exercise
general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law,
and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
In this case, the President of the Philippines' authority to review and
reverse the decision of the NAMARCO Board of Directors dismissing
Juan T. Arive from his position in the NAMARCO and to order his re-
instatement falls within the constitutional power of the President over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices because NAMARCO is a
Page 64 of 114
corporation owned and controlled by the government which partake of the
nature of government bureaus or offices, which is administratively
supervised by the Administrator of the Office of Economic Coordination,
"whose compensation and rank shall be that of a head of an Executive
Department" and who "shall be responsible to the President of the
Philippines under whose control his functions”.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioners.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued on March 15, 1966 against the
enforcement of respondent judge's order dated January 12, 1966 and writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction dated January 14, 1966 in Civil Case
No. 63720 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is hereby dissolved
effective immediately.
(SEC.17) G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA,
CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG
PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
Cruz, J.
Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section
187 of the Local Government Code1. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to
him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794
(Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the
1
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy.
The RTC revoked the Secretary’s resolution and sustained the
ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it
vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the
policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary
argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the
procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in
the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition
originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true
copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all
civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in
the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders
of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the
utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration
of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the
doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court,
Page 65 of 114
including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation
before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was
first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and
determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it
was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there
was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only
the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to
revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or
sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the
measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he
did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.. What
he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said
measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions
in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an
act not of control but of mere supervision.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are
not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by
his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does
not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules,
nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them.
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local
Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend
the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied
was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these
flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely
an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law
had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere
supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any
rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section
187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of
the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is
unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this
matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only
on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires
provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness, of the tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No
written notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordnance, no
minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog)
Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had
been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the
City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the
Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to
gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later
Page 66 of 114
submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial court that the
procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public
hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the
hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C
show that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the
Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila
Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q,
Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this
omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in
three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy
due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has
been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the
approval of local development plans and public investment programs of
the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.
(PASEI) vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT,
G.R. No. 98472 , August 19, 1993
Ponente: BELLOSILLO, J.:
Facts:
DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No.
16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private
employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong”.
As a result of the department order DOLE, through the POEA took over
the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers.
The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private
employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for
Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the
aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of
discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars;
Whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars
are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive;
and
Whether or not the requirements of publication and filing
with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not
complied with
Held:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did
not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC)
clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and
placement activities, to wit:
Art. 36. Regulatory Power. — The Secretary of Labor shall have the
power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of
all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment
and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement
the provisions of this title.
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial
powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the
growing complexities of the modern society.
Page 67 of 114
 THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and
unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in
the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2
of the Civil Code to wit:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is
otherwise provided;
Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit:
Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. — The Department of Labor and other
government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of
this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing
rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective
fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of
general circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by
it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed
within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — In addition to other rule-making requirements
provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become
effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless
a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of
imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of
which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The
agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to
persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the
Administrative Code of 1987).
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Prohibition granted.
G.R. No. 85243 October 12, 1989
CESAR R. DE LEON, petitioner,
vs.
J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, Director, National Bureau of
Investigation, respondent.
178 SCRA 457 (1989)
o "Alter-ego" Doctrine
FACTS:
Estavillo and de Leon are two NBI agents terminated by then Minister of
Justice Neptali A. Gonzales. Upon appeal to the Review Committee, the
said body declined to act on their petitions for reconsideration on the
ground that it had lost its jurisdiction with the ratification of the new
Constitution. They were advised instead to seek relief from the Civil
Service Commission.
The Merit Systems Protection Board of CSC held that their dismissals
were invalid and unconstitutional, having been done in violation of their
security of tenure under the 1987 Constitution. Accordingly, the Board
ordered their reinstatement.
However, respondent Carpio, as Director of NBI, returned the orders
issued by the Secretary of Justice to CSC “without action,” claiming that
they were null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction.
Page 68 of 114
ISSUE:
o Whether or not the Director of the NBI can disobey an explicit and
direct order issued to him by the Secretary of Justice
HELD:
It is an elementary principle of our republican government,
enshrined in the Constitution and honored not in the breach but in
the observance, that all executive departments, bureaus and offices
are under the control of the President of the Philippines.
The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over
the members of the Cabinet who, in turn and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department. The constitutional
vesture of this power in the President is self-executing and does
not require statutory implementation, nor may its exercise be
limited, much less withdrawn, by the legislature.
Theoretically, the President has full control of all the members of
his Cabinet and may appoint them as he sees fit or shuffle them at
pleasure, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments, and replace them in his discretion. Once in place,
they are at all times under the disposition of the President as their
immediate superior. “Without minimizing the importance of the
heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but
the projection of that of the President. Hence, their acts, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively
the acts of the Chief Executive.” (Villena v. Secretary of the
Interior)
In the case at bar, there is no question that when he directed the
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
respondent to reinstate the petitioners, Sec. Ordonez was acting in
the regular discharge of his functions as an alter ego of the
President. His acts should therefore have been respected by the
respondent Director of the NBI, which is in the Department of
Justice under the direct control of its Secretary. As a subordinate
in this department, the respondent was (and is) bound to obey the
Secretary’s directives, which are presumptively the acts of the
President of the Philippines.
G.R. No. 131255 May 20, 1998
HON. EDUARDO NONATO JOSON, in his capacity as the Governor
of the Province of Nueva Ecija, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY RUBEN D. TORRES, the DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
PUNO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the
President for barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case was endorsed to the
DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner
was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive
suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation”.
DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers
substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in
administrative proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of
the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG
Secretary.  The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension
from office for six (6) months without pay
Page 69 of 114
ISSUES:
Preventive suspension is proper
(b) Procedural due process is violated
(c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue
delegation; that it is the President who is the Disciplining Authority, not
the Secretary of DILG
RULING:
“(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining
Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence
of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great
probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly barging
violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the
company of armed men constitutes grave misconduct.  The allegations of
complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two (2) employees of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.  Respondent who is the chief executive of
the province is in a position to influence the witnesses.  Further, the history
of violent confrontational politics in the province dictates that extreme
precautionary measures be taken
“(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation
denied him procedural due process.  Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides
that at the preliminary conference, the  Investigating Authority shall
summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal
investigation.  This provision does not give the Investigating Authority the
discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would be
conducted.  The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal
investigation. There is nothing in the Local Government Code and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide that
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the
basis of position papers.  A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating
Authority may require the parties to submit their respective memoranda
but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.
“(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the
Disciplining Authority.  What is delegated is the power to investigate, not
the power to discipline. The power to discipline evidently includes the
power to investigate.   As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the
power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints
against local government officials.  A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the
power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as
may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority.  This is not undue
delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s claim
Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in
the Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the
presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however,
Page 70 of 114
may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he
is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act
for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers
personally all the time.   Each head of a department is, and must be, the
President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the President
is required by law to exercise authority.
G.R. No. 131367               August 31, 2000
HUTCHISON PORTS PHILIPPINES LIMITED, petitioner,
vs.
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, INTERNATIONAL
CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES INC., ROYAL PORT
SERVICES INC. and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS OF THE CASE
The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (or SBMA) advertised in leading
national daily newspapers and in one international publication, an
invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to develop and
operate a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport
Zone. Out of seven bidders who responded to the published invitation,
three were declared by the SBMA as qualified bidders after passing the
pre-qualification evaluation conducted by the SBMA’s Technical
Evaluation Committee (or SBMA-TEC). Among these is the petitioner.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Thereafter, the services of three (3) international consultants recommended
by the World Bank for their expertise were hired by SBMA to evaluate the
business plans submitted by each of the bidders, and to ensure that there
would be a transparent and comprehensive review of the submitted bids.
The SBMA also hired the firm of Davis, Langdon and Seah Philippines,
Inc. to assist in the evaluation of the bids and in the negotiation process
after the winning bidder is chosen. All the consultants, after such review
and evaluation unanimously concluded that HPPL’s Business Plan was
“far superior to that of the two other bidders.”
However, even before the sealed envelopes containing the bidders’
proposed royalty fees could be opened at the appointed time and place,
RPSI formally protested that ICTSI is legally barred from operating a
second port in the Philippines based on Executive Order No. 212 and
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Order 95-863.
ISSUE
1) Whether HPPL may sue SBMA
2) Whether the petitioner HPPL has the legal capacity to seek redress
from the Court.
RULING
1) HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines because it is a foreign
corporation registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. It did
not register here in the Philippines.
To be registered means that such foreign corporation need to obtain a
license to do business here in the Philippines. Participating in the bidding
process constitutes “doing business” because it shows the foreign
corporation’s intention to engage in business here. Therefore, HPPL has
done business here without license. It cannot now sue in the Philippines
Page 71 of 114
without license because its participation in the bidding is not merely an
isolated transaction
The primary purpose of the license requirement is to compel a foreign
corporation desiring to do business within the Philippines to submit itself
to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state and to enable the government to
exercise jurisdiction over them for the regulation of their activities in this
country
2) Yes. Admittedly, petitioner HPPL is a foreign corporation,
organized and existing under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. While
the actual bidder was a consortium composed of petitioner, and two other
corporations, namely, Guoco Holdings (Phils.) Inc. and Unicol
Management Services, Inc., it is only petitioner HPPL that has brought the
controversy before the Court, arguing that it is suing only on an isolated
transaction to evade the legal requirement that foreign corporations must
be licensed to do business in the Philippines to be able to file and
prosecute an action before Philippines courts.
There is no general rule or governing principle laid down as to what
constitutes “doing” or “engaging in” or “transacting” business in the
Philippines. Each case must be judged in the light of its peculiar
circumstances.Thus, it has often been held that a single act or transaction
may be considered as “doing business” when a corporation performs acts
for which it was created or exercises some of the functions for which it
was organized. The amount or volume of the business is of no moment, for
even a singular act cannot be merely incidental or casual if it indicates the
foreign corporation’s intention to do business.
Participating in the bidding process constitutes “doing business” because it
shows the foreign corporation’s intention to engage in business here. The
bidding for the concession contract is but an exercise of the corporation’s
reason for creation or existence. Thus, it has been held that “a foreign
company invited to bid for IBRD and ADB international projects in the
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Philippines will be considered as doing business in the Philippines for
which a license is required.”
G.R. No. 135385               December 6, 2000
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT
and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
EN BANC
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining
the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership
over the natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over
the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and
Page 72 of 114
the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources
in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large
scale development and exploitation
G.R. No. 143784             February 5, 2003
PHILIPPINE RETIREMENT AUTHORITY (PRA), petitioner,
vs.
JESUSITO L. BUÑAG and ERLINA P. LOZADA, respondents.
G.R. No. 142283. February 6, 2003
ROSA LIGAYA C. DOMINGO
Vs
HON. RONALDO D. ZAMORA, in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition1 with prayer for temporary
restraining order seeking to nullify Executive Order No. 81 and
Memoranda Nos. 01592 and 01594.2The assailed executive order
transferred the sports development programs and activities of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports ("DECS" for brevity) to the
Philippine Sports Commission ("PSC" for brevity). The questioned
memoranda ("DECS Memoranda" for brevity), on the other hand,
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
reassigned all Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports ("BPESS"
for brevity) personnel named in the DECS Memoranda to various offices
within the DECS.
Facts
On March 5, 1999, former President Joseph E. Estrada issued Executive
Order No. 813 ("EO 81" for brevity) entitled "Transferring the Sports
Programs and Activities of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports to the Philippine Sports Commission and Defining the Role of
DECS in School-Based Sports."
EO 81 provided thus:
"Section 1. Transferring the Sports Program and Activities to the PSC. All
the functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports
development as provided for in Sec. 16 of EO 117 (s. 1987) are hereby
transferred to PSC.
Section 2. Defining the Role of DECS in School-Based Sports. The DECS
shall have jurisdiction and function over the enhancement of Physical
Education (P.E.) curriculum and its application in whatever form inside
schools.
Section 3. The Role of PSC. As the primary agency tasked to formulate
policies and oversee the national sports development program, the
management and implementation of all school-based sports competitions
among schools at the district, provincial, regional, national and
international levels, in coordination with concerned public and private
entities shall be transferred to the PSC."
Pursuant to EO 81, former DECS Secretary Andrew B. Gonzales
("Secretary Gonzales" for brevity) issued Memorandum No. 01592 on
January 10, 2000. Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned, in the
exigency of the service, all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or
bureaus of the DECS effective March 15, 2000.
Page 73 of 114
On January 21, 2000, Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594
reassigning the BPESS staff named in the Memorandum to various offices
within the DECS effective March 15, 2000. Petitioners were among the
BPESS personnel affected by Memorandum No. 01594. Dissatisfied with
their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition.
In their Petition, petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional
for being an undue legislation by President Estrada. Petitioners maintain
that the President’s issuance of EO 81 violated the principle of separation
of powers. Petitioners also challenge the DECS Memoranda for violating
their right to security of tenure.
Petitioners seek to nullify EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda. Petitioners
pray that this Court prohibit the PSC from performing functions related to
school sports development. Petitioners further pray that, upon filing of the
petition, this Court issue a temporary restraining order against respondents
to desist from implementing EO 81.
During the pendency of the case, Republic Act No. 9155 ("RA 9155" for
brevity), otherwise known as the "Governance of Basic Education Act of
2001", was enacted on August 11, 2001. RA 9155 expressly abolished the
BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the DECS
relating to sports competition to the PSC. The pertinent provision thereof
reads:
"SEC. 9. Abolition of BPESS. – All functions, programs and activities of
the Department of Education related to sports competition shall be
transferred to the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC). The Program for
school sports and physical fitness shall remain part of the basic education
curriculum.
The Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS) is hereby
abolished. The personnel of the BPESS, presently detailed with the PSC,
are hereby transferred to the PSC without loss of rank, including the
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
plantilla positions they occupy. All other BPESS personnel shall be
retained by the Department."
Issue
The issue to resolve is whether EO 81 and the DECS Memoranda are
valid.
Ruling
We dismiss this petition for being moot and academic.
As manifested by both petitioners4 and respondents,5 the subsequent
enactment of RA 9155 has rendered the issues in the present case moot
and academic. Since RA 9155 abolished the BPESS and transferred the
DECS’ functions relating to sports competition to the PSC, petitioners now
admit that "it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra vires assumption by
the PSC of the functions of the BPESS."6 Moreover, since RA 9155
provides that BPESS personnel not transferred to the PSC shall be retained
by the DECS, petitioners now accept that "the law explicitly protects and
preserves"7 their right to security of tenure.
Although the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the
Court to point out that Executive Order No. 292 ("EO 292" for brevity),
otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, expressly grants the
President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
Section 31 of EO 292 provides:
"SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office.
– The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
Page 74 of 114
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President transfer the "functions, programs and activities of DECS related to sports
Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special development"10 to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.
Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Support System, by
However, the President’s power to reorganize the Office of the President
abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be distinguished from his
from one unit to another;
power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President
Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring
President from other Departments and Agencies; and functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and
(3) of EO 292, the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other
Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is
department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the
limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the
President from other Departments or Agencies." (Emphasis supplied.)
President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.
Since EO 81 is based on the President’s continuing authority under Section
This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees.
31 (2) and (3) of EO 292,8 EO 81 is a valid exercise of the President’s
The abolition of an office in good faith necessarily results in the
delegated power to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants
employee’s cessation in office, but in such event there is no dismissal or
the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every
separation because the office itself ceases to exist. 11 On the other hand, the
President to reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and
transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the employee’s
efficiency." The Office of the President is the nerve center of the
cessation in office because his office continues to exist although in another
Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the
department, agency or office. In the instant case, the BPESS employees
President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President
who were not transferred to PSC were at first temporarily, then later
in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After
permanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuring their
all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President. This
continued employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now mandates that these
is the rationale behind the President’s continuing authority to reorganize
employees "shall be retained by the Department."
the administrative structure of the Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement
Petitioners’ contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the
as to costs.
President is immaterial.1awphi1.nét Under EO 292, the DECS is
indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is
not part of the Office of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003
clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of the
DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter, the PSC is attached DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
to the Office of the President.9 Therefore, the President has the authority to RESOURCES

Page 75 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Vs
DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
FACTS:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi,
issued a Memorandum[3] directing the immediate transfer of the DENR
XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel),
South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR
Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary Antonio
H. Cerilles, which reads in part:
Subject: Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment
of Administrative Units in the Regional and Field Offices:
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 192, dated June 10, 1987 and as an
interim administrative arrangement to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) in delivering its services pending approval of the government-
wide reorganization by Congress, the following redefinition of functions
and realignment of administrative units in the regional and field offices are
hereby promulgated:
Section 1. Realignment of Administrative Units:
The DENR hereby adopts a policy to establish at least one Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative
Unit per Congressional District except in the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the National Capital Region (NCR). The
Regional Executive Directors (REDs) are hereby authorized to
realign/relocate existing CENROs and implement this policy in accordance
with the attached distribution list per region which forms part of this
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Order. Likewise, the following realignment and administrative
arrangements are hereby adopted:
1.6. The supervision of the Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani
shall be transferred from Region XI to XII.
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for
preliminary injunction. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining petitioner from implementing the assailed Memorandum.The
trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from
implementing the assailed Memorandum and rendered a decision in favor
of the respondents.
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred in enjoining it from causing the
transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices, considering that it was done
pursuant to DENR Administrative Order 99-14.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the
DENR.
RULING:
YES. Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive
are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
Page 76 of 114
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided
for under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution. However, as
head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to
exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. He
may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he
is required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he acts personally.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the
President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated
to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive
department. Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot, we held that the
President through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the
DOTC Secretary may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the
Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB
Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the
concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and
responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize
the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices
from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the
acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the
President to reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the power
to determine the regional centers. In identifying the regional centers, the
President purposely intended the effective delivery of the field services of
government agencies. The same intention can be gleaned from the
preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14 which the DENR sought to achieve,
that is, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DENR in
delivering its services.
Sec. 17 POWER OF CONTROL
Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 152259, July 29, 2004]
PETITIONER: ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ
RESPONDENTS: THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth
Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES
PONENTE: PANGANIBAN, J.
G.R. No. 152259             July 29, 2004
FACTS: The People of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed an information before
the anti-graft court on July 12, 1989 charging Romualdez with violation of
Sec. 5, Republic Act No. 3019 as amended.
     The information states that on or about and during the period from July
16 to July 29, 1975, Romualdez, brother-in-law of President Marcos,
former president of the Philippines, did then and there willfully and
Page 77 of 114
unlawfully, and with evident of bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his
self-interest and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a
contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO),
a government-owned and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard
and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority
of stocks of which is owned by former Pres. Marcos, whereby the
NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership
and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including
structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and
semi-expendable assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the
Engineer Island Shops including some equipment and machineries from
Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by BASECO in its shipbuilding
and ship repair program for the amount of P 5, 000, 000.00.
       Romualdez argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he
allegedly served as a high-ranking naval officer ----- specifically, as naval
aide-de-camp – of former President Marcos. He relies on Sec. 17, Art. VII
of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which states that:
“The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no
suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by other pursuant
to his specific orders during his tenure.”        Petitioner, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued,
ISSUE: Whether or not pursuant to Sec. 17, Art. VII of the 1973
Constitution, Romualdez is immune from criminal prosecution.
RULING: No. As aptly pointed out by Sandiganbayan, the provision in
Sec. 17, Art Vii of 1973 Constitution is not applicable to Romualdez
because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while the
alleged crime happened in 1975.
      In Estrada vs Desierto, the SC explained that executive immunity
applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to
shield a non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts
done while sitting in office. Romualdez’s reasoning fails since he derives
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
his immunity from one who is no longer sitting as president. Verily, the
felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives “are not acts of
the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands
on the same footing as any other trespasser.”
Chavez vs. Romulo [ 431 SCRA 534, 2004]
PETITIONER: FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
RESPONDENTS: HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR
GENERAL HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY
AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, ET. AL.
PONENTE: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
G.R. No. 157036             June 9, 2004
FACTS: Petition for prohinition and injuction seeking to enjoin the
implementation of the “Guildelines in the Implementation of the Ban on
Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence” issued by respondent.
requested the DILG to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present
petition impleading public respondents Ebdune, as Chief of PNP; Alberto
G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as Chief of the
PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division.
ISSUE/s:
1. Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is
unconstitutional
2. Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right
Page 78 of 114
RULING: In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost
consideration must be whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The
bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a
certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The
Director of Forestry, we ruled that “a license is merely a permit or
privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted;
neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right.”
In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.
that: “Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by
executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected
by the due process clause of the Constitution.”
xxx
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the
issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that “the Chief of
Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under
such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to
carry them outside of residence.” Following the American doctrine, it is
indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right
protected under our Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated
fields, may be revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but
only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions, and
such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license
subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of
the statutory conditions of this license is that it might be revoked by the
selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a
revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity,
or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of
Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held:
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
“The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary
consequence of the main power. A mere license by the State is always
revocable.”
Sec 18 COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
Lansang vs. Garcia 42 SCRA 448 [1971]
PETITIONER: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF TEODOSIO LANSANG RODOLFO DEL
ROSARIO, and BAYANI ALCALA
RESPONDENT: BRIGADIER-GENERAL EDUARDO M. GARCIA,
Chief, Philippine Constabulary, 
PONENTE: CONCEPCION, C.J.
G.R. No. L-33964 December 11, 1971
FACTS: In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the
Liberal Party of the Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda, Manila, for the presentation of its candidates in the general
elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand grenades were
thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were.
Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was
issued by the President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus
stating that there is a conspiracy of rebellion and insurrection in order to
forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ of habeas corpus were
filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.
It was stated that one of the safeguards of the proclamation was that it is to
be applied to persons caught in flagrante delicto. Incidentally, Proc. 889-A
was issued as an amendment, inserting the word “actually staging”. Proc.
889-B was also issued lifting the suspension of privilege in 27 provinces, 3
Page 79 of 114
sub-provinces and 26 cities. Proc. 889-C was issued restoring the
suspension in 13 provinces and cities(mostly in Mindanao). Proc. 889-D
further lifted the suspension in 7 provinces and 4 cities. Only 18 provinces
and sub-provinces and 2 cities whose privilege was suspended. Petitioners
maintained that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of
actual "invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof,
however it became moot and academic since it was amended. Petitioners
further contend that public safety did not require the issuance of
proclamations stating: (a) that there is no rebellion; (b) that, prior to and at
the time of the suspension of the privilege, the Government was
functioning normally, as were the courts; (c) that no untoward incident,
confirmatory of an alleged July-August Plan, has actually taken place after
August 21, 1971; (d) that the President's alleged apprehension, because of
said plan, is non-existent and unjustified; and (e) that the Communist
forces in the Philippines are too small and weak to jeopardize public safety
to such extent as to require the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
A resolution was issued by majority of the Court having tentatively arrived
at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy itself of the existence
of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves after
conclusive decision reached by majority.
ISSUE/s:  (1)Whether or not the authority to decide whether the exigency
has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus) belongs to the President and his decision is final and conclusive
upon the courts and upon all other persons.  OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO, ROLANDO
(2)Whether or Not public safety require the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus decreed in Proclamation No. 889-A.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
RULING: The President has authority however it is subject to judicial
review. Two conditions must concur for the valid exercise of the authority
to suspend the privilege to the writ (a) there must be "invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof," and (b) "public
safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. President has three (3)
courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or
any part thereof under martial law. He had, already, called out the armed
forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other alternatives, the suspension of
the privilege is the least harsh.
Petitioners contention that CPP-NPA has no ability, is negatived by the
killing of 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3 chiefs of police; that there
were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila
Area in 1970. CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine
major labor organizations; has exploited the (11) major student or youth
organizations; about thirty (30) mass organizations actively advancing the
CPP.
Aberca vs. Ver 160 SCRA 590 [1988]
PETITIONERS: ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA,
NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE,
BELEN DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN
JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX
MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH
SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN
TULALIAN and REBECCA TULALIAN
RESPONDENTS: MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL
SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B.
Page 80 of 114
LANTORIA, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL.
PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT.
DANILO PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO
RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO
BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon City
PONENTE: YAP, J.
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988
FACTS: Sometime in the early 1980s, various Intelligence units of the
AFP known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) were ordered by
respondents then Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver to conduct pre-emptive strikes
against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of
increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila.  In
compliance thereof, the TFM raided several places, employing in most
cases defectively issued judicial search warrants.  During these raids,
certain members of the raiding TFM confiscated a number of purely
personal items belonging to the 20 petitioners.  Petitioners were arrested
without proper arrest warrants issued by the courts.  For some period after
their arrest, they were arrested without denied visits of relatives and
lawyers; interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel,
through threats, torture and other forms of violence in order to obtain
incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.
                Plaintiffs then filed an action for damages before the RTC of
Quezon City against respondents-officers of the AFP headed by Ver. 
Respondents, in their motion to dismiss, claimed that (1) the writ of habeas
corpus was suspended, thus giving credence to petitioners’ detention; (2)
respondents were immune from liability for acts done in the performance
of their official duties, and that (3) the complaint did not state a cause of
action against respondents.  On November 8, 1983, the RTC granted the
motion to dismiss the case.  A motion to set aside the order dismissing the
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
complaint, and a supplemental motion for reconsideration were filed by
petitioners.  On May 11, 1984, the trial court, without acting on the motion
to set aside the Order of Nov. 8, 1983, declared the finality of said Order
against petitioners.  After their motion for reconsideration was denied by
the RTC, petitioners then filed the instant petition for certiorari, on March
15, 1985, seeking to annul and set aside the respondent court’s resolutions
and order. 
ISSUE:  Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches
conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties
guaranteed under the Constitution
RULING:  The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
(PWHC) does not destroy petitioners’ right and cause of action for
damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their
constitutional rights.  The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention.  What is suspended is merely the right of the
individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus
as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty. 
                Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of
action for damages are explicitly recognized in PD 1755 which amended
Art. 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following text: However, when
the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for quasi-delict) arises
from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving
the exercise of powers or authority arising from martial law including the
arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought
within one year. 
                Even assuming that the suspension of the PWHC suspends
petitioners’ right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it
does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries
suffered because of respondents’ confiscation of their private belongings,
Page 81 of 114
the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to as vital as the struggle of arms.  The linchpin in that psychological struggle
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture is faith in the rule of law.  Once that faith is lost or compromised, the
and other cruel and inhuman treatment.  struggle may well be abandoned. 
                The question became moot and academic since the suspension of
the PWHC had been lifted with the issuance of then Pres. Corazon Aquino
of Proclamation No. 2 on March 25, 1986. 
It may be that the respondents, as members of the AFP, were merely
responding to their duties, as they claim, “to prevent or suppress lawless IBP vs. Zamora (supra, Art. 2, Sec. 3 – Supremacy of Civilian Authority)
violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion” in accordance with
Proclamation No. 2054 of Pres. Marcos, despite the lifting of Martial Law PETITIONER: INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- RESPONDENT: HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, GEN. PANFILO M.
emptive strikes against alleged CT underground houses. But this cannot be LACSON, GEN. EDGAR B. AGLIPAY, and GEN. ANGELO REYES
construed as a blanket license or roving commission untrammeled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and PONENTE: KAPUNAN, J.
liberties of the individual citizen enshrined and protected by the
G.R. No. 141284               August 15, 2000
Constitution. 
                Article 32 of the Civil Code, which renders any public officer or
employees, or any private individual, liable in damages for violating the FACTS: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
constitutional rights and liberties of another, does not exempt the prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on
respondents from responsibility.  Only judges are excluded from liability constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada
under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the Marines) to
violation of the Revised Penal Code or other penal statute.  join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around
the metropolis.   Formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI")
                This is not say that military authorities are restrained from
which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task
pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with vigor, to
Force Tulungan, would be conducted. 2 Task Force Tulungan was placed
protect the Philippines from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right,
under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila through a
or from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic
sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-
institutions and imperil their very existence.  What is meant is that in
profile crimes especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates
carrying out their task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards
whose members include those that are well-trained, disciplined and well-
must be observed; otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to
armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.
unravel.  In the battle of competing ideologies, the struggle of mind is just

Page 82 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
ISSUE/s:
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of
calling the armed forces is subject to judicial revie
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint
visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian
supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
RULING: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII
of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the
Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However,
there is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review
of the President’s action to call out the armed forces. The distinction
places the calling out power in a different category from the power to
declare martial law and power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have
simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their revocation and
review without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights
the intent to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion
in using the power to call out because it is considered as the lesser and
more benign power compared to the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose martial law, both of which
involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic civil rights and
individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress and
review by the Court.
In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary
power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such
heavy burden, as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there
exists no justification for calling out the armed forces.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the
Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in violation
of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does
not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the
Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law
enforcement.
The local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all
times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real authority in the
operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and
not with the military. Since none of the Marines was incorporated or
enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian
position to speak of. Hence, the deployment of the Marines in the joint
visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP.
Lacson vs. Perez [May 10, 2001]
PETITIONERS: PANFILO LACSON, MICHAEL RAY B.
AQUINO and CESAR O. MANCAO
RESPONDENTS: SECRETARY HERNANDO PEREZ,
P/DIRECTOR LEANDRO MENDOZA, and P/SR. SUPT.
REYNALDO BERROYA
PONENTE: MELO, J.
Page 83 of 114
G.R. No. 147780      May 10, 2001
FACTS: On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an
“angry and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons,
clubs, stones and other deadly weapons” assaulting and attempting to
break into Malacañang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring that there
was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region. She likewise issued
General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the National Capital
Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the
“rebellion” were thereafter effected.
Aggrieved by the warrantless arrests, and the declaration of a “state of
rebellion,” which allegedly gave a semblance of legality to the arrests, the
following four related petitions were filed before the Court. Prior to
resolution, the “state of rebellion” was lifted in Metro Manila.
ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of a state of rebellion is
constitutional
RULING:
As to warrantless arrests
As to petitioner’s claim that the proclamation of a “state of rebellion” is
being used by the authorities to justify warrantless arrests, the Secretary of
Justice denies that it has issued a particular order to arrest specific persons
in connection with the “rebellion.” xxx
With this declaration, petitioners’ apprehensions as to warrantless arrests
should be laid to rest.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to
warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus, not based on the
declaration of a “state of rebellion.”
Was there violation of doctrine of separation of powers?
Petitioner Lumbao, leader of the People’s Movement against Poverty
(PMAP), for his part, argues that the declaration of a “state of rebellion” is
violative of the doctrine of separation of powers, being an encroachment
on the domain of the judiciary which has the constitutional prerogative to
“determine or interpret” what took place on May 1, 2001, and that the
declaration of a state of rebellion cannot be an exception to the general
rule on the allocation of the governmental powers.
We disagree. To be sure, section 18, Article VII of the Constitution
expressly provides that “[t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief
of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion…” thus, we held in Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Hon. Zamora, (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000):
xxx The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily
quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered
for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not
always accessible to the courts. Besides the absence of testual standards
that the court may use to judge necessity, information necessary to arrive
at such judgment might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain
pertinent information necessary to arrive at such judgment might also
prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information might be
difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many instances,
the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to
call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical
proof.
Page 84 of 114
On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property. Xxx
The Court, in a proper case, may look into the sufficiency of the factual
basis of the exercise of this power. However, this is no longer feasible at
this time, Proclamation No. 38 having been lifted.
Lim vs. Exec. Secretary [G.R. No. 151445, April
11, 2002]
PETITIONERS: ARTHUR D. LIM and PAULINO R. ERSANDO
RESPONDENTS: HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY as alter
ego of HER EXCELLENCEY GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
and HONORABLE ANGELO REYES in his capacity as Secretary of
National Defense
PONENTE: DE LEON, JR., J.
G.R. No. 151445      April 11, 2002
FACTS: Beginning January of year 2002, personnel from the armed
forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take
part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1.” They
are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual
Defense Treaty a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the
Philippines and the United States in 1951. Its aim is to enhance the
strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint
training with its American counterparts; the “Balikatan” is the largest such
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
training exercise directly supporting the MDT’s objectives. It is this treaty
to which the VFA adverts and the obligations thereunder which it seeks to
reaffirm.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando
filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the
constitutionality of the joint exercise.
ISSUE: Whether “Balikatan 02-1” activities covered by the Visiting
Forces Agreement?
RULING: To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the VFA itself. The
VFA permits United States personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis,
in “activities,” the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The sole
encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that
United States personnel must “abstain from any activity inconsistent with
the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31 and 32
contains provisos governing interpretations of international agreements. It
clearly provides that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an
examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the parties’
intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to
deduce the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty,
as well as other elements may be taken into account alongside the
aforesaid context.
It appeared farfetched that the ambiguity surrounding the meaning of the
word .’activities” arose from accident. It was deliberately made that way to
give both parties a certain leeway in negotiation. In this manner, visiting
US forces may sojourn in Philippine territory for purposes other than
military. As conceived, the joint exercises may include training on new
techniques of patrol and surveillance to protect the nation’s marine
Page 85 of 114
resources, sea search-and-rescue operations to assist vessels in distress,
disaster relief operations, civic action projects such as the building of
school houses, medical and humanitarian missions, and the like.
Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan
exercises. It is only logical to assume that .’Balikatan 02-1,” a “mutual
anti- terrorism advising, assisting and training exercise,” falls under the
umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the
agreement.
Sanlakas vs. Executive Secretary [421 SCRA 656, 2004]
PETITIONERS: SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO
MAGTUBO
RESPONDENTS: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY
ANGELO REYES, GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN.
HERMOGENES EBDANE
PONENTE: TINGA, J.
G.R. No. 159085           February 3, 2004
FACTS: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred
junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation,
command and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the
Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption
in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for the government,
demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the
PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No.
4, the Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations
took place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of
the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General
Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of
the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1)
SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the
Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call
out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such proclamation.
(2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners
contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report
requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the
President to submit a report to Congresswithin 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers
as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep.
Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary
Romulo, petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power
of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4)
Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of
rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional implementation of
warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion. 
ISSUE: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
are constitutional
RULING: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and
General Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not
Page 86 of 114
expressly prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to
its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to
call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The
issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no
indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of
usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since
the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested
on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be
subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishable
under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is
present.
David vs. Arroyo [G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006]
PETITIONERS: PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID, LORENZO TAÑADA
III, RONALD LLAMAS, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ
BUTUYAN, ROGER R. RAYEL, GARY S. MALLARI, ROMEL
REGALADO BAGARES, CHRISTOPHER F.C. BOLASTIG
RESPONDENTS: GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, AS
PRESIDENT AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, HON. AVELINO CRUZ II,
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, GENERAL GENEROSO
SENGA, CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO LOMIBAO,
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
PONENTE: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.
G.R. No. 171396             May 3, 2006
FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017
declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The
Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power
I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA. The police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was
his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS,
GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition
and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to
exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and
three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
Page 87 of 114
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the
emergency powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
ISSUE/s:
1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is
unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald
Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during
rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
as respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the
constitutionality of the proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the
alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used?
RULING/s:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it
constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous
provisions giving the President express or implied power:
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the
province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
"[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of
the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not
related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the
President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in
abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the
press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of
legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017
is only partly unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the
dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members
during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these petitioners
were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of
prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of
the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication
and other materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was
no clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is
the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual
Page 88 of 114
incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no
need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the “direct injury” test in our jurisdiction. In People
v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” Therefore, the court
ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered “direct
injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by
police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in
times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the
President may temporarily take over a privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest only if there is congressional
authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may
exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process
of law would be observed.
G.R. No. 190259               June 7, 2011
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE
SAHALI-GENERALE Petitioners,
vs.
HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government and alter-ego of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
and on behalf of the President of the Philippines, ARMED FORCES
OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units operating in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their units operating in
ARMM, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
Facts: 
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then
Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing “the Provinces of
Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of
emergency.” She directed the AFP and the PNP “to undertake such
measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and
suppress all incidents of lawless violence” in the named places. Three days
later, she also issued AO 273 “transferring” supervision of the ARMM
from the Office of the President to the DILG. She subsequently issued AO
273-A, which amended the former AO (the term “transfer” used in AO
273 was amended to “delegate”, referring to the supervision of the ARMM
by the DILG). 
Claiming that the President’s issuances encroached on the ARMM’s
autonomy, petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and
Regie Sahali-Generale, all ARMM officials, filed this petition for
prohibition under Rule 65. They alleged that the President’s proclamation
and orders encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy as these issuances
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and to
seize the regional government’s powers. They also claimed that the
President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency,
especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato,
Page 89 of 114
where no critical violent incidents occurred and that the deployment of
troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of
the President’s emergency powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation
1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) insisted that the President
issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but
to restore peace and order in subject places. She issued the proclamation
pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-Chief. The
determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her
wisdom. The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the
ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The
delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killing.
Issue:
Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions
Held:
The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. x x x
While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the
President’s exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her
judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of
the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the President that the
Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the
armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown
that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment. Thus, the Court
said:
If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the
President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of
calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be
objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is
a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the
courts. Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to
judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment might
also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent information
might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to the courts. In many
instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is
a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting
technical proof.
On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast
intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be
classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the
exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively
necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and
mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to
prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if
it were to have any effect at all. x x x. 
 
Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency
in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as
well as the President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual
basis. They simply alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were
placed under a state of emergency, it follows that the takeover of the entire
ARMM by the DILG Secretary had no basis too.
Page 90 of 114
 
The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued
Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent
further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned.  Progress reports
also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-
powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to
pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to
take preventive action.  She called out the armed forces to control the
proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that
continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places.
Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state
of emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces
to prevent or suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases,
the Court must respect the President’s actions. (Ampatuan vs Puno, G.R.
No. 190259, June 7, 2011)
G.R. No. 190293               March 20, 2012
PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN and ALBERT LEE G. ANGELES,
Petitioners,
vs.
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, as Commander-in-Chief and
President of the Republic of the Philippines, EDUARDO ERMITA,
Executive Secretary, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(AFP), or any of their units, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
(PNP), or any of their units, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES acting
under their direction and control, Respondents.
ABAD, J.:
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Facts:
On 24 November 2009, the day after the Maguindanao Massacre, then
Pres. Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, declaring a state of emergency in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. Believing that she
needed greater authority to put order in Maguindanao, on December 4,
2009 President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 1959 declaring
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
that province. On December 6, she submitted her report to Congress. On
December 9, the Congress, in joint session, convened to review the
validity of the President's action. But, two days later or on December 12
before Congress could act, the President issued Presidential Proclamation
1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus in Maguindanao. Petitioners brought the present action to challenge
the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959.
Issue:
Is there a need for the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in this case, considering the same were lifted within
a few days after being issued and thus Congress was not able to affirm or
maintain the same based on its own evaluation?
Held: 
The issue of the constitutionality of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable
for two reasons:
One. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint
houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review and
validate or invalidate the same. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution state:
Page 91 of 114
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call
out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires
it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof
under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress.
The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon
the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner,
extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by
the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following
such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules
without any need of a call.
Although the above vests in the President the power to proclaim martial
law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, he shares such
power with the Congress. Thus:
1. The Presidents proclamation or suspension is temporary, good for only
60 days;
2. He must, within 48 hours of the proclamation or suspension, report his
action in person or in writing to Congress;
3. Both houses of Congress, if not in session must jointly convene within
24 hours of the proclamation or suspension for the purpose of reviewing its
validity; and
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
 
4. The Congress, voting jointly, may revoke or affirm the Presidents
proclamation or suspension, allow their limited effectivity to lapse, or
extend the same if Congress deems warranted.
It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President and the
Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law or
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the
power, not only sequentially, but in a sense jointly since, after the
President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the
situation on the ground, a power that the President does not have.
Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the
power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow
Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather
than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend
the Constitution through such review should the Supreme Court step in as
its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the Presidents proclamation
of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in
the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint
houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same.
Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court
has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao was a supervening
event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
 
Page 92 of 114
Two. Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in just eight
days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military did not
take over the operation and control of local government units in
Maguindanao. The President did not issue any law or decree affecting
Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted by Congress. No
indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested
during the period were either released or promptly charged in court.
Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had been filed with the Court
respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President
intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and
sparsely populated province. In her judgment, the rebellion was localized
and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and amply armed
government presence.
In a real sense, the proclamation and the suspension never took off. The
Congress itself adjourned without touching the matter, it having become
moot and academic.
The Court has in exceptional cases passed upon issues that ordinarily
would have been regarded as moot. But the present cases do not present
sufficient basis for the exercise of the power of judicial review. (Fortun vs
Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 190293, March 20, 2012)
July 4, 2017
G.R. No. 231658
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S.
VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO, EMMANUEL A. BILLONES,
AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., Petitioners
vs.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF'ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW
ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN. EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR, Respondents
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS: 
Effective May 23, 2017, and for a period not exceeding 60 days, President
Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the whole of
Mindanao.
Within the timeline set by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the
President submitted to Congress on May 25, 2017, a written Report on the
factual basis of Proclamation No. 216. The Report pointed out that for
decades, Mindanao has been plagued with rebellion and lawless violence
which only escalated and worsened with the passing of time.
The President went on to explain that on May 23, 2017, a government
operation to capture the high-ranking officers of the Abu Sayyaf IP (ASG)
and the Maute Group was conducted. These groups, which have been
unleashing havoc in Mindanao, however, confronted the government
operation by intensifying their efforts at sowing violence aimed not only
against the government authorities and its facilities but likewise against
civilians and their properties. In particular, the President chronicled in his
Report the events which took place on May 23, 2017 in Marawi City
which impelled him to declare a state of martial law and suspend the
privilege of writ of habeas corpus
Page 93 of 114

The Report highlighted the strategic location of Marawi City and the
crucial and significant role it plays in Mindanao, and the Philippines as a
whole. In addition, the Report pointed out the possible tragic repercussions
once Marawi City falls under the control of the lawless groups.
President Duterte concluded, "While the government is presently
conducting legitimate operations to address the on-going rebellion, if not
the seeds of invasion, public safety necessitates the continued
implementation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao until such time that the
rebellion is completely quelled."
After the submission of the Report and the briefings, the Senate issued P.S.
Resolution No. 390 expressing full support to the martial law proclamation
and finding Proclamation No. 216 "to be satisfactory, constitutional and in
accordance with the law". In the same Resolution, the Senate declared that
it found "no compelling reason to revoke the same"
The Lagman Group, the Cullamat Group and the Mohamad Group
petitioned (Petitions) the Supreme Court, questioning the factual basis of
President Duterte's Proclamation of martial law. The OSG sided with
President Duterte.
Issue:
Is the President required to be factually correct or only not arbitrary in his
appreciation of facts.
Held:
The power of the Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
of habeas corpus under Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is
independent of the actions taken by Congress. The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the judicial power to review to be exercised
independently from the congressional power to revoke.
The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate
proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual
basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Thus,
the power to review by the Court and the power to revoke by Congress are
not only totally different but likewise independent from each other
although, concededly, they have the same trajectory, which is, the
nullification of the presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power
of the Court to review can be exercised independently from the power of
revocation of Congress.
February 6, 2018
G.R. No. 235935
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S.
VILLARIN, EDGAR R. ERICE, TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT,
JR., GARY C. ALEJANO, AND EMMANUELA. BILLONES,
Petitioners
vs.
SENATE PRESIDENT AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, SPEAKER
PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, DEFENSE SECRETARY DELFIN N.
LORENZANA, BUDGET SECRETARY BENJAMINE. DIOKNO
AND ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES CHIEF OF STAFF
GENERAL REY LEONARDO GUERRERO, Respondents
Page 94 of 114
TIJAM, J.:
 FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the
extension of the proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1 to
December 31, 2018.
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued Proclamation No.
216, declaring a state of martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao for a period not exceeding
sixty (60) days, to address the rebellion mounted by members of the Maute
Group and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).
On May 25, 2017, within the 48-hour period set in Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, the President submitted to the Senate and the House of
Representatives his written Report, citing the events and reasons that
impelled him to issue Proclamation No. 216. Thereafter, the Senate
adopted P.S. Resolution No. 388 while the House of Representatives
issued House Resolution No. 1050, both expressing full support to the
Proclamation and finding no cause to revoke the same.
On July 18, 2017, the President requested the Congress to extend the
effectivity of Proclamation No. 216. In a Special Joint Session on July 22,
2017, the Congress adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 2 extending
Proclamation No. 216 until December 31, 2017.
In a letter to the President, through Defense Secretary Lorenzana, AFP
Chief of Staff General Guerrero, recommended the further extension of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
the entire Mindanao for one year beginning January 1, 2018 “for
compelling reasons based on current security assessment.”
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
On the basis of this security assessment, Secretary Lorenzana wrote a
similar recommendation to the President “primarily to ensure total
eradication of DAESH-inspired Da’awatul Islamiyah Waliyatul Masriq
(DIWM), other like-minded Local/Foreign Terrorist Groups (L/FTGs) and
Armed Lawless Groups (ALGs), and the communist terrorists (CTs) and
their coddlers, supporters and financiers, and to ensure speedy
rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction efforts in Marawi, and the
attainment of lasting peace, stability, economic development and
prosperity in Mindanao.”
Acting on said recommendations, the President, in a letter dated December
8, 2017, asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to further
extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from
January 1, 2018 to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress
may determine.
On December 13, 2017, the Senate and the House of Representatives, in a
joint session, adopted Resolution of Both Houses No. 4 further extending
the period of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018
to December 31, 2018.
ISSUE:
1.     Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded (certiorari)
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No. 216.
2.     Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend and determine
the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
3.     Whether or not the President and the Congress had sufficient factual
basis to extend Proclamation No. 216.
Page 95 of 114
4.     Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the choice and
manner of the President’s exercise of military powers.
HELD:  PRELIMINARIES ON MARTIAL LAW
FIRST ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners may invoke the expanded
(certiorari) jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution in seeking review of the extension of Proclamation No.
216. NO.
The Court reiterated their earlier ruling in Lagman case where they
emphasized that the Court’s jurisdiction under the third paragraph of
Section 18, Article VII is special and specific, different from those
enumerated in Sections 1 and 5 of Article VIII. It was further stressed
therein that the standard of review in a petition for certiorari is whether the
respondent has committed any grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in the performance of his or her functions,
whereas under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the President’s exercise of emergency
powers.
Hence, the Court concluded that a petition for certiorari pursuant to
Section 1 or Section 5 of Article VIII is not the proper tool to review the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
The Court added that to apply the standard of review in a petition for
certiorari will emasculate the Court’s constitutional task under Section 18,
Article VII, which was precisely meant to provide an additional safeguard
against possible martial law abuse and limit the extent of the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief.
Finally, the Court held that a certiorari petition invoking the Court’s
expanded jurisdiction is not the proper remedy to review the sufficiency of
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
the factual basis of the Congress’ extension of the proclamation of martial
law or suspension of the privilege of the writ.
Congressional check on martial law
Congressional check on the President’s martial law and suspension powers
thus consists of:
1.     The power to review the President’s proclamation of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and to revoke
such proclamation or suspension. The review is “automatic in the sense
that it may be activated by Congress itself at any time after the
proclamation or suspension is made.” The Congress’ decision to revoke
the proclamation or suspension cannot be set aside by the President.
2.     The power to approve any extension of the proclamation or
suspension, upon the President’s initiative, for such period as it may
determine, if the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires it.
Joint executive and legislative act
When approved by the Congress, the extension of the proclamation or
suspension, as described during the deliberations on the 1987 Constitution,
becomes a “joint executive and legislative act” or a “collective judgment”
between the President and the Congress.
 
SECOND ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress has the power to extend
and determine the period of martial law and the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. YES.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to
how many times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may
Page 96 of 114
extend the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege
of habeas corpus.
What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are (1)
that the extension should be upon the President’s initiative; (2) that it
should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and
the demands of public safety; and (3) that it is subject to the Court’s
review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any
citizen.
Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the
proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the
authority to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the
extension shall be “for a period to be determined by the Congress.”
Commissioner Jose E. Suarez’s proposal to limit the extension to 60 days
was not adopted by the majority of the Commission’s members. The
framers evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to
determine the duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Section
18, Article VII and the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional
Commission buttress the view that as regards the frequency and
duration of the extension, the determinative factor is as long as “the
invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires” such
extension.
THIRD ISSUE: Whether or not the President and the Congress had
sufficient factual basis to extend Proclamation No. 216. YES.
Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution requires two factual bases
for the extension of the proclamation of martial law or of the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: (a) the invasion or rebellion
persists; and (b) public safety requires the extension.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Rebellion persists as to satisfy the first condition for the extension of
martial law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
The reasons cited by the President in his request for further extension
indicate that the rebellion, which caused him to issue Proclamation No.
216, continues to exist and its “remnants” have been resolute in
establishing a DAESH/ISIS territory in Mindanao, carrying on through the
recruitment and training of new members, financial and logistical build-up,
consolidation of forces and continued attacks.
AFP General Guerrero also cited, among others, the continued armed
resistance of the DAESH-inspired DIWM and their allies. Moreover, The
AFP’s data also showed that Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) are now
acting as instructors to the new members of the Dawlah Islamiyah.
Also, it does not necessarily follow that with the liberation of Marawi, the
DAESH/ISIS-inspired rebellion no longer exists. Secretary Lorenzana,
during the Congress’ Joint Session on December 13, 2017, explained that
while the situation in Marawi has substantially changed, the rebellion has
not ceased but simply moved to other places in Mindanao.
Acts upon which extension was based posed danger to general public
The Court also ruled that the acts, circumstances and events upon which
the extension was based posed a significant danger, injury or harm to the
general public.
The Court added that the information upon which the extension of martial
law or of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
be based principally emanate from and are in the possession of the
Executive Department. Thus, “the Court will have to rely on the fact-
finding capabilities of the Executive Department; in tum, the Executive
Department will have to open its findings to the scrutiny of the Court.”
Page 97 of 114
The Executive Department did open its findings to the Court when the·
AFP gave its “briefing” or “presentation” during the oral arguments,
presenting data, which had been vetted by the NICA, “based on
intelligence reports gathered on the ground,” from personalities they were
able to capture and residents in affected areas, declassified official
documents, and intelligence obtained by the PNP. According to the AFP,
the same presentation, save for updates, was given to the Congress. As it
stands, the information thus presented has not been challenged or
questioned as regards its reliability.
The facts as provided by the Executive and considered by Congress amply
establish that rebellion persists in Mindanao and public safety is
significantly endangered by it. The Court, thus, holds that there exists
sufficient factual basis for the further extension sought by the President
and approved by the Congress in its Resolution of Both Houses No. 4.
 
FOURTH ISSUE: Whether or not there is necessity to impose tests on the
choice and manner of the President’s exercise of military powers. NO.
The Court reiterated their ruling in the earlier Lagman case that the
determination of which among the Constitutionally given military powers
should be exercised in a given set of factual circumstances is a
prerogative of the President. The Court’s power of review, as provided
under Section 18, Article VII do not empower the Court to advise, nor
dictate its own judgment upon the President, as to which and how these
military powers should be exercised.
 
Sec. 19 Executive Clemency
Purpose of Executive Clemency
G.R. No. L-47941      December 7, 1940
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
MIGUEL CRISTOBAL, Petitioner, vs. ALEJO LABRADOR, ET AL.,
respondents
Victoriano Yamson for petitioner.
E. Voltaire Garcia for respondent Santos.
LAUREL, J.: chanrobles virt
Facts: 
Santos was convicted of estafa and was sentenced to six months of
imprisonment. Notwithstanding his conviction, he continued to be a
registered elector and was even seated as the municipal president of
Malabon. In 1938, the Election Code (Commonwealth Act No. 357) was
passed, sec. 94 (b) of which disqualifies Santos from voting for having
been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against property.
Because of this, Santos applied for absolute pardon with the President.
This was granted and he was restored to his full and civil political rights,
except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment,
he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or
manual in nature and involving no money or property responsibility.
 
Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos from the list
of voters on the ground that he was disqualified under the Election Code.
The trial court denied; hence, Cristobal filed a petition for certiorari.
Cristobal contends that the pardon granted by the President did not restore
Santos to the full enjoyment of his political rights because: a) the
pardoning power does not apply to legislative prohibitions; b) the
pardoning power would amount to an unlawful exercise by the President
of a legislative function, and c) Santos having served his sentence and all
accessory penalties imposed by law, there was nothing to pardon.
Page 98 of 114
Issue: impairment of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, not
contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore to the result
Whether the presidential power of pardon applies to legislative
that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a case of
prohibitions
this nature except through legislative action. (Labrador vs. Cristobal, G.R.
Held: No. 47941. December 7, 1940)

There are two limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional

prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power be
exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend cases
of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
G.R. No. 99031 October 15, 1991
action. It must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must
be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. RODOLFO D. LLAMAS, petitioner,
  vs.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN
all disabilities resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the OCAMPO III, respondents.
disability is the result of conviction without which there would be no basis
for disqualification from voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment Mauricio Law Office for petitioner.
which the law imposes upon those who violate its command. There are Ongkiko, Bucoy, Dizon & Associates for private respondent.
accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise
extends to such disabilities. When granted after the term of imprisonment  
has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of
PARAS, J.:
conviction.
In the present case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is
conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for appointment only to FACTS:
positions which are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or
property responsibility," it is absolute insofar as it "restores the respondent Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with
to full civil and political rights." some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III
for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found
The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in paragraph (b) of guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor,
section 94 of Commonwealth Act No. 357, does not fall within the Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III
purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the

Page 99 of 114
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume
office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in
criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase “after conviction by
final judgment” applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows
the grant of executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been
“convicted in an administrative case, allegedly because the word
“conviction” refers only to criminal cases.
ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant
executive clemency in administrative cases.
HELD: Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be
considered under criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not
distinguish, so we must not distinguish. The Constitution does not
distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by
the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same
token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it
would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment
cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same
do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.They do not clearly see any
valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive
clemency in administrative cases. It is the court’s considered view that if
the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she
grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less
serious than criminal offenses.The court stressed, however, that when we
say the President can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, we
refer only to all administrative cases in the Executive branch, not in the
Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.In criminal cases, the
quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof beyond
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum
of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.
G.R. No. 103567 December 4, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO SALLE, JR. Y GERCILLA @ "KA NONOY," RICKY
MENGOTE Y CUNTADO @ "KA RICKY/KA LIZA/KA JUN," and
TEN JOHN DOES, accused.
FRANCISCO SALLE, JR., Y GERCILLA and RICKY MENGOTE
Y CUNTADO, accused-appellants.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt and each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity. The appellants seasonably
filed their Notice of Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted the
appeal. On 6 January 1994, however, appellant Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. They were granted a conditional
pardon that with their acceptance of the conditional pardon, the appellants
will be released from confinement, the appellants impliedly admitted their
guilt and accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal should be
dismissed.  They were discharged from the New Bilibid Prison on 28
December 1993. Atty. La’o further informed the Court that appellant
Ricky Mengote left for his province without consulting her. She then prays
that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it
withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote has not
filed a motion to withdraw his appeal.
Page 100 of 114
ISSUE: Whether or not Mengote’s conditional pardon is valid?
RULING: No. Since pardon is given only to one whose conviction is
final, pardon has no effect until the person withdraws his appeal and
thereby allows his conviction to be final and Mengote has not filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal. – “WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-
appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from
notice hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of his
appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon granted the
said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such
withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director
of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back
into his custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the
assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of
Investigation.”
G.R. No. 91626 October 3, 1991
FRANKLIN DRILON, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice,
SILVESTRE BELLO III, in his capacity as the Undersecretary of
Justice, and AURELIO TRAMPE, in his capacity as the Acting City
Fiscal of Iloilo, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RODOLFO GANZON, and
RAUL PAREDES, respondents.
Eugenio O. Original for respondent R. Paredes.
Raymundo Magat for respondent R. Ganzon.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
FACTS:
The Department of Justice has brought suit to annul the CA decision
prohibiting the Government from pursuing criminal actions against the
private respondents for the death of Ireneo Longno and Lonely Chavez
during early martial law.
In 1973, the private respondents PAREDES and GANZON were charged
with double murder before Military Commission No. 34. The military
promulgated a decision acquitting PAREDES but sentencing GANZON to
life imprisonment with hard labor. PAREDES was released from custody
while GANZON was made to serve sentence until he was released in 1978
and placed under house arrest under guard. In 1985, GANZON joined the
Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL), the party in power, where he was
designated as campaign manager.
In 1988, administration having changed, then DOJ Sec. Ordoñez directed
State Prosecutor Trampe to conduct a preliminary investigation against the
private respondents for the above murders. The private respondents moved
for dismissal, in GANZON'S case, on the ground that he, Ganzon, had
been extended an absolute pardon by the President Marcos, and he, having
been previously convicted, can no longer be tried anew, and in Paredes'
case, on the ground that he, Paredes, had been acquitted. Trampe,
however, denied both requests and reconsideration having been likewise
denied, the private respondents went to the Court of Appeals on
prohibition.
 
The petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals, in granting prohibition,
committed a grave abuse of discretion:
(1)    Ganzon has not adequately proved the fact of presidential pardon;
(2)    there exists no evidence in the files of the Government to prove
pardon;
Page 101 of 114
(3)    Ganzon's copy is a bare machine copy and Ganzon has failed to
adequately establish the loss of the original;
(4)    the alleged pardon (or copy of it) had not been properly sealed and
authenticated, or executed in official Malacañang stationery; and
(5)    the disposition of the murder cases by the military does not
preclude the filing of new informations by the civilian government.
ISSUES & HELD:
 
1.     Whether or not the Government may proceed criminally
against the private respondents despite verdict earlier rendered by
Military Commission No. 34?
CANNOT PROCEED. Private respondents had been arraigned by the
military court, pleaded not guilty, and, with respect to Raul Paredes,
acquitted, and with respect to Ganzon, convicted and sentenced. To the
mind of the Court, Ganzon has accepted the judgment against him, and as
Tan asked, "why should [he] who has accepted the justness of the verdict
of the military court who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is
willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of
another hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time
perchance to serve a heavier penalty?"
The falls squarely within Tan's ruling, and as we tolerated no
reinvestigation there, we can not tolerate one here.
The Court cited three cases:
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
a.     Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 – Olaguer was rescued
from a court martial which sentenced him to death without receiving
evidence in his defense. It would be a cruel distortion of the Olaguer
decision to use it as authority for reprosecuting civilians regardless of
whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and regardless
of whether they have already been acquitted and released, or have accepted
sentences imposed on them and commenced serving the same.
b.     Tan vs. Barrios – Olaguer should, in principle, be applied
prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final
when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive
nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal,
rendered by military courts against civilians BEFORE the promulgation of
the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the
State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State
shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the
accused should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be
ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused,
and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, accused
should be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the
violation of his constitutional rights and denial of process.”
c.     Cruz vs. Enrile – “all the petitioners in said proceedings "who
have been serving (but not yet completed) their sentence imprisonment"
shall have "the option either to complete the servic their sentence, or be
tried anew by the civil courts. Upon conviction they should be credited in
the service of their sentence for the period of their previous imprisonment.
Upon acquittal, they should be set free."
Page 102 of 114
2.     Whether or not Ganzon has completed the service of his
sentence? YES.
Can Ganzon be reinvestigated? NO.
 
The Court can not consider Ganzon's house arrest as a continuation of his
sentence. First. because in no way is arrest a penalty, but rather a mere
means of "taking. . . a person into custody in order that he may be
forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense," or, during early
martial law, a means to carry out Proclamation No. 1881, and second,
because of the records' own scant condition as the exact terms in his
"house arrest" (which, parenthetically, no longer exists.) Hence, the view
of the Court is that irrespective of the "pardon," Ganzon has served his
sentence and to reiterate, he can no longer be reinvestigated for the same
offense, much more undergo further imprisonment to complete his
service.  The SC affirmed the following:
G.R. No. 76872               July 23, 1987
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
PRISONS, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
FACTS: 
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was
pardoned by the president with the condition that he shall not violate any
penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of
estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president
cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme Court
averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for
violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against
him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not  conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court
is necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for
violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve
the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: 
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions
of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a
pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of
trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article
159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less
conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict
may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Page 103 of 114
3.  Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and
because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded
judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he
was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
PARDON: NATURE AND LEGAL EFFECTS
G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner,
vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
FACTS:
• In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public
documents and sentenced them to imprisonment and to indemnify the
government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the
amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
• She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she
accepted.
• Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant
city treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the
backpay for the entire period of her suspension.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
• Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position
without the necessity of a new appointment
• The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon,
of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his
former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and
emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension pendente lite.
• In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a
reappointment before he can reassume his former position. And a pardon
shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence.
• Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by
reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her
conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no
final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city
treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited.
• The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed,
whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same
ISSUE:WON a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon
by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position
without need of a new appointment.
HELD:No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken
notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa
would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot
preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone
deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by
reason of the pardoned conviction.
Page 104 of 114
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part subsequently deposited in the City Treasurer's Office in the name of the
of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru Talisay Barrio High School. That was a grave error on the part of the
falsification of public documents. herein petitioner as it involves the very intricacies in the disbursement of
government funds and of its technicalities. So, petitioner, together with the
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
barrio captain, was charged of the violation of RA 3019, and both were
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
convicted to suffer a sentence of one year and disqualification to hold
that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply
public office.
and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.
 
CA modified the decision by eliminating the subsidiary imprisonment in
G.R. No. 87687 December 26, 1989
case of insolvency in the payment of one-half of the amount being
ISABELO T. SABELLO, petitioner, involved.
vs.
Sabello was granted an absolute pardon by the President, restoring him to
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,
full civil and political rights. With this instrument on hand, the herein
respondents.
petitioner applied for reinstatement to the government service, only to be
reinstated to the wrong position of a mere classroom teacher and not to his
GANCAYCO, J.:
former position as Elementary School Principal I.
FACTS: ISSUE: W/N petitioner should be reappointed to his former position
 
HELD: YES
Petitioner was the Elementary School Principal of Talisay and also the
As a general rule, the question of whether or not petitioner should be
Assistant Principal of the Talisay Barangay High School of the Division of
reappointed to his former position is a matter of discretion of the
Gingoog City.
appointing authority.
The barangay high school was in deficit due to the fact that the students
In Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., this Court held that the absolute
could hardly pay for their monthly tuition few. Since at that time also, the
disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of
President of the PH who was earnestly campaigning was giving aid in the
the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the
amount of P2K for each barrio, the barrio council through proper
individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to
resolutions alloted the amount of P840 to cover up for the salaries of the
all his civil rights. Although such pardon restores his eligibility to a public
high school teachers.
office it does not entitle him to automatic reinstatement. He should apply
The only part that the herein petitioner played was his being authorized by for reappointment to said office.
the said barrio council to withdraw the above amount and which was

Page 105 of 114

Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
In the present case after his absolute pardon, petitioner was reinstated to but the records do not show whether petitioner’s reinstatement was to the
the service as a classroom teacher by DECS. As there are no circumstances same position of Supervising Lineman.
that would warrant the diminution in his rank, justice and equity dictate
ISSUE: 
that he be returned to his former position of Elementary School Principal I
and not to that of a mere classroom teacher. Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been
reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
 As to backwages: NO backwages - Petitioner was lawfully separated from
the government service upon his conviction for an offense. Thus, although
his reinstatement had been duly authorized, it did not thereby entitle him to
backwages. Such right is afforded only to those who have been illegally
dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted
of the charge against them.
HELD:
The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public
G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993 office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But
VICENTE GARCIA, petitioner, since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because
vs. the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back
THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE wages.
HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM  
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV, respondents.
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this
Eulogio B. Alzaga for petitioner.
innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not
The Solicitor General for respondents.
been found guilty of the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon
because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party
BELLOSILLO, J.:
from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him
FACTS:
his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the finding of guilt.
Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of
 
qualified theft was filed against him. The president grated him an
executive clemency. The petitioner filed a claim for back payment of In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded
salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the service on 12 March 1984 not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner
did not commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him

Page 106 of 114

Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
innocent of the charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his
concern and dedication as a public servant. Verily, petitioner’s innocence
is the primary reason behind the grant of executive clemency to him,
bolstered by the favorable recommendations for his reinstatement. This
signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the
clemency.
Petitioner’s automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him
to back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent
from the start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of
his unjust dismissal from the service. The right to back wages is afforded
to those with have been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered
reinstated or to those otherwise acquitted of the charges against them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date
when he was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the
petitioner.
Sec. 21 Senate concurrence in international agreements
Gonzales vs Hechanova 9 SCRA 230 [1963]
RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. RUFINO
G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO
PERALTA, JR., as Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as
Auditor General, CORNELIO BALMACEDA, as Secretary of
Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARIÑO, as Secretary
of Justice,  >>Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does
CONCEPCION, J  not give him sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the
This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive
Secretary authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be
purchased from private sources, and created a rice procurement committee
composed of the other respondents herein 1 for the implementation of said
proposed importation.
Facts:
Petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales — a rice planter, and president of the
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, filed the petition herein,
averring that, in making or attempting to make said importation of foreign
rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction",
because Republic Act No. 3452 — which allegedly repeals or
amends Republic Act No. 2207 — explicitly prohibits the importation of
rice and corn by "the Rice and Corn Administration or any other
government agency";
>> Petitioner has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction is necessary for
the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency of this
case and to prevent the judgment therein from becoming ineffectual.
>> Petitioner prayed, therefore, that said petition be given due course; that
a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued restraining
respondents, their agents or representatives from implementing the
decision of the Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign
rice; and that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered making said
injunction permanent. ||| 
relief therein prayed for.
Page 107 of 114
== Republic Act No. 3452 declares, in Section 1 thereof, that "the policy importations by the Government, as such, becomes more apparent when
of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of these basic we consider that:||| 
foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and
landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a a. importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be
price that will afford them a fair and just return|||  authorized by "the President of the Philippines"||| 

== sufficient personality and interest|||  b. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds " that the importation
>>Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he
"has not exhausted all administrative remedies available to him before
coming to court
== Principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not applicable "where the question in dispute is purely a legal one"||| 
>>Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action.  Government itself, as distinguished from officers or employees of
that the proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Act
Nos. 2207 and 3452, but was authorized by the President as commander-
in-chief "for military stock pile purposes" in the exercise of his alleged
authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1
== the two Acts are applicable to the proposed importation in question
because the language of said laws is such as to include within the purview
thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines.||| (Gonzales
v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, [October 22, 1963], 118 PHIL 1065-
1089)
>>Respondents allege,||| provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452
do not apply to importations "made by the Government itself”
== This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein,
and each and every officer and employee of our Government, are
government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of said laws even to
of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the
corresponding taxes", thus indicating thatonly "private parties"
may import rice under its provisions;
c. Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the offender is a public
official and/or employee", he shall be subject to the additional
penalty specified therein. A public official is an officer of the
instrumentalities of the Government. ||| 
Besides, the stocking of rice and corn for purposes of national security
and/or national emergency is within the purview of Republic Act No.
3452. Section 3 thereof expressly authorizes the Rice and Corn
Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in such
quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet  any
contingencies".||| 
The provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which
respondents rely so much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the
general objectives of said legislation. The means for the attainment of
those objectives are subject to congressional legislation.||| 
NOTE:
Even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it

Page 108 of 114

Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
redounds to the benefit of the people".  Salus populi est suprema lex, it is
said.|||  invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
The Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2)
contracts for the purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and
another with the Government of Burma;
that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under
international law; that such agreements became binding and effective upon
signing thereof by representatives of the parties thereto;
that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 on
the one hand, and the aforementioned contracts, on the other, the
latter should prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent
with each other, the conflict must be resolved — under the American
jurisprudence|| - in favor of the one which is latest in point of
time||| (Gonzales v. Hechanova, G.R. No. L-21897, [October 22, 1963],
118 PHIL 1065-1089) 
Issue: WON RA 3452 prevailes over the 2 Executive Agreements entered
into by Pres. Macapagal?
Held: Yes
Although the President may, under the American constitutional system,
enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he
may not, by executive agreement, enter into a transaction which
is prohibited by statutes enacted prior thereto. Under the Constitution, the
main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress.
The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers
of the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power.
He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired the status of
laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by
said laws.|||  Agreement.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
As regards the question whether an international agreement may be
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing, in
Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not be
deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court may
provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in
— (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question".
In other words, our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not
only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.||| 
USAFFE Veterans Association vs Treasurer 105 PHIL 1030
BENGZON, J p
Facts:
The central issue in this litigation concerns the validity of the Romulo-
Snyder Agreement undertook to return to the United States Government in
ten annual installments, a total of about 35-million dollars advanced by the
United States to, but unexpended by, the National Defense Forces of the
Philippines.
In October 1954, the Usaffe Veterans Associations Inc., hereafter
called Usaffe Veterans, for itself and for many other Filipino veterans of
World War II, ex-members of the United States Armed Forces in the Far
East (USAF-FE)
>> prayed in its complaint before the Manila court of first instance that
said Agreement be annulled, that payments there under be declared illegal
and that defendants as officers of the Philippine Republic be restrained
from disbursing any funds in the National Treasury in pursuance of said
Page 109 of 114
>>Said Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys available, instead
of being remitted to the States, should be turned overt to the Finance
Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for the payment of all
pending claims of the veterans represented by plaintiff.
The complaint rested on plaintiff's three porpositions:
first, that the funds to be "returned" under the Agreement were funds
appropriated by the American Congress for the Philippine Army,
actually delivered to the Philippine Government and actually owned by the
said Government;
second, that U.S. Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority to
retake such funds from the P.I. Government; and
third, the Philippine Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority
to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the so-
called Romulo-Snyder Agreement.
The defendants moved to dismiss, alleging Governmental immunity from
suit. but the court required an answer, and then the case on the merits.
Thereafter, it dismissed the complaint, upheld the validity of the
Agreement and dissolved the preliminary injunction it had previously
issued. The plaintiff appealed.
On July 26, 1941, foreseeing the War in the Pacific, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt, called into the serve of the Armed Forces of the United States,
for the duration of the emergency, all the organized military forces of
the Philippine Commonwealth. ||| 
General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General of the United States
Army Forces in the Far East (known as USAFFE) placed under his
command all the Philippine Army units including the Philippine
constabulary||| 
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
== the expenses incident to such incorporation mobilization and
activities, the Congress of the United States provided in its Appropriation
Act of December 17, 1941 (Public Law No. 353, 77th Congress)||| 
==the last pertinent appropriation was Public Law No. 301 (79th
Congress) Known as the Rescission Act
"Advance of Funds under Public Law 353-77th Congress and Executive
Order No. 9011". this amount was used (mostly) to discharge in the
Philippine Islands the monetary obligations assumed by the U.S.
Government as a result of the induction of the Philippine Armed Forces
into the U.S. Army, and of its operations beginning in 1941. Part of these
obligations consisted in the claims of Filipino USAFFE soldiers for arrears
in pay and in the charges for supplies used by them and the guerrillas
The Philippine Government badly needed funds for its activities, President
Quirino, through Government Miguel Cuaderno of the Central Bank
proposed to the corresponding officials of the U.S Government the
retention of the 35-million dollars as a loan, and for its repayment inten
annual installments.||| 
>> Usaffe Veterans||| They insist;
first, the money delivered by the U.S. to the Armed Forces of the
Philippine Island were straight payments for military services; ownership
thereof vested in the Philippine Government upon delivery, and
consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing to consider as a loan;
and
second,the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was void because there was no
loan to be repaid and because it was not binding on the Philippine
Government for lack of authority of the officers who concluded the
same.||| 
Page 110 of 114
Issue: WON Romulo-Snyder Agreement was void?
Held: Yes.
There is no doubt that President Quirino approved the negotiations. And
he had power to contract budgetary loans under Republic Act No. 213,
amending Republic Act No. 16. the most important argument, however,
rests on the lack of ratification of the Agreement by the Senate of the
Philippines to make it binding on this Government. 
"That the agreement is not a 'treaty' as that term is used in the Constitution,
is conceded. The agreement was never submitted to Senate for
concurrence (Art. VII, Sect. 10). (7). However, it must be noted that a
treaty is not the only form that an international agreement may assumed.
For the grant of the treaty-making power to the Executive and the Senate
does not exhaust the power of the government over international
international relation, Consequently, executive agreements may be entered
into with other states and are effective even without the concurrence of the
Senate|||  PANGANIBAN, J p:||| (Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, [May 2,
The Court apparently holds that Executive agreements may be entered
into with other states, and are effected even without the concurrence of the
Senate.||| 
It is observed in this connection that from the point of view of
international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers
There are now various forms of such pacts or agreements entered into by
and between sovereign states which do not necessarily come under the
strict sense of a treaty and which do not require ratification or consent of
the legislative body of the State, but nevertheless, are consideration valid
international agreements.|||  brushed off these contentions and ruled that the WTO is constitutional.
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
Executive Agreements fall into two classes:
(1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external relations
and independent of or without legislative authorization, which may be
termed as presidential agreements, and
(2) agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Congress, which have
been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements
- it is hereby maintained that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was
legally and validly entered into to conform to the second category,
namely, 'agreements entered into purely as executive acts without
legislative authorization.' This second category usually includes money
agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. It
may be said that this method of settling such claims has come to be the
usual way of dealing with matters of this kind||| 
Tañada v. Angara
G.R. No. 118295 | May 2, 1997
1997], 338 PHIL 546-606)
Summary:
>> Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Philippines acceding to
the World Trade Organization for being violative of provisions which are
supposed to give preference to Filipino workers and economy and on
theground that it infringes legislative and judicial power.
The WTO, through it provisions on “most favored nation” and national
treatment, require that nationals and other member countries are placed in
the same footing interms of products and services. However, the Court
Page 111 of 114
Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the preferential use of
should be read in relation to Sections 1 and 13 (promoting the general Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.”
welfare). Also, Section 10 is self- executing only to “rights, privileges,
 
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony” but not every
aspect of trade and commerce. >>It is petitioners’ position that the “national treatment” and “parity
provisions” of the WTO Agreement“ place nationals and products of
There are balancing provisions in the Constitution allowing the Senate to
member countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in
ratify the WTO agreement. Also, the Constitution doesn’t rule out foreign
contravention of the “Filipino First”  policy of the Constitution. They
competition. States waive certain amount of sovereignty when entering
allegedly render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by
into
Filipinos.”
treaties.
 
Facts:
>> Petitioners argue that the “letter, spirit and intent” of the Constitution
 This case questions the constitutionality of the Philippines being part of mandating “economic nationalism” are violated by the so-called “parity
the World Trade Organization, particularly when President Fidel Ramos provisions” and “national treatment” clauses scattered in parts of WTO
signed the Instrument of Ratification and the Senate concurring in the said Agreement
treaty.
This is in view of the most-favored nation clause (MFN) of
 Following World War 2, global financial leaders held a conference the TRIMS (trade-related investment measures), TRIPS (Trade Related
in Bretton Woods to discuss global economy. This led to the establishment aspects of intellectual property rights), Trade in Services, and par. 4 of
of three great institutions: International Bank for Reconstructionand Article III of GATT 1994.
Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund and
“shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
International Trade Organization.
products of national origin.”
 However, the ITO failed to materialized. Instead, there was the General
 Sec. 19, Art II: The State shall develop a self-reliant and
Agreement on Trades andTariffs. It was on the Uruguay Round of the
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
GATT that the WTO was then established.
 Sec. 10, Art XII: Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
The WTO is an institution regulating trade among nations, including
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
the reduction of tariff and barriers.
Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the
>> Petitioners filed a case assailing the WTO Agreement for violating national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and qualified Filipinos
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give

Page 112 of 114

Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
 Sec. 12, Art XII: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino
labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures
that help make them competitive.”
Issue:
WON the provisions of the WTO Agreement contravene Section 19,
Article II and Section 10 & 12, ArtilceXII of the 1987 Constitution?
Held: NO!
These provisions are not self-executing
 Merely guides in the exercise of judicial review and in making laws.
 Sec. 10 and 12 of Article XII should be read and understood in relation to
the other sections in said article, especially Sec. 1 and 13:
 -A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
 -A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
-An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life
 The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-
executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough
balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there
are.
 
WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies
Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,
 Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and veto
powers in the SecurityCouncil, in the WTO, decisions are made on the
basis of sovereign equality, with each member’s vote equal in weight.
Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries
 Tariff reduction-developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6
years, developing 24%in 10 years
Domestic subsidy –developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6)
years, developing countries at 13% in 10 years
 Export subsidy – developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing
countries, 3/4ths of 36% in10 years.
Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition
 Encourages industries that are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets
 The Court will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of
trade liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its
constitutional duty of determining whether the Senate committed
grave abuse of discretion.
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of
principles and state policies." The counterpart of this article in the 1935
Constitution is called the "basic political creed of the nation" by Dean
Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-
executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of
judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.
As held in the leading case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, the
principles and state policies enumerated in Article II and some sections of
Page 113 of 114
Article XII are not "self-executing provisions, the disregard of which can
give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They do not embody judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.

Page 114 of 114

Case digest of Bahia,Bulos,Espeleta,Garado,Guarin,Langrio,Penarroyo,Raz,Tapia,Ventura,