Prop 1st Meeting Case Digests

LADERA VS.
HODGES
(G.R. NO. 8027-R, VOL. 48, NO. 12, O.G. 5374, SEPTEMBER 23, 1952)
FACTS:
1. Hodges entered into a contract promising to sell a lot to Ladera under certain terms
and conditions. One of which is that the contract may be rescinded and annulled in
case Ladera failed to make the monthly payment 60 days after it is due.
2. After the execution of the contract, Ladera built a house on the lot assessed at
4,500 pesos. However, Ladera failed to pay the agreed installments so Hodges
rescinded the contract and filed an action for ejectment.
3. The MTC ruled in favor of Hodges and issued an alias writ of execution. Pursuant
thereto, the sheriff levied upon all rights, interests and participation over the house.
Notices of sale were posted, however, were not published in a newspaper of
general circulation.
4. An auction sale was then conducted but Ladera was not able to attend as she had
gone to Manila. The house was then sold to one Avelina Magno as the highest
bidder. Meanwhile, Ladera sold the same lot to one Manuel Villa and on the same
day purchased the house from Magno for 200 pesos. This, however, was not
recorded.
5. Ladera then returned to Iloilo and learned what happened. She went to see the
sheriff and represented that the property can still be redeemed and so she gave him
230 pesos. It does not appear, however, that it was turned over to Hodges.
Thereupon, Ladera filed an action against Hodges, the sheriff, Magno and Villa to
set aside the sale and recover the house.
6. The lower court ruled in favor of Ladera on the ground of non-compliance based on
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. On appeal, Hodges contends that the house, built on
a lot owned by another, should be regarded as movable or personal property. The
sale of the land was also made without proper publication required by law.
ISSUE: Was the house movable or immovable?
LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

RULING: Immovable.
1. As enumerated in the Civil Code, immovable property includes lands, buildings,

roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. The law does not make any
distinction whether or not the owner of the lot was the one who built the
construction.
2. Also, Ladera did not declare his house to be a chattel mortgage. The object of the
levy or sale was real property and its publication in a newspaper of general
circulation was indespensible. Without it, the execution sale was void.
3. In addition, Magno, the alleged purchaser at the auction sale, was a mere employee
of Hodges and the low bid made by her as well as the fact that she sold the house
to Villa on the same day Hodges sold him the land, proves that she was merely
acting for and in behalf of Hodges.
4. In the sale of immovables, the lack of title of the vendor taints the rights of the
subsequent purchasers. Possession in good faith is not equivalent to title.
5. The principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories
to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said accessories should partake the
nature of the principal thing.

MINDANAO BUS COMPANY v. THE CITY ASSESSOR & TREASURER and the
BOARD OF TAX APPEALS of Cagayan de Oro City
G.R. No. L-17870 September 29, 1962
FACTS:
Petitioner is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by
motor trucks. It owns a land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor
trucks; a repair shop; blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with machineries placed
therein, its TPU trucks are made; body constructed; and same are repaired in a
condition to be serviceable in the TPU land transportation business it operates.
The machineries have never been or were never used as industrial equipment to
produce finished products for sale, nor to repair machineries, parts and the like offered
to the general public indiscriminately for business or commercial purposes.
Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4,400 petitioner’s

above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent
Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. The Board of Tax
Appeals of the City sustained the city assessor, so petitioner herein filed with the Court
of Tax Appeals a petition for the review of the assessment.
The CTA held the petitioner liable to the payment of the realty tax on its maintenance
and repair equipment mentioned above. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Should the tools and equipment in the petitioner company’s repair shop be considered
immovable taxable real properties?
DOCTRINE:
NO. Movable equipment to be immobilized in contemplation of the law must first be
“essential and principal elements” of an industry or works without which such industry or

works would be “unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was
established.” The tools and equipment are not essential and principle municipal
elements of petitioner’s business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor
trucks. They are merely incidentals — acquired as movables and used only for
expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. The transportation business could be
carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or
serviced in another shop belonging to another.

Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc.
GR No. L-58469
Property Law: Immovable Property
Facts:
In order to obtain financial accommodations from petitioner Makati Leasing and Finance
Corporation, the private respondent Wearever Textile Mills, Inc., discounted and
assigned several receivables with the former under a Receivable Purchase Agreement.
To secure the collection of the receivables assigned, private respondent executed a
Chattel Mortgage over certain raw materials inventory as well as machinery described
as an Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range.
Upon default, petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties
mortgage to it. Acting on petitioner’s application for replevin, the lower court issued a
writ of seizure. Then after, the sheriff enforcing the seizure order repaired to the
premises of private respondent and removed the main drive motor of the subject
machinery.
The Court of Appeals, in certiorari and prohibition proceedings ordered the return of the
seized drive motor, after ruling that the machinery in suit cannot be the subject of
replevin, much less of a chattel mortgage, because it is a real property pursuant to
Article 415 of the New Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground by means of
bolts and the only way to remove it from respondent’s plant would be to drill out or
destroy the concrete floor, the reason why all that the sheriff could do to enforce the writ
was to take the main drive motor of said machinery.
Issue:
Whether the seized drive motor cannot be a subject of chattel mortgage, because it is a
real property pursuant to Article 415 of the new Civil Code

Held:
No. The seized drive motor can be a subject of chattel mortgage.
Examining the records of the instance case, the Supreme Court found no logical
justification to exclude and rule out, as the appellate court did, the present case from the
application of the pronouncement in the TUMALAD v. VICENCIO CASE (41 SCRA 143)
where a similar, if not identical issue was raised. If a house of strong materials, like what
was involved in the Tumalad case may be considered as personal property for purposes
of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as the parties to the contract so agree
and no innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why
a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such. This is really because one
who has so agreed is estopped from denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
In rejecting petitioner’s assertion on the applicability of the Tumalad doctrine, the Court
of Appeals lays stress on the fact that the house involved therein was built on a land
that did not belong to the owner of such house. But the law makes no distinction with
respect to the ownership of the land on which the house is built and we should not lay
down distinctions not contemplated by law.
Private respondent contends that estoppel cannot apply against it because it had never
represented nor agreed that the machinery in suit be considered as personal property
but was merely required and dictated on by herein petitioner to sign a printed form of
chattel mortgage which was in a blank form at the time of signing. This contention lacks
persuasiveness. As aptly pointed out by petitioner and not denied by the respondent,
the status of the subject machinery as movable or immovable was never placed in issue
before the lower court and the Court of Appeals except in a supplemental memorandum
in support of the petition filed in the appellate court.

SANTOS EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. ALTO SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC.,
respondent.
G.R. No. L-11139
April 23, 1958
FACTS:
Petitioner Santos Evangelista sued Rivera for collection of sum of money on June 4,
1949. On the same date, he obtained a writ of preliminary attachment, which was levied
upon a house built by Rivera, a lessee, on a land owned by respondent lessor Alto
Surety. The levy was made pursuant to the rules governing the levy of real properties.
In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who, on October 8, 1951,
bought the house at the public auction made to satisfy the judgment. The corresponding
deed of sale was issued to him on October 22, 1952. When Evangelista sought to take
possession of the house, he was told that Alto Surety was now the owner of the house
because the latter allegedly bought the house at an auction sale on September 29,
1950. It turned out that Alto Surety likewise filed an action against Rivera and likewise
obtained a favorable judgment. The corresponding deed was issued to Alto Surety on
May 10, 1952.
Subsequently, Evangelista instituted an action against Alto Surety and Rivera for the
purpose of establishing his title over said house. The trial court ruled in favor of
Evangelista. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court on the ground that Evangelista did not acquire a preferential lien through the
preliminary writ of attachment because the house was levied as if it were an immovable
property. The Court of Appeals was of the opinion that the house should have been
levied pursuant to the rules governing the levy of personal property (apparently for the
reason that the house was constructed on a land belonging to another).

ISSUE: Whether a house, constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built,
should be dealt with, for purpose, of attachment, as immovable property, or as personal
property.
HELD:
The house is an immovable property. As explicitly held, in Ladera v. Hodges, a true
building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it
is erected by the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee.
It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house
as personal property for purposes of said contract. However, this view is good only
insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is based, partly, upon the principle of
estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract.
Much less is it in point where there has been no contract whatsoever, with respect to
the status of the house involved, as in the case at bar.
As held in Manarang v Ofilada, “Sales on execution affect the public and third persons.
The regulation governing sales on execution are for public officials to follow. The form of
proceedings prescribed for each kind of property is suited to its character, not to the
character, which the parties have given to it or desire to give it. When the rules speak of
personal property, property which is ordinarily so considered is meant; and when real
property is spoken of, it means property which is generally known as real property. The
regulations were never intended to suit the consideration that parties may have privately
given to the property levied upon. Enforcement of regulations would be difficult were the
convenience or agreement of private parties to determine or govern the nature of the
proceedings. We therefore hold that the mere fact that a house was the subject of the
chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property by the parties does not
make said house personal property for purposes of the notice to be given for its sale of
public auction.”

Tsai v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 120098 October 2, 2001
A chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the property described therein and
not like or substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the
same depository as the property originally mortgaged,
Facts:
Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of
Communications (PBCom). As security for the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of
PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and
the chattels located therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the mortgage
contract. PBCom granted a second loan to EVERTEX. The loan was secured by a
Chattel Mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached thereto. The
listed properties were similar to those listed in the first mortgage deed. Due to business
reverses, EVERTEX filed insolvency proceedings docketed. The CFI issued an order
on declaring the corporation insolvent. All its assets were taken into the custody of the
Insolvency Court, including the collateral, real and personal, securing the two
mortgages as abovementioned.
Upon EVERTEX’s failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX. PBCom was the highest
bidder. Thus, PBCom consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it
and leased the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai. PBCom sold the
factory, lock, stock and barrel to Tsai, including the contested machineries. EVERTEX
filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages with the Regional
Trial Court against PBCom, alleging inter alia that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject
mortgage was in violation of the Insolvency Law. EVERTEX claimed that no rights
having been transmitted to PBCom over the assets of insolvent EVERTEX, therefore
Tsai acquired no rights over such assets sold to her, and should reconvey the assets.

EVERTEX averred that PBCom, without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the
contested properties, which were not included in the Real and Chattel Mortgages.
Issue: Whether or not the foreclosure on after acquired properties of EVERTEX is valid.
Held:
Inasmuch as the subject mortgages were intended by the parties to involve chattels,
insofar as equipment and machinery were concerned, the Chattel Mortgage Law
applies, which provides in Section 7 thereof that: “a chattel mortgage shall be deemed
to cover only the property described therein and not like or substituted property
thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the same depository as the property
originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding.” And,
since the disputed machineries were acquired in 1981 and could not have been
involved in the 1975 or 1979 chattel mortgages, it was consequently an error on the part
of the Sheriff to include subject machineries with the properties enumerated in said
chattel mortgages. As the auction sale of the subject properties to PBCom is void, no
valid title passed in its favor. Consequently, the sale thereof to Tsai is also a nullity
under the elementary principle of nemo dat quod non habet, one cannot give what one
does not have
Assuming arguendo that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing
detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the
principle of estoppel. An immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a
stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel
mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar.

Serg’s Products, Inc. Vs. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc.
GR No. 137705. August 22, 2000
Facts:
Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc, filed with the RTC-QC a complaint for a sum
of money with an application for a writ of replevin.
Respondent Judge issued a writ of replevin directing its sheriff to seize and deliver the
machineries and equipment to PCI after 5 days and upon the payment of the necessary
expenses.
In the implementation of the said writ, the sheriff proceeded to petitioner’s factory,
seized one machinery with word that he would return for the other.
Petitioners filed a motion for special protective order, invoking the power of the court to
control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a
directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin.
The motion was opposed by PCI Leasing, on the ground that the properties were still
personal and therefore still subject to seizure and a writ of replevin.
The sheriff again sought to enforce the writ of seizure and take possession of the
remaining properties. He was able to take two more, but was prevented by the workers
from taking the rest.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the machineries purchased and imported by Serg’s became real
property by virtue of immobilization.
2. Whether or not the contract between the parties is valid.
Ruling:
The petition is not meritorious.
1. No.
The machines that were subjects of the Writ of seizure were placed by petitioners in the
factory built on their own land. Indisputably, they were essential and principal elements
of their chocolate-making industry. Hence, although each of them was movable or

personal property on its own, all of them have become immobilized by destination
because they are essential and principal elements in the industry. In that sense
petitioners are correct in arguing that the said machines are real property pursuant to
Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code.
But the Court disagrees with the submission of the petitioners that the said machines
are not proper subject of the Writ of Seizure.
The Court has held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be
considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently
stopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppels, a party to a contract
is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein.
Clearly then, petitioners are stopped from denying the characterization of the subject
machines as personal property. Under circumstances, they are proper subjects of the
Writ of Seizure.
It should be stressed, however, that the Court’s holding-that the machines should be
deemed personal property pursuant to the Lease Agreement-is good only insofar as the
contracting parties are concerned. Hence, while the parties are bound by the
Agreement, third persons acting in good faith are not affected by its stipulation
characterizing the subject machinery as personal. In any event, there is no showing that
any specific third party would be adversely affected.
2. Yes.
It should be pointed out that the Court may rely on the Lease Agreement, for nothing on
the record shows that it has been nullified or annulled. In fact, petitioners assailed it first
only in the RTC proceedings, which had ironically been instituted by respondent.
Accordingly, it must be presumed valid and binding as the law between the parties.
Petition denied. Judgment affirmed.
Note:
Article 415. The following are immovable property: (5) Machinery, receptacles,
instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or
works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend
directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works.

BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
FACTS:
The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in
the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous
papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession
and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum"
newspaper, were seized based on the strength of the two [2] search warrants issued by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.
Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:
1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and his witnesses, as mandated by the above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as
Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed.
3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and
the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized although the warrants were directed
against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.
4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery,
receptacles, instruments, etc.
5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they
conducted surveillance of the premises could not have provided sufficient basis for the
finding of a probable cause.
Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only
impugned the search warrant six months later.
ISSUE: WON there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

HELD:
NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would
lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a
newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials,
as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a
specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published
or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
The broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that petitioner "is in possession or
has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia, news publications and
other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as a means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of
probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as the basis for the issuance of a search
warrant and it was a grave error for the respondent judge to have done so.

ENRIQUE LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. VICENTE OROSA, JR., and PLAZA THEATRE,
INC., respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958
Facts:
After agreeing to make an investment in Orosa’s theatre business and his assurance
that he would be personally liable for any account that the said construction might incur,
Lopez delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of the Plaza Theatre.
But of the total cost of the materials amounting to P62,255.85, Lopez was paid only
P20848.50.
Plaza Theatre was erected on a piece of land formerly owned by Orosa, and was
acquired by the corporation. As Lopez was pressing Orosa for payment of remaining
unpaid obligation, the latter promised to obtain a bank loan by mortgaging the properties
of Plaza Theatre. Unknown to Lopez, the corporation already got a loan from a bank
with Luzon Surety Company as surety, and the corporation in turn executed a mortgage
on the land and building in favor of said company as counter-security.
Persistent demand from Lopez caused Orosa to execute an alleged “deed of

assignment” of his 480 shares of stock of Plaza Theatre, at P100 per share; and as the
obligation still remain unsettled, Lopez filed a complaint against Orosa and Plaza
Theatre Inc, praying that xxx in case defendants fail to pay, the building and land owned
by corporation be sold at public auction, or the shares of the capital stock be sold, and
the proceeds thereof be applied to said indebtedness.
As a defense, Orosa contended that the shares of stocks were personal properties and
cannot be made to cover and satisfy the obligation. it was thus prayed that he be
declared exempted from payment of deficiency in case the proceeds from the sale of
properties are not enough.

The surety company, upon discovery that the land was already registered, file a petition
to annotate the rights and interests of the surety company over the said properties,
which was opposed by Lopez who asserted that he has preferred lien over the
properties.
The two cases were heard jointly, and lower court held that Orosa were liable for the
unpaid balance of the cost of lumber used in the construction, and Lopez thus acquired
materialman’s lien over it. In making the pronouncement that tyhe lien was merely
confined to the building and did not extend to the land where it was built, the trial jduge
took into consideration that xxx codal provisions specifying that refection credits are
preferred could refer to buildings which are also classified as real properties upon which
the refaction was made. Orosa were thus required to xxx with respect tohe building,
said mortgage was subject to materialmen’s lien in favor of Lopez.
Lopez tried to secure a modification of decision in so far as it declared that lien did not
extend to the land, but was denied by court. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether a materialmen’s lien for the value of materials used in the construction of
building attaches to said structure alone, and does not extend to the land on which
building is adhered to.
Held:
Yes. Such lien attaches to structure alone, and does not extend to the land where the
building is.
In view of employment of the phrase, “real estate or immovable property”, and in as

much as said provision does not contain any specification delimiting the lien to the
building, said article must be construed as to embrace both the land and building or the
structure adhering thereto. SC cannot subscribe to this view, for while it is true that real
estate connotes land and building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of

the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may
constitute real properties could mean only one thing – that the building is by itself an
immovable property. Moreover, in view of the absence of any specific provision of law
to the contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said
structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner.
A close examination of the provision of the Civil Code reveals that the law gives
preference to unregistered refectionary credits only with respect to the real estate upon
the refection or work was made. The conclusion is that it must be that the lien so
created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of
which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the
unpaid value of the lumber used in construction of the building attaches only to said
structure and to no other property of the obligors.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed
from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. It is so ordered.

Yap v. Tanada
G.R. No. L-32917
DOCTRINE: The Civil code considers as immovable property among others, anything
“attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated
therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object”
FACTS:
Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. (herein Goulds) filed a complaint against Yap and
his wife seeking to recover the balance of the price and installation of the water pump in
the latter’s residence. The city court declared Yap and his wife in default and rendered a
judgment in favor of Goulds. Yap appealed to the CFI wherein Judge Tanada was
residing. Yap was again declared in default and judgment was again rendered in favor of
Goulds. Later on, Judge Tanada granted Gould’s Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution. Subsequently, the water pump was sold in a public auction in favor of Goulds
being the highest bidder. Another writ of execution was issued as regards the removal of
the water pump and delivery of such to Goulds. Yap is questioning validity of the auction
sale and praying that it be annulled as well as the writ of execution. Yap is alleging that
the water pump is considered as an immovable property because it is installed in his
residence. He also argued that being an immovable property, a notice must be made
before the auction sale pursuant to the Rules of Court. It is noted that
Yap filed several motion of reconsideration to which all were denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the water pump is an immovable property -- NO
HELD:
The Civil code considers as immovable property among others, anything “attached to an
immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object”
The water pump involved in this case does not satisfy the above description. It is highly
possible to remove the water pump without it breaking or deteriorating by simply
loosening the bolts or dismantling the fasteners that were used to attach or install it in his
house.

Machinery & Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. CA
G.R. No. L-7057
DOCTRINE: When the machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached

to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner,
in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter "without breaking
the material or deterioration of the object or that in order to remove said outfit, it became
necessary, not only to unbolt the same, but , also, to cut some of its wooden supports
and when, said machinery and equipment were "intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry" carried on said immovable and tended, it becomes immovable property
pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of Civil Code of the Philippines.
FACTS:
▪ On 13 March 1953, Machinery & Engineering Supplies, Inc. (the “Petitioner”) filed
a complaint for replevin in the Court of First Instance (“CFI”) of Manila for the recovery
of the machinery and equipment sold and delivered to Ipo Limestone Co., Inc and Dr.
Antonio Villarama (the “Respondents”) at their factory in Barrio Bigti, Norzagaray,
Bulacan.
▪ Upon application ex-parte of the Petitioner and upon approval of its bond sum of
P15,769.00, herein Respondent Judge issued an order directing the Provincial Sheriff of
Bulacan to seize and take immediate possession of the properties specified in the said
order.
▪ On 19 March 1953, two deputy sheriffs of Bulacan, Ramon S. Roco and a crew
of technician and laborers proceeded to Bigti to carry out the CFI’s order.
▪ Leonardo Contreras, herein Respondent Company’s Manager met the sheriffs
and handed the latter a letter addressed to Atty. Leopoldo C. Paled, ex-officio Provincial
Sheriff of Bulacan, signed by the Respondent Company’s counsel, protesting against
the seizure of the properties on the ground that the same are not personal properties.
▪ Roco and the deputy sheriffs contended that their duty is ministerial and went
ahead to the factory. At the factory, Rocco’s attention was called to the fact that the
equipment could not possibly be dismantled without causing damages or injuries to the

wooden frames attached to them but Roco insisted in dismantling the same on his own
responsibility and alleged that the bond was posted for such eventuality. Thus, the
deputy sheriffs directed that some of the machine’s supports be cut.
▪ On 20 March 1953, the Respondent Company filed an urgent motion, with a
counter-bond in the amount of P15,769 for the return of the properties seized by the
sheriffs. On the same day, the trial court issued an order, directing the Provincial Sheriff
of Bulacan to return the machinery and equipment to the place where they were
installed at the time of seizure.
▪ On 2 March 1953, the deputy sheriffs returned the said properties by depositing
them along the road near the quarry of the Respondent Company, without inventory and
re-installation in its former position and replacing the destroyed posts, which rendered
its use impracticable.
▪ On 23 March 1953, Respondents’ counsel asked the provincial sheriff if the
machinery and equipment dumped on the road would be re-installed to their former
position and condition. The next day, the provincial sheriff filed an urgent motion in
court manifesting the Roco had been asked to furnish the sheriff’s office with the
expenses, laborers, technical men and equipment to carry into effect the courts order,
among other things but that Roco absolutely refused and asking the Court that
Respondent Company be ordered to provide the required aid or relieve the sheriff of the
duty of complying to the said order.
▪ On 30 March 1953, the trial court ordered the provincial sheriff and the Petitioner
Company to reinstate the machinery and equipment removed by them in their original
condition. An urgent motion of the provincial sheriff dated 15 April 1953 requesting for
an extension was denied and on 4 May 1953, the trial court ordered the Petitioner
Company to furnish the provincial sheriff with the necessary funds and technical crew
and laborers to reinstate the machinery and equipment.
▪ The case was appealed before the Court of Appeals but the latter dismissed the
same for lack of merit.
▪ Hence this petition filed before the Supreme Court (the “SC”). The Petitioner
argued that the respondent judge had completely disregarded his manifestation that the
machinery and equipment seized were and still are the Petitioner's property until fully

paid for and such never became immovable. The question of ownership and the
applicability of Art. 415 of the new Civil Code are immaterial in the determination of the
only issue involved in this case.
ISSUE:
Whether the machineries and equipments can be considered as personal properties
subject to replevin. -- NO
HELD:
The SC held that the special civil action known as replevin, governed by Rule 62 of
Court, is applicable only to "personal property". When the sheriff repaired to the
premises of respondent company, the machinery and equipment in question appeared
to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a
fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter
"without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." Hence, in order to remove
said outfit, it became necessary, not only to unbolt the same, but, also, to cut some of
its wooden supports. Moreover, said machinery and equipment were "intended by the
owner of the tenement for an industry" carried on said immovable and tended." For
these reasons, they were already immovable property pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5
of Article 415 of Civil Code of the Philippines, which are substantially identical to
paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 334 of the Civil Code of Spain. As such immovable
property, they were not subject to replevin.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS
114 SCRA 273
FACTS:
Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel plates wielded and assembled on
the spot. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisted of compacted earth, sand pad
as immediate layer, and asphalt stratum as top layer. The tanks are within the Caltex
refinery compound. They are used for storing fuel oil for Meralco's power plants.
The municipal treasurer of Batangas made an assessment for realty tax on the two
tanks, based on the report of the Board of Assessors. Meralco contends that the said oil
storage tanks do not fall within any of the kinds of real property enumerated in article
415 of the Civil Code the tanks are not attached to the land and that they were placed
on leased land, not on the land owned by Meralco.
ISSUE : Whether or not the oil storage tanks constitute real property for the purposes of
real property tax
HELD:
YES. While the two storage tanks are not embodied in the land, they may
nevertheless be considered as improvements in the land, enhancing its utility and
rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been
installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable
quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations.
For purposes of taxation, the term real property may include things, which should
generally be considered as personal property. It is a familiar phenomenon to see
things classified as real property for purposes of taxation which on general
principle may be considered as personal
property.

CAPITOL WIRELESS, INC., Petitioner, v. THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF
BATANGAS, THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF BATANGAS, THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER AND ASSESSOR OF NASUGBU, BATANGAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 180110, May 30, 2016
J. PERALTA
QUESTION OF FACT V. QUESTION OF LAW (REMEDIAL LAW)
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application
of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue docs not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of
facts being admitted. In contrast, a question of fact exists when the doubt or difference
arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and
relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
RELEVANT FACTS:
Petitioner Capitol Wireless Inc. (Capwire) is a Philippine corporation in the business of
providing international telecommunications services. As such provider, Capwire has
signed agreements with other local and foreign telecommunications companies
covering an international network of submarine cable systems such as the Asia Pacific
Cable Network System (APCN) (which connects Australia, Thailand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines); the
Brunei-Malaysia-Philippines Cable Network System (BMP-CNS), the Philippines-Italy
(SEA-ME-WE-3 CNS), and the Guam Philippines (GP-CNS) systems.The agreements
provide for co-ownership and other rights among the parties over the network. Petitioner
Capwire claims that it is co-owner only of the so-called “Wet Segment” of the APCN,
while the landing stations or terminals and Segment E of APCN located in Nasugbu,
Batangas are allegedly owned by the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Corporation

(PLDT). Moreover, it alleges that the Wet Segment is laid in international, and not
Philippine, waters. Capwire claims that it also reported that the system “interconnects at
the PLDT Landing Station in Nasugbu, Batangas. As part of a loan restructuring
Capwire a Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties (Sworn Statement) at the
Provincial Treasurer’s Office, Batangas City, Batangas Province for the West Segment.
The SWORN STATEMENT was then by the Provincial Assessor of Batangas
(Provincial Assessor) that assessed Capwire for Real Property Tax. Capwire received
received a Warrant of Levy and a Notice of Auction Sale, respectively, from the
respondent Provincial Treasurer of Batangas. Capwire contends that such submarine
cables cannot be assessed with RPT as it lies in the international waters. It went to the
Regional Trial Court with Petition for Prohibition and Declaration of Nullity of Warrant of
Levy, Notice of Auction Sale and/or Auction Sale with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batangas City.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Capwire’s contention is a question of fact or question of law? –
Remedial/ Taxation
2. Whether or not Capwire’s submarine cables can be assessed Real Property Tax? -
Taxation/Political Law HELD: 1. Whether or not Capwire’s contention is a question of
fact or question of law? – Remedial/ Taxation? In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the
Court ruled: “A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue
docs not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the
truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. In contrast, a question of fact exists when the
doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites
calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation
to each other and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.” Verily, what is
alleged by Capwire in its petition as “the crux of the controversy,” that is, “whether or not
an indefeasible right over a submarine cable system that lies in international waters can
be subject to real property tax in the Philippines,”35 is not the genuine issue that the

case presents – as it is already obvious and fundamental that real property that lies
outside of Philippine territorial jurisdiction cannot be subjected to its domestic and
sovereign power of real property taxation – but, rather, such factual issues as the extent
and status of Capwire’s ownership of the system, the actual length of the cable/s that lie
in Philippine territory, and the corresponding assessment and taxes due on the same,
because the public respondents imposed and collected the assailed real property tax on
the finding that at least a portion or some portions of the submarine cable system that
Capwire owns or co-owns lies inside Philippine territory. Capwire’s disagreement with
such findings of the administrative bodies presents little to no legal question that only
the courts may directly resolve. In disputes involving real property taxation, the general
rule is to require the taxpayer to first avail of administrative remedies and pay the tax
under protest before allowing any resort to a judicial action, except when the
assessment itself is alleged to be illegal or is made without legal authority. For example,
prior resort to administrative action is required when among the issues raised is an
allegedly erroneous assessment, like when the reasonableness of the amount is
challenged, while direct court action is permitted when only the legality, power, validity
or authority of the assessment itself is in question. Stated differently, the general rule of
a prerequisite recourse to administrative remedies applies when questions of fact are
raised, but the exception of direct court action is allowed when purely questions of law
are involved.
2. Whether or not Capwire’s submarine cables can be assessed Real Property Tax? -
Taxation/Political Law Nasugbu is a coastal town and the surrounding sea falls within
what the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would define as
the country’s territorial sea (to the extent of 12 nautical miles outward from the nearest
baseline, under Part II, Sections 1 and 2) over which the country has sovereignty,
including the seabed and subsoil, it follows that indeed a portion of the submarine cable
system lies within Philippine territory and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the said local
taxing authorities. It easily belies Capwire’s contention that the cable system is entirely
in international waters. And even if such portion does not lie in the 12-nautical-mile
vicinity of the territorial sea but further inward, in Prof. Magallona v. Hon. Ermita, et al.
this Court held that “whether referred to as Philippine ‘internal waters’ under Article I of

the Constitution or as ‘archipelagic waters’ under UNCLOS Part III, Article 49(1, 2, 4),
the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of (its)
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.” Further,
under Part VI, Article 79 of the UNCLOS, the Philippines clearly has jurisdiction with
respect to cables laid in its territory that are utilized in support of other installations and
structures under its jurisdiction. And as far as local government units are concerned, the
areas described above are to be considered subsumed under the term “municipal
waters” which, under the Local Government Code, includes “not only streams, lakes,
and tidal waters within the municipality, not being the subject of private ownership and
not comprised within the national parks, public forest, timber lands, forest reserves or
fishery reserves, but also marine waters included between two lines drawn
perpendicularly to the general coastline from points where the boundary lines of the
municipality or city touch the sea at low tide and a third line parallel with the general
coastline and fifteen (15) kilometers from it.” Although the term “municipal waters”
appears in the Code in the context of the grant of quarrying and fisheries privileges for a
fee by local governments, its inclusion in the Code’s Book II which covers local taxation
means that it may also apply as guide in determining the territorial extent of the local
authorities’ power to levy real property taxation. Thus, the jurisdiction or authority over
such part of the subject submarine cable system lying within Philippine jurisdiction
includes the authority to tax the same, for taxation is one of the three basic and
necessary attributes of sovereignty, and such authority has been delegated by the
national legislature to the local governments with respect to real property taxation. As
earlier stated, a way for Capwire to claim that its cable system is not covered by such
authority is by showing a domestic enactment or even contract, or an international
agreement or treaty exempting the same from real property taxation. It failed to do so,
however, despite the fact that the burden of proving exemption from local taxation is
upon whom the subject real property is declared.

Fels Energy, Inc. v. Province of Batangas, et al.
G.R. No. 168557
DOCTRINE: Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that “docks and structures
which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place
on a river, lake, or coast” are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are
categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and
other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried
on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said
industry or work.
FACTS:
On January 18, 1993, National Power Corporation (NPC) entered into a lease contract
with Polar Energy, Inc. over 3×30 MW diesel engine power barges moored at Balayan
Bay in Calaca, Batangas. The contract, denominated as an Energy Conversion
Agreement, was for a period of five years. Article 10 states that NPC shall be
responsible for the payment of taxes. (other than (i) taxes imposed or calculated on the
basis of the net income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of its employees and (ii)
construction permit fees, environmental permit fees and other similar fees and charges.
Polar Energy then assigned its rights under the Agreement to Fels despite NPC’s initial
opposition.
FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the power barges from
Provincial Assessor Lauro C. Andaya of Batangas City. FELS referred the matter to
NPC, reminding it of its obligation under the Agreement to pay all real estate taxes. It
then gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in any conference regarding
the real property assessment of the Provincial Assessor. NPC filed a petition with the
Local Board Assessment Appeals (LBAA). The LBAA ordered Fels to pay the real
estate taxes. The LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities, while they may be classified
as movable or personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for taxation
purposes because they are installed at a specific location with a character of
permanency. The LBAA also pointed out that the owner of the barges–FELS, a private

corporation–is the one being taxed, not NPC. A mere agreement making NPC
responsible for the payment of all real estate taxes and assessments will not justify the
exemption of FELS; such a privilege can only be granted to NPC and cannot be
extended to FELS. Finally, the LBAA also ruled that the petition was filed out of time.
Fels appealed to the Central Board Assessment Appeals (CBAA). The CBAA reversed
and ruled that the power barges belong to NPC; since they are actually, directly and
exclusively used by it, the power barges are covered by the exemptions under Section
234(c) of R.A. No. 7160. As to the other jurisdictional issue, the CBAA ruled that
prescription did not preclude the NPC from pursuing its claim for tax exemption in
accordance with Section 206 of R.A. No. 7160. Upon MR, the CBAA reversed itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not barges are considered as real property, thus can be subject to
real property tax -- YES
HELD:
The CBAA and LBAA power barges are real property and are thus subject to real
property tax.
In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., et al. v. The City of New York, et
al., a power company brought an action to review property tax assessment. On the
city’s motion to dismiss, the Supreme Court of New York held that the barges on which
were mounted gas turbine power plants designated to generate electrical power, the
fuel oil barges which supplied fuel oil to the power plant barges, and the accessory
equipment mounted on the barges were subject to real property taxation.
Moreover, Article 415 (9) of the New Civil Code provides that “docks and structures
which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place
on a river, lake, or coast” are considered immovable property. Thus, power barges are
categorized as immovable property by destination, being in the nature of machinery and
other implements intended by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried
on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of said
industry or work.

Laurel v. Garcia
G.R. Nos. 92013, 92047, 187 SCRA 797, July 25, 1990
DOCTRINE: An abandonment of the intention to use the property for public service and
to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite
Abandonment and it cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use
was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack
of financial support to repair and improve the property Abandonment must be a certain
and positive act based on correct legal premises.
FACTS:
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their
representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179
square meters of land at Tokyo, Japan scheduled on February 21, 1990.
The subject property in this case is 1 of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on
May 9, 1956. The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the
Japanese government for national development projects are part of the indemnification
to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World
War II.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine
Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease
agreement with a Japanese firm. No change of ownership or title shall occur. The
Philippine government retains the title all throughout the lease period and thereafter.
However, the government has not acted favorably.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the event of
sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were
specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been
pushing its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the Roppongi lot. The
property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price of $225 million.
ISSUE:
W/N the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government. -- NO
HELD:
NO, the subject property cannot be alienated by the government, even if the property
has not been in use for a long time.
Vice President Laurel asserts that the lands were acquired as part of the reparations for
diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine government. Laurel states that the
Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership
under Article 420 of the Civil Code.
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for
public service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that being one of public
dominion, no ownership by anyone can attach to it, not even by the State. The
Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and
consular quarters, buildings and other improvements. The petitioner states that they
continue to be intended for a necessary service. They are held by the State in
anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be
appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it
cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite
v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at the
moment, the petitioner avers that the same remains property of public dominion so long
as the government has not used it for other purposes nor adopted any measure
constituting a removal of its original purpose or use.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the

social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the
citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of
appropration
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar
character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated
in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the
Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there
is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.
An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to
make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was
attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of
financial support to repair and improve the property Abandonment must be a certain
and positive act based on correct legal premises.

A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of
the Roppongi property's original purpose.
Moreover, President Aquino’s approval of the recommendation by the investigating

committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very least,
conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property. It does
not have the force and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative
powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a year. Assuming that the
Roppongi property is no longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale
by the respondents. There is no law authorizing its conveyance, and thus, the Court
sees no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised by petitioner Ojeda.

Rabuco v. Villegas
G.R. No. L-24661
DOCTRINES:
1. RA 3120 converting communal lands into alienable lands is constitutional.
2. Legislative body has wide discretion to reclassify State property.
FACTS:
The legislatures enacted RA3120 converting certain parcels of land in the City of Manila
which are reserved as communal property into disposable or alienable lands of the state
and providing for their subdivision and sale. It includes a lot located in San Andres,
Malate, which was occupied by petitioners (illegal settlers). The City Mayor of Manila
wanted to demolish and eject said occupants. Subsequently, a large fire gutted the
Malate area, which includes said property. City officials then took over the lot and kept
petitioners reconstructing or repairing their burned dwellings. The petitioners insisted
that RA 3120 should be implemented to them as the tenants and bona fide occupants
thereof.
ISSUE:
Can a communal property be converted into disposable or alienable land through
legislation? -- YES
HELD:
The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength of
the established doctrine that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although
titled in the name of the municipal corporation) and conveyance of the resulting
subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional
authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the due process
clause or the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a
manifestation of the legislature's right of control and power to deal with State property.

Respondents city officials' contention that the Act must be stricken down as
unconstitutional for depriving the city of Manila of the lots in question and providing for
their sale in subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of
just compensation is untenable and without basis, since the lots in question are
manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore
public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from
patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could
not be deprived without due process and without just compensation.
Here, Republic Act 3120 expressly declared that the properties were "reserved as
communal property" and ordered their conversion into "disposable and alienable lands
of the State" for sale in small lots to the bona fide occupants thereof. It is established
doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide
discretionary legislative power which will not be interfered with by the courts.
The case of Salas vs. Jarencio wherein the Court upheld the constitutionality of
Republic Act 4118 whereby Congress in identical terms as in Republic Act 3120
likewise converted another city lot (Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral survey of
Manila also in Malate) which was reserved as communal property into disposable land
of the State for resale in small lots by the Land Tenure, Administration to the bona fide
occupants is controlling in the case at bar.
The Court therein reaffirmed the established general rule that "regardless of the source
or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired
with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held in trust for
the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary
purposes. It holds such lands subject to the paramount power of the legislature to
dispose of the same, for after all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the
performance of a part of its public work, the municipality being but a subdivision or
instrumentality thereof for purposes of local administration. Accordingly, the legal
situation is the same as if the State itself holds the property and puts it to a different

use" 9 and stressed that "the property, as has been previously shown, was not acquired
by the City of Manila with its own funds in its private or proprietary capacity. That it has
in its name a registered title is not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held
in trust for the State as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of
Manila granted by the sovereign upon its creation."
There as here, the Court holds that the Acts in question (Republic Acts 4118 in Salas
and Republic Act 3120 in the case at bar) were intended to implement the social justice
policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that
they were not "intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its
character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the
National Government: ... The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting
subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an
exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of
Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of
its right and power to deal with state property."

Macasiano v. Diokno
G.R. No. 97764
DOCTRINE: "Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are
subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code.
Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount
considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community."
FACTS:
On June 13, 1990, the respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of
1990 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia
Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority
approved Ordinance No. 86, s. 1990 of the municipal council of respondent municipality
subject to the following conditions:
1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and that the
majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea market/vending
areas thereon;
2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea market/vending area shall be
marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides of the road shall be used by
pedestrians;
3. That the time during which the vending area is to be used shall be clearly
designated;
4. That the use of the vending areas shall be temporary and shall be closed once
the reclaimed areas are developed and donated by the Public Estate Authority.
June 20, 1990, Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any service
cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea
markets and/or vending areas. On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and
respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the
latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets

with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of
Paranaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the
said streets. On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP
Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were
later returned to respondent Palanyag. October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General
Macasiano wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days to
discontinue the flea market; otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled. Hence, on
October 23, 1990, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the trial court a joint
petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary
injunction, to which the petitioner filed his memorandum/opposition to the issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction. October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary
restraining order to enjoin petitioner from enforcing his letter-order of October 16, 1990
pending the hearing on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction. On December 17,
1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990
of the Municipality of Paranaque and enjoining petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano from
enforcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag.
ISSUE:
W/N an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of Paranaque
authorizing the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets
is valid. -- NO
HELD:
The Executive Order issued by acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del
'96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city
government contravenes the general law that reserves city streets and roads for public
use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public
to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel
for vehicles and pedestrians. The Solicitor General furthers the matter with his
observation, "Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are

subject to limitations laid down by the Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code.
Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount
considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. Every local
government unit has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the
public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and promote the
general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective, the local
government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely
affect the general welfare." Moreover, the municipality did not even comply with the
guidelines set forth by the Metropolitan Manila Authority. Even if we were to argue for
purposes of debate, the city of Paranaque's claim would still be bereft and lacking in
reason.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Regional
Trial Court dated December 17, 1990 which granted the writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining petitioner as PNP Superintendent, Metropolitan Traffic Command from
enforcing the demolition of market stalls along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt.
Garcia Extension and Opena streets is hereby RESERVED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

Republic v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 100709, 281 SCRA 639, November 14, 1997
DOCTRINE: When the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the
invaded property became foreshore land and passed the realm of the public domain
and accordingly cannot be a subject of a free patent.
FACTS:
Respondent Josefina Morato filed a Free Patent Application on a parcel of land. The
patent was approved at the Register of Deeds of Quezon. Both the free patent and the
title specifically mandate that the land shall not be alienated nor encumbered within five
years from the date of the issuance of the patent (Sections 118 and 124 of CA No. 141,
as amended).
Subsequently, the District Land Officer in Lucena City, acting upon reports that
respondent Morato had encumbered the land in violation of the condition of the patent,
conducted an investigation. Thereafter, it was established that the subject land is a
portion of the Calauag Bay, five (5) to six (6) feet deep under water during high tide and
two (2) feet deep at low tide, and not suitable to vegetation. Moreover, a portion of the
land was mortgaged by respondent Morato to respondents Nenita Co and Antonio
Quilatan. The spouses Quilatan constructed a house on the land. Another portion of the
land was leased to Perfecto Advincula, where a warehouse was constructed.
Petitioner filed an amended complaint against respondents Morato, spouses Nenita Co
and Antonio Quilatan, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon for the cancellation of title
and reversion of a parcel of land to the public domain, subject of a free patent in favor of
respondent Morato, on the grounds that the land is a foreshore land and was mortgaged
and leased within the five-year prohibitory period.
The lower court ruled that there was no violation of the 5-year period ban against
alienating or encumbering the land, because the land was merely leased and not

alienated. It also found that the mortgage to Nenita Co and Antonio Quilatan covered
only the improvement and not the land itself.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Thereafter, the
Republic of the Philippines filed the present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the questioned land is a foreshore land and thus must be reverted to the public
domain. -- YES
HELD:
The Supreme Court found that the subject land was foreshore land, it nevertheless
sustained the award thereof to Respondent Morato. It defined a foreshore land as “that
parcel of land which is between high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of
the tides”; it is that “strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that
is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide”.
From the actual findings of the lower court, it was found out that years before the
issuance of the free patent to private respondent, the questioned land was subjected to
several natural calamities like earthquakes and typhoons that caused severe erosion of
the land. Then private respondent introduced improvements and developments to the
land. At the time then of the issuance of free patent of land to Morato, it was not
covered by water but due to the gradual sinking of the land caused by natural
calamities, the sea advances had permanently invaded a portion of subject land. During
high tide, at least half of the land is 6 feet deep under water and three feet deep during
low tide. The Calauag Bay has extended up to a portion of the land.
Thus, uncontestedly, the land has become a foreshore land and is now a part of the
public domain pursuant to Article 420 of the New Civil Code – being part of the “shores”
defined therein. Accordingly, it cannot be disposed of by the government and
appropriated by a private individual, i.e. be a subject of a free patent.

Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga
G.R. No. L-24440
DOCTRINE: Under the law of Municipal Corporations, properties which are devoted to
public service are deemed public and the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to
be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for
governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.
FACTS:
On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality
of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. It further provided that buildings and properties
which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place will
be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to be fixed by the Auditor
General.
The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and some buildings
constructed thereon, located in the City of Zamboanga and covered individually by
Torrens certificates of title in the name of Zamboanga Province. Pursuant to CA 39, the
Auditor General fixed the value of the properties and buildings in question left by
Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at P1,294,244.00.
When RA 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into Zamboanga del
Norte and Zamboanga del Sur, assets and obligations of the previous Zamboanga
province were divided as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for
Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of
P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and buildings in question, or P704,220.05
payable by Zamboanga City.
The Executive Secretary issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a
vested right as owner of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of CA 39, and is entitled to
the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet
Resolution conveying all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City
when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to Dipolog.

The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal revenue allotment for the City of
Zamboanga. The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited to the province
of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P704,220.05 due it.
On June 17, 1961, RA 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50 of CA 39 by providing
that buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga
and located within the City of Zamboanga are transferred, free of charge, in favor of the
said City of Zamboanga.
Consequently, the Secretary of Finance ordered the CIR to stop from effecting further
payments to Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum taken from
it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte.
Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint for relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. They prayed that 1) RA 3039 be declared unconstitutional, 2) plaintiff's rights
and obligations under said law be declared, 3) they be reimbursed the sum paid to
defendant City, and 4) the latter be ordered to continue paying the balance of its internal
revenue allotments.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff.
ISSUE: WON RA 3039 is valid – PARTLY VALID
HELD:
Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public
service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be
considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental
purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.
Following this classification, RA 3039 is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol
site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the high school
playground sites — a total of 24 lots — since these were held by the former Zamboanga

province in its governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control
of Congress.
Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the records do
not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of
Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected
even before 1936 when CA 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had
no power to authorize construction of buildings at their own expense, it can be assumed
that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds.
Even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere
accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they follow the nature of
said lands, i.e., public.
But RA 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte of its share in the
value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are patrimonial properties since they are
not being utilized for distinctly, governmental purposes. Moreover, the fact that these 26
lots are registered strengthens the proposition that they are truly private in nature.
However, the fact that the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is
of no significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.
It results then that Zamboanga del Norte is still entitled to collect from the City of
Zamboanga the former's 54.39% share in the 26 properties which are patrimonial in
nature.

Chavez v. Pea and Amari
G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of
Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines
(CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,
tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to
the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation
Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects
under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It
was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of
Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the
FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-
Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to
AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement,
claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the “mother of
all scams”).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI
and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s
admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations
in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution

w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer
ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and
existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to
disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can
make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership
of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation
of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed
for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public
domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution

which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.

TEOFILO C. VILLARICO, petitioner, vs. VIVENCIO SARMIENTO, SPOUSES
BESSIE SARMIENTO-DEL MUNDO & BETH DEL MUNDO, ANDOK'S LITSON
CORPORATION and MARITES' CARINDERIA, respondents.
G.R. No. 136438. November 11, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner's lot is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue (highway) by a strip of land
belonging to the government. As this highway was elevated by four (4) meters and
therefore higher than the adjoining areas, the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) constructed stairways at several portions of this strip of public land
to enable the people to have access to the highway.
Sometime in 1991, Vivencio Sarmiento, his daughter Bessie Sarmiento and her
husband Beth Del Mundo, respondents herein, had a building constructed on a portion
of said government land. In November that same year, a part thereof was occupied by
Andok'sLitson Corporation and Marites' Carinderia, also impleaded as respondents.
In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, petitioner acquired a 74.30
square meter portion of the same area owned by the government. The property was
registered in his name as T.C.T. No. 74430 in the Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City.
In 1995, petitioner filed with the RTC, Branch 259, Parañaque City, a complaint for
accion publiciana against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-044. He alleged
inter alia that respondents' structures on the government land closed his "right of way"
to the Ninoy Aquino Avenue; and encroached on a portion of his lot covered by T.C.T.
No. 74430.
Respondents, in their answer, specifically denied petitioner's allegations, claiming that
they have been issued licenses and permits by Parañaque City to construct their
buildings on the area; and that petitioner has no right over the subject property as it
belongs to the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant has acquired a right of way.

HELD:
Considering that the lot on which the stairways were constructed is a property of public
dominion, it cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favor of
herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is by mere tolerance of the government
through the DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself. Verily, he cannot claim
any right of possession over it. This is clear from Article 530 of the Civil Code which
provides:
"ART. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be
the object of possession."
However, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that defendants' buildings were
constructed on the portion of the same lot now covered by T.C.T. No. 74430 in
petitioner's name. Being its owner, he is entitled to its possession. Neither petitioner nor
respondents have a right of possession over the disputed lot where the stairways were
built as it is a property of public dominion.

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987
FACTS:
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before
the RTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting
of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than
thirty (30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-
two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons–
Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth being Aristedes’s grandfather.
Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves.
But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban
and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties,
including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this
property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the
application for registration.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of

the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and
dismissed the appliocation of Malabanan.
ISSUES:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property
Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June
12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land
classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible
to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use
or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive
prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under
Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?
HELD: The Pertition is denied.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious

possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period
of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto
as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a

person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
own evidence—the Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change
its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus,
it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

Republic of the Philippines vs Santos
G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012
Facts:
Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent
Arcadio Ivan A. Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of
Lot 4998-B (the property) in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The
property, which had an area of 1,045 square meters, more or less, was located in
Barangay San Dionisio, Paraque City, and was bounded in the Northeast by Lot 4079
belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the Southeast by the
Paraque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by Lot
4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan. On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his
application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr. as his co-applicant because of the
latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed
through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous and
adverse possession for more than 30 years.
Issue: Whether or not the subject parcel land maybe acquired through the process of
accretion.
Held: No. Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of
rivers. The deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and
imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking
place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers.
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that
became respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was
definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved
the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not
equate to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the
river banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede

and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no
legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear and categorical
language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to accretion,
we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to.
Axiomatic it is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there
is no room for interpretation; there is only room for application. The first and
fundamental duty of courts is then to apply the law.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of
ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural
beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot
4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there
is an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other
person.
The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil
does not need to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession
are necessary in that instance because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium
to belong to the riparian owner from the time that the deposit created by the current of
the water becomes manifest has no applicability herein. This is simply because Lot
4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the land adjacent to
the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to possession of
Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.
Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B
for more than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the
land by prescription or by other means without any competent proof that the land was
already declared as alienable and disposable by the Government. Absent that
declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of its public dominion.

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. No public land can be
acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there is a showing of a title from the
State. Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot
ripen into ownership and be registered as a title.
Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river
beds that are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso
facto belonging to the owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives
to the owners of the adjoining lots the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not
ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land affected by the natural change of course
of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds remain property of public
dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless previously declared
by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B was
not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not
be deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.

Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc. v. Republic of the Philippines
G.R. No. 177168, August 3, 2015
Facts:
A Transfer Certificate Title (TCT)issued in Navy Officers’ Village Association, Inc.
(NOVAI)’s name covers a land situated inside the former Fort Andres Bonifacio Military
Reservation in Taguig. This property was previously a part of a larger parcel of land which
TCT’s under the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The then President Garcia
issued a Proclamation No. 423 which reserves for military purposes certain parcels
of the public domain situated in Pasig, Taguig, Paranaque, Rizal and Pasay City.
Thereafter, then President Macapagal issued Proclamation No. 461 which excluded
Fort McKinley a certain portion of land situated in the provinces abovementioned and
declared them as AFP Officers’ Village to be disposed of under the provisions of certain
laws. However, this area was subsequently reserved for veterans’ rehabilitation, medicare
and training center sites. The property was the subject of deed of sale between the
Republic and NOVAI to which the TCT was registered in favour of the latter. The Republic
then sought to cancel NOVAI’s title on the ground that the property was still part of the
military reservation thus inalienable land of the public domain and cannot be the subject
of sale. The RTC ruled that the property was alienable and disposable in character.
The Court of Appeals reversed RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether or not the property covered by TCT issued under the name of NOVAI is
inalienable land of public domain and cannot be the subject of sale.
Held:
Yes, the property remains a part of the public domain that could not have been
validly disposed of in NOVAI’s favor. NOVAI failed to discharge its burden of proving that
the property was not intended for public or quasi-public use or purpose. As provided in
Article 420 of Civil Code, “property of the public dominion as those which are intended for
public use or, while not intended for public use, belong to the State and are intended for
some public service”. In this case, the property was classified as military reservation thus,

remained to be property of the public dominion until withdrawn from the public use for
which they have been reserved, by act of Congress or by proclamation of the
President. Since there was no positive act from the government, the property had to retain
its inalienable and non-disposable character. It cannot therefore, be subject of sale
otherwise, the sale is void for being contrary to law.

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LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

NO. The search warrant is in the nature of general warrants.

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

Persistent demand from Lopez caused Orosa to execute an alleged “deed of

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

In view of employment of the phrase, “real estate or immovable property”, and in as

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

Yap filed several motion of reconsideration to which all were denied.

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

DOCTRINE: When the machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

QUESTION OF FACT V. QUESTION OF LAW (REMEDIAL LAW)

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

Moreover, President Aquino’s approval of the recommendation by the investigating

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

ISSUE: WON RA 3039 is valid – PARTLY VALID

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiff-appellant has acquired a right of way.

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA

LINGATONG | 2A | ATTY. SENGA