G.R. No.

204494

JO-ANN DIAZ-SALGADO and husband DR. GERARD C. SALGADO, Petitioners 

vs.
LUIS G. ANSON, Respondent

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision 2dated August 6, 2012 and the
Resolution3 dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989. The CA affirmed the Decision 4 dated July 23, 2007 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155, in Civil Case No. 69611.

The Facts

On September 5, 2003, Luis Anson (Luis) filed a Complaint 5 docketed as Civil Case No. 69611 against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado (Jo-Ann) and Gerard
Salgado (Gerard) (Spouses Salgado) along with Maria Luisa Anson-Maya (Maria Luisa) and Gaston Maya (Spouses Maya), seeking the annulment
of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale6 dated January 23, 2002 and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis
dated October 25, 2002.7

Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surv1vmg spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson (Severina). They were married in a civil ceremony
on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-
Ann is Severina's daughter from a previous relationship. 8

During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties located in San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by the following Transfer
Certificate of Title/s (TCT/s):

1. TCT No. 20618/T-104 (now TCT No. 11105-R),

2. TCTNo. 60069/T-301(nowTCTNo. 11106-R),

3. TCTNo. 5109/T-26 (nowTCTNo. 11107),

4. TCT No. 8478-R/T-43 (now TCT No. 11076-R),

5. TCT No. 44637/T-224-II (now TCT No. 11078-R), and

6. TCT No. 8003/T-41 (now TCT No. 11077-R).9

According to Luis, because there was no marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal
partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds of Sale on January 23, 2002 transferring
the properties covered by TCT Nos. 20618, 60069 and 5109 in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said properties. 10 When
Severina died on September 21, 2002,11 Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severina de Asis on
October 25, 2002, adjudicating herself as Severina's sole heir. She secured new TCTs over the properties covered by TCT Nos. 8478-R, 44637 and
8003.12

Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and of his inheritance as a
compulsory heir of Severina.13

In Jo-Ann's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, 14 which the trial court considered as the Answer of her husband, Gerard, 15 Jo-Ann countered that
she was unaware of any marriage contracted by her mother with Luis. She knew however that Luis and Severina had a common-law
relationship  which they both acknowledged and formally terminated through a Partition Agreement 16 executed in November 1980. This was
implemented through another Partition Agreement17 executed in April 1981. Thus, Luis had already received the properties apportioned to him by
virtue of the said agreement while the properties subject of the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were acquired exclusively by Severina. The TCTs covering
Severina's properties were under Severina's name only and she was described therein as single without reference to any husband. 18

Meanwhile, the Spouses Maya corroborated the Spouses Salgado's stance in their Answer, 19 stating that Maria Luisa is also not aware that Luis and
Severina were married. She is cognizant of the fact that Luis and Severina lived together as common-law husband and wife - a relationship which
was terminated upon execution of a Partition Agreement. In the Partition Agreement, Luis and Severina were described as single and they
acknowledged that they were living together as common-law spouses. They also mutually agreed to the partition of the properties they owned in
common. Hence, Luis already received his share in the properties 20 and is estopped from denying the same.21 After the termination of their
cohabitation in 1980, Luis went to United States of America (USA), married one Teresita Anson and had a son with her; while Maria Luisa was left
under the guardianship and custody of Severina. 22 It was after the death of Severina that Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement
of the Estate of the Deceased Severina de Asis on October 25, 2002. The Spouses Maya were also able to obtain a Certificate of No Record of
Marriage23 (between Luis and Severina) from the Office the Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office. 24

Trial ensued thereafter. After Luis gave his testimony and presented documentary evidence which included a certified true copy of his marriage
contract with Severina,25 the Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence. 26 The Spouses Salgado disputed the
validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license as borne out by the marriage contract. They further claimed that
Luis himself disclosed on cross-examination that he did not procure a marriage license prior to the alleged marriage. 27 Luis had also admitted the
existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement. 28 The logical conclusion therefore is that the properties disposed in favor of Jo-
Ann were owned by Severina as her own, separate and exclusive properties, which she had all the right to dispose of, without the conformity of
Luis.29

On February 16, 2006, the trial court denied both demurrers, explaining that the sufficiency of evidence presented by Luis is evidentiary in nature
and may only be controverted by evidence to the contrary. 30 The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed their separate motions for
reconsideration,31 which the trial court denied.32 Consequently, both the Spouses Salgado and Spouses ·Maya filed their respective petitions
for certiorari  with the CA.33 Meanwhile, the Spouses Salgado were deemed to have waived their presentation of evidence when they failed to attend
the scheduled hearings before the trial court.34

Resolving the petition for certiorari  on the demurrer to evidence filed by the Spouses Salgado, the CA Second Division directed the trial court "to
properly resolve with deliberate dispatch the demurrer to evidence in accordance with Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure by
stating clearly and distinctly the reason therefor on the basis of [the Spouses Salgado's] proffered evidence[,]" 35 whereas the CA Ninth Division
dismissed the petition of the Spouses Maya and ordered the trial court to decide the case with deliberate dispatch. 36

In an Order37 dated July 16, 2007, the RTC, in compliance with the order of the CA to resolve the demurrer to evidence in more specific terms,
denied the twin demurrers to evidence for lack of merit and held that the totality of evidence presented by Luis has sufficiently established his right to
obtain the reliefs prayed for in his complaint.

Ruling of the RTC

On July 23, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision38 in favor of Luis, holding that the marriage between Luis and Severina was valid. It noted that the
marriage contract, being a public document, enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution and is conclusive as to the fact of marriage. 39 The
trial court also based its ruling in Geronimo v. CA40where the validity of marriage was upheld despite the absence of the marriage license number on
the marriage contract.41 The trial court thus declared that the properties covered by the Unilateral Deeds of Sale were considered conjugal which
cannot be disposed of by Severina without the consent of her husband, Luis. 42

The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [Luis] and against [the Spouses Salgado] ordering as follows:

1. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) Unilateral Deeds of Sale, all dated
January 23, 2002 executed by [Severina] in favor of [Jo-Ann];

2. ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT of the three (3) [TCT] Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and
11106-R covering the subject properties, all issued in the name of [Jo-Ann] by the Registry of Deeds for San Juan, Metro Manila;

3. RESTITUTION of all properties covered by TCT Nos. 11107-R, 11105-R and 11106-R (formerly TCT Nos. 5109, 20618 and 60069, respectively)
to the conjugal community of properties between [Luis] and [Severina].

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.43

On November 17, 2008, the RTC rendered another Decision 44 which ordered the "ANNULMENT, VOIDING, SETTING ASIDE and DECLARING OF
NO FORCE AND EFFECT the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis executed by [Maria Luisa] dated
October 25, 2002 x x x."45 The RTC also ordered the cancellation of new TCTs issued by virtue of the said Deeds. 46

The Spouses Salgado and the Spouses Maya filed their respective motions for reconsideration on September 11, 2007 47 and August 28,
2007,48 respectively, which the RTC denied in the Omnibus Order 49 dated October 30, 2007 for lack of merit. This prompted the Spouses Salgado
and Spouses Maya to file their separate notices of appeal before the CA on December 13, 2007 50 and April 24, 2009,51 respectively.

Ruling of the CA

The Spouses Maya and Luis thereafter entered into a Compromise Agreement 52 which was approved by the CA in its Decision53 dated October 26,
2011. This resulted in the termination of the Spouses Maya's appeal. 54

On August 6, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision,55 dismissing the appeal of the Spouses Salgado. The fallo  reads as follows:

WHEREFORE,  the appeal interposed by [the Spouses Salgado] is DISMISSED.  The Decision dated July 23, 2007 of the [RTC] of Pasig
is AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

SO ORDERED.56

The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC for the simple reason that the Spouses Salgado did not present and formally offer any testimonial and
documentary evidence to controvert the evidence presented by Luis. 57 The CA further explained that "the best evidence to establish the absence of a
marriage license is a certification from the Local Civil Registrar that the parties to the Marriage Contract did not secure a marriage license or at the
very least a certification from the said office that despite diligent search, no record of application for or a marriage license was issued on or before
December 28, 1966 in favor of Luis and Severina. Again, Spouses Salgado failed to prove the same by their failure to secure the said certification
and present evidence during the trial."58
The Spouses Salgado and Spouses Maya filed a motion for reconsideration 59 which the CA denied through its Resolution60 dated November 26,
2012.

The Spouses Salgado elevated the matter before the Court raising the core issue of whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC
decision which declared the marriage between Luis and Severina valid and the subject lands as conjugal properties.

Ruling of the Court

The Spouses Salgado argue that the marriage between Luis and Severina is null and void for want of marriage license based on the Marriage
Contract61 presented by Luis which has adequately established its absence. 62

Luis, in his Comment,63 opposes the filing of the present petition on the ground that it raises a question of fact, which cannot be raised in a petition
for review on certiorari.  He also countered that the Spouses Salgado did not present any evidence to support their theory. 64 If the existence of the
marriage license is in issue, it is incumbent upon the Spouses Salgado to show the lack of marriage license by clear and convincing evidence. 65

Before proceeding to the substantive issues brought in this petition, the Court shall first tackle the procedural issue raised by Luis which pertains to
the propriety of the filing of this petition for review on certiorari.

Contrary to Luis' contention, the present petition raises a question of law, mainly, whether the absence of a marriage license may be proven on the
basis of a marriage contract which states that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer on account of the marriage being of an
exceptional character.

In any event, while the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the appellate court is, as a general rule, limited to reviewing errors of
law, there are exceptions66 recognized by the Court, such as when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. 67

Since the marriage between Luis and Severina was solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine its validity
is the Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of its celebration 68 on December 28, 1966.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 5369 of the Civil Code, and the absence thereof, save for marriages of exceptional
character,70 renders the marriage void ab initio  pursuant to Article 80(3 ). It sets forth:

Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)

"Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit, these marriages
are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis  or at the point of death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (3) consular marriages, (4)
ratification of marital cohabitation, (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage, (6) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (7) mixed marriages." 71 To
reiterate, in any of the aforementioned marriages of exceptional character, the requirement of a valid marriage license is dispensed with.

The marriage is not of an

exceptional character

A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license number was indicated therein. It also appears
therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the
reason therefor. The pertinent portion of the marriage contract is quoted as follows:

[A]nd I further certify that Marriage License No. x x x issued at x x x on x x x, 19 x x x in favor of, said parties, was exhibited to me or no marriage
license was exhibited to me, this marriage being of an exceptional character performed under Art. 77 of Rep. Act 386; x x x.72

The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being a public document, the marriage contract is not only
a prima facie  proof of marriage, but is also a prima facie  evidence of the facts stated therein. This is pursuant to Section 44, Rule 130 of the 1997
Rules of Court, which reads:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records.  - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie  evidence of the facts therein stated.

Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina's marriage contract are prima facie  proof that at the time of their marriage, no marriage license
was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.

Article 77 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 77. In case two persons married in accordance with law desire to ratify their union in conformity with the regulations, rites, or practices of any
church, sect, or religion, it shall no longer be necessary to comply with the requirements of Chapter 1 of this Title and any ratification made shall
merely be considered as a purely religious ceremony.

The foregoing provision pertains to a religious ceremony performed with the purpose of ratifying a marriage which was solemnized civilly. In the eyes
of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are
exempted from complying with the required issuance of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this
exemption to be applicable, it is sine qua non  that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to each other in accordance
with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature.

Applied to the present case however, it is clear that Luis and Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on
December 28, 1966 - the only date of marriage appearing on the records. This was also consistently affirmed by Luis in open court:

Atty. Francisco:

Q- You testified that you have a Marriage Contract marked as Exhibit A certifying that you were married to the late [Severina].

A- Yes, sir.

Q- Do you recall when this marriage took place?

A- As far as I can recall it was sometime two (2) days before my daughter get (sic) one (1) year old. That was 1966 December something like 28,
because she was born December 30, the death of Jose Rizal. I can remember 1965. So, before she turned one (1) year old two (2) days before we
got married here in San Juan.

Q- So, when was she born if you can recall?

A- Maria Luisa was born on December 30, 1965.

Q- If it is two (2) days before, it should be 1966?

A- Yes, sir.

Q- If you can recall who solemnized the marriage?

A- It was the late Mayor Ebona of San Juan.73

xxxx

[Atty. Valenton:] x x x You alleged during your direct examination that you were married to [Severina]?

A: Yes sir.

Q: When do you say you marr[ied] her?

A: Two (2) days before our daughter turned one year old, so that is December 28, 1966. 74(Emphasis ours)

Being that the ceremony held on December 28, 1966 was the only marriage ceremony between the parties and this was not solemnized pursuant to
any ratifying religious rite, practice or regulation but a civil one officiated by the mayor, this marriage does not fall under the purview of Article 77 of
the Civil Code. It is evident that the twin requirements of the provision, which are: prior civil marriage between the parties  and a ratifying religious
ceremony,  were not complied with. There is no prior ceremony to ratify. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and a marriage license
is required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.

Absence of marriage license

The next issue to be resolved is: who has the burden of proving the existence or non-existence of the marriage license?

Since there was an unequivocal declaration on the marriage contract itself that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer at the
time of marriage owing to Article 77 of the Civil Code, when in truth, the said exception does not obtain in their case, it is the burden of Luis to prove
that they secured the required marriage license.

However, instead of proving that a marriage license was indeed issued to them at the time of their marriage, Luis relied mainly on the presumption of
validity of marriage. This presumption does not hold water vis-a-vis  a prima facie  evidence (marriage contract), which on its face has established
that no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer. If there was a marriage license issued to Luis and Severina, its absence on the
marriage contract was not explained at all. Neither the original nor a copy of the marriage license was presented. No other witness also testified to
prove its existence, whereas Luis is not the best witness to testify regarding its issuance. He admitted that he did not apply for one, and is uncertain
about the documents they purportedly submitted in the Municipal Hall. As he revealed in his testimony:

ATTY. VALENTON:
Q- How did you prepare for the alleged wedding that took place between you and [Severina]?

A TTY. FRANCISCO: May I know the materiality, Your Honor?

ATTY. VALENTON: We are exploring as to whether there was really a wedding that took place, Your Honor.

COURT: Answer.

What preparations were done?

A- There was no preparation because we were just visitors of the Mayor during that time and the Mayor is a close friend of ours. 1âwphi1 So, when
he knew that we are traveling, we are going to Thailand with the invitation of a friend to work with him in Thailand, he told us you better get married
first before you travel because your daughter will be illegitimate. 75

xxxx

ATTY. VALENTON:

Q- Do you remember having applied for a marriage license?

A- We did not.

Q- So, you are telling us that there is no marriage license?

A- No.

CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT TO THE WITNESS

[Q-] There was no marriage license?

A- Well, when you get married you have to get a marriage license.

COURT:

Not necessarily.

A- But, I don't know whether there was an application for the license because it was at the house of the Mayor.

COURT:

But in this particular case before you went to the house of the Mayor for the solemnization of your marriage, did you apply for a marriage license?

A- No. 76

x x xx

RE-DIRECT EXAMINATION OF

[LUIS]:

Q- Mr. Anson, a while ago during your cross-examination you were asked by counsel as well as a question was raised by the Honorable Court
whether or not you applied for a marriage license when you got married on December 28, 1966 allegedly with [Severina]. Can you tell the Court what
you meant by that?

COURT:

By what?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

When he was asked, Your Honor, by the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Whether he applied?

ATTY. FRANCISCO:
Whether he applied for a marriage license prior to the solemnization of the marriage, you answered No.

WITNESS:

I did not apply for such, all what I know is to sign something affidavit or application before we went to the house of the Mayor to get marry (sic) but
that was about - - I cannot recall if that past (sic) a week or 2 days or 3 days ago.

ATTY. FRANCISCO:

Q- You mentioned, we signed an affidavit or application, when you used we, whom are you referring to?

A- [Severina].

Q- And, yourself?

A- Yes.

Q- In your recollection, where did you file those affidavits with [Severina] before the solemnization of the marriage?

A- It was in the Municipal Hall. I do not know whether that was the Registrar, Office of the [M]ayor or Office of the Chief of Police. 1awp++i1 I cannot
recall. It is inside the Munisipyo of San Juan.

Q- Who made you sign that Affidavit?

A- The Chief of Police whom we get (sic) to be (sic) witness for our marriage. They let us signed (sic) an application or affidavit. I cannot recall what
it is.77 (Emphasis ours)

In upholding the supposed validity of the marriage, the RTC and the CA failed to consider the glaring statements in the marriage contract that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer and that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, the
latter statement being fallacious. Both the RTC and CA upheld the fact of marriage based on the marriage contract but simply glossed over the part
stating that the marriage is of an exceptional character. It is inevitable to deduce that this is not a case of mere non-recording of the marriage license
number on the marriage contract, as was in Geronimo.78

The factual antecedents in Geronimo  are not on all fours with the case under review, hence, inapplicable. In Geronimo,  despite the absence of the
marriage license number on the marriage contract presented by therein petitioner (brother of the deceased), there was no statement therein that the
marriage is of an exceptional character. Various witnesses also testified that the deceased and her husband were indeed married. More importantly,
the husband of the deceased was able to produce a copy of the marriage contract on file with the National Archives and Records Section where the
marriage license number appears.

"[T]o be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be
apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties."79 Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false statement
therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than
that the marriage between Luis and Severina was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Dayot,80the Court similarly declared that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license based on a fabricated
claim of exceptional character, is void. In lieu of a marriage license, therein parties to the marriage executed a false affidavit of marital cohabitation.
In declaring the marriage void, the Court rejected the notion that all the formal and essential requisites of marriage were complied with. The Court
held that to permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. It was further explained:

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties' affidavit will not affect the validity of marriage, since
all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage
between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal
requirement in Article 76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the requirement
of a marriage license.

xxxx

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that the license
was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as
required by law. The contrast is flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here,
there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa's
cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it
refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all. 81

The Court cannot turn a blind eye to the statements made in the marriage contract because these refer to the absence of a formal requisite of
marriage. "The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a
pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception."82 "The requirement and issuance of marriage license is the State's demonstration of its involvement and
participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested. This interest proceeds from the constitutional mandate
that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family as a basic 'autonomous social institution."' 83

Partition Agreement is Valid

Relative to the properties they amassed during the period of their cohabitation, Luis and Severina executed a notarized Partition Agreement 84 in
November 1980, which divided their properties between them without court intervention. Luis sought to annul such agreement on the ground that
"the separation of property is not effected by the mere execution of the contract or agreement of the parties, but by the decree of the court approving
the same. It, therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial approval, without which it is void." 85

The Court does not subscribe to Luis' posture.

In Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City,86the Court held that "[i]n a void marriage,  regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Article 147 is a remake of Article 144 of the Civil Code x x x." 87 It provides:

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their .ioint efforts,
work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household.

Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos  of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common,
without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of
their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to
the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon termination of the cohabitation. 88 (Emphasis ours)

As there is no showing that Luis and Severina were incapacitated to marry each other at the time of their cohabitation and considering that their
marriage is void from the beginning for lack of a valid marriage license, Article 144 of the Civil Code, 89 in relation to Article 147 of the Family Code,
are the pertinent provisions of law governing their property relations. Article 147 of the Family Code "applies to union of parties who are legally
capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like absence of a
marriage license."90 "Under this property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work  and industry  shall be governed by the rules
on equal  co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie  presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party
who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's 'efforts consisted
in the care and maintenance of the family household."' 91

Accordingly, the provisions on co-ownership under the Civil Code shall apply in the partition of the properties co-owned by Luis and Severina. It is
stated under Article 1079 of the Civil Code that "partition, in general, is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong. The thing itself may be divided, or its value." As to how partition may be validly done, Article 496 of the Civil Code is
precise that "partition may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings x x x." The law does not impose a judicial approval
for the agreement to be valid. Hence, even without the same, the partition was validly done by Luis and Severina through the execution of the
Partition Agreement.

Moreover, Luis admitted the existence, due execution and authenticity of the Partition Agreement. 92 It also remains uncontroverted that he already
received his share as stipulated in the Partition Agreement. As such, the Court finds no reason to have the said agreement declared null and void or
annulled, in the absence of any circumstance which renders such contract invalid or at least, voidable.

All things considered, the Court holds that although a certification of no record of marriage license or certification of "due search and inability to find"
a record or entry issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the license, 93 such certification is not the only  proof that
could validate the absence of a marriage license.

In this case, the categorical statement on Luis and Severina's marriage contract that no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer,
coupled with a contrived averment therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code, are circumstances
which cannot be disregarded. Incidentally, it may be well to note that Luis' failure to assert his marriage to Severina during the latter's lifetime is
suspect. Luis left for the USA in 1981, and until Severina' s death in 2002, he never saw, much less reconciled with her. 94 All those years, he never
presented himself to be the husband of Severina. Not even their daughter, Maria Luisa, knew of the marriage. During trial, he never presented any
other witness to the marriage. He contends that his marriage to Severina was valid and subsisting, yet he knowingly contracted a subsequent
marriage abroad. Verily, Luis failed to prove the validity of their marriage based on the evidence he himself had presented.

"The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of
fraud against innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a prerequisite for a
valid marriage. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well."95
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 6, 2012 and the Resolution dated November 26, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 92989 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 69611 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 207406

NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL, Petitioner, 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the
second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution3 dated June 3, 2013.
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Decision 4 of Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila convicting petitioner Norberto Abella
Vitangcol (Norberto) of bigamy punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. 5 Norberto was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional  as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor  as maximum.6

In the Information dated April 29, 2008, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged Norberto with bigamy. 7The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about December 4, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then legally married to GINA M. GAERLAN, and
without such marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent
marriage with ALICE G. EDUARDO-VITANGCOL which second marriage has all the legal requisites for its validity with the said accused
NORBERTO ABELLA VITANGCOL knowing fully well prior to and at the time of the celebration of the second marriage he was already married to
the said GINA M. GAERLAN.

Contrary to law.8

Norberto was arraigned, pleading not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued. 9

According to the prosecution, on December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. Born into their
union were three (3) children.10

After some time, Alice "began hearing rumors that [her husband] was previously married to another woman[.]" 11 She eventually discovered that
Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the
National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto. 12

On the other hand, Norberto alleged that he and Alice became romantically involved sometime in 1987. 13 "After much prodding by their friends and
relatives, [he and Alice] decided to get married in 1994." 14

Before finalizing their marriage plans, however, Norberto revealed to Alice that he had a "fake marriage" 15 with his college girlfriend, a certain Gina
Gaerlan.16 Nevertheless, despite Norberto’s revelation, Alice convinced him that they proceed with the wedding. Thus, Norberto and Alice were
married on December 4, 1994 and, thereafter, had three children. 17

Sometime in 2007, Norberto heard rumors from their household workers that Alice was having an affair with a married man. He was able to confirm
the affair after hearing Alice in a phone conversation with her paramour. 18

Norberto then sought advice from his business lawyer who later on convinced Alice to end the affair. The lawyer also warned Alice of the possible
criminal liability she may incur if she continued seeing her paramour. 19

Allegedly in retaliation to the threat of criminal action against her, Alice filed the criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto. 20

Finding that Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice despite his subsisting valid marriage with Gina, Branch 25 of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila convicted Norberto of bigamy. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated September 1, 2010 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds accused Norberto Abella Vitangcol GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
BIGAMY defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor  as minimum imprisonment to twelve (12) years of prision mayor  as maximum imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.21

On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the guilty verdict against Norberto but modified the penalty imposed in accordance with the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 25, dated September 1, 2010 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the penalty to which appellant is previously sentenced. Accordingly, he is now meted to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum.

SO ORDERED.22

Norberto filed a Motion for Reconsideration,23 which the Court of Appeals denied in the Resolution dated June 3, 2013. 24

Norberto filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this court. The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
Comment25 to which Norberto filed a Reply.26

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. 27 He presents as evidence a Certification28from the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that
with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first
marriage.29

In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy. According to Norberto, nothing in
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code that punishes bigamy mentions that requirement. 30 Stating that "[a]ny reasonable doubt must be resolved in
favor of the accused[,]"31 Norberto prays for his acquittal.32

The prosecution counters that it has proven the existence of Norberto’s prior valid marriage with Gina as evidenced by the marriage contract they
had executed. The prosecution likewise proved that the first marriage of Norberto with Gina was not legally dissolved; that while his first marriage
was subsisting, Norberto contracted a second marriage with Alice; and that the second marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first. Norberto, therefore, should be convicted of bigamy. 33

The issue for our resolution is whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license issued to
petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not
categorically prove that there was no marriage license. Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For
more than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious first marriage declared a nullity. Even
when this case was pending, he did not present any decision from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Bigamy is punished under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code:

ARTICLE 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.

For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following elements:

[first,] that the offender has been legally married;

[second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil Code;

[third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and

[lastly,] that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. 34

The prosecution allegedly fails to prove the validity of his first marriage with Gina because the civil registrar of the municipality where they were
married had no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in their favor.

Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he married Alice.
Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the crime charged.

Based on the marriage contract presented in evidence, petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code
of the Philippines became effective on August 3,1988. 35 Consequently, provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines 36 govern the validity of his first
marriage.

Article 53 of the Civil Code enumerates the requisites of marriage, the absence of any of which renders the marriage void from the beginning: 37

Article 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

 (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The fourth requisite—the marriage license—is issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
resides.38 The marriage license represents the state’s "involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general
public is interested."39

To prove that a marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, "the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent
on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
parties."40

Petitioner presents a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states:

[A]fter a diligent search on the files of Registry Book on Application for Marriage License and License Issuance available in this office, no record
could be found on the alleged issuance of this office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA
M. GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.41

This Certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. It does not categorically state that
Marriage License No. 8683519 does not exist.42

Moreover, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract between him and his first wife, Gina. 43 The
marriage contract between petitioner and Gina is a positive piece of evidence as to the existence of petitioner’s first marriage. 44This "should be given
greater credence than documents testifying merely as to [the] absence of any record of the marriage[.]" 45

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro46 was originally an action for the declaration of nullity of a marriage. 47 As part of its evidence, the plaintiff
presented a certification that states that the marriage license "cannot be located as said license . . . does not appear from [the local civil registrar’s]
records."48

This court held that "[t]he certification . . . enjoys probative value, [the local civil registrar] being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license." 49

This court further said that "[u]naccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of ‘due search and inability to find’ sufficiently proved that [the local civil registrar] did not issue [a] marriage license . . . to the contracting
parties."50

The circumstances in Castro  and in this case are different. Castro  involved a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage that does not involve the
possible loss of liberty. The certification in Castro  was unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion, there being no prosecution for bigamy
involved. On the other hand, the present case involves a criminal prosecution for bigamy. To our mind, this is a circumstance of suspicion, the
Certification having been issued to Norberto for him to evade conviction for bigamy.

The appreciation of the probative value of the certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of its presentation, the cause of action in the case,
and the context of the presentation of the certification in relation to the other evidence presented in the case. We are not prepared to establish a
doctrine that a certification that a marriage license cannot be found may substitute for a definite statement that no such license existed or was
issued. Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of those words. That the license now
cannot be found is not basis per se to say that it could not have been issued.

A different view would undermine the stability of our legal order insofar as marriages are concerned. Marriage licenses may be conveniently lost due
to negligence or consideration. The motivation to do this becomes greatest when the benefit is to evade prosecution.

This case is likewise different from Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.51 In Cariño,  the marriage contract between Santiago Cariño and his first wife,
Susan Nicdao, bore no marriage license number. 52 In addition, the local civil registrar certified that it has no record of any marriage license issued to
Santiago Cariño and Susan Nicdao.53 This court declared Santiago Cariño’s first marriage void for having been solemnized without a marriage
license.54

In this case, there is a marriage contract indicating the presence of a marriage license number freely and voluntarily signed and attested to by the
parties to the marriage as well as by their solemnizing officer. The first marriage was celebrated on July 17, 1987. The second marriage was entered
into on December 4, 1994. Within a span of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and 17 (seventeen) days, petitioner did not procure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his first marriage. Even while the bigamy case was pending, no decision declaring the first marriage as spurious was
presented. In other words, petitioner’s belief that there was no marriage license is rendered untrue by his own actuations.

This factual context makes the use and issuance of the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar suspect. The prosecution has to prove that
despite the existence of a valid first marriage, petitioner nevertheless contracted a second or subsequent marriage. The admission of a marriage
contract with proof of its authenticity and due execution suffices to discharge the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that a prior marriage
exists. The burden of evidence will, thus, pass on to the defense. Mere presentation of a certification from the civil registrar that the marriage license
cannot be found is not enough to discharge the burden of proving that no such marriage license was issued.

The parties clearly identified Marriage License No. 8683519 in the marriage contract. 55 There is no evidence to show that the number series of that
license is spurious or is not likely to have been issued from its source. There is no proof as to whether the licenses issued before or after the
document in question still exists in the custody of the civil registrar. There is no evidence that relates to the procedures for safekeeping of these vital
documents. This would have shown whether there was unfettered access to the originals of the license and, therefore, would have contributed to the
proper judicial conclusion of what the manifestation by the civil registrar implies.

This court cannot grant the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official functions to the civil registrar for the purposes
sought by petitioner. In other words, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions is too remotely detached to the conclusion
that there is no marriage license.

At best, the presumption of regularity in the performance of the civil registrar’s function without the context just discussed can lead to the conclusion
that he in good faith could not find the marriage license in his office. This presumption does not mean that the marriage license did not exist. Nor
does it mean that the marriage license was issued.

However, even the conclusion of good faith is difficult to accept. There was a marriage contract duly executed by petitioner and his first spouse as
well as by the solemnizing officer. The marriage contract is in the custody of the civil registrar. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions by a public officer should likewise be applicable to infer a conclusion that the marriage license mentioned in that contract exists.

Conviction in a charge of bigamy will result to a legitimate imposition of a penalty amounting to a deprivation of liberty. It is not a far-fetched
conclusion—although this is not always the case—that a well-connected accused will use all means, fair or foul, to achieve an acquittal. Many
criminal cases can turn on documentary evidence the issuance of which is within the discretion of a government employee. The temptations for the
employee to issue a document, which may be accurate but which he knows the accused will be able to use for a different purpose, can easily be
created by an accused. Much of the bases of this conclusion will depend on how the trial court judge evaluates the demeanor of the witnesses. We
can defer to that discretion as much as to make our own judgment based on evidence conclusively admitted and weighed by the trial court. Using
both, we have no reason to disturb the conclusions of the trial court.

II

Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license, petitioner remains liable for bigamy.
Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared  void. Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil
Code.56 The second element of the crime of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.

As early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova, et al.57 that

parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.58

The commission that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho  ruling in wording Article 40 of the Family Code:59

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.1avvphi1

Should the requirement of judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy, Article 349 of Revised Penal Code
becomes useless. "[A]ll that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to . . . contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
first."60 Further, "[a] party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite—usually the marriage license—and thereafter contract
a subsequent marriage without obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void." 61

For these reasons, the Landicho  ruling remains good law. It need not be revisited by this court En Banc as petitioner insists. 62

The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4,
1994.63 As for the last element of bigamy, that the subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of
bigamy was consummated when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared void. 64

With all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of the crime charged. 1âwphi1

III

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty that may be imposed on petitioner is that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the minimum term of the penalty shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense. The court then has the discretion to impose a minimum
penalty within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty. As for the maximum penalty, the attending circumstances are
considered.65

The imposable penalty for bigamy is prision mayor.66 The penalty next lower to that is prision correccional. Prision correccional  ranges from six (6)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years;67 hence, the minimum penalty can be any period within this range.

As for the maximum penalty, it should be within the range of prision mayor  in its medium period, there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. Prision mayor  in its medium period ranges from eight (8) years and one (1) day to 10 years.

Petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional  as minimum to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor  as maximum. The ranges of the minimum and maximum penalties are within the ranges as previously
computed. The indeterminate penalty imposed was proper.
Nevertheless, "[k]eeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law ‘to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness[,]’" 68 we lower the minimum of the indeterminate penalty to six
(6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. Petitioner is, thus, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional  as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor  as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 18, 2012 and Resolution dated June 3,
2013 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33936 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional  as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor  as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.

Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking a
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to
them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default. Trial proceeded in his absence.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court
Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage
contract itself states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's parents. Thus, it was only in March
1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4)
months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of
Cardenas.

The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States.
She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they
discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.

As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:

February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the Pasay
City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license 
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license no . 3196182 does not
appear from our records.

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

(Sgd)
CENONA
D.
QUINTO
S
Senior
Civil
Registry
Officer

Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a license. Neither did she sign any
application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.

The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-issuance of a marriage license
prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not
conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued."

Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently
established the absence of a marriage license.
As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage between the contracting parties null
and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification issued by the civil registrar that
marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent
court for relying on the self-serving and uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject
marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the
legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.

Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court disregarded the presumption
that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license
no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the solemnization of the subject marriage.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent are
sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent
to Edwin F. Cardenas.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law 4 provides
that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid
marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio. 5

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that marriage license
no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.

We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, viz.:

Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. — A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy,
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that
a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of
the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage
license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.

The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The failure
to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject
marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" —
a legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either
or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the
former.

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband, Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly
served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was
properly declared in default. Private respondent cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was
absolutely no evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.

It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties is null and void for lack of a
marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license, purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have
been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing officer.

In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private respondent Castro
sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by respondent appellate court.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 167684             July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner, 
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004
which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.

In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and
intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the
Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister
of the Gospel. On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel.
According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license
from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969, 4 and in a church
ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry
of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

The trial court made the following findings:

In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev.
Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A
certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together with another
person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19,
1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon
verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994
(Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued
by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same
marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception were jointly shared by
his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose
Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his
medical studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical
student at that time. They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It
was during this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree
against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.

Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter
narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed
marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was
celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994
(Exh. "K") were all sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994
(Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by
that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and
defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony,
having been civilly married on May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on
May 19, 1969."

Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994
and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they met and were introduced to
each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who
was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to
follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's
mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them
that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was still fearful he may lose her, he asked
her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a
minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On
May 31, 1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came
from hospital. Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual consummation
 during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician
and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic
problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he
would take endless pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex,"
while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited weird sexual
behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who
breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from
sleep and then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed
as it has become a habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years,
and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an English teacher.
Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her,
and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.

Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter
and grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements
(Exhs. "9" and "10").

Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations
and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple wed in civil rites some time
prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences
between plaintiff and defendant.

As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order for them to
live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June
14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent
her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage
contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious. 6

In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the following justifications:

Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage void ab
initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A")
and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section
28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev.
Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev.
Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the
marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.

Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information. 7

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and
held:

In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."

In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling is already retired." With said testimony We
cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure
of the office of the local civil registrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such
marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply
put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an entry on marriage license
no. 2720792.

xxxx

Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant
is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on
record.8

Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages
in question;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the
issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a
marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and

3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of
marriage."9

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no
Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and
void ab initio.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53, 10 5811 and 80.12

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and
Jaime is of no exception.

At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:

[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v.
Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any
circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the
officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became
the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was
declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in
her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing
an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab
initio.

The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the
earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are
public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage
licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular
entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as
above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License No.
2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792, 16 we
exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
 Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

            Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License Number
2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

            Local Civil Registrar

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was filed and no Marriage License No.
2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.

This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be
fictitious.

This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve.

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

            Local Civil Registrar

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty
whether or not such license was issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who
stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of
the said person was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or
that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been
exerted.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for
marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969.
Did you bring with you those records?

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

 Q Did you bring that with you?

A No, sir.

Q Why not?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office maintains as required by the manual of the
office of the Local Civil Registrar?

COURT

May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.

xxxx

COURT

Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect
to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask
him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the
record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?

A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No.
2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the
certifications, is effectively rebutted.

According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable
presumptions.

In one case, it was held:

A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence
to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable
presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x. 21

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. 22

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the
presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed
true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot
easily accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight. 24

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. 25

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two offsprings, 26 now adults
themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in
1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit
from his own deceit and perfidy.28

Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage
is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members
alone.29

"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio –
Always presume marriage."30

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v.
Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the
Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 THIRD DIVISION
 
 
RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA,   G.R. No. 167746
Petitioner,  
  Present:
   
  YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
  Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
  CHICO-NAZARIO,
  NACHURA, and
  REYES, JJ.
   
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF Promulgated:
APPEALS,  
Respondents. August 28, 2007
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
 
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 
 
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30
September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners appeal and affirming the decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.
 
The antecedent facts are:
 
A petition for annulment of marriage [3] was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he and
respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a
marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev.  Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the
CDCC BR Chapel.[4] They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another marriage ceremony at
the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a
marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a
resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985,
respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing,
judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract [5] and its entry on
file.[6]
 
Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage
license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation,
respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel
Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children. [8] Petitioner only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against petitioner before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of
merit.
 
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:
 
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:
  
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
 
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos ( P20,000.00) per month as support for their two (2)
children on the first five (5) days of each month; and
 
3. To pay the costs.[11]
 
 
As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal.  His Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in
a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]
 
The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any evidence
to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage
under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [13]
 
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:
 
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has no legal and
factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment of the
solemnization of the marriage.
 
b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No. 7054133
despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the Marriage
license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.
 
c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this Honorable
Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
 
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of procedural rules to
protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants. [14]
 
 
We deny the petition.
 
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because he and
respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged everything for them. [15] The wedding took place at the stairs
in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs. [16] He and respondent did not go
to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them, neither he nor the
respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the
certification states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of Mr.  Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their
marriage contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number.
 
The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law to
determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
 
A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
marriage void ab initio  pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.[19]
 
Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:
 
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
 
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
 
(2) Their consent, freely given;
 
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
 
 (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
 
 
The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. [21]
 
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court considered the
absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.
 
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals ,[22] the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry
to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of due search and inability to find a
record or entry as to the purported marriage license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged
under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that there is
absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void  ab initio.
 
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as
void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license.  The court held that the certification issued by the
local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the necessary
marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage of the petitioner and the deceased
is undoubtedly void ab initio.
 
In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24]  the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15
November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
 

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

 
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the
absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil
registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a
marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The certification moreover is
precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
 
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:
 
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was issued in
favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.
 
This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve.
[26]

 
 
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was done in the
regular conduct of official business.[27] The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. However, the presumption prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless
the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the presumption and, in case of doubt
as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. [28] Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
 
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident
of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage.  Issuance of a marriage
license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of
publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the
marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity
are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.[31]
 
Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that
the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is
number 7054033. Once more, this argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a
closer scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may read either as 7054133
or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands, [32] petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a party to
the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place
because he initiated it.[33] Petitioner is an educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to
the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action and be allowed to
extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle.  We cannot
countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith. [34]
 
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license.  There is no
claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a
whimper on the part of the petitioner.
 
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract executed
during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as follows
 
WITNESS
 
As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.
 
COURT
 
What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.
 
WITNESS
 
I dont remember your honor.
 
COURT
 
Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?
 
WITNESS
 
I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is good enough for the
marriage and they accepted it your honor.
 
COURT
 
In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage Contract?
 
WITNESS
 
Yes your honor.
 
COURT
 
That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued which Marriage
License is Number 7054033.
 
 WITNESS
 
Yes your honor.[35]
 
 
The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church ceremony
was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding. [36]
 
Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the ceremony
before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer
or clergyman shown to have performed a marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary. [37] Moreover, the
solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil
registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the
issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law. [38]
 
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. [39] Every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September
2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
 
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. L-2209-CTJ August 27, 1981

ABDON SEGUISABAL, complainant, 
vs.
HON. JOSE R. CABRERA, City Judge of Toledo City, respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

In his verified Complaint filed on 18 June 1979, Abdon Seguisabal has charged City Judge Jose R. Cabrera of Toledo City with gross misconduct in
office and gross ignorance of the law for having solemnized, on 14 April 1978, the marriage of Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy without the
requisite marriage license pursuant to Article 53 of the Civil Code, and for having failed to transmit a copy of the marriage contract, signed by him
and the parties, to the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City within fifteen (15) days from the date of solemnization as mandatorily required
by Article 68 of the same Code.

That respondent actually solemnized said marriage without the requisite license, is shown by the marriage contract issued to the contracting parties
(Annexes "C", "C-1"). The f failure to transmit a copy of the marriage contract to the Local Civil Registrar is substantiated by the Certifications, both
issued on 5 June 1979, by the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City (Annex "A" and "B"),

Required to comment, respondent Judge explained:

On April 14, 1978 at around 12:00 o'clock noon, Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy accompanied by the mother of Jaime
Sayson the father of Marlyn Jagonoy and several others appeared before my Office bringing with them a Marriage Contract to be
solemnized in marriage. I asked them for their Marriage License but they told me that the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City
cannot issue the same because the one in-charge was not in his Office, it being already 12:00 o'clock noon. The bride-to-be was
three months pregnant.

Presuming that the papers were in order inasmuch as the parents were present, I solemnized the marriage but told the parties to
come back in the afternoon together with the Marriage License. The parties did not come in the afternoon and the papers left in
my office were lost in the mass of paper works attendant in the Office of the City Judge, in fact, I have virtually forgotten about it
myself.

Sometime in May 1979, about a year after, a crying girl bringing with her a child appeared before me in my office and I Identified
her as Marlyn Jagonoy. She informed me that her husband, Jaime Sayson, who was a draftee in the Philippine Army died in an
encounter with the Muslim rebels in Maguindanao and subsequently died. The army authorities will give her the benefits if and
when she can prove that she was actually married to the said Jaime Sayson. In sympathy and fairness to Marlyn Jagonoy whose
marriage I actually solemnized, I searched for the papers and found them. I told the father of Marlyn to go to the Local Civil
Registrar's Office in order that Marriage License be issued to her which he did but came back and told me that the Local Civil
Registrar will not receive the papers and will not issue the Marriage License for the reason that the parties have not attended the
Family Planning Seminar required by law before Marriage License may be issued. Believing that Family Planning was no longer
necessary inasmuch as Jaime Sayson was already dead, I issued to them the Marriage Contract in order that they can enjoy the
benefits accruing Jaime Sayson who died a hero's death in the service of the flag of the Republic. In issuing the Marriage
Contract, I had done it in good faith and in sympathy and in fairness to the widow, Marlyn Jagonoy, whom I believe is entitled to
the benefits she could enjoy it simply because of the technicality of the law. The issuance of the Marriage Contract made
everybody happy, The parents of the boy and the parents of the girl were satisfied and are not even a party to this Complaint
(Rollo, pp. 9-10).

Respondent Judge further averred that the complainant herein was obviously ill-motivated and resorted to this administrative action out of spite
because he had, on 24 November 1978, dismissed Criminal Case No. A-1712 for Alarm and Scandal filed by complainant against a certain Marcelo
Rizal, and that complainant is the accused in Criminal Case No. A-1907 for Qualified Theft pending before respondent's Court.

Considering the admissions made by respondent, and as observed in the Memorandum Report dated 22 October 1980 submitted by Deputy Court
Administrator, Leo D. Medialdea, concurred in by Court Administrator, Justice Lorenzo Relova, there was no more need for a formal investigation to
determine the administrative liability of respondent Judge. Respondent must be held guilty of the charge filed for in solemnizing the marriage of
Jaime Sayson and Marlyn Jagonoy on 14 April 1978 without requiring the essential pre-requisite of a marriage license, respondent had undoubtedly
transgressed Article 53(4) of the Civil Code in the absence of any showing that the subject marriage falls under marriages of an exceptional
character wherein a license is not mandatorily required. Respondent was likewise remiss in his duty under Article 68 of the Civil Code to transmit to
the Local Civil Registrar of Toledo City within fifteen (15) days from the date of solemnization of the marriage in question, a copy of the marriage
contract duly signed by him as the solemnizing officer and by the contracting parties.
The defense of good faith interposed by respondent is unavailing. As a judicial officer, he is expected to know the law on the solemnization of
marriages. His feeling of sympathy and fairness to the widow, Marlyn Jagonoy" cannot serve as a license for him to deliberately transgress or
dispense with legal requisites.

In view, however, of respondent's twenty-seven (27) years and seven (7) months of service in the Judiciary, and considering that he has applied for
retirement under Republic Act No. 5095 due to schemic heart ailment, we have mitigated the corresponding administrative sanction.

WHEREFORE, finding respondent Judge to be guilty of gross neglect of duty, he shall pay a fine equivalent to three (3) months salary, the same to
be deducted from his gratuity upon his retirement from the service.

A copy of this Decision should be attached to his personal record.

SO ORDERED,
A.M. No. MTJ-94-963 July 14, 1995

MARILOU NAMA MORENO, complainant, 

vs.
JUDGE JOSE C. BERNABE, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The responsibility of a Judge is indeed heavy. As the incarnation of law and justice, it is his sworn duty to lead by example, to be the example. But
how can he inspire the people to live by the law if he himself fails to do so?

Marilou Nama Moreno filed this complaint against Judge Jose C. Bernabe of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 72, Pasig, Metro Manila for grave
misconduct and gross ignorance of the law.

Complainant alleges that on October 4, 1993, she and Marcelo Moreno were married before respondent Judge Bernabe. She avers that Respondent
Judge assured her that the marriage contract will be released ten (10) days after October 4, 1993. Complainant then visited the office of the
Respondent Judge on October 15, 1993 only to find out that she could not get the marriage contract because the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
failed to issue a marriage license. She claims that Respondent Judge connived with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to deceive her. 1

In his comment,2 Respondent denied that he conspired with the relatives of Marcelo Moreno to solemnize the marriage for the purpose of deceiving
the complainant.

Respondent contends:

1. That the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig has actually prepared the marriage license but it was not released due to the subsequent objection of the
father of Marcelo Moreno;

2. That he did not violate the law nor did he have the slightest intention to violate the law when he, in good faith, solemnized the marriage, as he was
moved only by a desire to help a begging and pleading complainant who wanted some kind of assurance or security due to her pregnant condition;

3. That in order to pacify complainant, Marcelo Moreno requested him to perform the marriage ceremony, with the express assurance that "the
marriage license was definitely forthcoming since the necessary documents were complete;" 3

4. That the contracting parties were not known to him; and

5. That both parties, particularly the complainant, were fully apprised of the effects of a marriage performed without the required marriage license.

In a Resolution dated August 10, 1994, we referred this matter for investigation, report and recommendation to Executive Judge Martin Villarama,
Jr., of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 156.

In his Memorandum of October 11, 1994, Judge Villarama, Jr. recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Respondent for failure of
complainant to appear on any of the scheduled hearings and on the basis of a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" 4 executed on behalf of complainant who has
left for Singapore by her elder sister Sherlita N. Bendanillo expressly withdrawing her complaint against Respondent.

Judge Villarama, however, also recommended that the Respondent be issued a stern warning "in view of the fact on record that he indeed
solemnized a marriage without the requisite marriage license. . . ." 5

On November 7, 1994, we referred the aforementioned Memorandum to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.

In its Memorandum dated January 17, 1995, the Office of the Court Administrator stated:

Careful study of the records reveal that indeed respondent Judge displayed his ignorance of the law when he solemnized the
marriage without a marriage license. As a judge, he is presumed to be aware of the existence of Article 3(2) of the Family Code
of the Philippines (E.O. 209, as amended by E.O. 227), which provides that one of the formal requisites of a marriage is a valid
marriage license. Absence of said requisite will make the marriage void from the beginning (Article 35 [3], the Family Code of the
Philippines). Judges are enjoined to show more than just a cursory acquaintance of the law and other established rules. 6
It recommended that Respondent be held liable for misconduct for solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license and that the appropriate
administrative sanctions be imposed against him.7

We concur with the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator.

Respondent, by his own admission8 that he solemnized the marriage between complainant and Marcelo Moreno without the required marriage
license, has dismally failed to live up to his commitment to be the "embodiment of competence, integrity and independence" 9 and to his promise to
be "faithful to the law." 10

Respondent cannot hide behind his claim of good faith and Christian motives which, at most, would serve only to mitigate his liability but not
exonerate him completely. Good intentions could never justify violation of the law.

Must we always repeat our reminder in Uy v. Dizon Capulong 11 and several other cases12 that —

. . . the judge is the visible representation of law and justice from whom the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law.
For the judge to return that regard, the latter must be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow.
The judge should be studiously careful to avoid even the slightest infraction of the law. To fulfill this mission, the judge should
keep abreast of the law, the rulings and doctrines of this Court. If the judge is already aware of them, the latter should not
deliberately refrain from applying them; otherwise such omission can never be excused.

And have we not frequently stressed that:

. . .judges should endeavor to maintain at all times the confidence and high respect accorded to those who wield the gavel of
justice. Circular No. 13, dated July 1, 1987, enjoins judges "to conduct themselves strictly in accordance with the mandate of
existing laws and the Code of Judicial Conduct that they be exemplars in their communities and the living personification of
justice and the Rule of Law. . . . 13

A case in point, a definite precedent and a clear basis in determining the liability of Respondent in the instant case is Cosca, et al. v. Palaypayon, Jr.,
et a1. 14 where Judge Palaypayon, Jr. was duly fined and sternly warned for, among others, solemnizing marriages without licenses. We declared:

. . . the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding
judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not
only be characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an
example of integrity, uprightness and honesty. Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. It applies,
without qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the
exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter
alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the
essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are providing for
herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsibility. The Revised
Penal Code provides that "[p]riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law." This is of
course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

Finally, on the alleged withdrawal of the complaint against Respondent, we reiterate our ruling in Imbing v. Tiongson:15

The fact that complainant has lost interest in prosecuting the administrative case against herein respondent judge will not
necessarily warrant a dismissal thereof. Once charges have been filed, the Supreme Court may not be divested of its jurisdiction
to investigate and ascertain the truth of the matter alleged in the complaint. The Court has an interest in the conduct of members
of the Judiciary and in improving the delivery of justice to the people, and its efforts in that direction may not be derailed by the
complainant's desistance from further prosecuting the case he or she initiated.

To condition administrative actions upon the will of every complainant, who may, for one reason or another, condone a
detestable act, is to strip this Court of its supervisory power to discipline erring members of the Judiciary. Definitely, personal
interests are not material or controlling. What is involved here is a matter of public interest considering that respondent is no
ordinary citizen but an officer of the court whose personal behavior not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial
duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Respondent is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, G.R. No. 160172

Petitioner,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,

Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

February 13, 2008

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
 

TINGA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV. No. 69166, [2] declaring that (1) Reianna Tricia A. De Castro is the
legitimate child of the petitioner; and (2) that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid until properly nullified by a competent court in a
proceeding instituted for that purpose.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, follow.

Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the
Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired.  Thus, in order to
push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites.Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their
respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife.

 
On 13 November 1995, respondent gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the childs birth, respondent has been the one
supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and from her private practice.

On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (trial court.[3] In
her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially
support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child.[4]

Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake
affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible
administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got married.  He also
averred that they never lived together as husband and wife and that he has never seen nor acknowledged the child.

In its Decision dated 16 October 2000,[5] the trial court ruled that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it
was solemnized without a marriage license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her
support. Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion when, on the basis of
mere belief and conjecture, it ordered him to provide support to the child when the latter is not, and could not have been, his own child.

The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to be subsisting until a judicial declaration of
nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage.  In addition,
the Court of Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as well as his refusal to state with
certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him
of his obligation and reward him of his being irresponsible. [6] Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April 1998 executed
by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.

The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial court to declare the marriage of
petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal,
to see to it that there is no collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a marriage.  The
burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and
not in the instant proceedings. The proceedings before the trial court should have been limited to the obligation of petitioner to support the child and
his wife on the basis of the marriage apparently and voluntarily entered into by petitioner and respondent. [7] The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 16 October 2000, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
National Capital Judicial Region, Brach 70, in JDRC No. 4626, is AFFIRMED with theMODIFICATIONS (1) declaring Reianna
Tricia A. De Castro, as the legitimate child of the appellant and the appellee and (2) declaring the marriage on 13 March 1995
between the appellant and the appellee valid until properly annulled by a competent court in a proceeding instituted for that
purpose. Costs against the appellant.[8]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was denied by the Court of Appeals. [9] Hence this petition.

 
Before us, petitioner contends that the trial court properly annulled his marriage with respondent because as shown by the evidence and admissions
of the parties, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license. He stresses that the affidavit they executed, in lieu of a marriage license,
contained a false narration of facts, the truth being that he and respondent never lived together as husband and wife.  The false affidavit should never
be allowed or admitted as a substitute to fill the absence of a marriage license. [10] Petitioner additionally argues that there was no need for the
appearance of a prosecuting attorney in this case because it is only an ordinary action for support and not an action for annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage. In any case, petitioner argues that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the invalidity of their marriage since it was
validly invoked as an affirmative defense in the instant action for support. Citing several authorities,[11]petitioner claims that a void marriage can be
the subject of a collateral attack. Thus, there is no necessity to institute another independent proceeding for the declaration of nullity of the marriage
between the parties. The refiling of another case for declaration of nullity where the same evidence and parties would be presented  would entail
enormous expenses and anxieties, would be time-consuming for the parties, and would increase the burden of the courts. [12] Finally, petitioner claims
that in view of the nullity of his marriage with respondent and his vigorous denial of the childs paternity and filiation, the Court of Appeals gravely
erred in declaring the child as his legitimate child.

In a resolution dated 16 February 2004, the Court required respondent and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file their respective
comments on the petition.[13]

In her Comment,[14] respondent claims that the instant petition is a mere dilatory tactic to thwart the finality of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. Echoing the findings and rulings of the appellate court, she argues that the legitimacy of their marriage cannot be attacked collaterally, but
can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. With regard to the filiation of her child, she pointed out that
compared to her candid and straightforward testimony, petitioner was uncertain, if not evasive in answering questions about their sexual
encounters. Moreover, she adds that despite the challenge from her and from the trial court, petitioner strongly objected to being subjected to DNA
testing to prove paternity and filiation.[15]

For its part, the OSG avers that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it was improper for the trial court to declare null and void the marriage of
petitioner and respondent in the action for support. Citing the case of Nial v. Bayadog,[16] it states that courts may pass upon the validity of a marriage
in an action for support, since the right to support from petitioner hinges on the existence of a valid marriage.  Moreover, the evidence presented
during the proceedings in the trial court showed that the marriage between petitioner and respondent was solemnized without a marriage license,
and that their affidavit (of a man and woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for at least five years) was
false. Thus, it concludes the trial courtcorrectly held that the marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid.[17] In addition, the OSG agrees
with the findings of the trial court that the child is an illegitimate child of petitioner and thus entitled to support. [18]

Two key issues are presented before us. First, whether the trial court had the jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner
and respondent in an action for support and second, whether the child is the daughter of petitioner.

Anent the first issue, the Court holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage between petitioner and
respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked. [19] Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, we held:
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.  This is without prejudice
to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of
the Family Code connotes that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage. [20]

 
Likewise, in Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario ,[21] the Court ruled that it is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of two marriages despite
the main case being a claim for death benefits. Reiterating Nial, we held that the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. However, evidence must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a marriage an absolute nullity. [22]

Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void  ab initio,  whereas a defect in any of
the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. [23] In the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and
respondent did not have a marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that they had been living
together for more than five years. [24] However, respondent herself in effect admitted the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-
examination, thus

 
ATTY. CARPIO:

Q But despite of (sic) the fact that you have not been living together as husband and wife for the last five years on or before
March 13, 1995, you signed the Affidavit, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.[25]

The falsity of the affidavit cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the marriage
license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and
unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for
a marriage license.[26] In the instant case, there was no scandalous cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all.  The false affidavit
which petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper.  They
were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Anent the second issue, we find that the child is petitioners illegitimate daughter, and therefore entitled to support.

Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. [27] Thus, one can prove
illegitimate filiation through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child, or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. [28]

The Certificate of Live Birth[29] of the child lists petitioner as the father. In addition, petitioner, in an affidavit waiving additional tax exemption in favor
of respondent, admitted that he is the father of the child, thus stating:

 
1.      I am the legitimate father of REIANNA TRICIA A. DE CASTRO who was born on November 3, 1995 at Better Living,
Paraaque, Metro Manila;[30]

We are likewise inclined to agree with the following findings of the trial court:

 
 That Reinna Tricia is the child of the respondent with the petitioner is supported not only by the testimony of the latter, but also by
respondents own admission in the course of his testimony wherein he conceded that petitioner was his former girlfriend. While
they were sweethearts, he used to visit petitioner at the latters house or clinic. At times, they would go to a motel to have sex. As
a result of their sexual dalliances, petitioner became pregnant which ultimately led to their marriage, though invalid, as earlier
ruled. While respondent claims that he was merely forced to undergo the marriage ceremony, the pictures taken of the occasion
reveal otherwise (Exhs. B, B-1, to B-3, C, C-1 and C-2, D, D-1 and D-2, E, E-1 and E-2, F, F-1 and F-2, G, G-1 and G-2 and H, H-
1 to H-3). In one of the pictures (Exhs. D, D-1 and D-2), defendant is seen putting the wedding ring on petitioners finger and in
another picture (Exhs. E, E-1 and E-2) respondent is seen in the act of kissing the petitioner. [31]

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in part. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 69166 are
SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Pasig City in JDRC No. 4626 dated 16 October 2000 is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of
the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia
Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born out of that marriage. [2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband
contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. [3] When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or
ought to know that the same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not
know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years already
without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit. [4] According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would
have advised the latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the complaint be dismissed
for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier
Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits [5] of the late Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed
by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married
to Herminia Borja and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels, they had both
left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on the basis of those
affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and
without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and
found no legal impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to
marry each other]; and
5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had
found no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]
 Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993
and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also,
in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated.
Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent
marriage null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him
from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the
same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.
The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial.  Article 63(1) of the
Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case  the marriage
bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds
true all the more when the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.
Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been
cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least five years does
not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally
capacitated to marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge to
solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.
Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim
ignorance of the law excuses no one has special application to judges, [8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the
embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.
[9]
 And when the law transgressed is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. [10]
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be
imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs.  JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro.  He has submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends,
exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos,
Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del
Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa
have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The
same person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 1994, and
Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial
Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. [1] With respect to
the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the
Family Code which states that:"Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that
Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the
case.[2]
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt
upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's
malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated."
Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A.
Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. [3] The
affidavit was not issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before him.  In their affidavit, the affiants
stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation
and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for
almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample
reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:

"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles
391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse."
(Emphasis added.)

There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order
to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in
accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death.  Absent this
judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda.Whether wittingly, or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to
have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void,
marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not
falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family
Code, thus:

"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;

x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the
consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in
remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect."

Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo
and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's
chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon
request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death
or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
[4]

More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal
requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent
member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and
does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision.  Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate
the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese
or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize
marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the
officiating official to administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his
misplaced authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our
attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of
the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the
ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic
legal principles like the ones involved in instant case. [6] It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. [7] Otherwise, the
system of justice rests on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law.  While magistrates may
at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in
an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar
Tagadan and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union
and therefore void, and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation.Respondent is advised
to be more circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-4904            February 5, 1909

ROSALIA MARTINEZ, plaintiff-appellant, 
vs.
ANGEL TAN, defendant-appellee.

Domingo Franco, for appellant.

Doroteo Karagdag, for appellee.

WILLARD, J.:

The only question in this case is whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907, before the justice
of the peace, Jose Ballori, in the town of Palompon in the Province of Leyte.

There was received in evidence at the trial what is called an expediente de matrimonio civil. It is written in Spanish and consists, first, of a petition
directed to the justice of the peace, dated on the 25th of September, 1907, signed by the plaintiff and the defendant, in which they state that they
have mutually agreed to enter into a contract of marriage before the justice of the peace, and ask that the justice solemnize the marriage. Following
this is a document dated on the same day, signed by the justice of the peace, by the plaintiff, by the defendant, and by Zacarias Esmero and Pacita
Ballori. It states the presentation of the petition above mentioned; that the persons who signed it where actually present in the office of the justice on
the same day named; that they ratified under oath the contents of the petition, and that they insisted in what they had there asked for. It also stated
that being required to produce witnesses of the marriage, the presented Zacarias Esmero as a witness for the husband and Pacita Ballori as a
witness for the wife. Following this is a certificate of marriage signed by the justice of the peace and the witnesses Zacarias Esmero and Pacita
Ballori, dated the 25th day of September, 1907, in which it is stated that the plaintiff and the defendant were legally married by the justice of the
peace in the presence of the witnesses on that day.

The court below decided the case in favor of the defendant, holding that the parties were legally married on the day named. The evidence in support
of that decision is: First. The document itself, which the plaintiff admits that she signed. Second. The evidence of the defendant, who testifies that he
and said plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named, together with the witness Zacarias Esmero and Pacita Ballori, and that
they all signed the document above mentioned. Third. The evidence of Zacarias Esmero, one of the above-named witnesses, who testifies that the
plaintiff, the defendant, and Pacita Ballori appeared before the justice at the time named and did sign the document referred to. Fourth. The evidence
of Pacita Ballori, who testified to the same effect. Fifth. The evidence of Jose Santiago, the bailiff of the court of the justice of the peace, who testified
that the plaintiff, the defendant, the two witnesses above-named, and the justice of the peace were all present in the office of the justice of the peace
at the time mentioned.

The only direct evidence in favor of the plaintiff is her own testimony that she never appeared before the justice of the peace and never was married
to the defendant. She admits that she signed the document in question, but says that she signed it in her own home, without reading it, and at the
request of the defendant, who told her that it was a paper authorizing him to ask the consent of her parents to the marriage.

There is some indirect evidence which the plaintiff claims supports her case, but which we think, when properly considered, is not entitled to much
weight. The plaintiff at the time was visiting, in the town of Palompon, her married brother and was there for about two weeks. The wife of her
brother, Rosario Bayot, testified that the plaintiff never left the house except in her company. But she admitted on cross-examination that she herself
went to school every morning and that on one occasion the plaintiff had gone to church unaccompanied. The testimony of this witness loses its force
when the testimony of Pacita Ballori is considered. She says that at the request of the defendant on the day named, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon,
she went to the store of a Chinese named Veles; that there she met the plaintiff and her mother; that she asked the mother of the plaintiff to allow the
plaintiff to accompany her, the witness, to her own house for the purpose of examining some dress patterns; that the mother gave her consent and
the two rights left the store, but instead of going to the house of the witness they went directly to the office of the justice of the peace where the
ceremony took place; that after the ceremony had taken place, one came advising them that the mother was approaching, and that they thereupon
hurriedly left the office of the justice and went to the house of Pacita Ballori, where the mother later found them.

The other testimony of the plaintiff relating to certain statements made by the justice of the peace, who died after the ceremony was performed and
before the trial, and certain statements made by Pacita Ballori, is not sufficient to overcome the positive testimony of the witnesses for the defendant.
The other testimony of Pacita Ballori is severely criticized by counsel for the appellant in his brief. It appears that during her first examination she was
seized with an hysterical attack and practically collapsed at the trial. Her examination was adjourned to a future day and was completed in her house
where she was sick in bed. It is claimed by counsel that her collapse was due to the fact that she recognized that she testified falsely in stating the
office of the justice of the peace was at the time in the municipal building, when, in fact, it was in a private house. We do not think that the record
justifies the claim of the appellant. The statement as to the location of the office of the justice of the peace was afterwards corrected by the witness
and we are satisfied that she told the facts substantially as they occurred.

There is, moreover, in the case written evidence which satisfies us that the plaintiff was not telling the truth when she said she did not appear before
the justice of the peace. This evidence consists of eight letters, which the defendant claims were all written by the plaintiff. The plaintiff admits that
she wrote letters numbered 2 and 9. The authenticity of the others was proven. No. 9 is as follows:

ANGEL: Up to this time I did not see my father; but I know that he is very angry and if he be informed that we have been married civilly, I
am sure that he will turn me out of the house.

Do what you may deem convenient, as I don't know what to do.

Should I be able to go to-morrow to Merida, I shall do so, because I can not remain here.

Yours,           ROSAL.

Letter No. 6, which bears no date, but which undoubtedly was written on the morning of the 25th of September, is as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

ANGEL: It is impossible for me to go to the house of Veles this morning because my sister in law will not let me go there; if it suits you, I
believe that this afternoon, about 5 or 6 o'clock, is the best hour.

Arrange everything, as I shall go there only for the purpose of signing, and have Pacita wait for me at the Chinese store, because I don't
like to go without Pacita.

The house must be one belonging to prudent people, and no one should know anything about it.

Yours,           ROSAL.

It will be noticed that this corroborates completely the testimony of Pacita Ballori as to her meeting the plaintiff in the afternoon at the store of the
Chinese, Veles. Letter No. 7 is also undated, but was evidently written after the marriage before the justice of the peace. It is as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL, TAN.

ANGEL: If you want to speak to my mother, who is also yours, come here by and by, at about 9 or 10, when you see that the tide is high
because my brother will have to go to the boat for the purpose of loading lumber.

Don't tell her that we have been civilly married, but tell her at first that you are willing to celebrate the marriage at this time, because I don't
like her to know to-day that we have been at the court-house, inasmuch as she told me this morning that she heard that we would go to the
court, and that we must not cause her to be ashamed, and that if I insist on being married I must do it right.

Tell her also that you have asked me to carry you.

I send you herewith the letter of your brother, in order that you may do what he wishes.

Yours,           ROSAL.

Letter No. 8 was also evidently written after the marriage and is in part as follows:

Sr. D. ANGEL TAN.

ANGEL: I believe it is better for you to go to Ormoc on Sunday of the steamer Rosa, for the purpose of asking my father's permission for
our marriage, and in case he fails to give it, then we shall do what we deem proper, and, if he does not wish us to marry without his
permission, you must request his consent.

Tell me who said that my sister in law knows that we are civilly married; my brother ill treatment is a matter of no importance, as every
thing may be carried out, with patience.

It was proven at the trial that the defendant did go to Ormoc on the steamer  Rosa as indicated in this letter, and that the plaintiff was on the same
boat. The plaintiff testified, however, that she had no communication with the defendant during the voyage. The plaintiff and the defendant never
lived together as husband and wife, and upon her arrival in Ormoc, after consulting with her family, she went to Cebu and commenced this action,
which was brought for the purpose of procuring the cancellation of the certificate of marriage and for damages. The evidence strongly preponderates
in favor of the decision of the court below to the effect that the plaintiff appeared before the justice of the peace at the time named.
It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did
not constitute a legal marriage. General orders, No. 68, section 6, is as follows:

No particular form from the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in the presence of the person solemnizing the
marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife.

Zacarias Esmero, one of the witnesses, testified that upon the occasion in question the justice of the peace said nothing until after the document was
signed and then addressing himself to the plaintiff and the defendant said, "You are married." The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant
contained a positive statement that they had mutually agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The
document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified under oath, before the justice, the contents of
the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed
by both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized the marriage in due form, the parties before the
justice of the peace declaring that they took each other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in
this case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in the document signed by her, which
admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before
the justice of the peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to read and write the Spanish
language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied,
and so hold, that what took place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.

The defendant's original answer was a general denial of the allegations contained in the complaint. Among these allegations was a statement that
the parties had obtain previously the consent of the plaintiff's parents. The defendant was afterwards allowed to amend his answer so that it was a
denial of the allegations of the complaint except that relating to the condition in regard to the consent of the parents. The plaintiff objected to the
allowance of this amendment. After the trial had commenced the defendant was again allowed to amend his answer so that it should be an
admission of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the complaint, except that part which related to the consent of the parents. It will be seen that this second
amendment destroyed completely the first amendment and the defendants lawyer stated that what he intended to allege in his first amendment, but
by reason of the haste with which the first amendment was drawn he had unintentionally made it exactly the opposite of what he had intended to
state. After argument the court allowed the second amendment. We are satisfied that in this allowance there was no abuse of discretion and we do
not see how the plaintiff was in any way prejudiced. She proceeded with the trial of the case without asking for a continuance.

The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
G.R. No. L-61873 October 3l, 1984

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
ELIAS BORROMEO, defendant-appellant.

RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Appeal from the decision of the then Circuit Criminal Court, Fourteenth Judicial District, Cebu-Bohol (now Regional Trial Court), finding accused
Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,  with the
accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Susana Taborada-Borromeo, in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.

Records show that at high noon of July 3, 1981, the four-year old niece of Elias and Susana Borromeo reported to Matilde Taborada, mother of
Susana, that Susana was shouting frantically for help because Elias was killing her. The 71-year old Matilde Taborada told the child to go to
Geronimo Taborada, her son, who was then working in their mango plantation. Upon hearing the report of the child, Geronimo informed his father
and together they went to Susana's hut. The windows and the door were closed and Geronimo could only peep through the bamboo slats at the wall
where he saw Susana lying down, motionless, apparently dead beside her one-month old child who was crying. Elias Borromeo was lying near
Susana still holding on to a bloody kitchen bolo.

Susana's father called for the Mabolo police and, after a few minutes, police officer Fernando C. Abella and three policemen arrived. The peace
officers shouted and ordered Elias to open the door. Elias answered calmly that he would smoke first before he would open the door. When he did,
the peace officers found Susana already dead, her intestine having spilled out of her abdomen. A small kitchen bolo was at her side.

When questioned, the accused Elias Borromeo could only mumble incoherent words.

Dr. Jesus Serna, police medico-legal officer, submitted his necropsy report (Exhibits "A" & "B") which states that the cause of death was "stab
wounds, multiple chest, abdomen, left supraclavicular region and left shoulder." There were five (5) incised wounds and six (6) stab wounds on the
deceased.

In his brief, accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred (1) in holding as it did that appellant and Susana Taborada (the deceased) were
legally and validly married in a church wedding ceremony, when the officiating priest testified otherwise and there was no marriage contract executed
on the occasion or later on; hence, the accused could only be liable for homicide; (2) in failing to appreciate in favor of appellant the mitigating
circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance to offset the same; and, (3) in convicting
appellant of the crime of parricide and in imposing upon him the penultimate penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Appellant in his brief, page 9, concurs with "the trial court's finding to the effect that he killed Susana Taborada (the deceased) without legal
justification" The main issue raised by him is that he and Susana were not legally married and therefore the crime committed is not parricide, but
homicide.

Other than the stand of appellant's counsel against the existence of marriage in order to lessen or mitigate the penalty imposable upon his client,
accused Elias Borromeo himself admitted that the deceased-victim was his legitimate wife. Hereunder is his testimony on this point: têñ.£îhqwâ£

Q Please state your name, age and other personal circumstances?

A ELIAS BORROMEO, 40 years old, married, farmer, resident of Putingbato, Babag Cebu City.

The COURT: têñ.£îhqwâ£
 Q You say you are married, who is your wife?

A Susana Taborada.

Q When did you get married with Susana Taborada?

A I forgot.

Q Where did you get married?

A Near the RCPI station in Babag.

Q There is a church there?

A There is a chapel.

Q Were you married by a priest or a minister?

A By a priest.

Q Who is this priest?

A Father Binghay of Guadalupe.

Q Do you have any children with Susana Taborada?

A We have one.

Q How old is the child?

A I already forgot, I have been here for quite a long time already. (pp. 4-5, tsn.,
December 12, 1981 hearing)

There is no better proof of marriage than the admission of the accused of the existence of such marriage. (Tolentino vs. Paras, 122 SCRA 525).

Person living together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would
be living in constant violation of decency and law. (Son Cui vs. Guepangco, 22 Phil. 216) The presumption in favor of matrimony is one of the
strongest known in law. The law presumes morality, and not immorality; marriage, and not concubinage: legitimacy, and not bastardy. There is the
presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to each other. The reason for this presumption of marriage is well stated
in Perido vs. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legal matrimony. ...

And, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists in the registry of marriage does not invalidate said marriage, as long as in the celebration
thereof, all requisites for its validity are present. The forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the registry is not one of said requisites.
(Pugeda vs. Trias, 4 SCRA 849).

Anent the second and third assigned errors, suffice it to say that the penalty for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. (Article 246, Revised Penal
Code) Paragraph 3, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that where the law prescribed a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties
and the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating circumstances, with no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
Thus, assuming the presence of the mitigating circumstances of provocation or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, without any aggravating
circumstance to offset the same, the penalty is still  reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to P30,000.00. With
costs.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
ARTURIO TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs.  COURT OF APPEALS, FELIX TRINIDAD (deceased) and LOURDES TRINIDAD, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In the absence of a marriage contract and a birth certificate, how may marriage and filiation be proven?

The Case

This is the main question raised in this petition for review on certiorari  challenging the Court of Appeals [1] Decision promulgated on December
1, 1994[2] and Resolution promulgated on February 8, 1995 [3]in CA-GR CV No. 23275, which reversed the decision of the trial court and dismissed
petitioners action for partition and damages.
On August 10, 1978, Petitioner Arturio Trinidad filed a complaint [4] for partition and damages against Private Respondents Felix and Lourdes,
both surnamed Trinidad, before the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Branch I. [5] On October 28, 1982, Felix died without issue, so he was not
substituted as a party.[6]
On July 4, 1989, the trial court rendered a twenty-page decision [7] in favor of the petitioner, in which it ruled:[8]
Considering therefore that this court is of the opinion that plaintiff is the legitimate son of Inocentes Trinidad, plaintiff is entitled to inherit
the property left by his deceased father which is 1/3 of the 4 parcels of land subject matter of this case. Although the plaintiff had testified
that he had been receiving [his] share from said land before and the same was stopped, there was no evidence introduced as to what
year he stopped receiving his share and for how much. This court therefore cannot rule on that.
In its four-page Decision, Respondent Court reversed the trial court on the ground that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove
that his parents were legally married to each other and that acquisitive prescription against him had set in. The assailed Decision disposed:[9]
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES  the appealed decision.
In lieu thereof, the Court hereby DISMISSES  the [petitioners] complaint and the counterclaim thereto.
Without costs.
Respondent Court denied reconsideration in its impugned Resolution which reads: [10]

The Court DENIES defendants-appellants motion for reconsideration, dated December 15, 1994, for lack of merit. There are no new or substantial
matters raised in the motion that merit the modification of the decision.

Hence, this petition.[11]

The Facts

The assailed Decision recites the factual background of this case, as follows: [12]
On August 10, 1978, plaintiff [herein petitioner] filed with the Court of First Instance of Aklan, Kalibo, Aklan, an action for partition of four
(4) parcels of land, described therein, claiming that he was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, one of three (3) children of Patricio
Trinidad, who was the original owner of the parcels of land. Patricio Trinidad died in 1940, leaving the four (4) parcels of land to his three
(3) children, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. In 1970, plaintiff demanded from the defendants to partition the land into three (3) equal shares
and to give him the one-third (1/3) individual share of his late father, but the defendants refused.
 In their answer, filed on September 07, 1978, defendants denied that plaintiff was the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad. Defendants
contended that Inocentes was single when he died in 1941, before plaintiffs birth. Defendants also denied that plaintiff had lived with
them, and claimed that the parcels of land described in the complaint had been in their possession since the death of their father in 1940
and that they had not given plaintiff a share in the produce of the land.
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the parents of three (3) children, namely, Inocentes, Lourdes and Felix. When Patricio died
in 1940, survived by the above named children, he left four (4) parcels of land, all situated at Barrio Tigayon, Kalibo Aklan.
Arturio Trinidad, born on July 21, 1943, claimed to be the legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad.
Arturio got married in 1966 to Candelaria Gaspar, at the age of twenty three (23). Sometime after the marriage, Arturio demanded from
the defendants that the above-mentioned parcels of land be partitioned into three (3) equal shares and that he be given the one-third (1/3)
individual shares of his late father, but defendants refused.
In order to appreciate more clearly the evidence adduced by both parties, this Court hereby reproduces pertinent portions of the trial courts
decision:[13]

EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

Plaintiff presented as his first witness, Jovita Gerardo, 77 years old, (at the time she testified in 1981) who is the barangay captain of barrio Tigayon,
Kalibo, Aklan, since 1972. She testified that before being elected as barrio captain she held the position of barrio council-woman for 4 years. Also
she was [a member of the] board of director[s] of the Parent-Teachers Association of Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That she knows the plaintiff because
they are neighbors and she knows him from the time of his birth. She knows the father of the plaintiff as Inocentes Trinidad and his mother Felicidad
Molato; both were already dead, Inocentes having died in 1944 and his wife died very much later. Witness recalls plaintiff was born in 1943 in Barrio
Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, on July 21, 1943. At the time of the birth of the plaintiff, the house of the witness was about 30 meters away from plaintiffs
parents[] house and she used to go there 2 or 3 times a week. That she knows both the defendants as they are also neighbors. That both Felix and
Lourdes Trinidad are the uncle and aunt of Arturio because Inocentes Trinidad who is the father of the plaintiff is the brother of the defendants, Felix
and Lourdes Trinidad. She testified she also knows that the father of Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes[,] all surnamed Trinidad[,] was Patricio Trinidad
who is already dead but left several parcels of land which are the 4 parcels subject of this litigation. That she knows all these [parcels of] land
because they are located in Barrio Tigayon.

When asked about the adjoining owners or boundaries of the 4 parcels of land, witness answered and mentioned the respective adjoining
owners. That she knew these 4 parcels belonged to Patricio Trinidad because said Patricio Trinidad was a native also of Barrio Tigayon. Said
Patricio died before the [war] and after his death the land went to his 3 children, namely: Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes. Since then the land was
never partitioned or divided among the 3 children of Patricio.

A picture, Exhibit A, was shown to the witness for identification and she identified a woman in the picture as the defendant, Lourdes Trinidad. A man
with a hat holding a baby was identified by her as Felix Trinidad, the defendant. The other woman in the picture was pointed by the witness as the
wife of the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if Arturio Trinidad and Lourdes Trinidad and Felix Trinidad pointed to by her in the picture are the
same Arturio, Felix and Lourdes, who are the plaintiff and the defendants in this case, witness answered yes.

Another picture marked as Exhibit B was presented to the witness for identification. She testified the woman in this picture as Lourdes Trinidad. In
said picture, Lourdes Trinidad was holding a child which witness identified as the child Arturio Trinidad. When asked by the court when xxx the
picture [was] taken, counsel for the plaintiff answered, in 1966. When asked if Arturio Trinidad was baptized, witness answered yes, as she had gone
to the house of his parents. Witness then identified the certificate of baptism marked as Exhibit C. The name Arturio Trinidad was marked as Exhibit
C-1 and the name of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato as father and mother respectively, were marked as Exhibit C-2. The date of birth being
July 21, 1943 was also marked. The signature of Monsignor Iturralde was also identified.

On cross-examination, witness testified that she [knew] the land in question very well as she used to pass by it always. It was located just near her
house but she cannot exactly tell the area as she merely passes by it. When asked if she [knew] the photographer who took the pictures presented
as Exhibit A and B, witness answered she does not know as she was not present during the picture taking. However, she can identify everybody in
the picture as she knows all of them.

At this stage of the trial, Felix Trinidad [died] without issue and he was survived by his only sister, Lourdes Trinidad, who is his co-defendant in this
case.

Next witness for the plaintiff was ISABEL MEREN who was 72 years old and a widow. She testified having known Inocentes Trinidad as the father of
Arturio Trinidad and that Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes are brothers and sister and that their father was Patricio Trinidad who left them 4 parcels of
land. That she knew Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato who are the parents of Arturio, the plaintiff, were married in New Washington, Aklan, by
a protestant pastor by the name of Lauriano Lajaylajay. That she knows Felicidad Molato and Lourdes Trinidad very well because as a farmer she
also owns a parcel of land [and] she used to invite Felicidad and Lourdes to help her during planting and harvesting season. That she knows that
during the lifetime of Inocentes the three of them, Inocentes, Felix and Lourdes possessed and usufructed the 4 parcels they inherited from their
father, Patricio. That upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes Trinidad was in possession of the property without giving the widow of Inocentes any
share of the produce. As Lourdes outlived her two brothers, namely: Felix and Inocentes, she was the one possessing and usufructing the 4 parcels
of land up to the present. The witness testified that upon the death of Inocentes, Lourdes took Arturio and cared for him when he was still small,
about 3 years old, until Arturio grew up and got married. That while Arturio was growing up, he had also enjoyed the produce of the land while he
was being taken care of by Lourdes Trinidad. That a misunderstanding later on arose when Arturio Trinidad wanted to get his fathers share but
Lourdes Trinidad will not give it to him.

Plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, himself, was presented as witness. He testified that defendants, Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are his aunt and uncle,
they being the brother and sister of his father. That the parents of his father and the defendants were Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. That
both his father, Inocentes Trinidad, and mother, Felicidad Molato, were already dead having died in Tigayon, his father having died in 1944 and his
mother about 25 years ago.
As proof that he is the son of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, he showed a certificate of baptism which had been previously marked as
Exhibit C. That his birth certificate was burned during World War 2 but he has a certificate of loss issued by the Civil Registrar of Kalibo, Aklan.

When he was 14 years old, the defendants invited him to live with them being their nephew as his mother was already dead. Plaintiffs mother died
when he was 13 years old. They treated him well and provided for all his needs. He lived with defendants for 5 years. At the age of 19, he left the
house of the defendants and lived on his own. He got married at 23 to Candelaria Gaspar and then they were invited by the defendants to live with
them. So he and his wife and children lived with the defendants. As proof that he and his family lived with the defendants when the latter invited him
to live with them, he presented a picture previously marked as Exhibit B where there appears his aunt, Lourdes Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs daughter,
his uncle and his wife. In short, it is a family picture according to him. Another family picture previously marked Exhibit A shows his uncle, defendant
Felix Trinidad, carrying plaintiffs son. According to him, these 2 pictures were taken when he and his wife and children were living with the
defendants.That a few years after having lived with them, the defendants made them vacate the house for he requested for partition of the land to
get his share. He moved out and looked for [a] lawyer to handle his case.He testified there are 4 parcels of land in controversy of which parcel 1 is
an upland.

Parcel 1 is 1,000 square meters, [has] 10 coconut trees and fruit bearing. The harvest is 100 coconuts every 4 months and the cost of coconuts is
P2.00 each. The boundaries are : East-Federico Inocencio; West-Teodulo Dionesio; North-Teodulo Dionesio; and South-Bulalio Briones; located at
Tigayon.

Parcel 2 is an upland with an area of 500 square meters; it has only 1 coconut tree and 1 bamboo groove; also located in Tigayon, Kalibo,
Aklan. Adjoining owners are : East-Ambrosio Trinidad; North-Federico Inocencio; West-Patricio Trinidad and South-Gregorio Briones.

Parcel 3 is about 12,000 square meters and 1/4 of that belongs to Patricio Trinidad, the deceased father of the defendants and Inocentes, the father
of the plaintiff.

Parcel 4 is a riceland with an area of 5,000 square meters. The harvest is 40 cavans two times a years [sic]. Adjoining owners are: East-Gregorio
Briones; West-Bulalio Briones; South-Federico Inocencio and North-Digna Carpio.

Parcel 1 is Lot No. 903.

Parcel 2 is Lot No. 864 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo and only Lot 864-A with an area of 540 square meters is the subject of litigation.

Parcel 3 is Lot No. 979 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo covered by Tax Decl. No. 703310 with reference to one of the owners of the land, Patricio
Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones, one-half share.

Parcel 4 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22502 RO-174 covering Lot No. 863 of the cadastral survey of Kalibo. The title is in the name
of Patricio Trinidad married to Anastacia Briones.

Parcel 1 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 11609 in the name of Patricio Trinidad while parcel 2 is covered by Tax Decl. No. 10626 in the name of
Anastacia Briones and another Tax Declaration No. 11637 for Parcel 3 in the name of Ambrosio Trinidad while Parcel 4 is covered by Tax Decl. No.
16378 in the name of Patricio Trinidad.

On cross-examination, plaintiff testified that during the lifetime of his mother they were getting the share in the produce of the land like coconuts,
palay and corn. Plaintiff further testified that his father is Inocentes Trinidad and his mother was Felicidad Molato. They were married in New
Washington, Aklan, by a certain Atty. Lajaylajay. When asked if this Atty. Lajaylajay is a municipal judge of New Washington, Aklan, plaintiff
answered he does not know because he was not yet born at that time. That he does not have the death certificate of his father who died in 1944
because it was wartime. That after the death of his father, he lived with his mother and when his mother died[,] he lived with his aunt and uncle, the
defendants in this case. That during the lifetime of his mother, it was his mother receiving the share of the produce of the land. That both defendants,
namely Lourdes and Felix Trinidad, are single and they have no other nephews and nieces. That [petitioners] highest educational attainment is
Grade 3.

EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENDANTS:

First witness for the defendants was PEDRO BRIONES, 68 years old, unemployed and a resident of Nalook, Kalibo, Aklan. He testified
having known the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad. They being his first cousins because the mother of Lourdes and Felix by the
name of Anastacia Briones and his father are sister and brother. That he also knew Inocentes Trinidad being the brother of Felix and
Lourdes and he is already dead. According to the witness, Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1940 and at the time of his death Inocentes
Trinidad was not married. That he knew this fact because at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad he was then residing with his
aunt, Nanay Taya, referring to Anastacia Briones who is mother of the defendants, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad, as well as Inocentes
Trinidad. That at the time of the death of Inocentes Trinidad, according to this witness he stayed with his aunt, Anastacia Trinidad, and
with his children before 1940 for only 3 months. When asked if he knew Inocentes Trinidad cohabited with anybody before his death, he
answered, That I do not know, neither does he kn[o]w a person by the name of Felicidad Molato. Furthermore, when asked if he can
recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad witness knew of anybody with whom said Inocentes Trinidad had lived as husband and
wife, witness, Pedro Briones, answered that he could not recall because he was then in Manila working. That after the war, he had gone
back to the house of his aunt, Anastacia, at Tigayon, Kalibo, as he always visit[s] her every Sunday, however, he does not know the
plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad. When asked if after the death of Inocentes Trinidad, he knew anybody who has stayed with the defendants who
claimed to be a son of Inocentes Trinidad, witness, Pedro Briones, answered: I do not know about that..
On cross examination, witness testified that although he was born in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan, he started to reside in Nalook, Kalibo, as the
hereditary property of their father was located there. When asked if he was aware of the 4 parcels of land which is the subject matter of
this case before the court, witness answered that he does not know. What he knew is that among the 3 children of Patricio Trinidad,
Inocentes is the eldest. And that at the time of the death of Inocentes in 1940, according to the witness when cross examined, Inocentes
Trinidad was around 65 years old. That according to him, his aunt, Anastacia Briones, was already dead before the war. When asked on
cross examination if he knew where Inocentes Trinidad was buried when he died in 1940, witness answered that he was buried in their
own land because the Japanese forces were roaming around the place. When confronted with Exhibit A which is the alleged family
picture of the plaintiff and the defendants, witness was able to identify the lady in the picture, which had been marked as Exhibit A-1, as
Lourdes Trinidad, and the man wearing a hat on the said picture marked as Exhibit 2-A is Felix Trinidad. However, when asked if he knew
the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, he said he does not know him.
Next witness for the defendants was the defendant herself, LOURDES TRINIDAD. She stated that she is 75 years old, single and
jobless. She testified that Inocentes Trinidad was her brother and he is already dead and he died in 1941 in Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan. That
before the death of her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, he had gone to Manila where he stayed for a long time and returned to Tigayon in
1941. According to her, upon arrival from Manila in 1941 his brother, Inocentes Trinidad, lived only for 15 days before he died. While his
brother was in Manila, witness testified she was not aware that he had married anybody. Likewise, when he arrived in Tigayon in 1941, he
also did [not] get married. When asked if she knew one by the name of Felicidad Molato, witness answered she knew her because
Felicidad Molato was staying in Tigayon. However, according to her[,] she does not kn[o]w if her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, had lived
with Felicidad Molato as husband and wife. When asked if she knew the plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, she said, Yes, but she denied that
Arturio Trinidad had lived with them. According to the witness, Arturio Trinidad did not live with the defendants but he stayed with his
grandmother by the name of Maria Concepcion, his mother, Felicidad Molato, having died already. When asked by the court if there had
been an instance when the plaintiff had lived with her even for days, witness answered, he did not. When further asked if Arturio Trinidad
went to visit her in her house, witness also said, He did not.
Upon cross examination by counsel for the plaintiff, Lourdes Trinidad testified that her parents, Anastacia Briones and Patricio Trinidad,
had 3 children, namely: Inocentes Trinidad, Felix Trinidad and herself. But inasmuch as Felix and Inocentes are already dead, she is the
only remaining daughter of the spouses Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones. Defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, testified that her brother,
Felix Trinidad, died without a wife and children, in the same manner that her brother, Inocentes Trinidad, died without a wife and
children. She herself testified that she does not have any family of her own for she has [no] husband or children. According to her[,] when
Inocentes Trinidad [died] in 1941, they buried him in their private lot in Tigayon because nobody will carry his coffin as it was wartime and
the municipality of Kalibo was occupied by the Japanese forces. When further cross-examined that I[t] could not be true that Inocentes
Trinidad died in March 1941 because the war broke out in December 1941 and March 1941 was still peace time, the witness could not
answer the question. When she was presented with Exhibit A which is the alleged family picture wherein she was holding was [sic] the
child of Arturio Trinidad, she answered; Yes. and the child that she is holding is Clarita Trinidad, child of Arturio Trinidad. According to her,
she was only requested to hold this child to be brought to the church because she will be baptized and that the baptism took place in the
parish church of Kalibo. When asked if there was a party, she answered; Maybe there was. When confronted with Exhibit A-1 which is
herself in the picture carrying the child, witness identified herself and explained that she was requested to bring the child to the church
and that the picture taken together with her brother and Arturio Trinidad and the latters child was taken during the time when she and
Arturio Trinidad did not have a case in court yet. She likewise identified the man with a hat holding a child marked as Exhibit A-2 as her
brother, Felix. When asked if the child being carried by her brother, Felix Trinidad, is another child of the plaintiff, witness answered she
does not know because her eyes are already blurred. Furthermore, when asked to identify the woman in the picture who was at the right
of the child held by her brother, Felix, and who was previously identified by plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, as his wife, witness answered that
she cannot identify because she had a poor eyesight neither can she identify plaintiff, Arturio Trinidad, holding another child in the picture
for the same reason. When asked by counsel for the plaintiff if she knows that the one who took this picture was the son of Ambrosio
Trinidad by the name of Julito Trinidad who was also their cousin, witness testified that she does not know.
Third witness for the defendants was BEATRIZ TRINIDAD SAYON who testified that she knew Arturio Trinidad because he was her
neighbor in Tigayon. In the same manner that she also knew the defendants, Felix and Lourdes, and Inocentes all surnamed Trinidad
because they were her cousins. She testified that a few months after the war broke out Inocentes Trinidad died in their lolas house whose
names was Eugenia Rufo Trinidad. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad had lived almost in his lifetime in Manila and he went
home only when his father fetched him in Manila because he was already sick. That according to her, about 1 months after his arrival
from Manila, Inocentes Trinidad died. She also testified that she knew Felicidad Molato and that Felicidad Molato had never been married
to Inocentes Trinidad. According to her, it was in 1941 when Inocentes Trinidad died. According to her she was born in 1928, therefore,
she was 13 or 14 years old when the war broke out.When asked if she can remember that it was only in the early months of the year
1943 when the Japanese occupied Kalibo, she said she [was] not sure. She further testified that Inocentes Trinidad was buried in their
private lot because Kalibo was then occupied by the Japanese forces and nobody would carry his body to be buried in the Poblacion.
For rebuttal evidence, [petitioner] presented ISABEL MEREN, who was 76 years old and a resident of Tigayon. Rebuttal witness testified
that xxx she knew both the [petitioner] and the [private respondents] in this case very well as her house is only around 200 meters from
them. When asked if it is true that according to Lourdes Trinidad, [Inocentes Trinidad] arrived from Manila in 1941 and he lived only for 15
days and died, witness testified that he did not die in that year because he died in the year 1944, and that Inocentes Trinidad lived with
his sister, Lourdes Trinidad, in a house which is only across the street from her house. According to the said rebuttal witness, it is not true
that Inocentes Trinidad died single because he had a wife by the name of Felicidad Molato whom he married on May 5, 1942 in New
Washington, Aklan. That she knew this fact because she was personally present when couple was married by Lauriano Lajaylajay, a
protestant pastor.
On cross examination, rebuttal witness testified that when Inocentes Trinidad arrived from Manila he was in good physical condition. That
she knew both Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato to be Catholics but that according to her, their marriage was solemnized by a
Protestant minister and she was one of the sponsors. That during the marriage of Inocentes Trinidad and Felicidad Molato, Lourdes
Trinidad and Felix Trinidad were also present.
When plaintiff, ARTURIO TRINIDAD, was presented as rebuttal witness, he was not able to present a marriage contract of his parents but
instead a certification dated September 5, 1978 issued by one Remedios Eleserio of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of New
Washington, Aklan, attesting to the fact that records of births, deaths, and marriages in the municipality of New Washington were
destroyed during the Japanese time.

Respondent Courts Ruling

In finding that petitioner was not a child, legitimate or otherwise, of the late Inocentes Trinidad, Respondent Court ruled: [14]
 We sustain the appeal on the ground that plaintiff has not adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes
Trinidad. But the action to claim legitimacy has not prescribed.
Plaintiff has not established that he was recognized, as a legitimate son of the late Inocentes Trinidad, in the record of birth or a final
judgment, in a public document or a private handwritten instrument, or that he was in continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.
Two witnesses, Pedro Briones and Beatriz Trinidad Sayon, testified for the defendants that Inocentes Trinidad never married. He died
single in 1941. One witness, Isabel Maren, testified in rebuttal for the plaintiff, that Inocentes Trinidad married Felicidad Molato in New
Washington, Aklan, on May 5, 1942, solemnized by a pastor of the protestant church and that she attended the wedding ceremony (t.s.n.
Sept. 6, 1988, p. 4). Hence, there was no preponderant evidence of the marriage, nor of Inocentes acknowledgment of plaintiff as his son,
who was born on July 21, 1943.
The right to demand partition does not prescribe (de Castro vs. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23). Where one of the interested parties openly and
adversely occupies the property without recognizing the co-ownership (Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1958) acquisitive
prescription may set in (Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, Fifth Revised Edition, 1988, p. 497).Admittedly, the
defendants have been in possession of the parcels of land involved in the concept of owners since their father died in 1940. Even if
possession be counted from 1964, when plaintiff attained the age of majority, still, defendants possessed the land for more than ten (10)
years, thus acquiring ownership of the same by acquisitive prescription (Article 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines).

The Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for resolution: [15]

1. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has proven by preponderant evidence the marriage of his parents.
2. Whether or not petitioner (plaintiff-appellee) has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that he is the son of the late Inocentes Trinidad,
brother of private respondents (defendants-appellants) Felix and Lourdes Trinidad.
3. Whether or not the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar[,] the decision of the Regional Trial Court having been promulgated on
July 4, 1989, after the Family Code became effective on August 3, 1988.
4. Whether or not petitioners status as a legitimate child can be attacked collaterally by the private respondents.
5. Whether or not private respondent (defendants-appellants) have acquired ownership of the properties in question by acquisitive
prescription.
Simply stated, the main issues raised in this petition are:
1. Did petitioner present sufficient evidence of his parents marriage and of his filiation?
2. Was petitioners status as a legitimate child subject to collateral attack in the action for partition?
3. Was his claim time-barred under the rules on acquisitive prescription?

The Courts Ruling

The merits of this petition are patent. The partition of the late Patricios real properties requires preponderant proof that petitioner is a co-owner
or co-heir of the decedents estate. [16] His right as a co-owner would, in turn, depend on whether he was born during the existence of a valid and
subsisting marriage between his mother (Felicidad) and his putative father (Inocentes). This Court holds that such burden was successfully
discharged by petitioner and, thus, the reversal of the assailed Decision and Resolution is inevitable.

First and Second Issues: Evidence of and Collateral

Attack on Filiation

At the outset, we stress that an appellate courts assessment of the evidence presented by the parties will not, as a rule, be disturbed because
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. But in the face of the contradictory conclusions of the appellate and the trial courts, such rule does not apply
here. So, we had to meticulously pore over the records and the evidence adduced in this case. [17]
Petitioners first burden is to prove that Inocentes and his mother (Felicidad) were validly married, and that he was born during the subsistence
of their marriage. This, according to Respondent Court, he failed to accomplish.
This Court disagrees. Pugeda vs. Trias[18]  ruled that when the question of whether a marriage has been contracted arises in
litigation, said marriage may be proven by relevant evidence. To prove the fact of marriage, the following would constitute competent evidence: the
testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the couples public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedlock, the birth and the
baptismal certificates of children born during such union, and the mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents. [19]
In the case at bar, petitioner secured a certification [20] from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Aklan that all records of births, deaths and
marriages were either lost, burned or destroyed during the Japanese occupation of said municipality. This fact, however, is not fatal to petitioners
case. Although the marriage contract is considered the primary evidence of the marital union, petitioners failure to present it is not proof that no
marriage took place, as other forms of relevant evidence may take its place. [21]
 In place of a marriage contract, two witnesses were presented by petitioner: Isabel Meren, who testified that she was present during the nuptial
of Felicidad and Inocentes on May 5, 1942 in New Washington, Aklan; and Jovita Gerardo, who testified that the couple deported themselves as
husband and wife after the marriage. Gerardo, the 77-year old barangay captain of Tigayon and former board member of the local parent-teachers
association, used to visit Inocentes and Felicidads house twice or thrice a week, as she lived only thirty meters away. [22] On July 21, 1943, Gerardo
dropped by Inocentes house when Felicidad gave birth to petitioner. She also attended petitioners baptismal party held at the same house. [23] Her
testimony constitutes evidence of common reputation respecting marriage. [24] It further gives rise to the disputable presumption that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [25] Petitioner also presented his baptismal
certificate (Exhibit C) in which Inocentes and Felicidad were named as the childs father and mother. [26]
On the other hand, filiation may be proven by the following:
ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or by an authentic document
or a final judgment.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the continuous possession of status
of a legitimate child.
ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate filiation may be
proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. [27]
Petitioner submitted in evidence a certification [28] that records relative to his birth were either destroyed during the last world war or burned
when the old town hall was razed to the ground on June 17, 1956.To prove his filiation, he presented in evidence two family pictures, his baptismal
certificate and Gerardos testimony.
The first family picture (Exhibit A) shows petitioner (Exhibit A-5) carrying his second daughter and his wife (Exhibit A-4) together with the late
Felix Trinidad (Exhibit A-2) carrying petitioners first daughter, and Lourdes Trinidad (Exhibit A-1). Exhibit B is another picture showing Lourdes
Trinidad (Exhibit B-1) carrying petitioners first child (Exhibit B-2). These pictures were taken before the case was instituted.Although they do not
directly prove petitioners filiation to Inocentes, they show that petitioner was accepted by the private respondents as Inocentes legitimate son  ante
litem motam.
Lourdes denials of these pictures are hollow and evasive. While she admitted that Exhibit B shows her holding Clarita Trinidad, the petitioners
daughter, she demurred that she did so only because she was requested to carry the child before she was baptized. [29] When shown Exhibit A, she
recognized her late brother -- but not petitioner, his wife and the couples children -- slyly explaining that she could not clearly see because of an
alleged eye defect.[30]
Although a baptismal certificate is indeed not a conclusive proof of filiation, it is one of the other means allowed under the Rules of Court and
special laws to show pedigree, as this Court ruled in Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals:[31]
What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws, according to the Civil Code, or by evidence of proof in his
favor that the defendant is her father, according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. [Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, Handbook
on the Family Code of the Phil. 1988 ed., p. 246]
Concededly, because Gerardo was not shown to be a member of the Trinidad family by either consanguinity or affinity, [32] her testimony does
not constitute family reputation regarding pedigree. Hence, it cannot, by itself, be used to establish petitioners legitimacy.
Be that as it may, the totality  of  petitioners positive evidence clearly preponderates over private respondents self-serving negations. In sum,
private respondents thesis is that Inocentes died unwed and without issue in March 1941. Private respondents witness, Pedro Briones, testified that
Inocentes died in 1940 and was buried in the estate of the Trinidads, because nobody was willing to carry the coffin to the cemetery in Kalibo, which
was then occupied by the Japanese forces. His testimony, however, is far from credible because he stayed with the Trinidads for only three months,
and his answers on direct examination were noncommittal and evasive: [33]
Q: At the time of his death, can you tell the Court if this Inocentes Trinidad was married or not?
A: Not married.
Q: In 1940 at the time of death of Inocentes Trinidad, where were you residing?
A: I was staying with them.
Q: When you said them, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A: My aunt Nanay Taya, Anastacia.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Will you please tell the Court for how long did you stay with your aunt Anastacia Trinidad and his children before 1940?
A: For only three months.
Q: Now, you said at the time of his death, Inocentes Trinidad was single. Do you know if he had cohabited with anybody before his death?
A: [T]hat I do not know.
Q: You know a person by the name of Felicidad Molato?
A: No, sir.
Q: Can you recall if during the lifetime of Inocentes Trinidad if you have known of anybody with whom he has lived as husband and wife?
A: I could not recall because I was then in Manila working.
Q: After the war, do you remember having gone back to the house of your aunt Anastacia at Tigayon, Kalibo, Aklan?
A: Yes, sir,
Q: How often did you go to the house of your aunt?
A: Every Sunday.
 xxx xxx xxx
Q: You know the plaintiff Arturio Trinidad?
A: I do not know him.
Q: After the death of Inocentes Trinidad, do you know if there was anybody who has stayed with the defendants who claimed to be a son of
Inocentes Trinidad?
A: I do not know about that.
Beatriz Sayon, the other witness of private respondent, testified that, when the Japanese occupied Kalibo in 1941, her father brought Inocentes
from Manila to Tigayon because he was sick. Inocentes stayed with their grandmother, Eugenia Roco Trinidad, and died single and without issue in
March 1941, one and a half months after his return to Tigayon. She knew Felicidad Molato, who was also a resident of Tigayon, but denied that
Felicidad was ever married to Inocentes.[34]
Taking judicial notice that World War II did not start until December 7, 1941 with the bombing of Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, the trial court was not
convinced that Inocentes died in March 1941.[35] The Japanese forces occupied Manila only on January 2, 1942; [36] thus, it stands to reason that
Aklan was not occupied until then. It was only then that local residents were unwilling to bury their dead in the cemetery in Kalibo, because of the
Japanese soldiers who were roaming around the area. [37]
Furthermore, petitioner consistently used Inocentes surname (Trinidad) without objection from private respondents -- a presumptive proof of
his status as Inocentes legitimate child.[38]
Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party. [39] Compared to the
detailed (even if awkwardly written) ruling of the trial court, Respondent Courts holding that petitioner failed to prove his legitimate filiation to
Inocentes is unconvincing. In determining where the preponderance of evidence lies, a trial court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the
case, including the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want thereof, and their personal credibility. [40] Applying this rule,
the trial court significantly and convincingly held that the weight of evidence was in petitioners favor. It declared:
xxx [O]ne thing sure is the fact that plaintiff had lived with defendants enjoying the status of being their nephew xxx before plaintiff [had]
gotten married and had a family of his own where later on he started demanding for the partition of the share of his father, Inocentes. The
fact that plaintiff had so lived with the defendants xxx is shown by the alleged family pictures, Exhibits A & B. These family pictures were
taken at a time when plaintiff had not broached the idea of getting his fathers share. xxxx His demand for the partition of the share of his
father provoked the ire of the defendants, thus, they disowned him as their nephew. xxxx In this case, the plaintiff enjoyed the continuous
possession of a status of the child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the defendants themselves, which status was only broken
when plaintiff demanded for the partition xxx as he was already having a family of his own. xxxx.
However, the disowning by the defendant [private respondent herein], Lourdes Trinidad, of the plaintiff [petitioner herein] being her
nephew is offset by the preponderance of evidence, among them the testimony of witness, Jovita Gerardo, who is the barrio captain. This
witness was already 77 years old at the time she testified. Said witness had no reason to favor the plaintiff. She had been a PTA officer
and the court sized her up as a civic minded person. She has nothing to gain in this case as compared to the witness for the defendants
who are either cousin or nephew of Lourdes Trinidad who stands to gain in the case for defendant, Lourdes Trinidad, being already 75
years old, has no husband nor children.[41]
Doctrinally, a collateral attack on filiation is not permitted. [42] Rather than rely on this axiom, petitioner chose to present evidence of his filiation
and of his parents marriage. Hence, there is no more need to rule on the application of this doctrine to petitioners cause.

Third Issue: No Acquisitive Prescription

Respondent Court ruled that, because acquisitive prescription sets in when one of the interested parties openly and adversely occupies the
property without recognizing the co-ownership, and because private respondents had been in possession -- in the concept of owners -- of the parcels
of land in issue since Patricio died in 1940, they acquired ownership of these parcels.
The Court disagrees. Private respondents have not acquired ownership of the property in question by acquisitive prescription. In a co-
ownership, the act of one benefits all the other co-owners, unless the former repudiates the co-ownership. [43] Thus, no prescription runs in favor of a
co-owner or co-heir against his or her co-owners or co-heirs, so long as he or she expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
In this particular case, it is undisputed that, prior to the action for partition, petitioner, in the concept of a co-owner, was receiving from private
respondents his share of the produce of the land in dispute.Until such time, recognition of the co-ownership by private respondents was beyond
question. There is no evidence, either, of their repudiation, if any, of the co-ownership of petitioners father Inocentes over the land. Further, the titles
of these pieces of land were still in their fathers name. Although private respondents had possessed these parcels openly since 1940 and had not
shared with petitioner the produce of the land during the pendency of this case, still, they manifested no repudiation of the co-
ownership. In Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals,  the Court held:[44]
x x x Corollarily, prescription does not run again private respondents with respect to the filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs
for whose benefit prescription is invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In the other words, prescription of
an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership
duly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55 (1987). On the other hand, an action for partition may
be seen to be at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Considering the foregoing, Respondent Court committed reversible error in holding that petitioners claim over the land in dispute was time-
barred.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The trial courts decision
dated July 4, 1989 is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135216. August 19, 1999]

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB, as Special Administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Deceased Alfredo E. Jacob, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
PEDRO PILAPIL, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS for the Province of Camarines Sur, and JUAN F. TRIVINO as publisher of
Balalong, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due
execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage
contract.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals [1] (CA) dated January 15,
1998, and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from it being more consistent with the facts and the applicable law, the
challenged Decision dated 05 April 1994 of the RTC, Br. 30, Tigaon, Camarines Sur is AFFIRMED in toto. [2]

The decretal portion of the trial court Decision [3] is as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in favor of [herein Respondent] Pedro Pilapil, and against [herein Petitioner]
Tomasa Guison as follows:

a) Declaring Exh. B, the so called reconstructed marriage contract excluded under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said
Exh. B spurious and non-existent.
b) Declaring Exh. 3 Order dated July 18, 1961, and the signature of the issuing Judge JOSE L. MOYA (Exh. 34) to be genuine.
c) Permanently setting aside and lifting the provisional writ of injunction earlier issued; and
d) To pay attorneys fees of P50,000.
And costs against [herein petitioner.]

The Facts
 The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

Plaintiff-appellant [petitioner herein] claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special Administratix
for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased.

Defendant-appellee on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo. In support of his claim, he presented an Order dated 18 July
1961 issued by then Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo in favor of
Pedro Pilapil.

During the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Alfredo in Case No. T-46 (entitled Tomasa vda. de Jacob v. Jose Centenera,
et al) herein defendant-appellee Pedro sought to intervene therein claiming his share of the deceaseds estate as Alfredos adopted son and as his
sole surviving heir. Pedro questioned the validity of the marriage between appellant Tomasa and his adoptive father Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa opposed the Motion for Intervention and filed a complaint for injunction with damages (Civil Case No. T-83) questioning appellees
claim as the legal heir of Alfredo.

The following issues were raised in the court a quo:

a) Whether the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob was valid;

b) Whether the defendant-appellee is the legally adopted son of deceased Jacob.

On the first issue, appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros,
Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when
Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa presented as secondary evidence
a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978.

During the trial, the court a quo observed the following irregularities in the execution of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, to wit:

1. No copy of the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer thus giving the implication that there
was no copy of the marriage contract sent to, nor a record existing in the civil registry of Manila;
2. In signing the Marriage Contract, the late Alfredo Jacob merely placed his thumbmark on said contract purportedly on 16 September
1975 (date of the marriage). However, on a Sworn Affidavit executed between appellant Tomasa and Alfredo a day before the
alleged date of marriage or on 15 September 1975 attesting that both of them lived together as husband and wife for five (5) years,
Alfredo [af]fixed his customary signature. Thus the trial court concluded that the thumbmark was logically not genuine. In other
words, not of Alfredo Jacobs;
3. Contrary to appellants claim, in his Affidavit stating the circumstances of the loss of the Marriage Contract, the affiant Msgr. Yllana
never mentioned that he allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. And as admitted
by appellant at the trial, Jose Centenera (who allegedly acted as padrino) was not present at the date of the marriage since he was
then in Australia. In fact, on the face of the reconstructed Marriage Contract, it was one Benjamin Molina who signed on top of the
typewritten name of Jose Centenera. This belies the claim that Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave the copies of the Marriage Contract to
Mr. Jose Centenera;
4. Appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in the book of records in San Agustin Church where the
marriage was allegedly solemnized.

Anent the second issue, appellee presented the Order dated 18 July 1961 in Special Proceedings No. 192 issued by then Presiding Judge Moya
granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased Alfredo which declared therein Pedro Pilapil as the legally adopted son of Alfredo.

Appellant Tomasa however questioned the authenticity of the signature of Judge Moya.

In an effort to disprove the genuineness and authenticity of Judge Moyas signature in the Order granting the petition for adoption, the deposition of
Judge Moya was taken at his residence on 01 October 1990.

In his deposition, Judge Moya attested that he could no longer remember the facts in judicial proceedings taken about twenty-nine (29) years ago
when he was then presiding judge since he was already 79 years old and was suffering from glaucoma.

The trial court then consulted two (2) handwriting experts to test the authenticity and genuineness of Judge Moyas signature.

A handwriting examination was conducted by Binevenido C. Albacea, NBI Document Examiner. Examiner Albacea used thirteen (13) specimen
signatures of Judge Moya and compared it with the questioned signature. He pointed out irregularities and significant fundamental differences in
handwriting characteristics/habits existing between the questioned and the standard signature and concluded that the questioned and the standard
signatures JOSE L. MOYA were NOT written by one and the same person.

On the other hand, to prove the genuineness of Judge Moyas signature, appellee presented the comparative findings of the handwriting examination
made by a former NBI Chief Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui who examined thirty-two (32) specimen signatures of Judge Moya
inclusive of the thirteen (13) signatures examined by Examiner Albacea. In his report, Atty. Pagui noted the existence of significant similarities of
unconscious habitual pattern within allowable variation of writing characteristics between the standard and the questioned signatures and concluded
that the signature of Judge Moya appearing in the Order dated 18 July 1961 granting the petition for adoption was indeed genuine.
Confronted with two (2) conflicting reports, the trial court sustained the findings of Atty. Pagui declaring the signature of Judge Moya in the
challenged Order as genuine and authentic.

Based on the evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee sustaining his claim as the legally adopted child and sole heir of
deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage Contract as spurious and non-existent. [4] (citations omitted, emphasis in the original)

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:

Dealing with the issue of validity of the reconstructed  Marriage Contract, Article 6, par. 1 of the Family Code provides that the declaration of the
contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife shall be set forth in an instrument signed by the parties as well as by their
witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage
contract.

And if the authentic copy could not be produced, Section 3 in relation to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

x x x x x x x x x

Sec. 5. When the original document is unavailable. - When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy. Or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

As required by the Rules, before the terms of a transaction in reality may be established by secondary evidence, it is necessary that the due
execution of the document and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it is the due execution of the
document and subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such
document.

In the case at bench, proof of due execution besides the loss of the three (3) copies of the marriage contract has not been shown for the introduction
of secondary evidence of the contents of the reconstructed contract. Also, appellant failed to sufficiently establish the circumstances of the loss of the
original document.

With regard to the trial courts finding that the signature of then Judge Moya in the questioned Order granting the petition for adoption in favor of
Pedro Pilapil was genuine, suffice it to state that, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, the presumption applies that Judge
Moya in issuing the order acted in the performance of his regular duties.

Furthermore, since the signature appearing in the challenged Order was subjected to a rigid examination of two (2) handwriting experts, this negates
the possibility of forgery of Judge Moyas signature. The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statement of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics, and discrepancies
in and between genuine and false specimens of writing of which would ordinarily escape notice or dete[c]tion from an unpracticed observer. And in
the final analysis, the assessment of the credibility of such expert witnesses rests largely in the discretion of the trial court, and the test of
qualification is necessarily a relative one, depending upon the subject under investigation and the fitness of the particular witness. Except in
extraordinary cases, an appellate court will not reverse on account of a mistake of judgment on the part of the trial court in determining qualifications
of this case.

Jurisprudence is settled that the trial courts findings of fact when ably supported by substantial evidence on record are accorded with great weight
and respect by the Court. Thus, upon review, We find that no material facts were overlooked or ignored by the court below which if considered might
vary the outcome of this case nor there exist cogent reasons that would warrant reversal of the findings below. Factual findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal especially when established by unrebutted testimony and documentary evidence. [5] (citations omitted,
emphasis in the original)

Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court. [6]

The Issues

In her Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this Court:

a) Whether or not the marriage between the plaintiff Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was valid; and

b) Whether defendant Pedro Pilapil is the legally adopted son of Alfredo E. Jacob. [7]
 The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious. Petitioners marriage is valid, but respondents adoption has not been sufficiently established.

First Issue:

Validity of Marriage

Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding. [8] Aware of
this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because
there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. [9] We cannot sustain this contention.
To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties had no marriage license.  This argument is
misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. [10] An affidavit to
this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. [11] Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage
license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.[12] The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took
place prior the effectivity of the Family Code.

When Is Secondary Evidence Allowed ?

It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or
destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of
witnesses.[13] Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary
evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.[14]
The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and
Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of
Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding
had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization
issued by the Archbishop -- through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino -- ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and
petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of
the loss of the marriage certificate.
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the
introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence
to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,[15] the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the
execution and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be prove[n] by secondary evidence when the instrument itself is
accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs
precede proofs of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation for the introduction of secondary evidence of the
contents.

x x x x x x x x x

Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic
papers. Even when the document is actually produced, its authenticity is not necessarily, if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents
but by parol evidence. At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its execution may affect the weight of the evidence
presented but not the admissibility of such evidence. (emphasis ours)

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.[16] But even there, we
said that marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence. [17]
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized
the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. [18] The Court has also held that
[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document
lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has]
indeed [been] lost.[19]
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of
petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor
Yllana, as well as by petitioners own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence -- testimonial and documentary -- may be admitted
to prove the fact of marriage.
The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently
been obtained.[20] Even if we were to agree with the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this
certificate is not the only  proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner.
 Proof of Marriage

As early as Pugeda v. Trias[21], we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:

"Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of
marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage ."[22] (emphasis
supplied)

In Balogbog v. CA,[23] we similarly held:

[A]lthough a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove marriage. (emphasis supplied, footnote omitted)

In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,[24] in which, because
of the destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted testimonial evidence in its place. [25]
Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO). [26] He finds it quite bizarre for petitioner to have waited three years
before registering their marriage.[27] On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage
certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage. [28] In the second place, it was not the petitioners duty to send a copy of the marriage
certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer. [29]

Presumption in Favor of Marriage

Likewise, we have held:

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is xxx of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio --
Always presume marriage.[30](emphasis supplied)

This jurisprudential attitude[31], 1984; Perido v.  Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975.31 towards marriage is based on the prima
facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. [32] Given the
undisputed, even accepted,[33] fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife, [34] we find that the presumption of marriage was
not rebutted in this case.

Second Issue:

Validity of Adoption Order

In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was
valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties.  The appellate court also gave
credence to the testimony of respondents handwriting expert, for the assessment of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the
discretion of the trial court x x x.[35]
We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony.  The rule, however, is not
applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert
witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court failed to notice certain relevant facts which,
if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion. [36] Hence, the present case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law may
be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.[37]
Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moyas signature on the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court
on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondents
expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself. [38] Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judges action by arguing that the Deposition
was ambiguous.He contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the following portion as
proof:[39]
"Q. What was you[r] response, sir?
A. I said I do not remember.
Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judges testimony out of its context.  Considered with the rest of the
Deposition, Judge Moyas statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in the following manner:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
 Q. What else did she tell you[?]
A. And she ask[ed] me if I remembered having issued the order.
Q. What was your response sir[?]
A. I said I do not remember.[40]
The answer I do not remember did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was declaring.  In fact, he was emphatic and
categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:
Atty. Benito P. Fabie
Q. I am showing to you this Order, Exh. A deposition[;] will you please recall whether you issued this Order and  whether the facsimile of the
signature appearing thereon is your signature.
A. As I said, I do not remember having issued such an order and the signature reading Jose[;] I cant make out clearly what comes after the
name[;] Jose Moya is not my signature.[41]
Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he
positively declared that it was not his.
The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At the time, he could with medication still
read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him. [42] Indeed, we find no reason and the
respondent has not presented any to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya.
Judge Moyas declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:
Atty. Paraiso
Q And were you able to determine [w]hat purpose you had in your examination of this document?
A Yes sir, [based on] my conclusion, [I] stated that the questioned and the standard signature Jose L. Moya were not written by one and the
same person. On the basis of my findings that I would point out in detail, the difference in the writing characteristics [was] in the structural
pattern of letters which is very apparent as shown in the photograph as the capital letter J. [43]
It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without any compensation. Moreover, his
competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapils expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui. [44]
Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition,
however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in
which the accused pleaded guilty.[45] Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions
and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapils conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own
alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter. [46] In the same vein, no proof was
presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management [47] in Manila and the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur, [48] issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr.
Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.  [49]
The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship. [50] This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover,
the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED  and SET ASIDE.  The marriage
between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption
of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision 2 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration of
the CA Decision.

The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas
(Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a
marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines,
as a ground for the annulment of his marriage to Gloria.

In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was
presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of this case.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992
at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he was
at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F. Mu�oz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he
was told that he was going to undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria
told him later. He further testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in that area. In
July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of
their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be found. 5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No.
9969967, was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. 6 Said certification reads as
follows:cralawlibrary

11 July 2003

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:cralawlibrary

This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR. ARLINDO
GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19, 1993. ???�r?bl?��??r�??l�l??�l?br?r�

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.

This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or intents it may serve. 7?r?l1
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his counsel. 8?r?l1

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter
of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. 9?r?l1

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically. 10 He testified that the
certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19, 1993, and that their office had not issued any
other license of the same serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. 11?r?l1

For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize
marriages within the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on
January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola. 14 He testified that he had been
solemnizing marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements. 15 Rev. Dauz further testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary. 16 After the solemnization of the
marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license
with that office.17?r?l1

Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas
Goo.18 He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and
gave the same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage license was obtained. 20He attended the
wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple,
the solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. 21?r?l1

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony
held on January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage
license, and that a week before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with the application for marriage license. 23 Three
days later, the same person went back to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev.
Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and that she was told that the
marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 26?
r?l1

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and
Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her
testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof. 27 She and her
mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their
house and said that he will get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an application for marriage license for them to
sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence. 28?r?l1

Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15, 1993. 29?r?l1

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the
previous marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. 30?r?l1

Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been
celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were Chinese. 31?r?
l1

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. 32 It also took into account the fact that
neither party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the Family
Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage license is an absence of a
formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against the respondent declaring as follows:cralawlibrary

1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired during their
cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.

3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective
civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila. ???�r?bl?
��??r�??l�l??�l?br?r�

SO ORDERED.34?r?l1

Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to
the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the CA

In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:cralawlibrary

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO
THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES BEFORE THE
SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE
PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE
TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.35?r?l1 ???�r?bl?��??r�??l�l??�l?br?r�

The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal. It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification could not be
accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly
married and that there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. 37?r?l1

It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported
themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for bigamy. 38?r?l1

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on 09 January 1993 remains
valid and subsisting. No costs.

SO ORDERED.39?r?l1

Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 40 but the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008. 41?r?l1

Hence, this petition.

Grounds in Support of Petition

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE
SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL
BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. 42?r?
l1

The Ruling of this Court

The petition is meritorious.

As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the
applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:cralawlibrary

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:cralawlibrary

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. ???�r?bl?��??r�??
l�l??�l?br?r�

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally and administratively liable.

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:cralawlibrary

xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.

There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing
officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid marriage license under
Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage license had been issued for the
couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.

We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.

Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of
her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no such license was issued. In
the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals 43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:cralawlibrary

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent
search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.

In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court
held:cralawlibrary

The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the
names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 44?r?l1

The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data
relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the
effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which was issued in Carmona,
Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.

The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated that no
marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given probative value.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals. 45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining
the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely
stated that the alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the Certification was it
categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court to apply.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of
checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of
Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best
witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence of the marriage
license, as none of them applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the
license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a
certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as
well as the testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys
probative value.

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the court. However,
Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and Syed.

In the case of Cari�o v. Cari�o,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had
no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The case of Cari�o further held that the presumed validity
of the marriage of the parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage
was valid, and that the required marriage license had been secured. 49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden, and the only conclusion that can be
reached is that no valid marriage license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage license that would not
affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria
and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage
license.

To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:cralawlibrary

Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by
the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the signature above his name in
the marriage contract was his. Several pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing officer, the witnesses and
other members of appellants family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage
ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the Marriage Contract.

xxx

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993.
It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated
10 January 2003 was filed against him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon (Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are
not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
deceit and perfidy.50?r?l1

All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized
without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same
Code.51 Again, this marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is
void ab initio.

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a
bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the
weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab
initio.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July
24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on January 9,
1993 is hereby REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.