payShield 9000

Decommissioning Guide
Product Information

PPIF0552-002
March 2011

www.thalesgroup.com/iss
 payShield 9000 Decommissioning Guide

>> Table of Contents

>> Table of Contents ................................................................................... ii

>> Introduction .......................................................................................... 3

>> 1 - Temporary HSM Decommissioning...................................................... 5

>> 2 - Permanent HSM Decommissioning ..................................................... 8

>> 3 - Decommissioning of LMK smart cards ................................................ 9

>> Customer Responsibility ....................................................................... 11

Page 2 of 12 Thales – Information Technology Security

>> Introduction

>> Introduction

This guide describes the recommended decommissioning process for the payShield
9000 series of Hardware Security Modules (HSMs). These modules have been
supplied by Thales e-Security since 2009.

Secret information (i.e. cryptographic keys) for the payShield 9000 series of HSMs
is stored in two places. Local Master Key (LMK) components are stored on smart
cards external to the payShield 9000 and the composite LMK itself is secured
using tamper-protected battery-backed memory inside the payShield 9000. It is
important that both aspects of the LMK are handled properly depending on the
decommissioning scenario - see below.

The payShield 9000 is able to support multiple LMK sets which may be managed
by different security personnel. However the principles of decommissioning remain
the same. Once all the LMK(s) have been erased from the HSM it can perform no
useful processing until a new LMK (or set of LMKs) is installed.

There are several possible scenarios requiring the decommissioning of a payShield

9000. These generally fall into 3 categories:

1) The need to remove an HSM from service temporarily, e.g. for the purpose
of repair, maintenance or inspection. In this scenario all secret data held in
the affected HSM should be erased, though the expectation is that it will be
returned to service later, either in the same role or in a different role in the
same organization. In most instances, other HSMs (possibly other Thales
HSM models such as the RG7000 or HSM 8000) containing the same
LMKs will be left in service, so it will be important NOT to decommission the
LMK component smart cards. Refer to Section 1 –Temporary HSM
Decommissioning for instructions.
2) The need to remove an HSM from service permanently, ready for disposal at
end-of-life, but leaving other HSMs containing the same LMKs still in service.
Again it will be important NOT to decommission the LMK component smart
cards. In this scenario the HSM itself will become permanently unusable.
Refer to Section 2 – Permanent HSM Decommissioning for instructions
3) The need to remove the last in a set of HSMs from service and to
discontinue the application using the HSMs for cryptographic services. In this
case both the sensitive data held in the last HSM will need to be erased AND
all the LMK component smart cards must also be decommissioned. Refer to
Section 3 – Decommissioning of LMK Smart Cards for instructions. The
HSMs themselves can either be temporarily decommissioned ready for re-
deployment (as in Category 1 above) or permanently decommissioned (as in
Category 2 above) depending on requirements.

Thales – Information Technology Security Page 3 of 12

 >> Introduction

It is necessary to determine unequivocally which category applies to each HSM

being decommissioned.

Organizations using payShield 9000s will almost certainly have practices or

procedures which are to be followed in the event that cryptographic keys and/or
the products using them are to be decommissioned. This is usually to ensure that
all security events are properly recorded for auditing purposes. Users must
familiarize themselves with, and observe any such practices or procedures before
commencing any of the decommissioning activities described in this bulletin.

WARNING
Some of the processes described in this document may have inherent safety
hazards. This includes operations involving cutting, which can result in sharp edges
and/or small flying particles. All processes must be carried out in accordance with
local Health and Safety regulations and by personnel who have been trained and
equipped with the appropriate tools, safety equipment and a suitable place to work

Page 4 of 12 Thales – Information Technology Security

>> 1 - Temporary HSM Decommissioning

>> 1 - Temporary HSM Decommissioning

This procedure erases the Local Master Key from battery backed memory inside
the payShield 9000. The process is the same whether a single LMK set or multiple
LMK sets are loaded. It will also erase other security data stored inside the HSM
such as audit settings, the audit trail itself and remote management security keys.
NOTE: This procedure normally requires a console or PC running Local HSM
Manager and the physical keys to the HSM.

Left key 8 status LEDs Right key

Card reader
payShield 9000 Front Panel features

With the HSM powered on, (indicated by the “Power” LED being illuminated on the
front panel) check that the “LMK” LED is ON. This indicates that at least one LMK is
loaded. If the “LMK” LED is OFF then there is no LMK loaded. This should be
further verified via the console “VT” command or using Local HSM Manager. (See
the payShield 9000 Console Reference Manual or Local HSM Manager User’s
Guide for details).

If it has been positively established that the HSM contains no LMK(s), no further
action is required in this respect.

To erase the LMK(s) (and all other information such as any Remote Management
secret data, and any keys held in User storage), perform the following steps:
a) Disconnect the HSM from mains power
b) Press the “Erase” button on the rear panel. This will require a thin probe (like
a straightened paper clip) to be inserted into the hole in the rear panel (see
diagram below) until a slight “click” is felt. Do not press too hard.
c) Reconnect the HSM to mains power and wait for the unit to boot up.
d) Observe that the “LMK” LED on the front panel is now extinguished.
e) Verify that no LMK is present by using the “VT” console command or using
Local HSM Manager.

Thales – Information Technology Security Page 5 of 12

 >> 1 - Temporary HSM Decommissioning

Erase button
(via small hole)
payShield 9000 Rear Panel

At this stage all secret information will have been erased from the HSM and it will
no longer be able to perform any cryptographic operations. However, it will still
contain some other information which in certain circumstances may be considered
sensitive. Examples of this are: IP addresses, security settings, and other
configuration information. If local or audit procedures dictate that HSMs should not
be released with this information still present, steps must be taken to remove it.
Refer to the payShield 9000 Console Reference Manual or Local HSM Manager
User’s Guide for information about how to change the settings manually:
alternatively you may be able to use the “return to factory settings” facility described
in Note 4 below.

Once it has been verified that the HSM contains no sensitive information, it is ready
to be repaired, re-deployed or disposed of as appropriate.

Note 1: Pressing the “Erase” button causes an entry to be made into the system
Error Log. This in turn causes the front panel “Error Log” LED to flash. If the error
log entries are displayed, a number of new entries will be observed. One of these
will note that the “Erase” button has been engaged.

Note 2: The erase procedure can be carried out with the HSM powered from the
mains. If the HSM is powered when the “Erase” button is pressed, the HSM will
immediately reboot but the result will be the same (i.e. the “LMK” LED will be
extinguished and the “ERROR LOG” LED will flash).

Note 3: If the HSM is not operational (no LEDs illuminated when connected to the
mains) the above procedure will still cause the erasure of the LMK and any other
sensitive key material – the erase mechanism does not depend on the HSM being
operational. However under these circumstances, verification of erasure of the LMK
will not be possible.

Note 4: An alternative method of erasure of all sensitive information is available for

HSMs fitted with firmware version 1.1a or later. At this firmware version, a “return

Page 6 of 12 Thales – Information Technology Security

to factory settings” option was introduced which erases all keys (including LMKs)
and logs, and resets all configurable settings to their default values. This option is
available via the Console “RESET” command, or via the Local HSM Manager (Tools
menu, “Return to Factory Settings”). It is not available when using the Remote HSM
Manager. Refer to the Console Reference Manual or the Local HSM Manager
User’s Guide for details of how to use this option. After erasure using this method,
it is still recommended that a check is made that the front panel “LMK” LED is
extinguished and that no LMK is present by using the “VT” console command or
using Local HSM Manager. Please note that if use is made of the RESET Console
command or the “Return to Factory Settings” option in Local HSM Manager, the
HSM will still contain the most recently installed firmware and license which may not
be the same as that which was installed in the factory.

The fact that secret cryptographic material has been erased should be logged
against the serial number of the HSM in accordance with local, corporate or
scheme-related procedures.

In the unlikely situation where there is a lack of confidence that the LMK erasure
process has been successful (for example if the HSM is damaged in some way or
the erase button did not operate as expected), there are broadly three options
available to complete the decommissioning:
1) Contact your nearest Thales Support office to discuss the option of a Field
Service Engineer attending your site for the purposes of initiating a deliberate
tampering of the HSM which will cause the erasure of all sensitive data. Special
tools are required to complete this task. If this option is adopted the affected
HSM will in all cases need to be returned to Thales to be repaired and re-
secured before any further use. (NOTE: This option may not be available in all
countries).
2) Contact your local Thales Support Office to arrange for provision of the “Secure
Destruction” service. There will be a charge made for this service. It will be
necessary to arrange for the secure transportation of the HSM to the Thales-
nominated facility. Clearly the affected HSM will become permanently
decommissioned in this case.
3) As a last resort you can make your own provision to have the HSM physically
disabled using local mechanical workshop facilities. Clearly if this option is
chosen, the unit will become permanently decommissioned. If this approach is to
be adopted, it is recommended that the two physical keys are each destroyed by
cutting them into two or more pieces and disposing of the pieces separately
from each other and the HSM itself.

The serial number and status of each HSM decommissioned on either a temporary
or permanent basis should be logged in accordance with any local, corporate or
scheme-related procedures.

Thales – Information Technology Security Page 7 of 12

 >> 2 - Permanent HSM Decommissioning

>> 2 - Permanent HSM Decommissioning

Permanent decommissioning may become necessary when an HSM reaches the

end of its normal operational life. For example it could be replaced by a newer
model or by a higher speed model, or the application to which it provides security
services is to be discontinued.

Prior to permanent decommissioning, the same steps as described under Section

1 – Temporary HSM Decommissioning must be carried out to ensure that no
secret data remains stored inside. This step alone ensures that the HSM can
perform no further cryptographic processing.

The objective of permanent decommissioning is to ensure that the HSM can never
be used again. This final step reduces still further the possibility of the HSM being
re-commissioned accidentally or covertly as a result of it falling into the hands of
unauthorized personnel.

The options for permanent decommissioning are:

1) Contact your local Thales Support Office to arrange for provision of the
“Secure Destruction” service. There will be a charge made for this service. It
will be necessary to arrange for the secure transportation of the HSM to the
Thales-nominated facility.
2) Make your own provision to have the HSM physically disabled using local
mechanical workshop facilities (e.g by crushing or cutting into multiple small
pieces). If this approach is to be adopted, it is also recommended that the
two physical keys are each destroyed by cutting them into two or more
pieces and disposing of the pieces separately from each other and the
physically disabled HSM itself.

The serial number and status of each permanently decommissioned unit should be
logged in accordance with any local, corporate or scheme-related procedures

Page 8 of 12 Thales – Information Technology Security

>> 3 - Decommissioning of LMK smart cards

>> 3 - Decommissioning of LMK smart cards

The payShield 9000 series of HSMs use smart cards to store LMK components.
Typically there are three components to each LMK, each stored on a separate
smart card. Normally a Security Officer has control over one primary LMK
component card and one secondary (or backup) card making a total of six cards.
These six cards will normally have been stored in separate secure locations. The
three Security Officers will each need to retrieve their own cards ensuring that they
are associated with the HSM (or HSMs) which are to be decommissioned.

Note that if the cards are also used in conjunction with HSMs which are not to be
decommissioned at this time, they must NOT be decommissioned otherwise the
HSMs still in operation will have no means of reloading the LMK when this becomes
necessary. Only when the last HSM of a group using a common LMK is to be
decommissioned is it appropriate to decommission the LMK component cards and
their backup cards.

If the LMK components themselves, or any information about them, is written on

paper, this must be destroyed using a good quality cross-cut shredder.

Some organizations have their own practices or procedures for dealing with
cryptographic keys when they are no longer required. Any such practices or
procedures should take precedence over the methodology described below.

NOTE: Refer to the Warning on Page 1 of this bulletin before proceeding with the
next steps.

Thales recommends that LMK component cards are decommissioned by cutting

each card into two pieces along a line which crosses the middle of the gold-plated
metal contact plate embedded in the plastic card. The objective is to cut the actual
chip into two pieces to ensure that it can never be used again. (The chip of the
smart card is mounted behind and in the middle of the contact plate).

It is important that the smart card is cut precisely across the middle of the contact
plate as the actual chip on the other side is very small (approximately 1.5 mm
square). A small deviation in the position of the cutting line from the middle of the
contact plate could mean that the chip itself is not cut into two pieces

The cutting of the card and chip may be performed using a tough pair of scissors or
other similar cutting tool. The cutting operation may result in sharp edges or flying
particles.

Thales – Information Technology Security Page 9 of 12

See the diagram below which shows where the card should be cut.

Cut line Metal contact plate

Position of chip
behind contact plate

Decommissioning an LMK smart card

Each Security Officer must personally either perform the decommissioning of their
cards, or witness the process of decommissioning being carried out by someone
else.

The decommissioning of each card (i.e. LMK component) must be logged in

accordance with any local, corporate or scheme-related procedures.

For added security each Security Officer should dispose of the cut pieces of the
card separately from the other officers and ensure that the two pieces of each card
are disposed of such that the likelihood of them ever coming together again is
minimised. One way of achieving this is to dispose of each card piece at two
different times separated by an interval which ensures that the pieces are carried
away by two different waste collection cycles.

Page 10 of 12 Thales – Information Technology Security

>> Customer Responsibility

>> Customer Responsibility

Once all secret key material has been erased from a payShield 9000, it may safely
be re-deployed for use with a different application or, if permanently
decommissioned, it may be disposed of.

If it is to be re-deployed, either a new set of smart cards will be required to enable

the establishment of new LMKs, or the HSM may be loaded with an LMK already in
use with other HSMs – effectively joining that group of HSMs. Refer to the HSM
installation instructions to ensure that a re-deployed HSM is brought back into
service correctly.

If the HSM has been permanently decommissioned, disposal should take place in
accordance with local environmental regulations (e.g. the European Union Waste
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Directive) as an electronic device with a
Lithium battery. Thales recommends that unwanted electronic equipment is not
disposed of in landfill sites.

Thales – Information Technology Security Page 11 of 12

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