Conservatism

Conservatism is a political and social philosophy promoting traditional social institutions in the context of culture and civilization. The central tenets of conservatism
include tradition, organic society, hierarchy, authority, and property rights.[1] Conservatives seek to preserve a range of institutions such as religion, parliamentary
government, and property rights, with the aim of emphasizing social stability and continuity.[2] The more traditional elements—reactionaries—oppose modernism
and seek a return to "the way things were".[3][4]

The first established use of the term in a political context originated in 1818 with François-René de Chateaubriand[5] during the period of Bourbon Restoration that
sought to roll back the policies of the French Revolution. Historically associated with right-wing politics, the term has since been used to describe a wide range of
views. There is no single set of policies regarded as conservative because the meaning of conservatism depends on what is considered traditional in a given place and
time. Thus conservatives from different parts of the world—each upholding their respective traditions—may disagree on a wide range of issues. Edmund Burke, an
18th-century politician who opposed the French Revolution, but supported the American Revolution, is credited as one of the main theorists of conservatism in Great
Britain in the 1790s.[6]

According to Quintin Hogg, the chairman of the British Conservative Party in 1959: "Conservatism is not so much a philosophy as an attitude, a constant force,
performing a timeless function in the development of a free society, and corresponding to a deep and permanent requirement of human nature itself".[7]

Contents
Forms
Liberal conservatism
Conservative liberalism
Libertarian conservatism
Fiscal conservatism
National and traditional conservatism
Cultural and social conservatism
Defending inequality
Religious conservatism
Paternalistic conservatism
Authoritarian conservatism
History
Development of Western conservatism
Historical conservatism in different countries
Modern conservatism in different countries
Characteristics of conservatism in different countries
Psychology
See also
References
Bibliography
Further reading
Primary sources
External links

Forms

Liberal conservatism

Liberal conservatism incorporates the classical liberal view of minimal government intervention in the economy. Individuals should be free to participate in the
market and generate wealth without government interference.[8] However, individuals cannot be thoroughly depended on to act responsibly in other spheres of life,
therefore liberal conservatives believe that a strong state is necessary to ensure law and order and social institutions are needed to nurture a sense of duty and
responsibility to the nation.[8] Liberal conservatism is a variant of conservatism that is strongly influenced by liberal stances.[9]

As these latter two terms have had different meanings over time and across countries, liberal conservatism also has a wide variety of meanings. Historically, the term
often referred to the combination of economic liberalism, which champions laissez-faire markets, with the classical conservatism concern for established tradition,
respect for authority and religious values. It contrasted itself with classical liberalism, which supported freedom for the individual in both the economic and social
spheres.

Over time, the general conservative ideology in many countries adopted economic liberal arguments and the term liberal conservatism was replaced with
conservatism. This is also the case in countries where liberal economic ideas have been the tradition such as the United States and are thus considered conservative.
In other countries where liberal conservative movements have entered the political mainstream, such as Italy and Spain, the terms liberal and conservative may be
synonymous. The liberal conservative tradition in the United States combines the economic individualism of the classical liberals with a Burkean form of
conservatism (which has also become part of the American conservative tradition, such as in the writings of Russell Kirk).

A secondary meaning for the term liberal conservatism that has developed in Europe is a combination of more modern conservative (less traditionalist) views with
those of social liberalism. This has developed as an opposition to the more collectivist views of socialism. Often this involves stressing what are now conservative
views of free market economics and belief in individual responsibility, with social liberal views on defence of civil rights, environmentalism and support for a limited
welfare state. In continental Europe, this is sometimes also translated into English as social conservatism.

Conservative liberalism

Conservative liberalism is a variant of liberalism that combines liberal values and policies with conservative stances.[10][11][12] The roots of conservative liberalism
are found at the beginning of the history of liberalism. Until the two World Wars, in most European countries the political class was formed by conservative liberals,
from Germany to Italy. Events after World War I brought the more radical version of classical liberalism to a more conservative (i.e. more moderate) type of
liberalism.[13]

Libertarian conservatism

Libertarian conservatism describes certain political ideologies most prominently within the United States which combine libertarian economic issues with aspects of
conservatism. Its four main branches are constitutionalism, paleolibertarianism, small government conservatism and Christian libertarianism. They generally differ
from paleoconservatives, in that they favor more personal and economic freedom.

Agorists such as Samuel Edward Konkin III labeled libertarian conservatism right-libertarianism.[14][15]

In contrast to paleoconservatives, libertarian conservatives support strict laissez-faire policies such as free trade, opposition to any national bank and opposition to
business regulations. They are vehemently opposed to environmental regulations, corporate welfare, subsidies and other areas of economic intervention.

Many conservatives, especially in the United States, believe that the government should not play a major role in regulating business and managing the economy.
They typically oppose efforts to charge high tax rates and to redistribute income to assist the poor. Such efforts, they argue, do not properly reward people who have
earned their money through hard work.

Fiscal conservatism

Fiscal conservatism is the economic philosophy of prudence in government spending and debt.[16] In his Reflections on the
Revolution in France, Edmund Burke argued that a government does not have the right to run up large debts and then throw
the burden on the taxpayer:

[I]t is to the property of the citizen, and not to the demands of the creditor of the state, that the first and original
faith of civil society is pledged. The claim of the citizen is prior in time, paramount in title, superior in equity.
The fortunes of individuals, whether possessed by acquisition or by descent or in virtue of a participation in the
goods of some community, were no part of the creditor's security, expressed or implied...[T]he public, whether
represented by a monarch or by a senate, can pledge nothing but the public estate; and it can have no public 2009 Taxpayer March on Washington
estate except in what it derives from a just and proportioned imposition upon the citizens at large. as conservative protesters walk
down Pennsylvania Avenue,
Washington, D. C.

National and traditional conservatism

National conservatism is a political term used primarily in Europe to describe a variant of conservatism which concentrates more on
national interests than standard conservatism as well as upholding cultural and ethnic identity,[17] while not being outspokenly
nationalist or supporting a far-right approach.[18][19] In Europe, national conservatives are usually eurosceptics.[20][21]

National conservatism is heavily oriented towards the traditional family and social stability as well as in favour of limiting
immigration. As such, national conservatives can be distinguished from economic conservatives, for whom free market economic
policies, deregulation and fiscal conservatism are the main priorities. Some commentators have identified a growing gap between
national and economic conservatism: "[M]ost parties of the Right [today] are run by economic conservatives who, in varying
degrees, have marginalized social, cultural, and national conservatives".[22] National conservatism is also related to traditionalist
conservatism.

Traditionalist conservatism is a political philosophy emphasizing the need for the principles of natural law and transcendent moral
order, tradition, hierarchy and organic unity, agrarianism, classicism and high culture as well as the intersecting spheres of loyalty.[23]
Some traditionalists have embraced the labels "reactionary" and "counterrevolutionary", defying the stigma that has attached to these
terms since the Enlightenment. Having a hierarchical view of society, many traditionalist conservatives, including a few Americans,
defend the monarchical political structure as the most natural and beneficial social arrangement.

Gianfranco Fini, former

Cultural and social conservatism President of the Italian
Chamber of Deputies, in
Cultural conservatives support the preservation of the heritage of one nation, or of a shared culture that is not defined by national 2004
boundaries.[24] The shared culture may be as divergent as Western culture or Chinese culture. In the United States, the term "cultural
conservative" may imply a conservative position in the culture war. Cultural conservatives hold fast to traditional ways of thinking
even in the face of monumental change. They believe strongly in traditional values and traditional politics and often have an urgent sense of nationalism.

Social conservatism is distinct from cultural conservatism, although there are some overlaps. Social conservatives may believe that society is built upon a fragile
network of relationships which need to be upheld through duty, traditional values and established institutions;[25] and that the government has a role in encouraging
or enforcing traditional values or behaviours. A social conservative wants to preserve traditional morality and social mores, often by opposing what they consider
radical policies or social engineering. Social change is generally regarded as suspect.

A second meaning of the term social conservatism developed in the Nordic countries and continental Europe, where it refers to liberal conservatives supporting
modern European welfare states.
Social conservatives (in the first meaning of the phrase) in many countries generally favour the anti-abortion position in the abortion controversy and oppose human
embryonic stem cell research (particularly if publicly funded); oppose both eugenics and human enhancement (transhumanism) while supporting bioconservatism;[26]
support a traditional definition of marriage as being one man and one woman; view the nuclear family model as society's foundational unit; oppose expansion of civil
marriage and child adoption to couples in same-sex relationships; promote public morality and traditional family values; oppose atheism,[27] especially militant
atheism, secularism and the separation of church and state;[28][29][30] support the prohibition of drugs, prostitution and euthanasia; and support the censorship of
pornography and what they consider to be obscenity or indecency. Most conservatives in the United States support the death penalty.

Defending inequality

In contrast to the tradition-based definition of conservatism, some political theorists such as Corey Robin define conservatism primarily in terms of a general defense
of social and economic inequality. From this perspective, conservatism is less an attempt to uphold traditional institutions and more "a meditation on—and theoretical
rendition of—the felt experience of having power, seeing it threatened, and trying to win it back".[31] Conversely, some conservatives may argue that they are
seeking less to protect their own power than they are seeking to protect "inalienable rights" and promote norms and rules that they believe should stand timeless and
eternal, applying to each citizen.[32][33]

Religious conservatism

Religious conservatism principally apply the teachings of particular religions to politics, sometimes by merely proclaiming
the value of those teachings, at other times by having those teachings influence laws.[34]

In most democracies, political conservatism seeks to uphold traditional family structures and social values. Religious
conservatives typically oppose abortion, LGBT behavior (or, in certain cases, identity), drug use,[35] and sexual activity
outside of marriage. In some cases, conservative values are grounded in religious beliefs, and conservatives seek to increase
the role of religion in public life.[36]

Paternalistic conservatism 2012 March for Life in Paris, France

Paternalistic conservatism is a strand in conservatism which reflects the belief that societies exist and develop organically and
that members within them have obligations towards each other.[37] There is particular emphasis on the paternalistic obligation of those who are privileged and
wealthy to the poorer parts of society. Since it is consistent with principles such as organicism, hierarchy and duty, it can be seen as an outgrowth of traditional
conservatism. Paternal conservatives support neither the individual nor the state in principle, but are instead prepared to support either or recommend a balance
between the two depending on what is most practical.[38]

It stresses the importance of a social safety net to deal with poverty, support of limited redistribution of wealth along with government regulation of markets in the
interests of both consumers and producers.[39] Paternalistic conservatism first arose as a distinct ideology in the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Benjamin
Disraeli's "One Nation" Toryism.[39][40] There have been a variety of one nation conservative governments. In the United Kingdom, the Prime Ministers Disraeli,
Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, Harold Macmillan[41] and Boris Johnson were or are one nation conservatives.

In Germany, during the 19th-century German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck adopted policies of state-organized compulsory insurance for workers against sickness,
accident, incapacity and old age. Chancellor Leo von Caprivi promoted a conservative agenda called the "New Course".[42]

In the United States, the administration of President William Howard Taft was a progressive conservative and he described himself as "a believer in progressive
conservatism"[43] and President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared himself an advocate of "progressive conservatism".[44]

In Canada, a variety of conservative governments have been part of the Red tory tradition, with Canada's former major conservative party being named the
Progressive Conservative Party of Canada from 1942 to 2003.[45] In Canada, the Prime Ministers Arthur Meighen, R. B. Bennett, John Diefenbaker, Joe Clark,
Brian Mulroney, and Kim Campbell led Red tory federal governments.[45]

Authoritarian conservatism

Authoritarian conservatism or reactionary conservatism[46][47][48] refers to autocratic regimes that center their ideology around conservative nationalism, rather
than ethnic nationalism, though certain racial components such as antisemitism may exist.[49] Authoritarian conservative movements show strong devotion towards
religion, tradition and culture while also expressing fervent nationalism akin to other far-right nationalist movements. Examples of authoritarian conservative leaders
include António de Oliveira Salazar[50] and Engelbert Dollfuss.[51] Authoritarian conservative movements were prominent in the same era as fascism, with which it
sometimes clashed. Although both ideologies shared core values such as nationalism and had common enemies such as communism and materialism, there was
nonetheless a contrast between the traditionalist nature of authoritarian conservatism and the revolutionary, palingenetic and populist nature of fascism—thus it was
common for authoritarian conservative regimes to suppress rising fascist and National Socialist movements.[52] The hostility between the two ideologies is
highlighted by the struggle for power for the National Socialists in Austria, which was marked by the assassination of Engelbert Dollfuss.

Sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has examined the class basis of right-wing extremist politics in the 1920–1960 era. He reports:

Conservative or rightist extremist movements have arisen at different periods in modern history, ranging from the Horthyites in Hungary, the Christian
Social Party of Dollfuss in Austria, Der Stahlhelm and other nationalists in pre-Hitler Germany, and Salazar in Portugal, to the pre-1966 Gaullist
movements and the monarchists in contemporary France and Italy. The right extremists are conservative, not revolutionary. They seek to change
political institutions in order to preserve or restore cultural and economic ones, while extremists of the centre and left seek to use political means for
cultural and social revolution. The ideal of the right extremist is not a totalitarian ruler, but a monarch, or a traditionalist who acts like one. Many such
movements in Spain, Austria, Hungary, Germany, and Italy-have been explicitly monarchist... The supporters of these movements differ from those of
the centrists, tending to be wealthier, and more religious, which is more important in terms of a potential for mass support.[53]

History

Development of Western conservatism

United Kingdom

In Great Britain, conservative ideas (though not yet called that) emerged in the Tory movement during the Restoration period (1660–1688). Toryism supported a
hierarchical society with a monarch who ruled by divine right. Tories opposed the idea that sovereignty derived from the people and rejected the authority of
parliament and freedom of religion. Robert Filmer's Patriarcha: or the Natural Power of Kings (published posthumously in 1680, but written before the English
Civil War of 1642–1651) became accepted as the statement of their doctrine. However, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 destroyed this principle to some degree by
establishing a constitutional government in England, leading to the hegemony of the Tory-opposed Whig ideology. Faced with defeat, the Tories reformed their
movement, now holding that sovereignty was vested in the three estates of Crown, Lords and Commons[54] rather than solely in the Crown. Toryism became
marginalized during the long period of Whig ascendancy in the 18th century.

Conservatives typically see Richard Hooker (1554–1600) as the founding father of conservatism, along with the Marquess of Halifax (1633–1695), David Hume
(1711–1776) and Edmund Burke (1729–1797). Halifax promoted pragmatism in government whilst Hume argued against political rationalism and
utopianism.[55][56] Burke served as the private secretary to the Marquis of Rockingham and as official pamphleteer to the Rockingham branch of the Whig party.[57]
Together with the Tories, they were the conservatives in the late 18th century United Kingdom.[58] Burke's views were a mixture of liberal and conservative. He
supported the American Revolution of 1765–1783, but abhorred the violence of the French Revolution (1789–1799). He accepted the liberal ideals of private
property and the economics of Adam Smith (1723–1790), but thought that economics should remain subordinate to the conservative social ethic, that capitalism
should be subordinate to the medieval social tradition and that the business class should be subordinate to aristocracy. He insisted on standards of honor derived from
the medieval aristocratic tradition and saw the aristocracy as the nation's natural leaders.[59] That meant limits on the powers of the Crown, since he found the
institutions of Parliament to be better informed than commissions appointed by the executive. He favored an established church, but allowed for a degree of religious
toleration.[60] Burke justified the social order on the basis of tradition: tradition represented the wisdom of the species and he valued community and social harmony
over social reforms.[61] Burke was a leading theorist in his day, finding extreme idealism (either Tory or Whig) an endangerment to broader liberties and (like Hume)
rejecting abstract reason as an unsound guide for political theory. Despite their influence on future conservative thought, none of these early contributors were
explicitly involved in Tory politics. Hooker lived in the 16th century, long before the advent of toryism, whilst Hume was an apolitical philosopher and Halifax
similarly politically independent. Burke described himself as a Whig.

Revival

Shortly after Burke's death in 1797, conservatism revived as a mainstream political force as the Whigs suffered a series of internal
divisions. This new generation of conservatives derived their politics not from Burke, but from his predecessor, the Viscount
Bolingbroke (1678–1751), who was a Jacobite and traditional Tory, lacking Burke's sympathies for Whiggish policies such as
Catholic emancipation and American independence (famously attacked by Samuel Johnson in "Taxation No Tyranny"). In the first
half of the 19th century, many newspapers, magazines, and journals promoted loyalist or right-wing attitudes in religion, politics and
international affairs. Burke was seldom mentioned, but William Pitt the Younger (1759–1806) became a conspicuous hero. The most
prominent journals included The Quarterly Review, founded in 1809 as a counterweight to the Whigs' Edinburgh Review and the
even more conservative Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine. Sack finds that the Quarterly Review promoted a balanced Canningite
toryism as it was neutral on Catholic emancipation and only mildly critical of Nonconformist Dissent; it opposed slavery and
supported the current poor laws; and it was "aggressively imperialist". The high-church clergy of the Church of England read the
Orthodox Churchman's Magazine which was equally hostile to Jewish, Catholic, Jacobin, Methodist and Unitarian spokesmen.
Edmund Burke (1729–1797)
Anchoring the ultra Tories, Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine stood firmly against Catholic emancipation and favoured slavery,
cheap money, mercantilism, the Navigation Acts and the Holy Alliance.[62]

Conservatism evolved after 1820, embracing free trade in 1846 and a commitment to democracy, especially under Disraeli. The effect was to significantly strengthen
conservatism as a grassroots political force. Conservatism no longer was the philosophical defense of the landed aristocracy, but had been refreshed into redefining its
commitment to the ideals of order, both secular and religious, expanding imperialism, strengthened monarchy and a more generous vision of the welfare state as
opposed to the punitive vision of the Whigs and liberals.[63] As early as 1835, Disraeli attacked the Whigs and utilitarians as slavishly devoted to an industrial
oligarchy, while he described his fellow Tories as the only "really democratic party of England" and devoted to the interests of the whole people.[64] Nevertheless,
inside the party there was a tension between the growing numbers of wealthy businessmen on the one side and the aristocracy and rural gentry on the other.[65] The
aristocracy gained strength as businessmen discovered they could use their wealth to buy a peerage and a country estate.

Although conservatives opposed attempts to allow greater representation of the middle class in parliament, they conceded that electoral reform could not be reversed
and promised to support further reforms so long as they did not erode the institutions of church and state. These new principles were presented in the Tamworth
Manifesto of 1834, which historians regard as the basic statement of the beliefs of the new Conservative Party.[66]

Some conservatives lamented the passing of a pastoral world where the ethos of noblesse oblige had promoted respect from the
lower classes. They saw the Anglican Church and the aristocracy as balances against commercial wealth.[67] They worked toward
legislation for improved working conditions and urban housing.[68] This viewpoint would later be called Tory democracy.[69]
However, since Burke, there has always been tension between traditional aristocratic conservatism and the wealthy business
class.[70]

Robert Peel (1788–1850)
In 1834, Tory Prime Minister Robert Peel issued the Tamworth Manifesto in which he pledged to endorse moderate political reform.
This marked the beginning of the transformation of British conservatism from High Tory reactionism towards a more modern form
based on "conservation". The party became known as the Conservative Party as a result, a name it has retained to this day. However,
Peel would also be the root of a split in the party between the traditional Tories (led by the Earl of Derby and Benjamin Disraeli) and
the "Peelites" (led first by Peel himself, then by the Earl of Aberdeen). The split occurred in 1846 over the issue of free trade, which
Peel supported, versus protectionism, supported by Derby. The majority of the party sided with Derby whilst about a third split
away, eventually merging with the Whigs and the radicals to form the Liberal Party. Despite the split, the mainstream Conservative
Party accepted the doctrine of free trade in 1852.

In the second half of the 19th century, the Liberal Party faced political schisms, especially over Irish Home Rule. Leader William
Gladstone (himself a former Peelite) sought to give Ireland a degree of autonomy, a move that elements in both the left and right-wings of his party opposed. These
split off to become the Liberal Unionists (led by Joseph Chamberlain), forming a coalition with the Conservatives before merging with them in 1912. The Liberal
Unionist influence dragged the Conservative Party towards the left as Conservative governments passing a number of progressive reforms at the turn of the 20th
century. By the late 19th century, the traditional business supporters of the Liberal Party had joined the Conservatives, making them the party of business and
commerce.[71]

After a period of Liberal dominance before the First World War, the Conservatives gradually became more influential in government, regaining full control of the
cabinet in 1922. In the inter-war period, conservatism was the major ideology in Britain[72][73][74] as the Liberal Party vied with the Labour Party for control of the
left. After the Second World War, the first Labour government (1945–1951) under Clement Attlee embarked on a program of nationalization of industry and the
promotion of social welfare. The Conservatives generally accepted those policies until the 1980s.

In the 1980s, the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, guided by neoliberal economics, reversed many of Labour's
programmes.[75] The Conservative Party also adopt soft eurosceptic politics, and oppose Federal Europe. Other conservative
political parties, such as the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP, founded in 1993), Northern Ireland's Ulster Unionist Party
(UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP, founded in 1971), began to appear, although they have yet to make any significant
impact at Westminster (as of 2014, the DUP comprises the largest political party in the ruling coalition in the Northern Ireland
Assembly), and from 2017 to 2019 the DUP provided support for the Conservative minority government.

France

Another form of conservatism developed in France in parallel to conservatism in Britain. It was influenced by Counter-
Enlightenment works by men such as Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald. Many continental or traditionalist conservatives do
not support separation of church and state, with most supporting state recognition of and cooperation with the Catholic Church, such
as had existed in France before the Revolution.
Margaret Thatcher (1925–
Eventually, conservatives added Gaullism, patriotism, and nationalism to the list of traditional values they support. Conservatives 2013), under whose
leadership the Conservative
were the first to embrace nationalism, which was previously associated with liberalism and the Revolution in France.[76]
Party has shifted their
economic policies to the
Germany right as well as Thatcherism

Conservatism developed alongside nationalism in Germany, culminating in Germany's victory over France in the Franco-Prussian
War, the creation of the unified German Empire in 1871 and the simultaneous rise of Otto von Bismarck on the European political
stage. Bismarck's "balance of power" model maintained peace in Europe for decades at the end of the 19th century. His
"revolutionary conservatism" was a conservative state-building strategy designed to make ordinary Germans—not just the Junker
elite—more loyal to state and emperor, he created the modern welfare state in Germany in the 1880s. According to Kees van
Kersbergen and Barbara Vis, his strategy was:

[G]ranting social rights to enhance the integration of a hierarchical society, to forge a bond between workers and the
state so as to strengthen the latter, to maintain traditional relations of authority between social and status groups, and to
provide a countervailing power against the modernist forces of liberalism and socialism.[77]

Bismarck also enacted universal male suffrage in the new German Empire in 1871.[78] He became a great hero to German
Joseph de Maistre (1753–
conservatives, who erected many monuments to his memory after he left office in 1890.[79]
1821)

With the rise of Nazism in 1933, agrarian movements faded and was supplanted by a more command-based economy and forced
social integration. Though Adolf Hitler succeeded in garnering the support of many German industrialists, prominent traditionalists
openly and secretly opposed his policies of euthanasia, genocide and attacks on organized religion, including Claus von Stauffenberg, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Henning
von Tresckow, Bishop Clemens August Graf von Galen and the monarchist Carl Friedrich Goerdeler.

More recently, the work of conservative Christian Democratic Union leader and Chancellor Helmut Kohl helped bring about German reunification, along with the
closer European integration in the form of the Maastricht Treaty.

Today, German conservatism is often associated with politicians such as Chancellor Angela Merkel, whose tenure has been
marked by attempts to save the common European currency (Euro) from demise. The German conservatives are divided under
Merkel due to the refugee crisis in Germany and many conservatives in the CDU/CSU oppose the refugee and migrant policies
developed under Merkel.[80]

United States

American conservatism is a broad system of political beliefs in the United States that is characterized by respect for American
traditions, support for Judeo-Christian values, economic liberalism, anti-communism and a defense of Western culture. Liberty
within the bounds of conformity to conservatism is a core value, with a particular emphasis on strengthening the free market,
limiting the size and scope of government and opposition to high taxes and government or labor union encroachment on the
entrepreneur.

Interestingly, in early American politics, it was the Democratic party practicing 'conservatism' in its attempts to maintain the Angela Merkel, Chancellor of
social and economic institution of slavery. Democratic president Andrew Johnson, as one commonly known example, was Germany since 2005
considered a Conservative. [81] “The Democrats were often called conservative and embraced that label. Many of them were
conservative in the sense that they wanted things to be like they were in the past, especially as far as race was concerned.” [82]
[83]

The major conservative party in the United States today is the Republican Party, also known as the GOP (Grand Old Party). American conservatives consider
individual liberty, as long as it conforms to conservative values, small government, deregulation of the government, economic liberalism, and free trade, as the
fundamental traits of democracy, which contrasts with modern American liberals, who generally place a greater value on social equality and social justice.[84][85]

Historical conservatism in different countries

Conservative political parties vary widely from country to country in the goals they wish to achieve. Both conservative and liberal parties tend to favor private
ownership of property, in opposition to communist, socialist and green parties, which favor communal ownership or laws requiring social responsibility on the part of
property owners. Where conservatives and liberals differ is primarily on social issues. Conservatives tend to reject behavior that does not conform to some social
norm. Modern conservative parties often define themselves by their opposition to liberal or labor parties. The United States usage of the term "conservative" is
unique to that country.[86]
According to Alan Ware, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom retained viable conservative parties into the 1980s.[87] Ware said that Australia, Germany,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Malta, New Zealand, Spain, and the United States had no conservative parties, although they had either
Christian democrats or liberals as major right-wing parties. Canada, Ireland and Portugal had right-wing political parties that
defied categorization: the Progressive Conservative Party of Canada; Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and Progressive Democrats in
Ireland; and the Social Democratic Party of Portugal.[88] Since then, the Swiss People's Party has moved to the extreme right
and is no longer considered to be conservative.[89]

Klaus von Beyme, who developed the method of party categorization, found that no modern Eastern European parties could be European People's Party (EPP)
Congress in Bucharest in 2012,
considered conservative, although the communist and communist-successor parties had strong similarities.[90]
whose three conservative leaders
In Italy, which was united by liberals and radicals (Risorgimento), liberals, not conservatives, emerged as the party of the in the EPP included Prime
Minister of Spain Mariano Rajoy
right.[91] In the Netherlands, conservatives merged into a new Christian democratic party in 1980.[92] In Austria, Germany,
(2011–2018), Chancellor of
Portugal and Spain, conservatism was transformed into and incorporated into fascism or the far-right.[93] In 1940, all Japanese
Germany Angela Merkel and
parties were merged into a single fascist party. Following the war, Japanese conservatives briefly returned to politics, but were Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor
largely purged from public office.[94] Orbán

Louis Hartz explained the absence of conservatism in Australia or the United States as a result of their settlement as radical or
liberal fragments of Great Britain. Although he said English Canada had a negligible conservative influence, subsequent writers claimed that loyalists opposed to the
American Revolution brought a Tory ideology into Canada. Hartz explained conservatism in Quebec and Latin America as a result of their settlement as feudal
societies.[95] The American conservative writer Russell Kirk provided the opinion that conservatism had been brought to the United States and interpreted the
American Revolution as a "conservative revolution".[96]

Conservative elites have long dominated Latin American nations. Mostly, this has been achieved through control of and support for civil institutions, the church and
the armed forces, rather than through party politics. Typically, the church was exempt from taxes and its employees immune from civil prosecution. Where national
conservative parties were weak or non-existent, conservatives were more likely to rely on military dictatorship as a preferred form of government. However, in some
nations where the elites were able to mobilize popular support for conservative parties, longer periods of political stability were achieved. Chile, Colombia and
Venezuela are examples of nations that developed strong conservative parties. Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador and Peru are examples of nations where this did not
occur.[97] The Conservative Party of Venezuela disappeared following the Federal Wars of 1858–1863.[98] Chile's conservative party, the National Party, disbanded
in 1973 following a military coup and did not re-emerge as a political force following the subsequent return to democracy.[99]

Belgium

Having its roots in the conservative Catholic Party, the Christian People's Party retained a conservative edge through the twentieth century, supporting the king in the
Royal Question, supporting nuclear family as the cornerstone of society, defending Christian education, and opposing euthanasia. The Christian People's Party
dominated politics in post-war Belgium. In 1999, the party's support collapsed, and it became the country's fifth-largest party.[100][101][102] Currently, the N-VA
(nieuw-vlaamse alliantie/New Flemish Alliance) is the largest party in Belgium.[103]

Canada

Canada's conservatives had their roots in the Tory loyalists who left America after the American Revolution. They developed in the socio-economic and political
cleavages that existed during the first three decades of the 19th century and had the support of the business, professional and established Church (Anglican) elites in
Ontario and to a lesser extent in Quebec. Holding a monopoly over administrative and judicial offices, they were called the "Family Compact" in Ontario and the
"Chateau Clique" in Quebec. John A. Macdonald's successful leadership of the movement to confederate the provinces and his subsequent tenure as prime minister
for most of the late 19th century rested on his ability to bring together the English-speaking Protestant oligarchy and the ultramontane Catholic hierarchy of Quebec
and to keep them united in a conservative coalition.[104]

The conservatives combined pro-market liberalism and Toryism. They generally supported an activist government and state intervention in the marketplace and their
policies were marked by noblesse oblige, a paternalistic responsibility of the elites for the less well-off.[105] From 1942, the party was known as the Progressive
Conservatives until 2003, when the national party merged with the Canadian Alliance to form the Conservative Party of Canada.[106]

The conservative and autonomist Union Nationale, led by Maurice Duplessis, governed the province of Quebec in periods from 1936 to 1960 and in a close alliance
with the Catholic Church, small rural elites, farmers and business elites. This period, known by liberals as the Great Darkness, ended with the Quiet Revolution and
the party went into terminal decline.[107] By the end of the 1960s, the political debate in Quebec centered around the question of independence, opposing the social
democratic and sovereignist Parti Québécois and the centrist and federalist Quebec Liberal Party, therefore marginalizing the conservative movement. Most French
Canadian conservatives rallied either the Quebec Liberal Party or the Parti Québécois, while some of them still tried to offer an autonomist third-way with what was
left of the Union Nationale or the more populists Ralliement créditiste du Québec and Parti national populaire, but by the 1981 provincial election politically
organized conservatism had been obliterated in Quebec. It slowly started to revive at the 1994 provincial election with the Action démocratique du Québec, who
served as Official opposition in the National Assembly from 2007 to 2008, before its merger with François Legault's Coalition Avenir Québec in 2012, that took
power in 2018.

The modern Conservative Party of Canada has rebranded conservatism and under the leadership of Stephen Harper, the Conservative Party added more conservative
policies.

Colombia

The Colombian Conservative Party, founded in 1849, traces its origins to opponents of General Francisco de Paula Santander's 1833–1837 administration. While the
term "liberal" had been used to describe all political forces in Colombia, the conservatives began describing themselves as "conservative liberals" and their opponents
as "red liberals". From the 1860s until the present, the party has supported strong central government; supported the Catholic Church, especially its role as protector
of the sanctity of the family; and opposed separation of church and state. Its policies include the legal equality of all men, the citizen's right to own property and
opposition to dictatorship. It has usually been Colombia's second largest party, with the Colombian Liberal Party being the largest.[108]

Denmark
Founded in 1915, the Conservative People's Party of Denmark. was the successor of Højre (literally "Right"). The conservative party led the government coalition
from 1982 to 1993. The party was a junior partner in coalition with the Liberals from 2001 to 2011.[109] The party is preceded by 11 years by the Young
Conservatives (KU), today the youth movement of the party. The party suffered a major defeat in the parliamentary elections of September 2011 in which the party
lost more than half of its seat and also lost governmental power. A liberal cultural policy dominated during the post-war period. However, by the 1990s,
disagreements regarding immigrants from entirely different cultures ignited a conservative backlash.[110]

Finland

The conservative party in Finland is the National Coalition Party (in Finnish Kansallinen Kokoomus, Kok). The party was founded in 1918 when several monarchist
parties united. Although in the past the party was right-wing, today it is a moderate liberal conservative party. While the party advocates economic liberalism, it is
committed to the social market economy.[111]

France

Conservatism in France focused on the rejection of the secularism of the French Revolution, support for the role of the Catholic Church and the restoration of the
monarchy.[112] The monarchist cause was on the verge of victory in the 1870s, but then collapsed because the proposed king refused to fly the tri-colored flag.[113]
Religious tensions heightened in the 1890–1910 era, but moderated after the spirit of unity in fighting the First World War.[114] An extreme form of conservatism
characterized the Vichy regime of 1940–1944 with heightened antisemitism, opposition to individualism, emphasis on family life and national direction of the
economy.[115]

Following the Second World War, conservatives in France supported Gaullist groups and have been nationalistic and
emphasized tradition, order and the regeneration of France.[116] Gaullists held divergent views on social issues. The number of
conservative groups, their lack of stability and their tendency to be identified with local issues defy simple categorization.
Conservatism has been the major political force in France since the Second World War.[117] Unusually, post-war French
conservatism was formed around the personality of a leader, Charles de Gaulle; and did not draw on traditional French
conservatism, but on the Bonapartism tradition.[118] Gaullism in France continues under The Republicans (formerly Union for a
Popular Movement), which was previously led by Nicolas Sarkozy, a conservative figure in France.[119] The word
"conservative" itself is a term of abuse in France.[120]

Greece

The main inter-war conservative party was called the People's Party (PP), which supported constitutional monarchy and
opposed the republican Liberal Party. Both it and the Liberal party were suppressed by the authoritarian, arch-conservative and
royalist 4th of August Regime of Ioannis Metaxas in 1936–1941. The PP was able to re-group after the Second World War as
part of a United Nationalist Front which achieved power campaigning on a simple anticommunist, ultranationalist platform
during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949). However, the vote received by the PP declined during the so-called "Centrist
Nicolas Sarkozy, President of
Interlude" in 1950–1952. In 1952, Marshal Alexandros Papagos created the Greek Rally as an umbrella for the right-wing
France (2007–2012)
forces. The Greek Rally came to power in 1952 and remained the leading party in Greece until 1963—after Papagos' death in
1955 reformed as the National Radical Union under Konstantinos Karamanlis. Right-wing governments backed by the palace
and the army overthrew the Centre Union government in 1965 and governed the country until the establishment of the far-right
Greek junta (1967–1974). After the regime's collapse in August 1974, Karamanlis returned from exile to lead the government and founded the New Democracy
party. The new conservative party had four objectives: to confront Turkish expansionism in Cyprus, to reestablish and solidify democratic rule, to give the country a
strong government and to make a powerful moderate party a force in Greek politics.[121]

The Independent Greeks, a newly formed political party in Greece, has also supported conservatism, particularly national and religious conservatism. The Founding
Declaration of the Independent Greeks strongly emphasises in the preservation of the Greek state and its sovereignty, the Greek people and the Greek Orthodox
Church.[122]

Iceland

Founded in 1924 as the Conservative Party, Iceland's Independence Party adopted its current name in 1929 after the merger with the Liberal Party. From the
beginning, they have been the largest vote-winning party, averaging around 40%. They combined liberalism and conservatism, supported nationalization of
infrastructure and opposed class conflict. While mostly in opposition during the 1930s, they embraced economic liberalism, but accepted the welfare state after the
war and participated in governments supportive of state intervention and protectionism. Unlike other Scandanivian conservative (and liberal) parties, it has always
had a large working-class following.[123] After the financial crisis in 2008, the party has sunk to a lower support level around 20–25%.

Luxembourg

Luxembourg's major Christian democratic conservative party, the Christian Social People's Party (CSV or PCS), was formed as the Party of the Right in 1914 and
adopted its present name in 1945. It was consistently the largest political party in Luxembourg, and dominated politics throughout the 20th century.[124]

Norway

The Conservative Party of Norway (Norwegian: Høyre, literally "right") was formed by the old upper class of state officials and wealthy merchants to fight the
populist democracy of the Liberal Party, but lost power in 1884, when parliamentarian government was first practised. It formed its first government under
parliamentarism in 1889 and continued to alternate in power with the Liberals until the 1930s, when Labour became the dominant political party. It has elements both
of paternalism, stressing the responsibilities of the state, and of economic liberalism. It first returned to power in the 1960s.[125] During Kåre Willoch's premiership in
the 1980s, much emphasis was laid on liberalizing the credit and housing market, and abolishing the NRK TV and radio monopoly, while supporting law and order
in criminal justice and traditional norms in education[126]

Sweden

Sweden's conservative party, the Moderate Party, was formed in 1904, two years after the founding of the Liberal Party.[127] The party emphasizes tax reductions,
deregulation of private enterprise and privatization of schools, hospitals, and kindergartens.[128]
Switzerland

There are a number of conservative parties in Switzerland's parliament, the Federal Assembly. These include the largest, the Swiss People's Party (SVP),[129] the
Christian Democratic People's Party (CVP)[130] and the Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland (BDP),[131] which is a splinter of the SVP created in the
aftermath to the election of Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf as Federal Council.[131] The right-wing parties have a majority in the Federal Assembly.

The Swiss People's Party (SVP or UDC) was formed from the 1971 merger of the Party of Farmers, Traders and Citizens, formed in 1917 and the smaller Swiss
Democratic Party, formed in 1942. The SVP emphasized agricultural policy and was strong among farmers in German-speaking Protestant areas. As Switzerland
considered closer relations with the European Union in the 1990s, the SVP adopted a more militant protectionist and isolationist stance. This stance has allowed it to
expand into German-speaking Catholic mountainous areas.[132] The Anti-Defamation League, a non-Swiss lobby group based in the United States has accused them
of manipulating issues such as immigration, Swiss neutrality and welfare benefits, awakening antisemitism and racism.[133] The Council of Europe has called the
SVP "extreme right", although some scholars dispute this classification. For instance, Hans-Georg Betz describes it as "populist radical right".[134] The SVP is the
largest party since 2003.

United Kingdom

According to historian James Sack, English conservatives celebrate Edmund Burke as their intellectual father.[135] Burke was affiliated with the Whig Party which
eventually became the Liberal Party, but the modern Conservative Party is generally thought to derive from the Tory party and the MPs of the modern conservative
party are still frequently referred to as Tories.

Modern conservatism in different countries

While conservatism has been seen as an appeal to traditional, hierarchical society, some writers such as Samuel P. Huntington see it as situational. Under this
definition, conservatives are seen as defending the established institutions of their time.[136]

Australia

The Liberal Party of Australia adheres to the principles of social conservatism and liberal conservatism.[137] It is liberal in the sense of economics. Other conservative
parties are the National Party of Australia, a sister party of the Liberals, Family First Party, Democratic Labor Party, Shooters, Fishers and Farmers Party, Australian
Conservatives, and the Katter's Australian Party.

The second largest party in the country is the Australian Labor Party and its dominant faction is Labor Right, a socially conservative element. Australia undertook
significant economic reform under the Labor Party in the mid-1980s. Consequently, issues like protectionism, welfare reform, privatization and deregulation are no
longer debated in the political space as they are in Europe or North America. Moser and Catley explain: "In America, 'liberal' means left-of-center, and it is a
pejorative term when used by conservatives in adversarial political debate. In Australia, of course, the conservatives are in the Liberal Party".[138] Jupp points out
that, "[the] decline in English influences on Australian reformism and radicalism, and appropriation of the symbols of Empire by conservatives continued under the
Liberal Party leadership of Sir Robert Menzies, which lasted until 1966".[139]

Brazil

Conservatism in Brazil originates from the cultural and historical tradition of Brazil, whose cultural roots are Luso-Iberian
and Roman Catholic.[140] Brazilian conservatism from the 20th century on includes names such as Gerardo Melo Mourão
and Otto Maria Carpeaux in literature; Oliveira Lima and Oliveira Torres in historiography; Sobral Pinto and Miguel Reale
in law; Plinio Corrêa de Oliveira and Father Paulo Ricardo[141] in the Catholic Church; Roberto Campos and Mario
Henrique Simonsen in economics; Carlos Lacerda[142] in the political arena; and Olavo de Carvalho in philosophy.[143]
Brazilian Labour Renewal Party, Patriota, Progressistas, Social Christian Party and Social Liberal Party are the conservative
parties in Brazil.

India

In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), led by Narendra Modi, represent conservative politics. The BJP is the largest
right-wing conservative party in the world. It promotes cultural nationalism, Hindu Nationalism, an aggressive foreign policy
against Pakistan and a conservative social and fiscal policy.[144]

Jair Bolsonaro, the incumbent

Italy
President of Brazil, known for his
conservative stances
After World War II, in Italy the conservative parties were mainly represented by the Christian Democracy (DC) party, which
government form the foundation of the Republic until the party's dissolution in 1994. Officially, DC refused the ideology of
conservatism, but in many aspects, for example family values, it was a typical social conservative party.

In 1994, the media tycoon and entrepreneur Silvio Berlusconi founded the liberal conservative party Forza Italia (FI). Berlusconi won three elections in 1994, 2001
and 2008, governing the country for almost ten years as Prime Minister. Forza Italia formed a coalition with right-wing regional party Lega Nord while in
government.

Besides FI, now the conservative ideas are mainly expressed by the New Centre-Right party led by Angelino Alfano, Berlusconi formed a new party, which is a
rebirth of Forza Italia, thuds founding a new conservative movement. Alfano served as Minister of Foreign Affairs. After the 2018 election, Lega Nord and the Five
Star Movement formed the current right-wing populist government.

Russia

Under Vladimir Putin, the dominant leader since 1999, Russia has promoted explicitly conservative policies in social, cultural and political matters, both at home and
abroad. Putin has attacked globalism and economic liberalism. Russian conservatism is unique in some respects as it supports Economic intervention with a mixed
economy, with a strong nationalist sentiment and social conservatism with its views being largely populist. Russian conservatism as a result opposes libertarian ideals
such as the aforementioned concept of economic liberalism found in other conservative movements around the world. Putin has as a result promoted new think tanks
that bring together like-minded intellectuals and writers. For example, the Izborsky Club, founded in 2012 by Aleksandr Prokhanov, stresses Russian nationalism, the
restoration of Russia's historical greatness and systematic opposition to liberal ideas and policies.[145] Vladislav Surkov, a senior government official, has been one of
the key ideologists during Putin's presidency.[146]

In cultural and social affairs, Putin has collaborated closely with the Russian Orthodox Church. Mark Woods provides specific examples of how the Church under
Patriarch Kirill of Moscow has backed the expansion of Russian power into Crimea and eastern Ukraine.[147] More broadly, The New York Times reports in
September 2016 how that Church's policy prescriptions support the Kremlin's appeal to social conservatives:[148]

"A fervent foe of homosexuality and any attempt to put individual rights above those of family, community, or nation, the Russian Orthodox Church
helps project Russia as the natural ally of all those who pine for a more secure, illiberal world free from the tradition-crushing rush of globalization,
multiculturalism, and women's and gay rights."

— Andrew Higgins (The New York Times: In Expanding Russian Influence, Faith Combines With Firepower)

South Korea

South Korea's major conservative party, the Liberty Korea Party, has changed its form throughout its history. First it was the Democratic-Republican Party (1963–
1980) and its head was Park Chung-hee, who seized power in a 1961 military coup d'état and ruled as an unelected military strongman until his formal election as
president in 1963. He was president for 16 years until his assassination on 26 October 1979. The Democratic Justice Party inherited the same ideology as the
Democratic-Republican Party. Its head, Chun Doo-hwan, also gained power through a coup and his followers called themselves the Hanahae. The Democratic
Justice Party changed its form and acted to suppress the opposition party and to follow the people's demand for direct elections. The party's Roh Tae-woo became the
first President who was elected through direct election. The next form of the major conservative party was the Democratic-Liberal Party and again through election
its second leader, Kim Young-sam, became the fourteenth President of Korea. When the conservative party was beaten by the opposition party in the general
election, it changed its form again to follow the party members' demand for reforms. It became the New Korean Party, but it changed again one year later since the
President Kim Young-sam was blamed by the citizen for the International Monetary Fund. It changed its name to Grand National Party (GNP). Since the late Kim
Dae-jung assumed the presidency in 1998, GNP had been the opposition party until Lee Myung-bak won the presidential election of 2007.

United States

The meaning of "conservatism" in the United States has little in common with the way the word is used elsewhere. As
Ribuffo (2011) notes, "what Americans now call conservatism much of the world calls liberalism or neoliberalism".[149]
Interestingly, in early American politics, it was the Democratic party practicing 'conservatism' in its attempts to maintain the
social and economic institution of slavery. Democratic president Andrew Johnson, as one commonly known example, was
considered a Conservative. [150] “The Democrats were often called conservative and embraced that label. Many of them
were conservative in the sense that they wanted things to be like they were in the past, especially as far as race was
concerned.” [151] [152] In 1892, Democrat Grover Cleveland won the election on a conservative platform, that argued for
maintaining the gold standard, reducing tariffs, and supporting a laisse faire approach to government intervention. [153] Since
the 1950s, conservatism in the United States has been chiefly associated with the Republican Party. However, during the era
of segregation, many Southern Democrats were conservatives and they played a key role in the conservative coalition that President of the United States
Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), whose
largely controlled domestic policy in Congress from 1937 to 1963.[154] The conservative Democrats continued to have
Reagan Doctrine has reshaped the
influence in the US politics until 1994's Republican Revolution, when the American South shifted from solid Democrat to
Republican Party
solid Republican, while maintaining its conservative values.

Major priorities within American conservatism include support for the traditional family, law and order, the right to bear
arms, Christian values, anti-communism and a defense of "Western civilization from the challenges of modernist culture and totalitarian governments".[155]
Economic conservatives and libertarians favor small government, low taxes, limited regulation and free enterprise. Some social conservatives see traditional social
values threatened by secularism, so they support school prayer and oppose abortion and homosexuality.[156] Neoconservatives want to expand American ideals
throughout the world and show a strong support for Israel.[157] Paleoconservatives, in opposition to multiculturalism, press for restrictions on immigration.[158] Most
US conservatives prefer Republicans over Democrats and most factions favor a strong foreign policy and a strong military. The conservative movement of the 1950s
attempted to bring together these divergent strands, stressing the need for unity to prevent the spread of "godless communism", which Reagan later labeled an "evil
empire".[159][160] During the Reagan administration, conservatives also supported the so-called "Reagan Doctrine" under which the US as part of a Cold War
strategy provided military and other support to guerrilla insurgencies that were fighting governments identified as socialist or communist. The Reagan administration
also adopted neoliberalism and trickle-down economics, as well as Reaganomics, which made for economic growth in the 1980s, fueled by trillion-dollar deficits.

Other modern conservative positions include opposition to big government and opposition to environmentalism.[161] On average, American conservatives desire
tougher foreign policies than liberals do.[162] Economic liberalism, deregulation and social conservatism are major principles of the Republican Party.

The Tea Party movement, founded in 2009, has proven a large outlet for populist American conservative ideas. Their stated goals include rigorous adherence to the
US constitution, lower taxes, and opposition to a growing role for the federal government in health care. Electorally, it was considered a key force in Republicans
reclaiming control of the US House of Representatives in 2010.[163][164][165]

Characteristics of conservatism in different countries

This is a broad checklist of modern conservatism in seven countries based on the linked articles.
 France Italy Greece Russia United United Israel
Poland
Kingdom States
Likud, Yisrael
Law and
Beitenu,
Forza Italia, Justice, United
The New Democracy, Golden United Russia, Telem, Derekh
Parties in League, Poland, Conservative
Republicans, Dawn, Greeks for the Liberal Eretz, New
national or Brothers of Agreement, Party,
Debout la Fatherland, Greek Democratic Republican Party Right, National
regional Italy, Us with National Democratic
France, National Solution, Independent Party, Rodina, Union-Tkuma,
legislature Italy, Movement, Unionist Party
Rally Greeks Civic Platform Jewish Home,
Cambiamo! Polish People’s
Shas, United
Party
Torah Judaism
Defends
monarchism
and unionism.
Rejects
republicanism.
Supports
unelected
Megali Idea,[166][167] Strong House of Lords
Irredentism,[168] defenders of Proponents of chamber.
Proponents of Proponents of
Russophilia,[169] historical presidentialism. Defends first-
presidentialism presidentialism
Strong Russian Opposed to past-the-post
and federalism. Euroscepticism,[170] Supports and Zionism.
defenders of sphere of federalism. voting system.
Government republicanism.
Critical of the Anti-immigration,[171] influence. Critical of the Originally
constitutionalism, Critical of the
Italian Anti-establishment/Anti- federalism and Israeli judiciary
Opposed to Celebratory of Polish judiciary opposed to, but
constitution and capitalism,[172][173][174] republicanism. and supportive
federalism. Russia's and supportive now accepting
the Italian Anti-communism,[175] of judicial
Tsarist and of judicial of Scottish
judiciary. and reforms.
Soviet strong- reforms. Devolution and
Antisemitism[176][177][178] man rule. Welsh
Devolution.
To Merge
between the
United Kingdom
and the Isle of
Man as a whole
Country.
UR: statism.
Strong,
FI, LN: small Small, minimal,
powerful, Strong,
Bonapartism, decentralized decentralized
centralized centralized
Gaullism. state. Small state particularly
State Economic state. state. Small, semi-
Small sized, but FdI, NCR, and centralized at federal level.
control
centralized CR: small nationalism[179][180][181] LDPR: strong, Allegations of
state. Strongly
central state.
powerful, statism and
state. centralized influenced by
centralized authoritarianism.
state. libertarianism.
imperialist
state
Individualism,
Rule of law,
traditionalism,
traditionalism,
law and order,
authority, liberty, Promotion of Law and order,
Traditionalism, gun ownership,
promotion of traditional Judaism,
opposition to promotion of
traditional gender roles and traditionalism,
immigration, traditional gender
gender roles, Rule of law, Catholicism, defenders of
criticism of roles, against
public health authority, cult opposes Hierarchy, rule the Jewish
multiculturalism, euthanasia,
care. of personality, abortion, of law, liberty, nature of the
individualism, abortion,
Strongly state unity, euthanasia, in- freedom, Jewish state,
cult of prostitution,
supportive of public unity, vitro fertilization, traditionalism, opposition to
personality, law pornography, and
French culture, Orthodox Christianity and law and order, civil unions, British stoicism, judicial
Social views and order, same-sex
Francophone, traditionalism. traditionalism. same-sex against abortion activism and
against marriage.
and against Against marriage. Highly and same-sex non-Jewish
abortion, same- Strong
Americanisation. modernism, critical of LGBT marriage in immigration,
sex marriage, supporters of a
Some members LGBT rights, rights. Northern supporters of
civil unions, and textualist
are critical of and Western Anti- Ireland. West Bank
euthanasia. interpretation of
abortion and culture. communism. settlements.
Supportive of the American
same-sex Opposed to Opposed to
legal Constitution and
marriage. legal legal
prostitution. the separation of
Supportive of prostitution. prostitution.
powers.
legal
Immensely
prostitution.
anticommunist.
The 2012
Republican
platform states: Likud, NR, DE
"We support the and Telem:
public display of Influenced by
the Ten both
Commandments secularism
as a reflection of and Orthodox
High
Defends Critics of Strong our history and of Judaism.
Strong adherents to the Anglicanism.
secularism. laicism, adherents to Strong our country's YB:
Religious Greek Orthodox Church Presbyterianism
Influenced by influenced by the Russian adherents to the Judeo-Christian Secularism
views and opposition to in Scotland and
Catholic social the Catholic
secularism.
Orthodox Catholic Church.
Northern heritage."[182] and anti-
teaching. Church. Church. Heavily clericalism.
Ireland.
influenced by Shas, JH, NU
Evangelical and UTJ:
Protestantism in Strong
southern and adherents to
midwestern Orthodox
states, and Judaism.
Mormonism in
western states.
Economic LR and DLR: Mixture of Mixed economy[183][184] Mixture of Mixture of Economic Majority: Generally
views social market economic state regulation statism and liberalism, low Economic economic
economy, liberalism, and market market reforms. taxation, liberalism, free liberalism,
distributism, protectionism, freedoms, Moderate privatisation, market; factions privatisation,
 nationalisation low taxation, nationalisation taxation, free trade, small are variously free free trade, but
of major opposition to only of moderate re- welfare state, or fair trade, low with some
industries, wealth taxes. strategic distribution of but unopposed taxation, minimal more
loosely industries, low wealth. to nationalized welfare state. economically
influenced by taxation, health care. Minority: statist
economic moderate re- Economic factions.
liberalism, distribution of nationalism. Supportive of
moderate wealth, All: Opposes government-
welfare system. rejection of government run run health
FN: communism. and funded care.
nationalisation health care.
of major
industries,
protectionism,
and moderate
re-distribution of
wealth, with pro-
market minority
faction.
Supportive of
LR: supportive Commonwealth
FI, NCR, and
of the United of Independent
CR: supportive
Nations and States and the
of NATO, Supportive of Largely
NATO. Eurasian Atlanticism.
various factions the United supportive of Critical of the
Supportive of Economic Mostly
are moderately Supportive of the United Nations, NATO, NATO, but United Nations
the European Union. supportive of
International supportive or Nations and NATO. and the critical of and sceptical
Union. Sceptical NATO, various
government sceptical about Supportive of the Commonwealth. distribution of of the
FN, DLR, and about the factions are
the EU. European Union. Sceptical about workload. European
MPF: sceptical United Nations soft- and strong-
LN and FdI: the European Critical of the Union.
about the United and the eurosceptic.
sceptical about Union. United Nations.
Nations, NATO, European
the EU and
and the Union, and
NATO.
European Union. critical of
NATO.
Opposed to Opposed to Opposed to In favour of Opposed to Opposed to Opposed to
Military In favour of nuclear
nuclear nuclear nuclear nuclear nuclear nuclear nuclear
Issues disarmament.
disarmament. disarmament. disarmament. disarmament. disarmament. disarmament. disarmament.
LR: Factions are
Interventionist,
interventionist, variously
strong Interventionist,
favor closer ties interventionist or
scepticism in favour closer Interventionist.
with the United Factions are non-
relations with Strong ties with the Strong
States. variously interventionist.
the United scepticism in United States, scepticism in
FN, MPF, and interventionist Strong
States, relations with other relations with
DLR: non- or non- Non-interventionist, scepticism in
Georgia, and Germany and Anglosphere Iran, Turkey,
International interventionist, interventionist. strong scepticism in relations with
Ukraine. Russia, majority states, Israel, and Palestine.
affairs strong Support closer relations with the United China, Cuba, and
Support strong support strong Saudi Arabia, Favors closer
scepticism in ties with the States. Iran. Favor closer
relations with relations with Poland, and ties with the
relations with United States, ties with Israel,
other CIS the United India. Strong United States,
the United Israel, and the United
countries, States. scepticism in India, China,
States. Russia. Kingdom,
India, Syria, relations with and Russia.
All support Poland, India,
Iran, and Russia.
closer ties with and Saudi
China.
Russia. Arabia.

Psychology
Following the Second World War, psychologists conducted research into the different motives and tendencies that account for ideological differences between left
and right. The early studies focused on conservatives, beginning with Theodor W. Adorno's The Authoritarian Personality (1950) based on the F-scale personality
test. This book has been heavily criticized on theoretical and methodological grounds, but some of its findings have been confirmed by further empirical
research.[185]

In 1973, British psychologist Glenn Wilson published an influential book providing evidence that a general factor underlying conservative beliefs is "fear of
uncertainty."[186] A meta-analysis of research literature by Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway in 2003 found that many factors, such as intolerance of ambiguity
and need for cognitive closure, contribute to the degree of one's political conservatism and its manifestations in decision-making.[185][187] A study by Kathleen
Maclay stated these traits "might be associated with such generally valued characteristics as personal commitment and unwavering loyalty". The research also
suggested that while most people are resistant to change, liberals are more tolerant of it.[188]

According to psychologist Bob Altemeyer, individuals who are politically conservative tend to rank high in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) on his RWA
scale.[189] This finding was echoed by Adorno. A study done on Israeli and Palestinian students in Israel found that RWA scores of right-wing party supporters were
significantly higher than those of left-wing party supporters.[190] However, a 2005 study by H. Michael Crowson and colleagues suggested a moderate gap between
RWA and other conservative positions, stating that their "results indicated that conservatism is not synonymous with RWA".[191]

Psychologist Felicia Pratto and her colleagues have found evidence to support the idea that a high social dominance orientation (SDO) is strongly correlated with
conservative political views and opposition to social engineering to promote equality,[192] though Pratto's findings have been highly controversial as Pratto and her
colleagues found that high SDO scores were highly correlated with measures of prejudice. However, David J. Schneider argued for a more complex relationships
between the three factors, writing that "correlations between prejudice and political conservative are reduced virtually to zero when controls for SDO are instituted,
suggesting that the conservatism–prejudice link is caused by SDO".[193] Conservative political theorist Kenneth Minogue criticized Pratto's work, saying: "It is
characteristic of the conservative temperament to value established identities, to praise habit and to respect prejudice, not because it is irrational, but because such
things anchor the darting impulses of human beings in solidities of custom which we do not often begin to value until we are already losing them. Radicalism often
generates youth movements, while conservatism is a condition found among the mature, who have discovered what it is in life they most value".[194]

A 1996 study on the relationship between racism and conservatism found that the correlation was stronger among more educated individuals, though "anti-Black
affect had essentially no relationship with political conservatism at any level of educational or intellectual sophistication". They also found that the correlation
between racism and conservatism could be entirely accounted for by their mutual relationship with social dominance orientation.[195]
In his 2008 book, Gross National Happiness, Arthur C. Brooks presents the finding that conservatives are roughly twice as happy as liberals.[196] A 2008 study
demonstrates that conservatives tend to be happier than liberals because of their tendency to justify the current state of affairs and because they're less bothered by
inequalities in society.[197] In fact, as income inequality increases, this difference in relative happiness increases because conservatives, more so than liberals, possess
an ideological buffer against the negative hedonic effects of economic inequality.[197]

A 2009 study found that conservatism and cognitive ability are negatively correlated. It found that conservatism has a negative correlation with SAT, Vocabulary, and
Analogy test scores, measures of education (such as gross enrollment in primary, secondary, and tertiary levels), and performance on math and reading assignments
from the PISA. It also found that conservatism correlates with components of the Failed States Index and "several other measures of economic and political
development of nations."[198]

See also
Conservatism in Australia
Conservatism in Canada
Conservatism in Hong Kong
Conservatism in India
Conservatism in New Zealand
Conservatism in North America
Conservatism in Pakistan
Conservatism in Russia
Conservatism in South Korea
Conservatism in Taiwan
Conservatism in the United States
Black conservatism
Fiscal conservatism
Liberal conservatism
Libertarian conservatism
National conservatism
Social conservatism
Traditionalist conservatism

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Bibliography
Adams, Ian (2001). Political Ideology Today (https://archive.org/detail
s/politicalideolog0000adam). Manchester University Press.
ISBN 978-0-7190-6020-5.
Altemeyer, Bob (1981), Right-wing Authoritarianism (https://books.go
ogle.com/books?id=4preAAAAMAAJ), University of Manitoba Press,
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Eccleshall, Robert (1990). English Conservatism since the
Restoration: An Introduction and Anthology. London: Unwin Hyman.
ISBN 978-0-04-445346-8.
Hainsworth, Paul. The extreme right in Western Europe, Abingdon,
OXON: Routledge, 2008 ISBN 0-415-39682-4.
Heywood, Andrew (2015). Key Concepts in Politics and International
Relations. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-49477-1.
Heywood, Andrew (2012). Political Ideologies: An Introduction.
Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-36994-8.
Heywood, Andrew (2017). Political Ideologies: An Introduction.
Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-137-60604-4.
Heywood, Andrew (2013). Politics. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-
137-27244-7.
Lacey, Robert J. (2016). Pragmatic Conservatism: Edmund Burke
and His American Heirs. Springer. ISBN 978-1-349-94903-8.
McAnulla, Stuart (2006). British Politics: A Critical Introduction. A&C
Black. ISBN 978-0-8264-6155-1.
Osterling, Jorge P. Democracy in Colombia: Clientelist Politics and
Guerrilla Warfare. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989
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Vincent, Andrew (2009). Modern Political Ideologies. John Wiley &
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Winthrop, Norman and Lovell, David W. "Varieties of Conservative
Theory". In Winthrop, Norman. Liberal Democratic Theory and Its
Critics. Beckenham, Kent: Croom Helm Ltd., 1983 ISBN 0-7099-
2766-5, 978-0-7099-2766-2.

Further reading
Blee, Kathleen M. and Sandra McGee Deutsch, eds. Women of the Right: Comparisons and Interplay Across Borders (Penn State University
Press; 2012) 312 pages; scholarly essays giving a global perspective on women in right-wing politics.
Blinkhorn, Martin. Fascists and Conservatives: The Radical Right and the Establishment in Twentieth-Century Europe. 1990.
Carey, George (2008). "Conservatism" (https://books.google.com/books?id=yxNgXs3TkJYC). In Hamowy, Ronald (ed.). The Encyclopedia of
Libertarianism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage; Cato Institute. pp. 93–95. doi:10.4135/9781412965811.n61 (https://doi.org/10.4135%2F9781412965
811.n61). ISBN 978-1-4129-6580-4. LCCN 2008009151 (https://lccn.loc.gov/2008009151). OCLC 750831024 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/75
0831024).
Crowson, N. J. Facing Fascism: The Conservative Party and the European Dictators, 1935–1940. 1997.
Crunden, Robert Morse. The Superfluous Men: Critics of American Culture, 1900–1945. 1999.
Dalrymple, Theodore. Our Culture, What's Left of It: The Mandarins and the Masses. 2005.
Fryer, Russell G. Recent Conservative Political Thought: American Perspectives. 1979.
Gottfried, Paul E. The Conservative Movement. 1993.
Nugent, Neill. The British Right: Conservative and Right Wing Politics in Britain. 1977.
Sunic, Sunic and de Benoist, Alain. Against Democracy and Equality: The European New Right. 2011.
 Honderich, Ted. Conservatism. 1990.
Kirk, Russell. The Conservative Mind. 2001.
Bacchetta, Paola. Right-Wing Women: From Conservatives to Extremists Around the World. 2002.
Nisbet, Robert. Conservatism: Dream and Reality. 2001.
O'Sullivan, Noel. Conservatism. 1976.
Scruton, Roger. The Meaning of Conservatism. 1980.
Woodwards, E.L. Three Studies In European Conservatism. Mettenich: Guizot: The Catholic Church In The Nineteenth Century (1923) online (h
ttps://archive.org/details/in.ernet.dli.2015.461719)

Primary sources
Schneider, Gregory L. ed. Conservatism in America Since 1930: A Reader. 2003.
Witonski, Peter, ed. The Wisdom of Conservatism. (4 vol. Arlington House; 1971). 2396 pages; worldwide sources.

External links
Conservatism (https://www.britannica.com/topic/conservatism) an article by Encyclopædia Britannica.
Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Conservatism" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conservatism/). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Conservatism (https://curlie.org/Society/Politics/Conservatism/) at Curlie
Conservatism (http://www.themontrealreview.com/2009/Conservatism-Kieron-OHara.php). Kieron O'Hara. Reaktion Books. 2011 (reviewed in
The Montreal Review).

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